Tuesday August 12 2003, 10.30 am:

Andrew Gilligan, Reporter for the BBC

LORD HUTTON: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. I have received a message from the members of the press

that to aid them in accurate reporting they would like to see copies of the documents which are presented to the

Inquiry each day. I fully understand the reasons for this request and I wish to give a little more consideration to just

the mechanics of doing that and I will propose to say something about that when we sit again after the luncheon

adjournment. I am certainly very well aware of the interests of the press and I will try to facilitate them just as much

as I possibly can. Yes Mr Dingemans.

MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, Mr Gilligan please.

MR ANDREW GILLIGAN (called) Examined by MR DINGEMANS

Q. Can you tell his Lordship your full name.

A. Yes, it is Andrew Paul Gilligan.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. I am a journalist.

Q. And who do you work for?

A. The BBC.

Q. In what capacity?

A. I am the defence and diplomatic correspondent of the Today Programme on Radio 4.

Q. How long have you been employed in that capacity?

A. Just under four years now.

Q. What did you do before that?

A. I was the defence correspondent of the Sunday Telegraph.

Q. How long were you working there?

A. In that particular job about four years and then an earlier year or so on the foreign desk.

Q. That is your journalistic experience, the Daily Telegraph and Today?

A. The Sunday Telegraph.

Q. Sorry, the Sunday Telegraph.

A. I have also freelanced for a number of Fleet Street publications, local newspapers, the Cambridge Evening News,

that kind of thing.

Q. You met Dr Kelly on a number of occasions?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us when you first met Dr Kelly?

A. Yes, it was in the early months of 2001. I cannot tell you exactly when because I have lost my appointments diary

for that year but it was probably in January or February. I was going to Iraq and I wanted to speak to him to discuss,

you know, Iraqi related issues with him.

Q. How had you come on his name?

A. He had been initially recommended to me by a colleague at the BBC, and I had then found his details in fact in

our central contacts database. There is a computer database in the BBC system with a variety of contacts in a

number of fields. Dr Kelly has been on that since 1988 and all his numbers are in there. His description, he was

described as an MoD expert that journalists could call on.

Q. Are you talking about the document BBC/7/33?

A. That is the one, yes.

Q. And that lists his London, New York and Porton Down telephone numbers.

A. And his home number and indeed his address.

Q. Did you carry out any further research before you met Dr Kelly?

A. Yes, I did. I looked him up in a cuttings database called Neon which we have at the BBC. I found his name had

been mentioned several times. I looked him up in some of the standard reference works on the subject. In a book

called Plague Wars for instance by Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg I found quite a full description of him which

described him as the senior adviser to the MoD on biological defence and one of the world's leading experts in

biological weapons, and described his track record in some detail, which made me actually very interested indeed in

his potential as a contact.

Q. Is that a reference to BBC/7/45?

A. Yes, that is right. There is a sort of potted biography of him and it starts by saying: "If David Kelly were a tax

inspector he would recoup Britain's entire national debt."

Q. That is within the book Plague Wars written by Tom Mangold?

A. Yes, it is, yes.

Q. Did you make any notes of your first meeting with Dr Kelly?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Can we look at BBC/7/36? Is this a transcript of those notes?

A. Yes, it is. Yes.

Q. I think you have supplied the manuscript as well. What was the nature of your discussion with him on that

occasion?

A. It was an introductory talk really. I wanted to get to know him. I wanted to find out the extent of his expertise. I

was quite keen to glean any information he could give to me from his knowledge about Iraq since I was going to

travel there in the future. It was a kind of first meeting a journalist has with a contact. You just want to kind of

establish a relationship. I was particularly interested in the issue of smuggling of components for weapons of mass

destruction, because that was something I covered.

Q. Where did that meeting take place?

A. I am pretty sure it was in the Charing Cross Hotel. I am pretty sure all my meetings with him were. I certainly know

the last two were.

Q. Did you make a report of any meeting -- of anything he had said at that meeting?

A. Did it lead to a story on the programme?

Q. Yes.

A. Not directly. It did provide information, some quite useful information actually about smuggling and some further

contacts and some quite useful background. But there was no specific story involved. It just helped me to flesh out

a project I was already doing.

Q. How long did the meeting that took place last?

A. I am not quite sure but about maybe three quarters of an hour or thereabouts. It is difficult to remember at this

juncture.

Q. And did you eat together or drink together?

A. We had a drink, yes. I cannot remember exactly what we had.

Q. What was his manner to you?

A. He was really quite open and helpful and, you know, often with officials they are rather cautious. Dr Kelly struck

me really as a sort of -- he wanted to share his knowledge. In a funny way he was a sort of teacher almost. He

wanted to share what he knew about the subject and he was interested in people who were interested in it, and he

was clearly very well informed. I felt very glad to have begun a relationship with him. I think he was pretty helpful.

Q. Did he say whether or not you could report his remarks at that meeting?

A. I had said it was off the record. I said it was unattributable because that is the way --

Q. Is there a difference between off the record and unattributable?

A. Well, unattributable in strict terms means you can use the words but not attribute them to a particular individual.

The terms are to some extent loose and interchangeable.

Q. Right. Off the record does not mean you cannot use it at all and unattributable means you can use it but not

attribute it; is that a distinction?

A. There is no set law of journalistic convention for this. Generally a phrase somebody might use, or a journalist

might use to another person if they do not wish them to be reported in any way, their views to be reported in any

way, would be deep background or background or something like that. Off the record means that you can report it

but not attribute it to that person.

Q. But in any event you did not report anything that had occurred that time, that was just a meeting?

A. No, I did not. No.

Q. When was your next meeting with Dr Kelly?

A. It was on the 11th April 2002.

Q. And if we look at BBC/7/49, is that your diary entry for that date?

A. That is right. It has been redacted. There are some other entries on those days and other days that are not in

there, but that is my entry for my meeting with David.

Q. I was going to say it seemed a remarkably empty diary but you have taken out the other references?

A. Yes.

Q. If we turn to BBC/7/53, is this the note you made of your meeting with him?

A. Yes, it is. Yes. Sorry, no, that is a transcript of the handwritten note I made.

Q. Right.

A. There are a couple of mistakes in this transcript actually.

Q. Perhaps if there are any material ones you can point them out when we go through that. Who set up this

meeting?

A. I did. I always initiated our meetings.

Q. You initiated all the meetings with Dr Kelly?

A. Yes. I would ring him and say, "Can we meet?"

Q. What was the reason for this meeting?

A. It was really a general sort of wrap up. The issue of Iraq was moving up the agenda a little. Most of 2001 or the

latter half of 2001 had been spent on 9/11 and Afghanistan, and a good deal of the first part of 2002, but then in the

sort of spring and summer we began to get clearer signals that Iraq was moving up the agenda of both us and the

US Government. A dossier had been promised for publication in the spring, for instance, detailing Iraq's WMD

threat, so it was a general meeting to talk about that because I regarded him as one of my main expert contacts on

Iraq.

Q. We can see from the note that it appears you talked about the Tareq missile plant, programmes continuing, "quite

ambitious". You did refer to the earlier dossier or proposed dossier and that is about eight lines up from the bottom.

Can you tell us what that says?

A. It was rather uneventful. This is the Government's proposed dossier which they had first -- I think Alastair

Campbell had briefed some American journalists in March. We had seen things appearing about it in the papers, in

February of 2002 they were going to publish a dossier. After about six weeks it seemed to transpire they were not

going to publish it then after all. I asked him about that; you know, I asked him what was in it, and he said essentially

not really very much that you as a relatively informed lay person would not know already. I said was that the reason it

was delayed, and he said yes.

LORD HUTTON: So the reference to "rather uneventful" is to the dossier, is it?

A. Yes indeed.

MR DINGEMANS: Did he describe his role in the April dossier?

A. He did in outline terms. I said something like: what was your involvement? He said it was to advise on all claims

relating to his expertise in the dossier.

Q. And what did you understand his expertise to be?

A. Chemical and biological weapons. He described himself to me at our earlier meeting as the chief adviser on

biological weapons and also very knowledgeable about chemical weapons. He had spent a great deal of time in Ira

Q. He was pretty close to the subject.

Q. What view did he convey to you of the Iraqi regime?

A. He was extremely suspicious of them; and I mean he had been involved in many confrontations with them when

he was an UNSCOM inspector. Again some of the open literature, he would not say this himself, but some of the

open literature described him as the inspector that the Iraqis most feared but at the same time respected. He did not

trust them at all. He was extremely conscious of the deceit and manipulation which they practised on the whole

series of UN weapons inspectors and all the lies that they had told. He described some suspicious sights, and that

things had continued. They were not conclusive proof to his mind, but he said people we were interested in were

maintained as teams, for instance, some equipment is unaccounted for; the sort of thing that also appeared in the

UNMOVIC reports in the run-up to this year's war.

Q. Do you recall having any other face to face meetings with Dr Kelly before you met on 22nd May?

A. No. I mean, I very much doubt I did. I have not noted it in any of my diaries. I do not always note meetings in my

diaries but I do not recall any other meetings. I cannot find any other notes. It is my belief I had three face to face

meetings with him.

Q. And how strong is your recollection on that?

A. Well, pretty strong. I mean, as I say I have looked through all my diaries for the relevant years, apart from 2001

which I have lost, and I am pretty sure that I had no other face to face meetings with him. I had no face to face

meetings with him in 2002 other than this.

Q. Can I take you to a document where Dr Kelly recorded his meetings with you. That is MoD/1/20 at the first

paragraph where he said this: "I have not had extensive dealings with Andrew Gilligan. As I recall I first met him at

the IISS 'Global Strategic Review' in September 2002 after the IISS dossier was published but before the UK

Government dossier appeared. We would have discussed the IISS dossier since it was at the forefront of delegates'

discussions but the detail is now forgotten."

A. I am not sure what that refers to at all. I mean, if it is the event to launch the IISS dossier I can say I certainly was

not at that. I had already received a copy of the dossier from the IISS and I had done it on the programme as far as I

was concerned. I had done it on the programme that morning and as far as I was concerned, the story of that

particular dossier was over and it was not worth going to the press conference. I cannot recall meeting him at any

IISS event. That is not to say I might not have seen him across a room or something. I am pretty sure I only went to

one IISS event on Ira

Q. It was less to do with WMD, it was more to do with the prospects for Iraq after the regime change. I am pretty

sure I did not see or speak to him there. I think it may be somebody else he is speaking about there.

