truro college: cold war booklet 4
DESCRIPTION
Cold War extension to the Far East 1950-53TRANSCRIPT
1840 1900 1911 1925 1930 1945 1949
CHINA BEFORE 1949
Using the background section at the start of “The People’s Re-public of China since 1949” by M. Lynch complete the timeline by adding the main events in Chinese history before its fall to Communism.
How did America attempt to contain Communism in different countries within Asia?
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Following WWII America considered W. Europe to be the most important area to contain communism, however a fear about the future of countries in Asia pushed America to focus carefully on Japan, China, Korea and Vietnam. JAPAN After Japan’s unconditional surrender Emperor Hirohito was stripped of powers but was allowed to remain as a figurehead. Japan was to face military occupation by the Allies, but this resulted in a dominant US influence (90% of troops were American) under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. Soviet requests for an occupation zone was refused on the account that the S.U. had not fought in the Pacific War. MacArthur was only loosely supervised by Washington but his brief was to demilitarise and democratise. The Japanese army was demobilise, weapon reserves destroyed and a “no war” clause was written into the new Japanese constitution in May 1947. Political parties were encouraged as were Trade Unions. This led to the emergence of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). War criminals were also brought to trial. From 1947 the USA made a change in policy as it viewed Japan as the cornerstone of a strategy to contain communism in Asia. Japan was now to be anchored closely to America. This was no easy task as Japan was in ruins. 2.5 million Japanese citizens had died in the war and 40% of the buildings in Japan’s 66 main cities had been destroyed. Prices were soaring and unemployment was high.
Following 1947 America put all is energy into economic reconstruction. This forced some restrictions to be made. By 1948 government workers were forbidden to strike and communist sympathisers in Trade Unions were arrested. In 1949, $500m in aid for foodstuffs and raw materials needed for production was poured into Japan. The prosecution of war criminals was scaled down and the day-to-day running of Japan was transferred to the Japanese.
Why would Japan’s poor economic situation alarmed America? (Consider how this could affect political activity).
Why do you think a less harsh approach was followed by the Americans at this time?
How did America attempt to contain Communism in different countries within Asia?
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CHINA America’s interest in Chinese politics was mainly due to a concern over control over key resources. However America’s aid to the Chinese Nationalists fighting the CCP was modest. By 1947 Japan was a higher priority and America wished to rescue China from Communism but not through spending precious dollars. Fighting in China by 1948 showed that the Nationalists were losing and within a year surrendered so America then aimed to pen the CCP in N. China. KOREA Following Japan’s surrender, Korea (once a Japanese colony) was divided into two occupation zones with a long-term goal of unifying Korea under fair and free elections. The USA occupied the South and the S.U the North. The long-term goal gradually disappeared though and as neither side could agree on terms for elections and unification. By 1947 America simply wished to hold onto S. Korea. It may not have been vital to US national security but it was important if communism was to be contained.
In 1948 Korea was two states: The North became the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ruled by Kim IL Sung but under strict control from Moscow. The South became the Republic of Korea with the new leader Syngman Rhee democratically elected. Soviet troops left but T-34 tanks remained and the following year the US left, but economic aid continued. Skirmishes continued killing 100,000 Koreans before 1949.
How would a democratic Korea help America’s economic policy in Japan?
Why do you think Truman meant by a “Europe-first” policy?
How did America attempt to contain Communism in different countries within Asia?
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VIETNAM Vietnam had been occupied by the Japanese during the war. Before the war Vietnam had been part of the French empire in Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia). America wished to promote nationalism and the breakdown of the old empires. When Vietnamese nationalist organised themselves under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh the US put pressure on the French to grant independence. Ho Chi Minh even approached Washington for aid. However the communist stance of the nationalist (the Vietminh) by 1946 pushed America to ally with France asking them to make concessions to the non-communist nationalists by preparing for self-government. In 1949 France had set up a limited independent native government under the leadership of Bao Dai. However it was simply not enough. When war against the French began America was prepared to offer support through dollars but war was never contemplated. THE ASIAN PERIPHERY America wished to make Asia a self-supporting economic area with Japan at the core. America maintained airbases and garrisons on the Ryukyu Islands, Guam and the Philippines.
Why do you think this area was referred to as the “defence perimeter”?
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Why did the US intervene in Korea?A
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Vivienne Sanders highlights six reasons:
• US anti-Communism
• The world balance of power
• McCarthyism and domestic political concerns
• NSC-68
• Fears for Japan
• The UN and ‘lessons’ from history
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Reason 1: US anti-Communism
• The reason underlying all the others …
• The ideological dimension to the Cold War
• See your earlier notes on the origins of the Cold War, the Kennan Telegram and the Truman Doctrine
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Reason 2: The World Balance of Power
• By 1950 most of Eastern Europe and Soviet ‘half’ of Germany behind the ‘Iron Curtain’
• Several events 1948-49 suggested world balance of power had tilted in favour of Communism, e.g.– opposition to Communism wiped out in Czechoslovakia
– Berlin blockade
– Fall of China to Communism
• In August 1949, the Soviets successfully tested their own atom bomb – the US monopoly of nuclear weapons was ended
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Reason 2: The World Balance of Power
• This suggested to Truman that Communist aggression had to be contained in Korea
• Peter Lowe – Europe’s battles were fought on the battlefields of Korea
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Reason 2: The World Balance of Power
• ‘Loss’ of China in 1949 added pressure on Truman
• Republican accusations left Truman on the defensive
• He felt he needed to prove his anti-Communist credentials
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Reason 2: The World Balance of Power
• After the fall of China, Communism appeared to be entering an expansionist phase
• There were Communist insurgencies in:– Vietnam, the Philippines
and British Malaya
– (picture on left shows British marine with heads of two Chinese insurgents)
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concerns
• Truman under intense
domestic political
pressure:
– China Lobby blamed
Truman for ‘loss’ of
China to Communism
– US officials felt
Communist takeover of
Korea threatened
Japan – country
central to US Asian
strategy
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orea Reason 3: McCarthyism and domestic political
concerns
• February 1950 Republican
Senator Joseph McCarthy’s
list claimed there were 205
state department officials
who were Communists
• This started a 4 year period
of large-scale, anti-
Communist hysteria
• HUAC targeted suspected
Communists in all walks of
life – even Hollywood was
not exempt
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orea Reason 3: McCarthyism and domestic political
concerns
• Congressional mid-term elections were due in November 1950
• Truman may have wanted to appear tough on Communism to avoid a Republican win over the Democrats
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Reason 4: NSC-68
• NSC-68:– Secret document setting out
US policy in Cold war
– Argued USSR seeking world domination
– So US needed to massively increase defence spending and take on Communism with military force if necessary
– US intervention in Korea first sign NSC-68 implemented
• TASK:– Read pp.35-41 of your textbook
– Complete the questions on the NSC-68 Worksheet
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China and NSC-68
• NSC-68 was a 58 page classified report issued in the United States on April 14, 1950 during the presidency of Harry S. Truman
• It has become one of the classic historical documents of the Cold War
• NSC-68 shaped US government actions in the Cold War for the next 20 years
• Truman officially signed NSC-68 on September 30, 1950
• It was declassified in 1975
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• By 1949, events reinforced need for better coordination of
national security policy:– North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formed
– Military Assistance Programme for Europe begun
– USSR detonated an atomic bomb
– Communists won control in China
• US Department of State decided to review US strategic
policy and military programs
• State Dept. set up interdepartmental committee under its
Policy Planning head, Paul Nitze
• Their report was NSC 68 (February 1950 – April 1951)
• NSC-68 outlined de facto US national security strategy and
• Analysed military, economic, political, and psychological
capabilities of USA and USSR
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Content
• NSC-68 argued for US military build-up to confront an enemy:
– “unlike previous aspirants to hegemony... animated by a new fanatic
faith, antithetical to our own.”
• USA and USSR existed in a polarized world
• There was a war of ideas
• Therefore, US “center of power in the free world,” should:
– build an international community in which American society would
"survive and flourish" and pursue a policy of containment
• Influenced by Kennan’s Long Telegram
• NSC-68 emphasized military action over diplomatic
• NSC-68 defined as:
– “a policy of calculated and gradual coercion.”
• NSC-68 called for significant peacetime military spending
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Recommendations
• Called for a military capable of:
– Defending the Western Hemisphere
– Providing and protecting a mobilization base
– Conducting offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the
Soviet war-making capacity
– Defending and maintaining lines of communication and base
areas
– Providing aid to allies
• Costs estimated as significant, perhaps more than the 20%
of GDP the US was already committing
– Specific costs left to subsequent group in the NSC to analyse and
budget
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• NSC-68 drew criticism from those who believed the Cold
War was being escalated unnecessarily:– “USSR is steadily reducing the discrepancy between its overall
economic strength and that of the United States…I do not feel that
this position is demonstrated, but rather the reverse... The actual
gap is widening in our favor.” Willard Thorp
– William Schaub believed that: “in every arena,” the US was far
superior than the Soviet Union
– Kennan, although "father" of the containment policy, also
disagreed with the document
• Truman, even after the Soviets became a nuclear power,
sought to curb military spending
• However, did not reject recommendations of NSC-68 out of
hand because of the start of the Korean War– “Korea... created the stimulus which made action.” Dean Acheson
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Debate
• NSC-68 is source of much historical debate
• NSC-68 important part of an overall shift in US foreign
policy to a comprehensive containment strategy; confirmed
by successive administrations
– Emergence of the Eisenhower Doctrine
– Involvement in Vietnam
• Analysis ranges:
– from Michael Hogan's belief that NSC-68 portrayed the threat “in
the worst light possible”
– to it providing an accurate picture of a genuine and growing threat
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Conclusion
• NSC-68 critical to understanding the Cold War
• Implementation of NSC 68 demonstrated a 'shift' in US policy
not only towards the USSR but all other communist satellites
• Signing NSC-68 showed clear defined and coherent US
policy that did not exist until 1950 under the Truman
administration
• Can be argued that NSC-68 solved Truman's problem from
attack from the right after the 'reds in the beds' scare and the
Alger Hiss case
• Although not made public, increase in both conventional and
nuclear US capabilities was clearly seen – providing US with
increased financial burden
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Reason 5: Fears for Japan
• Japan was central to US
plans in the Pacific
• It had been turned into a
‘model state’ after 1945
• Japan was only 100 miles
from Korea and within
Acheson’s defence
perimeter
• According to Peter Lowe,
anxiety over Japan was a
major factor in US
intervention in Korea
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Reason 6: The UN and lessons from history
• UN provided a ‘second chance’ at collective security
• Truman believed that this was one of its first major tests
• Support from Britain and France was likely as they were also
under pressure from Communism in Malaya and Indochina
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Influences on US foreign policy towards Asia and
their response
• Influences?– IDEOLOGY
– LOST ATOMIC MONOPOLY p.38
– LOSS OF CHINA pp.36-7
– MCCARTHYISM AND ‘RED SCARE’ pp.38-9
• Response?– CONTAINMENT
(reaffirmed commitment to contain spread of communism)
– NSC 48/2 (escalated economic and military assistance in Asia. Aid committed to French in their war in Indo-China)
– NSC 68 pp.39-41
= loss of confidence = hardline
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NSC-68 United States Objectives and Programs for National Security NSC 68 The Soviet Union is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war. On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand, any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. It is in this context that the United States and its citizens in the ascendancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril. Recommendations
The United States must have substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defences to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance.
