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DRDC Toronto. CR 2012-085

Trust Violation and Trust Repair Strategies within the Whole of Government Context

by:

Michael H. Thomson, Barbara D. Adams, Emily-Ana Filardo, Yvonne C. DeWit, and Craig R. Flear

Humansystems® Incorporated

111 Farquhar St. Guelph, ON N1H 3N4

Project Manager:

Barbara D. Adams (519) 836 5911 ext: 249

PWGSC Contract No.: W7711-098155/001/TOR Call-up No. 8155-04

On Behalf of

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

as represented by

Defence Research and Development Canada Toronto 1133 Sheppard Avenue West North York, Ontario, Canada

M3M 3B9

DRDC Toronto Scientific Authority: Dr. Ritu Gill

416-635-2191

March 2012

Disclaimer: This report has been produced according to the “Publication Standard for Scientific and Technical Documents, 2nd Edition” by Defence R&D Canada, September 2007, specifically Section 6.7 “Formatting

Requirements for Contract Reports.”

Author

Michael H. Thomson Humansystems® Incorporated

Approved by

Dr. Ritu Gill Socio-Cognitive Systems Section

The scientific or technical validity of this contract report is entirely the responsibility of the Contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada.

© Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2012

© Sa majesté la reine, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2012

Humansystems® Trust Violation and Repair Strategies in the Whole of Government Context Page iii

Abstract

This report was conducted with the aim of gaining insight into the nature of trust violations between various interagency departments, such as the Canadian Forces (CF) and other government departments (OGDs) and the goal of identifying effective trust repair strategies. This work is in support of Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto Applied Research Program (ARP) investigating interagency trust. It has three components; first, a review of the most recent literature was conducted to aid in the understanding of the various aspects of trust, including the features of trust violations (e.g., timing) and the precursors to trust repair (e.g., cultural differences). Second, a scenario-based empirical study was used to assess the impact of trust violations as well as trust restoration strategies that most effectively and efficiently restore trust in the whole of government (WoG) context. Finally, using data from a previous study (Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011), a qualitative analysis was conducted, looking at WoG military and civilian subject matter experts’ (SMEs) responses to WoG pre-deployment training and recommendations for future education and training. SMEs emphasized the need for integrated WoG education and training, and the retention of personnel with WoG experience.

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Résumé

Le présent rapport a été produit dans le but de comprendre la nature des bris de confiance entre divers organismes, par exemple, entre les Forces canadiennes (FC) et les autres ministères et afin de cerner des stratégies efficaces qui permettront de rétablir la confiance. Ces travaux sont effectués à l’appui du Programme de recherches appliquées (PRA) de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) Toronto, qui examine la confiance entre les organismes. Il comporte trois éléments. D’abord, un examen des plus récentes publications a été effectué dans le but d’aider à la compréhension des différents aspects de la confiance, notamment les caractéristiques des bris de confiance (p. ex. le moment où il se produit) et les précurseurs du rétablissement de la confiance (p. ex. les différences culturelles). Ensuite, on a eu recours à une étude empirique fondée sur un scénario pour évaluer l’incidence des bris de confiance, ainsi que les stratégies de rétablissement de la confiance qui sont les plus efficaces et efficientes dans un contexte pangouvernemental. Enfin, au moyen des données obtenues dans une étude antérieure (Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011), une analyse qualitative a été exécutée, examinant les réactions des experts en la matière (EM) militaires et civils de l’ensemble du gouvernement à l’égard de l’instruction préalable au déploiement dans l’ensemble du gouvernement et les recommandations relatives aux futurs programmes d’instruction et d’éducation. Les EM ont mis l’accent sur la nécessité de fournir une éducation et une instruction intégrée pour l’ensemble du gouvernement, et de maintenir en poste les membres du personnel qui ont acquis de l’expérience de travail dans un contexte pangouvernemental.

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Executive Summary

Trust Violation and Trust Repair Strategies in the Whole of Government Context Michael H. Thomson, Barbara D. Adams, Emily-Ana Filardo, Yvonne C. DeWit, and Craig R. Flear, Humansystems Incorporated; DRDC Toronto No. CR2012-XXX; Defence R&D Canada Toronto; March 2012. This report was conducted with the aim of gaining insight into the nature of trust violations between various interagency departments, such as the Canadian Forces (CF) and other government departments (OGDs) and the goal of identifying trust repair strategies. This work is in support of Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto Applied Research Program (ARP) investigating interagency trust. It has three components.

First, this report includes a short review of the most recent (2010 – 2012) literature, pertaining to interorganizational trust and trust violations and repair. In relation to a Whole of Government (WoG) context, Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009) identified two general measures for dealing with interorganizational trust violations, legal (e.g., formal mechanisms) and non-legal (e.g., non-bureaucratic social accounts), and discuss their merits. Other research efforts have examined the impact of the timing of a transgression, cultural differences, post-apology behaviours, and the frequency and severity of the transgression on trust repair following a violation.

Second, a scenario-based empirical study was used to assess the impact of trust violations as well as trust restoration strategies that most effectively and efficiently restore trust in the whole of government context. The scenario consisted of a situation in which an imaginary country, Safia, was experiencing conflict due to the rising power of a local terrorist organization. The military from another country (namely, Massey) entered Safia to deal with the terrorist threat and assist in the development and security of Safia. Another government agency in Safia called ‘Massey Assistance and Development Organization’ (MADO) was also reported to be assisting in development and reconstruction. The Massey military, MADO, and other Massey agencies would be working together, in a Whole of Government or Comprehensive Approach, to assist in the security and development of Safia.

Embedded within the scenario were the OGD knowledge, trust violation, and trust repair manipulations. Participants either experienced the OGD knowledge manipulation or control (no knowledge of OGD roles and responsibilities), as well as either a trust violation committed by the OGD partner, or no trust violation (control). Furthermore, participants experienced either the apology trust repair (including a redress plan) or no trust repair (control).

Analyses exploring the results were limited to manipulation checks and providing descriptive data for each of the conditions.

Finally, using data from a previous study (Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011), a qualitative analysis was conducted, looking at WoG military and civilian subject matter experts’ responses to WoG pre-deployment training and recommendations for future training. Civilian participants mentioned that they had participated in CF exercises, such as Maple Guardian. Participant recommendations underscored the need to have integrated WoG training all the way through the process, and not post-hoc. Participants also emphasized the need to retain the staff with WoG field experience to teach personnel for future WoG engagements.

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Sommaire

Trust Violation and Trust Repair Strategies in the Whole of Government Context Michael H. Thomson, Barbara D. Adams, Emily-Ana Filardo, Yvonne DeWit, and Craig R. Flear, Humansystems Incorporated; DRDC Toronto No. CR2012-XXX; R&D pour la defense Canada; Mars 2012. Le présent rapport a été produit dans le but de comprendre la nature des bris de confiance entre divers organismes, par exemple, entre les Forces canadiennes (FC) et les autres ministères et afin de cerner des stratégies efficaces qui permettront de rétablir la confiance. Ces travaux sont effectués à l’appui du Programme de recherches appliquées (PRA) de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) Toronto, qui examine la confiance entre les organismes. Il comporte trois éléments.

Tout d’abord, le rapport comprend un bref examen des ouvrages les plus récents (2010 – 2012) concernant la confiance entre les organisations, ainsi que les bris de confiance et la restauration de celle-ci. À l’égard du contexte pangouvernemental, Janowicz-Panjaitan et Krishnan (2009) ont relevé deux mesures générales pour composer avec les bris de confiance entre les organisations, qu’ils soient de nature juridique (p.ex., liés aux mécanismes officiels) ou non juridique (p.ex. réseaux sociaux non bureaucratiques), et ils en discutent les mérites. D’autres travaux de recherche portent sur l’incidence du moment où se produit la transgression, des différences culturelles, des comportements après les excuses, ainsi que de la fréquence et de la gravité de la transgression sur le rétablissement de la confiance après le bris de celle-ci.

Ensuite, on a eu recours à une étude empirique fondée sur un scénario pour évaluer l’incidence des bris de confiance ainsi que les stratégies de rétablissement de la confiance qui sont les plus efficaces et efficientes dans un contexte pangouvernemental. Dans le scénario, un conflit sévit dans un pays fictif, le Safia, en raison de la montée en puissance d’une organisation terroriste locale. Les forces armées d’un autre pays (le Massey) ont pénétré au Safia en vue d’enrayer la menace terroriste et d’aider au développement et à la sécurité du Safia. On signale également qu’un autre organisme gouvernemental du Safia, appelé « Organisation d’aide et de développement du Massey » (OADM) aide au développement et à la reconstruction. Les forces armées du Massey, l’OADM, et les autres organismes du Massey travailleraient ensemble, selon une approche globale ou pangouvernementale, en vue d’aider à la sécurité et au développement du Safia.

Le scénario comprend des manipulations à l’égard des connaissances des autres ministères, des bris de confiance et des mesures visant à rétablir la confiance. Les participants ont été soumis soit à des manipulations ou du contrôle des connaissances par les autres ministères (aucune connaissance des rôles et des responsabilités des autres ministères), soit à un bris de confiance de la part d’un partenaire d’un autre ministère, soit à aucun bris de confiance (contrôle). De plus, les participants ont été soumis soit à des démarches de restauration de la confiance par la présentation d’excuses (y compris un plan de réparation des torts), soit à aucune démarche de restauration de la confiance (contrôle).

Les analyses des résultats se limitaient aux vérifications des manipulations et à la prestation de données descriptives pour chacune des conditions.

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Enfin, à partir des données d’une étude antérieure (Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011), une analyse qualitative a été effectuée à l’égard des réactions des experts en la matière (EM) militaires et civils de l’ensemble du gouvernement à l’égard de l’instruction préalable au déploiement dans l’ensemble du gouvernement et de leurs recommandations concernant de futurs programmes d’instruction. Les participants civils ont mentionné qu’ils avaient participé à des exercices des FC, comme Maple Guardian. Dans leurs recommandations, les participants ont souligné la nécessité de fournir une instruction pangouvernementale intégrée tout au long du processus, et non a posteriori. Les participants ont également insisté sur la nécessité de maintenir en poste le personnel ayant acquis de l’expérience dans les activités pangouvernementales afin qu’ils puissent former les autres membres du personnel en vue des prochains engagements pangouvernementaux.

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT...............................................................................................................................................III

RÉSUMÉ..................................................................................................................................................IV

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................IV

SOMMAIRE .............................................................................................................................................VI

TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................................................VIII

LIST OF FIGURES.......................................................................................................................................X

LIST OF TABLES........................................................................................................................................XI

1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................11.1 INTERORGANIZATIONAL TRUST..................................................................................................................21.2 TRUST VIOLATION AND REPAIR .................................................................................................................4

2. METHOD ......................................................................................................................................... 192.1 EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIO AND DESIGN ....................................................................................................192.2 PROCEDURE ............................................................................................................................... .........202.3 PARTICIPANTS............................................................................................................................... .......212.4 MEASURES............................................................................................................................... ...........252.5 LIMITATIONS ............................................................................................................................... ........26

3. RESULTS .......................................................................................................................................... 273.1 MANIPULATION CHECKS ........................................................................................................................27

3.1.1 Knowledge manipulation check..................................................................................................273.1.2 Trust violation manipulation check ............................................................................................283.1.3 Repair manipulation check.........................................................................................................31

3.2 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES ......................................................................................................................323.3 FREQUENCY COUNTS ............................................................................................................................37

4. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS SME DISCUSSIONS (THOMSON ET AL., 2011)......................... 414.1 PRE DEPLOYMENT TRAINING AND EDUCATION ..........................................................................................414.2 TRAINING AND EDUCATION FOR FUTUREWOG ENGAGEMENTS ....................................................................42

5. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................... 47

REFERENCES........................................................................................................................................... 49

ANNEX A – INFORMATION LETTER.......................................................................................................... 53

ANNEX B – VOLUNTARY CONSENT FORM ............................................................................................... 57

ANNEX C – BIOLOGICAL DATA FORM...................................................................................................... 59

ANNEX D – SCENARIOS........................................................................................................................... 63D.1 BASELINE SCENARIO..............................................................................................................................63D. 2 KNOWLEDGE SCENARIO.........................................................................................................................64D.3 NO KNOWLEDGE SCENARIO....................................................................................................................64D.4 VIOLATION SCENARIO ...........................................................................................................................65D.5 NO VIOLATION SCENARIO ......................................................................................................................66

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D.6 REPAIR SCENARIO ............................................................................................................................... . 68D.7 NO REPAIR SCENARIO........................................................................................................................... 68D.8 REDRESS SCENARIO.............................................................................................................................. 69D.9 NO REDRESS SCENARIO......................................................................................................................... 69

ANNEX E – QUESTIONNAIRES .................................................................................................................71E.1 EXPECTATIONS/PERCEPTIONSA ............................................................................................................... 71E.2 TRUST – COMPETENCE A........................................................................................................................ 72E.3 TRUST – BENEVOLENCE A....................................................................................................................... 72E.4 TRUST – INTEGRITY A ............................................................................................................................ 73E.5 TRUSTING INTENTIONS A........................................................................................................................ 73E.6 WILLINGNESS TO RISK A......................................................................................................................... 74E.7 ADDITIONAL EXPECTATIONS A ................................................................................................................. 74E.8 CAUSAL DIMENSION SCALE BC ................................................................................................................. 75E.9 MANIPULATION CHECKS ....................................................................................................................... 77

E.9.1 Knowledge Manipulation Check de............................................................................................. 77E.9.2 Trust Violation Manipulation Check b ........................................................................................ 77E.9.3 Apology/Repair Manipulation Check d....................................................................................... 77

E.10 PERCEPTIONS OF STUDY D ...................................................................................................................... 78

ANNEX F – DEBRIEFING...........................................................................................................................79

Page x Trust Violation and Repair Strategies in the Whole of Government Context Humansystems®

List of Figures

FIGURE 1. OVERVIEW OF TRUST STUDY CONDITIONS (N=150) ......................................................................20

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List of Tables

TABLE 1. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.................................................................................................................... 21TABLE 2.MILITARY EXPERIENCE............................................................................................................................... 22TABLE 3. JOB TITLES ............................................................................................................................... ............... 23TABLE 4. OGD EXPERIENCE ............................................................................................................................... ..... 24TABLE 5. KNOWLEDGEMANIPULATION QUESTIONS BREAKDOWN ACROSS KNOWLEDGE (C1, C2, & C5) AND NO KNOWLEDGE

(C3, C4, & C6) CONDITIONS......................................................................................................................... 27TABLE 6. BREAKDOWN OF RESPONSES TO PRE REPAIR VIOLATIONMANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONS ACROSS VIOLATION (C1 –

