tsp 155-h-03971 integrate critical thinking skills derived from military history methodologies into...

TSP 155-H-0397 1

Integrate Critical Thinking Skills Derived from Military History Methodologies into the Advanced Training and Education of Subordinate

Officers, Warrant Officers, and Non-Commissioned Officers

Task Title

TSP 155-H-0397 2

Terminal Learning Objective

Action: Apply knowledge of combined arms warfare, advanced battle analysis, and the staff ride to the professional development of subordinate officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers.

Conditions: Given study materials for this lesson and a source for obtaining research materials.

Standard: * Selects correct definition of:» combined arms warfare.» advanced battle analysis.» the staff ride.* Identifies the purposes for the study of the evolution of combined

arms warfare, advanced battle analysis, and the staff ride.* Outlines a recommended approach for studying combined arms

warfare.* Develops an advanced battle analysis that meets four of five

established criteria.* Plans a staff ride that meets one-hundred percent of established

criteria.

TSP 155-H-0397 3

Combined Arms Warfare

British Major Gerald Gilbert (1907):“We have gotten into the fashion of

talking of cavalry tactics, artillery tactics, and infantry tactics. This distinction is nothing but a mere abstraction. There is but one art, and that is the tactics of the combined arms.”

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What is Combined Arms? From FM 100-5: Simultaneous

application of combat arms, CS, & CSS toward a common goal.

Goal is to confuse, demoralize, & destroy the enemy with the coordinated impact of combat power.

Entails coordination, simultaneity, & synergy between all battlefield functions.

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Importance of Combined Arms to You!

To effectively participate in the current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), you must know how combined arms warfare has evolved, especially in the twentieth century, in the U.S.

Army & other Western armies.

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Western Combined Arms, 1600-1914 (I)

Interplay of three constants:» Mobility.» Protection.» Offensive power.

Calculated process:» Procure weapons.» Understand & disseminate doctrine.» Train troops.» Apply the above three in battle.

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Western Combined Arms, 1600-1914 (II)

1690s-1820s:» Smooth-bore musket, socket bayonet, & linear battlefield

predominated.» Direct-fire smoothbore artillery & massed cavalry seldom

decisive. First & second waves of technology,

1827-1900:» Greater technology culminated in advent of machine gun,

internal combustion engine, & radiotelegraph.» Required greater combined effort by all arms.

Most European nations relied on massed armies & reservists.

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Western Combined Arms, 1600-1914 (III)

Organization & Doctrine to 1914:» Cavalry--Preferred mounted reconnaissance,

security, & pursuit operations.» Combat Engineers--Performed technical,

mobility, & countermobility missions.» Infantry--Focused on attacking, always!» Artillery--Preferred direct over indirect fire.

Little to no combined arms doctrine or training.

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World War I (WWI)--Introduction

Efforts to break the tactical stalemate of the Western Front &

restore maneuver there in particular resulted, in part, in the early development of combined

arms warfare.

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WWI--Artillery & Coordination

Mass artillery fire most obvious solution to tactical stalemate.

Considerable problems implementing:» Artillery inexperience in indirect precision fire.

» Coordinating infantry & artillery in attack.

» C2 limited by technology.

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WWI--Problem of Penetration

Penetration of enemy front line trenches easier to achieve than exploit.

Full exploitation required combination of attrition, new weapons, & new infantry tactics.

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WWI--Flexible Defense

By 1917, Germans developed defense against penetrations based on three principles:» Flexibility.» Decentralized control.» Counterattack.

Allies, attacked seldom by Germans, took longer to reach same conclusion.

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WWI--Technological Change New weapons developed to achieve

penetration:» Gas.» Airplane.» Truck.» Tank.

First mass use of tanks by British at Cambrai in 1917.» Penetration achieved but not exploited due

partly to lack of combined arms tactics.» Germans developed effective antitank doctrine.