The United States must develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression and as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilisation should war prove unavoidable.
The internal security of the United States against dangers of sabotage, subversion, and espionage must be assured.
Our economic potential, including the strengthening of our peacetime economy must be maximised.
We must strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations; and help such of those nations as are able and willing to make an important contribution to US security, to increase their economic and political stability and their military capability.
Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power and particularly on the relationships between Moscow and the satellite countries.
Keep the US public fully informed and cognisant of the threats to our national security so that it will be prepared to support the measures which we must accordingly adopt.
Our position as the centre of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership. We must organise and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace, which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination. From the report NSC-68 (issued in April 1950 by the National Security Council)
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1. What view does the report give of the aims of the USSR?
2. What events had prompted the US government to produce this review of policy?
3. In what ways does this report mark a hardening of the US stance against the USSR?
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Read pp.35-41. Answer the following two questions:
1. What were the reasons leading to the extension of the Cold War to the Far East 1950-1953?
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2. Was the extension of the Cold War to the Far East a result of actions by the Soviet Union or USA?
Actions taken by the Soviet Union
Actions taken by the USA
The Korean War: An Overview
By Michael Hickey
Last updated 2011-03-21
The Cold War turned hot for the first time in the Korean peninsula in the mid-1950s.
Michael Hickey provides an overview of the so-called 'forgotten war'.
Introduction
At the mid-point of a century that had already seen two appallingly destructive and
costly global conflicts, a savage war broke out in a remote country at the extremity of
the Asian landmass. During the world war of 1939-45, the future of the Japanese empire
was decided at Allied summit meetings. In the short term, pending the return of Korean
independence, Korea, a Japanese colony since 1910, was to be occupied north of the
38th parallel by Soviet Russia. To the south, a United States military administration
under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur would control the area from its
headquarters in Tokyo.
In the North, the Soviets backed a Stalinist regime under their client Kim Il-sung and
created the North Korean Peoples' Army, equipped with Russian tanks and artillery. In
the South, the chaotic political situation resulted in an American-backed administration
under the presidency of Syngman Rhee, whose openly declared aim was the imposition
of national unity by force. As a result of this stance, the American-trained South Korean
army was limited to a lightly armed gendarmerie, lacking tanks, combat aircraft and all
but a small amount of field artillery.
The North Koreans advanced rapidly south, aiming to take the vital port of
Pusan.
After several years of increasingly bloody frontier incidents along the 38th parallel, the
Republic of Korea was invaded by the North Korean Peoples' Army on 25 June 1950.
Despite earlier indications, the Pentagon was caught off-guard. As the North Koreans
swept south, overwhelming all opposition, the US called on the Security Council to
invoke the United Nations Charter and brand the North Koreans as aggressors. This was
done and member states were called on to send in military assistance. The first
American troops were then sent in to stiffen resistance against the invader. The British
government responded at once and elements of the Far East Fleet were soon in action
along the Korean coast, together with ships of Commonwealth navies.
However, the North Koreans still advanced rapidly south, aiming to take the vital port of
Pusan. The American troops hurriedly sent from occupation duties in Japan fared badly
against superior North Korean troops, but General Walton Walker, commanding the 8th
The Korean War: An Overview
United States Army in Korea (EUSAK), rallied his forces and held the Pusan bridgehead
as reinforcements began to arrive. These reinforcements included two British battalions
from Hong Kong, the Middlesex and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and an
Australian battalion from Japan. Furthermore, a strong brigade group was mobilised in
England and several thousand reservists were recalled to active duty. The 29th Brigade
set sail in October 1950, reaching Korea a month later just as it seemed that the war
was over.
China's intervention
Corporal Derek Hirst of the Royal Army Medical Corps in Korea ©In mid-
September, General MacArthur brought off a masterstroke by landing two divisions
240km (150 miles) in the enemy rear at the port of Inchon. Their communications cut,
and under heavy aerial bombardment, the North Koreans broke and fled back north;
MacArthur ordered a hot pursuit which led across the 38th parallel and deep into North
Korea. As the victorious UN forces drew near to the Manchurian border, there were
ominous signals from Peking that communist China would intervene to defend its
territory. In mid-October, MacArthur met President Harry Truman on Wake Island in
their first encounter to assure him that a massive UN offensive was about to conclude
the war victoriously by Christmas. No sooner had this been launched in November than
the Chinese unleashed their armies.
...there were ominous signals from Peking that communist China would
intervene to defend its territory.
The UN forces recoiled in disorder and, by the new year, were defending a line well to
the south of Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Morale was low but the new field
commander, General Ridgway, revived his heterogeneous command and advanced
slowly north in the spring of 1951. By mid-April, the allies were back in the area of the
38th parallel when the Chinese launched their spring offensive. The British 29th Brigade
narrowly escaped annihilation on the Imjin river as the 27th Commonwealth brigade on
the central front beat off savage Chinese attacks. The UN line held, then moved north
again. This time, there was no reckless advance into the north. The line stabilised in the
general area of the 38th parallel and the remaining two years of fighting consisted of
near-static operations as both sides fought from heavily fortified positions, using
artillery, mines and wire to deny the enemy access to strategically important ground.
Throughout the war, air power was decisive. The North Korean air force was driven from
the skies by US Air Force, Navy and Marines, using their superior equipment and
The Korean War: An Overview
training. Heavy bombers razed the cities and industrial plants of North Korea.
Continuous attacks on the transport system forced the Chinese to rely on the packhorse
for much of their logistical support. A new phase of air war opened when American B-29
bombers and their fighter escorts were challenged by Russian-built MiG-15 fighters flown
by Chinese airmen. The MiG-15's outflew first-generation American jet fighters until the
introduction of the swept-wing F-86 Sabre tipped the balance. In the world's first
supersonic air combats, the Americans prevailed.
Stalemate
Harry Gledden in Korea ©The allies achieved total naval
supremacy when the North Korean navy's torpedo boats were blown out of the water by
UN firepower. For the rest of the war, American, British, Commonwealth and other allied
ships maintained a tight blockade on North Korea. In addition, naval aviation played a
leading role in air support of the army on the ground.
In July 1953, a great calm descended over the battlefields...
In mid-1951, with the land battle in stalemate, both sides agreed to go to the conference
table and armistice talks began. They dragged on for two years. The main haggling point
was the future of the tens of thousands of communist prisoners held in camps on Koje
Island off the coast of South Korea. While the communist negotiators were adamant that
all were to be returned to their country of origin, thousands of prisoners were unwilling
to be repatriated. There were several great mutinies in the Koje camps before a
satisfactory formula enabled those who wished to be repatriated to go home and for
asylum to be granted to those who wished otherwise. In July 1953, a great calm
descended over the battlefields and in Operation Big Switch, thousands of former
prisoners on each side were returned. A Demilitarised Zone or DMZ was established on
the border. Both sides withdrew from their fighting positions, and a UN commission was
set up to supervise the armistice.
Some 100,000 British servicemen and women served in the Japan-Korea theatre during
the war. In July 1951, with the arrival of the strong Canadian brigade, the British,
Australian, New Zealand and Indian units were formed into the 1st Commonwealth
Division, which soon gained an enviable reputation among its allies.
The aftermath
No one knows exactly how many people died in this war. In a sense it was a civil war
fought out with foreign participation on both sides. It was the first military test of the
United Nations and also the last martial adventure of the old Commonwealth. The
American Department of Defence acknowledges that almost 40,000 of its servicemen
The Korean War: An Overview
died, either in battle or of other causes. British casualties were 1,078 killed in action,
2,674 wounded and 1,060 missing or taken prisoner.
It was the first military test of the United Nations and also the last martial
adventure of the old Commonwealth.
The true casualty figures for the North and South Koreans and Chinese will never be
known. It is estimated that some 46,000 South Korean soldiers were killed and over
100,000 wounded. The Chinese are estimated by the Pentagon as having lost over
400,000 killed (including Mao Tse-tung's son) and 486,000 wounded, with over 21,000
captured. The North Koreans lost about 215,000 killed, 303,000 wounded and over
101,000 captured or missing.
British veterans of the campaign were left with abiding memories of a South Korea which
had been deprived of its dignity, fought over and ruined, its demoralised population
brought to beggary and its infrastructure destroyed. Since 1953, the Republic of Korea
has transformed into a modern state. In the North, however, the Stalinist regime created
by Kim Il-sung is only now beginning to move out of its hermit state. The economy is in
ruins and famine stalks the land. It is too early to say if the tentative moves towards
reconciliation will result in attainment of the unity so deeply desired by many Koreans.
Find out more
Books
The Korean War: The West Confronts Communism, 1950-1953 by Michael Hickey (John
Murray, 1999)
About the author
Michael Hickey was commissioned in 1949 and served with the RASC in Korea from
1950-52. In 1981, he retired as a General Staff Colonel with the Ministry of Defence. He
is the author of The Unforgettable Army - Slim and the 14th Army in Burma (1992);
Gallipoli (1995) and The Korean War 1950-53 (1999).
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aThe Korean War, 1950-53
Korean War landmark Cold War
development as first military
conflict between West and
communist state
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Why Korea?
• At Potsdam Korea
partitioned along 38th
Parallel (circle of latitude
38 degrees north of
equator)
– USSR controlled north;
USA controlled south
• 1948 division formalised
with creation of
communist North under
Kim Il Sung and
capitalist South Korea
under Syngman Rhee
• Kim determined to reunite
country under him and asked
Stalin for help
• 1950 Stalin agreed:
– 1949 USSR successfully test
A-bomb ending US nuclear
monopoly
– 1949 Mao Zedong establishes
communist regime in China
– Early 1950, US Sec. of State
Dean Acheson appears to
exclude South Korea from
US’s Asian defensive
perimeter
Outbreak of war
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• 25th June 1950 – the
forces of North Korea
invaded the South
– Supported by Soviet tanks
and aircraft
• The exact sequence of
events that started the war
are a source of debate:
– The North claimed they had
been attacked by the South
first
– The West believed the
North invaded the South
first
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aThe Korean War – an overview
• USA took the issue to UN and called
for help for South Korea
• UN Security Council authorised
military intervention to restore South
Korean independence
• USSR unable to veto as boycotting
UN over USA’s refusal to allow
Communist China membership
• 16 countries sent troops under the
banner of the UN
• UN troops led by anti-communist
American: General Douglas
MacArthur
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The Korean War – an overview
• MacArthur seized the initiative and led a successful
offensive driving communist forces out of South Korea
• Raises questions over US strategy:– Containment or rollback of communism?
