886

accounting of our men lost in Laos ••• •

proper BVlI Banoi ehoul.d f th laat priaonere from, 1 f A • After the recovery 0 e till hold them reeponaib. or • ed ivocally that we • • be advia unequ being held 1n Indochina .•. the return of all POW_

be made to the ranking LPP B.· ... 4 strong demarche shOUld. initiative should plainly and representative in Vienuin •••• Thi

ll no longer pl.ay qamea with the

forcefully assert that -=Stb.~ immed.i.ate relea •• as well :8ed

&n POW issue in Laos ••• we cl 11 those who may have 1 •

tin and infol:lllAtion on a faJ.lure to provide a ;~ITy, qUe LPP should be ad~~8~ ~ropriate t1n1ted State. satisfactory answer could reau actions ••• •

UIIl1.n the LPP have not responded D •• Shortly after 28 KaJ:ch,~:. t!etical ai.r reconnaialumce of favorably, .intenai va and 0 oua ce Add..i. tiona1ly, the JDOVemant N rth and South Laos should COJIIID8Dth • waters off Viet.nam should be o~ a new carrier taak.force into e publiclyannounced ...

the BVII/Pathet Uo forces hav. • the evidence i.nd.ieatea that and the LPP have provided. no ~~ture u.s. personnel since l'i9~~er that the ten names listed on prisoner or c~sualty data. at a 1 February •••

03/27/73

tinq 8JIOJlg the President, Transcript of a recording Ofa!t -::n.ld Ziegler on .March 27, Baldeaa.n John Bbrlichllan, frca Illio A.X. to 1.30 P.K.

B.R. 1973

s one uh this, this watergate ·Bhrliclman. '1'h!s story and, ~i~tJ.nq'~, but .. have to thJ.nq 10 potentially very 1ae to keepinq people baq in. uh ••• clevote a large part of our t

Presidents I know ••• • 1

houlcl go out on natiou. President; ••• 1 don't believe that !n: go out on the 1faterqate telerision 11ke tonight or ::-:::: day on national televiSion.: C~sion aDd then woul.~: to e qet the Vietnaa out of the ~ • Vietnaa •• oily vi... if ~d 1 th.1nlc: that qives you. 00'

_ybe 'let thi. right you • JaM)

D_ (~. bat _ to / Ri_ DOte to --..-_ 04/03 73 f Stata

IMnda a note to secretary 0 --- of Def_ Riclulrdaon ~ •• tiOll OIl ~ 0IItT 5ec ___ .z .t__ -llbile than i_ .Ull _c:.e .,.- ttea.Uon -..t Rogera su ____ , cl ......... tcul&rly in t.oa, oar a for of our JIeJl are still bel , ..--th d.J.tficul t ta.k of accounting now be focuaed priAarily on e the ai •• ing' in action.-

m...,u; 5 -_,

887

04/0S173 Godley Cable to lIDqera

u. S. AaIbe..sador ..• Godley, sends cable to Secretary of State Rogers stating they were reluctantly approaching the conclusion that the Pathet Lao did not hold additional prisoners, and that it was t..i:Ge to change the focus to accounting for HlAa as opposed to searching for POWs.

04/06173 ,...., of _tor 1IJ."DOlce -..unq with 50th Peb:osy

"Senator Brooke; s Dleet.ing 1fi. th LPP representat.ive 50th Phetrasy on April 6" ~ Latter fODrlally stated that LPP holds no DIOre American prisoners in Laos. 50th .aid On1y prisoners LPP held were the nine who -.re returned to USG in Hanoi on Karch 28 ••• -

04/12173 Shields Pres. Conf8<8DCe

The Defense Depart:ment sponsors a press conference ..• in which Roger Shields states, "We have no indication at this moment that there are any Americans alive in Indochina." ••• Dr. Shields furth~r states that with interviews of returning POWs alaost complete, none of the MIAs have been changed to POW status.

Rumors that U.S. servicemen vere still held in Laos "do the families a disservice,- .ays Shield •.

Prior to the DoD news con£erence, Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements states to Dr. Shields, in reference to remaining POW/lUAs, -You didn't hear me, they're all dead."

04/14/73 ~ to State OUtlfning prior~ti.s

U.S. Ambas8ador in 5a.igon, Ellsworth Bunker, sends message to secretary of State •.• Bunker references -informal Washington instructions" that first priority will be reCOVery of remains of those personnel listed as died in captivity On the 27 january 1973 list. Second priority i8 described a8 -.eeking information fram the other side on specific .KIA persons who, according to 0.5. recOrds, were believed caPtured ali va 0 •• OU has provided folders on 80 persons in this category. Bunker lists the third priority aa negotiating a process for air and ground search of crash site ••

OS/01173 Riclu1zdaOD,...., (phasing out POW/KIA .... sk Force)

Secretary of Defense Riehardson signa the memorandum proPOSed by ABo Bagleburqer on April 25th to phase out the POW/KIA Task Porce.

OS123/73 U •• iDger ~ with La Due """

Kiasinger asks I.e Due Tho to have an underStanding with the 0.5. to "not contradict- any U.S. public statements that article 8(b) of the Paris accords applies to all of Indochina.

APPBBDIX 5 - Page 8

888

till U.lce a .entence fro- you "II we IIbtnllcl • ,mJ.ch sa,.. that S. then .tataa. .. ~ why you. can't g-ive us -- i CJJ18d beinO vh..1ch I don ' t und~ :a-ad that there are no U.S. pr 8 have been the DRV haa been info i.onere held 1n LaO. 't'ho held in x..oe -- that all the ~t for ue. · Le Due been ed It would be very that all of th_ have :!;:Snda : -1 have ac:]a1.oWl.:19~= J;; can ' t you write it down?­released.. ltJ.B8inger .alta,

OS/24/13 Sb1.elds to IIU1 .--ce held April 12, 191~L I ~~t red pre •• con ......... - ledq_ i.Ddiea~CJ ~ -In a ~~~t DoD had no epacl!!: = prieoner in Southeaat :; ~. S. personnel were .till a~i:!cs factual ltateD8D.t at the t1llle Asia . •• It wall a totally accur it waB mad • . • • •

I believe that anaver 1. no longer • In light of more rec~t event., fully satisfactory •• • nine of whom were u.s.

ed that only 10 persona, over 300 U. S. • .. . it should be not other aide all LaOS prisoners. were released by the unted for in Lao •• • personnel remai.n unac

co ard.1n the possibility of

• I believe that the DoD PO~~: .~d be 9a1tered. slightly ••• • ~ • stlll being held prisoner

06/13/73 n •• inger~. conference -eel aboUt the following point., .. We are specifically conce~_

. • . lamentation of the cease-fire Ram and the _ One, the i.nad.equa~= infiltration into South Vi::-rs for that _ Secondly, the con oa and c .. 'boc',a aa corr 0 continued utilization of La for the infiltration. ed aboUt the inad.equate accounting Three we were concern the ~s.in;' in action. ad. about the violation. of were concern - 'Fourth, we tlon vi til demilitarized. zonadoncerned. about the inA~~ CC:~~~q of the - Fifth, we werel

CO trol Cc::I1IIIl1s.ion and e. ow =_;~~i~~ c:-.··~~t the violationa of ~~le,: Sixth, we were concernl of forei91l trooPs frca - in the v1.thdrava requi.r ; .. ion all sld." ~ ~~:~'the prov=.~ ~~~~~f~C:O h~tf_~~~: lec1qed that they ti t,hxOUqhout Ind.oc~, • P unt for the aissinq 1n ac on rn to the United. states ••• :c:tter which ie of great conca

u (ata .... _ l 06/05/73 Bill to 0_ ~i Deputy secretat1' Robert Hill a",v ses Assistant Secretary of Defense APPBIIDU 5 _ page ,

889

of Defense Willi8.lll. C18lMlDt. that 'As you requested, I have prepared. for your signature a memorandum directing that all atatWi cb.a.nge. from mi •• ing in action to prisoner of war be cleared by you." 07/17/73 C1a.errta on Statull J)etere'n-Uons

'I am concerned that the process for equitably d.etm:m.i.n.1nq statua of the m •• Lng in Southeaat Aaia may be und.uly influenced. by emotional factor. rather that the law qove~q such determinations and the facts bearing on each Lndividual ca.e . •• • •

"The Department of Defense is currently following quidance that finding in which an individ.ual is presumed to be d.ead. viII not be _d.a at this time unless the incident occurred over vater • •. It is not our intent to write off our mi.sin; men prematurely, but at the same time we cannot condone building undue hope for the family members without justification.-

. .. -the deci.sion to change status ahoul.d not be unalterably tied. to the Lnspection of combat ai tea, the recovery of remain., or the personal clesires of family members . The d.eciaion should be based. aolely on a thorough study of the avaJ.la.ble infoJ:]l&tion and a qualitative jud.gement by the Service Secretarias ••• Therefore, in the continued. absence of progress in accounting for the m1ssillq, the Military Services intend to proceed nov with a status change in those cases where it is warranted. by avaJ.lable i.nformation. · 09/07/73 naai.Dqer test1.-..y to SeDate OIl JttAa

Dr . Henry Xi.singer, at confirmation hearings •• • for Secretary of State, is asked by Senator Church the question of bow many of the 1,300 MIAs have been accounted for to date .

