triangulating debates within the field: teaching international relations research methodology

Triangulating Debates Within the Field:Teaching International Relations Research

Methodology

Peter Howard1

American University

Undergraduate introductory methods courses offer a unique opportu-nity to bring methodological pluralism to the field by teaching studentsmultiple approaches to research. This article presents one way to orga-nize an introductory undergraduate research methods course. By focus-ing on central debates between methodological approaches on issues ofcausality, context, and essentialism, an instructor can introduce positiv-ism, interpretivism, and relationalism as distinct, coherent methodologi-cal approaches to research. Depicting these three debates and threeapproaches graphically on a triangle can illuminate some core method-ological debates within the field today. It also illuminates the methodo-logical underpinnings of many of the discipline’s theoretical debates.

Keywords: teaching, methodology, relationalism, interpretiv-ism, positivism

While the ‘‘high politics’’ of methodological debates within the field play out inthe pages of top journals, the ‘‘low politics’’ of methodological debates reside inthe curriculum design of introductory undergraduate methods courses. Thesecourses serve as critical junctures in the education of both future scholars andthe much wider group of future readers of scholarship, where students learnhow to discern, evaluate, and construct knowledge claims, evidence-based argu-ments, and methodologically sound work. However, a generic version of thiscourse, using a generic textbook as its guide, typically presents a very narrow pic-ture of both the discipline of international relations and contemporary social sci-ence methodology. Given calls for expanding methodological pluralism withinthe discipline (Monroe 2005), it is important to introduce students to differentways scholars are presently doing research without a priori privileging one overthe other. Such an approach accomplishes two important pedagogical goals:equipping students to critically read, evaluate, and appreciate scholarship from arange of methodological approaches, and empowering students to locate them-selves in a particular methodological camp so that they may then learn to

Author’s note : Special thanks are due to all of the students in my Introduction to International RelationsResearch classes at American University’s School of International Service for whom this triangle was developed. Anearlier version of this paper was presented at the 2007 annual meeting of the International Studies AssociationNortheast. The views expressed in this article are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the US govern-ment.

1Peter Howard is currently an AAAS Science and Technology Policy Fellow at the US Department of State. Heis also an adjunct assistant professor in the School of International Service at American University.

doi: 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2010.00413.x� 2010 International Studies Association

International Studies Perspectives (2010) 11, 393–408.

produce coherent scholarship. Students are empowered by learning the tools,language, and skills to ask questions and design research projects consistent withtheir philosophical approach to knowledge. Making these implicit commitmentsto knowledge explicit allows students to develop an understanding of thepossibilities as well as limits of their chosen approach to research.

As Schwartz-Shae and Yanow (2002) observe, ‘‘an exclusive emphasis on posi-tivist epistemology limits students’ capacity for questioning what is worthwhile toknow—with a consequent skewing (or even stultifying) effect on the kinds ofresearch questions students learn to pose. Or, it leaves those asking such ques-tions in a weak position absent philosophical and methodological arguments tosupport their case.’’ This is the story of one attempt to enact these goals in theclassroom—the syllabus of my undergraduate Introduction to International Rela-tions Research course. In that course, I teach three major approaches toresearch methodology within contemporary international relations in relation toone another, as if in a sustained scholarly conversation that illuminates impor-tant debates within the field. This approach offers a different way to introducestudents to methodology in a way that is intended to both better serve studentsand better serve the long-term health of the field that some of these studentsmay eventually join.

In introducing approaches to research methodology, it is important to recallthat we as scholars typically define ‘‘research’’ as the production of ‘‘knowledge.’’Any discussion of different approaches to research draws on longstanding debatesin ontology and epistemology—what we can know about the world and how wecan know it. The goal of methodology is not to resolve these intellectually priordebates, but rather to start from a particular position and articulate what exactly‘‘counts’’ as knowledge, how claims about that knowledge are arbitrated, and whatone must demonstrate with evidence to produce knowledge.

Within a given methodological framework, then, various methods can be dis-cussed and those techniques of gathering information about the world can beput into context of the methodologies they serve. Some methods can be used indifferent ways to make different points, depending on the methodologyemployed. For example, archival research is a well-established method in inter-national relations research. However, archival documents can be used by anynumber of scholars in a number of ways in service of a number of differentmethodologies. An archival record could be part of a process-tracing of a keyforeign policy decision, it could be part of a case study that tests a hypothesis, orit could be an example of a discourse to analyze (George and McKeown 1985;Van Evera 1997; Hansen 2006). It does not mean that archival work must serveone or the other; rather, going to the archives is a method of research thatrequires a methodology to tell the researcher how to make sense of the informa-tion—in this case the documents—found in the archives.