• Truman authorises rollback and MacArthur crossed 38th
Parallel and headed towards Chinese border
• Mao determined to stop UN forces reaching China:– October 1950 mobilises ‘volunteer’ force to aid North Korea
• Initially, Chinese forces push UN forces back …
• However, Chinese success short-lived and conflict reaches
stalemate around 38th Parallel until 1953 armistice
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a• Read pp.41-44 of your textbook and create an annotated
timeline of the key events of the Korean War
• Watch the CNN/BBC documentary Korea, 1949-54 or
https://media.truro-
penwith.ac.uk/View.aspx?ID=6751~4t~V2IQjABC
• Answer the following questions:
– Why did the USA cross the 38th parallel into North Korea?
– Why was China’s intervention significant?
– How important was the USA’s intervention in South Korea?
– Why was MacArthur sacked?
TASK:
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New Communist Threats …
• Led to NSC-68 (April 1950)
• Success of NSC-68 dependent on US position of power
– US used ‘Dollar Diplomacy’
– Now needed military strength
TASK: Discuss
• Truman’s reaction to NSC 68?
• Effect of outbreak of Korean War on Truman’s decision?
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a How did events in China and Korea affect the Cold
War?• USA felt Korea confirmed aggressive nature of world communism
• Takeover of China by communists and retreat of Chinese Nationalists
to Taiwan failure of US foreign policy
– USSR had base for future expansionism
– Communism could spread into neighbouring Indochina and Korea the USA felt
threatened
• US atomic monopoly over so USA were in weaker position
• Korea demonstrated hardening of US attitudes towards foreign policy
• US felt Korea confirmed the domino effect
• Pessimism and defeatism in Europe now stopped by USA’s direct
action in Korea
• Rolling back communism was considered
• Domestic considerations played a part in USA’s objectives
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aSo Korean War led to …
• Justification of NSC-68
• Militarisation of Cold War
• Strengthening of NATO
• Proposal to re-arm West Germany
• Restoration of sovereignty of Japan
• Resumption of aid to Taiwan
• Increased aid to French in Vietnam
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Militarisation of the Cold War
• Implementation of NSC-68 and
• Justification of NSC-68
• Truman asked Congress for $10 billion to spend on US
armed forces
• US Defense production output between 1950 and 1953
increased sevenfold
– $240 billion for the hydrogen bomb project
– $4 billion for military aid for US allies
• So, Korea marked militarisation of the Cold War
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aStrengthening of NATO
• Western Europe still regarded as most likely area for Soviet
expansion so:
– NATO given an expanded secretariat and unified command
structure working under US commander
– US divisions dispatched to Europe, military bases in Turkey gave
the US the capability of launching air raids against southern Soviet
Union
– US encourages NATO partners to increase their spending in an
attempt to make NATO a shield against Soviet aggression
– Britain in 1951 allocated 8.7% of GDP to defence spending,
previously 5.9% in 1950
– Between 1951 and 1955 the US spent $25 billion in aid to its
NATO allies
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Proposal to re-arm West Germany
• West German rearmament central to the reinforcement of
NATO
– As soon as Korean War broke out US wanted West Germany to
share in defence of Western Europe
– US not advocating an independent German army but a West
German membership of NATO
– France not so enthusiastic! So therefore attempted to delay whole
enterprise and impose limits on German rearmament
– October 1950 French put forward Plevan Plan where West
Germany would join NATO but would take its place within a
European army called the European Defence Community (EDC)
– US recognised West Germany as a full sovereign state 1952
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aRestoration of sovereignty of Japan
• Korean War gave sustenance to Japan’s weak economy:
– 1950 and 1954 US place $3 billion war related orders with Japan
– During Korean War Japan home to thousands of US soldiers whose
spending power produced small economic boom
• Political reconstruction of Japan confirmed in San Francisco
Peace Treaty 8 September 1951
• On same day US received Japans’ signature to Mutual Security
Agreement
– Guaranteed US military bases on island of Okinawa
– Okinawa formed bulwark against further communist expansion
• Yoshida letter 24 December 1951 Japan agreed trade with US
• All this alarmed New Zealand and Australia so US signed ANZUS
Pact 1 September 1951
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Resumption of aid to Taiwan
• US policy changed towards Taiwan as soon as Korean War started
• After Nationalists’ defeat US finally gave up on Chiang Kai-shek and
had no formal plans to assist him if communist China attacked
• But June 1950 Truman immediately ordered 7th Fleet to Taiwan
Straits to defend the island against possible attack
• Korean War destroyed immediate hope that US would recognise
Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
• US recognised Taiwan as the only official Chinese state until 1971
• Substantial aid was given and the denial of the island of Taiwan to
China was important in limiting the power of Chinese communism in
Asia
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aIncreased aid to French in Vietnam
• Against background of Korean War US now increased
subsidies to France in its war against the Vietminh
• US view Ho Chi Minh as puppet of Moscow now firmly
entrenched
• By early 1950s US spending $1 billion a year on military
assistance to France
• US policy makers believed fate of South East Asia and the
future of Japan intertwined
• Indochina now had to fill the economic gap created by the
‘fall’ of China to communism as a source of raw materials
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Conclusions
• Pivotal event?
– Marked an acceleration but not reorientation of US Policy
– Post-Korea USA had commitments across world and higher
levels of defence spending so
– Militarisation of American policy
– Before Korea US avoided committing US troops to war in Asia
– After Korea US ready to deploy troops anywhere in order to
defend ‘free world’
TASK:
• Discuss and answer:
– Which is more important turning point in US Foreign Policy,
Truman Doctrine or Korean War?
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aWas the Truman Doctrine a Turning Point in US
Foreign Policy?
• Suggests continuity with US policy from 1941?
• What actually changed with the Truman Doctrine?
• Rhetoric?
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a Was the Korean War a Turning Point in US Foreign
Policy?
• Substantial rise in US defence budget
• Not just for fighting Korea – NSC 68
• Militarization of the Cold War
• Strengthening of NATO – membership enlarged, expanded
secretariat, unified command structure, financial aid
• West German rearmament – Plevan Plan
• San Francisco Peace Treaty (Sept 1951) – restoration of Japan –
Mutual Security Agreement (Sept 1951), Yoshida Letter (Dec 1951)
• Changed policy towards Taiwan
• ANZUS Pact – (Sept 1951)
• Tougher policy re Vietnam, increased aid to French
Cold War in Asia – Summary Notes Global Cold War – Hot War in Korea 1949-53
1. New Communist Threats:
From the autumn 1949, US wanted to reinforce the core of the free world -
Western Europe and Japan - while limiting the advance of communism on the
periphery, especially in Asia. USA analysts thought that if the USSR was denied
the opportunity for expansion, the whole system would collapse in upon itself.
YET two events transformed the situation and ushered in a new and dangerous
phase of Cold War.
The victory of the CCP in the Chinese Civil War:
In Oct 49, the Nationalists quit Chinese mainland for the island of Taiwan. The
People’s Republic of China (PRC) was formed and Mao invited foreign
governments to establish diplomatic relations with China. This was a disaster
for USA, as a vast new communist state now existed in Asia, which USA
suspected as being an agent of Stalin and further, that he would now seek to
promote – ‘the menace of’ - communism throughout the whole continent of
Asia. In fact, relations between the Kremlin and CCP had been frosty but Stalin
moved quickly to ally with the People’s Republic in order to promote Soviet
interests in Asia. In addition, Stalin encouraged China to tow the Soviet line
towards USA. In February 1950, a 30 year mutual assistance treaty was agreed
resulting in USSR providing $300m in credits to China. The response of USA to the PRC was indecisive, there were no diplomatic relations, but at the same time, they ended aid to Jiang and no promise was made to defend Taiwan. Secretary of State Acheson hoped to woo PRC away from Stalin but the Republicans in Congress would never have allowed such open relations and ultimately, USA proved unable to influence events on Mainland China.
The Detonation of the first Soviet Atomic Bomb:
One month before the ‘fall’ of China, USA intelligence detected traces of
radioactivity in the northern Pacific, resulting in panic in Washington. USA had
not only underestimated the technological expertise of SU but as a result of the
work of Soviet spy Klaus Fuchs, who had worked on the Manhattan Project, the
SU bomb was a replica of the USA bomb! Soviet possession of the bomb
‘Changed everything’ – Acheson – as the USA monopoly had acted as a shield
for USA’s risk-taking anti-USSR policies and as a deterrent against a Soviet
invasion of Western Europe. Truman’s reaction was to authorise in January
1950 the development of a superior fusion bomb, thus ensuring USA superiority
in the field of nuclear weapons.
2. NSC 68:
These events and pressure from the Republicans, who criticised Truman for
weak policies and the subsequent loss of China, resulted in a review of goals
and tactics. The outcome of this was NSC 68, which had been produced by the
National Security Council in April 1950. It demonstrated the underlying
Cold War in Asia – Summary Notes continuity of USA policy and the objectives of diplomacy – it differed little from
Kennan’s position:
The confinement of Communism The gradual erosion of Soviet Influence leading to the eventual downfall
of the Soviet system.
The achievement of these aims depended on the continued ascendancy of USA within the
international system. USA policy was based on the premise that the USA could only win the
Cold War by remaining more powerful than USSR. The key to a global balance of power
favourable to USA was to draw:
the power centres of Japan
the workshop of Asia and
industrialised Western Europe into the orbit of USA.
Yet, NSC 68 marked one departure from existing policy, previously $ had been the weapon of
the war, now NSC 68 proposed a substantial increase in military strength – conventional and
atomic - as USSR policy might become more aggressive now that it had the surety of the
atomic bomb. BUT such developments would mean increased taxes, cuts in welfare and thus
political unpopularity, Truman did nothing. However, the eruption of the Korean War eventually
saw almost every recommendation of NSC 69 implemented.