C4) AND NO VIOLATION (C5 – C6) CONDITIONS............................................................................................... 28TABLE 7. POST REPAIR VIOLATIONMANIPULATION QUESTION BREAKDOWN FOR SINGLE PRESENTATION PARTICIPANTS ONLY.. 29TABLE 8. POST REPAIR VIOLATIONMANIPULATION QUESTION BREAKDOWN FOR DUAL PRESENTATION PARTICIPANTS ONLY ... 30TABLE 9. POST REPAIR VIOLATIONMANIPULATION QUESTION BREAKDOWN ACROSS VIOLATION (C1 – C4) AND NO VIOLATION

(C5 – C6) CONDITIONS ............................................................................................................................... . 31TABLE 10. REPAIRMANIPULATION QUESTION BREAKDOWN FOR PARTICIPANTS ACROSS REPAIR (C1 & C3) AND NO REPAIR (C2,

C4, C5, & C6) CONDITIONS .......................................................................................................................... 31TABLE 11. EXPECTATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS ............................................................................................................. 32TABLE 12. TRUST COMPETENCE ............................................................................................................................ 32TABLE 13. TRUST BENEVOLENCE ........................................................................................................................... 33TABLE 14. TRUST INTEGRITY ............................................................................................................................... .. 33TABLE 15. TRUST INTENTIONS............................................................................................................................... 34TABLE 16. TRUST WILLINGNESS TO RISK.................................................................................................................. 34TABLE 17. ADDITIONAL EXPECTATIONS ..................................................................................................................... 35TABLE 18. CAUSAL DIMENSION SCALE –MADO ATTRIBUTIONS..................................................................................... 35TABLE 19. CAUSAL DIMENSION SCALE –MADO CONTROL ........................................................................................... 35TABLE 20. CAUSAL DIMENSION SCALE – INFORMATION REFLECTION................................................................................ 36TABLE 21. CAUSAL DIMENSION SCALE – STABILITY....................................................................................................... 36TABLE 22. SAFIA REPRESENTS: ............................................................................................................................... . 37TABLE 23.MASSEY MILITARY REPRESENTS: ............................................................................................................... 38TABLE 24.MADO REPRESENTS:............................................................................................................................. 39

Humansystems® Trust Violation and Repair Strategies in the Whole of Government Context Page 1

1. Introduction

The war in Afghanistan has greatly influenced how contemporary military operations are currently anticipated to be conducted in the future, especially in failing or failed states. Following the attacks on the World Trade Towers, Canada’s immediate presence in Afghanistan aimed to help the Americans oust the remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda in Kandahar. In 2001, the Canadian Forces (CF) was still recovering from a number of setbacks, including the impact of challenging peace support operations (such as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda) and the CF concerns over loss of public confidence following the infamous events recounted in the Somalia Inquiry (Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, Department Of National Defence, Government Of Canada, 1997). The CF also faced sizeable defence budget cuts, which had resulted in growing dependence on the US military for equipment, training, doctrine and intelligence as well as accusations from the Pentagon that Canada was a free loader with respect to continental security (Stein & Lange, 2007). As such, the Government of Canada needed to adopt a strategy that would signal the acceptance of military responsibility to its allies and impress Washington, but also to preserve the “myth” in the eyes of Canadians that peacekeeping was the CF’s true legacy and proper function (Granatstein, 2007). This balancing act was reflected in the political discourse of the time.

Then Minister of National Defence Art Eggleton declared that the CF would “play a major role, a front-line role…stand[ing] with our allies in weeding out the perpetrators [of the attacks on the US], in destroying the organizations, wherever they may be” (cited in Stein & Lange, 2007, p. 1). At the same time, however, then Prime Minister Jean Chretien suggested that the principal role for the CF would be “to make sure aid gets to the people who need it” and that Canada’s overall engagement would “bring peace and happiness as much as possible” to the Afghan people (quoted in Stein & Lange). Though the CF would engage in combat when necessary, its strategic position would be to provide stabilization to open doors for humanitarian assistance (Stein & Lange). So despite Canada’s initial combat role, there was always the intention to rebuild Afghanistan, which over the past couple of decades had been ravaged by war and Taliban tyranny.

Combat was only part of the Afghan equation; the other parts included stabilization, reconstruction, and nation-building, which entailed more than just military assets. Indeed, no one governmental agency has the capacity to achieve success if operating entirely independently, especially given the current global pressures, such as non-state actors, terrorism and violent conflict, climate change, strains on energy and natural resources (Davidson, 2009). The approach in Afghanistan, therefore, demanded an interagency configuration to ensure the range of requisite expertise. In particular, once Canada had signed on for a longer term to the mission in Afghanistan, it was clear that success would require a Whole of Government (WoG) approach.

Governments like Canada who adopt the WoG approach to operations “actively use formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government’s agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving desired objectives” (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, OECD, 2006, p. 14). WoG approaches to operations are expected to be useful in failing states, such as Afghanistan or Haiti, because “military responses [alone] are insufficient for multidimensional state-building and post-conflict peace-building processes” (OECD, p. 17). According to the OECD, “development actors have come to realize that successful long-term development in impoverished nations is impossible when incapacitated states cannot deliver the collective goods of basic security and effective

Trust Violation and Repair Strategies in the Whole of Government Context Humansystems®

governance” (p. 17). This must come from external other governmental departments (OGDs) like defence and diplomacy. Successful operations in failing and failed states demand the input and coordination of development and diplomacy alongside security initiatives.

Specific to the Afghan context, the Government of Canada sought to define and apply a coherent strategy and policy regarding its mission that relied on the integration and coordination of the CF with OGDs to more effectively realize Canadian peace and security goals in the international sphere. Consequently, the CF worked alongside the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the Correctional Services of Canada (CSC), as well as international partners, and various levels of the Afghan government. In WoG approaches to operations, the CF role is “to connect all relevant organizations and agencies with CF architecture and provide liaison to support these agencies in the execution of the mission” (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008). The CF contribution is an effects-based philosophy that seeks to create a cooperative culture and collaborative working environment between government departments and agencies.

However, recent research suggests that number of challenges may hinder collaboration among various actors in theatre that do not typically work with one another and have very distinct organizational culture (see Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011; Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear, 2010). For example, individuals (i.e., soldiers, diplomats, development officers) who had experience operating in a WoG context indicated that interorganizational trust was an issue, and this often stemmed from entrenched negative stereotypes (Thomson et al., 2010). In support of a Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto applied research program (ARP) investigating interagency trust, Thomson et al. (2011) met with subject matter experts (SMEs) to discuss their experiences collaborating in a WoG operational context.

These SMEs reported several differences in organizational factors (such as organizational strategies, systems, structure and staffing) that were associated with a lack of interorganizational trust. SMEs also reported instances where their trust had been violated (e.g., perceptions of a lack of competence and/or goodwill and concerns regarding the partners’ interests in the mission). Such incidents are important to take note of as trust is said to be one condition required for effective collaboration (San Martin-Rodriguez, Beaulieu, d’Amour, & Ferrada-Videla, 2005). As more CF operations are expected to be conducted in the WoG context, establishing and maintaining interorganizational trust merits further exploration. The sections that follow briefly discusses interorganizational trust and how it can be established, before examining relevant research examining trust violations and repair mechanisms at interpersonal and interorganizational levels .

1.1 Interorganizational Trust Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone (1998, p. 142) describe interorganizational trust as “the extent to which organizational members have a collectively-held trust orientation toward the partner” organization. When personal interactions and a shared history are absent, specific mechanisms help promote initial trust in another organization; these include well-established organizational frameworks like systems, structures, practices, etc. (McKnight, Cummings & Chervany, 1998; Wehmeyer, Reimer, & Schneider, 2001; Bachmann, 2001; Koeszegi, 2004). These frameworks establish a degree of predictability and reliability for trustors. As MacDuffie (2011, p. 39) states, “[k]nowledge of an organization’s system of rules and practices for developing expertise, motivation, and ethical awareness can lead to attributions of high skill, commitment, and honesty to each organizational member belonging to (and socialized in) that system”.


Without previous knowledge of one another, personnel from the various organizations (such as CIDA, CF, DFAIT) working in operations will need to trust one another enough to collaborate effectively and ensure the overall mission strategy is realized. Interorganizational trust differs from interpersonal trust because to a large extent it is based in the impersonal in that it is not expected to develop over time and experience in the same way as is the case for interpersonal trust. To address these basic differences, Kramer and Lewicki (2010) introduce the notion of “presumptive trust”. This impersonal kind of trust is necessary, they argue, to satisfy our social expectations because “the requisite history of individualized interpersonal interaction is not available” (p. 258) in an interorganizational context. This kind of trust emerges from an “assumption or stereotype of the prototypic organizational member” (Hogg, 2005; cited in Kramer & Lewicki). It is “a generalized social expectation perceivers confer on the collective as a whole”; a positive expectation conferred to members of an organization, knowing in general what that membership signals (Kramer & Lewicki, p. 259).

Kramer and Lewicki (2010) explain that there are three foundations of presumptive trust, including identity-based, role-based and rule-based. Role-based trust might be the most relevant when considering individuals operating in a WoG context. For this, Kramer and Lewicki explain that as people are differentiated along formal and functional lines within organizations, their identity will become aligned and connected with the well-established organizational roles they adopt. They state that “[r]ole-based knowledge becomes a basis for positive expectations about others, in so far as those expectations are predicated on knowledge that individuals occupy particular roles in the organization, rather than on specific, individuated knowledge regarding their capabilities and intentions” (p. 262). In other words, trust is bestowed on an individual who occupies a particular role on the assumption that they possess the capabilities and intention to fulfil the responsibilities of the role. It is “the system [e.g., selection, socialization, and controls and mechanisms for ensuring performance] of expertise that produces and ensures the role-appropriate behaviour of role occupants”, and what that implies (Kramer & Lewicki, p. 263). And “knowledge about an organizational role can boost expectations that the role occupant is both competent at executing role-based obligations and responsibilities and motivated to do so” (MacDuffie, 2010, p. 39). When a member of another organization fails to meet expectations, then, this may be perceived to signal a lack of trustworthiness on the part of the individual in the role, as well as indicating that the organization that the individual serves may not be wholly trustworthy itself.

However, the SMEs who contributed to our research exploring WoG collaboration suggested that while there appeared to be a lack of interorganizational trust at the corporate level “in Ottawa”, this was not always evident at the operating level. In fact, SMEs reported developing trust (e.g., demonstrating credibility) on the ground with their WoG partners over time (Thomson et al., 2011). Known as boundary spanners, these individuals “are responsible for processing information from the partner organization and representing their [own] organization in the [collaborative] relationship” (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009). Because they primarily represent their organization and have contact with members of the partnering organization, boundary spanners are particularly important in the process of developing and maintaining interorganizational trust (Sydow, 1998; Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009).

According to the literature (Kramer & Lewicki, 2010), presumptive trust may be aided by clear knowledge of the boundary spanner’s particular operating role and its fulfilment. But in a WoG approach to operations, roles may not be well-defined and boundary spanners might not fit well in the particular operational context, such as a non-permissive environment like Afghanistan. Indeed, SMEs from CIDA reported cases where they felt that their own organization sent in the wrong people, while other SMEs provided examples where they perceived that their trust had been


violated and this sometimes arose from a failure to live up to role expectations (Thomson et al., 2011; Thomson et al., 2010). These examples highlight the importance of understanding how to repair trust following a violation. The next section details some of the most recent research looking at trust violations and repair.

1.2 Trust Violation and Repair Trust in interorganizational contexts has been shown to benefit organizations by lowering transaction costs, developing superior information sharing (Dyer & Chu, 2003), increasing ‘social capital’ or “the social resources embedded in relationships” (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998; as cited in Ibbott & O’Keefe, 2004), reducing uncertainty in interactions (Ibbott & O’Keefe, 2004), as well as improving job attitudes, and increasing organizational commitment and performance (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Kramer, 1999; both cited in Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, and Dirks, 2004). Despite the benefits of trust in interorganizational contexts (Aulakh, Kotabe, & Sahay, 1996; Fryxell, Dooley, & Vryza, 2002; both cited in Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009; Dyer & Chu, 2003) and the relative frequency of trust violations (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper & Dirks, 2004; Sitkin & Roth, 1993; all cited in Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009), there is little research examining the impact of a trust violation in interorganizational contexts. For instance, Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009) point out that there is also very little research examining the methods used to restore interorganizational trust and that the methods used to restore violated trust will differ from those used to establish trust in the first place. In fact, once trust has been violated, it is said to be very difficult to restore (Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan, & Murnighan, 2008).

Kim and colleagues (2004) explain that the amount of trust needed to restore violated trust is very high because the initial baseline level of trust is typically elevated. That is, most people tend to default to trust at the initial stages of the relationship (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998, cited in Kim et al.), which, Kim et al. explain, continues to grow to an even higher level of trust through the trustor’s positive experience with the trustee, and continued shared experiences of trusting behaviour. To restore trust to pre-violation levels then is very challenging once a violation has occurred. Another barrier to restoring violated trust is that mistrusted parties must reinstate positive expectations while simultaneously overcoming negative ones (Kim et al), and the details surrounding the violation may be particularly salient, reinforcing the low trust level, despite attempts to demonstrate positive expectations (Slovic, 1993, cited by Kim et al).

According to Kramer and Lewicki (2010), research examining trust violations and repair has fallen into four streams, including (1) the ways trust is broken, (2) the role of repair strategies in healing, (3) the impact of these strategies, and (4) the development of structural solutions to minimize the probability of future trust violating events and vulnerability. To restore trust following a transgression, the relationship must move from a negative state to a previously held positive state that constituted the relationship in the first place (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009). One well-known and researched strategy to repair trust is an apology, i.e., when someone admits responsibility of the transgression and offers up an expression of regret that it occurred (Kim et al., 2004). Indeed, apologies are thought to be crucial for resolving disagreements or disputes as well as restoring trust among collaboration partners (Maddux, Kim, Okumura, & Brett, 2011).

Citing research conducted by Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki (2004), Kramer and Lewicki (2010) highlighted important aspects of an apology for trust repair. First, an apology is more effective than none. Second, an apology is effective when they are seen as sincere. Third, the sooner an apology occurred after the violation, the better. Fourth, when transgressors assumed responsibility rather than trying to blame external causes, the apology was more effective. Internal attributions for


transgressions can signal guilt and interest in making amends (Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2007; cited in Kramer & Lewicki). Finally, when a relationship was already strong and the violation was an isolated rather than recurring, the apology was successful. Kramer and Lewicki also argue that apologies should be credible, they should come with assurances of correcting or repairing the problem in the long term, and they should maintain the goodwill of those who they are directed toward.