Xisainqer responds -- - I d.o not believe any of them have been accounted for ad.equately . It bas been one of the unsatisfactory aspects of the implementation of the agreement • •• In Laos, actually ". have JDOre reason for concern, becaWie the ration of prisoners to those that we have reason to believe parachuted. is smallar than it i. in any other part of this area ••. we are extremely dissatisfied. with the results of the t.lplementation of that part of the agreement, and that is one of the reasons why we cannot proceed. in certain other area. such as economic aid neqotiations . -

0'/14/73 Laos ~l. signed

Protocols to the Laos February 21st Ceas.-P'1re Aqreement are signed. • •• Article 18 of the Protocols atat •• : "Within 15 to 30 d.ays after the ciate of the sign.1.ng of this protocol, each siei. will iafOQl the Central Joint COIIIIlission for the t.:plementation of the .llJreement of the n1Dlber of the persons captured and detained., and. I:tat. clearly the nationality of each person, •.• as well as the list of the captured persons who died. eiurLng the period of detention.-

APPBIJI)II 5 - page 10

890

05/08176 State to VJ.em- (begin _ aegotiaticDJo)

orb. Depart:.ant of State senda diplc:aatic not. to VietDul ••• -the

.elective application of paat a~tB would not be

trui.tful ••. the united State. believe. it would be more useful to

di.~. 1 •• ue. affecting future relation. between our two

countries. The hwaan1tar.i.an concern of a full accounting of our

mi.sing men will be ona of the prilDary iS8u •• of the unJ.ted Stat ••

in lIuch eli.cu •• ion.. Unti.l "this i •• ue i8 substantially reBolvec1,

there can be no real progre •• toward no~lization of relationa.-

06/19/76 VietruIJI to U.S. protest p fnking aid to IlIA resolution)

Vietnam responds with diplomatic not. statinq that the -unilateral

U.S. denunciation of the Paria agreement is aimed at evading the

pledges it has solemnly undertaken ..• On the other hand, the u.s.

demand. that Vietnam implement Article 8(b) of the

egre nt ••• ObvioU8!Y it want. to renege on it. obligations under

the Par!.. agreement on VIetnam. while claman<U.ng that the other aide

implement. another article of the same agreement ••• -

08/02/76 IIah1b Latter to """~ (naaiDger denJ.al of offer)

Onder Secretary of State for political Affairs, Philip habib, sends

a letter to the Montgomery Commission ... In reference to the

Pebruary 1st Buon letter to the Borth Vietnamese on reconBtruction

ald ... Habib states, -The President's message did not contain any

pledges of promises of aid ••. the letter did not specifically pledge

to seek any particular sum of money.-

11/13/76 Habib to naa1.Dqer (Vletnaa i. linking aid to 1lIAs)

Under secretary of State Phi1lp Habib reports to secretary of State

Henry Ussinger, on the November 12th meeting with the

Vietnamese •••• he states that the core of the Vietnamese arguD8Ilt is

that Vietnam is -prepared to fu1till fully, and I repeat, tully,

our obliqatiou- under the Paris AgreeJDent to account for the XI.Aa,

but that the U.S. should tultlll it. -obligation to contribute to

bindinq up the wouncla of war and the reconstruction of Vietnam and.

to accomplish that which was agreed on in 1973 in the Joint

Economic Commiesion.-

12/13/76 Kon~ ec:-.1ssicm Report (Vietna:a i.. linking 18auaa)

The Report of the Bouse Select COIIIII.lttee on Hissing Persona is

filed. The major conclusion reads, -No Americans are Btill being

held alive as pri.eoners in Indochina, or elsewhere, as a result ot

the was in Indochina. - ..• -lack of cUrect discussions - • •. bas

·prevented the closing of this chapter ••• The U.S. wi.hes and serves

an accounting for the aissing .•• The U.S. insists on an account1n9

as A precondition to nODmaI relations. The Indochines.,

particularly the Vietnamese, state that reconstruction aid auat

JlPPDOII 5 - Page 11

891

precede the.1r accounting for our missing .•

09/25/85 Brooko a.port

In a JDelDorandWD: to General Shutel t COIIIIDOd TIl ' ore OII4s Brooks wrote

1. -I was not at all pleased '

OVer responsibility for the ~ the Situation I tound whan I took

~!lo!~s protessional the ope»;!l~~su~:.......~ deeper I looked,

g to .be particular probleas, '---.""'4 ••• I found the

a. case files unprofessional. incomplete, sloppy ••• and generally

b. There ware no act1.on 1 logs, antries had not been .. ogds ~ the cases or where there were

e ~ a long ti.ae.

c. Follow_up actions had not actions were called for but ware been pursued ..• obvious follow_up

never taken and years had passed. d. our There was no tickler system

own taaking... to ensure that we followed up on

4. I am not persuaded tha this problem if it is the : enough as.ets are being dedicated

particular, I wonder ia JCR~ lriodrity probl .. we claim it is. to Sa equAtely manned... In

6. I see the moat imPOrtant cementing relationshi 8 0 ~g w& must do right now i8 to be

Hendon w1.ll be using !ur ;i:: :!lli" It ~s clear that Congressman

that we have fol:1l8d. the necess • .,-.p at{!=ed.it us •.. We need to ensure -.z l.4nces .•.

7 • I am. afraid we are in for withstand scrutiny very well ~':- troubled tilles •.. we will not

Ddni.mdze the critici .. this s~~tin;U:il~in~~~ preparations to

03/18/86 GaiJ>ea Report

Meaao to Director from lti.JIball Ga Porce. The JD8IDO states th ~e8, Chief, Director's PH/KIA Ta k

a hardnosed objective ~~a:~sl J."rce Charter vaa to Condu~t Procedures and to report findin XIA substantive is.ues and

Di.rector within thirty de ga and recOlllllendatlons to th

serious ShortComings in ys ••• The Task Porce review reveal~

fOllows: every important area ••• Pindings are as

~.Unhealthy attitudes. .Alaost total lack f

Smart. 0 managEml8nt - working hard but not

3.Baphazard approach to bl 4.Too much direct e pro ems and functions.

5.Inadequate Plann~sure of the working level analysts l..Dq, internal cOllUlltmication, and'

workinq

written

APPBRDIX 5 - Page 12

892

quidanc •. 6.Data. baa. 1e a wasteland. 7.Worldng files unprofessional, sloppy, incomplete, no standard.

procedure •• S.No disciplined, coherent, collection management effort.

9.Too much detective worle, not enough analysis.

10.Rot nearly enough administrative and intelligence technician

support. ll . Significant ADP d.ficien~ie8 • • .

05/27/86 ~iqhe Report

Report from General. Eugene Tighe to General Leonard Perroota,

Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. In the report 8lJJ11mlU:y,

General Tighe states, ·We judge there ia no cover-up by the U.S.

Government, the intelligence ~t:y, nor the Defenae

Intelligence Aqancy • • • There i8 lnfo:z:mation, even 1.n our limited

sample, whi.ch establiahes the strong possibility of Aaerican

prisoners of war being held 1.n Laos and Vietnam. This judgement i.

based a cateqory of eyewitness reports ... allegation. by defectors

and. escapees... and • signals· in the refugee cOJalllUnity probably

originating with the Vietnamese intelligence servicea ... •

·A longstanding lapse in diligent intelligence work has produced

serious gaps i.n our knowledge about Viet.nam' s and others' behavior

relative to prisoners of war.-

ae continues in his conclusions that,

1. ·We have found no evidence of -cover-up· by DU.

2. It is aelf-evident that a larqe number of HIAs may never be

properly accounted for. Therefore, false hope should not be

offered to those seeking a total accounting of PM/MIA' s.

3.DIA holds info:z:mation that established the strong possibility of

American prisoners of war being held in Laos and Vietnam ••.

5 •••• major improvements .in procadurea and resources are required

for the OIA PM/KIA center to evaluate info.I3Dation properly .••

12.The OIA PW/KIA center i. organizationally misplaced and probably

viII perform better directly under the Director, n.ten.e

Intelligence Agency. 13.The JCRC forward field orqanization is woefully unde:caanned.

14. The govenmtent handling of the P1f/KIA issue is constantly

harassed by phonies and profiteers ... •

03/23/87 Bush to Perot Letter

Letter from then Vice President George Bush to Ross Perot J.a

reference to Perot's decision to get out ot the POW/KIA issue aDd

turn over all materials and. infomation he has to tM

administration. Excerpts .includes ·The President deterained that

Howard Baker would CAll you the other day, . • . I am sorry you f .. l

you have had less thAn full cooperation; but I do understand your

APPBRDII 5 - page 13

893

deciaion, • • . to -get out of it· and have to the n ew negotiator.. .. convey whatever int'oJ:JlWltion you

• ••• The admdnistration will front burner. We can d'o';"'o les~n~u~oitkeep this iaaue on the

to those who served. . -0'/08/87

Letter from Ross Perot to titan .

the POW/MIA issue. Be diseu88e~!d~tdin' Ronald Reagan reqardinq n ga .

- l.We left POWs behind at th

2 . we knew we were leaving me: ~~ the war in Vietnam.

3 . The men left behind • 4 . The evidence that menwere held in Laos.

7. In April, 1973, the o.;:'X:e ~ld in Laos ie substantiaL .•

th~re were no more living Amer~t publ.icly declared -- that

Aal.a •• • this was done at a time wh being held in Southeast

{and Probably in Cambodia and Vi ~ we Jcnew we had left men in Laos

9 . It i8 unrealistic to att team) • ••

11 . The re ill only one real~J.c a milJ.tary ABcue of the •• __ men

men -- through negotiation. way to gain the release of the •..

l2.Several months ago I t' , recommended. appointin

nego ~ator . .• General Vessey i. an 11 g a Presidential axce ant choice .. .

25 . The prinCipal Obstacle in ob since the end of the war has ~ininq the release of these men __

through by our government ChOO8~lACk of diligence and follov­

stature, giving him a broad miasio 9 a man of General Veasey ' s

resources he needs, and havin hha n, supporting him With whatever

strongest POSsible approach t; gatn!:port d.i.rectly to you is the g the release of these men.