3. Turning Point: War in Korea, 1950-53:
CAUSES
On 25th June 1950, 90,000 North Korean soldiers smashed across the 38th parallel on Kim Il
Sung’s orders, Kim sought to unify the Korean peninsular under communist rule. He believed
that because of support for communism in the South and opposition to Rhee’s regime, he
would be welcomed as a liberator and champion. Kim thought war would last days as Acheson
had omitted South Korea from his list of countries that USA would automatically defend in the
event of aggression. Kim was also hostile to USA, he resented USA policy of rebuilding Japan,
for a variety of reasons
Japan had occupied Korea between 1910 and 1945
Kim had fought with Mao against Japan in Manchuria and
USA’s attempts to undermine Mao by supporting Jiang was a further factor.
Stalin agreed to invasion plans but warned Kim in April, that USSR would not intervene directly;
Stalin sent military supplies and advisors in May and June 1950. Stalin did not want USSR
involved in another war so soon after WWII, although the conquest of South Korea would be to
USSR’s advantage, as it would:
Secure Russia’s borders Threaten USA’s ally, Japan and Place Korea’s extensive lead reserves at USSR’s disposal.
Mao could only consider limited assistance while he was consolidating the revolution and
securing the defeat of Nationalist forces in Taiwan. Whilst USA’s initial response, was to rush
military supplies to Korea. Then on 30th June, Truman ordered USA troops stationed in Japan,
into Korea – this action met with widespread support for the President – 75% support in the
polls!
Cold War in Asia – Summary Notes June 27th UNO passed a resolution to launch military action against North Korea - USSR was
boycotting the Security Council because of USA refusal to accept China as a member of the
Council. The UNO force was essentially American - 260,000 USA troops and 35,000 others,
made up of 15 other nationalities and South Korea. The force was under the command of
General Douglas MacArthur. So, five years after the end of WWII, USA was at war again because policy makers refused to
accept that Kim was acting independently of Moscow, the belief was that this was Soviet expansion in action and there was fear that the Domino Theory might come true. A firm response was what would thwart it and further, action provided evidence of USA credibility and
reliability to resist world communism. b) OVERVIEW
USA got off to a bad start, in August, North Korea captured Seoul. Fighting conditions were appalling, it was the monsoon season and temperatures rose above 100 and soldiers got dysentery from the water. In September, UN forces occupied but a toehold around Pusan on the Southern tip of the peninsular. MacArthur thus mounted a daring amphibious outflanking movement and pushed towards the 38th Parallel from the port of Inchon and at the same time, broke out of Pusan and advanced rapidly northwards. Truman now changed plan, he jettisoned his original war aim of expelling North Korean forces from the South and pushed across the 38th Parallel towards the North Korean capital, Pyongyang fell while MacArthur raced towards the Yalu River on the Chinese- North Korean border. The policy was now one of recovery, or ‘rollback’, adopted to ensure that South Korea was no longer constantly vulnerable to the communist threat – the decision was partly based on intelligence reports that neither SU nor China would intervene. OH DEAR! The reports were flawed Chinese forces were amassing beyond the Yalu, but their numbers were severely underestimated. MacArthur thought it was a bluff, but Mao had felt compelled to intervene as he saw USA presence as a threat to national security, he also feared that Jiang might launch a counter-revolution in China with USA support. Initially Mao sent a limited number of ‘volunteers’ who helped halt MacArthur’s advance and then withdrew in order to test the intentions of USA. MacArthur continued the offensive and thus, 260,000 Chinese troops poured across the Yalu River. Bleak days followed for USA troops as temperatures fell to -20 and -30, 40,000 USA troops were penned in by the Chinese and had to fight their way out before being evacuated from the port of Hungnam. In December, USA suffered their worst casualties, 11,000 in two days, including 3,000 deaths in one day. The Communists launched a major counter offensive and reoccupying Pyongyang and Seoul in January 1951. Truman and Acheson decided to revert to the original plan of restoring the border at the 38th Parallel, in order to avoid any risk of a confrontation with SU, this suited Stalin who had avoided almost all participation – again he was acting in the interests of SU and avoiding any chance of conflict with USA. However, Truman and MacArthur, conflicted on this change of policy – see page 70. MacArthur was thus relieved of his command – the military must obey the orders of the C-in-C (President) – the General returned a hero, as both politicians and public were angry at Truman, blaming him for the loss of China - public opinion had also become frustrated by the high casualties and slowness of the limited war strategy. MacArthur’s successor was Lieutenant-General Matthew Ridgway and in February 1951 he launched a powerful counterattack, Operation Killer, followed in March by Operation Ripper. Superior firepower and air command enabled UN troops to recross the 38th Parallel, and
‘Rollback’ for the rest of the war, the front line stabilised along a 150 mile long line just north of the 38th Parallel.
Stalemate encouraged both sides to seek a negotiated end to hostilities and peace talks began in July 1951 but dragged on for two years. There were two obstacles to any agreement i Stalin urged Mao and Kim to extract more concessions from USA ii The repatriation of POWs However, Stalin’s death in March 1953 and compromise on the issue of repatriation, brought an armistice in July 1953. Under the terms, the new boundary was virtually the same as the 38th Parallel. Although the war never became global, there were high costs to pay, the three years of fighting involved: 250,000 USA troops facing 865,000 communists and cost: 33,629 USA troops, 415,000 South Koreans and 3,000 from the UN allies. Communist dead and wounded were estimated at two million.
Cold War in Asia – Summary Notes
5
The consequences of the Korean War were far-reaching: DOMESTIC It resulted in the permanent expansion of USA’s armed forces and a constant state of military readiness for limited wars against communism worldwide, based on the assumption that the Soviets were aggressive. In addition, the maintenance of nuclear superiority was vital, Truman asked Congress in 1950 for $260m to be spent on the hydrogen bomb project, along with $l0m on the armed forces and $4m military aid to USA’s allies. For the supporters of increasing armaments against communism, Korea came at an important time, just when they felt their cause was losing support.
JAPAN In the East, Japan’s economic and political recovery was also accelerated by Korean War, many USA troops were stationed in Japan and the spending power of hundreds of thousands of troops helped to stimulate the economy. Political reconstruction was confirmed by the San Francisco peace treaty (1951), which ended state of war between USA and Japan, restored sovereignty to Japan and terminated the occupation with effect from 1952. In return, The Mutual Security Alliance guaranteed USA military bases in Japan and on island of Okinawa. Japan’s importance to USA strategy in the area, was made clear by the Yoshida Letter, which sought to end any trade agreement between Japan and China. USA did not want Japan to become detached from the USA sphere, and had hoped that economic isolation of China would bring down Mao’s regime. The letter also secured Japanese trade with Taiwan. With regard to Taiwan, in June 1950, Truman ordered the USA Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits to defend the island from any possible communist invasion. Jiang received substantial economic and military aid, as the denial of Taiwan to China was an important means of limiting the power of Chinese communism in Asia. Australia and New Zealand saw the new Japan as an economic rival and potential aggressor. To ensure their compliance and to align them behind the pro-Japan policy, USA set up and signed the ANZUS Pact, by which each nation would help each other in the event of any aggression against Australasia. SOUTH-EAST ASIA In the attempt to eliminate communism in Vietnam, USA threw its weight behind the French. Ho Chi Minh was seen as an agent of the Kremlin – Acheson quote! By the early 1950s, USA was spending $l billion per year in military assistance to the French. It was seen as essential that, Japan and the non-communist countries of SE Asia, must be integrated into a regional economy guaranteeing mutual prosperity. CONCLUSION: There is no doubt that the Korean War was a pivotal event in the Cold War. It marked an acceleration of USA policy, yet measures such as: The reinforcement of NATO West German sovereignty and potential rearmament A Japanese peace treaty and
Cold War in Asia – Summary Notes
6
Increased economic aid to the anti-communist regimes, had all been under consideration beforehand, and showed that there had been no reorientation of USA policy. The new military commitments worldwide, meant permanently high levels of defence spending - never less than $40b pa. War in Korea also brought a militarisation of USA policy, as after Korea, USA was ready to deploy troops anywhere in order to defend the ‘free world’.
KOREA – The Historians’ Views: Edwards: Korea cannot be isolated from the rest of the Cold War. It has to be explained in the following fashion - 1 The significance of the loss of China 2 New Communist threats 3 Domestic pressures on Truman The USA had the same objectives in 1949 as they had had in 1947 - 1 To shore up the ‘Free World’ – Marshall Plan 2 To stop the development of Communism in areas such as Asia. But more immediate concerns existed. CHINA: Chinese Communist Party (CCP) victory in the civil war was expected. The Nationalists had to quit the Chinese mainland. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) was formed with Nationalists withdrawing to the off-shore island of Taiwan. A vast new government was formed. In the USA it was feared that this represented the monolithic spread of Communism. China was the agent of the Kremlin and as such the whole of Asia was in danger of going down the Communist route. Stalin was quick to welcome Mao’s victory. He was prepared to concede China’s control over the region, provided China respected its border with the USSR. Thus in February 1950 they both signed a mutual assistance treaty under which the USSR promised to provide China with $300m in credits. AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO THE PRC: Initially, indecisive as Acheson’s ‘Dust to settle’ phrase suggests. 1 USA refused PRC diplomatic recognition but also no guarantees to the Nationalists 2 Acheson still hoped in 1950 that he could detach Sino-Soviet link 3 Month prior to the fall of China, USSR had detonated her bomb – ahead of schedule! The latter changed everything, now there was no US monopoly. USA now much more considered in its responses – Fear? – compare this with Truman’s attitude at Potsdam. NSC 68: The events of 1949 caused change in attitudes. The Republicans had now lost 5 consecutive elections and there was definite bitterness. They saw the Cold War as an opportunity. Thus Truman would have to respond to the threat from Korea. This came in the form of NSC 68. It based its findings on the nature of Soviet’s ‘absolute control’ and the total submission of its people –“The personality of the individual is so broken and perverted that he participates in his own degradation” and further “The
Cold War in Asia – Summary Notes
7
Kremlin seeks to bring the free word under its domination by the methods of war”. Thus the USA continued with its aim of confining Communism to those areas in which it already existed but eventually to destroy it. Therefore USA had to be dominant. NSC increased military strength. Truman was a bit hesitant as a peacetime army and the costs were such a move away from the previous position of isolationism but once North Korea attacked it would be accepted. THE CONFLICT: Kim thought that USA would not become involved – Acheson’s ‘defensive perimeter’ speech (Jan 1950). Stalin warned Kim that he would not get directly involved: “If you should get kicked in the teeth, I shall not lift a finger” but he did send troops. China also gave limited support as Mao needed to consolidate his own victory. USA RESPONSE: Immediate action - 1 Military supplies rushed in 2 UNO resolution for military action against North Korean aggression 3 USA troops moved in from Japan – 75% of Americans approved. The reasons for this response were largely twofold - 1 NK was being directed by Moscow: “If we let Korea down, the Soviets will keep right on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another” (Truman). 2 USA’s credibility around the world – Truman Doctrine. Containment and ‘Limited War’ were the watchwords at the outset of the campaign but after the rapid success of Mac Arthur’s outflanking exercise at Inchon the approach became a bit more bullish. The intelligence reports suggested that China would not become involved and so the opportunity for a Cold War boost was identified and now ‘Rollback’ became the new aim. However, the intelligence was wrong and the war turned bad on USA. Truman was now flustered and considered other options - 1 Atomic bomb – fear of war with USSR 2 Revert to original aim and settle for division at 38th Parallel. However, dispute then arose between Truman and MacArthur over the President’s desire for a return to a more conservative approach. MacArthur was relieved of his command – replaced by Ridgway – and then blamed the President directly for the loss of China. CONSEQUENCES: USA defence production was increased sevenfold 1950 to 1953 NATO was strengthened – 4 more US divisions Bases in Turkey West Germany was now both independent and an ally Indochina was now seen as key and USA threw weight behind the French – Ho was seen as an agent of the Kremlin So, Korea resulted in an acceleration of USA policy, an increase in US commitments abroad and in militarisation. Ambrose: Truman needed to show the US people that he was not soft on Communism and to extend containment to Asia.