However, apologies can be construed as “cheap talk” and empty when they are not accompanied by tangible reparations (Farrell & Rabin, 1996; cited in Kramer & Lewicki, 2010). Kramer and Lewicki point out that the notion of “cheap talk” was exacerbated because of the recent corporate and banking frauds. They explained that in recent “corporate and banking frauds and ethics scandals…CEOs have been encouraged to ‘say nothing,’ often because acknowledging wrongdoing or bad business practice could significantly increase the company’s legal liability for consequences and damages”. Rather, CEOs had offered merely “cheap talk” in the form of empty apologies that were not accompanied by clear changes in business policies and practices that would ensure such transgressions would not reoccur. There is research that examines ways in which an apology is not merely construed as “cheap talk”.

For example, Dirks , Kim, Ferrin, and Cooper (2011) considered the impact of substantive responses on trust repair. Substantive responses are efforts to repair trust that involve a tangible element and, consequently, can combat the limitations of mere words to repair trust after a transgression (Dirks et al.). They conducted four studies, focusing on two common and firmly established substantive responses to trust violation: penance and regulation. Penance involves offering to pay a price to provide a demonstration of renewed trustworthiness. Regulation involves offering to set up a system to limit future transgressions, thereby ensuring trustworthy behaviour. Dirks et al. were also interested in perceived repentance (the degree to which it is believed that a transgressor regrets his or her action, is committed to the reform of the shortcoming, and has resolved to act differently in the future) and perceived prevention (the degree to which it is believed that future untrustworthy behaviour of the transgressor will be prevented). Dirks et al. hypothesized that penance will increase trust following a violation; regulation will increase trust following a violation; perceived repentance will mediate the relationships between substantive responses and trust; and perceived prevention will mediate the relationships between substantive responses and trust.

In Dirks et al.’s (2011) first study, undergraduates from Singapore conducted a monetary trust-related game that included a direct violation to participants. The study included an operationalization of trusting behaviour and trusting beliefs. Penance in the form of a fine paid by the transgressor to the trustor was found to be related to higher levels of trusting beliefs and trusting behaviours post-violation than the control condition. Regulation was operationalized by having the researcher monitor the transgressor for future violations. Compared to the control, however, this manipulation was not found to be significantly related to greater trusting beliefs or trusting behaviours. Compared to the control, penance resulted in increased levels of perceived repentance and regulation resulted in higher levels of perceived prevention. Perceived repentance was found to completely mediate the relationship between penance and trusting beliefs and partially mediated the relationship between penance and trusting behaviours. Perceived prevention did not predict trust.

In Study 2, Dirks et al. (2011) used a sample of undergraduates and business graduate students from the United States, and asked them to watch a video-based scenario of a CEO responding in a news broadcast to a public violation that, unlike Study 1, did not directly impact the participant.


They found that penance and regulation both resulted in increased post-repair levels of trusting intentions, perceived integrity, and perceived competence compared to the control condition. The results of mediation analysis indicated that perceived repentance mediated the relationship between penance and regulation, and each of trusting intentions, perceived integrity, and perceived competence. Perceived prevention did not predict trust outcomes. Trusting beliefs fully mediated relationships between all predictors and trusting intentions. This study also demonstrated that perceived repentance was more positively related to competence violations compared to integrity violations.

According to Dirks et al. (2011), the two studies provide strong evidence of the reparative potential of penance. These two studies also demonstrate that perceived repentance plays a key role in the reparative effects of substantive responses. On the other hand, the mixed results for regulation are likely due to its relationship with mediators. Regulation was related to perceived prevention in both studies, but perceived prevention was not related to higher levels of trust. However, in Study 2, when regulation was found to be related to perceived repentance, it was found to significantly repair trust.

Dirks et al. (2011) wanted to investigate the relationship between regulation and perceived repentance further. In their third study, regulation was only significantly related to increased trust when combined with a non-substantive signal of repentance. The significant relationship was again mediated by perceived repentance. Finally, in their fourth study, a non-substantive apology was compared to the substantive responses of penance and regulation (with no form of apology). Though apologies were found to be less effective than penance for trust repair, apologies were found to be equally effective as regulation. Dirks and colleagues concluded that “the effectiveness of trust repair responses hinges not on their type, but on their power to affect the mediating cognition of perceived repentance”, i.e., the degree to which it is believed that a transgressor regrets his or her action, is committed to the reform of the shortcoming, and has resolved to act differently in the future (p. 14).

Hui, Lau, Tsang, and Pak (2011) also acknowledge that an apology must first be construed as genuine and sincere if it is to elicit trust and forgiveness. They identified a number of potential conditions that promote this. First, knowing both the transgressor (previous transgressions, character, and social group) and the actual transgression are important elements in interpreting the genuineness and sincerity of the apology. Second, timing of the apology is important. Hui et al. point out that late apologies might signal a reluctance to admit guilt, and consequently indicating insincerity and untrustworthiness. Third, taking remedial action signals genuineness and sincerity.

For Hui et al. (2011), behaviours consistent with the apology are perhaps the most important consideration for restoring trust. They argue that behaviours inconsistent with an apology may be construed as a further instantiation of the transgression or another unacceptable one. Moreover, inconsistent behaviour might confirm the victim’s fear and expectation that the transgression will occur again. Ultimately, this will damage trust as predictability (e.g., consistent behaviour) is a central dimension of trust. Hui et al. hypothesized that inconsistent behaviours with an apology would decrease trust and decrease forgiveness. They further hypothesized that those willing to forgive an initial transgression would be less affected by subsequent inconsistent behaviours.

To look at forgiveness from a non-Western perspective, Hui and colleagues’ (2011) participants were drawn from a number of Chinese businesses. They asked participants to read a scenario that included a mistake on a bid by a co-worker and his reason for increasing the bidding price (to gain more commission for the team). The co-worker explained his behaviour, promised not to act in a similar way again and to consult the participant in future bids, and bought the participant dinner.


Trust and intent to forgive were measured (Cummings & Bromiley, 1996, the Organizational Trust Inventory-Short Form OTI-SF and McCullough et al., 1998, Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations scale TRIM, respectively; cited in Hui et. al.). In the consistent behaviour with apology condition, the co-worker reported the truth of the mistake on the bid to senior management., As per the scenario, when the co-worker and the target person had to work together again a few months later, the transgressor worked seriously and well, discussed the work, agreed to the budget, rehearsed the presentation and showed up earlier. In the inconsistent behaviour with apology, the co-worker was dishonest with senior management and blamed the participant for the initial transgression. When the co-worker and the target had to work again, he was late for the presentation, he failed to consult the participant (citing as an excuse no time), and raised the price on the bid. Once participants read the scenarios, again they were asked to indicate their trust in the co-worker and if they were willing to forgive him.

Hui et al.’s (2011) results showed that, prior to the manipulation, the trust and intent to forgive were similar in both conditions. However, after the manipulation, trust and intent to forgive increased for those in the consistent behaviour condition, whereas it decreased in the inconsistent behaviour condition. Inconsistent behaviour might, therefore, be viewed as unpredictable and less trustworthy. This behaviour also signals to the recipient that the apology was given insincerely, thereby undermining the already damaged relationship. One ought to only promise what one can deliver. An apology without consistent behaviours to the contrary of a past violation appears to be “cheap talk”. Hui et al.’s results also showed that those who have the intent to forgive give this despite the deservingness of the transgressor as they were comparatively less impacted by the inconsistent behaviour. They point out that “forgivingness” is a dispositional trait (Thompson et al., 2005; cited in Hui et al.) and, as such, underscores the need to consider individual differences in restoring trust.

Substantive responses accompanying an apology, therefore, appear important to restore trust. However, apologies might not be universal. Another variable that should be considered is culture. In other words, does an apology in one culture have the same impact or even meaning in another? While the research by Hui et al. (2011) incorporated non-Western participants, they did not investigate the role of culture per se in their research as they failed to include a cross-cultural comparison group. Given that many CF missions are conducted overseas, culture is an important factor to consider when understanding strategies for repairing violated trust.

Since culture provides “functional solutions to critical issues [such as trust repair] of social interactions” (Chiu & Hong, 2006; cited in Maddux, Kim, Okumura, & Brett, 2011), the use of an apology may differ across cultures. Maddux and colleagues wondered if culture would impact the effectiveness of an apology. Following a review of the cross-cultural literature, they suggested that culture shapes both the function and meaning of apologies. They explained that those people in an individualist culture (e.g., United States) view apologies as analytic mechanisms for assigning and assuming blame and regaining personal credibility, whereas those in a collectivist culture (e.g., Japan) view them as means of showing remorse and not as a means to assign blame to any particular individual. More specifically, an apology in Japan is used “to alleviate interpersonal stress associated with damaged relationships, and to acknowledge interconnectedness and indebtedness to others” (Ide, 1998; Takagi, 1996; cited in Maddux et al., p. 408). Apologies in collectivist cultures are a way to establish interpersonal harmony, and, as such, may occur more frequently across a number of circumstances (Maddux et al.).

Maddux and colleagues (2011) argue that the functional and meaning differences regarding apologies emerge from differences in cultural conceptualizations of agency and locus of control


(i.e., internal vs. external). In individualist cultures, causal agency for events is more often sought in the individual. In collectivist cultures, agency resides more at the group or societal level. Using Japan and the United States as their basis of comparison, Maddux and colleagues hypothesized that apologies will occur more often with Japanese participants compared to Americans; Japanese will apologize in ambiguous situations when there is no clear individual to blame; Americans will interpret the apology as assuming blame for a violation; and Americans will use an apology to regain personal credibility and self-worth. To test their hypotheses, they administered a survey to Japanese and American college students and found evidence for all of their hypotheses. The function and meaning of apologies, they argue, differ as a result of culture.

Maddux et al. (2011) also considered how the type of apology, i.e., competency-based apologies and integrity-based apologies, might be influenced by culture. They explained that people tend to weigh positive information more heavily than negative information regarding competence and negative information more heavily for integrity (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; cited in Maddux et al.). They argued that “because Japanese are less likely to equate an apology with the acceptance of blame than Americans, apologies would carry both less positive and less negative information in Japan than in the U.S.” (p. 419). Maddux et al. hypothesized that trust would be more effectively repaired in the United States following a competence violation and apology compared to Japan because the positive information surrounding repentance would factor more heavily into this process than negative information, i.e., assuming blame. The opposite, they hypothesized, would occur following an integrity violation and apology. The negative information following an integrity-based violation should factor in less with Japanese trust repair compared to Americans. Maddux et al. believed this would impact both trusting beliefs and trusting intentions.

Their second study was a 2 ×2 × 2 design (type of violation, culture, and evidence – guilt versus innocence). Participants were American and Japanese college students. Maddux et al. (2011) had participants assume the role of a manager in charge of hiring and managing a senior level accountant. Participants were told that a firm had already interviewed candidates, which were videotaped and transcribed for review. They were shown one of the interview transcriptions and video tape and then filled out a questionnaire. The recruiter on the video said to the applicant that, following a reference check, she had learned of an “accounting-related violation” at her previous employment. Violations were either competency-based or integrity-based. The applicant apologized, admitted responsibility, and said it would not happen again. The evidence manipulation was received through a human resources memo.

Results showed that an apology after an integrity-based violation repaired trust more effectively for Japanese participants compared to Americans, whereas it repaired more trust for Americans following a competence-based violation (Maddux et al., 2011). Maddux et al. also reported interactions for perceptions of integrity, willingness to risk, and job responsibilities, which were largely due to differences in culture in the integrity violation condition. Mean differences in trust repair for competence-based violation with apology between Americans and Japanese were not found, but, nevertheless, Maddux et al. concluded that the overall pattern supported their hypothesis that trust restoration after an apology differ on account of the interaction between culture and type of violation. They also claim that Japanese see moral character as more malleable and less stable in comparison to Americans (Heine et al., 2001; cited in Maddux et al.). In other words, transgressions are likely to be seen as more correctable by Japanese than Americans. This malleability of moral character might explain more trusting beliefs and intentions by Japanese, following an integrity violation and apology. Ultimately, Maddux et al.’s research showed that “an apology in one cultural context can have very different functions, meanings, and consequences in another culture, and can exacerbate or ameliorate conflict depending on whether these signals are


conveyed and interpreted appropriately” (p. 420). And underlying this difference might be differences in cultural conceptions of agency and locus of control.

Indeed, the impact of culture on repairing relationships was investigated by Ren and Gray (2009). Specifically, they developed a model for this process following conflict, and identify culture as a factor influencing restoration rituals. The following highlights the core differences they see between those people from an individualist culture (e.g., United States) and those from a collectivist culture (e.g., Japan), and how these differences might be expected to result in different approaches to restoring relationships following a violation.

Ren and Gray (2009) argue that individualist and collectivist “cultural construals manifest themselves in three types of rules that govern rituals for relationship restoration: language rules, display rules for emotions, and facework behavioural rules” (Ren & Gray, p. 114). With respect to language rules, Ren and Gray point out that the use of words that portray notions of harmony and indebtedness to others are conveyed in word choices within collectivist cultures. The choice of such words in trust restoration attempts in collectivist cultures “invoke symbolic meanings and imply unstated behavioural expectations” (Ren & Gray, p. 114). Similar types of meaning imbued words may not, they argue, exist in individualist cultures. Regarding display rules for emotions across cultures, Ren and Gray suggest that these may differ with respect to both the expressiveness of extreme emotions and the focus of the emotion. For example, within individualist cultures, self-focused emotions, such as anger or frustration, are prevalent. Moreover, the expression of extreme emotions are common. Within collectivist cultures, on the other hand, extreme emotions are often suppressed and the focus of emotions tends to be other-related, demonstrated in for example relational shame or embarrassment (Ting-Toomey, 1999; cited in Ren & Gray). Finally, Ren and Gray also thought that individualist and collectivist cultures would differ with respect to facework, i.e., the “communication tactics used to uphold, support, and challenge” face (Goffman, 1967; as cited in Ren & Gray, 2009, p. 115). Ren and Gray argue that because people from individualist cultures are more often focused on self-face threats, their communication tactics are direct and confrontational. Collectivist cultures, on the other hand, are more focused on other-face threats and therefore prefer mediational, non-confrontational, or accommodating reparation strategies (Ren & Gray).

Taken together, these rules for relationship restoration within collectivist and individualist cultures indicate that the way that people from these cultures deal with conflict and attempt to restore trust will differ at several stages. Specifically, Ren and Gray (2009) argue that people from collectivist cultures are less likely than those from individualist cultures to acknowledge conflicts directly, those from collectivist cultures in general emphasize mutual respect and harmony. But they argue that once a conflict is acknowledged, the process for relationship restoration will differ as a result of culture. Those from collectivist cultures, they argue, will be more likely to use harmony imbued language, suppress negative emotions, and use other-focused facework in order to repair a relationship after a trust violation. Further, Ren and Gray considered the interaction between culture and the type of violation on the type of restoration tactics. For example, “[i]dentity violations occur when normative boundaries that preserve identity are wittingly or unwittingly crossed during an interaction” (Ren & Gray, p. 111). Ren and Gray explain that these cause an individual to lose face, because their identity claims are challenged. On the other hand, violations of control result in relationship conflicts “when an individual’s sense of control is threatened by another’s actions” (Ren & Gray, p. 112). Conflict arises because one’s goal is obstructed, which can be subsequently interpreted as unfair.