Xessage 91922, 13 Mar 67 Chief of Staff/ ' from Lieutenant General Wade, Air Force

AF personnel will be re rted

death exiats, even thC:9h th:s ~ll~ if conclusive evidence of

conSist •••• of evidence so • emaas are not recovered and

any possibility of survival tron; ~ 80 convincing as to OV:Xbeax

:rsts, the member is reported·~. mi.ssf: such overwhelming Proof

this status unless and. 9 in action and is Carried

becomes available If until conclUSive evidence of death

COuld have surviv~' ~ ac~a. ~S~ihilit:r exists . . . that a. member

action . • n, e IDUst be reported. as missing in

APPDDU 5 - Page 14

894

Appendix 6

Selected Excerpts from Hearing Testimony

895

u.s. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

Hearing: AdmjnjAtration's Oyeryiew

Tuesday, November 5, 1991 at 9:30 a.m. Room 21£, Hart Senate Building

PANEL 1: Paul Wolfowitz Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

PANEL 2: Gen. John W. Vessey, U.S. Army (Retired) Special Presidential Emissary to Vietnam for POWIMJA Matters

PANEL 3: Duane P. Andrew. Assistant Defense Secretary for

Command, Communications, Control, and Intelligence

PANEL 4: Ken QuiDn Cbairman of the POW/MIA Interagency Group and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

East Asian and Pacific Affairs

PANEL 5: Carl W. Ford, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

MlQor General Michael E. Ryan, U.S. Air Force, Vice Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), The Joint Staff

MlQor General George R. Christmas, U.S. Marine Corps, Director of Operations (J -3), Pacific Command

PANEL 6: DeDDia Nagy, Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Robert Sheetz, Chief of the Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, Defense Intelligence Agency

CharI ... F. Trowbridge, Jr., Deputy, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, Defense Intelligence Agency

/

896

<YC'T""'" co~nEE ON POw/MIA AFFAIRS U.s. SENATE ~~ ,..,.~

• U.s Effortll to Find Welpe Soldiei'B HrmPG __ '_ -

Wednesday, November 6, 1991 ~t .10 a.m. Room 216, Hart Senate Building

pANEL 1: Operations on the Ground

GarDett E. Ben. Chief, U.S. Office for POW /MlA, Hanoi

Gad Jr U S Joint Casualty Resolution· William B.. Our)',·,·· Leos, Joint Casualty Resolution Center

CoL John Cole, I)ireetor, Stoney Beach, Thailand Defense Intelligence Agency

PANEL 2: Families' Perspectives

Ann Mills Griftlths, Executive I)ireetor, National League of Families

Dolores Apodaca AlfoncJ... ~ational Chairperson, National Alliance of Families

Dr. Patricia O'Grady and Robert Apodaca, Vessey Discrepancy Cases

PANEL 3: Veterans' Perspectives

Robert E. Wallace, National Commander, Veterans of Foreign Wars

John F. SoJDllU!l", Jr., Executive I)ireetor, ADlerican Legion

Joseph E. Andry, former National Commander, Disabled ADlerican Veterans

Bill Duker, Chairman, pOV!iMlA Committee, Vietnam Veterans of ADlenca

J Thomas Burch. Chairman, ., National Vietnam Veterans Coalition

897

u.s. SENATE SELECT COMMITl'EE ON POWIMIA AFFAIRS

Hearing; Critics' ~yes

Thursday, November 7, 1991 at 9:30 a.m. Room 216, Hart Senate Building

PANEL 1: Bui Tin, Vietoamese Defector and former Communiat Party member and editor

PANEL 2: Senate Foreign Relations Committee Republican Staff Report on U.S. Policy toward POW. and MIAs

PANEL 2: Gen. Eugene Tighe,U.S. Anny (Retired) [tentative] Former Director of the Defense lntelligence Agency

CoL MIllard Peek, U.S. Anny (Retired) [tentative] Former Chief of the Special Office for POW/MlA at the Defense lntelligence Agency

PANEL 3: Mouica Jenaen-SteveDllOD, author, Kjss the BoH Goodbye

Nicel Cawthorne, author, The Bamboo Cage

PANEL 4: Jeff Donahue, author, POWIMIA Timeline and MIA relative

Ted Sampley. Homecoming IT Project U.S. Veterans News

PANEL 5: Recently Publicized Photo.

Jack Bailey (Carr case)

Hamilton Gayden (Borah case)

Albro L. Lundy m, Barbara Robertson, Gladya F1eckenatein (LundylRobertsoniStevens case)

PANEL 6: Administration response

[After the conclusion of testimony from the final panel, the Administration will have an opportunity to respond to Senators' questions. The Department of Defense team will be led by Carl Ford].

Select Committee on

POW/MIA FOR IMMEDlA'IE RELEASE January 15, 1992

898

.ktII F. Klny, ~ QwinwI Bob ~ New ~ 'fIceOWnWl

Affairs -,,-,--­_c._~ __ 1_ eo.o.. _ CWIooI

CONTACT: Deborah DeYoung 2(J2J 224-2075

FORMER U.S. IN'fELUGENCE ANALYSTS TO TESDFY IAN. 22

ABOUT POWs ALLEGEDLY HELD AFrER TIlE VIETNAM WAR

WASHINGTON - The Select Committee on POW/MlA Affails will hear charges that American POWs were held after the Vietnam War ended. Chairman John F. Kerry, D·Mass., and Vice Chairman Bob Smith, R-NH, announced today.

The hearing on Wednesday, Jan. 22 begins at 11:30 a.m. in Room 106, Dirksen Senate Office Building.

Two former National Security Agency analysts will testify about tracing American POWs in Southeast Asia - and possibly to the USSR -after the Vietnam War. The witnesses are Jerry Mooney, of Wolf Point, Montana, and Terrell Minarcin, of Tacoma, Washington.

The former KGB head of foreign counterespionage, Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin, has said that Soviets interrogated American POWs in Vietnam as late as 1978 - five years after the war ended. Kalugin will testify Tuesday. Jan. 21 at 2:30 p.m. In Room 216, Hart Senate OM .. BuDding. .

At the Committee's first round of hearings in November, Bui Tm. a former top North Vietnamese official testified that Soviets interrogated U.S. servicemen in Vietnam during the war. The Pentagon contends that no American POW, who returned at Operation Homecoming reported being interrogated by Soviets.

899

SENATE SELECI' COMMIllEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

June 24, 1992

Panel 1: An Overview of Wartime Casualty Accounting 1961-73

Robert SungeDis, Chief Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports, Office of Secretary of Defense, 1973-1992

Charles Trnwhridge, Deputy Director Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Office for POW/MlA Affairs, 1971-1992

Senior Service Casualty Officen CoL Michael SpinellO, U.s. Army Brig. GeD. Michael McGinty, U.s. Air Force Capt. Peggy Debien, U.s. Navy Col. AA Quebodeaux, U.s. Marine Corps

Representative, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Panel 2: Accounting Ef'forts During Operation Homecoming, January - June, 1973

Robert SungeDis, Chief Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports, Office of Secretary of Defense, 1973-1992

Charles Trnwhridge, Deputy Director Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Office for POW/MlA Affairs, 1971-1992

AdmiraI Thomas Moorer (USN, Ret.). Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1971-1975

Lt. General Eugene Tighe. Director Defense Intelligence Agency 1977-1981, and Ch,ef of Intelligence at CINCPAC, 1m-1m

900

SENATE SELECI' COMMII lEE ON POW/MlA AFFAIRS

June 2S,lm

Panel 1: POW/MlA Accounting 1973-1m

DT. Roger E. Shields, Deputy Assistant Secretazy

for International Economic and POWJMIA Affairs, Defense Department 1971-1977

Robert SungeDis, Chief Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports,

Office of Sectetazy of Defense, 1973-1992

Charles Trowbridge, Deputy Director

Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Office for POW/MlA Affairs, 1971-1992

Frank Sieverts, Special Assistant for POW/MlA Matte",

Department of State, 1966-1978

Gen. Robert Kingston (USA ReL), Commander,

Jamt Casualty Resolution Center, 1973-1974

Michael Olaenberg. Staff National Security Council, 1976-1978

Panel 2: Status of Current Efforts to Account for POWJMIAs

Gen. John Vessey, (USA, ReL)

President', Special Emissary to Hanoi on POW/MlA Affairs;

and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1982-1986

Maj. Gen. George R. Christmas (USMC), Director

of Operations, U.s. Pacific Command

Bob Sheetz, Chief Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Office for POW/MlA Affairs

Robert SungeDis, Chief Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports, Office of Secretazy of Defense, 1973-1992

Senior Service Casualty Officers

901

AUGUST 11. 1m H. Ross Perot

Hany McKillop, Perot Associate (1969-present)

Murphy Martin,

Perot Associate (1969-1973)

Thomas Meurer Perot Associate (1969-1973)

McMurtrie Godley,

US Ambassador to Laos, 1969-1973

James Murphy, Aide to Ambassador Godley

Oosed Session CIA Station Chiefin Laos

AUGUST 12 199~

LTG Leonard Perroots DIA Director, 1985-1988

Richard Childress Nat'l Security Co~cil (Reagan Administration)

Richard Armitage, Defense Department (Reagan Administration)

Sen. Howard Baker

White House Chief 'Of Staff 1987-1989

James Cannon Deputy to Baker 1987

902

SENATE SELECI' coMMJITEE ON POW{MJA AFFAIRS

September 21. 1992 ~ 8:30 • m Paris Peace ~tNHOttation5 for POW!MIAs

Panel I : CentrollBteJH&eBce AgeDq's Input

James II. SchIeslJller Director, Centnlllnte1ligence Agency, 1913 Secretary of Defense, 1913-1914

Pancll: State and Def ..... Departments' Input

Melvin II. Laird Secretary of Defense, 1969·1913

WIlliam P. Ro&<n Secretary of State, 1969-1973

Pancl3: u.s. NegotlaliB& Teom

Wmston Lord National Security Council, 1969-1973 . Special Assistant to National Security Adviser, 191()'1973 977 Director of Policy planning at State Department, 1973·1

Goo"e H. Aldrich Legal Adviser to State Department, 1965·1981

Pe .. r W. Rodman Staff, National Security Council, 1969-1977

Vernon A. Walters 912 1916 Deputy Director, Centnll Intelligence Agency, 1 -

William H. sum .... Ambassador 10 Laos, 1%4-1968 Chief of US. Mission to Laos, i968-;96~t Asian and Pacific AffairS, Deputy Assistant Secretary of tate or

Natio--' Security Cotmci1/DOD Efforts thrOUIh Jm Paocl4: ~

Ge ... Alexander M. Hal&. J~. (US~ Rd.1969-1973

Assistant 10 Nabonal Secunty Adviser, White House Chief of Staff, 1913-1914

903

Dr. Bemy A. Kissinger National Security Adviser, 1969-1915 Secretary of State, 1913-1977 •

