turkey and the middle east in the 1990s sabri sayari

Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s

Sabri Sayari

Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3. (Spring, 1997), pp. 44-55.

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With the end of the cold war, andparticularly following the Gulf War, Turkey abandoned its low-profile posture in the Middle East for a more activist regional role. The Kurdish issue, the single most important item on the county's domestic and foreign policy agendas, has also had important implications for Turkey's Middle East policy, further exacerbating longstanding problems with Syria that in turn contributed to Ankara's decision to sign a military agreement with Israel, The rise to power of the Islamist Refah party in July 1996 in a coalition government is likely to have significant implications for the coun- t y ' s identity and relations both with the West and the Islamic world.

THE 1990s REPRESENT AN ERA OF CONSIDERABLE ferment in Turkey's relations with the Middle East. Not only has a host of new issues come to the fore and become part of Turkish foreign policy, but the domestic context of the foreign policy-making processes is changing rapidly as well. Clearly, after decades of discreet disengagement from its Middle Eastern environment, Turkey has become a more active player in the international politics of the region. This is reflected in a number of issues ranging from developments in northern Iraq and the future of the Kurds to Ankara's pursuit of a more proactive policy vis-2-vis Damascus aimed at undermining Syrian support of the separatist Kurdish guerrilla organization, the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK). Turkey's greater focus on its Middle Eastern neighborhood comes at a time when the country's Islamist Refah (Welfare) party, having increased its electoral popularity to become the largest party in the parliament, controls governmental power through a coalition with the center-right True Path Party. The rise to power of Refah, which long has advocated closer ties with the Islamic states, has significant implications for Turkey's relations with the Middle East.

During the cold war period, Turkey's relations with the Arab world dis- played a number of chara~teristics,~ First, and foremost, Turkey avoided involvement in inter-Arab disputes, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and other regional conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq War. Second, Turkish governments

SABRI SAY^ is the executive director of the Institute of Turkish Studies and research professor of international affairs at Georgetown University.

Journal of Palestine Studies X X V , no. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 44-55.

sought, with varying degrees of success, to maintain cordial if not very close political and diplomatic ties with all the Arab regimes, Iran, and Israel. The only exception to this trend was Syria whose relations with Turkey were marked by ill feeling arising from Turkish sovereignty over Hatay (Alexan- dretta) province, ceded by France in 1939. Third, save for its participation in the ill-fated Baghdad Pact from 1955 to 1958, Turkey generally maintained a nonactivist and low-profile posture in its approach to the Arab world. Fourth, having recognized Israel in 1949-the only predominantly Muslim state to do so at the time-Turkey gradually moved toward a more pro-Palestinian position in the Arab-Israeli conflict after 1967. This shift was due partly to domestic political pressures, including the growing saliency of Islam in electoral politics, and partly to Ankara's efforts to initiate better political relations with the Arab world at a time when Turkey had begun to experience strains in its relations with the West, particularly the United States, over the Cyprus problem. Finally, beginning with the 1973-74 oil crisis, economics and trade acquired increasing importance in Turkey's Middle East policy, as Turkish governments endeavored to meet the rising oil bills from the Arab states and Iran by expanding Turkey's export of goods and services to the region.

Turkey was profoundly affected by the end of the cold war, which raised fundamental questions about its role in the Western a~liance.~ The main thrust of its response to the new situation was to pursue a more activist role in regions close to its borders-the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle ~ a s t . ~ Turgut Ozal, prime minister from 1983 to 1989 and then president until his death in 1993, played a central role in the formulation of this strategy. Ozal believed Turkey could continue to be a valued ally of the West only by expanding its regional role and influence. As someone who gave primacy to economics and commerce in international politics, he was convinced that the path to economic progress was through increased trade with Turkey's neighbors which itself would come from a greater political involvement in the regional environment. Ozal's thinking and vision had a significant impact on Turkish foreign policy, especially during the 1989-91 period when he personally oversaw a number of critical policy decisions and new initiatives.*

The single most important event that paved the way for a more active policy in the Arab world was the Gulf War of 1990-91. Turkey's support for the allied coalition marked a radical departure from its established policy regarding noninvolvement in regional conflicts and wars. By shutting off the twin pipelines that carried Iraq's oil exports and permitting U.S. use of Incir- lik airbase in southeastern Turkey for strikes into northern Iraq, Turkey played a key role in the UN-backed military and economic campaign against Saddam Hussein's regime. Ozal managed to maneuver his way through considerable domestic opposition to align Turkey firmly with the coal i t i~n.~ Dis-counting the risks of pursuing an active role in the Gulf crisis on the grounds that Iraq did not have the capability to withstand the US.-led military cam-

paign, he was convinced that the Gulf War offered Turkey an opportunity to attain several important objectives. These included expanding Turkey's political role and influence in regional affairs; gaining leverage with Wash- ington regarding bilateral defense and trade issues and with Brussels regarding its goal of becoming a full member of the European Union (EU); and increasing its trade and business opportunities in the Middle East, particularly in the ~ u l f . ~