LORD HUTTON: Is this the letter of 3rd June?

MR DINGEMANS: I am pretty sure it is, yes.

LORD HUTTON: To his line manager in the MoD?

MR DINGEMANS: Yes. Can I ask you about another document that impacts on the number of meetings you had

with him. That is BBC/6/222. This is described as an Andrew Gilligan debrief on 18th July 2003. If you look at the

first paragraph, it says this: "Dr David Kelly was a well known contact on WMD for journalists. I had four face to face

meetings with him, the first one about two years ago."

A. Yes.

Q. This was produced on 18th July. We are not much on in August.

A. I think I am wrong about that. I think it was three. I have checked my diaries and I have checked my notebooks

and I have checked my recollections and I think it was three rather than four. I also note here that I say: "My second

face to face meeting was about 18 months ago, then again in May 2002." Both of those are wrong as well. It is just

that that is something I wrote on the day that he died and it was done from memory. I am pretty sure it was three

rather than four. I cannot be absolutely categoric. As I say, at this time I had not gone through all my diaries and I

had not looked at all my notebooks.

Q. At that stage, before reference to your diaries, you thought it was four, but now you think, having looked at your

diaries, it is three?

A. And as well essentially this is a typed up note of something Richard Sambrook, the BBC's director of news,

discussed with me on the day Dr Kelly died. I had a good deal on my mind on that day. I was not very happy.

Q. You have told us that your meeting in early 2001 did not lead to any article. Did the meeting on 11th April 2002

lead to any article?

A. I think it may have been reflected in some of the sort of two-way -- the general informative discussions that we

have on the programme between reporters and presenters. To the best of my knowledge it did not lead to a specific

story. Again, I could be wrong about that, but I have had a look. I think it is unlikely to have led to a specific story. It

would have been reflected, you know, when the dossier came up and its apparent delay came up. I might have said

something like: I have been talking to an expert within Government or somebody within Government and he says

there is not very much in it. I do not think it would have led to a special story about it.

Q. The Government's dossier was then published on 24th September 2002. You reported on that for the Today

Programme?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And you I think suggested -- I am afraid we have not yet got the material ready to pull up on the screen, but you

described some tabloid headlines and new, interesting, sort of spicy angles; is that right?

A. Can I have a look at the transcript, is that possible?

Q. No, not until 11 o'clock. I am not being deliberately awkward.

A. I think that is right. It would be nice to see the context.

Q. Perhaps we can come back to that. BBC/4/74. I am afraid it will not come up at the moment. I will come back to

the September dossier and your comments on that. You reported, in February 2003, that you had received a top

secret document which related to the absence of links between Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein; is that

right?

A. Yes.

Q. Did that have anything to do with Dr Kelly?

A. No.

Q. Did you meet Dr Kelly in 2003 before the meeting in May 2003?

A. Not to the best of my knowledge, no. Again, I cannot be absolutely categoric on this but I have checked the

diaries, there is nothing in the diaries. I do not have any recollection or notes of such a meeting. I would have spoken

to him on the phone maybe but not met him face to face.

Q. Can we go back to MoD/1/20. This is his letter to his line manager about his meetings with you. The first

paragraph again, when he has discussed his meeting with you in September 2002 and you can see about four lines

down: "I next met him in February 2003 at his request because he was about to depart to Iraq to cover the

forthcoming war. I cannot recall any contact in the interim and do not believe that contact was made." Does that

help remind you of any meeting?

A. No. I mean, I have thought quite hard about this because I saw his earlier evidence and I think -- I mean February

2003 was an extremely busy month for me. I spent just under a week in Munich at the Wehrkunde Security

Conference. That was around the weekend of the 6th. Then more or less straight after that I came back to London

for a couple of days, then went to New York for 10 days to do the debates on Iraq in the Security Council, and I think

-- I mean I really was not even in the country for most of February.

Q. Can I then turn to the meeting on 22nd May. You say you had been in Iraq covering the war and you had returned

in April?

A. Yes.

Q. When had you returned in April; do you recall?

A. I left Baghdad on I think Easter Monday or the day after -- probably the day after Easter Monday, so whatever

that was. I then spent about 10 days on sort of rest and recuperation in Jordan and then in Turkey. I think I probably

actually landed back in Britain on either 30th April or 1st May.

Q. Then continued your normal duties in London?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was responsible for the meeting on 22nd May? Did you contact him or did he contact you?

A. No, I contacted him.

LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you something, Mr Gilligan? Where did you contact Dr Kelly? Did you telephone

him?

A. Yes.

LORD HUTTON: To where?

A. I am not sure. I think I would have probably used his home number, probably his mobile.

LORD HUTTON: That is his home number in Oxfordshire?

A. Yes.

LORD HUTTON: So you had both his home number in Oxfordshire and his mobile?

A. Yes, I did.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: What time did you meet, do you recall that?

A. 4 o'clock. It was fixed for 4 o'clock. I was slightly late.

Q. Can I take you to diary entry BBC/7/55? You have written 4 o'clock. Did you actually meet at 4 o'clock or could it

have been afterwards?

A. I was slightly after, you know maybe 10 or 15 minutes late. He was waiting when I got there.

Q. I think you have seen his evidence where he said the meeting was at 5. Does that accord with your recollection?

A. No, I think it was at 4. It was certainly fixed for 4, and I had another meeting after that, then I went on to

something else; and I am pretty sure, you know, it would not have started later than about 4.10 or 4.15. I have a

drinks receipt, I bought drinks for us.

Q. We will come to that. Can we turn to BBC/7/56. You did not have something to eat this time?

A. I do not think so. This might not have been the only thing I bought. We might have had some sandwiches or more

drinks but that is the only thing I can find.

Q. That shows a bottle of coke and a bottle of Appletise. That shows the time on that. Can you help me with the

time on that?

A. That says 4.15, 16.15. That is the time I went to the bar to buy the drinks.

Q. That is the only receipt you had for the meeting?

A. Yes. It may be that I bought something else but I cannot remember at this distance.

Q. You still have this receipt because I imagine you put this through the BBC accounts, do you?

A. Yes, I need to claim it back for expenses.

Q. Is this right, it is a reasonable inference that you did not buy anything else or you would have kept the receipt?

A. I think that is right. It is possible I have lost the receipt or not been able to find it.

Q. How long did the meeting last?

A. From my recollection probably about one and a half hours or so.

Q. Dr Kelly's recollection, you have seen his evidence on this, was more like 45 minutes.

A. I think it was longer than that.

Q. Did you make notes throughout the meeting?

A. No. It was like our other meetings, in that it was intended as a general discussion of issues around Iraq. I started

out without taking notes actually and then I asked to take notes when he got on to interesting topics.

Q. So the meeting was intended as a general discussion about Iraq?

A. Yes. I mean, I wanted to hear from him why he thought no weapons of mass destruction had been found. You

know it was quite a salient issue by then. He was actually -- he sounded anyway, maybe he was just being polite --

quite keen to hear from me what my experience had been. Obviously Iraq had been his profession speciality. He had

not been able to go there himself for four or five years. You know he was always interested in seeing people who

had come from Iraq to, you know, to get their impressions.

Q. So the meeting was as much for him to find out from you as it was for you to find out from him?

A. No, I think -- I mean, I had a great deal less to tell him than he could tell me. I would not put my -- I think perhaps

he was just being polite in some ways. He did seem genuinely interested as we talked.

Q. The notes you have produced of your earlier meetings, and we have seen the transcripts of them, they were

handwritten. Perhaps we can look at BBC/7/51. In fact, if you look at the top of the page, you can recognise that

passage that I pointed out on the earlier typewritten bit: "Rather uneventful, not much in it so delayed". Where did

you make those notes?

A. I made them at the meeting.

Q. Pen, pencil?

A. Pen.

Q. Into a notebook?

A. Yes.

Q. Then we have seen the transcribed versions.

A. Yes.

Q. The notes you made on 22nd May 2003, were those made with a pen and pencil or with some other means?

A. They were made on my personal organiser.

Q. Can we turn to BBC/7/57? This is the printout from your personal organiser?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you manage to make all the notes on one page?

A. No, I started a continuation file. I think either I just saved it and that takes you out of it and I decided to start a

new file, or else this particular one file was full so I started a continuation file.

Q. Can we look at BBC/7/58? Is that the continuation file?

A. Yes, it is. Yes.

Q. Can we go back, then, to BBC/7/57?

LORD HUTTON: I wonder,

MR DINGEMANS, would it be helpful if you were to ask Mr Gilligan to read out the note in full so that everyone is

aware of its contents because it is in a sort of shorthand. It certainly I think would help me and no doubt others. Just

do it at your own time when you think it appropriate.

MR DINGEMANS: Mr Gilligan, whilst we are looking at the note, would you mind reading that out to everyone, but

obviously where it has "wk" putting in "week".

A. Do you want me to include my questions as well?

Q. No, just the note at the moment.

LORD HUTTON: I think if you just read the note exactly as it is without putting in any additions or insertions.

MR DINGEMANS: Then I will come back to you and ask you about your questions.

A. The whole thing?

Q. Yes, just reading the note through, if that is all right.

A. "Transformed week before publication to make it sexier. The classic was the 45 minutes. Most things in dossier

were double source but that was single source. One source said it took 4 [that should be 45] minutes to set up a

missile assembly, that was misinterpreted. "Most people in intelligence weren't happy with it because it didn't reflect

the considered view they were putting forward. "Campbell: real information but unreliable, included against our

wishes. Not in original draft -- dull, he asked if anything else could go in. "Uranium from Africa -- not nuclear expert

but was very suspect, documents certainly forged or forgeries. "10 to 15 years ago there was a lot of information.

With the concealment and deception operation there was far less information. "It was small ...", this is the

programme, I think. "It was small because you could not conceal a large programme."

LORD HUTTON: Is it "you could not" or "you do not"?

A. "You could not". "... you could not conceal a large programme and because it was actually quite hard to import

things. The sanctions were effective. They did limit the programme. No usable weapons. "In one of the Jan", that is

a reference to one of the Blix reports by Hans Blix to the UN, it said there were some "chemical reactors which had

not been destroyed by UNSCOM. Glass lined chambers to promote chemical reactions. These were being used

again by the Iraqis. They were recovered, they were taken to [that should be] Al-Munthanna [another plant] not

properly destroyed by the UN, recovered by the Iraqis, taken to Fallujah and used for non-banned purposes." This is

him discussing another thing that Blix overlooked. "The 18 chemical missiles", these were missiles with the potential

for chemical tipped warheads although I do not think they actually obtained chemicals, "were reported by Blix but

they were downplayed. Blix thought they were leftovers." I cannot read it, the type is a bit faint

LORD HUTTON: It looks like "thin". Is it "I think"?