E:r:pec:tatiODS about POW, in laos

Admiral Thomu Moorer (USN, Rd.) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 191(}'1914

G. McMnrtrie Godley Ambassador 10 Laos, 1969-1973

John H. BoldricIJe Assistant Secretary of State, East Asia and the Pacific 19 -1983 China Specialist, State Department 1948-1985 -

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy (Ret., USN) (Thursday, Panel 1) Dep. Director for Intelligence Community, CIA, 1977-1980

Laos Questions

Maj. Ge ... Richard Secord Laos auef of Air, Centnlllnte1ligenco Agency. 1966-1968 Laos Desk Officer, Defense Department, 1m-I915

Elliot 1. Richardson Secretary of Defense, 1913

Four-Party Joint MIlitary CollUlllssioU; Questions Rell1llinlng aIIer Operation BomecolDin&

Gov. William Oements Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1973-1916

Dr. Ro&er E. Shields Deputy Assl. Secretary for Internat1 Economic & POWJMIA Affairs, Defense Department 1971-1977

CoL La ...... ce Robson (USAF, Rd.) POW Subcommission of Four-Party Joint Military Commission

904

Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

November 10, 1m

Panel Oat:

Alan Ptak Deputy Assistant ScaetaIy of Defense for POWJMIAAffairs

Charles Kartman Director, Office of Korean Affairs, State Department

Lt. Col. James Caswell Joint Staff, Defense Department

Dr. Paul Cole Researcher, Rand Corporation

Panel Two

Lt. CoL Philip Cone (USA, ReL) National Security Council Staff, Eisenhower AdmiDistration

Serban Opricka Former engineer in North Korea

Col. Delk. Simpson (USAF, ReL) Former militaIy attache in Hong Kong

Steve K1ba . Former Korean War POW held in China

ranel1bree

James Sanden and Mark Sauter Authors, SoIdien of Misfortune

John M.G .. Brown Author, MIW'9W Bound

Thomas Ashworth Researcher

Richard Boylan ArchiYis~ National Archives

905

Seaate SeIec:t Commi_ ... POW/MIA _

N ....... berll,Im

I'!!!e! Ope: Russan Delegation to the .Joint Commission

GeD. Dimitri Volkogonov (Ret.) MilitaIy Adviser to President Boris Yeltsin and Co-auoirman of the U.s.-Russia Joint Commission

Doel Two: [Other memhen of the Russian delegation, if available)

Dnel 'J'hm: U.s. Delegation to Joint Commission

Richard D. Kauzlarich Assistant Scaetary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Maj. GeD. Bemard LoeIIke OIie~ Tuk Force Russia

Ai Graham Select Committee lnvestigator posted to Mosonw since May

Pane! Four; Family Members

Dolores Alfond

Bruce W. Sanderson

Greg Skavinsld

Jane ReynOlds Howard

906

SelUlte Select CommIuee on POW/MlA Alrairs

December 1, 1992

Panel One: IDterpal ReYiews of DJA

John H. Wiand Head of February 1983 Inspector General investigation

Ken deGraffenreid NSC Staff, author of report on DIA to

National Seeurity Adviser in 1983-84

Col. Glenn F. Hargis, Head of February 1985 Inspector General investigation

Dennis M. Nagy, Head of March 1985 Inspector General investigation

Cdr. Thomas Brooks, Author of Sept 25, 1985 Memorandum

Col. Kimball Gaines, Head of Gaines Task Force

(Report issued March 1986)

Gen. Eugene Tighe, Head of Tighe Commission (Report issued May 1986)

Col. Millard Peck, Author of January 1992 Letter

Panel Two: D"', Respopse to Cd.

U Gen. Leonard Perroots, Director of DIA, 1985-88

Richard Qilldress, National Seeurity Council (Reagan Administration)

Ronald J. Knecht Defense Department

Gen. James Williams, former Director, DIA

Col. Joseph Schlatter, Member of Gaines Task Force;

Chief of Analysis Branch, 198&-87; and Chief PQW/MIA Office at DIA,

Gen. James aapper, Director, DIA

Panel Three; Interaeency Group

Ann Mills Griffiths, National League of Families

RichardQilldreu, National Seeurity Council

Kenneth Quinn, State Department

Robert Sheetz, Defense Department

Carl Ford, Assistant Secretary for Defense

907

Seaate Select Committee OD POW/MlA AJraln

Ile<ember 2, 1992

line. Ope: Public Awareness Activities

Patty Sheridan RiYer Rats (of Kansas)

Marty Eddy,

POW Committee of Michigan

John Sommer, American Legion

Bill Duker, Yletnam Veterans of America

JoAnn Shaw, Geo.p POW Committee

hie! Two; f'lmd!!fsinc Ac!IYiti ..

Bruce Eberle and Unda Canada Broce Eberle &: Associates

MariJyn Price, <:realM Advantage

Jcoeph SaJta, Response Development

101m Curtis, lDrocision Manaaemeut

Pa~e! Three: RegulatloD or Fuodraising ActiVities

Ken Albrecht,

National Charities Information Bureau

Charles Browa, Charitable Trusts Division, NC

Richard Allen,

National Ag'o of Attorneys General

908

SeDate Select Committee on POW/MlA AmlIrs

December 3, 1992

Panel One

Admiral James and Sybil Stockdale

Panel Two: POWIMIA Wives

Donnie Collins (VA)

Janis Dodge Otis (CA)

Carol Hrdlicka (CO)

Panel Three: Other Family Memben

John Kustigian (MA)

Pat Plumadore (NY)

David and Steve Morrissey (AZ)

Robert Brown (CA)

Panel Four. Casualty omcers

George Atkinson, USAF Casualty Affair.;

BJ. Andrews, DoD Family Liaison

David Geraldson Fonner Casualty Officer

Lt. Col Mack Brooks, US. Total AnDy Personnel Command

909

SeDate Select Committee on POW/MIA AmlIrs

December 4, 1m

lIpel QDe

General John Vessey, Special Presidential Emissary to Vietnam

f!Pd Two

Adntiral Charles Larson, Commander in Oticf, Pacific Forces

Maj. Gen. Thomas Needham, aue~ Joint Task Force-Full Aeeounting (ITF-FA)

Maj. Gen. George Ouistmas, CINCP ACs Director of Operations

b lTh ....

Alan Ptak, Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/MIA Affairs, Defense Department

Kenneth Quinn, Department of State

Carl Ford, Assistant Secretary for Defense

Col. John Cole, Defense Intelligence Agency

Robert Sheetz, Defense Intelligence Agency

Robert DeStatte, Defense Intelligence Agency

Ted Schweitzer, Researcher

Garnett Bell, Investigator, ITF.FA

William Gadoury, lnvestigator, ITF-FA

MSGT Bill Deeter, Investigator, JTF-FA

Accounting . Left Behind

Accounting . Left Behind

Accounting . Left Behind

Admiral Stockdale 12/ 03 / 92

Admiral Stockdale 12 / 03 / 9:2

Admiral Stockdale 12/ 03 / 9:i

910

Chairman Kerry: Based aD that concept of morality that you have heen driven by and. the entire process that you felt drove all of you that you would come back t09'ether speaking to us today, to a matter of moral certainty in your heart and under oath, do you believe that you left anybody behind or that anybody was alive?

No. I would not

It was the Son Tay Raid of November 1970 that prompted the NOrth Vietnamese to bring them all - . all of these chickens out in the satellite camps back, all back to Hoala Prison, where in January 1971 every American prisoner' - with two exceptions whiCh I'll cover in a minute - - where every American prisoner who had ever been Sighted. whispered to, tapped to by any other American over the last 6-1/2 years were all locked up in a ring of contiquous larqe cell blocks around the largest of Koala

Pound in those dungeons .. all of this activity found in those dunqeons. a meaning of life centered on being your brother's keeper emerged. keeping a memorialized chronoloqy of contacts and acquaintances that could some day . God willing. when papers and pencil. were available. allow you to present to the world a history, in the wer . t case. of who was last known to be

Accounting Admiral StOCkdale 12/ 03 / 92

Andry 11/ 06 / 91

911

And then there's a kind of an unreal·· as we ' ve come I

ff~ century, we've becO:eonq in this

s~ous ... where we believe that

an aPOl~OW:d u: an expl~ tion and is not i payback 1f Sanething Start qu te right. And when YOU seen aIilking about warriors last Go ve, never being . • that th

vernment owes yoU a blow.b bl e ~~s~r~Ption of wha t happened Y ~o ~em thei~l.~ about either their dem1se or a war inS~f~~esstb there's never been COuld do that.ry at any government

To say tlutt the Government owes us explanation for what happened to a an

~~ ~~tra~ilast seen alive out on h e eld . can anybody see ~rafna:t~~S8ible reality? At night avalanch • people get buried under thi es. There's any number of hiS~~~~hat have happened over

an unrealistic goal cooked uP. and now it.s

Mr. Chairmen, let me say we don ' t ~ect this committee t o take on nussion impossible by trying to ~~ount for every Single POW or MIA

Shou~~ :0 believe that every effort' e made to determine why the

Governm~t has been unable to do a ~oeltdt~r Job of accountinq for theSe

l.ers. Furthermo should b re, every effort

1 e made to determine what pans our has made to

situation

APPENDIX 6

Account inq

Accounting -Left Behind

Account i nq KIA/ 8NR

Accounting

Bell 12 / 04 / 92

Be ll 11/ 06 / 91

Brooks 12 /01/ 92

OUUnbers 08 / 04 / 92

912

. .. we're not talkinq about one man being the only one privy to this information, we're talking about hundreds of thousands of analysts at the time of intercept having access to the same information that Mr . Mooney saw and that Mr . Minarsin aaw.

And they have all reached the same conclusion, that just never happened that there is no indication that •

Singled out based on c rew status. based on their capability or their

as MOscow-bound, - and this Is , as I time that it ' s been for

We had information of Americans beiDCJ held at that time [after Operation Homecomdnq). sir , but it was not correlated to any specific individual.