My approach is premised on the notion that in contemporary internationalrelations research there are three dominant methodological approaches to schol-arship in the discipline. The ideal-type version of each methodology can be iden-tified by its position on three debates. The debates allow us to ‘‘triangulate’’these three positions. Recall the way an ideal type works—no one researcheractually takes these positions in a pure form, rather they approach them as afunction approaches a limit. We evaluate scholarship by holding it up to theideal, assessing its convergences and divergences, and understanding its relation-ship to the ideal type (Weber 1968). To triangulate the position of each typewithin the field, I will outline three debates. Each debate involves a two-stepdiscussion. First is a yes ⁄ no distinction between those willing to commit to theposition and those who are not. Second is a debate among members onthe ‘‘yes’’ side on how that position is defined. Three positions on each issueare presented and illustrated graphically. When combined, they form a

394 Triangulating Debates Within the Field

methodological triangle for international relations that I have found particularlyuseful as a pedagogical tool. Like Skocpol’s triangle of comparative history, itilluminates ‘‘research designs and the presentation of arguments in scholarlypublications’’ (Skocpol 1994).

The focus on research design is a key pedagogical feature of the class—research starts with posing questions, yet each methodology articulates a differ-ent design for answering questions. Pedagogically, it has been easier to teach thetriangle when it is connected to a practical research experience. As the mainassignment for the class, students are asked to pick a topic on which they willproduce three short research designs. Students write one design for each meth-odological camp identified on the triangle, forcing them to grapple with themethodological implications of the intellectual commitments associated witheach position. Using a common topic allows students to more clearly see thecontrasting types of knowledge claims produced by each methodology. Theassignments allow students to learn the triangle by putting it into practice.

This triangle is meant to introduce the different approaches to research inthe discipline in the context of sustained intellectual debates. By starting withdebates, multiple methodologies can emerge on equal footing. This approach isnot meant to argue for a radical re-interpretation of the field, nor is it designedto open vast new areas of inquiry. This map is useful in that it illuminatescertain debates within the field, allowing students to understand the crux ofcertain methodological arguments as they are introduced to major methodo-logical positions within the field. It also explains some of the alliances andtrouble within those alliances that one observes in the literature (Price andReus-Smit 1998; Sterling-Folker 2000; Barkin 2003). When paired with a verybasic theoretical map of the field, it reveals that many theoretical debates are asmuch about methodology as they are about theory. It is also important to keepin mind what this triangulation is not. It is not meant to be a definitive map ofthe discipline, nor is it meant to create boxes in which scholars and researchprograms may be placed. Moreover, it is not meant to be exclusive—otherapproaches to introducing methodology can present a coherent picture of thediscipline in a compelling and enlightening way. It is designed primarily as peda-gogical tool to help students better understand the fundamental commitmentsof certain methodologies and the relationships between them.

To explain the development and use of this triangle in teaching researchmethods, I will first discuss the three main debates that define the distinctionsbetween approaches to research and knowledge: causality, context, and essential-ism. Next, I will articulate the ideal-type sketch of the three main methodologi-cal types based on positions within those debates and provide a brief example ofhow this plays out in one segment of the international relations literature. Thedebates will be depicted graphically, on a triangular map of methodology ininternational relations research. Finally, I will pair the methodological map witha basic theoretical map of the field to further illuminate debates within interna-tional relations.

The ‘‘Great Debates’’

Causality

The first key debate concerns the status of causality. This remains a central fault-line within the field, and many methodological texts only discuss this issue(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994), ignoring the other two. The debate overcausality happens on two levels, illustrated graphically in Figure 1.

The first level of debate about causality pits those who reject the notion ofcausality altogether against those who see a causality as central to any

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explanation of a phenomenon. Robert Keohane asserts that ‘‘making causalinferences is the ‘Holy Grail’ of political science’’ (Keohane 2009) and exhortspolitical scientists to seek causal factors that produce the outcomes we observein contemporary politics. This knowledge of causation thus unlocks explanation,understanding, and recommendations. While, traditionally, a majority of themembers of the discipline agree with Keohane’s assertion, an increasing numberare challenging the role that causality plays in contemporary social scienceinquiry.

Claiming that social life is too complicated and contingent, and aware thatthe position of the researcher has significant influence on what is reported, it ispossible to reject causality as a relevant source of explanation in the social world.From this perspective, social phenomena are not caused in any meaningfulsense; rather, they are interpreted or experienced by an author from a particularposition. Dunn, for example, remains ‘‘unconvinced that we can offer causalexplanations. The world is far too complex, complicated, and contingent to bestudied with any degree of certainty’’ (Dunn 2006). He instead follows Camp-bell’s (1993) ‘‘logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability ofcataloguing, calculating, and specifying ‘real causes.’’’ This position of ‘‘nocausality’’ demands that a researcher focus only on the particular experience ofa phenomenon. Among those who appreciate and seek to understand causality,then, there are two approaches to the phenomenon: that of general causation,and that of particular causation (Parsons 2007).