Ren and Gray (2009), therefore, propose that the type of restoration that is appropriate will differ as a result of both the type of conflict violation and the cultural construal. Where individualists will be more likely to overtly acknowledge their acceptance of an attempted repair of the relationship, collectivists are more likely to display acceptance implicitly (e.g., through their behaviours and language).

When an identity violation occurs, Ren and Gray (2009) suggest that individualists are likely to expect and make direct apologies. Because identity violations reflect disrespect, they are considered taboo within the collectivist culture. As a result, when such violations occur, collectivists are more likely to use external explanations through a third party, especially when there is ambiguity with regard to the cause of the violation. This helps save face for both the victim and the offender. If there is no ambiguity with regard to the cause of the violation, within collectivist cultures apologies are warranted, because of the potential disharmony that results from direct confrontation. Apologies are generally communicated through a third party. According to Ren and Gray, it is necessary for the reparation of relationships after an identity violation within collectivist cultures to demonstrate concern for the offended party.

Ren and Gray (2009) argue that violations of control within individualist cultures would generally result in penance. This might be coupled with a reframing of the account or invoking of an external explanation. According to Ren and Gray, within collectivist cultures, restoration efforts after violation of control include a reframing of the accounts of the violation through a third party so that the action is no longer seen to be unfair and the victim’s belief that they are being singled out unfairly is diminished. Another method of restoring the relationship within collectivist cultures is aimed at reframing the action in an altruistic manner (i.e., benefitting the greater good). Finally, because public displays of penance would bring negative focus on the offended party and potentially disrupt harmony, private penance is more likely to be recourse for those within a collectivist culture attempting to repair a relationship.

In a similar vein, Fehr and Gelfand (2010) examined the impact of self-construals (i.e., self-perceptions of relationships with other people). on apologies and forgiveness. First, they pointed out that the majority of empirical research involving apologies used a dichotomous construct, where a participant either does or does not receive an apology. Instead, they considered three different components of apologies, including offers of compensation, expressions of empathy, and acknowledgment of violated rules/norms. They explain apologies that include offers of compensation focus on the restoration of equity through the exchange of tangible goods or through socio-emotional exchange. Expressions of empathy are relational in nature and show recognition of and concern for a victims’ suffering. An apology can also acknowledge that the offending behaviour went beyond the limits of explicit or implicit rules or norms that govern interpersonal behaviour, which, they further, “may be particularly important within organizational and group contexts wherein strong behavioural norms are prevalent” (p. 39). Fehr and Gelfand argue that the acceptance of apologies with these components might be influenced by self-construals.

Fehr and Gelfand (2010) identify three different self-construals They explain that an independent self-construal views the self as unique and autonomous, and detached from others (Cross & Madson, 1997; cited in Fehr & Gelfand). On the other hand, a relational self-construal prioritizes interpersonal relationships, viewing themselves as closely connected to others (Cross & Madson, 1997; cited in Fehr & Gelfand. Finally, individuals holding a collective self-construal, emphasize broader group categorization (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; cited in Fehr & Gelfand). Fehr and Gelfand hypothesized that individuals who emphasize an independent self-construal would react most positively to apologies that include compensation; individuals who emphasize a relational


self-construal would react most positively to apologies that include expressions of empathy; and individuals who emphasize a collective self-construal would react most positively to apologies that include acknowledgments of violated rules/norms. They conducted two studies to validate their hypotheses.

In their first study, Fehr and Gelfand (2010) asked American undergraduates to complete a self-report measure of self-construal and basic demographic information and then approximately a month later participants completed an apology measure. The apology measure was a newly developed scale of 14 items that tapped into the components of apologies. Each item involved a rating of disagreement or agreement that a good apology should include a specific component. The measure has three subscales corresponding to the three apology components: compensation, empathy, and rule/norm. This study provided support for their hypotheses. The independent self was only significantly related to the compensation apology component, relational self was only significantly related to the empathy component, and collective self was only significantly related to rule/norm.

Fehr and Gelfand’s (2010) second study examined the impact of apology components and self-construals on forgiveness. Again, they found evidence supporting their hypotheses as the independent self-construal was shown to strengthen the effect of the compensation apology component on forgiveness, the relational self-construal was shown to strengthen the effects of the empathy apology, and the collective self-construal was found to strengthen the effects of the rule/norm apology. An additional finding was that the relational self-construal increased the effect of the acknowledgement of rule/norm violation on forgiveness. Fehr and Gelfand also investigated the effects of the severity of harm caused by the offender in the second study. However, the severity of harm did not significantly influence the relationship between self-construals and the effectiveness of the three apology components.

Fehr and Gelfand’s (2010) findings suggest that when investigating the effectiveness of apologies, research should consider the different components accompanying an apology as well as the recipient’s self-construal as these variables may influence the apology’s acceptance. This is further evidence that apologies alone carry little weight. Rather, “apologies with multiple components are in general more likely to touch upon what is important to a victim than brief, perfunctory apologies” (Fehr & Gelfand, p. 46).

Haselhuhn, Schweitzer, and Wood (2010) examined how implicit beliefs impact trust restoration; specifically, they argued that some people believe that moral character can change (incremental beliefs) whereas others believe it is fixed (entity beliefs). They wondered if people holding incremental beliefs would view trust repair strategies (e.g., apology or promise to change) and efforts to change previously untrustworthy behaviour to trustworthy behaviours as sincere and possible, compared to those holding entity beliefs, following a trust violation. Haselhuhn et al. first induced participants’ implicit beliefs by asking them to read an essay on either incremental or entity beliefs. Then they asked participants to play a repeated trust game designed to foster trust changes over time (for details see Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; cited in Haselhuhn et al.). Each participant had $6 that they could pass to their counterpart or keep. If they passed it, the money tripled. At that time, the counterpart could pass back half $9 or keep it all $18. In the first 3 trials, participants were exposed to untrustworthy behaviour, followed by actions meant to build trust in the next three trials. The final round measured trust, which was operationalized as the decision to pass the money to their counterpart or not (they invoked similar reasoning to Lount et al.’s (2008) notion of “ultimate trust” measurement – see below). Participants believed they were


playing against randomly selected counterparts, when in fact they played against the same pre-programmed computer counterpart each time.

Haselhuhn et al.’s (2010) induced either an incremental belief or an entity belief of moral character by having participants read essays espousing one or the other view. Results showed that those participants in the incremental beliefs condition viewed moral character as more malleable than those in the entity belief condition. The researchers were also successful in eroding trust over the course of the first two rounds. By the third trial, most participants in both conditions were reluctant to pass their endowment to their counterpart. However, trust was recovered. In comparison to when trust was really low (in trial 3), Haselhuhn et al.witnessed a significantly greater number of participants passing their endowment in the final trial. A logistic regression with passing decision in trial 7 as the dependent variable and implicit belief as the independent variable (controlling for initial trust and gender) showed that participants who were in the incremental belief condition were more willing to trust their counterpart following trust repair, compared to those who were in the entity belief condition. According to Haselhuhn and colleagues, these results highlight the importance of a target’s belief systems in determining the effectiveness of trust repair strategies. It appears that those who see character as malleable may view trust strategies and efforts to make amends for previous wrongdoings as genuine. As such, those who have violated trust, they suggest, might want to try to alter the implicit beliefs of the trustor to effectively regain trust (e.g., make an apology as well as stating that people can change).

Other research investigating trust restoration manipulated the timing of a breach and how that impacts repair. Considering two competing hypotheses of trust development (i.e., trust develops gradually over time vs. trust starts out high), Lount et al. (2008) examined the development, maintenance, and restoration of trust, the behavioural outcomes, and mutually cooperative action, following a breach. The test bed was a prisoner’s dilemma game conducted on a computer. Before beginning, to encourage cooperative interactions, participants received a tutorial on cooperation and were told that they may receive more participant payment from randomly selected trials. Participants were then randomly assigned to four possible conditions, three that included violations via a confederate either immediately, early on in the trials, or late. These conditions were designed to create a noteworthy negative experience, a short cooperative relationship, and a stronger cooperative relationship, respectively. The final condition was no-breach. To establish a behavioural measure of trust, participants were told two-thirds of the way through the trials that they had 10 more trials left, moving from an uncertain end time to a certain one. Game theory suggests that rational players expect their counterparts to defect on the last trial because there is no retribution (Luce & Raiffa, 1957; cited in Lount et al.) and via backward induction (i.e., next-to-last reduction), less cooperation is expected once the endpoint is known (Rubenstein, 1982; cited in Lount et al.). Lount et al. explain that the very last trial, when participants are most vulnerable, is the “ultimate trust” testimonial. The number of trials was made visible to them on their computer. Following the last trial, participants received the post-experiment questionnaire.

In the first study, Lount et al. (2008) found that violations led to less cooperative choices, but that there was a return to a stable rate of cooperation, following the breach. Though they reported cooperation was relatively good for the last ten trials, when participants were certain of the end, previously experiencing a violation did lead to less trust than cooperation. In line with the theory that trust starts out high, violations that occurred early had the greatest negative impact on cooperation than those that occurred later in the trials. Lount et al. found that immediate trust violations damaged trust repair compared to the other conditions. It was reported that later breaches had short term effects. Self-reports also mirrored the behavioural data. Participants who faced a violation immediately trusted their counterpart less than those who faced a violation later in the


trials (Lount et al.). In the case of an immediate trust violation, a negative first impression may be difficult to overcome as people tend to weigh more heavily information acquired early (Anderson & Barrios, 1961; Jones, Goethals, Kennington, & Severance, 1972; cited in Lount et al.) and resist accommodating discrepant information (Lount et al.).

In their second experiment, Lount et al. (2008) investigated the damaging effects of trust violations. Using the same procedure as the first experiment, they included perceptual and emotional reaction measures immediately following the breach of trust and at other points throughout the trial. To measure the impressions of their partner, Lount et al. used Byrne’s (1971; as cited in Lount et al.) Interpersonal Judgement Scale as well as open ended questions. For emotional reactions, participants were asked to report their level of anger and irritation with their partner. Cooperation results were consistent with the original experiment. Immediate trust violations led to a decrease in cooperation throughout the experiment and once the end was known compared to later breaches, which showed moderate reductions in cooperation (Lount et al.). Combining the data from the two experiments and conducting a meta-analysis suggested that cooperation can be established after a trust violation, but “ultimate trust” is improbable (Lount et al.). Moreover, people who experienced immediate trust violations reported the most negative evaluations overall compared to those who experienced a breach later or no breach. And this difference held despite improved evaluations over time. Lount et al. also found that partner evaluations immediately following a trust violation mediated the effect of the timing of a breach on endgame cooperation.

Working in a WoG context, first impressions of one’s partners may well be critical as interorganizational trust might be low to begin with due to pre-existing negative stereotypes based in organizational culture differences (e.g., Holton, et al., 2011). Trust will need to be established between boundary spanners. Research provided instances where WoG partners violated trust from the start of interactions with partners and could never gain it back (Thomson et al., 2011). This may be because the negative information was more salient than later positive information. Of course, it could also be because there was so much negative information that trust was impossible to establish. Impression management strategies might be a useful resource to adopt in order to develop trust at the beginning of the relationship to get off on the right foot.

Other research examined trust repair from the perspective of contextual factors, including relationship dependence and outcome severity. To account for the nature of the relationship and the outcome of the interpersonal interactions, Tomlinson (2011) used interdependence theory as his theoretical framework. He detailed indicators of relationship dependence and outcome severity, and how these predict the attributions of negative outcomes made by victims following a trust violation. These attributions subsequently predict the need and difficulty of restoring trust.

Tomlinson (2011) argues that a high degree of relationship dependence can lead to quicker trust restoration. He explains that dependence can be manifest as the level of dependence (i.e., how much one relies on another to meet needs) and the mutuality of that dependence (i.e., equality of reliance). Individuals are dependent when their outcomes are in part determined by others like in a WoG context (e.g., development could only occur when the CF provided security – Thomson et al.). According to Tomlinson, those who are more dependent on the relationship have a greater probability of assigning blame for the violation away from the offender (benevolent attribution – Takaku, 2001; cited in Tomlinson). This occurs, he continues, because the trustor seeks confirming rather than disconfirming evidence to maintain positive expectations (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; cited in Tomlinson) and/or has strong emotional bonds for the relationship (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; McAllister, 1997; Williams, 2007; cited in Tomlinson, 2011). Moreover, efforts in cognitive sense


making after a violation may result in too much “psychological strain” when admitting one’s trust had been misplaced (Tomlinson).

Tomlinson (2011) identifies other indicators of relationship dependence that increase the probability of benevolent attributions following a trust violation. As we enter into relationships, we make investments in those relationships, which can be instrumental (e.g., spending time and money for economic benefits) and/or emotional (e.g., promoting affective bonds for security, affirmation, and approval) (McAllister, 1997; cited in Tomlinson). Greater investment in the relationship, therefore, invokes a tendency to rely more heavily on the relationship for desired outcomes (Moon, 2001; cited in Tomlinson). Relationship dependence is also impacted by the quantity and quality of alternative relationships. Dependence increases when there are few alternatives. Structural commitments, such as institutional mechanism, may preclude termination of a relationship following a trust violation. Tomlinson also points out that “negative outcomes [often] occur in complex social contexts”, making causal attributions ambiguous (p. 146). It is believed that individuals high in relationship dependence will “‘evaluate ambiguous information about [their] counterpart positively’” (Weber, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2005, p. 87; quoted in Tomlinson, p. 146). This then facilitates more benevolent attributions for better or worse.

Tomlinson (2011) points out that the severity of a trust violation has been understood primarily in terms of the magnitude of harm. There is strong evidence that a trust violation that produces more harm to the victim leads to more negative attributions toward the transgressor (Schwartz, Kane, Joseph, & Tedeschi, 1978; cited in Tomlinson, 2011), less acceptance of apologies and excuses (Shapiro, Buttner, & Barry, 1994; cited in Tomlinson), and less desire for reconciliation (Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004; cited in Tomlinson). But Tomlinson also suggests that the irreversibility of consequences as well as the magnitude of disconfirmation should be factored in when considering trust violations and repair. As he explains, some negative outcomes can be reversed (e.g., institutional mechanisms to put right a wrong in performance), whereas others cannot. Tomlinson also argues that having a sense of what to realistically expect will impact trust repair. Falling below a set level of expectations shifts attributions to the trustee and damages trust (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; cited in Tomlinson). With these in mind, Tomlinson suggests that restoring trust may be difficult and in extreme cases even the most sincere attempts to repair trust will not be accepted. Moreover, he speculates that the relationship between relationship dependence and benevolent attributions weakens with the severity of the trust violation.