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WWI--Resurgence of Infantry Infantry regained ability to seize & hold

terrain. French led way in 1915 with new

infantry weapons. German rebirth of tactical offense

reached zenith with “Hutier Tactics.”» Based on bypassing strong points &

attacking weak ones. “Hutier Tactics” partly formed

foundation of later German blitzkrieg.

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WWI--Return of Mobility, 1918 German 1918 offensives “a blitzkrieg

without tanks.” German infiltration tactics summarized:

» Bruckmueller artillery preparation.» Combined arms storm battalion.» Bypass centers of resistance.» Disorganize enemy rear area.

Resulting attrition, demoralization, & lack of clear strategic objectives led to German 1918 failure.

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WWI--Organizational Results Infantry organizations, weapons, &

tactics all changed considerably.

Lone exception was U.S. Army infantry division:»Retained four-regiment structure.» Increased size of rifle company in

1917.

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WWI--Summary Logistics & manpower presented

problems. Detailed planning & coordination

necessary. Advancing on battlefield difficult at

best. Allies learned to combine weapons

effectively. German combined arms methods most

adaptable.

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Interwar Period (IP)--Introduction

General revulsion during IP to warfare & all things military.

Defense budgets chronically tight & rapidly changing technology too expensive.

Confusion & contention in military circles regarding development of mechanized warfare.

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IP--Great Britain: “Hasten Slowly” Led world in 1918 in armored equipment &

doctrine. Lost lead over next 20 years.

»Tight defense budgets.»Commitments to costly imperial defense.»Change opposed by military

conservatives. Creation of permanent “Mobile Division”

during 1930s belied drift in mechanization.

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IP--Germany: “Strike Concentrated, Not

Dispersed” Tradition since 1860s favored maneuver

warfare. Did not fully accept blitzkrieg until 1940. Guderian most influential mechanization

proponent. Luftwaffe close air support critical. Tradition of combined arms integration

continued.

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IP--France

German threat focused French on elaborate defenses:» Maginot Line most obvious form.

Doctrine centered on defense and infantry. Some officers offensive minded:

» LTC Charles de Gaulle most recognizable. Army still militia-based and unready for

WWII.

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IP--Soviet Union: “Deep Battle”

Russian CW focused Red Army on maneuver art.

1920s-30s Tukhachevsky developed “Deep Battle.”» Essentially combined arms warfare.

1930s Stalinist purges delayed doctrinal & force structure development.

Red Army in shambles 1939-40 & unready for German challenge.

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IP--United States

Square division & infantry primacy into 1920s. 1935 CSA GEN Craig review led to adoption of

triangular division.» Followed earlier Pershing-Conner combined

arms ideas. Field artillery developments outpaced those in

armor or aviation.» Developed massed fires on targets of

opportunity.

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IP--Summary

Fiscal restraints & traditional infantry-artillery dominance prevailed.»Red Army was partial exception.

Long-range bombing developments retarded close air support.

1939-41 German success unique & transitory.

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World War II (WWII)-- Axis Advance, 1939-42-

Introduction Mechanized combined arms warfare

came of age in WWII. Dominance of infantry declined. Antiblitzkrieg developments also

prevailed. End of purely ground operations.

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WWII--Poland, 1939

Germany defeated Poland in 17 days. German commanders still not

committed to blitzkrieg. Problems of supply, maintenance, &

suitability of German armor developed. Experience began evolution of German

panzer division to combined arms orientation.

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WWII--German Advance, 1940

1940 German defeat of France seemed to validate blitzkrieg concept.

Germans massed mechanized forces at critical points.

French & British employed thin, linear defense.

German superiority in combined arms warfare evident.

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WWII--British Response, 1940-42

British reassessed training & doctrine after fall of France.

Revamped training produced commanders, staffs, & units abler to employ combined arms.

Royal Armoured Corps instituted doctrinal & organizational changes.

» 1942 armoured division trimmed by one brigade.