The traditional definition of social science research is to provide explanationsof social phenomena. Within political science and international relations, manyhave sought to define an acceptable explanation as a ‘‘causal law’’ (King et al.1994; Van Evera 1997). Modeled after a basic understanding of causality in theclassical description of the ‘‘hard sciences’’ (physics, chemistry) originating withthinkers such as Hume and Mill, the idea of causality assumes that a particularand identifiable force acts on an entity to produce an observed outcome. Grav-ity causes objects to fall. Imbalances of power cause states to go to war (Mears-heimer 2001). The life-blood of social science research has long been a questto identify causal relationships of this sort. The key to this sort of causal argu-ment is to be able to identify a causal force and to be able to correlate out-

FIG. 1. Causality


comes with the existence of this causal force to generate enough confidencethat a scholar can generalize the causal nature of the causal force. The goal isto produce parsimonious, generalizable law-like claims about how the worldworks that can be verified by other researchers through rigorous testing. This isthe mainstream, most widely accepted position for research in political science,as defined by King, Keohane, and Verba in Designing Social Inquiry (King et al.1994). For undergraduate students, this is perhaps the easiest position to under-stand and reproduce in a research design, as it resonates with what they weretaught in high school science classes about the Scientific Method. Therefore, itmakes a good starting point to introduce the concept of research design.

Increasingly, a number of scholars are rejecting the idea of causal forces andgeneralizable causal laws in favor of a study of causal mechanisms and processes(Tilly 1995). Here, causality is a process, the result of specific mechanisms actingin particular ways to produce an identifiable outcome. While the process may besomewhat generalizable, outcomes are not because they depend on sequence,setting, and circumstance. Context and causal mechanisms can explain variationin similar processes—variation that is neither general nor predictable indepen-dent of context. Causation moves from the generalizable political force to thespecific interaction of actors and mechanisms in a causal chain. Instead ofasking what causes war, a focus on causal mechanisms suggests asking whatcaused a particular war, or rather, how a set of causal mechanisms led to theoutbreak of the war in question (Suganami 1996). A focus on causal mechanismsstill seeks to uncover a cause for an outcome, but the resulting inquiry privileges‘‘how’’ as ‘‘why’’ (Tilly 2006).

Context

The second key debate is over the role of the social context in social science(Figure 2). Dating back to the classic Cartesian assumption of dualism thatallows for objectivity, there is a longstanding position that social context isirrelevant when making claims about the way the world works. If there is anobjective, observable world that exists independent of the researcher, then anyresearcher should be able to observe, measure, and test ideas against thatobjective world. The social context—of both observer and observed—has norole in this objective world because that social context cannot be observed andmeasured. Social context cannot be generalized nor predicted. What mattersare generalized, observable outcomes and independent facts that can be stud-ied and confirmed by any researcher. When context is considered, it is treatedas another observable and reproducible factor in a study. The goal of researchthen is to produce an accurate representation of the objective world. General-izing findings is possible because generality depends on objective existenceindependent of the researcher, not anything content-, context-, or researcher-specific.

Opposite this is the notion that the context matters; that it is too rich andconsequential to be broken into variables. Social science is the study of thesocial world, and in a social world, individuals act on the basis of what thingsmean to them. Consider Geertz’s (1973) classic discussion of Gilbert Ryle’sdescription of the difference between a wink and a twitch. Both consist of thesame observable behavior, an eyelid moving up and down while an eyeball ispointed at a particular person. Substantially more important than this basicbehavior, the point of a wink is to convey important meaning from winker towinkee. From a purely objective position, all that can be observed and general-ized is the raising and lowering of the eyelid. But, to the social scientist appre-ciative of social context, the conspiratorial wink, the creepy wink, or theamusing wink all convey deep yet very different meaning for the participants

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in the moment. It is this context that makes the wink worth studying (andworth doing). As an in-class example, it readily demonstrates value of under-standing context as students are quite familiar with the different contexts andmeanings associated with a wink. It also points out the importance of the con-text of the researcher, as in-class discussion will quickly reveal a wide variety ofways to make sense of the same wink based on past experience as either a win-ker or winkee.