Within the WoG context, structural commitments may make the relationship quite dependent, which, at least in theory may make trust repair easier for partners (Tomlinson, 2011). Moreover, in the WoG context at least some trust violations can be reversed. For example, a boundary spanner can be replaced by a more suitable member if the performance is not at the appropriate level. This can facilitate the restoration of interorganizational trust. In fact, SMEs reported cases where this occurred in a WoG context in Afghanistan and this change did indeed help to promote a more trusting relationship between the organizations (Thomson et al.).

Up to this point in the discussion, the research presented has examined trust violations and repair primarily at the individual level. Though this does not diminish the importance of the research for the WoG context as it can be extrapolated, it does underscore the need to advance the research to the interorganizational level. Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009) considered trust violation and repair at the interorganizational level. Specifically, they wondered if, at minimum, the relationship between organizations could still be preserved to ensure future collaboration. They were interested in identifying the conditions necessary for trust repair as well as uncovering the circumstances where trust is lost, but collaboration still can continue. As such, they developed a


theoretical framework which considered both the type of violation (i.e., competence-based or integrity-based violation) and repair strategy adopted (i.e., apology or denial), and importantly how the role of boundary spanners (i.e., corporate or operating level) might influence this. They reasoned that since roles across an organization vary, so too might the violations and repair strategies associated with these particular roles. For example, operating level boundary spanners are responsible for actualizing corporate level strategy and decision making (Doz, 1996; cited in Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan) and are expected to deliver on tasks set out in the interorganizational collaboration (Zaheer, Loftrom, & George, 2002; cited in Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan). This differs from boundary spanners at the corporate level who devise those strategies and make decisions necessary to ensure strategy implementation. This requires building a partnership at the initial stages of collaboration between organizations.

Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009) identified two general measures for dealing with interorganizational trust violations. The first, legal measures, refers to formal mechanisms that prevent future violations or address the consequences of a violation. The second, non-legalistic measures, refers to non-bureaucratic social accounts or explanations by the trust violator meant to alter the perception of the violator’s responsibility. Non-legalistic measures can be an excuse, justification or apology. Using a non-legalistic approach, a trust violator can accept personal responsibility (internal attribution) or point to some other factor or influence as the source of the violation (external attribution). The effectiveness of these two strategies, they argue, depends on a number of variables, including the type, frequency and severity of the violation. Importantly, they argued that the role of boundary spanners and the organizational limits on these would also impact interorganizational trust violations.

Reflecting on the literature, Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009) argue that competence-based trust is resilient, as violations are perceived as behavioural anomalies provided that they are infrequent and slight (Bell & Anderson, 2000; cited in Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan). People assign greater significance to positive competence-related information than to negative information (Martijn, Spears, Van der Pligt, and Jakobs, 1992; cited in Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan), and it is not at all surprising that competent individuals will perform below expectations from time to time (Martijn, Spears, Van der Pligt, & Jacobs, 1992; cited in cited in Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan). Considering boundary spanners at the operating level of an organization, Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan argue that using a non-legalistic measure to repair trust is the most effective means for this type of violation. For example, an apology signals personal responsibility for the violation and is further enhanced by promises to implement corrective behaviour to avoid future violations. This only holds, they continue, if competence-based trust violations are infrequent and slight and occur at the operating level of an organization.

Cases that involve frequent or severe competence violations necessitate legalistic measures because they specify requirements and contingencies for the fulfilment of a particular task (e.g., employee training or outsourcing expertise) (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009). Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan hold that these measures are most effective when they are voluntarily imposed and issued at the corporate level of the organization, because boundary spanners at the corporate level have “the power to design and change the collaborative interface of the interorganizational relationship” (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, p. 262). Though trust may not be repaired following frequent or sever competence-based violations, legal measures provide the injured party with recourse that the task will be completed and the relationship, though tenuous, preserved for the duration of collaboration (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan).


Legalistic measures are also necessary for any competence-based trust violations at the corporate level because considering the strategic nature of decisions at this level such violations are undoubtedly always sever (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009). As Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (p. 258) put it, “[t]he failure of an organization to deliver according to expectations is therefore an indication that the corporate managers are incapable of coordinating the organizational resources so as to deliver the expected outcome”. They argue that non-legalistic measures at this level may be construed by the injured party as a trivialization of the consequences. But legalistic measures will help maintain the collaborative relationship. On the other hand, frequent corporate level competency-based violations will likely lead to a termination of the relationship because trust is almost impossible to regain (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan).

For integrity-based trust violations, Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009) argue that operating level boundary spanners are well positioned to take externally attributed non-legalistic measures to right a wrong because they are often subjected to a number of organizational constraints concerning their conduct (i.e., rules and regulations). As such, they are unable to act freely (Perrone, Zaheer, & McEvily, 2003; cited in Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan). In the absence of organizational constraints, using a non-legalistic measure with internal attribution to address an integrity-based violation may be the most effective way to repair trust. In fact, some argue that such an admission to guilt, demonstrating an awareness of the broken rule, implicitly reinstates a trustee’s rectitude (Blumstein et al., 1974; cited in Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan). Again, Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan hold that the frequency and severity will no longer make non-legalistic measures suitable. Organizations that permit frequent integrity-based violations may communicate organizational values that tolerate or promote opportunism (Perrone et al.; cited in Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan). Legalistic measures will need to be voluntarily invoked at the corporate level to mitigate operating level violations in order to, at minimum, preserve the working relationship (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan).

Corporate level integrity-based violations are even more problematic than those made at the operating level because boundary spanners at the top level are less constrained by their organization and are positioned to make strategic decisions. Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009) suggest either adopting legalistic measures to maintain the collaborative relationship or exiting the relationship altogether. The choice, they explain, will be determined by the level of dependence between the partners. The greater the dependence, the greater the probability that the relationship will require legal measures to safeguard contract arrangements. The problem with substituting trust with legalistic measures is the relationship loses the benefits that come with trust, including “resilience to external and internal shocks, lower transaction costs, higher information and knowledge flows” (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, p. 263). In a WoG context, if interorganizational trust has been violated, it might be necessary to implement legal measures to ensure the operational objectives are met.

Though Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009) nicely detail differences in trust violations and trust repair strategies for different roles in an organization, they explain that they did not investigate whether or not a violation at one level leads to a violation at another level. In other words, does a violation at the operating level implicate a violation at the corporate level and vice versa? Rather, their framework merely considers role as a variable for repair measures in interorganizational relationships. But research examining trust in the WoG context suggested that there can be a lack of interorganizational trust at the top level, but that trust at the operational level can develop and exist in order to make it work on the ground – as one SME said it works because you have to “cut the crap and just get right to it” (Thomson et al., 2011).


A previous study conducted by Gill, Thompson, and Febbraro (2011) examined trust violation and repair strategies in a comprehensive (combination of civilian and military assets to achieve mission objectives) approach to operations. Using a scenario-based laboratory design, they asked participants to imagine that they were members of the local population of a fictitious country that had experienced internal conflict as a result of rising terrorism. A foreign military had deployed to help address the terrorist threat as well as help with development and diplomacy efforts. Participants read either competence-based trust violations or integrity-based violations committed by the foreign military. Gill et al found that participant’s trust measured before the violation was significantly higher than after, suggesting allegations of untrustworthiness was enough to diminish previously held trust. In response to trust repair, participants suggested that more effective communication (e.g., clearly defining plan of action to ensure transparency, consulting with the locals, etc.) and inclusion of the local population in military development efforts may help to restore it. Gill et al found that the best scenario to maintain trust between groups was to avoid trust violations altogether. However, when a violation did occur, they found that apologizing (as opposed to denying responsibility for the violation) was the most promising recourse for restoring trust.

Having reviewed the most recent empirical advances concerning trust, trust violations and trust repair, we next turn our attention to the second objective of the current report, i.e., to advance research concerning trust violations and trust repair in a WoG context. To this end, the current scenario-based study follows from Gill et al.’s (2011) previous methodology, and has two main purposes: 1) to understand the nature and impact of trust violations in a WoG operational context, and 2) to examine the impact of trust repair strategies on restoring lost trust between various actors in a WoG operational context.


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2. Method

In order to increase our ability to access as many participants as possible, the experiment was available through an online survey tool approved for use with CF personnel (Fluidsurveys, 2011). The methodology and questionnaires were reviewed and approved by the DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) and all participants received remuneration according to DRDC guidelines.

2.1 Experimental Scenario and Design The specific scenario, provided to the contractors, was based on Gill, Thompson, & Febbraro (2011), which consisted of a situation in which an imaginary country, Safia, was experiencing conflict due to the rising power of a local terrorist organization. The military from another country (namely, Massey) entered Safia to deal with the terrorist threat and assist in the development and security of Safia. The current instantiation of the scenario involved the addition of national and international agencies and organizations that were also in Safia to assist in development and reconstruction. In particular, one OGD was from Massey, called ‘Massey Assistance and Development Organization’ (MADO). The Massey military, MADO, and other Massey agencies would be working together, in a Whole of Government or Comprehensive Approach, to assist in the security and development of Safia.

Embedded within the scenario were the OGD knowledge, trust violation, and trust repair manipulations. Participants either experienced the OGD knowledge manipulation or control (no knowledge of OGD roles and responsibilities), as well as either a trust violation committed by the OGD partner, or no trust violation (control). Furthermore, participants experienced either the apology trust repair (along with a redress plan) or no trust repair (control). The apology trust repair strategy used was based on recent empirical data in the area of trust (Kim et al., 2004), and contained a specific acknowledgement that a trust violation was committed prior to the apology itself. In the violation control condition no trust repair was offered, as no trust violation was committed.

More detailed information about the study design and the measures used is provided in the sections that follow.

In this scenario-based study, participants were randomly assigned to conditions using the Fluid Survey software. Each participant completed the study individually at home or in their office.

This study used a 2 (OGD Knowledge: knowledge of OGD organization, no knowledge of OGD organization control) x 2 (Trust violation: violation, no violation control) x 2 (Trust repair strategy: apology (with redress plan), no repair strategy control) design. Two conditions were excluded from the design; specifically, they were the OGD knowledge, no violation, repair condition and the no OGD knowledge, no violation, repair condition. They were excluded because in the case where no violation occurred, as stated above, no repair was required, resulting in six conditions. The full design of the study is shown in Figure 1.


Figure 1. Overview of trust study conditions (N=150)

OGD Knowledge Control Control

OGD Knowledge Provided

+ Trust Violation

(Violation)

No OGD Knowledge Provided

+ Trust Violation

(Violation)

OGD Knowledge

+ No Trust

Violation and No Repair

No OGD Knowledge Provided + No Trust

Violation and No Repair

Trust

Repair

Apology &

Redress Plan

Condition 1 (C1)

(N = 25)

Condition 3 (C3)

(N = 25) Condition 5 (C5)

( N = 25)

Condition 6 (C6)

(N = 25) No Trust Repair

Strategy

Condition 2 (C2)

(N = 25)

Condition 4 (C4)

(N = 25)

2.2 Procedure All participants first read an Information Letter describing the study (see Appendix A). Participants then completed the Voluntary Consent Form (see Appendix B), as well as a Biographical Data Form (see Appendix C), the scenario (see Appendix D), the questionnaires (see Appendix E), and the Debriefing Form (see Appendix F). The experiment took approximately one hour to complete.

Participants were told that the study was designed to assess perceptions of the relationship between military organizations and the OGD partner they work within a WoG context. They began with a baseline portion of the scenario detailing the mission and the country context. Baseline assessments (related to trust and expectations about their partners) were gathered from participants at this point (see Appendix E.1 to E.7).

After this, participants in the knowledge of OGDs condition read about the roles and responsibilities of the OGD depicted in the scenario. Participants in the control condition read another description that was designed to not provide any specific information about the OGD with which they would be working in the hypothetical scenario. At this point, trust-related measures were administered again (see Appendix E.1 to E.7).

At the next step of the study, some participants were exposed to a trust violation, where they were informed that the OGD had committed a violation toward them. Specifically, participants were told that the OGD representatives did not support the participants’ initiatives, were not dependable in providing funding, did not deliver on their promises, were young and inexperienced which raised concerns about their ability to work in a theatre of operations, and had different priorities in addressing minor, apparently non-mission focused goals. Participants in the no violation control condition read a scenario in which no trust violations were committed by the OGD. Rather, they read a neutral passage describing other events, such as the OGD representatives responding quickly to minor requests, which had no potential to be perceived as a violation. At this point, trust-related measures were administered again (see Appendix E.1 to E.7).

Those participants in the trust repair condition then were presented with information suggesting that the OGD personnel who had violated their trust acknowledged that they were responsible for


the difficulties and apologized for the difficulties they had caused. Participants in the no repair control condition were told that the OGD representatives were satisfied with the mission progress. This information was again followed by the trust-related measures (see Appendix E.1 to E.7).

The final scenario segment in the repair condition detailed the measures that the fictional OGD would take to ensure the trust violation would not reoccur. Having recognized the shortcomings related to the mission, the OGD personnel who apologized were also reported to make efforts to repair the relationship. Participants in the no repair control condition read that the OGD would continue the status quo. This information was again followed by the completion of the trust-related measures (see Appendix E.1 to E.7). A measure of causal attributions (see Appendix E.8), a short manipulation check1 (see Appendix E.9), and background information questionnaire (see Appendix E.10) followed by a debriefing completed the general methodology of the study (see Appendix F).

2.3 Participants Military personnel were recruited through the CF chain of command, through the members of the research team, and through the Military Operations Advisor (LCol Dwayne Hobbs) of the Socio-Cognitive Systems Section at DRDC Toronto.

This study was conducted with 150 CF participants. The demographic characteristics of participants are described in Table 1.

Table 1. Demographic information2

Dimension Category N % Gender Male 128 85%

Female 22 15% Age (N = 148) 18-21 11 7%

22-26 36 24% 27-31 34 23% 32-36 21 14% 37-41 21 14% 42-46 11 7% 47-51 12 8% 52 and over 2 1%

Highest education level

Some high school 6 4% High school diploma 26 17% Some university or college 46 31% University or college degree 55 37% Graduate degree 17 11%

1 After approximately half of the participants had completed the study, the manipulation check questions were assessed to examine whether or not the knowledge, trust, and repair manipulations were effective. At that time, the researchers noticed that the trust violation was weak. It was theorized that participants who were in the trust violation/repair condition were no longer seeing the OGD as unreliable and undependable due to the apology and redress that they received. Therefore, the violation manipulation check questions were included, at that point, just prior to the trust repair manipulation. There were 72 participants who received this added manipulation check. 2 N = 150 unless otherwise specified.