A. "I think it is 30 per cent likely that Iraq had an active chemical warfare programme in the six months to a year and

likelier that there was a biological warfare programme."

LORD HUTTON: Is it "chemical warfare" or "chemical weapons"?

A. Either really. "There was not much coming out of the detainees [these were the people being detained in Iraq

since the end of the war] despite financial incentives." I asked about what conditions they are in. He said: "They are

in quite good conditions" --

MR DINGEMANS: We will come back to the questions if you just read the note.

A. Sure. "They are in quite good conditions in the Middle East. "There has been proliferation -- not in terms of

people walking across the Iraqi border with 20 shells, but supplying chain knowledge and plans." Then we talked

about the Iraq Survey Group, which is the group that had been set up to look for weapons of mass destruction in Ira

Q. We talked about that. "ISG headed by a major general, below him two one stars [that is an office of brigadier, air

commodore or commodore rank], British and Australian one stars. "We do not have a great deal more knowledge

than we had before." Again talking about the size of the ISG here, it was going to be 1,500 strong, 100 British, 10 to

20 Australians. "They are not all experts. About 20 of the Brits are." Then we talked about other nationalities. He said

it is a big handicap not to be able to draw on the expertise of German and Russian experts. I do not know what that

last bit means, "isq ba".

Q. If we continue over to BBC/7/58, your continuation file, perhaps you could again read that in as it were?

A. "There is real debate as to whether the mobile labs [these are the mobile laboratories that were discovered after

the -- or the alleged mobile laboratories that were discovered] are what they appear to be. It is an odd piece of kit.

Feeling is it could be made into a fermenter but is it a fermenter?" Fermenter is an important part of the biological

weapons programme. "There is an enormous quantity of documents to be exploited." Then we talk about some of

the well known figures of the Iraqi WMD programme like Am'r al Saadi and Riab Tah

A. "Saadi and Taha were taken out of the problem because they interfaced with the UN. "We have 10 to 20 in

custody." These were people who gave themselves up or were captured. Then we asked, and this is something I

asked him to repeat because he said it in the unnoted part: "Why didn't they use them?" Why did they not use the

weapons of mass destruction? "Because in the early stages you just have to look at the weather conditions [the

weather was very poor]. By the end the commander control [that should be C2, it is an abbreviation for commander

control] was in total disarray. "His programme was small. He could not have killed very many people even if

everything had gone right for him. Not really mass destruction in true meaning of the word." Then we just went back

to the ISG and he said: "The British one star, the British commander is John Deverell and I will be the senior British

inspector in the group", which is something else that came from an idea of (inaudible).

Q. You wanted to read into that your questions. Was there any question that had provoked the first note on

BBC/7/57?

A. Yes. We started by talking about other things and then we got on to the dossier; and I said: What happened to it?

When we last met you were saying it was not very exciting. He said: Yes, that is right, until the last week it was just

as I told you. It was transformed in the week before publication. I said: To make it sexier? And he said: Yes, to make

it sexier. Then I said: What do you mean? Can you give me some examples? And he said the classic -- he did not

use the word example, he said the classic was the 45 minutes, the statement that WMD could be ready in 45

minutes, and most things in the dossier were single source. There is a bit more in there. These are notes. They do

not --

LORD HUTTON: Most things in the dossier were double sourced, were they not?

A. Sorry, yes, most things in the dossier were double sourced but that was single source. These are notes. They do

not note everything that was said. They are not a verbatim transcript of the conversation. They are only highlights.

Some words are abbreviated, some sentences are abbreviated. There are quite large portions of the conversation

which I have not noted at all.

MR DINGEMANS: But those are the questions that you have just related to his Lordship which gave rise to the first

paragraph, is that right?

A. That is right.

Q. Were there any questions giving rise to the next entry, "Most people in intelligence ..."?

A. The question was something like: so how did people feel about this transformation? And then that answer: this

transformed dossier, or something like that.

Q. Then there is the entry which is just a single word, "Campbell". Was there any question that gave rise to that

entry?

A. Yes, it was something like: how did this transformation happen?

Q. Right.

A. And then the answer was that, one word.

Q. He said just "Campbell"?

A. Yes.

Q. And what question led to the next entry?

A. Well I was surprised and I said: What, you know, Campbell made it up? They made it up? And he said: No, it was

real information but it was unreliable and it was in the dossier against our wishes.

LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Mr Gilligan, looking at the first paragraph, you put the question: Was it to make

it sexier? And Dr Kelly replied: Yes, to make it sexier?

A. Yes, to make it sexier, yes, so he adopted my words.

LORD HUTTON: Now are you clear in your recollection that you asked how was it transformed, and that the name

Campbell was first spoken by Dr Kelly?

A. Yes, absolutely.

LORD HUTTON: It was not a question by you: was Campbell involved in this?

A. No, it was him. He raised the subject of the 45 minutes and he raised the subject of Campbell.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: The questions that led to the later entries I am not sure that I need to ask you for. But from the

best of your recollection, those are the questions leading to the entries in the top four paragraphs on page 57, is that

right?

A. Yes.

Q. Can we then turn to look at what you first produced for your Today broadcast. This is BBC/4/202. I hope now that

BBC/4/202 should be on-line. This is a log. It says: "Gilligan has a very good story. He has not stood up yet. I will

explain in the meeting." That is ET and we are told somebody obviously has made an annotation. Who is ET?

A. That is probably Eloise Twisk. She is one of the people on the programme.

Q. That appears to have been made on May 24th, is that right, from --

A. I think so. I mean it is difficult to tell with these things. That is what it says. I have not any recollection of this

document, I would never have seen this.

LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you,

MR DINGEMANS, I missed the reference to that; BBC?

MR DINGEMANS: Sorry, my Lord, it is BBC/4/202.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.

A. I am not sure this refers to this story at all. I think it is a different story. If it is from 24th May, I did not tell anyone

on the programme about this story until -- at least I told one of the editors I met in an awards ceremony it was not a

formal conversation. I did not tell anyone in the office about it until the Wednesday. So I think this must be another

story, I think.

MR DINGEMANS: Right. Now what would have been the Wednesday? That would have been Wednesday 28th

May?

A. 28th, yes.

Q. Of May?

A. Yes.

Q. Which was some six days after the meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. What were you doing in the interim in relation to this story?

A. The first thing I did was I sat down and did a sort of manuscript note of my full recollection of the conversation,

because the trouble with making notes on one of these little keyboards is, as you see, they are abbreviated, so while

it was still in fresh in my mind I actually sat down and did a full manuscript note of what I remembered my questions

had been and what his answers had been; and the answers, the sentences are slightly fleshed out a little. Some of

the sentences in the notes were abbreviated and these sentences fleshed them out. So that was the first thing I did.

Then I basically sought to corroborate the story. I went to see --

Q. How did you try to do that?

A. I went to see a couple of people. I saw the -- well, I will call them senior contacts in Government; and I asked

them about this. I did not tell them obviously that David Kelly had said it but I said I have been told this and was

there any truth in it. And neither of them would confirm or deny --

Q. Sorry to interrupt. What did you say you had been told?

A. I said I had been told that the dossier had been transformed the week before it was published and that this was

done at the behest of Alastair Campbell.

Q. So those two things were what you put to the two senior Government contacts?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. What did they say?

A. Neither of them denied it. One of them said something I could not take as a confirmation but said, you know: I

think you should keep digging, something like that. But when somebody says something like that, it is not a

confirmation and it cannot be taken as such but it is obviously not a denial either. And then the others just refused to

talk about it. I know both of these people -- I believe anyway both of these people would have been in positions to

know about the dossier. In fact I also mentioned it to a couple of sort of open source type people -- people you can

name openly. I mentioned it to Gary Samore at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He said he had not

heard this specifically but he had heard similar things from counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic. He is an

American, he has quite good contacts in the US intelligence world. I recorded a clip with him, a short interview

which I was planning to use in the item broadcast on the Thursday, but in the end it was dropped for reasons of

space.

Q. Was there anything else that you did to confirm or deny the story?

A. Well, I went to look at the dossier itself, and to sort of do a sort of textual analysis of the dossier itself. I looked at

the language of the dossier and particularly the sort of heart of the thing which is the chapter 3 on Iraqi chemical and

biological weapons programmes, which is the main area of David Kelly's expertise.

Q. Yes.

A. And I looked at that and I thought -- you know, I really did think that the language in that, there was evidence that

the language had been hardened.

Q. What, from the document itself?

A. From the document itself. You can see that the language in the document is actually inconsistent.

Q. Is there any passage that you would like to refer us to?

A. There is a passage on page 18 --

LORD HUTTON: Would it help you to have a copy of the dossier before you?

A. Could I please, yes.

MR DINGEMANS: Could we have DOS/1/55 plus 18.

LORD HUTTON: I do not know if there is a copy of the document Mr Gilligan might like to look at.

MR DINGEMANS: DOS/1/73. Is this the page to which you are referring?

A. Yes, yes. That is right.

LORD HUTTON: That is page?

MR DINGEMANS: It is page 18 of the dossier, DOS/1/73.

A. This is the right page. It starts off by saying: "In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq retained some chemical

warfare agents, precursors, production equipment and weapons from before the Gulf War. These stocks would

enable Iraq to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within weeks and of nerve agent within months." "Would

enable Iraq to produce". "The JIC concluded that intelligence on Iraqi former chemical and biological warfare

facilities, their limited reconstruction and civil production pointed to a continuing research and development

programme." Again, "research and development programme". "These chemical and biological capabilities

represented the most immediate threat from Iraqi WMD", "the most immediate threat". Then paragraph 4 says: "In

the last six months the JIC has confirmed its earlier judgements on Iraqi chemical and biological warfare capabilities

..." So it has confirmed those judgments that it made in 2001. Then you go down to paragraph 8, this is on the next

page, on page 19.

Q. DOS/1/74.

A. This is paragraph 8 now.

Q. At the bottom.

A. Then you see standing almost on its own a very bald statement shows: "... Iraq has continued to produce

chemical agent." That is not what the earlier bit says. It says it could produce it within weeks. This says it has

continued to produce it. Also there is another reference on I think it is page 21 to "Iraq has continued to produce

biological ... agents". Neither of those references are backed up by any further context. They are just statements,

single sentences on their own. Paragraph 12.