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WWII--War in the Desert, 1940-42

German intervention negated British defeat

of & pursuit of Italians into Libya.» Quality of German equipment & combined

arms evident. 1942 British began revamping training &

organization in desert.» Gen. Montgomery led effort.

Fall 1942 Battle of Alamein featured results of retraining effort.

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WWII--German Advance into Russia, 1941

Purges left Red Army in disarray despite

1940-41 reform efforts.» Combined arms mechanized formations

reintroduced. 1941 German Army at peak performance &

invasion of Soviet Union heyday of blitzkrieg.» Scale of invasion prompted Hitler to

dilute strength of panzer divisions.

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WWII--Soviet Response, 1941-42

Soviet 1941 defensive operations obviated Deep Battle.

1942-43 Soviet reforms in doctrine & organization produced six combined arms tank armies.» Spearheaded all following Soviet

offensives. Deep Battle closely resembled German

blitzkrieg.» Founded on concepts of penetration,

exploitation, & encirclement.

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WWII--Summary, 1939-42

Success of German blitzkrieg waning.

British and especially Soviet combined arms now ascending.

Criticality of logistics, technology, & defense-in-depth emerging.

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WWII--Complexity of Total War, 1942-45-Introduction

U.S. & Soviet involvement made production & technology as important as battlefield maneuver.

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WWII--American Response, 1941-44

U.S. declared participant in war following Pearl

Harbor. Beginning Mar 1942, Army reformed infantry

division.» Intent was to conduct maneuver warfare &

facilitate strategic deployment. Army also reformed armored division.

» Intent was smaller, more balanced division.» Followed British & German examples.

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WWII--Antitank Technology

Two ways to defeat armored vehicles.»Kinetic or chemical energy weapons.

By Apr 1942, U.S. Army had developed hand-held “bazooka.”»Fired rocket-driven, shaped-charge warhead.

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WWII--Tank Surrogates

U.S. “tank destroyer” was most original surrogate.» Looked like & often mistaken as tank.

U.S. tank destroyer battalion developed from early divisional antitank battalion.» Was combined arms force but

unbalanced. Soviets & especially Germans also

developed tank surrogates.

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WWII--Tank Design & Production

Germans used many designs & variations. Americans & Soviets standardized & mass

produced a few basic designs. U.S. Army MBT was M4 Sherman.

»Excellent compromise between reliability, mobility, armor protection, & gun power.

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WWII--SIGINT & Communication

SIGINT in effect another “arm.” ULTRA most effective for strategic

intelligence. German SIGINT most effective at

tactical level. Tactical radio commo & tactical

SIGINT bases for controlling mechanized ops.

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WWII--Soviet Concepts & Practices, 1943-45

Held initiative after Jul 1943 Battle of Kursk. Emphasized rapid penetration, encirclement,

exploitation, & pursuit.» Intent to negate coherent German defense.

Favored narrow breakthrough fronts.» Produced high casualties.

Used combined arms “forward detachment” to seize German outposts & spearhead advance.

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WWII--German Decline, 1943-45

1942 onward attrition eroded both

infantry & panzer divisions.»Balanced panzer division remained effective in tactical defense.

After 1943 hard pressed to halt or contain Soviet offensives.

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WWII--U.S. Concepts & Practices, 1943-45

Initial combat with Axis forces disappointing. Often had to relearn combined arms lessons.

»Effective combined arms teams from Normandy on.

»Massive air superiority critical.»Specialized units frequently dispersed.

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WWII--Air-Ground (Non)Cooperation

Interservice rivalry & misunderstanding in U.S.

Army & U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) relations. AAF operated largely independently & gave

close air support low priority.» Minimal cooperation was field expedient.» Formal air-ground doctrine & training

developed late war. Similar challenges for German & British forces.

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WWII--Air Trans & Air-Landing Forces

Involved moving supplies & non-parachute

troops in theaters. Most often used in lean Asian conditions.