Dimension Category N % Marital status (N = 150)

Single 68 45% Married 82 55%

First language (N = 150)

English 136 91% French 8 5% Other (1 each - Arabic, Serbian, Persian, Cantonese, Korean, Polish)

6 4%

Ethnic Background (N = 150)

White 123 82% Asian 10 7% South Asian 1 1% Black 1 1% Filipino 1 1% Latin American 5 3% Southeast Asian 0 0% Arab 2 1% West Asian 1 1% Aboriginal 4 3% Other (1 each - Gyanese, Philipino/German)

2 1%

As Table 1 shows, participants in this study were predominantly male, and represented a wide range of ages and education levels. They were also fairly homogeneous in terms of their first language and ethnic background. Nonetheless, a broad sample of participants agreed to complete the experiment.

Information relevant to participants’ military experience is shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Military experience

Variable Category N %

Force represented (N = 148)

Regular 82 55% Reserve 66 45%

Rank (N = 150) Private 20 13% Cpl/MCpl 63 42% Sgt/WO 24 16% MWO/CWO 7 5% Jr. Officer 29 19% Sr. Officer 7 5%

Are you in a command role? (N = 147)

Yes 54 37%

No 93 63%



Time serving the CF (N = 148)

2 years or less 16 11%

3 - 5 years 32 22% 6 - 9 years 34 23% 10 -15 years 26 18% 16 - 20 years 13 9% 21 - 25 years 16 11% 26 - 30 years 8 5% over 31 years 3 2%

As Table 2 shows, participants were a fairly equal mix of Regular and Reserve force personnel, with the majority of participants being non-commissioned members, and about 24% being commissioned personnel. About 37% of the participants reported functioning in a command role. Results also showed a very good spread of experience, with about 33% of participants having 5 years or less experience but there were also 27% with more than 16 years of military experience.

Participants were also asked to indicate their CF job title. Table 3 summarizes these results.

Table 3. Job titles

Job title N %

Infantryman 24 16% Infantry Company/Section/Platoon Command 19 13% Resource Management Support Clerk 16 11% Training Development Officer 8 5% Military Police 7 5% Supply Technician 6 4% Artilleryman 5 3% Crewman 4 3% Signal Operator 4 3% Vehicle Technician 4 3% Army Communications and Information Systems Specialist 3 2% Combat Engineer 3 2% Electronic-Optronic Technician 3 2% Medical Technician 3 2% Administrative Officer 2 1% Civil-Military Cooperation 2 1% Intelligence Operator 2 1% Logistics Operator 2 1% Mobile Support Equipment Operator 2 1% Regimental/Branch Sergeant-Major 2 1% Weapons Technician 2 1% Adjutant 1 <1%


Job title N %

Armoured Officer 1 <1%Arms Crew Commander 1 <1%Artillery Officer 1 <1%Base Superintendent Clerk 1 <1%Communicator Research Operator 1 <1%Dental Officer 1 <1%Engineer Officer 1 <1%G3 2 CMBG 1 <1%Influence Activities S3-2 1 <1%J3 Operations 1 <1%Lineman 1 <1%Maintenance Officer 1 <1%Medical Officer 1 <1%Nurse 1 <1%Officer Commanding 1 <1%Pilot 1 <1%Planner 1 <1%Postal Services 1 <1%Recce Troop Warrant 1 <1%Sapper 1 <1%Sonar Operator 1 <1%Traffic Technician 1 <1%Watchkeeper 1 <1% All Groups 150 100

As can be seen in Table 3, the types of jobs held by participants varied a great deal. The largest proportion of participants were either infantrymen or infantry commanders.

It was also important to explore participants’ experience working with other government departments (OGD), as shown in Table 4.

Table 4. OGD experience


How many times have you worked with representatives from other government departments in the field? (N = 149)

0 69 46%

1-2 46 31% 3-4 19 13% 5-9 4 3% 10 or more 11 7%

More than half of the participants in this experiment reported having some OGD experience, with about 10% of participants reporting 5 or more opportunities to interact with personnel from other government departments.


2.4 Measures Expectations/Perceptions of MADO. Participants answered seven items that assessed their expectations of the MADO organization (e.g., “The MADO representatives and Massey military will work well together,” “The MADO representatives seem to have good training”), that were adapted from a measure developed by Brown, Adams, Famewo, and Karthaus (2008). The participants responded on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). This scale was administered at five different points in the study, including baseline, post-knowledge, post-violation, post-repair and post-redress. Reliability analyses for the measure were excellent, being .90 and above (see Table 11 in Section 3.2).

Trust dimensions. A total of seventeen items adapted from Mayer and Davis (1999) reflected the three most prominent trust dimensions: competence, benevolence, and integrity. The participants responded on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). This scale was administered at five different points in the study, including baseline, post-knowledge, post-violation, post-repair and post-redress. Reliabilities were all excellent [competence, 6 items: e.g., “The MADO representatives are very capable of performing their job,” Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .95 at baseline and post knowledge to .98 post redress (see Table 12 in Section 3.2); benevolence, 5 items: e.g., “The MADO representatives are very concerned about the safety and mission goals of the Massey military,” Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .89 at baseline to .96 post violation, post repair and post redress (see Table 13 in Section 3.2); integrity, 6 items: e.g., “The MADO representatives have a strong sense of justice,” Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .94 at baseline to .97 post violation, post repair and post redress (see Table 14 in Section 3.2)].

Trust intentions. Five items assessed participants’ propensity to trust the OGD (e.g., “I would have no problem letting the MADO representatives continue to have influence over important operational decisions I make for the duration of their mission in Safia,” adapted from Mayer & Davis, 1999). The participants responded on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). This scale was administered at five different points in the study, at baseline, post-knowledge, post-violation, post-repair and post-redress. This measure had excellent reliability. Cronbach’s alphas ranged from 87 at baseline to .95 post violation (see Table 15 in Section 3.2).

Willingness to risk. Seven items measured the degree to which participants agreed with statements such as: “If the MADO representatives and I were in a high risk negotiation situation with Safian rebels, I would be able to rely on the MADO representatives to ‘watch my back’” (adapted from Brown et al., 2008). The participants responded on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). This scale was administered at 5 different points in the study, including baseline, post-knowledge, post-violation, post-repair and post-redress. This measure also had excellent reliability. Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .94 at baseline to .98 post violation (see Table 16 in Section 3.2).

Additional expectations. Five items addressed additional expectations about the MADO representatives, including items like “I expect the MADO representatives to keep their word” and “I expect the MADO representatives to be reliable”. The participants responded on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). This scale was administered at 5 different points in the study, including baseline, post-knowledge, post-violation, post-repair and post-redress. This measure had excellent reliability. Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .92 at baseline to .96 post repair and post redress (see Table 17 in Section 3.2).

Causal dimension scale (Adapted from McAuley, Duncan and Russell, 1992). This scale assessed the attributions that participants made for what had occurred (i.e., where they placed the


responsibility, whether with MADO, or with the military). The scale reflected four dimensions: 1) attributions about MADO and its members (2 items, e.g. , “The events that happened in the scenario give important information about the representatives in theatre/situation itself”), 2) the control MADO had over the situation (4 items, e.g., “The events that happened in the scenario could/could not be controlled by MADO representatives in theatre.”), 3) on who the scenario reflected (MADO or Massey military) (3 items, e.g., “The events that happened in the scenario provide important information about Massian military personnel/the MADO representatives in theatre.”), and 4) the stability of the situation (1 item, “The events that happened in the scenario are/are not likely to change in the future.”).

In each subscale participants rated the items on a scale of 0 to 10. In the MADO attributions subscale, higher numbers reflected an internal rather than an external attribution. In the MADO control subscale, higher numbers reflected an internal rather than an external locus of control. In the information reflection subscale, higher numbers indicated that the events reflected more about the Massey military and the participant rather than MADO. Finally, in the stability subscale, higher numbers reflected a more unstable rather than a stable situation.

The causal dimension scale was administered twice, post-violation and post-redress. Cronbach’s alphas on the various subscales ranged from .65 for the MADO attributions subscale at the post redress stage to .81 for the MADO control and information reflection subscales post violation (see Tables 18 to 21 in Section 3.2).

Manipulation checks. Participants answered five multiple-choice questions that assessed the following:

Knowledge manipulation 1 - Whether participants recognized that they had received specific knowledge about MADO responsibilities (see Annex E.9.1).

Knowledge manipulation 2 - Whether participants recognized that they had received specific knowledge about the mandate of MADO (see Annex E.9.1).

Trust violation manipulation 1 - Whether they recognized that a trust violation had occurred or not. This question asked participants to indicate whether the MADO representatives were a reliable or unreliable whole of government (WOG) partner (see Annex E.9.2).

Trust violation manipulation 2 - Whether they recognized that a trust violation had occurred or not. This question asked participants to indicate whether the MADO representatives were a dependable or an undependable partner, or again that they had no opportunity to assess the dependability of the MADO representatives (see Annex E.9.2).

Apology manipulation - Whether participants recognized that the MADO representatives had apologized or not (see Annex E.9.3).

2.5 Limitations Although it would have been ideal to have had access to participants with more operational experience within the Whole of Government context, this would have greatly restricted the size of the sample that would have been available. Given the need for statistical power, and the generally limited availability of military personnel, it was necessary to compromise while defining the sample, and to restrict participation only to military personnel.


3. Results

In accordance with the Statement of Work, this section explores only preliminary results of the study. The sections that follow describe the results of manipulation checks, quantitative analyses (descriptive statistics of the key measures), and frequency counts related to post-scenario questions.

3.1 Manipulation Checks

3.1.1 Knowledge manipulation check One participant in the knowledge condition (C5) did not respond to the second manipulation check question. The breakdown of all other responses is listed in Table 5.

Table 5. Knowledge Manipulation Questions Breakdown across Knowledge (C1, C2, & C5) and No Knowledge (C3, C4, & C6) Conditions (N = 150)

% responded

development

% responded

foreign relations/space

% responded

not described

Knowledge manipulation check #1

Knowledge condition (N = 75)

78.7 10.7 10.7

No knowledge condition (control) (N = 75)

60.0 8.0 32.0

Knowledge manipulation check #2


93.2 2.7 4.1


72.0 1.3 26.7

Knowledge manipulation check overall


85.9 6.7 7.4


66.0 4.7 29.3

Note. Percentages listed in bold were considered the correct response for that condition.

While an average of 85.8% of the participants in the knowledge condition correctly identified that MADO was responsible for carrying out development programs, an average of 66% of participants in the no knowledge control condition also were able to identify that MADO was responsible for carrying out development programs., Only 29.3% of participants correctly indicated that the MADO mandate was not described.


3.1.2 Trust violation manipulation check 3.1.2.1 Pre-Repair Manipulation Table 6 displays the responses to the trust violation manipulation check questions for the 72 participants who completed the study after this manipulation check was added prior to the repair manipulation (see Footnote 1). One participant in the violation condition (C3) did not respond to the first manipulation check question and another participant in the violation condition (C4) did not respond to the second manipulation check question.

Table 6. Breakdown of Responses to Pre-Repair Violation Manipulation Check Questions across Violation (C1 – C4) and No Violation (C5 – C6) Conditions (N = 71)

% responded

reliable/ dependable

% responded unreliable/

not dependable

% responded

not applicable

Violation manipulation check #1

Violation condition (N = 48)

18.7 68.7 12.5

No violation condition (control) (N = 23)

91.3 4.3 4.3



12.5 79.2 8.3


100.0 0.0 0.0

Violation manipulation check overall


15.6 74.0 10.4


95.7 2.2 2.2


On average, 74% of participants in the violation condition correctly responded that the OGD was an unreliable partner when the manipulation question was responded to prior to, for some participants, reading about the attempt at trust repair and redress by the OGD. Almost all of the no violation control participants (95.7%) correctly responded that the OGD was a reliable whole of government partner.

3.1.2.2 Post-Repair Manipulation Tables 7 to 9 display the responses to the trust violation manipulation check questions that were presented after participants completed the scenario (see Section 2.2).

Table 7 includes data only from the first 78 participants who completed the manipulation check only after having completed the entire scenario. One participant in the violation condition (C1) did not respond to the first question and two participants in the no violation condition (1 in C5, 1 in C6) did not respond to the second question.


Table 7. Post-Repair Violation Manipulation Question Breakdown for Single Presentation Participants Only (N = 78)

% responded



not dependable

% responded

not applicable



20.0 70.0 10.0


88.9 7.4 3.7



15.7 70.6 13.7


92.0 4.0 4.0



17.8 70.3 11.9


90.4 5.8 3.8


Among the participants who only completed the violation manipulation check after having read through the entire scenario, on average only 70.3% of those in the violation condition responded correctly that MADO was an unreliable/not dependable partner. As mentioned in Footnote 1, it was hypothesized that part of the reason that some participants in the violation condition may not have viewed the OGD as unreliable or undependable may have been that learning of their apology altered their perceptions of the OGD.

Table 8 includes data only from the 72 participants who completed the manipulation check both pre- and post-repair manipulation. One participant in the violation condition (C4) did not complete the second question.


Table 8. Post-Repair Violation Manipulation Question Breakdown for Dual Presentation Participants Only (N = 72)

% responded



not dependable

% responded

not applicable



32.7 61.2 6.1


100.0 0.0 0.0



27.1 62.5 10.4


100.0 0.0 0.0



29.9 61.9 8.2


100.0 0.0 0.0


Among the participants who completed the violation manipulation check both prior to the trust repair manipulation and at the end of the entire scenario, on average, only 61.9% of the participants in the violation condition felt that the OGD partner was unreliable/not dependable. This is a considerable decrease from the pre-repair manipulation check (74.0%), thus strengthening the argument that the perception of the OGD was altered as a result of the repair. However, a full analysis of this hypothesis was beyond the scope of this report. 3

Table 9 includes data from all 150 participants with the exception of those participants who did not answer a particular question. One participant in the C1 violation condition did not respond to the first question and three participants (one in the C4 violation condition, one each in the C5 and C6 no violation conditions) did not respond to the second question.

3 An overall average of the correct responses to the violation manipulation check items was created by using only the first responses to this item that the participant provided (i.e., for the first 78 participants this was post-repair, for the final 72 participants, this was pre-repair). Within the violation condition, 72.1% of the responses correctly identified that the OGD partner was unreliable/not dependable. Within the no violation condition, 92.9% of the responses correctly identified that the OGD partner was a reliable/dependable partner.


Table 9. Post-Repair Violation Manipulation Question Breakdown across Violation (C1 – C4) and No Violation (C5 – C6) Conditions (N = 150)

% responded



not dependable

% responded

not applicable



26.2 65.7 8.1


94.0 4.0 2.0



21.2 66.7 12.1


95.8 2.1 2.1



23.7 66.2 10.1


94.9 3.1 2.0


Across all of the participants (both those who completed the manipulation check twine and those who completed it only at the end of the entire scenario), an average of 66.2% of those in the violation condition, correctly identified that the OGD was not a dependable/reliable partner after having read the entire scenario.

3.1.3 Repair manipulation check The breakdown of responses for all participants to the repair manipulation check questions is shown in Table 10.