Q. At the bottom of the page.

A. "We know from intelligence that Iraq has continued to produce biological warfare agents." You know I did look at

this quite carefully. I went back again over the chapter. Again if we go back now, if we could, to page 19 --

Q. DOS/1/74.

A. -- there is a paragraph about recent intelligence somewhere. I think it is the previous page, actually, to this.

Q. The paragraph headed "Recent Intelligence" is paragraph 5 on DOS/1/73.

A. I thought okay, maybe the difference between those two statements was explainable by this recent intelligence. If

you look at what they say the recent intelligence consists of, there is no recent intelligence about production

capabilities. So there are inconsistencies in this document; and in all cases it was the harder -- the firmer statement,

that they actually had weapons, rather than just the ability to produce weapons or research and development

facilities, actual weapons, that is the statement, that they had actual weapons deployable or ready within 45

minutes. Those are the statements that make it into the executive summary, into the Prime Minister's foreword, and

there is no reference to this other stuff about the JIC assessment, actually being it is only about research and

development. I thought that was interesting and I thought that it suggested that the foreword and the executive

summary at least were not completely accurate reflections of everything that was in the dossier. On the 45 minutes

specifically, I also saw that the language changed a bit. In the body of the dossier it says that weapons of mass

destruction could be "deployed or deployable within 45 minutes". In the foreword it says they could be "ready within

45 minutes". It may be a semantic distinction but "ready" is a stronger word I think than "deployable". That is a

slightly more debatable point, it is a semantic debate, but I think "ready" is a stronger word. "Deployable" just

means moveable.

Q. When did you carry out this research or this analysis of the dossier?

A. This is in the week between meeting Dr Kelly and the broadcast. I did several other things as well. I mean, I

looked up to see what use had been made of this 45 minute claim. It did make a great deal of impact on the days

after the dossier's publication. It was the main story in the Standard on the day the dossier was published. The

headline said something like "45 minutes from attack". It made a big splash in a lot of the other papers. Then it kind

of seemed to have faded away. I did a cuttings check on Neon, this press cuttings database we have, and also I did

a Hansard check to see whether it had been mentioned in the Commons by any Ministers. I found one cutting on

Neon, a speech by Jack Straw in February 2003 which mentioned it, and I found one reference by a Minister in the

Commons which is by Baroness Simons, a trade minister, again in February. So in all that time, in the six months

between the 45 minutes making a big splash, it had almost disappeared from view. Not quite, but almost. It was

never mentioned in any of the really big set piece debates in the Commons even though the Government had quite a

lot of -- wanted to make the strongest possible case for taking some form of action against Iraq. But they did not

mention it again. I sort of thought that was probably an indication that they were suspicious of it. It was a good

search of the Hansard and the press cuttings. I cannot pretend it is an absolutely exhaustive search. I mean the

Government might be able to turn up some other speech by some minister where he said it. But I considered the

way it had almost disappeared from view for that six whole months was suggestive.

Q. Notwithstanding that it had then been mentioned back in February?

A. Absolutely, but it was one of the two main headlines from the dossier in September; and if it was as good as it

seemed then I would have expected it to have been mentioned a lot more often than twice in the six months

between the publication of the dossier and the outbreak of war.

Q. So you have spoken to two contacts you have described, you have looked at the language of the dossier and you

have done your research on the 45 minute claim. Was there anything else you did?

A. I knew already that the Government had embellished another dossier. They published a dossier in February 2003

on Iraq's infrastructure of concealment, deception and intimidation and it had come out -- I mean the Prime Minister

described it as further intelligence and intelligence reports in the Commons in fact. Actually I think the intelligence

component of it was quite small and most of it -- a good part of it anyway was copied off the Internet. I knew also,

and I had seen reported, that it was copied almost word for word, including the spelling mistakes actually in some

cases, but one of the figures was embellished, and a couple of the claims, some of the language was embellished.

In the student's original PhD thesis, the wording --

Q. What student are you referring to?

A. This is Ibrahim al Marishi. He wrote the thesis which was then copied into the February dossier by the

Government without acknowledgment. Marishi wrote the Iraqi Mukhabarat had a role in aiding opposition groups in

hostile regimes, and that was changed in the February dossier to supporting terrorist organisations in hostile

regimes, which is quite a substantial change.

Q. You relied on what had happened to the February dossier. Was there anything else?

A. None of this evidence was conclusive of course. It just went to -- it supported -- you know, I mean, it helped -- it

was context and background. It made the claim seem more likely to be true. If they had done this with this earlier

dossier then perhaps they could have done it -- if they had done it with the February one then they could have done

it with the earlier dossier in September. What else did I do? I looked at the uranium from Africa claim. David Kelly

had mentioned that. That was never mentioned again by any Government minister, not once as far as I could trace.

Q. On your searches?

A. Yes. I also knew, of course, that in March 2003 the International Atomic Energy Authority had been very critical of

it and had described it as based on forged documents. What else did I do? I looked at -- I mean one of the things

the Government used to point -- some of the independent evidence the Government used to justify military action,

the Prime Minister referred to this in his speech on 18th March just before the war, he referred to the UNSCOM

report, unresolved disarmament issues -- sorry UNMOVIC report, 173-page report. The impression you would have

got from listening to that speech was that UNMOVIC inspectors had reported there were actually weapons. Actually

what the report says is that there had been weapons and that stocks were unaccounted for. I looked to see if there

was anything to support what the dossier had said as well, to say, you know, that David Kelly was wrong. I did not

consider that that, which was the main piece of independent evidence produced by the Government in its support, I

did not consider it actually offered the support which the Government said it offered. I did a press cuttings search as

well. I looked to see if anyone had made any comments about the dossier before it was published, and I knew what

Dr Kelly had said in April obviously and that it was not very eventful. I also found a couple of clippings from more

recently. I found a clipping from The Times. Mike Evans, the defence editor of The Times, quoted a senior Whitehall

official as saying that the dossier was not revelatory, that was on 29th August. Then Richard Norton-Taylor, the

Guardian security man, he quoted a Whitehall official on 5th September, but it was a conversation which had taken

place a few days earlier, saying the dossier would no longer play a role because there is nothing to put in it.

Obviously that was only three weeks before it was published. You know, there was a reasonable amount -- there

was something, anyway, that was --

Q. So am I right in summarising the effect of your research as this: that you had carried out a number of researches

and you have outlined them at some length and you carried out this textual analysis of the dossier and you have

taken us through that, and that suggested to you that there was no recent intelligence; is that what you are saying?

Because that is what is indicated by the Times article and the textual analysis. You talked about recent intelligence

or the absence of recent intelligence. Is that a fair analysis of what you were finding?

A. I was fairly inclined to believe Dr Kelly anyway because I knew of his standing and of his involvement, but it made

me even more inclined to believe him. I mean none of it was of course directly corroborative evidence in any way,

but it did make the charges he was making more credible. There were other press articles. There was several press

articles I picked up in about February or March time. One of those mentioned that there were rows between Alastair

Campbell and the intelligence agencies over the September dossier. Another one had Menzies Campbell, the foreign

affairs spokesman of the Liberal Democrats, he was saying he had been told by intelligence agencies that they were

unhappy about the way the Government was using their intelligence, that they were being selective and that context

was being removed, which is again exactly the substance of the charge that Dr Kelly was making.

LORD HUTTON: You said that it made Dr Kelly's challenges more credible.

A. Charges.

LORD HUTTON: Challenges?

A. Charges.

LORD HUTTON: Did you regard him in his conversation with you on 22nd May as challenging the Government's

claims?

A. With respect my Lord I said charges rather than challenges. I do not think he set out to sort of take on the

Government in that sense. I just think he was expressing his professional opinion of the dossier and saying what he

said.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: But I think you have said the research you carried out was suggesting that there was not new

intelligence. That was the gist of the Times article, that was the gist of some of the analysis you found, your textual

analysis. But Dr Kelly had made it clear to you, if we go to BBC/4/198, that there was real information, if we look at

the fourth paragraph on that. BBC/4/198. Sorry, still not getting that. Well, we can take that in BBC/7 -- I am sorry,

you will have to bear with me -- at 57. If we look at the fourth paragraph --

A. Yes.

Q. -- you were saying that your research was suggesting there was no intelligence. Someone was writing in The

Times in August: nothing new. Indeed that is what you said Dr Kelly had said. In your textual analysis, recent

intelligence, when you chased it through, did not actually say this. Dr Kelly is telling you here it is real information.

Did you understand him to be talking about real intelligence?

A. Yes, I mean --

Q. But his comment on it was that it was "unreliable and included against our wishes".

A. Yes, I mean to say there was nothing new to put in it, obviously there is new intelligence coming through all the

time, but in order to make it into a dossier, it is or should have to be assessed as reliable. So I think that was

perhaps the import of the comment in The Times that there was nothing that had been assessed as sufficiently

reliable to put in a dossier. Obviously there was, they do get information in all the time; but, you know, not all of it is

particularly reliable. I mean, Dr Kelly was in no doubt that there was -- and he said this and it was one of the things

he asked me to say in the report -- that there was a WMD programme of some sort but he did not believe the level

of the threat to the West was as great as the dossier had said.

LORD HUTTON: When you refer to intelligence having to be sufficiently assessed to be reliable, what body has to

assess it? We have heard that there is the DIS which considers information. It then passes it on to the assessment

group in the Cabinet Office and they then pass it on to the Joint Intelligence Committee. Do you have regard to

which body assesses intelligence?

A. Yes, I mean, I knew roughly how the assessment system worked.

LORD HUTTON: Did you know there was that sequence, Mr Gilligan, which we heard described in some detail

yesterday?

A. Yes, I did. And I mean that applies to other agencies as well.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. And the assessments -- you know, the assessment staff and the Cabinet Office and the JIC are areas in which the

intelligence is assessed and subsequent reports are produced. I mean, one other thing about the dossier that struck

me was that it did not look like a JIC report. It was described as largely the product of the Joint Intelligence

Committee but it really did not look -- the language did not look like a JIC report I have seen historical ones and I

have seen one current one and they are a great deal less assertive in their language than the dossier. They are

usually more sort of caveated in tone and more cautious. I know a couple of other people who have seen them and

have said similar things.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: That was the research. Was there any other research that you carried out before you prepared the

piece for broadcast?