Cold War in Asia – Summary Notes
8
Rhee’s style was an embarrassment to the USA and there were calls from the South Korea Assembly for unification. Connally, the chairman of the Relations Committee, stated that South Korea would have to be abandoned as the Communists overran it. However, Korea was not ‘greatly important’ – a reiteration of Acheson’s view and the position of the Truman administration. BUT not with NSC 68 or the rise of McCarthyism. However, when called upon to act, Truman responded positively and quickly to the use of US troops and further, he extended the Truman Doctrine directly to Asia. Aid was also extended to the French in their fight against Ho. At the same time HST informed Stalin that his approach was limited – containment not conquest – “… to restore peace and … the border.” He wanted containment at a low cost however; US money and equipment – bombers – would do the job. BUT in fact it did not. So what next? Withdraw or increase commitment? UNO said the purpose was containment but there was no consultation with that body or allies when things improved for USA and ‘Rollback’ became the watchword. September 1st 1950 Korea had the right to be “Free, independent and united.” A meeting with MacArthur saw broad agreement about freeing the North – Pyongyang would become “The first iron curtain capital to be liberated”. Then it went wrong and the differences emerged - HST called for a worldwide mobilisation against Communism. He even talked of using the bomb MacArthur called for an attack against China. January 1951 Truman showed his resolve: He put the nation on a Cold War footing Selective service reintroduced $50 billion budget announced, along the lines of NSC 68 Increased aid to the French He gave USA a thermonuclear bomb Rearmed Germany Agreed a treaty with the Japanese and Extended US bases around the world thus hemming in Communism and any Communist who poked his head through the ‘curtain’ would get it shot off. Truman had increased the risk of war while making war immeasurably more dangerous. This was containment in action – Communism would not rise anywhere new BUT in America this acceptance of permanent Cold War was not universally popular. Millions still wanted to ‘Free the Slaves’ whilst millions more wanted to destroy the Communist threat and this attitude was manifested in the body of MacArthur. In March 1951 he was at the Parallel again and he crossed. Truman was furious, April 5th Joseph Martin read a letter from MacArthur calling for a new foreign policy and to start by reunifying Korea. The American people seemed to be rejecting containment. Truman was under pressure from UNO and from his NATO allies in Europe to negotiate. Peace was not forthcoming but the war situation stabilised. Truman won there would be no more rollback. In the senate, the MacArthur hearings seemed to conclude that USA could not destroy USSR or China but nor could they allow them to expand. Public opinion swung back to Truman. Ambrose finishes by stating that containment of opponents rather than destruction was the way ahead and that the best measure of the success of
Cold War in Asia – Summary Notes
9
this approach was its continuation by his successors in the White House.
24 The Historian / Autumn 2010
Imperialism resurgent: European attempts to ‘recolonise’ South East Asia after 1945
John Springhall
‘To think that the people of Indochina would be content to settle for less [from the French] than Indonesia has gained from the Dutch or India from the British is to underestimate the power of the forces that are sweeping Asia today’.An American adviser in 1949 cited: Robin Jeffrey ed., Asia: The Winning of Independence (Macmillan, London, 1981), p. 17.
A focus on the achieving of independence by India and Pakistan (1947) or on rapidly decolonising British, Belgian and French Africa (1956-68) has meant that the white dominions are usually excluded as vital to the process seen in the West as decolonisation (‘pull out’) or in the former colonies themselves as a triumphant national liberation struggle (‘push out’).1 Also easily overlooked have been the forcible endeavours made in the decade immediately after the Second World War to return former South East Asian colonial territories, officially won back from the Japanese, to their pre-war white European overlords. Unexpectedly, British armed forces played an essential if little known part in assisting the attempted Dutch and French recolonisation of what eventually became the independent territories of Java, Sumatra, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Not only because of Britain’s initially uncontested reoccupation of Malaya and Singapore but also through the key role played for six months during 1945-46 by Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command (SEAC). The latter were virtually the only source of allied troops in this vast region capable of dealing with the surrendered Japanese and of liberating their internees.
The Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia)On 17 August 1945, two days after Japan’s post-Hiroshima surrender ended the Second World War, an indecisive [Ahmed] Sukarno, along with Mohammad Hatta, proclaimed independence from their pre-war Dutch rulers in Java – the heartland of ‘Indonesian’ national consciousness. The political vacuum left by Japanese collapse and withdrawal from nearly all the main towns and cities of what was, before the Japanese invasion in 1942, the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), was rapidly occupied by a functioning nationalist government determined to oppose the unwelcome return of Dutch rule. Eventually, six weeks after the Japanese capitulation, largely Indian Army and British-officered troops of Mountbatten’s SEAC (fatigued after service in Burma) arrived in Java and Sumatra, as agreed by the allies at Potsdam, to accept the surrender of and disarm Japanese soldiers, release Dutch or allied prisoners and maintain order. As a peace-keeping force mediating between the Dutch eager to restore colonial rule, Japanese prisoners, their internees, and volatile nationalist Indonesians, 23rd Indian Division found themselves saddled unforeseen with what was soon to become the most explosive political problem in the Far East.2
On the evening of 30 October 1945 in Surabaya, East Java, Brigadier A. W. S. Mallaby, commander of the 49th Indian Brigade of the 23rd Division was killed while attempting to enforce a highly fragile truce between British-Indian troops and nationalist Indonesians that would allow thousands of Dutch men, women, and children previously interned by the conquering
Focus
An Indian soldier fires at snipers from behind a knocked out Indonesian tank in Surabaya, November 1945.Imperial War Museum
A soldier of an Indian armoured regiment examines a Japanese light tank used by Indonesian nationalists and captured by British forces during the figthing in Surabaya Imperial War Museum
The Historian / Autumn 2010 25
Japanese to reach the local docks and be shipped out. The circumstances which led to this senior British officer’s unanticipated death and the ignominious retreat of the 49th Brigade, heavily outnumbered by Japanese-armed nationalists, widely dispersed, and out-manoeuvred, has been subject to a great deal of speculation, much of it erroneous. We now know that Mallaby, confined in a grey Lincoln sedan car with two other British officers, was shot by a young pemuda of around 16 or 17 years old, not long after trying to broker a ceasefire in front of the Internatio Bank in Union Square, where a company of the 6th Mahrattas were holding out, confronted by an angry crowd of 500 or so hostile Indonesians. The indignity of the retreat to the docks after Mallaby’s death was subsequently wiped out only by a ferocious British seizure of the city of Surabaya after severe bombing and fighting whose excesses have been too easily forgotten outside of Java.3
On 31 October 1945 the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Philip Christison, made the impossible demand, under Foreign Office prompting, that unless those Indonesians who had broken the truce and ‘foully murdered’ Brigadier Mallaby surrendered to the British, ‘I intend to bring the whole weight of my sea, land and air forces and all the weapons of modern war against them until they are crushed’. Consequently, from 10 November 1945, reinforcements of the 5th Indian Division from Batavia (Jakarta) with 9,000 troops and 24 Sherman tanks, commanded by Major-General Robert
Mansergh, began a bloody punitive sweep through Java’s second city under cover of heavy air and naval warship bombardment. Surabaya was ravaged by constant shelling, more than 500 bombs were dropped by allied aircraft in just the first few days. In the face of ‘fanatical’ Indonesian resistance, the mopping-up operation occupied nearly three weeks of bitter and intensive fighting. At least 6,000 Indonesians were killed, far more than in the two Dutch ‘police actions’ that followed the final British withdrawal a year later, earning comparison in the anti-colonial American press with the barbarities of Nazi Germany. Heroes’ Day (Hari Pahlawan) still celebrates, on 10 November each year, the folk memory of a people’s struggle in Surabaya and of a blood sacrifice for national independence (the concurrent
Indonesian slaughter of Chinese and Eurasians conveniently forgotten). ‘The battle of Surabaya remains one of the largest single engagements fought by British troops since the end of the Second World War, and it was the last use of Indian soldiers in combat by the British Empire’, point out the distinguished authors of self-explanatory Forgotten Wars (2007).4
The first Dutch ‘police action’, or armed invasion of the still unrecognised republic, came in July 1947 with many of their troops shipped through Singapore. The United States under President Harry Truman did little to prevent this ‘imperialist’ act of aggression because of America’s need for Dutch anti-communist support in Western Europe. Then, in September 1948, there was a premature attempt at a coup by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) at Madiun in East Java, whose violent suppression won American support for the embattled republic. Yet this was followed by the second Dutch ‘police action’ from December 1948 until April 1949, undeterred by the disapproval of the United Nations (UN) and anti-imperialist world opinion. This second invasion of republican territory climaxed in a successful military sweep that brought the arrest of nationalist leaders, including Sukarno and Hatta, at Yogjakarta in south-central Java. Thus actual or threatened military repression of anti-colonial opposition clearly seemed like a viable option in the first four years of the republic’s history, albeit guerrilla resistance in the countryside soon began to weigh down the Dutch military machine. So the use of force by the well-armed Dutch military in attempting to recover the riches of the East Indies became a constant factor until the Americans at last vetoed reconquest of what was now recognised as a legitimate anti-communist
Javanese revolutionaries armed with bamboo spears and a few Japanese rifles, 1946.
Ceremony of raising the flag of Indonesia moments after the reading of the Indonesian Declaration of Independence 17 August 1945.