I. too. have wondered why some cases were left MIA when all good. in my estimation, evidence suggested that the person never survived the plane crash, bailing out of the aircraft, whatever the situation happened to

As I have explained, our analysis sets an upper l~t on the number of MIAs who could possibly be PONs. It does not suggest that there are POW., or that any PeWs were in fact held past the time of Operation Homecoming . What we are talking about here are those MIAs who potentially could bave survived. do not knOw if they su.zvived. I cannot overemphasize this

Accounting aA-BRR

Chambers 08 / 04 / 92

Chambers 08 / 04 / 92

Chambers 08 / 04 / 92

913

The Defense :Intelligence we were just discussi Aq~cy, as 2,266 cases to identi~,~v1eWed all who bad the best chane! f se people 8urvival •• . However i or of the 10S8 ineid~tour nvestigation not all of the 1 171s reVealed that candidates for s~rv were likely have cases where i :val •. • We also individual's tate ~ O~tion on an

evidence of their ~:t~i:dia~i These are the most di ffi ing .. • because it is a1most i_CUlit cases , know where t b i ss ble to unles8 more ~nf~tin ibnvestigation available. on ecomes

In some of the 1 171 the individual dido' teases : we know thOugh he wasn't surv1ve, even action by his killed in Mr. Sheetz I think cases where all

of an individual~~w;.;r;.~;~~;~~~~· sheer f orce of an ".n"".y. there are

This leaves us with 100 to 125 Sir, the 269 total are the . • . individuals who were likely candid~tes for survival and POssible

but wi thin that sub .

~'·bdtihaffiCUlt task of identifying who ve survived and i

prisoner after the ~ar brema ned a before priso ' egan even Operation H~~ereirelea8ed durinq continues ted n9 n 1973 and una ay· • • the total 2 266

cCOunted for · , killed in 1 , 095 were

,171

APPENDIX 6

Accounting XIA/BNR

Accounting

Chambers 08/04/92

Cheney 11 / 05/91

914

As sbown here. the 269 individuals tor priority investigation are drawn from Vietnam. Laos. and cambodia, and have been the focus of our field investigations that began in vietnam in September of 1988 ..• However, not all 269 individuals are likely candidates for survival and possible captivity •.. Based on our field activities in Vietnam, 61 of these people are known to have died. An

additional 78 cannot be considered as possible POW candidates for one of the following reasons:

They are known to have died but happen t o have been lost in the same incident with a last-known-alive person.

They are known to have died in captivity. but are incorporated 4S priority cases because at one time they were carried by their respective services as a POW or they do not meet the criteria for a last known alive desiqnation but are included as discrepancy cases because we believe the Indochinese Governments are withholdinq information concerning their fate.

And finally , there are remains still under analysis at the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii that we expect will lower this number further once they are identified.

There are also several cases where we have information that points stronqlY but not conclusively to death at the time of loss. loss.

I feel we ever been to

Accounting XIA/BNR Clapper

08/04/92

915

... I need to mak the determinat1~ c:ear as well that whether someone Iso status as to not totally an inte~~ilS not KIA 1s There are oth qence call.

and obViouslye~~tt~~f r~ay in t~1s, next-of-kin WOUld e famdl1es or

~f ca~eqOrizatio~e~;sfa~i~y accept 1 ed ~n action body' were

• not reCovered.

Chainnan Kerry. W 1 you know fl' e 1. I'm trOubled sUff1ci~t ~v~~' if there isn't '

KIA list, tbey ~~~~tt~ fut them on a mean, this is part f e onq on it. I

much controversy to °th~haf lends so ~s ssue.

APPENDIX 6

Accountinq Left Behind

Clements 09/24/92

916

Chairman Kerry: Let me ask this question. Governor. in that second paragraph that you were just reading. this is a July document, correct?

Governor Clements: JUly the 17th.

Chairman ~erry: And you said in that document of this number, 67 are officially listed as prisoner of war.

Governor Clements: They are officially listed as prisoner of war based on information that they reached the ground safely and were captured.

Chainman Kerry: COrrect. That is exactly the point I want to make. .

You have 67 people in July that you have recorded as on the ground and captured.

Governor Clements: That' s riqht.

Chairman Kerry: Last known alive captured. correct?

Governor Clements: That is correct.

Chairman Kerry: Seems to me that is an indication you have people alive in Southeast Asia .

Accounting . Clements Status Changes 09 / 24 / 92

917

Chairman Kerry- Ha the ratio . Y I ask YOU what be a nale was. and there may well