A. I did -- again, I mean, I did look to find other contexts and I saw a speech by Robin Cook, Robin Cook's

resignation speech in March 2003. He said something like: Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the

commonly understood use of the term. And he would have been --

Q. And how did he define the commonly understood use of the term?

A. A strategic device capable of hitting a -- a device capable of hitting a strategic sitting target, something like that.

He would have been privy, certainly until he left the job of Foreign Secretary in May 2001 he would have been privy

to the intelligence on that. That sort of coincided with Dr Kelly's view that any weapons that there were were very

small and very crude.

LORD HUTTON: Would this be an appropriate time to give the stenographers a short break?

MR DINGEMANS: It certainly would.

11.40 am: Short Break

11.45 am:

LORD HUTTON: During the brief adjournment I have had a discussion with Mr Lee Hughes, the Secretary to the

Inquiry, and with Mr Dingemans about the enquiry of the press and their wish to see the documents referred to in

evidence. As I stated when I first sat, it is our intention to have the documents referred to shown on the website at

the end of the day. Now, I understand that at the end of the first day of evidence there were some technical

difficulties which made it not possible to achieve that objective. We hope that will be achieved today and that the

documents will be available to ladies and gentlemen on the website. If that is not possible at the end of the day, I will

certainly give careful thought to some other method whereby you can see copies of the documents. We will

proceed, I think, on that basis today. Yes, Mr Dingemans.

MR DINGEMANS: Mr Gilligan, I think you had concluded telling us about the research you carried out for this

broadcast. Can I then take you to BBC/4/205? This is a typewritten version of some manuscript notes prepared by

Miranda Holt. First of all, who is Miranda Holt?

A. She is one of the assistant editors of the Today Programme. She was the day editor who was on duty that day.

Each edition of the programme is produced by two different teams of people, a day team and night team. They

change over at 8 o'clock in the evening, overlap for an hour between 8 and 9. She was the editor of the day team on

the Wednesday preparing for the Thursday programme on which this was broadcast.

Q. And do the first four lines of that note refer to what you discussed with her? Perhaps you can read them out.

A. "WMD -- weapons of mass destruction. Gary Samore. "AG meeting ..."

Q. AG is you, is it not, Andrew Gilligan?

A. Yes: "Chief British weapons inspector. 24/9 dossier 45 minutes. "Until the week before -- nothing significant in the

dossier. "'Sexed up' 45 minutes -- added at Campbell's behest. "MI6 -- defector. 'To set up missile'."

Q. That did not refer to anything you were dealing with, did it?

A. No. Well "to set up missile" did, he said that.

Q. And then 1, 2 and 3.

A. "1. IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) -- Chipman."

Q. Who is Chipman?

A. He is a director of it. John Chipman is the director of the IISS. Gary Samore, he works for the IISS. "2. British

Government dossier 24/9/02. "3. Dodgy dossier February 2003." Do you want me to read the rest?

Q. Then the rest.

A. "Seriously angry ... British inspector UNSCOM, Iraq survey team 1500 US/UK. "History was OTG info." On the

ground information I think that means. Yes, on the ground information. "African uranium -- obvious -- cut and paste

job -- Niger government letterhead. "Bid for: John Denholm, Chris Smith, Robin Cook, Clare", which is probably

Clare Short.

Q. In terms of who they were hoping to have on the programme?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know how that came into existence, that note?

A. No, I do not. I have spoken to Miranda about the story. It might be a note of my first meeting, but I do not know. It

might be a note of the first phone call.

LORD HUTTON: What is the reference to "seriously angry"?

A. I do not know. I mean I might have said something in the phone call that the agencies were unhappy or angry or

something like that which is based on what David Kelly had told me. But he did not use the words "seriously angry".

MR DINGEMANS: You mentioned producing a manuscript version of your meeting with him after you had produced

your Palm Pilot version. Do you still have that?

A. No, I do not. At least I do not believe I do. I have looked quite hard for it but I cannot find it.

Q. You have looked everywhere but you cannot find that?

A. No.

Q. You did produce something. Can we look at BBC/4/203? I think we will have to try that in another file. BBC/7/61.

What is this document?

A. This is an EMPS message. EMPS is our internal computer message system at the BBC, which I sent to Mirand

A. She asked for the fuller details of what he had said. It is a summary of the main quotes I was proposing to use. It

is not a verbatim transcript, it was based on the manuscript note that I just described to you.

Q. Because in inverted commas, if you look at the question and answer, you have: "Question: What about the Blair

dossier (Sept 2002)? When we last met (in spring 2002) you said the dossier wouldn't tell us anything we didn't

already know. "Answer: Until the week before it was just the same as I told you. It was transformed in the week

before it was published, to make it sexier." I thought you said you were the person who first suggested to make it

sexier.

A. Yes, I said sexier and he said yes, to make it sexier. This does not purport to be a verbatim transcript, it is a note

of the main quotes I was proposing to use on the programme.

Q. Even though you had put it, as it were, in inverted commas?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there anything else that you produced in writing for the broadcast?

A. Once the story had been accepted and, you know, they had decided to do it, I produced -- among other things I

did a -- there were going to be two appearances of the story on the programme the next day in the main body of the

programme. The main appearance was at 7.30 and I produced a script for that which I then sent over to the -- by

that time they had changed over to the night team. I sent that over to the night team.

Q. Is that the document we see at BBC/4/215?

A. No. This is a separate thing.

Q. What is this?

A. The other thing I produced was a script for a bulletins piece. There are news bulletins in Today at 6, 7 and 8 am.

They are under separate editorial control but they are part of the programme in the sense they fall within the

programme time. This is the script for a short voice piece for the news bulletins that I sent to the editor of the news

bulletins. You have to send them a script to get it approved before you broadcast your piece and before you record

your piece. I sent the news bulletin editor this script and his assistant then replied back saying: yes, it is all right

apart from one thing which is the "infamous". Can you take out the "infamous"?

Q. Do we see that on BBC/4/214?

A. Yes, it is there, it is underlined.

Q. It appears to be an exchange of e-mail traffic.

A. Yes, these are EMPS messages. I have access to EMPS wherever I am and I can send messages on it and I sent

this as a message to the bulletin editor saying this is a piece I would like you to consider for the morning bulletins.

He said fine. His assistant replied saying: Fine, yes, we like your piece, send us the script. So I sent him the script

and his assistant replied saying "infamous" is a bit strong. I said I would delete that. Once I had done that then I

recorded the voice piece for the bulletins and then sent it over to the BBC and it was played in the bulletins the next

day. So there were two things that were scripted. There was the main item on Today itself at 7.30 and there were

bulletin pieces for 6, 7 and 8. I think they played it at all those points.

Q. There is a document at BBC/4/213 headed "Master Prospects for Thursday, 29th May". Is this the document to

which you were referring?

A. No, this is something else again. This is produced by the programme team. This is by way of a briefing between

the two teams, the day team and the night team, that I have described. The day team produces this to give the night

team an idea of what they have been working on during the day and what bids for Ministers and for other people

have been put in and what is the progress on stories we have been chasing. They hand over this to the night team at

their handover meeting at 8 o'clock and they discuss it as well. So this is on the story -- this is their entry for the

story I did.

Q. We can see halfway down the story they were looking at was this: "The dossier on Iraq which the Government

produced last September (24th) was jazzed up at the last minute to include new information based on dubious

sources -- including the claim that chemical and biological weapons could be deployed at 45 minutes notice. LIVE

0700-0730 Andrew Gilligan illustrated two ways. Gilligan has got this from a senior source who shall remain

anonymous -- his interview is with Gary Samore from IISS who backs up the line that intelligence sources weren't

happy about this." That was the gist of the story you were proposing to run, is that right?

A. Yes, I mean Samore did not back up the story that David Kelly gave me; as I say, he told me about unhappiness in

the American intelligence community. These things do sometimes get translated when they are the results of phone

conversations. That is essentially it, yes.

Q. That then prepares you for the publication the next day, the broadcast the next day?

A. How it worked on that day was that there were a series of phone calls with Miranda Holt. The first one was I

described the story to her. I think that is probably the note you flashed up a few documents ago. She then said:

Okay, sounds like quite a good story, I will discuss it with Kevin, who is the overall editor of the programme. Then

she came back asking for more information and a summary of what the guy had said; and then they wanted to know

who the source was; and I told her -- I did not tell her his name, I told her his position; and then they said: right, well,

Kevin has agreed to do the story. How should we handle the Government response? We discussed that for a bit. I

mean there was a series of phone calls.

Q. What was the gist of your discussion in relation to that?

A. There was already another story, another reporter's story on cluster bombs on the programme for the next day.

We had invited Adam Ingram, who is the defence minister, on to discuss that. Their decision was that we should

"extend the bid" in the jargon -- the bid is a request for Government Ministers or anybody -- we should extend that

to cover the dossier; and that was what we decided. They said they would make calls to the Ministry of Defence to

that effect. I think they did. I said I would also speak to the MoD, tell them a bit about the story so Ingram was

prepared to answer on it. So that was the sort of MoD side of things. Then, as I say, once we had done that I then

spoke to the night editor Chris Howard once he had taken over and I told him more about the story and I said I

would script the main item because it was to include voiced up clips of David Kelly, obviously anonymous, which

would need to be voiced up in the office by one of the production team, and I would need to write a script because

they would need to know when to play the clips in. So once I did that, and once I had also spoken to the bulletins

people, I wrote the script for the 7.30 item, I sent that to Chris Howard -- this would have been in the early hours of

the morning by now -- for his approval, he approved it and got the clips voiced up and then we were ready to go the

next morning. They told me also that Adam Ingram had accepted or the Ministry of Defence had accepted on

Ingram's behalf the bid to talk about WMD.

Q. So who was the person who had contacted someone to talk from the Government side about this story?

A. Well, the contact with -- deciding how the programme should get a Government response is the responsibility of

the office team. They said they would speak to the MoD about Ingram. Now I think one of the producers on the team

-- each item is assigned a producer and the assigned producer spoke to the Ministry of Defence and told them

about the story. As I say, I also spoke to the MoD. I spoke to Kate Wilson, who is the chief press office at the MoD,

on my mobile phone about 7.30 and I told her.

Q. And what did you tell her?

A. I cannot remember exactly what I told her because it was a mobile phone and I did not take notes of my

conversation.