» British used aerial supply and trans to defeat Japanese infiltration tactics.

» 1945 British advance in Burma featured air transport.

Limited use by other nations.

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WWII--Airborne Operations

Appeared to be effective way of bypassing

prepared defenses. 1941 German airborne capture of Crete.

» Unsupported & great cost in men & equipment.

Obstacles to use of airborne divisions.» Expensive, elite forces with poor mobility

& firepower. Shortage of British & U.S. combat troops led

to overuse of airborne forces.

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WWII--Amphibious Operations Most complex of WWII operations.

»Always joint & often combined in nature.

»Foreshadowed future war. U.S. Marine Corps developed tactical

doctrine during interwar period.

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WWII--Unconventional Warfare

Guerrillas perceived to be dependent on supply & training of conventional forces.

Communist politics of some guerrilla forces also suspect to Allies.

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WWII--Summary German Army experience indicative.

» Initial training, doctrine, & equipment advantages eroded.

Still, accumulated U.S. & Soviet combined arms skills needed to defeat Germans.

Many practical combined arms warfare lessons lost after war.

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Combined Arms after 1945 (A45)--Introduction

Two postwar challenges to mechanized combined arms warfare seemed to obviate traditional land combat everywhere.» Nuclear weapons.» Guerrilla insurgencies.

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A45--Soviet Army, 1945-66: Decline of Conventional Forces

1945-53: Further refined conventional forces for European conflict.» Lacked nuclear weapons.

1953-66: Soviets decided future war to be nuclear & conventional.» Ground forces & combined arms

secondary to nuclear-equipped arms.» Supremacy of Strategic Rocket Forces.

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A45--Rebirth of Soviet Combined Arms after 1967

Rebirth followed Premier Khrushchev’s 1964 ouster.

Centered on likelihood of conflict including conventional force combat.

By mid-1970s back to combined arms doctrine & organization.

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A45--U.S. Army: Demobilization to Korea

Field commanders generally unsatisfied with organization & equipment.

Numerous combined arms organizational changes to infantry & armored divisions.

Most changes stillborn by postwar fiscal austerity.

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A45--Korean Conflict U.S. Army force structure & doctrine

unready for June 1950 start of Korean War.

1951 stabilization of front introduced war of attrition.»Few opportunities thereafter for

maneuver attacks. Helicopters new area of air-ground ops.

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A45--In Search of a Mission: U.S. Army Organization from Triangle to

ROAD Korean War increased budget & size of U.S.

forces. Postwar reorganization produced “pentomic”

ID.» 5 battle groups to function on atomic or

non-atomic battlefield. Kennedy adm. commitment to flexible

response led to adoption of ROAD.» Division to task organize as needed.» More flexible than Pentomic structure.

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A45--Air Assault 1962 U.S. Army Howze Board studied aviation

to improve tactical mobility of ground forces.» 1963-65 11th Air Assault Div. (Test)

experimented with helicopter mobility.» Army integrated helicopter into force

structure & tactics.» U.S. Air Force protested Army close air

support. 1965 1st Cav. Div. entered Vietnam War.

» Closely integrated helicopter & ground forces.

» Operated without defined frontline.

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A45--Battle of Lam Son 719 1971 battle involved U.S. & ARVN operation

into Laos against NVA logistical base. Prepared NVA air & ground defenses stronger

than expected. ARVN commander abandoned ground

advance.» Air assaults next month accomplished

mission. Demonstrated vulnerability of helicopters to

prepared air defense.» Especially so for high-flying helicopters.

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A45--NATO Powers 1960s on European NATO armies focused

on defense. Britain, France, & W Germany accepted

combined arms concept. British retained WWII structure but

experimented with infantry & armoured divisions.

French made combined arms organic to battalion.

W Germans integrated mounted infantry with armor.