The question arises, however, as to the nature of social context: is meaningwholly subjective, determined separately by each observer and ultimately open toeach observer’s unique interpretation, or is meaning intersubjective, created byshared understandings among actors as to how all make collective sense of anexperience? On the subjective side, meaning is strictly a function of positionand encounter. Each researcher will uncover a different meaning depending onhis or her position and access to a social structure. Because social contexts areunique, they are not reproducible; rather, all one can do is attempt to under-stand how a researcher made sense of, or ‘‘read’’ a particular encounter.Indeed, each encounter of researcher and subject is unique, emphasizing‘‘multiple representations or interpretations and the infinite number of ways inwhich individuals or groups ‘see’ the world’’ (Fierke 2002). As Dunn (2006) says,‘‘I am interested in whether or not my conclusions make sense to me.’’ Meaningis thus fluid, and its interpretation is ‘‘absolutely’’ relative.

On the other hand, meaning may be understood as intersubjective—a seriesof shared understandings that exist in use, be it a discourse, practice, or institu-tional form. The more subjective orientation ‘‘tends to emphasize interpretationand representation rather than rules’’ (Fierke 2002). From the intersubjectiveposition, meaning does not depend on what any one individual believes, rather,meaning rests in what members of a group can share amongst themselves andrecognize as such. Social context is thus a set of shared rules. The interpretationof a rule can only be taken so far—there is a way to grasp a rule that is not pureinterpretation—is one following the rule or not. From an intersubjective per-spective, the social context is more plastic. It can be maintained as stable for asustained period, allowing complex social forms to develop, but it is not so rigidas to resist change and the social practices that give rise to change. The morewho share a social context, the more work to change it. But because it is inter-subjective, a social context can be easily studied, observed, and traced. It cannotreside inside an individual’s head, it must be shared, and again, the process ofsharing meaning must be participatory and therefore observable for study.Indeed, meaning rests in this process of sharing, not with the actors who mayparticipate in this process.

FIG. 2. Context


Essentialism

The third key debate is over essentialism (Figure 3). This is perhaps the mostrecent debate and most difficult to explain to undergraduates, but it is no lesssignificant. Those who make or rest on essentialist claims hold that actors in thesocial world have clear, identifiable, unchanging essences. A state is… Bipolarityis… The West is… The notion that there is such a thing as a state or bipolarityor the West that can be identified with a core set of characteristics without whichit would not be itself is the hallmark of essentialism. Essentialism locates theproperties of an object within that object, and essences serve as the startingpoint for inquiry.

Opposite the essentialists are those who argue that all social phenomena to bestudied are processes, not things (Tilly 1995). ‘‘Instead of possessing a constitutiveessence, actors—whether states or individuals—should be regarded as the productof ongoing constitutive practices’’ (Jackson 2004b; emphasis original). The sup-posed ‘‘essence’’ of an object at any particular point is thus the product of a pro-cess. At any one moment it may appear fixed, but that fixity is subject toexplanation. It is the job of the researcher to disassemble ‘‘things’’ into theprocesses that create, maintain, and shape those social forms. The West is not anessential culture, rather, the West is an ongoing project to assert a connectionamong certain core texts, ideas, history, and people. France is a set of processesand practices to continually link an idea of nationhood to a particular set ofinstitutions, people, and territory. All of it could unfold differently, giventhat such processes are contingent and not fixed (in any essential way). Hence,both stability and change are equally problematic and to be explained. Changerequires an explanation of processes leading to different results, taking advan-tage of a particular contingency, while stasis requires an explanation of howparticular processes were continually maintained and reproduced in the face ofcontingency.

Essentialists differ on the nature of essence: are essential qualities materialand objective facts, or are they ideational and subjective items? Material, objec-tive essences are posited to exist in actors or things such as States or Bipolarityor the National Interest. ‘‘The State’’ is a fundamental unit of study in the field,and it has identifiable interests that can be identified and measured. States existand persist, and it is the job of the researcher to most accurately represent theiressential nature. On the other side, items like culture or a foundational texthave an ideational, subjective essence. To claim that there is an ‘‘authentic’’local culture that best represents a traditional folkway is to essentialize both the‘‘real nature’’ of a culture and the items that threaten it by somehow distancingit from its essential roots. Either way, essences serve as the starting point forinquiry and are not the object of inquiry. Stasis is the assumed nature of things,while change is to be problematized and explained.

Triangulation

When combined, these three debates allow for the triangulation of three ideal-type methodological positions within contemporary international relationsresearch. It is important to keep in mind that these are ideal-types around whichit becomes possible to organize and map the literature of the field. I do notassume that these ideal types represent the research of any particular scholar.Rather, as scholars identify with one methodological camp or another, as definedby these ideal types, they locate their research relative to the above debates.

A short description of each of the three approaches to research—the pointsof the triangle—follows. Pedagogically, my syllabus is actually organized this way,as it is easier to teach each methodology as a coherent approach. Moreover, it is

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necessary to support the research design assignments for the course. The courseunfolds in three sub-units, covering each methodological approach. Eachsub-unit concludes with a research design assignment, forcing students to thinkthrough the requirements of research design for each approach and the practi-cal consequences of those requirements in the research process. After a descrip-tion of each approach, I provide an example of how I illustrate these differencesin class using the democratic peace debate.