26 The Historian / Autumn 2010
Focus
nationalist regime under Sukarno. They threatened to end Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands if they did not enter into negotiations, leading to the eventual transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949. The new Republic of Indonesia, capital Jakarta, officially came into being on 17 August 1950.5
French Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) Following the Japanese surrender, Mountbatten’s SEAC, the only command with sufficient allied troops in the region, was also drawn willy-nilly into another attempted recolonisation in SE Asia: the vain French attempt to restore their imperial rule in Indochina or the three provinces which are now Vietnam, grouped together with Cambodia and Laos. On 2 September 1945 Ho Chi Minh had proclaimed the birth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in front of a northern crowd of 500,000 in Hanoi, masking evidence of a communist ascendancy by quoting from the American Declaration of Independence, the text of which had been helpfully supplied by an Office of Strategic Services (OSS = forerunner CIA) officer. Meanwhile, SEAC, whose area already covered Burma, Singapore, Malaya, Borneo, Thailand, Java and Sumatra, was given responsibility under the Potsdam agreement to disarm the Japanese and occupy former French Indochina south of the 16th parallel, with nationalist China to occupy the land north of it. The 80th Infantry Brigade of the 20th Indian Division under Major-General Douglas Gracey hence flew into Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City), for 80 years the southern hub of the French colony, from 12 September 1945 onwards. Mounttbatten had ordered Gracey to avoid the south’s internal problems – French settlers versus the communist Vietminh, plus various other parties, religious cults, and mercenary gangsters all jockeying for power – and merely to remove the mainly French prisoners of war and disarm the surrendered Japanese.6
When the long-serving but politically inexperienced Gracey first arrived (without a Foreign Office representative), Saigon was in chaos. The discredited French Vichy administration had crumbled, devastated by the defeat of Japan, whose thousands of troops now awaited repatriation. On 21 September Gracey exceeded Mountbatten’s instructions by proclaiming martial law but, with only one brigade of British, Indian and Ghurka troops at his disposal, he lacked the muscle to enforce his decree. So, encouraged by de Gaulle’s parachuted-in representative
Jean Cédile, on the following day he released and armed 1,400 French army troops, mostly foreign legionnaires, who had been imprisoned in Saigon jail by the Japanese. The desperate Vietminh leaders temporarily in power in Saigon thereupon mobilized a massive protest demonstration deliberately designed to provoke British and French reprisals, thence causing local casualties that would attract world-wide attention.7
A French orgy of violence pre-empted them in the early hours of 23 September 1945 when, a day after their release, French soldiers went on a rampage, ousting the Vietminh’s so-called provisional executive committee and raising the French tricolour from the rooftops. Their ranks swollen by angry French settlers, the legionnaires indiscriminately victimised any so-called Annamites (Vietnamese) they ran into despite pleas for calm by Gracey and Cédile, appalled by the violent spectacle that they had themselves unleashed. ‘It was a tragic blunder, grievously compounded by the brutal and hysterical behaviour of the French’, writes the author of an early disclosure of the British role in Vietnam.8 Gracey’s collusion in the military coup that restored the French to power in Saigon, given its long-term effects and explicit support for French colonialism, has invited controversy among historians ever since.
Responding to the French frenzy, the Vietminh leaders launched a general strike on 24 September 1945, thereby marking the opening of real hostilities in Vietnam overall. Gracey’s inadequate British-Indian force was now used to suppress the Annamite uprising in Saigon which meant that he had no choice but to make extensive use of Japanese soldiers, not only in support and auxiliary roles but also as active combat units, often, though not always, under the command of British officers. Up to the end of January 1946, the major-general gave 3 British soldiers killed, 37 Indian or Ghurka, 106 French, 110 Japanese and 3,026 Annamite (of whom 1,825 were reported as killed by the French). Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Dewey of the OSS, accidentally killed in a Vietminh ambush near the Saigon golf course on 26 September, was to be the first of nearly 60,000 Americans subsequently killed in Vietnam. The fighting that took place between British-Indian troops, the Japanese, the French, and nationalists in and around Saigon has been referred to by some historians as post-1945 the First Vietnam War.9
The British foreign policy dilemma back in Whitehall was that Gracey could not continue to back the gradually
returning French in the provinces of Annam and Cochinchina without alienating Nationalist China and anti-colonial American opinion. On the other hand, retreat from Saigon would cause consternation among the French who considered all of Indochina theirs by divine right and perhaps encourage nationalist revolt in Britain’s own colonial possessions in Asia, such as a volatile Burma. So French troops had to be sent to southern Indochina (South Vietnam) with the utmost dispatch and, after turning it over to them, British troops must be withdrawn as soon as possible. This was, in effect, what took place. The United States, while hesitant to get directly involved in aiding French imperialism, raised no objections as the British gave their American military equipment to French units and transported them by troop ship to Saigon and up into the Mekong Delta. British military intervention was mostly over by early 1946, subsequently forgotten by the collective memory, and British-Indian troops were already on their way to deal with the intractable problem of Dutch re-entry into the East Indies.
On 28 January 1946 the British Control Commission in Saigon was wound up and General Gracey departed, leaving the French and the Vietminh to resolve their irreconcilable differences by themselves. A vicious eight-year colonial war (1946-54) followed with both sides suffering terrible casualties, French generals hardly knowing how to fight an armed-peasant guerrilla war and the Vietminh forces trying desperately to avoid fighting pitched battles. The French campaign to recover ‘Indochina’ reached the unexpected and highly unusual climax of a nationalist force actually defeating European troops near the Laotian border on 7 May 1954 at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. This crushing French humiliation on the eve of the Geneva Conference on former Indochina sealed the end of their once-proud Asian Empire. Following this demoralising colonial war in South East Asia, Gallic military honour now became irretrievably committed to the preservation of French Algeria.10
British Malaya (Malaysia and Singapore)After 1948, the Malayan Emergency meant that communist-guerrilla warfare both retarded the prospects of British withdrawal from the tin and rubber-rich peninsula and constrained the development of anti-colonial Malay nationalist politics. The British could justify their continued presence as necessary, in the context of the emerging Cold War, until the largely Chinese
The Historian / Autumn 2010 27
communists had been defeated and safe passage was guaranteed to a united, independent, and democratic Malayan nation. Yet the successful restoration of British colonial rule after August 1945 without an anti-Japanese invasion meant that its eventual independence came a decade after India, Burma, or Pakistan. The old imperial supremacy in Asia lingered on here for British policy makers showed little hint of any desire to pull out, influenced by Malaya’s tin and rubber annually earning Britain more dollars than did all Britain’s own exports. Plans drawn up during and after the Second World War revealed instead a determination to extend and strengthen British control that accords with the current view that Britain’s aim in the years immediately following 1945 was to reinvigorate the empire, not to abandon it.11
This process of re-imposing British influence was focused after 1948 on the struggle to prevent armed take-over by a communist regime hostile to both British and western influence. The British were increasingly keen, on the other hand, to distance themselves from the imperialist outlook of the French and the Dutch in South East Asia, believing in a different strategy designed to lead eventually to self-government within the Commonwealth. Hence the ‘second colonial occupation’ of British Malaya that took place after 1945 saw the creation of a viable multi-ethnic nation-state as the culmination of the imperial mission. Parallels have been drawn, none the less, between British military strategy in Malaya and that of the Americans some 15 years later in South Vietnam. If anything, the British
were more ruthless in draining the sea of frightened peasantry within which the communist fish were allowed to swim. Starting in 1950, Chinese squatters exposed to Malayan Communist Party (MCP) intimidation on the fringes of the jungle were moved to new settlements or regrouped in the same locality, while the old settlements were replaced by ‘New Villages’ protected by barbed wire and police stations. By 1952 some 450,000 squatters had been brusquely resettled, defended by Malay police and their own Chinese home guard.12
Astonishingly, despite the MCP under Chin Peng being outnumbered 50 to one by British servicemen, Malay police, and colonial troops, on 5 October
1951, Sir Henry Gurney, the British High Commissioner, was killed in a road-side ambush by communist guerrillas. At this low point for British fortunes, the Tory Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, decided to concentrate civil administration and military authority in one man: General Sir Gerald Templer, GOC Eastern Command, who had been recommended by Field-Marshal Montgomery. Some believe that what really turned the tide for the British in the peninsula was the arrival in February 1952 of this 53-year-old general, a former director of military intelligence, given greater political power in a state of undeclared war than any British soldier since Oliver Cromwell. For Templer, the ‘Tiger of Malaya’, carried out a classic anti-insurgency campaign between 1952 and 1954 which broke the communist resistance, meanwhile speeding up political reform with the promise of future independence.
On the operational side, Templer endorsed the pre-existing plan of Chinese resettlement in ‘New Villages’ and gave it fresh impetus, in the interim using propaganda to win their ‘hearts and minds’, a phrase with which he became indelibly associated. On the political side, Templer continued to appoint prominent Malays as members of the federal government, answering for some departments in the Legislative Council and so representing a step on the road to independence. The next Tory Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, made a House of Commons statement in autumn 1954 promising independence once the anti-communist Emergency had been brought to a successful conclusion. This did much
Workers on a rubber plantation in Malaya travel to work under the protection of Special Constables whose function was to guard them throughout the working day against attack by communist forces, 1950. Imperial War Museum
Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten gives a public address from the steps of the Municipal Buildings in Singapore during signing of the Japanese surrender at Singapore, 1945.Imperial War Museum
28 The Historian / Autumn 2010
to ensure Malay support for the British anti-terrorist campaign which had successfully broken the back of the largely Chinese-communist resistance by the mid-1950s.13
The British were fortunate because the prosperity generated by the Korean War (1950-53) with its demand for military vehicles meant that the price of natural rubber on the international market was the best for any decade since the ‘boom years’ of the First World War. This prosperity made the expensive resettlement of Chinese squatters possible and also helped finance Templer’s ‘hearts and minds’ strategy. Without the rubber boom and the general economic buoyancy of the period, there is little doubt that the colonial government’s task would have been that much more difficult. For the final end of French colonial rule in Indochina in 1954 had left the British isolated as the only significant colonial power in South East Asia, if we discount Portuguese East Timor and Dutch New Guinea (Irian Jaya). The changing international environment (American, Russian, and UN insistence on the abolition of colonialism) also urged British flexibility towards Malaya’s constitutional development and partnership with popular nationalist movements, such as the multi-racial alliance (UMNO-MCA) led by future ruler (1957-70) Tunku Abdul Rahman. Following a conference in London early in 1956, the date for independence or merdeka of the Federation of Malaya was fixed for 31 August 1957, albeit British armed forces stayed on in Malaya to deal with the dying embers of the communist insurrection for a further three years.14
ConclusionsDutch, French and British experiences of armed resistance against nationalist or communist movements in post-1945 South East Asia, and the varieties of international, metropolitan and colonial reactions, have few characteristics in common. What are perhaps significant are less the parallels, such as French and Dutch intransigence, than that recolonisation was attempted at all after the surrender of the Japanese, given the pious assurances of freedom for colonial peoples enshrined in both the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the 1945 UN Charter. British reluctance to leave Malaya, Singapore, and Borneo, the need to appease their allies, plus a general concern for the position of European powers in South East Asia, also meant that a Labour government (1945-51) felt militarily compelled from 1945-46 to support both the French and Dutch imperialist struggles to re-impose a
reviled foreign ‘sovereignty’, despite the presence of strong nationalist movements. The impact of socialist ideology on Labour’s imperial and colonial policy-making was not very deep. The Dutch military effort to restore their East Indies colonial system has been called one of the major pieces of self-deception in the annals of empire, a dubious accolade equalled only by the self-deluding French campaign to recover the entirety of Indochina.