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A45--From Home Defense to Blitzkrieg: Israeli Army to 1967

Expert practitioner of highly mechanized combined arms warfare.

1948 war, Israeli forces amateurish confederation.

1956 war, C of S Dayan’s reforms focused on U.S. & German WWII combined arms principles.» Victory convinced Dayan of armored

force superiority in maneuver war. 1967 war, relied on tank-fighter bomber

team.

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A45--Israel: Failure of Combined Arms, 1967-73

Israel continued tank-fighter bomber dominance over balance of arms.

Egypt analyzed previous mistakes, adjusted forces, & with detailed plan attacked in 1973.

Israel overcame difficulties & won with improved solutions.

Israeli Army experience parallel to WWII German Army.» Effectiveness of blitzkrieg declined over

time as enemies adjusted.

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A45--Aftermath of 1973 1973 Arab-Israeli War in particular

carefully studied by professional soldiers.

U.S. Army adjusting doctrine & force structure to Soviet threat in Europe.

Lessons of 1973 sometimes obscure.»Clear that all weapons & arms now

vulnerable.

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A45--SummaryCompatible organization &

equipment needed to ensure protection & movement over terrain.

Arms & aviation need to train to fight together.

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Combined Arms Summary--1914-73 Pre-1914 firepower deprived early WWI armies of

battlefield mobility. Rest of war centered on combined arms as means

of restoring mobility. Various factors hampered interwar combined arms. 1939-41 German victories defined blitzkrieg as

mechanized combined arms standard.» U.S. & Soviet developments ended German

domination. Atomic bomb questioned land combat. Combined arms reemerged 1960s-70s.

» Israelis most skillful practitioners.

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Combined Arms--Trends & Principles

Combined arms & services at ever-lower levels of organization.»Doctrine as guiding light.»Aviation included in process.

Defense in depth one of key components.»U.S. Army’s “Active Defense” much

maligned.

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U.S. Army Combined Arms Since 1973 (S73) (I)

Doctrine:» Emergence of offensive & joint-service

AirLand Battle. Equipment:

» Combat materiel upgraded with Big Five. Organization:

» Division 86 & Army of Excellence. Training:

» Individuals & units tested in realistic combined arms exercises.

TSP 155-H-0397 64


S73 (II) Army fulfilled DePuy-Starry vision

of quality force for high-intensity central European war.

1989-91 end of Cold War & partial demobilization of force.

Grenada & Panama did not fully test AirLand Battle & “new” Army.

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Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS) (I)

1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. U.S. Army ending 20-year, post-Vietnam reform. U.S.-led UN coalition to liberate Kuwait.

» Planning & preparation from defensive to offensive in Fall 1990.

U.S. forces under CENTCOM.» 550K personnel & 2K combat aircraft.» Ready to attack January 1991.

Combined arms philosophy permeated ARCENT.

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ODS (II) Desert Storm campaign commenced January

1991. Month-long air op. focused on C2 & interdiction.

» 270K U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps to jump off. Elegant CENTCOM plan of campaign.

» Incorporated classical “fix and flank” concept.

Late February 100-hour blitzkrieg ground op. achieved UN mandate to liberate Kuwait.» Proof of post-Vietnam revival of U.S. Army.

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ODS (III) ODS demonstrated quality of U.S.

Army doctrine, equipment, training, & leadership.»Ground op. reflected combined

arms warfare aspects of ALB. Big Five gave Army significant

materiel advantage over Iraq. 1/4 of all Army & USMC casualties

from fratricide.

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Digitizing the post-Cold War Army, 1991-98 (I)

Despite ever-smaller post-Cold War appropriations, U.S. Army is determined to:» maintain technological edge.» reduce fratricide.

Goal is to:» achieve “situational awareness.”» enhance combat potential of combined

arms team.

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Digitizing the post-Cold War Army, 1991-98 (II)

1992 hands-on work began with LAM & Battle Labs.» 1994 AWE Desert Hammer first in series.