. very gOOd one, but what

~~~~~:~1!;;~~~~~.l~!·s!~~~~!~T:: did You BUddenlynha;e ~~~~k!t~ Why reviews? ese

Governor Clements; This was most delicate Situation. The~st. some very legitimate reasons andwere

cases for Changing of Status ....

~irman Kerry: So if there was a eqitimate reason for Somebody t b

made POW by did 0 e and be thewarb't you have to step in

l. er of that?

~V~~~i~:~ti:th~ti~ f: !~!ng understandable situation th ry all kinds of nuances to tbis ere were

particular question.

APPENDIX 6

Accountinq Status Changes

Accountinq . Shields Statement

Clements 09/24 / 92

Clements 09/24/92

918

Chairman Kerry: ..• Approximately how many cases, individual cases , do you remember being brouqht to your i attention after Homecoming, that s for reclassifica t ion?

Clements: Well, quite a few. And for me to put a number on it would be very difficult.

Chairman Kerry: Was it more of the maqnitude of five or 100? can you

· v us some idea of how many cases? ~U~d have brought to your attention. Not with any accuracy, was your d answer. Question: I'll und~rstan that it ' s just an approximat~~~ Answer: Over a four·year per 0 75

could easily have been 5 or ~:!: that were investigated in·depth that would have been brought to my attention.

So the range was 5 to 100'iYOU lot ' 50 t 7S Now that s a

picked t~t ~tentiallY the service ~!c~~:~ sent to you sayinq we~ant to reclassify this pers~ as :hat . If it had been left to em, t person would have been. It waS no

f them You had taken over ~~a~ ;~thority. The result was none were.

There was never any diSOU8SiODtOfn ~~9ument between us that statemen all likelihood probably was true.

Chairman Kerry; dead.

Tha t they were all

Governor Clements: probably and in all dead.

That they likelihood were

Chairman Kerry: was that the prevailing attitude at DoD?

Governor Clements: Absolutely ..•

APPENDIX ,

ACCounting Clements Status Changes 09n4 / 92

Accounting Clements Shields 09 / 24 / 92 Statement

ACcountinq Clements Status Changes 09 / 24 / 92

ACcounting . Clements Status Changes 09/24 / 92

919

Governor Clements: I Want to correct ODe thing there. I did not take over that authority, and my actions in this reqard were strictly on a review ~sis ...

Chairman Kerry: You used the word review, but when the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Acting Secretary at some periods of time, says, I want a memo sent to all departments that any reclassification from MIA to POW must first be cleared by me, that is a clearance. MIA to KIA is OK within each service. So it was OK to take MIA and PUt them into ICIA, kill them off. But do not make them prisoners. I have got to see it. And nothing happened. Nobody was made a prisoner.

WI don't think there's any QUestion at all that I said . . not in those exact words, but I said that in all likelihood those people over there are Probably dead ...•

Vice Chairman Smith: .•. Why did you, Governor Clements, make a deCision to not allow YOur service secretaries, which as far as I know has never happened before and has not happened since .. to not allow your service seCretaries to Upgrade an individual from an MIA category to a POW cateqory? Why did you make that deciSion?

Governor Clements: tha t I made such a I don't think

deCision. Vice Chairman Smith: Governor. I have qot it in your own handwriting ••• 'I want a memo sent to all departments, services. ASD, DrA, JCS, that any reClassification from MIA to POw muSt first be cleared by me'·me.' That is what YOU said.

APPENDIX 6

AccountiDq -Status Charl08a

Cl.ernenta 09/24/92

920

Governor ClementS: I have no recollection of making a decision of that kind. Let me tell you somethiDq. senator, it i8 vary. very clear that only classification can be changed within the services. And let'S don't qet that confused .

vice Ola,irman smith: • I request that aU actions which reccmrwmd reclassification of military personnel from mi8siDq in action to captured status be submitted to me for approval . proposed reclassification action sboU1d be first routed thrcuqh the ASsistant secretary of Defense for a preliminary review before referral to me . ' That was JUne 8th. 1973.

APPENDIX ,

Accountinq . NiXOIl Statement

Daschle 09/21 / 92

921

From my perspective. and listeninq to the data and reading the ~ents. there was a sea change attitude immediately followinq the President's assertion that everybody bas now cc:me bane.

sven somebody with your credibili ty and dedication and determdnation, for whatever reason, even though you were in the White Hou.e and obviously assigned to a different responsibility, chose not to raise the issue, in spite of the fact that you did feel strongly about it and took the actions that you have so capably described. this morning. But you did not raise the issue . NO one raised. the issue, apparently, inside the Government after the President made his assertion in March of 1973.

And I quess I would just like you, if you could, to describe what it was, with all of those who felt as strongly as you did, that this was no longer a time within which to raise the issue, and wa are qoing to put it behind us.

All I am askinq .. and I do not mean it to be in any wayan accusa tory question. I just would like you to describe the atmosphere that apparently permeated the White House and the administration in June when you arrived, re-arrived, about this isaue? Why was it such that no one chose to challenge the President's statement and recharactarize it in a way that would be leS8 positive, aa you described it?

Laird: I Senator. sc:methinq

cannot explain that, I believe that that's you should pursue.

APPENDIX 6

922 923

Accountinq Daschle ••• you miqht as well have been in two 06/24 / 92 different countries tryi nq to look

into this thinq. for as 11 ttla cooperation and coordinatio~ that there was.

Accountinq . Dole Thouqh without suqqestinq that it is Left Behind 09 / 24 / 92 the intent of the committee, there ia

certainly a fact of life that the media is reportinq your work as a kind of who shot John exercise . The headlines are all full of finqer-pointinq about, quote. who abandoned, unquote. our POW/ MIAS 'I about who 1s to blame for the situation where too little was done for too loD9; and tryinq to find out the truth about the fate of our POWs and MIAs.

Accountinq Duker ... 1 don't know that I'll ever be 12 / 02 / 92 totally satisfied that the resolution

is there personally. I do believe a

Accounting Godley This is an important distinction. 09 / 24 / 92 Th~ ~s were men in aircraft , pr1nc1pally, shot down. They were carried as MIAs until they were either reported as POWs or their qraves were l ocated, or a larqe number o f their wing men or other aircraft in the air at that time reported shot or downed in flames.

Accounting Grassley With?ut this statement. that the Nixon Statement 06 / 25 / 92 Preudent made and o f course those attendant fOllow-on POlicy decisions there . is absolutely no electrifying ' con~11ct. People are i ncensed. I d?n t suppose people are incensed w1th bureaucratic incompetence. they have. learned to handle that. but they are 1ncen~ed . because of the deception around th1S 1Ssue. deception by our own government.

beginninq would be, though. to • - at least for every American ~t was last knOwn alive or last known alive in captivity, if we could resolve every one of those cases that would at least be a beqinninq towards comdng to some kind of an accounting.

Accounting Grassley •.. the Paris Peace Accords hearings 10/ 15/ 92 qave the l i ve-siqhtinq reports a context, a plausibility quotient . In my vi ew, we must revisit this issue before our work is complete . and we must certainly qet a response on the discrepancies.

Accounting - Pord I have not seen anything that would Left Behind 1l/ 15/ 91 convince me that there are not some

Americans still alive •• . how many, I'm not sure, but I think that the reports suggest that there was one for sure, that the Vietnamese didn't tell us about until much later. That was one, but there are also some , reports sugqestinq that people miqht have been alive we didn't know about. We didn't know where they were . - and they probably died afterwards .

• • . As we accumulate evidence and as we qo throuqh that p~es8, we are able to beqin to piece t09'ether a little bit better what happened back in 1972, or 1973 , or 1975. and the evidence. as we accumulate it. more and more sugqests that there are probably some left alive in 1973.

APPENDIX 6 APPENDIX 6

924 925

Accounting . Grassley presently. there are 1.l78 military personnel who are unaccounted for as comptroller's 09/24/92 a result of the hostilities in Records Southeast Asia. Of this number. 67 are officially listed as prisoner of war based on information that they reached the ground safely and were captured. NOw. that is from Cl~ts to President Nixon. And that 15 on. I believe. the 17th of July. 1973. Now. the point tha~ I want to rais e and that I would ll.ke to have you respond to is, as I see it, the bottom line is that we may not have known with 100 percent certitude that these men were prisoners. But it seems to me that we sure as heck believed that to be the case, to the point that we would list them as current captured.. We believed it to the point that we had a list entitled .. CUrrent captured." An~. at the least, it seems to me, ~16 information conflicted w1th both the Nixon statement on March the 29th and the Shields statement on April the

ACcounting - Kerrey MY own belief is that a full Status Ol.anges 09/'22/92 accounting of our people will not

occur until the Vietnamese Government itself is accountable to its own people. This is a Government that has lied to its people ever since they seized illegitimate power in 1975. They have continued to lie and mdsrepresent facts to their own people.

Accounting Kerrey It is very important for us to try to 09/24/92 figure out what we are going to do

today. Dot [just] what we should have done 20 years a90.

Accounting . Kerry So there is certainly that measure of Left Behind 06/25/92 information that we have received.

There are other acknowledgments that I think are not insiqnificant; acknowledgements that we are not really dealing with a universe of 2.266, (that] it is smaller.

In fact the commcittee. through its exhaustive review. suggest that somewhere in the vicinity, in 1973.

14th. of 244 is a reasonable number, mdnus

Accounting Grass!ey I have got in front of me documents that are entitled number of comptroller'S 09/24/92 casualties incurred by u.~. military

Records personnel in connection w1th the conflict in Vietnam. And the bottom line has a figure that is current captured. And I do not know whether they are daily or weekly reports. but probably weekly reports. on March the 31st, 1973, there are 81 listed~ 7 April, 73. 80; 14 April, 73, and that is the date that shields made his stat8m3nt that there are not any alive. We had 75. April 28th. 72.

those immediately dete~ned to have died in captivity. which leaves you somewhere in the vicinity of 133. which is close, as Vessey said, to the numbers he has come up with.

Accountinq Kerry Before Operation Homecoming. our Shields 09/22/92 officials in the military. and you in Statement the executive. expressed the

conviction that POWs were about to be left behind because the Laos list was incanplete. But after Operation Homecoming, the statements seemed to have shifted and been calibrated more towards putting people at ease, and urging an acceptance or encouraqinq the belief that the goal had been achieved.

APPENDIX , APPEmlIX 6

Accounting

Accounting Shields Statement

)terry 09/21/92

]Cerry 06/25/92

926

Clainnan }terry: President Nixon won in 1968 on a peace platform and indeed, no sooner was he elected than be began wi thdrawinq troops. OUr withdrawal was forestalled in 1968. Por four more years the war went On. More prisoners were created and finally, we neqotiated with the recoqnition that the country was fed up and SOuth Vietnam was to either stand alone or fall alone with enormous military support, I might add, from us .••

We are here 20 years later trying to understand in the dynamics of where we got to, whether or not we qot our prisoners out or not ••. lt was not us who stated that we do not have all our prisoners back, that was in memos that your colleagues in Government created.

The families, however. knew this and for 20 years they have sought an honest accounting from us. so we are here today to do tlul t and I am sure you are sympathetic to that.

Dr. Shields. do you not think that it is a little disingenuous to stand up before the Nation and have a policy announced that says we have no indication that there are any Americans alive when you know people are carried as POW and have nothing to suggest they are dead?

Why did you not say, -You knov. we have qat 244 questions. We have got people we list as pow. and we do not know,- instead of sayinq, -There are no indications that anybody is alive . - Because the last thinq you knew was that they were alive .