Type 1: (Neo)Positivists

The (Neo)Positivists are those who subscribe to general causality, objective essen-tialism, and reject the importance of social context. This ideal type is best articu-lated by Waltz (1979) and later King et al. (1994), and remains the dominantstandard against which much research is evaluated. Again, though, keeping withthe notion of the ideal type, it is important to note that few researchers are fullyable to implement each and every one of King, Keohane, and Verba’s dictums.Rather, they try to approach this ideal, making necessary compromises as partic-ular projects require. Take, for instance Van Evera’s (1997) Guide to Methods forStudents of Political Science. It is intended as a guide, a cookbook almost, on howto construct a qualitative case study dissertation. Van Evera continues to holdKing, Keohane, and Verba as the ideal, but instructs students on acceptable com-promises deviating from the ideal in the name of practicality.

The goal of a (Neo)Positivist research design is to construct a project thatseeks to test a claim of cause and effect on an observable world to generate ageneralizable causal law about how the world works. The role of theory is to gen-erate hypotheses, defined as statements positing a causal relationship betweenindependent and dependent variables, and test those hypotheses againstobjective, real-world evidence. Successful research will produce evidence thatcorresponds with the claims of the hypothesis, thus validating its causal claims.

Type 2: Interpretivist

The Interpretivists subscribe to the importance of subjective context, idea-tional ⁄ subjective essences, but reject the notion of causality. For the interpretivist,the goal of research is to uncover essential meanings of cultures, representations,or discourses while recognizing that each articulation of meaning is totally andincontrovertibly subjective. Each reading of the world is subjectively unique,

FIG. 3. Essentialism


depending on the position of the reader and the encounter. Indeed, interpretiveresearch ‘‘self-consciously adopts a perspective’’ (Campbell 1993). As a result, anyinterpretation is as equally valid as the next, so long as it is consistent on its ownterms and makes sense to the interpreter him or herself (Dunn 2006). Indeed, itis impossible for any two people to have the exact same encounter from the exactsame position. This subjectivity requires all interpretations have merit in andof themselves—the merit lies in the self-conscious nature of the investigation,uncovering the ‘‘political consequences of adopting one mode of representationover another’’ (Campbell 1993).

An interpretivist research design seeks out a new position to encounter orread an aspect of politics and report back on how the author made sense of thatencounter, identifying what key meanings were uncovered. In its ideal-typicalform, it is a wholly subjective enterprise where each inquiry stands alone on itsown merits. This may take the form of pure ethnography or pure textual decon-struction. Regardless, the end product is a reading of (world) politics indicativeof the position of the researcher alone.

Type 3: Relational

The third approach requires bringing a term from sociology into the interna-tional relations methodological lexicon. Despite the difficulties of introducing anew label that is not yet widely used, I find it useful to highlight the impact rela-tional sociology (Emirbayer 1997) is having on a new generation of internationalrelations scholarship (Nexon 2009), forming a cohesive methodological campthat is home to a variety of theories and investigative techniques (Jackson andNexon 2009).

A relational approach rejects essentialism, focuses on the specifics of causalprocesses and the intersubjective nature and importance of social context. Theprocesses that form ‘‘things’’ are indeed causal and produce an intersubjectiveunderstanding among those involved that can lead to particular outcomes incontingent situations. The stuff of politics is intersubjective understandingsshared over a network of actors. This network, however, is not a network of wiresand routers, rather it is a social network of social ties and social communication.These social ties are processes themselves, causal mechanisms that create ormaintain a network. The stuff of those social processes is the intersubjectivemeaning making sense of the world. Social context exists in the relationshipsactors have with each other. Relational approaches study relations before states(Jackson and Nexon 1999).

A relational research design seeks to identify either the constitution of inter-subjective understandings and social networks or the causal processes and mech-anisms that create, maintain, and change those items. Both can be seen as twosides of the same coin—processes of relating create relationships that can bedescribed as a network, processes of discourse create intersubjective understand-ings—but a researcher must start somewhere, and often analytically brackets oneside to investigate the second. The result of this research is an account of how aparticular, contingent configuration of social processes come together to pro-duce a recognizable, meaningful result. ‘‘What is generalizable from an accountsuch as this is not a specific set of nomethetic generalizations, but a ‘toolkit’ ofanalytical devices which might be used to analyze similar situations’’ (Jackson2002).