EXFOR is 4th ID.» Plan for brig. through corps AWEs to build Army XXI.

1997 brig.-sized Task Force XXI AWE at NTC.» 1/4 ID combined arms team as Army microcosm.

November 1997 AWE as CPX.» Corps AWE scheduled FY02.

Battlefield dominance through omniscience & omnipotence.

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Teaching About the Evolution of Combined Arms Warfare

to Subordinates Leaders Knowledge of CAW provides

context for participating in RMA.

Professional Development provides opportunities for studying CAW.

TSP 155-H-0397 71


Combined Arms WarfareBibliography

Basic sources lead to advanced

sources, which lead to deeper

insight & professionalism.

TSP 155-H-0397 72


Check on Learning:

Evolution ofCombined Arms

Warfare

TSP 155-H-0397 73

Advanced Battle Analysis

Military History and the Conduct

of Battle

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What is Advanced Battle Analysis?

An advanced method used by the U.S. Army to provide a systematic approach to the study of battles, campaigns, and other operations, and for critical thinking about military problems.

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Advanced Battle Analysis Steps

Define the subject. Review the strategic setting. Review the operational/tactical

situation. Describe the action. Assess the significance of the

action.

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Employing Advanced Battle Analysis

Tailor analysis to organizational mission.

Draw on Army History Program resources.

Use student handouts if desired. Several formats available.

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Conducting Advanced Battle Analysis

Step 1: Define the Subject. Step 2: Review the Strategic Setting. Step 3: Review the Operational/Tactical

Situation. Step 4: Describe the Action. Step 5: Assess the Significance of the

Action.

TSP 155-H-0397 78


Describe Advanced Battle Analysis to Subordinate

Leaders

Appropriate to school or unit setting.

Capitalize on level of student training or experience.

TSP 155-H-0397 79


Check on Learning:


TSP 155-H-0397 80

The Staff Ride

The Staff Ride

TSP 155-H-0397 81

The Staff Ride

Staff Ride Planning

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The Staff Ride

What is a Staff Ride?

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The Staff Ride

Staff Ride: Not a Tour and Not a

TEWT!

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The Staff Ride

Phases of a Staff Ride

Phase 1: Preliminary Study.Phase 2: Field Study.Phase 3: Integration.

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The Staff Ride

Staff Ride Planning Methodology

Step 1: Select a Site.Step 2: Develop Instructor & Support

Teams.Step 3: Prepare for Preliminary Study.Step 4: Prepare for Field Study.Step 5: Prepare for the Integration

Session.

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The Staff Ride

Staff Ride Planning Methodology:

Select a Site.

TSP 155-H-0397 87

The Staff Ride


Develop Instructor & Support Teams.

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The Staff Ride


Prepare for Preliminary Study.

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The Staff Ride


Prepare for Field Study.

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The Staff Ride


Prepare for Integration.

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The Staff Ride

How to Teach Staff Ride Planning Methodology

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The Staff Ride

Check on Learning:

Staff Ride Planning

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Terminal Learning Objective

Action: Apply knowledge of combined arms warfare, advanced battle analysis, and the staff ride to the professional development of subordinate officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers.

Conditions: Given study materials for this lesson and a source for obtaining research materials.

Standard: * Selects correct definition of:» combined arms warfare.» advanced battle analysis.» the staff ride.* Identifies the purposes for the study of the evolution of

combined arms warfare, advanced battle analysis, and the staff ride.

* Outlines a recommended approach for studying combined arms warfare.

* Develops an advanced battle analysis that meets four of five established criteria.

* Plans a staff ride that meets one-hundred percent of established criteria.

tsp 155-h-03971 integrate critical thinking skills derived from military history methodologies into...

Documents

combined arms doctrine

greater combined effort

advanced battle analysis

warrant officers

staff ride

advanced training

cavalry tactics

artillery tactics