Vicious colonial wars in Indochina and subsequently in Algeria (1954-62) were the terrible price paid to maintain France’s international role, since without their colonial empire Gaullists and communists alike felt that their nation would be demoted. Similarly, politicians in The Hague, unable to see forward to a prosperous Dutch future within the Common Market, were convinced that their economy could not survive without the oil, rubber, sugar, tobacco, tea and coffee to be extorted from, primarily, the outer islands of the NEI. The real task confronting returning European colonial powers in post-war South East Asia following a brutal Japanese occupation was one of how to reach political accommodation with the leaders of nationalist resistance to imperial rule and to do so without endangering future and favoured trading relations. The French and the Dutch showed little understanding of the changed international environment or the rise of an Asian nationalism that had been encouraged by the Japanese occupiers, whereas Britain’s more pragmatic and goal-oriented imperial outlook in Malaya was qualitatively different and had widespread Malay support.
References1. A. G. Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonization’, Past
and Present, 200 (August 2008), pp. 211-247, argues that the effective transfer of power to the old dominions took place long after 1945 and not suddenly at the 1931 Statute of Westminster. On definitions of terms see: John Springhall, Decolonization since 1945: The Collapse of European Overseas Empires (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001), pp. 2-4.
2. G. M. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Cornell University Press, Ithaca: New York, 1952); Peter Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace: Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945-1946 (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1987); Richard McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945-1946: Britain, the Netherlands and the Indonesian Revolution (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon., 2005).
3. John Springhall, ‘“Disaster in Surabaya”: The Death of Brigadier Mallaby during the British Occupation of Java, 1945-46’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 24, 3 (September 1996), pp. 422-43; McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia, pp. 46-52. A useful Dutch DVD (subtitled) on the British occupation of Surabaya in the autumn of 1945 is available from: wwwsoerabajasurabaya.nl.
4. Gen Christison, AFNEI to ALFSEA cipher, 31 October 1945, WO 203/2650, National Archives; Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain’s Asian Empire (Penguin Books, London, 2008), p. 180. In August 2001, in a rare gesture, the British government under
Tony Blair made a formal statement of apology for what had taken place at Surabaya.
5. Robert Cribb and Colin Brown, Modern Indonesia: A History since 1945 (Longman, London, 1995), pp. 15-16; Robert J. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-49 (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1981).
6. John Springhall, ‘“Kicking out the Vietminh”: How Britain Allowed France to Reoccupy South Indochina, 1945-46’, Journal of Contemporary History, 40, 1 (January 2005), pp. 115-30; Nicholas Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998).
7. Peter M. Dunn, The First Vietnam War (Hurst, London, 1985), pp. 155-56; Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace, pp. 39-40, 169.
8. George Rosie, The British in Vietnam: How the 25 Year War Began (Pan Books, London, 1970), p. 65.
9. ‘List of casualties inflicted and incurred in the [British] occupation of Southern Indochina up to 27 January 1946’, 4/8, Gracey Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, University of London; ‘Official casualties, mid-October 1945 to mid-January 1946’, Foreign Office Documents on British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict, 1945-46 (HMSO, London, 1965), p. xviii.
10. Mark Atwood Lawrence and Fredrik Logevall eds., The First Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2007); Peter Macdonald, Giap: The Victor in Vietnam (Fourth Estate, London, 1993); Martin Windrow, The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 2004).
11. A. G. Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonization’, p. 216; idem., ‘Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History’, Past and Present, 164 (1999), pp. 198-243.
12. Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993 ed.); Robert Jackson, The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth’s Wars, 1948-1966 (Routledge, London, 1991).
13. John Cloake, Templer, Tiger of Malaya: The Life of Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer (Harrap, London, 1985).
14. Richard Stubbs, Counter-Insurgency and the Economic Factor: The Impact of the Korean War Prices Boom on the Malayan Emergency (Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1974); T. N. Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001).
Further ReadingA recent study of decolonisation that integrates theory and illustrative case studies, including ones of Indochina and Indonesia, is Martin Shipway, Decolonization and its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires (Blackwell, Oxford, 2008). The most readable general survey of the British dilemma in post-war South East Asia and one not limited to military history is: Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain’s Asian Empire (Penguin Books, London, 2008). Still invaluable is Peter Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace: Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945-1946 (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1987).
Dr John Springhall is a Reader Emeritus in History at the University of Ulster where he taught for many years and is the author or editor of six books, among them Decolonization since 1945: The Collapse of European Overseas Empires (Palgrave, Basingstoke and New York, 2001).
Bombing at Washington D.C. home of Attorney-General Palmer
“These attacks will only increase the activities of our crime-detecting forces," declares Attorney-General Palmer, whose Washington home, shown above, was damaged by a bomb-explosion on June 2.
How Long Will Your Uncle Samuel Stand for This? (Mexico)
Close the Gate
Put Them Out and Keep Them Out
Step by Step
Stop! The Red: "Let's Go to the Bottom First"
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aMcCarthy Witchhunts
• Beginning of 1950’s growing interrelationship between US
domestic policy and foreign affairs
• Cold War sees, and is primary cause of, virulent anti
communism in USA
• But McCarthyism did not emerge out of the blue
– 1920’s and 1930’s
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• House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) 1938
• Hatch Act 1939:
– prohibited employees (civil servants) in executive branch of federal
government, except president, vice-president, and certain
designated high-level officials of executive branch, from engaging in
partisan political activity
• Smith Act 1940:
– set criminal penalties for advocating overthrow of US government
and required all non-citizen adult residents to register with
government
• Flood of anti-communist literature appearing after WW2:
– Raymond Allen, Communists Should Not Teach in American
Colleges (1949)
• Truman fanning the flames? (Why?)
HUAC
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aAlger Hiss
• Anti-communism was
factor in 1948 election –
though Truman held it in
check
• But Alger Hiss accused of
being Soviet spy 1948
• Convicted of perjury in
connection with this
charge 1950
– exposed liberals to attack
• Hiss scandal acted as
curtain raiser for McCarthy
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McCarthy
• Speech 9 February 1950
• Claimed he had 205
names of known
communists in State
Department
• McCarthy addressing
rising public anxiety over
communism and US
‘losing’ Cold War
• Embarked on four year
anti-communist crusade
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a• Further revelations …
• 1950 Klaus Fuchs
member of the British
team working at Los
Alamos convicted as a
spy
• Ethel and Julius
Rosenberg executed
19th June 1953 for
treason – spying during
wartime
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Impact of the Korean War
• Brought McCarthy ‘fully to life’
• Fuelled suspicions and anxieties
• Encouraged its longevity …
• Continued until McCarthy began attacking the military (see
next slide)
• Effects of McCarthyism
– 9,500 civil servants dismissed
– 15,000 resigned
– 600 teachers lost their jobs
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aEnd
• McCarthy disgraced in 1954
– televised Army – McCarthy hearings from April – June 1954
• His brutal, reckless and irresponsible manner was seen by
all
• Though public approval remained until this point
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TASK:
• Watch CNN/BBC Cold War documentary: Reds 1948-54
The Policy of Containment:
Confining Soviet Power 1947-1949
Introduction
Kennan’s ‘long telegram’ had been the instigator of the policy of Containment. It was based on the assumption that SU would try to extend its power by applying pressure on weak points beyond its own sphere of influence through existing communist movements in Western Europe and Asia. The objective was to prevent the spread of communism beyond the areas where it already existed, especially in Western Europe or in the Atlantic
seaboard. Kennan had identified FIVE world centres of military and industrial power - Soviet Union USA Japan Great Britain The Ruhr and it was seen as vital that the SU was prevented from gaining the other four. However, the policy would not be purely defensive, USA had to exploit its position as the world’s leading economy to establish a global balance of power that was favourable to USA. Thus dollars would be used to nurture the stable, democratic, capitalist states and to counter communism via – The Marshall Plan The formation of a new West German state A North Atlantic security pact and A massive infusion of $ into Japan.
The Truman Doctrine Greece and Turkey were seen as weak and at risk of Soviet pressure. Greece was in civil war between royalists and communists and a victory for the latter, would draw Greece into Stalin’s sphere of influence. As for Turkey, it bordered the SU and had been a historical target for expansion. In February 1947, GB announced that it could no longer afford financial aid to Greece and Turkey, which left a vacuum that USA filled, as there was a belief that SU would use their influence in Greece and Turkey to extend into the Middle East and its oil reserves. However, Truman faced a difficult task in persuading a Republican Congress, elected to cut spending, to allocate funds to the two nations in order to combat communist expansion. In order to help, Truman exaggerated the threat of communism and the ideological conflict between USA and SU. Thus on March 12
th 1947,
Truman announced that: “I believe that it must be the policy of the USA to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by
outside pressures.” The alarmist tactics worked, $400 million was granted. In the end, Stalin did not become involved; rather it was Tito, eyeing a Balkan Federation, who had financed the Greek communists. Ironically, the Greek and Turkish govts were extremely corrupt and undemocratic BUT they were right-wing and that was good enough for Truman!
National Security
Though war with SU was not really a possibility, military preparedness was increased – A system of selective service was introduced in order to keep military numbers up and
The atomic stockpile was increased from 13 to 50 between June 1947 and June 1948. The National Security Act (1947) saw -
The creation of the new Defense Department based at the Pentagon
The establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) whose function was to gather intelligence on potential enemies of USA and
The National Security Council (NSC) whose ‘Advisor’ would be a key confidant of the President in all matters of national security.