Example

There are numerous examples and exemplar pieces of scholarship for eachapproach. When crafting a syllabus, providing many examples of exemplar

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scholarship is necessary to give students a tangible understanding of how toengage in research from each approach. However, I have found it also useful toprovide examples of each approach to research on similar topics. By showingdifferent ways of looking at a similar empirical puzzle, students can see theimplications of each research perspective on both the type of question asked,project proposed, and analysis offered. The democratic peace debate providesone such site.

There is a substantial amount of (Neo)Positivist research on the democraticpeace, most relying on statistical analysis to identify a causal relationshipbetween regime type and conflict. I have found one early debate in the litera-ture, between Maoz and Russett (1993) and Farber and Gowa (1995), particu-larly useful. Maoz and Russett were among the first to offer and test a set ofhypotheses on the causes of the democratic peace. Farber and Gowa disputetheir findings, and thus challenge the democratic peace hypothesis. These twoarticles engage each other directly, and use the same data source to test rivalhypotheses. The core of this particular dispute produces a discussion of theimportance of how a researcher operationalizes a variable and the sample size ofthe test data. When taught together, the two articles provide a solid example ofhow (Neo)Positivist research is conducted across the discipline to test a hypothe-sis with objective data to produce cumulative knowledge about concepts such asthe democratic peace.

From the interpretive perspective, Ido Oren (1995) offers a trenchant andpowerful criticism of this debate. He argues that a claim about democracies isvalue-laden, not objective and value-free, and the product of the American socialcontext in which the scholarship was produced. I often introduce this article byasking students to define democracy—framing the question as who counts as ademocracy in the world today. As students debate democracy, they soon see thesubjective elements of the definitional debate. Once the class has a working defi-nition, I then ask when the US became a democracy by that standard. Theanswer is often sometime in the early to mid-twentieth century, and yet the USis often classified as a democracy from the founding of the republic. As Orendemonstrates, by interpreting the definition of democracy relative to a contem-porary American standard, and yet not applying these standards in a uniformtranshistorical fashion when coding data, the democratic peace argument isreally a peace among states understood to be ‘‘like us.’’ Through a detaileddiscussion of prominent early political scientists’ views of Germany before andafter World War I, Oren shows that as Americans reinterpret which states theymost admire, they reinterpret the essential elements and meaning of democracy.

Colin Kahl (1999) offers an early relational approach to his analysis of thedemocratic peace. While Kahl wrote before the widespread use of the relationallabel, his argument nevertheless makes use of relational approaches. Kahl(1999) explicitly positions himself between the ‘‘hard’’ positivists and the‘‘extreme form’’ of interpretivism, making an early case for a relationalapproach to the democratic peace. He identifies a collective liberal identity asthe mechanism that produces peaceful relationships among those states whoshare the set of liberal intersubjective understandings he describes. Kahl’s focuson the democratic peace as an intersubjective process of sharing an identitybased on the meaning of democracy in a particular social context, rather thanan objective, essential quality of a particular regime type differentiates him fromthe (Neo)Positivists. His focus on the causal mechanisms generated by intersub-jective understandings separates him from interpretivists. The process of creatinga shared understanding among states can generate international outcomes. Kahlillustrates how he is not simply splitting the difference between these twopositions, but rather attempting to construct a coherent third approach to thedemocratic peace debate.


This typology of the three ideal type methods is graphically depicted in the tri-angle below (Figure 4) which is a combination of the three debates from above(Figures 1–3):

The points of the triangle are the ideal type positions of the three majorresearch methodologies in international relations today. The legs of the triangleare the three main debate issues from above. The midpoint of each leg repre-sents the limit or break between the two ways to view the issue. The altitudes ofthe triangle are the rejectionist positions. Thus, the (Neo)Positivists, at the top,are on the general causal and objective material essentialism sides of the causal-ity and essentialist legs. They discount the role of social context, and thus areopposite the context leg, as indicated by the altitude from the context leg to the(Neo)Positivist point. Interpretivists, in the lower left, are on the side of subjec-tive meaning of context and subjective, ideational essentialism while rejectingthe importance of causality. Relationalism, on the lower right, is on the side ofcausal processes, intersubjective meaning to context and anti-essentialism.

Again, the points of the triangle represent ideal types in this methodologicalmap. Few scholars do actual research and design actual projects from thosepoints. Rather, individual researchers make pragmatic and practical compro-mises that have them slide down the legs, toward the center of the triangle inthe practice of research and scholarship. Qualitative case study research, forexample, brings the importance of contextual accounts or more specific causalprocesses to bear as explanations. However, a researcher can only slide so fardown the leg—the midpoint of the leg acts as a limit, the point at which onemust switch a fundamental conviction about how the world works.