Table 10. Repair Manipulation Question Breakdown for Participants across Repair (C1 & C3) and No Repair (C2, C4, C5, & C6) Conditions (N = 150)

% responded apologized

% responded worked well

% responded

not applicable

Repair manipulation check

Repair condition (N = 50)

84.0 10.0 6.0

No repair condition (control) (N = 99)

5.0 87.0 8.0


The apology/repair manipulation was quite successful because 84% of participants in the repair condition correctly identified that the OGD apologized whereas 87% of those in the no repair condition indicated that MADO commented that they worked well with the Massey military.


3.2 Quantitative Analyses In accordance with the Statement of Work, simple descriptive analyses were conducted on the data for this study. The primary set of analyses explored means and standard deviations for each of the scale indexes (e.g., expectations, trust dimensions) at each stage of the scenario and for participants in each of the 6 conditions. These descriptive statistics are listed in Tables 11 to 21.

Table 11. Expectations and perceptions Expectations/ Perceptions

C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 ALL Reliability

Baseline

Mean 5.10 4.84 5.23 5.26 5.14 4.96 5.09 0.93

SD 1.28 1.22 1.27 0.90 0.90 1.04 1.11

Post-Knowledge

Mean 5.51 5.30 5.34 5.47 5.75 4.99 5.39 0.94

SD 1.24 1.13 1.30 0.85 0.80 0.99 1.07

Post-Violation

Mean 2.89 2.25 2.53 2.82 6.22 6.09 3.80 0.98

SD 1.16 0.99 1.26 1.33 0.55 0.83 1.98

Post-Repair

Mean 4.07 3.62 3.92 3.83 5.95 5.80 4.53 0.96

SD 0.92 1.37 1.36 1.46 0.78 1.20 1.53

Post-Redress

Mean 4.52 3.69 4.20 4.21 6.14 5.90 4.78 0.97

SD 1.09 1.46 1.45 1.50 0.75 1.08 1.53 Note. C1 = Knowledge, Violation, Repair; C2 = Knowledge, Violation, No Repair; C3 = No Knowledge, Violation, Repair; C4 = No Knowledge, Violation, No Repair; C5 = Knowledge, No Violation, No Repair; C6 = No Knowledge, No Violation, No Repair.

Table 12. Trust – Competence Competence C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 ALL Reliability

Baseline

Mean 5.13 4.43 5.26 5.37 4.95 4.85 5.00 0.95

SD 1.29 1.26 1.23 0.74 1.10 0.97 1.14

Post-Knowledge

Mean 5.55 5.08 5.30 5.55 5.87 4.93 5.38 0.95

SD 1.22 1.21 1.16 0.84 0.84 1.04 1.09

Post-Violation

Mean 2.98 2.45 3.01 3.27 6.21 6.04 3.99 0.97

SD 1.12 0.96 1.34 1.28 0.62 0.87 1.86

Post-Repair

Mean 3.71 3.62 3.70 4.00 6.05 5.87 4.49 0.97

SD 1.12 1.56 1.31 1.41 0.70 1.10 1.60

Post-Redress

Mean 4.27 3.64 4.08 4.30 6.17 5.95 4.73 0.98



Table 13. Trust – Benevolence

Benevolence C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 ALL Reliability

Baseline

Mean 5.03 4.24 5.00 4.62 4.58 4.69 4.69 0.89

SD 1.32 1.42 1.19 1.38 1.04 1.17 1.27

Post-Knowledge

Mean 4.69 4.18 5.06 4.67 4.56 4.71 4.65 0.92

SD 1.53 1.40 1.09 1.45 1.08 1.37 1.33

Post-Violation

Mean 2.33 2.06 2.42 2.64 5.69 5.62 3.46 0.96

SD 0.98 0.94 1.53 1.26 0.60 1.16 1.91

Post-Repair

Mean 3.86 3.24 3.91 3.61 5.43 5.38 4.24 0.96

SD 1.29 1.42 1.35 1.46 0.79 1.32 1.53

Post-Redress

Mean 4.52 3.14 4.42 3.42 5.63 5.44 4.43 0.96


Table 14. Trust – Integrity Integrity C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 ALL Reliability

Baseline

Mean 5.05 4.49 5.16 5.07 4.88 4.91 4.92 0.94

SD 1.21 1.24 1.49 0.96 0.91 1.06 1.16

Post-Knowledge

Mean 5.27 5.04 5.41 5.29 5.43 5.02 5.24 0.95

SD 1.18 1.18 1.46 1.00 0.77 1.05 1.12

Post-Violation

Mean 2.66 2.45 2.80 3.23 6.05 5.95 3.85 0.97

SD 1.03 0.85 1.32 1.18 0.63 0.91 1.83

Post-Repair

Mean 4.01 3.55 3.79 3.82 5.93 5.78 4.49 0.97

SD 1.09 1.51 1.34 1.42 0.66 1.17 1.56

Post-Redress

Mean 4.53 3.59 4.24 3.97 5.95 5.83 4.68 0.97



Table 15. Trust – Intentions

Intent C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 ALL Reliability

Baseline

Mean 3.90 3.47 4.50 4.08 3.95 3.86 3.96 0.87

SD 1.43 1.27 1.21 1.20 1.16 1.49 1.31

Post-Knowledge

Mean 4.18 3.66 4.58 4.41 4.12 3.87 4.13 0.92

SD 1.64 1.30 1.42 1.50 1.22 1.54 1.45

Post-Violation

Mean 2.06 1.58 2.13 2.39 4.81 4.72 2.95 0.95

SD 0.98 0.74 1.41 1.25 1.00 1.43 1.74

Post-Repair

Mean 2.68 2.70 2.64 2.92 4.74 4.39 3.34 0.94

SD 1.11 1.39 1.48 1.44 1.22 1.65 1.63

Post-Redress

Mean 3.15 2.55 3.24 2.99 4.86 4.61 3.57 0.94


Table 16. Trust - Willingness to risk Willingness to Risk


Baseline

Mean 4.41 3.53 4.74 4.34 4.02 3.84 4.15 0.94

SD 1.29 1.26 1.21 1.29 1.15 1.41 1.31

Post-Knowledge

Mean 4.51 3.93 4.81 4.45 4.38 4.16 4.37 0.95

SD 1.46 1.41 1.53 1.35 1.13 1.44 1.40

Post-Violation

Mean 2.19 1.81 2.34 2.62 5.22 5.17 3.22 0.98

SD 0.94 0.80 1.61 1.35 0.75 1.37 1.83

Post-Repair

Mean 3.05 2.90 2.90 3.28 5.21 4.78 3.69 0.97

SD 1.24 1.47 1.58 1.30 0.97 1.56 1.65

Post-Redress

Mean 3.67 2.90 3.64 3.34 5.21 4.96 3.95 0.97



Table 17. Additional expectations

Additional Expectations


Baseline

Mean 5.36 5.01 5.54 5.74 5.49 5.35 5.41 0.92

SD 1.26 1.28 1.17 0.84 0.84 0.96 1.08

Post-Knowledge

Mean 5.41 5.34 5.62 5.88 5.67 5.46 5.56 0.93

SD 1.15 1.15 1.30 0.79 0.83 1.01 1.05

Post-Violation

Mean 4.06 3.60 3.44 4.24 6.17 5.98 4.58 0.95

SD 1.41 1.76 1.65 1.61 0.62 0.90 1.75

Post-Repair

Mean 4.46 4.26 3.96 4.84 6.19 5.83 4.92 0.96

SD 1.54 1.67 1.56 1.55 0.61 1.14 1.60

Post-Redress

Mean 4.74 4.23 4.59 4.77 6.13 5.95 5.07 0.96


Table 18. Causal dimension scale – MADO attributions Causal Dimension Scale


Post-Violation

Mean 4.96 5.66 5.36 5.68 4.58 5.27 5.25 0.73

SD 2.23 2.14 2.36 2.69 2.09 1.86 2.24

Post-Redress

Mean 5.06 5.90 6.24 6.18 4.84 5.24 5.58 0.65


Table 19. Causal dimension scale – MADO control Causal Dimension Scale


Post-Violation

Mean 4.52 4.80 4.95 4.72 5.45 5.50 4.99 0.81 SD 1.83 2.32 2.56 2.10 1.44 1.75 2.03

Post-Redress

Mean 4.54 5.28 5.59 5.05 5.50 5.86 5.31 0.76 SD 1.62 1.87 1.86 2.20 1.74 1.59 1.85

Note. C1 = Knowledge, Violation, Repair; C2 = Knowledge, Violation, No Repair; C3 = No Knowledge, Violation, Repair; C4 = No Knowledge, Violation, No Repair; C5 = Knowledge, No Violation, No Repair; C6 = No Knowledge, No Violation, No Repair.


Table 20. Causal dimension scale – information reflection

Causal Dimension Scale


Post-Violation

Mean 4.95 3.48 4.21 4.40 3.64 4.32 4.17 0.81 SD 1.73 1.84 2.38 2.16 1.64 1.64 1.95

Post-Redress

Mean 4.39 3.27 3.36 3.60 3.63 3.92 3.69 0.75 SD 1.62 1.58 1.82 1.52 1.41 1.56 1.61


Table 21. Causal dimension scale – stability Causal Dimension Scale


Post-Violation

Mean 3.96 3.56 4.65 4.88 6.40 5.64 4.85 N/A SD 2.03 2.26 2.72 2.28 2.10 1.68 2.36

Post-Redress

Mean 5.88 3.60 6.44 4.67 5.25 5.44 5.22 N/A SD 1.51 2.20 2.58 2.63 2.21 2.20 2.39



3.3 Frequency Counts Upon completion of the scenario, participants were asked to indicate what country Safia might represent, what military the Massey military might represent, and what organization MADO might represent if they were real. Tables 22 to 24 list the responses to these questions. In cases where participants listed more than one answer, responses were included in the count of each response they listed.

Table 22. Safia Represents: Country Frequency

Afghanistan 86

Somalia 14

Africa/African Nation (unspecified) 12

Sudan 8

Haiti 7

Bosnia/Croatia/former Yugoslavia 5

Any 3rd world/developing nation 4

Libya 4

Middle East (unspecified) 3

Sierra Leone 3

Syria 3

Canada 2

Central African Republic 1

Columbia 1

Congo 1

Honduras 1

Lebanon 1

Pakistan 1

Rwanda 1

South West Asia 1

Zimbabwe 1

Unsure 6


Table 23. Massey military Represents: Military Frequency

Canada 114

America 4

NATO member/any allied force 4

ANA/ANP 3

Western/developed country 3

Afghanistan 2

Any 3rd world/developing nation 2

France 2

UN 2

Bosnia 1

Britain 1

Denmark 1

Egypt 1

Germany 1

Iraq 1

Israel 1

Netherlands 1

Syria 1

Tanzania 1

Unsure 5


Table 24. MADO Represents: Organization Frequency

CIDA 45

DFAIT/Foreign Affairs 21

UN/UNDP 20

NATO/NATO contractors 15

Red Cross 5

Canada’s WoG (e.g., PWGSC/HRSDC) 4

Afghan Army/Government 3

Canada 3

PRT 3

Any NGO 1

Blackthorn 1

CARE 1

CIMIC 1

Human Rights Organization 1

ISAF 1

NDP 1

Other Aid 1

PSS 1

Relief International 1

START 1

Syrian Rebels 1

U.S. 1

UNICEF 1

Union Energy 1

WHO 1

World Vision 1

Unsure 17


4. Qualitative Analysis of Previous SME Discussions (Thomson et al., 2011)

A final requirement of the amended SOW was for a review of the qualitative analyses of previous WoG transcripts (Thomson et al., 2011). More specifically the requirement called for the identification of SME discussions that were relevant to the issue of trust violation and repair. In addition, this requirement asked for the identification of any education or training recommendations that were proffered by SMEs in the previous study. In that research, Thomson et al. (2011) spoke with a number of individuals from the CF, CIDA, DFAIT, CSC, and RCMP about their experiences collaborating in a WoG context. At the close of the discussion, participants were asked to speak about the WoG training they received before deploying to theatre, as well as to suggest training that would be useful for this type of operation. Suggestions emerging from these discussions included keeping a record of lessons learned from Afghanistan; retaining staff with experience to train employees for future WoG engagements; the importance of ensuring that training and education are relevant, inclusive and integrative. This was noted to require involvement from all governmental departments (not only the CF).

The following two sections consider in more depth some of the SMEs’4 responses regarding pre-deployment training and training suggestions to better prepare personnel operating in a comprehensive or WoG context.

4.1 Pre-Deployment Training and Education Participants were asked what kind of pre-deployment training they received that may have promoted effective collaboration with their WoG partners.

Military Training and Exercises

Many OGD participants mentioned that they had participated in military courses or exercises. For example, some said they had completed the Hazardous Environment Training (HET) course in Kingston. However, it was not considered very relevant for their WoG operational experience. One participant said that HET “was good”, but “it didn’t really relate to your job per se right. So I think you could probably take that out of the equation… it’s not the way we deploy, you know.” Another explained that HET was not really a good use of civilian resources. He said, “unless I really get in deep shit, I’m staying in the truck”. On the other hand, he thought that exercises like Maple Guardian, a 3 week intensive and highly realistic pre-deployment training live-action exercise where members of the CF are able to interact with actors portraying Afghan local villagers and insurgents in order to allow the CF experience real world situations that might be encountered in theatre, 5 were “fantastic”. Maple Guardian, at the very least, provided participants with an opportunity to meet and bond with WoG partners prior to deployment.

4 Of the 26 SMEs interviewed, 15 were from OGDs (DFAIT, CIDA, RCMP, and CSC) and 11 were from the CF. 5 Exercise Maple Guardian is. Recently, Exercise Maple Guardian has also included members of the media as well as members of OGDs in an effort to allow both the CF and OGD to adapt to the WoG environment.


Some OGD members suggested ways that military exercises could improve. For example, if “the civilians showing up to [Maple Guardian] actually know all of their files and have a much better understanding of what it is they’re actually doing in that context”. Another OGD SME said, to maximize resources, civilian departments should know the following: “What kind of individuals do you [CF] need there? What’s the training focused on? How best can we meet your [CF] needs?” The CF needs to articulate this more effectively and provide openings in their training for those opportunities, he said. He recalled one of his experiences where he went on an exercise in Kingston, Maple Ready “a computer-based exercise”, and “sat in the corner for four days reading the newspaper waiting for them to have something that had to do with corrections”. On the other hand, the Maple Guardian exercise he went on was “more front line…it was great…[they] built a prison for us!” His recollections suggest that on the ground training during Maple Guardian was more effective for his needs than classroom computer simulation training during Maple Ready. For the latter, he continued, the CF could simply “pretend that there was a CSC guy over there...[in Afghanistan]…I can send you stuff to read”, whereas the former required CSC attendance because it was more “operational…front line”.