The Marshall Plan
June 5
th 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall announced a massive programme of
economic assistance for the countries of Western Europe, large $ grants would be used to buy food, materials and machinery from USA – “Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working
economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. … Any govt that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full co-operation … Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically, will encounter the opposition of USA.” The motives behind the plan were various –
Economic - A captive market would be created for USA goods for the next four years
Containment – Prosperity was considered to be the best antidote to communism and, as USA believed that poor and/or unemployed peoples were more prone to extremism, the rise of the Left in post-war Europe was a real threat -
PCF in France had 1 million members and was part of the Coalition Italian communist party boasted 1.7 million members and any further communist electoral success in these countries, allied to their closer alignment with Moscow, would see the communist ideology dominant in Europe and this would present a real threat to the national security of USA. Thus a large-scale transfusion of dollars to Western Europe would – Stimulate coal production Raise industrial output and Create employment and these three factors would improve prosperity – the best antidote …. In order to avoid allegations of encouraging poor relations with Stalin, USA offered the aid to SU and satellites but, as expected, SU refused and blocked any hopes of acceptance from its ‘bloc’. USA regarded Marshall Aid as an attempt to create USA economic empire in Eastern Europe, while also leaving SU without resources or markets and with an
economy isolated from its satellites. From this point, compromise between USA and
SU was no longer a real possibility and prompted a more aggressive Soviet foreign policy based largely on fear. (see Khrushchev quote)
In response, SU came up with the Molotov Plan, which aimed to bind Eastern Europe into
a single economic area. Further, in September 1947, Stalin reformed Comintern into
Cominform in order to: Circulate propaganda abroad Liase and assist with the communist parties of Western Europe – PCF, encouraged by Stalin, backed a wave of strikes at the end of 1947. At the same time, Stalin consolidated his position in Eastern Europe –
Hungary – in 1948, non-communists were expelled from the govt and Stalinists replaced
them
Czechoslovakia – a Czech attempt to seek Marshall Aid, saw a communist coup in February 1948 and the murder of Jan Masaryk.
The Czech coup saw any opposition in Congress crumble and the granting of $17 billion
of aid, to be distributed over four years via the Economic Co-operation Administration
(ECA). The main recipients were GB, France and Germany and by 1952, industrial
production had increased by 35% and agricultural output by 10% on pre-war levels.
There can be little doubt that Marshall Aid greatly accelerated the economic
recovery of Western Europe.
The Creation of a West German State
The rise of Russian power in the east, convinced USA to revive Germany more quickly
than planned at Potsdam. The position of West Germany, between non-communist
Europe and occupied Eastern Europe, was viewed as a strategically vital
battleground in the Cold War. USA argued for an early end to military occupation and the combination of the three western zones into a West German state which would provide - an ally for USA a solid buffer zone against communism and avoid Soviet control of the coal and heavy industries of the Ruhr. USA believed it was in a battle with SU for German public opinion and so external controls were relaxed, as the day-to-day running of western Germany was shared between the occupying powers and the Germans themselves – with the clear promise of their own state. In 1948, after the introduction of a separate currency for the western sector, the three occupying powers met to draw up a constitution for the new state. Stalin interpreted this as the signal for the establishment of a new Germany in the west and this reawakened his fears about an economically strong and rearmed Germany. Thus the land blockade was initiated with the clear realisation that SU had control of the old capital in their sector. Thus the people of Berlin and the occupying troops were totally reliant upon the allies for supplies. The Blockade began in earnest in June 1948, with the express aim of forcing the western allies into cancelling plans for the new state. However, the allies were more resolute regarding Berlin and began the airlift of supplies to the stranded
Berliners. The Berlin Airlift resulted in 200,000 flights in 320 days containing food
and coal to 2.2million people. In May 1949, the blockade was lifted. This had been the first real crisis of the Cold War in Europe and it saw a major victory for USA. Any thought of withdrawal from Berlin would have been perceived as weakness and could have seen the Germans turning to SU for protection and accepting a single German state but inside the Soviet sphere.
Free elections for the first West German state and the birth of the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG) took place in September 1949. However, it was not permitted to have an army and so USA, GB and French troops remained in case of German aggression or
Soviet invasion. In October 1949, The German Democratic Republic was set up in the
Soviet zone, in order that Stalin could retain the support of those Germans in the east. It became a one-party state with Russian troops present. The division of Germany reflected the division of Europe as a whole - neither superpower was prepared to let the whole of Germany fall into the other’s sphere of influence.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
NATO was the first USA treaty with Europe since 1778. It was a military alliance of twelve
states based on the principle of collective security. It was said to have been set up to: “Keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in” but perhaps based on previous experiences, GB and France wanted to see a permanent USA presence as a guarantee against any Soviet attack. For the French, NATO was a shield against a resurgent Germany – the paranoia still existed. In 1948, a solely European defensive alliance was set up without USA – which sums up that a Soviet invasion of the
west was very unlikely - the Western European Union (WEU). USA had recognised that the security pact was - a precondition of French - and GB - consent to the West German state that it tied the relatively strong GB to the recovering western Europe calmed French fears and offered anxious Germans protection against SU. The military advantages to USA were threefold - USA not solely responsible for defence of Europe against SU invasion Provided valuable air bases from which air attacks could be launched Framework for eventual German role in defence of Europe.
USA Policy towards Asia In the main, USA pursued a Europe-first policy, yet policy makers also feared the projection of Soviet influence into Asia and thus there was a threat of Soviet communism on a world scale. USA was therefore prepared for a global response. The principle areas/means of containment in Asia were: The conversion of Japan into a satellite of USA Substantial financial assistance to anti-Communist forces in China and Vietnam Support for an independent, non-communist South Korea
The ‘Perimeter Strategy’ – re the defence of off-shore Pacific islands.
Japan After the surrender in August 1945, Japan was subjected to military occupation by USA forces under General Douglas MacArthur. A four-power council for Japan was set up which included SU but the latter was refused a zone in Japan, the real power lay in the hands of USA.
Between 1945 and 1947, the main objectives of USA policy were demilitarisation and
democratisation - The armed forces were demobilised and stockpiles of weapons were destroyed A no-war clause was written into the new Japanese constitution in 1946 Trade Unions and the right to strike were recognised Political pluralism existed – inc Japanese communists! War criminals were brought to trial and Japan was forced to pay reparations to her enemies in the Pacific war. As Kennan had acknowledged, Japan was one of the five economic and military powers in the world and this made it vital in the whole policy of Containment that Japan remained free. Japan was considered vital to USA security and was seen to hold the key to the balance of power in Asia. Indeed, the securing of Japan as an ally was the cornerstone of the strategy of containment in Asia. USA plans were compromised by the effects of the war on Japan – 2.5 million citizens were dead 40% of buildings in major cities had been destroyed
Agricultural and Industrial output was low and prices were high Unemployment was widespread and the people were defeated and demoralised. Given all this, and bearing in mind the allure of communism in such circumstances, it was little surprise that the communists polled three million votes in the elections. The USA saw the European solution as applicable to Asia – Industrial production was encouraged Govt workers were forbidden from striking Communist sympathisers in the TU movement were arrested and In 1949, $500 million was granted by Congress to aid Japanese economic growth. Further, the more aggressive post-war activities were toned down as USA sought to win over the Japanese people and bring Japan into the American orbit.
China USA attempts to bolster the Nationalists were increasingly frustrated and Marshall was concerned that the failure to defeat the CCP would merely encourage SU to interfere and openly support the CCP. By the end of 1946, relations between Jiang and Marshall were reaching breaking point. However, Washington’s changing attitudes in 1947 meant that aid was still forthcoming, although not on the same scale as in Japan – Jiang was too unpredictable. USA was worried that SU would get a grip on raw material sources in Manchuria and northern China, the creation of a Soviet sphere of influence in the area
was unacceptable to Washington. It was clear that for USA, the Cold War was as much
a conflict over the control of key resources as a battle of ideas. 1947/48 saw further victories for the communists and a change in USA policy, now they sought to limit CCP expansion. Nationalist domination of the areas outside Northern China was now an essential aspect of American strategy in the Far East, as Japanese economic revival could revolve around access to vital Chinese raw materials and markets. However, by early 1949 Mao’s forces gained further ground and victory for the CCP was now only a matter of time.
Korea USA had envisaged the unification of Korea as a long-term aim. However, SU and USA could not agree terms for elections and so, USA policy-makers became convinced that at the very least, South Korea must be held. Apart from the influence Moscow exercised over Kim in North Korea, USA saw SU control of the whole peninsula as damaging Japanese recovery by depriving them of an important trading partner. As no agreement was forthcoming, two separate states were set up in 1948 –
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north and
The Republic of Korea in the south. Syngman Rhee was confirmed as leader and he was supported by USA $ in the longer-term and up until 1949, by a small USA military presence. Both Korean leaders were intent on reunifying the Korean peninsula, and by force.
Vietnam Like Korea, Vietnam had been occupied by Japan in the war, having previously been subjected to French colonial power. These circumstances had encouraged nationalism
and an appetite for independence. The Nationalist movement (Vietminh) was led by Ho
Chi Minh. In 1946, hostilities between the French and the Vietminh broke out and despite
previous non-colonial attitudes, USA supported the French but suggested that the non-communist nationalists should be granted concessions and the country should be prepared for self-government. In 1949, the French offered token independence but the Vietminh were not interested. In 1950, both China and SU recognised the Vietminh as the official govt of Vietnam. USA responded by opening formal diplomatic relations with the French appointed governor, while also hardening their attitude towards Ho and his
ambitions. Secretary of State Acheson described Ho as: “an outright commie”. In March 1950, USA sent military aid to the French, Ho was seen as a major threat to USA interests in Asia and any withdrawal by the French would serve to swell the rising tide of Communism in Asia and might also encourage Malayan communists to rise against the
British. Further, the loss of Vietnam, might turn public opinion against the French govt,
maybe to the benefit of the PCF. Thus USA granted $ to the French and Chinese Nationalists in order to defeat communism.
Defensive Perimeter The key objective of USA policy was to unite the Asian periphery and the Japanese core into a single economic area. USA bases and garrisons on Guam and the Philippines would form the first line of military defence against communism in Asia.
Why was the Policy of Containment less successful in Asia than in Europe USA policy makers never committed the same resources or attached the same
importance to restricting communism in Asia, Europe came first. The communist threat
was more complex in Asia than in Europe. USA was slow to recognise the diversity of Asian communism and that Asian links with Moscow were remote in many cases. The popularity of leaders such as Ho and Mao had nothing to do with their connections with Moscow but was a result of internal revolutions in Vietnam and China. No European communists had the kind of power base enjoyed by Mao and in Vietnam, Ho was still riding a tide of nationalism generated by years of French colonialism and Japanese
occupation. In the attempt to suppress communism in Vietnam, USA was siding with
an unpopular colonial power against a champion of national independence. The communist threat in Europe was defeated by the ‘investment’ of massive USA resources BUT the communist threat was never as serious as USA supposed and the defeat of communist parties in free elections underlined that fact. In direct contrast, in parts of Asia, communism and revolutionary nationalism combined to create large and well-supported movements and this put them beyond the control of USA.