Along those lines, it is possible to consider an inscribed circle resting in thetriangle. This circle becomes an area of incompatible assumptions. It is, in asense, an argument against complete methodological eclecticism because to

FIG. 4. Triangulating Debates

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occupy a position in that circle is to hold fundamentally incompatible assump-tions about the world. Either there is an objective reality or there is not, and toconcede that one side dominates over the other has profound implications as tothe ultimate importance and relevance of meaning and generalization in thesocial world. There either are essences of actors or there are not, to have anactor be half essence, half process is to concede one side of the debate. While itis possible to come toward the center of the triangle part-way (indeed, not justpossible, but required on some level), one must stay within the limits of one’sown position. The triangle requires commitment to one point or another.

Toward the end of the course, when presented with the triangle in full,students learn two very important lessons about the way I am teaching themresearch methodology. At the outset of the course, I tell them that they will loveone unit, hate one unit, and find a third unit plausible. They encounter a simi-lar experience with the research design assignments—one is straightforward, oneis plausible, and one baffling. The first lesson is that there is a pre-analytic, per-sonal decision to be made about why they come to embrace the positions theydo. It is a decision that they are capable of making. The approach that makesthe most sense does so for a reason: it resonates with how they make sense ofthe world. I attempt to clarify this point repeatedly in class discussions. The sec-ond lesson is that their particular choice does not matter—what matters is theirability to recognize, articulate, and defend that choice and produce rigorousresearch designs from their chosen methodological home. Solid research cancome from any approach if pursued rigorously. This moment is intended to beempowering to students, as they locate themselves within the field and learnhow to design inquiries that they find both interesting and convincing.

Methodology and the Sociology of the Discipline

Toward the end of the class, after covering each of the three points of the triangle,I attempt to illustrate the link between theory, method, and the sociology ofknowledge within the discipline. My triangle is somewhat reminiscent of Alker’striangle on international relations theory (Alker and Biersteker 1984). But, beforeI complete the comparison, I want to clearly lay out the limits of what I am aboutto argue: The theoretical map I propose is not meant to be definitive, and therelationship between the two maps is one of general similarity, NOT a one-to-onecorrespondence or any sort of isomorphism. Not all theorists from one theoreticalcorner fit into the similar methodological corner. Rather, there is, to borrow theWeberian term, an elective affinity between certain theories and certain methodol-ogies. The general similarity is useful to illuminate the tension between theoreti-cal camps and the types of debates they have with one another.

This theoretical triangle has its genesis in the Alker triangle of the early 1980swhere Alker divided the field into Realist, Liberal, and Radical ⁄ Marxistapproaches to international relations (Alker and Biersteker 1984). Alker’s trian-gle is reproduced in Figure 5.

In the 1990s, the shape of the Alker triangle changed. First, the distancebetween realist and liberal points shrunk considerably, resulting in the ‘‘neo–neo’’ consensus (Powell 1994; Waever 1996). Neorealists and Neoliberals arguedthe finer points of relative vs. absolute gains but otherwise espoused rather simi-lar theories. While that happened, the radical line extended itself significantly,ultimately fracturing. Marxists largely disappeared with the end of the Cold War,and a whole host of new ‘‘radicals’’ arose in their place. Constructivism emergedas a new ‘‘third pillar,’’ creating a new ‘‘Big 3’’ theories of international rela-tions (Walt 1998; Snyder 2004). At the same time, postmodernism (and severalother ‘‘post’’ theories), along with critical theory emerged as the new ‘‘radical-ism,’’ thereby creating a new trapezoid-triangle of realist ⁄ liberal, postmodern,


and constructivist theories. Thus, the contemporary theoretical triangle is notactually a nice, neat triangle, but a somewhat contrived trapezoid that at leastlooks similar to a triangle from a certain distance (Figure 6).

FIG. 6. Contemporary International Relations Theory and the Three Methodologies

FIG. 5. Alker and Bierstecker’s Triangle of International Relations Theory (Alker and Biersteker1984)

405Peter Howard

Step back and consider the two triangles side by side, as shown in Figure 6. Itreveals a distinct similarity between theory and method. The realists and liberalsconverge around (Neo)Positivism. The postmodernists occupy the interpretivistposition, and the constructivists occupy the corner for relational approaches.Again, this is neither an isomorphic nor a one-to-one map. While many construc-tivists fit this relational framework, not all do—most notably Alex Wendt and hisadoption of scientific realism as a way to be a constructivist and yet remain onthe positivist side of the triangle. Post-structuralism fits somewhat uncomfortablyon the bottom leg of the triangle, somewhere between interpretive and rela-tional approaches. That said, the point of the comparison between the two trian-gles is not to pigeon-hole every theorist into a particular methodological campor vice versa. Rather, the comparison serves to illuminate some of the debateswithin the field to students encountering them for the first time—so much ofwhat passes for theoretical debate is in fact methodological debate.