Q. You have no notes of that conversation?

A. No, but I took her through the story in outline.

Q. And what was the gist of the outline that you gave to her?

A. I cannot remember the exact words I used, to be absolutely honest, because so much has happened since then

and it was one of dozens and dozens of calls I made that day to MoD press officers. I know I took her through the

outline of the story. I said that Ingram would be asked about it the next day.

LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you this, Mr Gilligan: when you refer to the Government response, this is a response

after your report has been broadcast; is that correct?

A. Yes, that is right. I mean, the way Today works is that typically -- and this is like this for a number of programmes,

Newsnight is quite similar -- they will do a report and then have a minister on straight afterwards to give the

Government response to it. That is quite common on our programme and on other sort of programmes like

Newsnight. In this case Ingram was not on straight after, he came on at 8.10 because he was discussing something

else as well, and he was on about 40 minutes after the original broadcast of my piece.

LORD HUTTON: Suppose the report on the Today Programme could be viewed as being a serious criticism of the

Government or some other body or a person, is the person who is going to be criticised given a chance to point out

what they might regard as inaccuracies or unfairnesss in the report before the report is broadcast at all?

A. We did not name a particular individual.

LORD HUTTON: You did not?

A. We did not name a particular individual in this report; but I think had we named a particular individual I think we

would have. But we regarded this I think as a development of a story that we had been pursuing for some time

anyway, and we did ensure that the Government view was very fully reflected, and the Government did have the

opportunity, several times, to get its views across. We started the main item with a Government denial saying

nothing in this was not the work of the intelligence agencies, and then we had Adam Ingram on for probably about

15 minutes, of which half of that was on this. So the Government did get its views across --

LORD HUTTON: When you say you started with a Government denial or a Government explanation, at what time

was that broadcast?

A. This is at 7.30. We started the main item at 7.30 with a Government denial.

LORD HUTTON: But your first broadcast was at 6 or 7 am, was it?

A. That is right.

MR DINGEMANS: Can I return to the contacts before I ask you to deal with the broadcast itself?

A. Yes.

Q. Can I ask you to look at CAB/1/390. This is a letter written by Richard Sambrook dated 29th June to Ben

Bradshaw, MP for Wrexham. He said this: "Thank for your letter yesterday asking for a correction to our assertion

that the MoD were forewarned of the WMD story we broadcast on 29th May. My understanding, from

contemporaneous programme notes, is as follows: "At 5 pm on May 28th the Today Programme put in a bid to the

MoD for an interview on cluster bombs [which I think you told us about]. "At 6.30 pm Andrew Gilligan spoke to Kate

O'Connor, the MoD press officer, about the cluster bomb interview and added there would be another story running

on WMD." Is that the gist of your conversation?

A. Well, no, I did not say -- I cannot remember exactly what I said but I am pretty sure I did not speak mainly about

the cluster bomb story because it was not my story, you see. I did not know about it. It was another reporter's story,

and I would not discuss another reporter's story with the MoD.

Q. Although in some of the correspondence it suggested you have a particular interest in cluster bombs, is that

right?

A. Only in as much as it is a defence issue and I am interested in all defence issues. I do not how much of the

conversation we spoke about cluster bombs. It was a seven and a half minute conversation and I would not have

spoken about it for that whole time because it was not my story.

Q. To conclude the bullet points: "Between 6.30 pm and 7 pm producer Martha Findlay spoke to MoD press officer

Richard Walley and confirms the bid has widened from cluster bombs to include WMD. "Between 8 and 8.30 pm the

MoD calls the Today Programme and confirms an interview with Adam Ingram on cluster bombs but does not

confirm that he will speak about WMD. "At 9.45 pm the MoD press office rings the Today Programme to confirm Mr

Ingram will speak about WMD as well." Then can I take you to the next letter at CAB/1/403. This is the first page of a

three-page letter written by Geoff Hoon, Secretary of State, to Richard Sambrook. He says he has seen the letter in

paragraph 1, and it says: "During his interview on the Today Programme with Ben Bradshaw on 28 June John

Humphreys said that Andrew Gilligan 'checked with the Ministry of Defence' before broadcasting his story. This is

simply not true, as the record below makes clear. "Shortly after that interview was broadcast, at 8.50 am, Andrew

Gilligan called the MoD duty press officer. Two press officers were present as this was during the handover period.

Mr Gilligan said he was calling to 'note that he had spoken to the Chief Press Officer before the programme was

broadcast and that was what he had said'. He then rang off without offering any explanation. "I deduce from this call

that the basis for John Humphreys' claim that the story was 'checked with the MoD' is the conversation Mr Gilligan

had with the Chief Press Officer at approximately 6.30 pm on 28 May." Continuing on page 404, their note is this:

"As we have already made clear, the conversation on 28 May was actually about a piece on the use of cluster

bombs in Iraq and a possible interview bid for Adam Ingram. Mr Gilligan did not discuss any other story. He was

asked whether he was working on anything else for the programme. He then mentioned that he was working on

something else about WMD. He did not discuss any detail of this story, he did not put any questions about it to the

MoD and most importantly, he said that this was not a story for the MoD. By his own admission he did not regard

MoD as the relevant Government department. I cannot see how this can be described as 'checking the story'." Is

that a fair analysis of the conversation?

A. No, I do not believe so. I mean, as I said, I would not have spent seven and a half minutes discussing another

reporter's story. I did not know what the cluster bomb story was; and I would not have done it anyway. You know, it

would have been a breach of protocol to talk to a Government press officer about another reporter's story. I think it

is correct to say -- I did not ask the MoD press office to go away and seek specific responses to these specific

points. I simply wanted to forewarn them about what was going to be in the broadcast so that Adam Ingram was

equipped to discuss it the following day. But I certainly did not spend the whole time talking about cluster bombs.

Q. Did you put some of the specific allegations that you made in the broadcast? In the early morning broadcast, the

6 o'clock broadcast, you have referred to the Government knowing that the 45 minute claim was wrong before it

was put in. Did you put that allegation to the Ministry of Defence press officer?

A. I do not believe I did put those specific words, no. As I say, I cannot remember exactly what I said. I gave them an

outline of the story, a summary of the story. But I cannot remember exactly what I said to them.

Q. Did you put the other perhaps major allegation, that Downing Street had ordered the dossier to be sexed up and

more facts to be discovered as broadcast; did you put that to the MoD press officer?

A. Yes, again I may not have used those exact words because I cannot remember which words I used. But I put the

gist of the story, which was that the dossier had been exaggerated at Downing Street's behest.

Q. Can I complete the correspondence on this issue. At CAB/1/409 Richard Sambrook replied to Mr Hoon: "Dear

Geoff, I am now in a position to respond to your letter of 2 July. "As you know, I asked Stephen Whittle, Controller,

Editorial Policy, to look at what happened on the night of may 28th. The Today Programme team again made clear to

him that it is their belief that at least three calls were made to MoD press officers. They believe that between them

those calls covered sufficiently both the allegations made by the source about WMD, as well as the extension of the

bid for the interview with Adam Ingram. However, we acknowledge that it would have been better if our logs about

this were more specific as there is a clear conflict over exactly what was said." And there was then subsequently a

meeting between Mr Hoon and Mr Sambrook on 8th July, but if that is right, I would propose to deal with Mr

Sambrook and Mr Hoon on that. Can we then turn to the broadcast itself? I think we have this on tape. What you are

going to hear is your broadcast at about 7.40 and your subsequent broadcast on Radio 5 Live which I hope is a fair

analysis of what was broadcast. (Broadcast played)

MR DINGEMANS: I think now we are going to hear the next version at 7.40. (Broadcast played)

A. This is the wrong report actually. This is not the right report. This is the wrong report.

Q. Sorry, you were saying something?

A. The one you just played there was two days after, that was on 31st May.

MR DINGEMANS: That was on 31st May. Do you have the second broadcast on 28th May? That was the broadcast

I think you put out on 31st May, was it not?

A. That is right, that one you just heard.

LORD HUTTON: It begins I think with Mr Humphreys saying "28 minutes to 8 ..."

MR DINGEMANS: Can we look at BBC/1/5. Slightly less dramatically, could you be Andrew Gilligan at the bottom

and I will be Mr Humphreys. If we pick it up halfway down the page: "Mr Humphreys: 28 minutes to 8. Tony Blair had

quite a job persuading the country and indeed his own MPs to support the invasion of Iraq; his main argument was

that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction that threatened us all. None of those weapons has been found. Now

our defence correspondent, Andrew Gilligan, has found evidence that the government's dossier on Iraq that was

produced last September was cobbled together at the last minute with some unconfirmed material that had not

been approved by the Security Services. Now you told us about this earlier on the programme Andy, and we've had

a statement from 10 Downing Street that says it's not true, and let me just quote what they said to you: 'Not one

word of the dossier was not entirely the work of the intelligence agencies'. Sorry to submit you to this sort of English

but there we are. I think we know what they mean. Are you suggesting, let's be very clear about this, that it was not

the work of the intelligence agencies?"

A. "No, the information which I'm told was dubious did come from the agencies, but they were unhappy about it,

because they didn't think it should have been in there. They thought it was -- it was not corroborated sufficiently,

and they actually thought it was wrong, they thought the informant concerned had got it wrong, they thought he'd

misunderstood what was happening."

Q. At the top of page 6 you continue.

A. "I mean let's go through this. This is the dossier that was published in September last year, probably the most

substantial statement of the government's case against Ira

Q. You'll remember that the Commons was recalled to debate it, Tony Blair made the opening speech. It is not the

same as the famous dodgy dossier, the one that was copied off the internet, that came later. This is quite a serious

document. It dominated the news that day and you open up the dossier and the first thing you see is a preface

written by Tony Blair that includes the following words." Then the words in quotes were voiced up, Tony Blair's

words were voiced up by somebody on the production team. Those words were: "Saddam's military planning allows

for some weapons of mass destruction to be ready within forty five minutes of an order to deploy them." Then it is

back to me again: "Now that claim has come back to haunt Mr Blair because if the weapons had been that readily to

hand, they probably would have been found by now. But you know, it could have been an honest mistake, but what I

have been told is that the Government knew that claim was questionable, even before the war, even before they

wrote it in their dossier. "I have spoken to a British official who was involved in the preparation of the dossier, and he

told me that until the week before it was published, the draft dossier produced by the Intelligence Services, added

little to what was already publicly known. He said ..." Again, this is a voice up. This is a different person saying these

words, but I will say them: "It was transformed in the week before it was published, to make it sexier. The classic

example was the statement that weapons of mass destruction were ready for use within forty five minutes. That

information was not in the original draft. It was included in the dossier against our wishes, because it wasn't reliable.