Accounting • Left Behind

ACcounting

Accounting Hixon Statement

Kerry 09/24192

Kerry 06/25/92

'e= 09/24/92

927

Evidence was available to American policy makers in 1973 that saae POWs might have been alive. Clearly. there were people listed as POW who did not return. That does not mean that they were alive. It also does not mean the converse; that they were dead.

What we did say unequivocally is that there were a body. a group of people listed as POW for whom there was a reason they were listed as pow. about whom we knew enough to call them POW. And we did not get an accounting at that time. And we had reason to believe that many of them were alive.

Well. I would say. AdDdral (Moorer). I think your effort to explain it that way is understandable and noble , but the fact is I read this morning a series of statements made by the President which did not refer to we are getting baCk the people on the list. it said all our prisoners are home.

• •• Secondly. on May 24th, in a speech to the POWs once they were all back, he said 1973 saw the return of all our prisoners of war. He did not say to them. we are still concerned. about some of your friends; we are going to pursue it. He said you are all back.

And in a speech on June 15th. he said that for the first time in eight years allot our prisoners are back, all our prisoners are home here in America. So I must say to you that the evidence is overwhelming to the committee that there is a gap between the stated public policy and between reality at that point in time.

APPENDIX 6

Accounting . Kerry Nixon Statement 09/24 / 92

Accounting Kerry Shields 06 / 25 / 92 Statement

928

It there were a clearer way tor the Ccm:Dander in Chief to send a messaqe to Hanoi, or to the Pathet Lao, or to the American public and to our defense and intelliqence officials that the active search tor a live American prisoner was at an end, I do not know what that mig'ht have been. Now, no question. there is reference after reference in these documents to our continued desire for a full accounting for those listed as missing. But nowhere is there a reference to a belief in the likelihood that live Americans might still be held.

(Tape) Question: 00 you think there still are POWs alive and well somewhere in either Laos or Cambodia? Answer: We have no indications at this time that there are any Americans alive in rndochina . (End tape)

Chairman Kerry: That was your statement at a press conference on the nth of April, 1973. We have no indications at this time that there are any Americans alive.

Now it is a fact, is it not, that as of Pebruary of 1973 you personally had information about an Be or an SO· 47 sbot down in Laos. and you believed. that four member s of that crew survived.. did you not?

APPENDIX ,

ACCounting . Xerry Nixon Statement 09 / 24 / 92

Accounting Xerry 11/ 15/ 91

929

So I frame that we have not got a full accounting in the context of haVing heard there is no evidence ~ anybody is sti ll alive, and my

iate next thought is , OX, that ~st mean we have got to find out who 1& dead or how they died .

The~e i& a huge difference. I mean I

am 1n poli~ic&. I understand what it means to g1ve a message. I remember those . d~ys too . I was riveted to the telev1s1on set the night the President said all the prisoners are coming home ... I thought they were all caning hane too.

I muSt tell you, and I thought I was pretty aware back then , I never knew what I am learning today. I never knew you guys had a list of people ~t you thouqht were still pr1soners . I never heard of it.

I am a little disappointed that you folks do not have at your fingertips those numbers and the ability to tell me , Senator. here is how many went down. Here is exactly how many were unaCCounted for.

APPENDnc 6

Accountinq

Accounting Nixon Statement

Kerry 06/25/92

Kerry 09/24/92

930

If you have evidence to show that somebOdy ouqht to be on a list. now is the time to come forward. But it is not sufficient for anybody to simply say ge8. it ouqht to be biqqer.

we are dealinq with reality .. And we have taken and put together 1~8t. from every possible list we have been able to find. subpoena. s~n. locate. uncover in the arch~ves. and there just are not any other lists. Moreover, there is a finite universe of people who went to vietnAm and either came back or did not. We know their names and we know the locations and the dates and times and we have records. And we are qoinq to deal with records. we are not 901n9 to deal with hypothesis, theory. supposition, fantasy, and ultimately even hope, no matter how deep that hope may be. We have to base this on reality. We all have hope. bu~ we are trying to figure out what 18 real here.

NoW I want to emphasize again that the'committee does not assert that every one of the names of the 133 were alive. We do not do that. We caMot do that. No one could do that. Qlairman Kerry: well, does that raise a question in your mind today as to whether they were, in fact, all herne on the March .-

Admiral Murphy: Well, yeah, if I'm looking at a piece of paper that says there are 67 of them left.

APpENDIX 6

Accounting Shields Statement

.'

Accounting -Nixon Statement

1 ;

:

I

I:

.

Keny 09/24/92

Kerry 09/21/92

931

.•. while there is truth to the statement that I could not say where so-and-so was specifically on this day, we d..ie! have evidence that individuals had been captured and that individuals were not returning. And I think that is the centerpiece of the quandary we find ourselves in 20 years later. That those families know tha t. and now the country knows that. Those families knew that for 20 years. We also have evidence that there were people within the mil! tary. and in the State Department and elsewhere, who believed that. The President mentioned the MIA issue in conjunction with a number of issues that were not meeting with full compliance •.. he did not personalize and raise the issue of noncaDpliance on POWs wi th the notion that we believe there were people that could be accounted for who were not being accounted for. There was just sort of this general sense of, well, MIAs are not being accounted for, which is distinct from the notion that you believe you have prisoners that were held and they have not returned. I think the Americans would have reacted, obviously, very differently to the latter than the former.

Secondly, his broader comment was not, we have gotten back all the prisoners that they have given us a list of. It was that all the prisoners have cerne home. So, there was a real distinction between what we knew or thOught we knew about prisoners versus MIA generically. And that is, I think. somethin9' that lingered.

APPENDIX 6

Accounting Kerry Nixon Statement 09 / 24 / 92

Accountinq comptroller's Records

Kerry 09 / 24 / 92

932

Chairman Kerry: You would aqree with me, Mr. Secretary, there is a distinction between someone listed as POW and someone listed as MIA.

Richardson : Definitely.

Chairman J:erry: And you would aqree with me, then , that the people listed as MIA, some of them did not come home, correct . . excuse me, people listed as pow, some did not come home, correct?

Richardson: Yes.

Chairman Kerry: Therefore , a statement that all POWs are home is also incorrect, is it not?

Richardson: Yes. This is a colloquy ... He could have rationalized it, I suppose , on tbe basis that all the ones we know of have been accounted for.

Chairman Kerry: You, in July, are still left with 67, by your own account. Now , you have already taken into account the people who came bac k and who died. Those briefinqs are several months prior. You are reportinq to the President, memorandum of the United States of America on 17 July, you folks yourselves are saying 67 are officially listed as prisoner of war, b~sed on information that they reached the qround safely and were captured . .. I do not want this to be contentious, but do you not see the problem here? If you have 67 people that the Secretary of Defense is telling the President are prisoners because they reaChed the ground and they were captured? Do you not understand why people say hey, wait a minute, there is a prisoner of war over there that we have no t gotten back?

APPENDIX 6

Accounting • XerTY Nixon Statement 09 / 24 / 92

Ii

Ii

Accounting _ <arTY Nixon Statement 09 / 22 / 92

933

And they are on the Ii

~1:~:~er8~p~~~:~de!nii ~t6~~i~~ Ma ch • you say by

r we had decided there were none i~ere. and yet people were atill ~ted as prisoners. So what was it

t allowed this decision to be made that just sort of -. wiped it aw ? ~t strikes me is that there wa:Y

~~ qroup that we believed were POWs otherS~:~~lfd off into a cateqory in n people's minds

to a sort of MIA ca teqory wi ~ t really having been aCCOunted fa U QUote. as POWs. r.

• - . we have found statements where the ~ident said we are still worried for ~e f~~l accountino. but it was hi .' e problem is there was

t 8 c118tinction drawn between MIAs and those that we believed were PaWs.

APPENDIX 6

935 934

ClementS)- NOW. I Accountinq - XerTY Chairman ~~o[~~e next critical

09 / 24 / 92 want to C thi as your Status Changes point . GOvernor. a :nd you talk memorandum of 17 July. 551558. pUbliC LaV 37 U.S . C. ~~ the service secr~t~rt:: are specifica~lY ~~~e~t:~~8 changes. responsib11i~t time this system haS YOU say at t

f t'vely to make statuS

been used ef ~Csinq in action. and chaDQ8S for ttU& he President. for you send over t~a~t sheet discussing some rea50~' a of the law, which the provis ons . ds the question of raises in our DUD t have been why the p r esident mi9~U8 changes . and interested in t~ staat a prior t~e, if be was. why d ~~ion personallY, had you made a ~itin9 . to requi~e ~e~~~ ~re~a~!8i;O~r~!~ ~~rst time to ~~9 NoW I understand change s y . • d1 q to your there wer! 50 -=_a~~~~e ~ere some 50 own depo81ti~n by the secretaries to to 75 requ.es s POW not as MIA, and list sanebodY as e ~y oDe of those, you did not approv correct?

1975 I testified Kingston on 19 November , COIIIJl,ittee ACcounting 06 / 25 / 92 before the House . sele~~eas~ Asia Lef~ Behind MiSsing pers~~s~~nl. I was also {MOntgomery es did you have of asked. hOW many cas alive in caPtivi~Y men that were seen rib equen~ ~o that bu~ not heard from 8 S knOW'

time? I replied. I ~~;Sked, can accurately. I was ny there were? I you es tima te haw ma replied, around 100.

i' When you were head of Kingston sen. Mcca n. any hard Accoun~in9 -06 / 25 / 92 the JCRe, did yOU ~~~ss::re alive? Left Behind evidence that M19r

Accounting . Kissinger On MarCh 29~h, Presiden~ Nixon Nixon Sta~ement 09 / 22 / 92 announced tha~ all of our American PaWs are on their way home. Accounting . Jtissinger If servicemen were kept by our Left Behind 09 / 22 / 92 enemies. ~here is one villain and one villain only; ~he cold-hearted rulers in Hanoi. Accoun~ing KiSSinger Bi~her people were known as Nixon Statemen~ 09{22 / 92 prisoners. or they were missing in

ac~ion. and ~herefore what Presiden~ Nixon conveyed was that thase we knew were prisoners were on their way home, and he also said those who were missing in action we were not satisfied with. and that was the state of our classification at the time.

Accounting . Kissinger Nor did any Administration know that Left Behind 09/22 / 92 there were live Americans kept in Indochina .

Accounting - Kissinqer Fundamentally. I would have to say I Left Behind 09 / 22 / 92 can find no rational reason for them to hold prisoners . Accounting . J(issinqer Personally • I have no proof whether Left Behind 09/22 / 92 Americans were kept behind by Hanoi.

My present qut feelinq is that probably no prisoners were left behind in Vietnam. Possibly some prisoners were left behind. were kept behind in Laos. which has been my feelinq more or less since the middle Seventies. but I'm not dogmatic about this •• . But I want to make clear, they were left .. if so. they were kept in violation of the agreement. in total ignorance ot the American Government _

Kingston: NOt to my recall. mission was ~o

Accoun~inq Kingston I interpreted tha~ my d idendfy dead 06 / 25 / 92 search for. recover an 1 and missing u . s. personne .

APpENDIX , APPENDIX 6

Accounting -Left Behind

Account ing -Left Behind

Accounting' . Left Behind

Accountinq -Left Behind

Accountinq

tissinger 09/22 / 92

Kissinger 09/22 / 92

Xissinqer 09 /22 / 92

IUssinger 09/22/92

Kissinger 09 /22/ 92

936

Secretary Schlesinger was not exactly shy in expressinq his di saqreements with the views of the A~nistration. I do not believe you can find one memorandum, one phone conversation. one meeting , or one anything in which he expressed at the time the views he expressed yes terday. And I can assure you , if we had known, if we bad heard thi 8, we would bave acted on it. because nobody was more dissatisfied with the performance of the Vi etnamese than I. NObOdy was

