© 2004 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.The information contained herein is subject to change without notice

Trusted Computing for the GRID

Dirk Kuhlmann [dirk.kuhlmann@hp.com]

Trusted Systems Lab, HPLabs, Bristol

Sep 15, 2004 GGF12 Security WS - Sep 20, 2004 - Trusted Computing & Grid 2

Platform security concerns for GRID

• Large number of dynamically managed nodes− Reliably identify a particular node− Get reliable information about runtime status− Protect user data and programs

• OS and hardware in GRID scenarios− Commercial ‘off the shelve’ elements to save costs− Subjected to COTS vulnerabilities− ‘Script kiddies’ and worms don’t care whether they attack

a private platform or a GRID node

• Trusted platforms− Next-generation hardware and software

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Trusted Nodes as building blocks for Trusted Infrastructure

• Are the IT systems on my network the ones I intended to be part of the infrastructure?

• Is the software and configuration on IT systems what they are intended it to be?

• Is the software I deploy on my IT systems going to behave as intended?

Trusted Computing could become a foundational component to address the first two question.

TC hardware is no silver bullet! • Secure product development must address the

third issue.• Main challenges concern software, in particular

OS!

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Trusted Computing and HPLabs

• Trusted Computing Platform Alliance - TCPA− Founded October 1999− Compaq, HP, IBM, Intel, Microsoft− Created Embedded Security chip Specification v1.1b

• Trusted Computing Group - TCG− Founded April 2003− Build on TCPA− Expands Trusted Computing to other platform categories

and infrastructure

• HPLabs held HP’s Technical Committee chair for TCPA and now for TCG.

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Trusted Computing evolution

TPM Hardware

availability

Tier 0

HW Platform

Root-of-Trust

TC Operating

Environment -

Chain-of-Trust

Tier 1TC Apps –

Enterprise,

Biz. Critical,

Other

Tier 2

Tier 3

Trusted

Ecosystems /

GRID

Increased in

tegration

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The Trusted Platform Module - TPM -

• Trusted Computing builds upon a TPM hardware Root of Trust. Think: smartcard-like hardware component embedded into the platform

random numbergeneration

Non-volatileMemory

Processor Memory

asymmetric keygeneration

signing andencryption

power detectionclock/timer

I/O

HMAC

hash

Available in D530 series desktops and nc4010, nc6000, nc8000, and nw8000 notebooks

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Main value-proposition for GRID today: platform authentication

• With Trusted Computing Platforms, network resources can be restricted for access from approved devices as well as approved users

• Access granted to devices authenticated using the Trusted Platform Module (TPM – or Embedded Security Chip)

•To grant access to sensitive applications and services

•To control access to file servers and databases•To control access from peers or remote clients

through VPN and segment portions of the network

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The VPN example

Corporate Corporate GatewayGateway

Corporate Corporate GatewayGateway

Authenticates user AND Authenticates

Platform as Corporate IT-maintained

platform

Authenticates user AND Authenticates

Platform as Corporate IT-maintained

platform

Remote Employee

InternetISP

Resources

Establish encrypted channel

Databases Services

and/or

TC-enabled

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Authentication of users and devices

User Authentication Device Authentication

+

Trusted Computing

• Creates a Trusted Entity on the network

− Provides enhanced network rights, roles, and responsibility− Can be introduced with no disruption to existing IT infrastructure− allows IT managers to dynamically assign granular access control

• The device can also now be used as an authentication factor with:− Ease of Use – for the mobile professional− Reduced Total Cost of Ownership – for the IT department

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Value proposition for GRID tomorrow: trustworthiness of nodes

• Research / Development

TPM Hardware

availability

Tier 0

HW Platform

Root-of-Trust

TC Operating

Environment -

Chain-of-Trust

Tier 1TC Apps –

Enterprise,

Biz. Critical,

Other

Tier 2

Tier 3

Trusted

Ecosystems

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Trusted Node Requirements• Allow for device authentication• Monitor software integrity during boot-up

and runtime• Keep node alive and manageable• Support standard operating systems

• Current operating systems:− Integrity measurements as such do not enhance

security− Typically not geared towards ‘keep alive’

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Generic vs. hosted OS

Virtualization & Mgmt

Hardware (CPU, Disks, Network etc.)