Most things in the dossier were double source, but that was single source, and we believe that the source was

wrong." That is the end of David Kelly's first quote. Then it is me again: "Now this official told us that the

transformation of the dossier took place at the behest of Downing Street, and he added ..." Again, this is a voice up.

Again, this is David Kelly's quote: "Most people in intelligence weren't happy with the dossier, because it didn't

reflect the considered view they were putting forward." Then me again: "Now I want to stress that this official and

others I've spoken to, do still believe that Iraq did have some sort of weapons of mass destruction programme."

Another quote from David Kelly voiced up: "I believe it is about 30 per cent likely there was a chemical weapons

programme in the six months before the war and considerably more likely, that there was a biological weapons

programme. We think Hans Blix downplayed a couple of potentially interesting pieces of evidence, but the weapons

programmes were small: sanctions did limit the programmes." That is the end of David Kelly's quote. Then it is me

again: "The official also added quite an interesting note about what has happened as a result, since the war, of the

capture of some Iraqi WMD scientists." And him again: "We don't have a great deal more information yet than we

had before. We have not got very much out of the detainees yet." That is the end of his quote. It is back to me: "Now

the forty five minutes really is not just a detail, it did go to the heart of the Government's case that Saddam was an

imminent threat, and it was repeated a further three times in the body of the dossier, and I understand that the

Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee is going to conduct an Inquiry into the claims made by the British

Government about Iraq, and it is obviously exactly this kind of issue that will be at the heart of their investigation."

Q. "Mr Humphreys: Andrew Gilligan, many thanks." That concluded the second broadcast.

A. That is right.

Q. I think we do have Radio 5 Live. (Broadcast played)

Q. That concluded, effectively, your contribution to the BBC Radio 5 Live?

A. No, I mean those three pieces were -- I have gone back through the files and as far as I can tell, and it is difficult

to tell at this distance, but I can trace at least 19 items I did on this story --

Q. Yes.

A. -- between 29th May and 5th June, and there were several more on that day as well on all the various BBC

networks, News 24, the World Service, Radio 2, Radio 5 bulletins, the news bulletins on Radio 4. So those were

three of 19 that you heard.

Q. But those were the broadcasts that started the story going?

A. The very first one that we heard was the first -- no it was not actually. There was another one, a news bulletin

piece at 6 which we have not heard. So the first one you heard in the court today was the second and then the

principal one was the one we had not found the tape of that I had to read. That was the principal appearance of that

story on Today that morning.

Q. The 7.40 one?

A. Yes.

Q. Can we go back to BBC/1/4, which is the transcript for your first broadcast which I think took place shortly after 6

in the morning, is that right?

A. Yes, this is in fact the second appearance of the story in the programme. There had already been an appearance

in the news bulletin on the programme. This was immediately afterwards at 6.07.

Q. Was this contribution to the programme scripted?

A. No, it was not.

Q. So this was you speaking from the studio or from home?

A. From home. I have an ISDN line at home because it is an early morning programme. This is me speaking live and

unscripted.

LORD HUTTON: You are speaking?

A. Speaking live and unscripted.

MR DINGEMANS: Live and unscripted.

A. Yes.

Q. Can I take you to five lines down on your AG which was this: "... and what we've been told by one of the senior

officials in charge of drawing up that dossier was that, actually the Government probably, erm, knew that that forty

five minute figure was wrong, even before it decided to put it in." Now, we have all been through the note you say

you made of Dr Kelly's meeting; it does not appear to be in that note.

A. No, I mean the word "wrong" appears in the manuscript note that I did on the day after and that formed the basis

of the note to Miranda Holt. This is not intended to be a direct quote from David Kelly. I make it clear that on one

occasion when I do quote him directly in this piece, I make it clear by bracketing him with the words something like -

- where are we? Where is it? Yes, here we are: "because to quote the source, he said" and then at the end I say,

"that is a quote from our source". That is the only time in the broadcast when I am actually quoting directly from the

source. I was trying to make a distinction by using those forms -- it is obviously more difficult on radio because you

cannot put quote marks on a page. It was trying to make a distinction between areas where we were trying to

convey the essence of what the source had said and trying to convey a direct quotation from him.

Q. So it was not a direct quotation from the source and you did not portray it as a direct quotation. Was it supported

by what Dr Kelly had told you?

A. I believe so. He had said that the 45 minute point had been included against our wishes. This inclusion was the

classic example of how the dossier had been transformed. The transformation had been done at the behest of

Campbell or the transformation was the work of Campbell. He also said it was real information. The probable

conclusion was that the Government had been made aware that the agencies believed it was wrong.

Q. Well, Dr Kelly, in that passage to which you refer of your note of what he said, says: "It was real information but

included against our wishes because they considered it unreliable."

A. That is right.

Q. Does that support the reporting that you have set out at page 4?

A. Well, I think it is a reasonable conclusion to draw from what he said. But I have to say that with the benefit of

hindsight, looking at it now with a fine toothcomb, I think it was not wrong, what I said, but it was not perfect either,

and in hindsight I should have scripted that too.

Q. And if it was not entirely supported by what Dr Kelly had said but your inference that you had drawn from what he

had said to you, why did you not go back and check it with him?

A. As I say, what this was was a product of a live broadcast. It was, I do believe, a fair conclusion to draw from what

he said to me. But I think, on reflection, I did not use exactly the right language. It was not wrong, but it was not

perfect either.

Q. Was this allegation ever withdrawn at any time before Dr Kelly died?

A. Well, I never returned to the form of words I used in the 6.07 broadcast. Subsequent broadcasts were scripted.

The word I used in the 7.32 broadcast, the scripted one, was "questionable", which I was happier with.

Q. If we turn to BBC/1/5, you concluded the piece in the morning by making the point which is obvious, common

sense, that there is a world of difference between people getting things wrong innocently and people getting things

wrong knowingly. The lawyers have a distinction between mistakes and fraud, and this was effectively a charge of

fraud, was it not?

A. Well, I mean the word "if" appears there: "If it was, if it was wrong, things do, things are, got wrong in good faith

but if they knew it was wrong before they actually made the claim, that's perhaps a bit more serious." So I was not

making a charge, I was simply reporting what I believed Dr Kelly had meant when he said what he said, and I was

not making the judgment that the Government had got it wrong in bad faith. That is why I used the words: "... if they

knew it was wrong before they actually made the claim, that's perhaps a bit more serious."

Q. This story was picked up and reported worldwide. You have I think seen a lot of those clippings. What was

picked up and reported worldwide in some of the reports was the allegation of express bad faith, was it not?

A. Yes, but that was not an allegation I would necessarily support. You see, the reason why I say that my

phraseology in that first two-way was not perfect was that it was not my intention to give anyone the impression that

the Government had lied or that it had made up this intelligence. It was real intelligence. I always wanted to make

that clear. But it seems that some people did get that impression; and I did not return to that form of words that I

used at 6.07 and I specifically corrected that impression with the first thing I did at 7.32. I said it was real information

but the intelligence agencies were not happy with it.

Q. I think we are scrolling down to it at the bottom of page 5.

A. Yes. I mean I also made it clear in that latest broadcast, in that one we played a little bit of, in my 31st May one

and also in my writings in this that we did not allege that anything had not been real intelligence or that anything had

been fabricated and that was never my intention. On a close reading of this, I do not think it quite supports that

interpretation but obviously these words are not meant to be read, they are meant to be heard. I think their impact

was not carefully enough considered by me in that one two-way. But I want also to stress that one 6.07 item was not

I believe representative of all the items I did, you know, on the programme alone let alone across the whole of the

rest of the BBC output. That is something that is quite important. It did not represent the overall effect of our

coverage, that one item.

Q. There is no doubt, is there, that part of the reason that the dispute between No. 10 broadly and the BBC broadly

became so heated was because of the perception that there had been the allegation of conscious wrongdoing, is

that right?

A. As I say, it was not a perception that I intended to come across as strongly as it did in that 6.07 two-way. That is

why I say that the words, in hindsight, were not perfect, and I think also why I say it would be better if I had scripted

that item, and that the impact of the words was not carefully enough considered in that one item. The Government

has used on occasions in the past a particular technique where it quotes selectively from a particular detail of a

report that it believes is the weakest detail and then uses it to discredit the whole report. I believe that was what was

going on on this occasion. The Government actually wanted to put the most extreme interpretation on it. There is

one occasion, in fact, in our documents in which Ben Bradshaw brings up and complains that we are not putting the

most extreme interpretation on it, and I think it would be unrepresentative to hold that 6.07 broadcast as

representative of all my output on the story. I must say I really did not intend to give that impression, and I corrected

it, that the 45 minute claim was invented or fabricated and that it was not the work of the intelligence agencies.

Q. There is an e-mail that has been shown to us at BBC/5/118. Can you tell us who this e-mail is from and to?

A. Yes, it is from my editor, Kevin Marsh, on 27th June which is about a month after they had broadcast to Stephen

Mitchell.

Q. Who is Stephen Mitchell?

A. He is Kevin's boss, essentially, he is the head of radio news programmes.

Q. He says: "Some thoughts... clearly I have to talk to AG early next week: I hope that by then my worst fears --

based on what I'm hearing from the spooks this afternoon -- aren't realised. Assuming not, the guts of what I would

say are: "This story was a good piece of investigative journalism, marred by flawed reporting -- our biggest millstone

has been his loose use of language and lack of judgment in some of his phraseology. "It was marred also by the

quantity of writing for other outlets that varied what was said or was loose with the terms of the story. "That it is in

many ways a result of the loose and in some ways distant relationship he [which I assume to be you] has been

allowed to have with Today." Then some changes are proposed which I do not propose to read. Is that a fair analysis

of your reporting that morning?

A. No, I do not think that an entirely fair analysis. It was written, as I say, a month after the broadcast. That is the

only time in all the correspondence I see where Kevin expresses any kind of concern about the reporting of that

story. And he never expressed it to me. It was written at a time of maximum pressure. This was just after Alastair

Campbell's appearance on the Select Committee and you know about the sort of volley of complaints that followed.

I do not think it is necessarily representative of his broad views. I mean, I have an e-mail from him to me on 30th

May which is the day after the story.

Q. Can I just take you to that e-mail?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact it has literally just been handed to me, as I think you know, so it is I am afraid not in any document

reference. Would you mind telling me who the e-mail is from and to?