This illustration provides one way to make sense of several alliances within thefield. Constructivists, critical theorists, and post-structuralists have made acommon stand against the neopositivism of liberals and realists which ignoresthe social context they find so vital (Price and Reus-Smit 1998). Some construc-tivists and realists have attempted to make common cause over the study of therole and function of power (Barkin 2003; Jackson 2004a) while other constructiv-ists and liberals share an appreciation of the power of liberal ideas to shape statebehavior (Sterling-Folker 2000). This triangle reveals that such theoreticalconversations and collaborations are potentially fruitful on certain commonground but also are limited by fundamental differences on a key issue.

For example, consider the challenge faced by feminist approaches to interna-tional relations theory. Much of the resistance to feminist research is justified onmethodological, not substantive grounds. Consider Keohane’s critique of femi-nist scholarship in his exchange with Tickner (1995). Keohane’s primary chal-lenge to feminists is a methodological critique on the issues of causality, from aclear (Neo)Positivist position on the triangle. Keohane asserts that proper socialscience methods investigate causality, and because the feminists in question donot tell causal stories that generate testable hypotheses, they are not makingsignificant contributions to the discipline. Tickner’s response asserts the rele-vance of the other legs of the triangle—feminist theory does have somethingimportant to say, it just says it by employing a methodology that falls somewherealong the social context leg of the triangle. The triangle also illuminates the tac-tical alliance between constructivist and postmodern feminists against critics likeKeohane. When juxtaposed with a traditional (Neo)Positivist, the relative agree-ment among feminists on the general importance of social context leads to anability to have a broad conversation about the importance of understanding asocial context theoretically and a tactical alliance against those who deny anyrelevance to any sort of context or meaning.

Toward the end of the term, I include a discussion on the sociology of thediscipline. While the triangle presents the three methodological approaches onequal footing, a quick glance at the actual state of the discipline, whether aprogram from the annual ISA meeting or a list of the articles in the top jour-nals or the dissertations deposited each year, reveals that in practice, scholar-ship is unevenly distributed among the three approaches. Neopositivism stilldominates the field. However, the number of interpretive and relational schol-ars, papers, and publications is growing at a noticeable rate. This revelation,however, serves as another teachable moment about the differences betweenthe three approaches and why they are not as balanced in practice as theymight be in theory. For the undergraduate new to the discipline, this discus-sion serves two important purposes—one theirs and one mine. First, for thestudents, it provides an explanation for what they will encounter as they


continue their studies in the field. The students with an affinity for alternativeapproaches are empowered to know that they are able to defend the legitimacyof their position and that they have intellectual allies to do so. Second, forme, it helps realize the goal of methodological pluralism within the field. Bymaking my students—future producers and consumers of knowledge as schol-ars, policymakers, and active citizens—aware of the current sociology of thefield, I seek to encourage them not to mindlessly reproduce it, but rather,create a future where all three methodological approaches are on a level play-ing field.

Conclusion

This triangle map of the three dominant research methodologies within interna-tional relations today illuminates many of the debates and alliances amongmethodological camps. It is not the only way to map methodologies in interna-tional relations, but it is illuminating in ways that other maps are not, because itshows the fault lines between the approaches and presents each approach onequal footing, as one position in a tri-partite debate. It also allows one to empha-size the difference between methodology—how one organizes and makes senseof information about how the world works—and method—particular techniquesfor gathering and processing information about the world. Methods—like inter-viewing, case studies, or computer-assisted quantitative analysis—can be usefulfor a multitude of methodologies, depending on how they are used. Interviewscan serve as data points to generalize relationships by gathering in-depth per-sonal evidence, texts to deconstruct, or stories of causal processes and relation-ships. What matters, from this perspective, is less the way in which a researcherchooses to gather information, and more the way in which the researcherchooses to organize and makes sense of that information to make a claim abouthow the world works. As such, it provides an organizing logic for an introductoryclass in international relations research.

My course explores all three approaches to research, presenting each on its ownmerits, as if in a sustained scholarly conversation with other approaches. Doing sodoes not inherently privilege one approach as dominant, nor does it force stu-dents into a particular track. Rather, it provides an opportunity for students tolearn each methodological approach on its own terms, understand its epistemo-logical and ontological commitments, and construct coherent research projects. Iask them to design three research designs exploring a common topic, one fromeach approach, forcing them to grapple with the practical side of identifying,gathering, and making sense of data to support an argument. Most significantly, itempowers students to determine how they come down on the three triangulatingquestions and locate themselves on the methodological triangle. Finally, for futurescholars, this triangle helps to illuminate the stakes in making such choices ininternational relations theory and international relations research.

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triangulating debates within the field: teaching international relations research methodology

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