Personal Inquiry and Experience

No participants reported that they received any direct collaboration training for WoG operations, though as mentioned above some participants participated on EX Maple Guardian. In fact, some participants said that they had learned about their counterparts through their own efforts. For example, one CF participant recalled taking the initiative to learn about the kinds of programs his DFAIT and CIDA partners would be working on throughout his deployment. He reflected,

“I came here and went online and started looking at what CIDA, DFAIT were spending money on the programs… read the bible right…So when I got into Afghanistan, I met the CIDA and DFAIT rep. I knew what the programs were right. I’m not a stupid cat. I educated myself…the question was ‘What programs are you on?’ I’m going to say ‘Based on this program, and you have this objective, what are the activities that’s going to lead you there and how am I going to support you or what do you need me to support you on?’”

Another OGD SME also said “a lot of the stuff that I knew before going there [to Afghanistan] I learned myself”.

Without any real WoG training and education, SMEs also reported learning in theatre. For example, one said training was essentially “learning on the fly and using your common sense and best judgment”. One CF member said he received a “briefing [in theatre] from the DFAIT, CIDA and other people on the camp on what was going on in their point of view”, but thought that DFAIT and CIDA “veterans” should explain to CIMIC personnel “how they work and what’s been going on and how the relationship has been in the past. And if they can bring that to the table…I think it would be better…pre-training”. This suggests that increased dialogue among the different WoG players prior to meeting in theatre would be helpful.

4.2 Training and Education for Future WoG Engagements Participants were asked to think in hindsight what kind of training or education they could receive that may have helped them collaborate more effectively with their mission counterparts. The two most important themes identified were 1) a desire for integrated WoG training and education, and 2) a desire to retain experienced personnel and, from a CF perspective, recruit effective CIMIC operators. Each of these themes is explored in more detail in the sections that follow.

Integrated WoG Training and Education


The single most important theme that continued to emerge when SMEs spoke about WoG training and education was that it needed to be integrated. One OGD SME recalled early efforts of WoG training. He said,

“[t]he CF will identify and develop the training package and execute it and then come to us and say ‘We need you to play this role’ or ‘We need you to be an NGO’…So it’s all done after the fact. ‘We just need a couple of civilians to fill the spots’…When we know that the training is around a whole-of-government deployment, for example, we need to be part of the early stages of planning. We need people who’ve done it and are good at planning…and are good at capturing the lessons from real life experiences to be part of the front end of training.”

Too often, he countered, civilians get into the training and are asked to play a role and then respond “Well actually this is not how it would work, you know, you’ve developed a methodology based on a false premise of what the role of the civilian in this case would be”.

Another OGD SME also reflected the need for truly integrated training. He said that “we have to train our people [DFAIT] on military stuff and military has to train its people on civilian stuff and then you need to do…training that’s combined…half of it is taught by civilians and half of it is taught by soldiers.” He continued, “if you haven’t been face down in the muck with a C7 and not slept for five days, it’s hard to appreciate some of the crazy training [the CF does]…” Another CF member said WoG training should include:

“a series of old command post exercise and field exercises to familiarize both sides with the functions of each other and to know where they fit into the system and probably most importantly, how they fit into…the command and control structure together. Because, we’re not gonna have CIDA guys and military guys, you know, charging forward to take a hill. That’s not gonna happen okay. The jobs are different. However where it comes together is at the, the taskforce level headquarters and…they have to learn how to properly interact and to know what each other’s capabilities and requirements are.”

Integrated training, therefore, helps to manage expectations. Knowing what each brings to the table, “eliminate[s] a lot of the frictions and things that we see not because people are bad people but because if you’ve never worked or trained together you just have no idea what to expect”.

One CF member suggested that there needs to be a well-integrated WoG pre-deployment package for the relevant players, where all departments (i.e., CF, CIDA, DFAIT, etc.) are signed on and willing to send their people. He explained,

“You don’t take your person from Egypt embassy, send them to Maple Guardian at Wainwright for a week as pre-deployment training and then send him back, send him back to Egypt for another three months. No. No. No. No. Once a person in Egypt is tagged, finish your tour, send him on this pre-deployment training, like army guys do, get educated, do your thing, know your business, and then when you hit down range, the unit is formed, well aware, handover takes place, execution goes on.”

He also believed that the inability to spare OGD personnel was an excuse and that the level of commitment to integrated training was not much different in the CF. A firm commitment from all of the departments to pre-deployment training was argued to be necessary for effective WoG operations.

Integrated training might also help all WoG partners embrace common operational goals. As one OGD SME said,


“What was missing I think was the military’s total embrace of those goals [six Government of Canada priorities in Afghanistan], so they understand what we were doing. But they really thought that we would just go off and do that ourselves. Well in an environment where it’s, it’s a war going on, you know, you have to have common goals and commonly accepted, like, approaches right? And I don’t think that was always the case.”

This might also be challenging given the CF rotation system. As one OGD SME argued:

“[E]very General coming in has to show that he has won the war, he has done something completely different than the last General who got it all wrong, and that’s a bit of an exaggeration but not much…for short term operations, that’s fine but for civilian departments where we’re on like a three year timeline to implement our programs, that was very difficult. It was very difficult to, to work around.”

Establishing common goals and understanding of those might help to create consistency throughout long term WoG engagements. For instance, this overarching understanding may well assist in the articulation of what would be appropriate 6-month goals within the security pillar of the overall operation, thus meeting the requirement for observable military successes within each deployment cycle.

Another way to ensure integration of WoG partners is to co-locate the relevant personnel (e.g., those who will be doing the planning and creating operational policies) in Ottawa during a mission. As one OGD participant explained, WoG collaboration was effective in theatre because

“you're getting to a common sense of purpose and good collaboration based on being physically located in the same space for weeks and weeks and weeks on end… all in the same place sitting, working together, sharing job taskings along civil military lines”.

It was too “segregated in Ottawa”. In fact, as one CF participant said, “I think there is a lack of corporate level (like senior level) and political level understanding about how to really make interdepartmental barriers collapse so that you can actually collaborate and really produce effects. And that’s all about ownership…”

One current example that might indicate a level of appropriate integration is the National Security Program offered at the Canadian Forces College (CFC). It was identified as a “perfect vehicle” to prepare OGD and CF personnel for WoG deployments. One CF participant explained that having a variety of perspectives at the table “force[s]…people like myself to open our eyes a little bit more…to look at problems in different perspectives”. Another CF member said that the NSP was “absolutely pivotal because…you’re talking about Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels, guys that are destined to hold [senior level] posts [in operations]…and they need to have their head entirely around it [i.e., WoG concept of operations]”.

Recruitment and Retention

All of the relevant departments need to have some level of input regarding training and education initiatives for future WoG initiatives. However, this will require that experienced personnel are retained. This was another point OGD and CF SMEs both made about future training and education initiatives. For example, SMEs said it was important to retain “a cadre of diplomats” or CF “alumni” with WoG experience in order to prepare for any future WoG engagements. However, retention may need to be construed as necessary and come with incentives. As one OGD SME explained, “somebody who is happy to deploy right now…[to]…shitholes, you know, in five years, a lot of them actually have kids…[and are]…not really willing to deploy”. It was suggested that


START (Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force) should be responsible for retaining WoG skill sets for conflict and post-conflict diplomatic deployments.

A few CF members believed that the selection and training of CIMIC operators needs to be effective as they are often the conduit between the CF commander and the civilian elements in theatre. According to some CF personnel, CIMIC operators were “mis-employed”. One participant, a trained CIMIC Operator, explained the legacy of CIMIC.

“When they first started up CIMIC, they said ‘Right, it’s gonna be reservists.’ Which is fine. Honestly it makes more sense to have most of the reservists there because we need those civilian skill sets. But they said, ‘No you cannot rob the units. You have to get people who don’t belong to a unit.’ And if you’re in the reserves, and you don’t belong to a unit, there’s a reason okay? So in a lot of cases what we got was the island of misfit toys…we got people who, you know, didn’t belong in their units and they, they were, you know, they had problems with authority…”

He explained further that CIMIC is a “military weapons system” that traverses the tactical, operational and strategic level. However, early CIMIC training resided only at the tactical level, and consequently training did not include “teaching people how to command or control or to advise commanders on the proper use of CIMIC”.

A similar perspective was echoed by a regular force CF member who said that some …

“CIMIC officers were downright dangerous…unskilled in their trade. So they weren’t good soldiers to begin with. Like to talk. So they talk on your game…going through just the selection and giving them this inflated ego just makes them dangerous. Makes them think they are more than they are. And, of course, our training indicates that they have the lead when we’re on the objectives, so they take the lead. We let them take the lead, and then we end up usually extracting them from some kind of problem…thankfully when we were there [in Afghanistan] it only happened once where it erupted into shooting! But a lot of hairy moments with these CIMIC. And there are CIMIC team leaders that were replaced during our rotation and replaced three or four times from different jobs that they were trying to find for these guys because institutionally we don’t really want to fire somebody, so we’ll remove him from where he’s most dangerous and put him someplace where he’s hopefully not as dangerous and then find later okay well he’s incompetent there too…it’s frustrating to see it.”

These preceding comments regarding the challenges with inadequate CIMIC operators underscore the importance of placing the appropriate staff with the requisite skills into particular roles to maximize operational effectiveness. Retaining the WoG knowledge and recruiting the best people will be necessary components for future WoG engagements.


5. Conclusion

Understanding the features of trust violations and repair strategies will continue to be important within WoG contexts as members of these teams often come from very diverse and culturally distinct organizations. Moreover, interorganizational trust violations are said to occur relatively frequently (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper & Dirks, 2004; Sitkin & Roth, 1993; cited in Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009). Research specifically considering interorganizational trust in a WoG context similarly presents instances of trust violations in the field (Thomson et al., 2011). Given that the SOW required only descriptive statistics, the conclusions that can be drawn from the research at this point are limited. However, the data collected for this project, when subjected to more complete analyses will help shed light on this particular phenomenon in order to inform the CF education and training system and help promote stronger collaborative working relationships among partners for future WoG engagements.


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Annex A – Information Letter


Annex B – Voluntary Consent Form


Annex C – Biological Data Form


Annex D – Scenarios

D.1 Baseline Scenario


D. 2 Knowledge Scenario

D.3 No Knowledge Scenario


D.4 Violation Scenario


D.5 No Violation Scenario


D.6 Repair Scenario

D.7 No Repair Scenario


D.8 Redress Scenario

D.9 No Redress Scenario


Annex E – Questionnaires6

E.1 Expectations/Perceptionsa

6 Future tense used in questionnaires administered post-baseline and post-knowledge. Past tense used in questionnaires administered post-violation, post-repair and post-redress. a Administered post-baseline, post-knowledge, post-violation, post-repair, and post-redress.


E.2 Trust – Competence a

E.3 Trust – Benevolence a


E.4 Trust – Integrity a

E.5 Trusting Intentions a


E.6 Willingness to Risk a

E.7 Additional Expectations a


E.8 Causal Dimension Scale bc

___________________________ b Administered post-violation and post-redress. c MADO attributions subscale = 1, 2; MADO control subscale = 3, 4, 6, 7; information reflection = 8, 9, 10; stability = 5.


E.9 Manipulation Checks

E.9.1 Knowledge Manipulation Check de

E.9.2 Trust Violation Manipulation Check b

E.9.3 Apology/Repair Manipulation Check d

___________________________ d Administered post-redress. e Option b for the first 15 participants described MADO as being responsible for foreign relations, however, an assessment of participant responses indicated that there was some confusion, therefore, this option was changed to create a clearer distinction between a and b.


E.10 Perceptions of Study d


Annex F – Debriefing


DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA (Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)

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Humansystems Incorporated 111 Farquhar Street Guelph, ON N1H 3N4

2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (Overall security classification of the document including special warning terms if applicable.)

UNCLASSIFIED (NON-CONTROLLED GOODS) DMC A REVIEW: GCEC JUNE 2010

3. TITLE (The complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification should be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C or U) in parentheses after the title.)

Trust Violation and Trust Repair Strategies within the Whole of Government Context

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Michael H. Thomson; Barbara D. Adams; Emily-Ana Filardo; Yvonne C. DeWit: Craig R. Flear

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March 2012

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Contract Report

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DRDC Toronto CR 2012-085

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13. ABSTRACT (A brief and factual summary of the document. It may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall begin with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (S), (C), (R), or (U). It is not necessary to include here abstracts in both official languages unless the text is bilingual.)

This report was conducted with the aim of gaining insight into the nature of trust violations between various interagency departments, such as the Canadian Forces (CF) and other government departments (OGDs) and the goal of identifying effective trust repair strategies. This work is in support of Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto Applied Research Program (ARP) investigating interagency trust. It has three components; first, a review of the most recent literature was conducted to aid in the understanding of the various aspects of trust, including the features of trust violations (e.g., timing) and the precursors to trust repair (e.g., cultural differences). Second, a scenario-based empirical study was used to assess the impact of trust violations as well as trust restoration strategies that most effectively and efficiently restore trust in the whole of government (WoG) context. Finally, using data from a previous study (Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011), a qualitative analysis was conducted, looking at WoG military and civilian subject matter experts’ (SMEs) responses to WoG pre-deployment training and recommendations for future education and training. SMEs emphasized the need for integrated WoG education and training, and the retention of personnel with WoG experience.

Le présent rapport a été produit dans le but de comprendre la nature des bris de confiance entre divers organismes, par exemple, entre les Forces canadiennes (FC) et les autres ministères et afin de cerner des stratégies efficaces qui permettront de rétablir la confiance. Ces travaux sont effectués à l’appui du Programme de recherches appliquées (PRA) de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) Toronto, qui examine la confiance entre les organismes. Il comporte trois éléments. D’abord, un examen des plus récentes publications a été effectué dans le but d’aider à la compréhension des différents aspects de la confiance, notamment les caractéristiques des bris de confiance (p. ex. le moment où il se produit) et les précurseurs du rétablissement de la confiance (p. ex. les différences culturelles). Ensuite, on a eu recours à une étude empirique fondée sur un scénario pour évaluer l’incidence des bris de confiance, ainsi que les stratégies de rétablissement de la confiance qui sont les plus efficaces et efficientes dans un contexte pangouvernemental. Enfin, au moyen des données obtenues dans une étude antérieure (Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011), une analyse qualitative a été exécutée, examinant les réactions des experts en la matière (EM) militaires et civils de l’ensemble du gouvernement à l’égard de l’instruction préalable au déploiement dans l’ensemble du gouvernement et les recommandations relatives aux futurs programmes d’instruction et d’éducation. Les EM ont mis l’accent sur la nécessité de fournir une éducation et une instruction intégrée pour l’ensemble du gouvernement, et de maintenir en poste les membres du personnel qui ont acquis de l’expérience de travail dans un contexte pangouvernemental.

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.) trust violation; interagency; canadian forces; trust repair; whole of government; training