A. From Kevin Marsh to me.

Q. What is the date?

A. 30th May.

Q. So how long after the broadcast is this?

A. 24 hours, just over 24 hours.

Q. Can you just read what it says?

A. "Statement of the obvious I guess but it's really good to have you back here in the UK. Great week, great stories,

well handled and well told. Course it's meant Today has had a great week too, and that has lifted everyone. We still

have to have that conversation [which is my annual appraisal] but since you are entirely nocturnal while I'm a normal

human being we don't seem to meet too often. Maybe you could creak the coffin lid open next week during daylight

hours. Anyway, it's great to have you back on your beat. Talk soon." So that I mean arguably perhaps supports the

other thing, that I did not have enough contact with him, but it completely contradicts it in the other respect, on the

...

Q. Were you aware of what had been said in the discussion that the governors had about this matter, BBC/6/102?

Here there is part of the minute that the governors made at their meeting on 6th July, and it deals with a proposed

public statement and coverage in the war on Iraq at (a) and produces guidelines I think we can see, scrolling down.

Towards the bottom it says this: "On the guidelines more generally, the board might consider commenting publicly

that these were re-examined in the light of this episode not least because the intelligence service is now operated in

a more open fashion. Also there has been management activity since the broadcast that required examination [I am

continuing reading over the page], for example careful language had not been applied by Andrew Gilligan

throughout". You can see that concludes right at the top of the page. Were you aware of what the governors had at

least discussed? I think this was before the management had joined.

A. No, I was not; and, I mean, it would not be made aware to me, and as I say, I was not aware of Kevin's thoughts

on this either.

Q. Would you agree with the governors' provisional analysis that careful language had not been applied by Andrew

Gilligan throughout?

A. I think in hindsight as I say, particularly that 6.07, quite unwittingly and unintentionally but I did give people the

wrong impression about whether this was real intelligence or whether it was made up or not; and I never intended to

give anyone the impression that it was not real intelligence or that it had been fabricated, but I think I must have

done; and so in that sense I agree to that, I think.

Q. Can I now turn, before I take you to your evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, to Dr Kelly's evidence of the

meeting that he says he had with you. Can I start at MoD/1/20. Just so that you know and everyone knows what this

is, this is an extract from his letter to the line manager. We have seen part of the second paragraph, but he then says

this: "I next met him in February 2003 at his request." He deals with that. He talks about other contact he has had

with members of the BBC. The next paragraph he begins with this: "I met with Gilligan in London on 22nd May for

45 minutes in the evening to privately discuss his Iraq experiences and definitely not to discuss the dossier (I would

not have met with him had it been the case)." Is that right, that at the start of the meeting it was not the intention to

discuss the dossier?

A. Well, I mean the dossier was bound to come up in any discussion on Iraq, but the conversation began as a

general conversation about Ira

Q. But there was no -- I mean he did not say anything like: I cannot discuss the dossier. He was quite willing to

discuss the dossier.

Q. I think you have told us that it came up in conversation but the question was whether or not you had met to

discuss the dossier?

A. Well, that among other things, not that alone. But that among other things.

Q. Had you mentioned that when you discussed -- I think you told us you contacted him?

A. I am not sure, to be honest; I do not recall the content of that phone conversation.

Q. Then he says this: "As I recall, we discussed his ability to report before, during, and after the war in the presence

of minders and freedom to move around Baghdad; accommodation of the Palestine Hotel; his impression of the

coalition attacks; US military protection of journalists; the revelations likely to be made by Amer Al-Sa'adi, Huda

Amash, Rihab Taha, Tariq Aziz and Ahmed Murtadda who are individuals associated with Iraq's 'past' programme."

Is that right? You did discuss those matters, did you?

A. Yes, we did. Yes.

Q. "He was particularly intrigued by Huda since he visited her home and met her husband but not Huda after the

war and found her home guarded by 'regime' Iraqis." Is that correct?

A. Yes, I believe we discussed that. That is certainly what I found.

Q. "We also discussed the failure of Iraq to use WMD and the inability to find them. I offered my usual and standard

explanations (conditions early in the war not favourable to CB use and lack of command and control late in the war;

that the small arsenal of weapons (or its destroyed remnants) compared to 1991 would be difficult to find without

human information)." I think we have already heard from you that that was discussed and we can see that in your

note; is that right?

A. Yes, and I mean -- I am not quite sure what he said about the human information part but everything else I

certainly remember saying to him.

Q. Then he says this: "The issue of 45 minutes arose in terms of the threat (aerial versus land launch) and I stated

that I did not know what it refers to (which I do not)." Is that accurate?

A. No, I think -- the conversation is as I described to you. The part of the conversation that related to 45 minutes is

as I have described to you.

Q. "He asked why it should be in the dossier and I replied probably for impact." Do you recall him using those

words?

A. No, again he raised -- he brought up the 45 minutes, it was not me who brought it up. He gave it as the classic

example of the way in which the dossier had been transformed.

Q. "He raised the issue of Alastair Campbell and since I was not involved in the process (not stated by me) I was

unable to comment. This issue was not discussed at any length and was essentially an aside." Is that accurate?

A. No. It was he who brought up Alastair Campbell. I asked him: how does this transformation come about? And he

said: Campbell.

Q. "I made no allegations or accusations about any issue related to the dossier or the Government's case for war

concentrating on his account of his stay in Ira

Q. I did not discuss the 'immediacy' of the threat. The discussion was not about the dossier." Is that accurate?

A. Well it was not entirely about the dossier but it did include a reasonably large section devoted to the dossier, so it

is not entirely accurate.

Q. "Had it been so then I would have indicated that from my extensive and authoritative knowledge of Iraq's WMD

programme, notably its biological programme, that the dossier was a fair reflection of open source information (i.e.

UNSCOM/UNMOVIC) and appreciations." Did he make it clear that he was broadly supportive of the dossier?

A. No. I mean, as I say, he expressed his belief to me that Iraq had had a weapons of mass destruction programme,

but he did not believe that there were usable weapons in any great number. He did not say the whole dossier was

wrong or anything like that but he raised significant concerns about the dossier. And it is also wrong, I think, to say

the dossier was a fair reflection of open source information. It was explicitly described as a reflection of intelligence

information by its own publishers.

Q. He says this: "I most certainly have never attempted to undermine Government policy in any way especially since

I was personally sympathetic to the war because I recognised from a decade's work [and I am afraid we will have to

go to 21 at the top] the menace of Iraq's ability to further develop its non-conventional weapons programmes. "I

have had no further contact with Andrew Gilligan since 22nd May."

A. I do not think -- he did not say what his views on the war were. I mean, he certainly did not say he was against

the war. One of the things he had been at all our meetings convinced of was the potential threat from Iraq, but he did

not believe the actual threat as it existed in September 2002 was particularly great.

Q. Can I next turn to a document MoD/1/25 and just so that you know where this comes from, this is a note of Dr

Kelly's interview with Dr Wells on 4th July. Then it is the third paragraph down: "Dr Kelly said his next contact with

Gilligan was in May. Gilligan rang him to offer feedback from his experiences in Ira

Q." Is that accurate?

A. Well, it is partly accurate. I mean that certainly was part of the purposes of our discussion as I described earlier.

But I do think that it was more me wanting to pick his brains than he pick mine because he had so much more

knowledge than I did about the subject.

Q. I am not worried about what actually transpired once you had met, but he says the phone call was you ringing up

saying -- did you call him David?

A. I called him David.

Q. "David, I have just got back from Iraq, I can tell you what is happening out there."

A. No, I wanted to discuss issues relating to the non-discovery of Iraqi WMD with him. I wanted to discuss reasons

why they had not been found. I wanted to discuss what happened next about finding them. It was two-way

information. But to be honest, the information I had I cannot imagine would have been a huge amount of use to him

because I am not a trained scientist.

Q. Then it says: "He had accepted, for the reasons set out in his letter. They met on 22nd May in the Charing Cross

Hotel. (Dr Kelly later said that the meeting took place at about 1745 and lasted until approx 1830)." I have already

asked you about time so I am not going to waste time on that. "Gilligan took notes but did not appear to have a tape

recorder ..." You did not appear to have a tape recorder.

A. No, I did not have a tape recorder.

Q. "... (although Kelly did not ask and there was no discussion of the basis of the meeting)", is that right?

A. No. As I say, when I got out my organiser he said "unattributable". So that was the discussion we had then. And I

would have said in the phone conversation "on the usual terms" or something like that meaning off the record.

Q. Meaning?

A. Unattributable or off the record.

Q. "The vast bulk of the conversation was about Iraqi individuals associated with WMD programmes, the course of

the war, and why WMD had not been used." Is that fair?

A. Part of the conversation certainly did talk about Iraqi individuals. I have read this part to you and he described

some of the well known scientists and said that he believed that he had been taken out of the programme because

he had contact with the UN. But that was only a relatively small part of the discussion. The course of the war,

certainly that was another part of the discussion and certainly why WMD had not had been used. That is reflected in

my notes. They are relatively -- I would not describe them as the vast bulk. They were parts of the conversation but

not the vast bulk.

Q. Then: "In the course of the latter, as recorded in his letter, Gilligan had raised the reference in the September

dossier to the possibility of weapons being deployed in 45 minutes. Kelly had commented that this did not

correspond with any weapon system that he knew". I think you have already told us that did not form part of the

conversation; is that right?

A. Well, as I say it was David Kelly that raised the issue of 45 minutes. He described it as a classic example of how

the dossier had been transformed. I mean the second sentence in that: "Kelly had commented that this did not

correspond with any weapon system that he knew". If you read the notes I sent to Miranda Holt, he is talking about

there being conventional weapons in that time but not weapons of mass destruction, so that could be -- you know,

there is something in that sentence of what we said certainly.

Q. Right.

A. But again I must stress it was he who brought up the 45 minutes.

Q. "Gilligan had asked why he thought the claim had been included in the dossier. Kelly had said that he had

assumed that it was for impact. Although he did not know what the claim was based on, it emphasised the

immediacy of the threat." Does that accord with your recollection?

A. No, I do not remember hearing the word "impact". Clearly, I mean part of that is the sort of import of what he said,

if he said it was merely included for impact rather than because it was true, but I mean again that is not really an

accurate reflection of the conversation we had.

Q. Right. After lunch I will take you through what he said about your conversation to the FAC.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much. We will rise now and sit again at 2 o'clock.

1.05 pm: The short adjournment