Some prisoners may - I repeat may -have been kept behind by our adversaries in violation of solemn oommdtments. No prisoners were left behind the deliberate act or

omission of American

The committee also owes to the Ameri can people a statement of this simple truth. Some prisoners may .­I repeat, may·· have been kept behind by our adversaries in viOlation of solemn commitments, No prisoners were left behind by the deliberate act or neqligent anission of American officials _ Anyone suggesting otherwise is playing a heartless game with the families of the MIAs _

I think it is possible that they were held, and it would bave been in total violation of the agreement. We did not have any information at the tiAe that I was in Government that was

The return of POWs and accountinq of the MIAs was an inteqral part of every American proposal and was always declared as non-negotiable by

}.Ccountinq

Accountinq . Left Behind

Accounting _ Left Behind

Kissinger 09 / 22 / 92

Itissinqer 09 / 22 / 92

Laird 09/21 / 92

937

Vi,until October 8, 1972 , the etnamese bad never agreed to ive

any accounting of anythinq, So 9' the iSiue that YOU're addreSSing did not ar se until we were down to 25 000 (troops) , •

Healinq those wounds preoccupied me ~enitif has preoccupied me Since.

s one reason I find this inquiry 80 painfUl_ Mr, Chairman you have stated that this inquiry' deaiqned to heal the wounds of was

Vietnam, I aqree, but it cannot be

~~evTY~~:~nq Ameri can offiCials e~se transgressions nor b

~~uend08. distortions and outright y i a s~ being leaked. OUt of this Dqul.ry, nor did any __

So let us stop torturing OUrselves The United States kept faith with ' those who served their country No

admdnistration knew that there'were live Americans kept in Indochina ~rican prisoners may have been'kept n Vietnam by a treacherous en in

viOlation of agreements and hU::: decency, hut no one was left there by the deliberate act or negligent oadssion of any American official,

Nc?". it was a 50-50 chance on that Sl.tuation that prisoners of war would not be there , but I submit to you as members of this COIIIIti.ttee that ev . prisoner of war in North Vietnam ~ a180 in the South knew about that raid, and it qav. them hope that we eared about them and it was a sUCcessful raid. and the idea from standpoint that it did show that we rq

in the united. States cared about our POWs . and we did recoqnize them.

APPENDIX 6

Accounting Laird 09/21/92

Accounting - LOrd 09/21/92 Left. Behind

Accounting - LOrd 09/21/92 Nixon Statement

,

938

secretary of When I first be~~number of letters Defense. t~e tOe~ved since January that we ha rae of 1969, the 1st of 1960 to /f~:~ we 1 d received total number 0 :e went public in were 620. ~fie~e number of letterS January of 7 lmOst 5,000. 1 ,000 bad gone up ~?~lar letter did come of thO~e ~~o~s peace activists. throug v . . There is no question Chauman ~erry. there, t.hat those in your ~nd. i~ imate questions of represented leql~ 14 as a prisoner? people who were e

Lord: AbsolutelY.

5 in effect. When Chairman Kerry: o. and the we got out in Janua~n9 home and the pri8?ners st!~te~lctbe prisoners are presldent sa a knew that on their way hQme~a~based on tbe could not be acCU information you bad seen. o it is very bard Chairman Ke~tee't~ understand ~t for the comm1 GoVernment ~s if the united States have any publiclY sayinq we do ~~ive it would indication of a~~~~s to sit with kind of be mean 1 and make real [the Nor~h vietnameS8are worried your not10n thatiYOU r that they have abOut. discrepanc:- es 0 t.o worry abOUt ~t. •..

Accountino

Accountlno . Left Behind

Maguire 12/ 04 / 92

McCain 09/2"}./92 "

939

What Mr. Mooney seems to have done is, in every case where it either mentions a shoot down, a parachute beinq seen, a search being conducted for an individual. he put that person in a POW status, and that just .. that's a jump in loqic that'S not supported by the other evidence. The problem is that Mr . Mooney was really restricted to a small body of intelligence wit.h which to make his assessment. and that body of intelligence was the known u.s. losses at the time of the report. What we have information on is the search and rescue efforts that happened after the loss incident. We've had subsequent intelligence reports from other sources, and when you put that all toqether, you can't support 300 or more people ever even being captured through signals reports.

So if he saw a report that said on the 22nd May the 283rd AAA Battalion shot down an P-4, he would 90 to a list of P·4 losses on that day, and any P' 4 tha t happened t.o have a person unaccounted for, he would put that person into a POW status, totally disregarding any other losses where we may have rescued an individual. and in many cases be totally disreqarded the 10ss8s of anythiuq other than O.S. aircraft. • •• if both former Secretaries of Defense knew or believed at the time that there was Americans left in Southeast Asia, then I think they have a oreat deal of ~~swerinQ to do as to whY they did not do more. especially before the Woodcock and Montqomery Commissions . to brioq these concerns or their beliefs to light.

APPKNDIX 6

940 941

Accounting Mccain [to Moorer] Your m8Ssaqe on March. 09 / 24 / 92

22nd says, the JCS message says. Do Left Behind not commence withdrawal of the fourth increment until the follOWing two conditions are met: the U.S. ~8 been provided with a complete 1~8t of all U.S. PaWs. including those held by the pathet LaO, as well as the time and place of releasel and the first group of PeWS have been physicallY transferred to ~.S'. custody.- That was the cr1ter1B on March 22nd.

J,ccounting - Mccain I would like to, again, refer to the Nixon Statement 09/22/92 full statement made by president Nixon on March 29th, 197). The chairman and others continue to refer to a statement where he says all of our American POWs are on their way home. I think it is important to add that he one sentence later said: -There are still some problem areas: the provisions of the agreement requiring an accounting for all miSSing in action in IndOChina, the provisions with regard to LaOS and cambodia, the provisions prohibiting (et cetera] have not been complied Then on March 23rd. a message was

sent: and I know. Mr. Chairman, this is part of the record. both of these messages, it said:

with.-

So the President of the United States did not just say all Americans are on their way home. He caveated it, and .Seek private meeting with North . Vietnamese representative. our bas1c

concern is the release of ~he prisoners. as we do not obJect to the PLP playing the central role as long as the men are return~d to us. we need precise informat~on and understanding on the times and place of release of the prisoners on the list provided by 1 pebruary. Of course we intend to pursue the I questioning of other u.s. personne

i captured or missing in LaoS follow ng the release of the men on the 1 pebruary list.-

very strongly. So both Dr. Shields and the President of the United States in 1973 stated unequivocally that there were still serious prOblems with the full accounting of the MIA/POWs.

Accounting - Mccain ODe reading this would reach the Left Behind 0./24/.2 conclusion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff dictated a certain policy: suspend everything on one day, and then the following day said go ahead and move forward with the proceedings.

J.ccountinq Mooney Chairman ~erry: What did you do in Nixon Statement 01/22/.2 197), when you saw Operation Hanecoming? At that time you knew that there was a discrepancy between those coming hOme and those who ucst readily, in your memory, were on the lht.

Mr. Mooney: Yes sir. I was not really concerned, because we still had the highest requirements on the book, and we did Dot expect many of these people to come horne.

APPBNDIJ. , APPENDIX 6

Accounting . Nixon Statement.

ACcounting . Nixon Statement

ACcounting . Left Behind

MOOney Ol/:2:z./92

MoOrer 0. / 24/.2

Moorer 09 / 24 / .2

942

Ident Nixon made his When pre~ that all the men are back. statemen 't even taken seriously. that wasn when Nixon made his . (becau~el the hiqhest tasking aa statemen· . " 5 desk in the field

to search for. locate American in . And that

1d I make a cooment plea ... yes; COUb lieve that you will tind sIr t len e the president made that. tha t be was in Key Biscayne. .. statemen au h Ziegler. the pUblic made it thr q d I' to. cont ident !ala affair~ Of~~~e~~ ~mplY the package was re e~~ ready t o come out. And that we 150 or so that were all of thOSOl1le~ out except one that .. ready to c d in south d a little later own ~r:tnam. :Ui ~~~kW~~tO~s~~lY back. An t when he said all. He what he mea, 'f the ones that we had meant al 0 scheduled.

There is another senten~~ that publiC announcement. I '~,cb"'~ on to say but there are ~ ~~~:rs we've got to search for.

sen. Gras~ley: It ~l~f~~a:' but I beheve the P t any bas not rea~ t~~ ~~t~ere ha~ way, and IOn the part of NiXOD been a

. 1 I

think that for all pract~ca . ,. 11 lost the war. purposes we rea Y litical point particularly from a POuldn't get in of view. because wetcoeach pOint of an airplane and g~hO~ght there mi9ht contact Wherefo

w: d and held against be a POW con 1n will

Moorer 0./l4/.2

Murphy 09 / 24 / 92

Murphy 0. / 24 / .2

Naqy 12/ 01 / 9'

Qksenberg 06 / 25/'2

943

.•. tbe question arises now wbether you would be willing to detain those boys who thouqht they were cominq haDe while we went throuqh another long discussion and neqotiation with North Vietnam . So mY position was, let's qet those we have home and continue to press to find out wbether

••. in my personal view there were no confirmed reports of live u.S. military per~onnel left behind in Vietnam or Laos. I do not recall seeing any suCh reports. and I would have been upset , as you would be, if to read such a report

It would seem to me. somebody in the canptroller's office would have to testify to just how they were using these numbers. I will admdt that it current captured, is a real

going down to 67 by the end of

There certainly was a change in attitude on the part of the Reagan admdnistration that was evident during the 1980's. That certainly let. and I believe throughout the period of the seventies and eighties that it was basically a continuation inside of DIA, and that was that there remained the possibility that there were Btill live Americans present in Southeast Asia remaining after the of the United

Sen. Mccain : Did you SBe any hard evidence or any evidence that Americans were alive?

Mr. Oksenberq: I saw no hard evidence that Americans were alive.

o wi th the upsurqe of increasing reports of

APPENDIX 6

Accounting . Left Behind

Accounting -Left Behind

Accounting Shields Statement

Oksenberq 06/25/92

Otis 12/03/92

Perot 08 / 11/92

944

I can assure you. Senator, that at no point during rQY time on the watch did we come to the conclusion that there were c~rtainlY no live Americans in

In spite of the high viSibility of CoIlmander Dodge' 5 case. the North Vietnamese chose to deny any knowledge of him. COItInander Dodqe was not repatriated in 1973.

I was extremely concerned about the media reports .that proclaimed all POWs returned . I received letters from President Nixon, Vice Admiral David Bagley , Chief of Naval Personnel, and Roger Shields, Office of the Assistant Secretary ot Defense, all assurinq me of their commitment to securing the fullest possible accounting.

The only letter that even mentioned live Americans was that o f Dr. Shields. who stated. quote, there is no specific knowledge of any live Americans left. unquote. In other words, fullest possible accounting meant search for remains.

There was no public challenqe of the

Vietnamese by the united States that captured servicemen were left behind. There seemed to be a naivete that all prisoners had been returned and that remains would be forthcominq. I .... as shocked and bewildered, but I could not believe that the missinq were already abandoned by our own

and

•• _ [the Vietnamese] said. your awn Government declared these men dead 1973. Why should we thinJc. your Government wants

Accountinq Shields Statement

Accountinq . Left Behind

Perot 08/11/9~

Richardson 09 / 24 / 92

945

I 8aid Roger I'm declared all'th .uZ'prised: that you

1973. He said eImen dead in April

it. And he said hwas ordered to do it by the DePUty S e was ordered to do Defense, William c~cretary of said words to the ~ts. Then he protested beca e eet that he earlier these ~ just two weeks around. s were qOinq

Chairman lCerryo Looki obviOUSly tOng through this, looking atrft~spectivelY, but

at it and lOOki~w:~r1ttryinq to look American peo I as tbe years later.Pu!f~;~ looking at it 20 say that the re dUDatelY, would you American cor suggests that the families ~l:oand certainly the respect to thiS?t leveled witb

~cbard8on: I would say that

Wi~~~i~~n~he face of it was have to use s em, ~d one WOUld tbat .. that ~ ~at~onale for doing

, or withholding it.

APPENDIX 6