Windows / Linux

Applications

Host OS options:• UM Linux • Micro / Exokernels• Paravirtualization

(Xen)• VMware / Plex86

TPM

Secuity enhanced OS (Windows / Linux)

Applications

• SE Linux • Bastille• Trustix, … • Windows NGSCB?

Hardware (CPU, Disks, Network etc.) TPM

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Chain of trust: TPM + hardened OS• List of trusted drivers, libraries, binaries, config, policies • Intercept syscalls open(), exec() etc• OS monitor checks memory image for each ‘trusted’ file

− Alternative: check complete boot file system image

• Policy: no further LKM-loading after trusted boot-up

• OS locked down: restrict raw disk /memory access etc.

• Fine grained OS policy to constrain max. possible damage− Compartments: essentially ‘sandboxing’ at user/process group level− Processes subjected to group-specific I/O and IPC policy− No visibility of processes of other compartments, chroot’ed− List of allowed ‘from/to’ addresses for networking

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TPM + hardened host OS for UM-Linux

• Use hardened OS as host OS− Host OS integrity check supported by TC hardware− Guest OS integrity checked by trusted SW in host OS

• think tripwire

• Guest OS launched inside host OS compartment− Guest OS ‘inherits’ compartment rules− network policy enforced outside the guest OS− can be restricted further, e.g. by netfilter on guest OS

• Option: dedicated hosted instances − packet filtering, firewall local to platform or guest OS− monitor, audit, report

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Challenges• Weak TC notion of ‘expected behaviour’

− SW integrity checking (essentially signed binaries)• Could be extended to binary + policy

− No notion of actual runtime behaviour• Borrow concepts: anomaly detection, proof carrying code• Further extension: runtime + policy + runtime signature• ‘Contractual Programming’? ‘Commpacts’?

• Management overhead: is it worth it?• Main concern: size of Trusted Computing

Base− Huge TCB for User Mode Linux scenario− Who does the validation for OSS? − Favours microkernel/virtualization layer, minimal

code base

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A TCG/Virtualization Artifact

Secure Virtualization Layer

Hardware (CPU, Disks, Network interfaces etc.)

Windowsor Linux

Applications

Windowsor Linux

Applications

TPM

Trusted Infrastructure Interface (TII)

RptgAgent

+ TCG functionality

Windowsor Linux

Applications

SoftTPM

SoftTPM

SoftTPM

Isolated processing environments

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Accountability SystemTimestamp

service

Trust Instrumentation: TCG and Secure Audit

AutomatedTest

Results

CERTVuln.

SWActivityreport

Systemconfig.report

ProcessReports …

TCGrooted

reporting

TCGrooted

reporting

TCGrooted

reporting

ExternalServiceagent probe sensor

Query: show meall patching eventson my service

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Trusted Virtualization Layer: Proprietary or Public/Open?

• There is a lot of effort going into proprietary solutions, esp. Windows NGSCB …

• So far, little complementary efforts in the Open Source field− General scepticism about Trusted Computing approach− Problem space beyond ‘typical’ OSS developer community

• Controversial discussion about OSS security in general

• Co-ordinated effort for Open Source is necessary− International approach− Academia, industry, and OSS communities− Validation as important as design & implementation !

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Conclusions• Today’s TCG hardware can be the stepping stone for

innovative security capabilities.

• Trusted Computing is a journey and we are seeing the first technology components appear on the market

• It will be a long and difficult way towards trusted GRID nodes and infrastructure. The main challenges are in the area of software: operating systems and management.

• Trustworthiness requires peer-review, replicable validation: Open Trusted Computing

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