Ozal's strategy had mixed results. Although the Gulf War underscored Turkey's continued strategic importance to the West in Gulf contingencies, this did not necessarily translate into better relations between Turkey and the West. Nor did the expected economic benefits materialize: There was no significant rise in Turkey's exports to the Middle East, and, more importantly,

the UN economic sanctions imposed on Iraq cost Turkqy's more actirbt Turkey nearly $20 billion between 1990 and 1994.'

*$fiddle Eastpol@' I z d an Thus, Turkey's search for a new regional role in the ~Gforse@tconsequence: early 1990s produced few tangible political or eco-

Arab conccn*ns nomic gains for Ankara in terms of its relations with ubout the Arab states, and new economic initiatives by An-

TurkiWz regional kara-such as a $21-billion project to transport sur- donzirut!rcc~. plus water from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers to Arab

states and Israel through a so-called "Peace Pipelinen-never got off the ground.' However, the more activist Middle East policy had one important consequence that had not been foreseen: It increased concerns in Arab capitals about the reemergence of Turkish dominance in the region.

Developments in Iraq have created a major security dilemma for Turkey by drawing it far more deeply than policymakers had planned or desired into the affairs of its southern Arab neighbor. The failure of the allied coalition to oust Saddam Hussein, the unsuccessful Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq, and the influx of tens of thousands of Kurdish refugees into Turkey during March and April 1991 vastly complicated Turkey's Kurdish problem. To prevent further waves of Kurdish refugees, Ankara agreed to host at Incir- lik airbase Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), an allied force, including Tur- key, formed to protect Iraqi Kurds above the 36th parallel from attacks by the Iraqi military. However, what the Turks initially viewed as a humanitarian measure produced, much to their surprise and frustration, an important political outcome: The Kurds of northern Iraq, under the protection of the West and beyond Baghdad's control, laid the foundations for a new Kurdish political entity.9 Turkey traditionally had opposed an independent Kurdish state near its borders owing to its potential for mobilizing ethnic Kurdish nationalist sentiments within Turkey, but grudgingly accepted the new Kurd- ish entity, which was dependent on 0 ~ c . l ~

However, the situation in northern Iraq has intensified Turkey's own Kurdish dilemma.'' The PKK, which has waged a guerrilla campaign since 1784 to carve out an independent Kurdish state from Turkey, took advantage of the absence of authority in northern Iraq to establish bases close to the Turkish border. In addition to strengthening the PKK, the post-Gulf War developments heightened the ethnic consciousness among Turkey's Kurdish citizens, especially those living in the country's southeastern region. The challenge posed by the PKK to Turkey's political order and territorial integ- rity has become the single most important item on the country's domestic and foreign policy agendas. The PKK's violent efforts and the Turkish military's campaign to suppress it have been very costly: The conflict has re- sulted in more than 20,000 fatalities; has led to large-scale social and economic dislocation in southeastern Turkey; and has caused the government to divert a large portion of its economic resources to combating the PKK.

The Kurdish problem also has become a major issue in Turkey's relations with its neighbors, especially Iraq and syria.12 The de facto fragmentation of the Iraqi state gave momentum to Kurdish nationalist aspirations and shifted Ankara's priorities to the preservation of the unity of Iraq and the reestablish- ment of some form of stability along the Iraqi-Turkish border.13 Reconciled to Saddam Hussein's continuing grip on power, Turkey has sought to nor- malize its relations with his government and has worked through diplomatic channels to remove the UN economic sanctions on 1raq.14

Under a "hot pursuit" agreement signed between Ankara and Baghdad in 1984, Turkey had launched several incursions into northern Iraq during the 1780s against the PKK. Since the Gulf War, Turkey has continued the policy of incursions aimed at putting the PKK on the defensive and preventing it from using the border area as a refuge for Kurdish militants. In March 1775, Ankara sent 40,000 troops across the Iraqi border for a six-week military operation aimed at demolishing PKK bases and logistical infrastructure. In the wake of the fighting between rival Iraqi Kurdish groups during 1776, Turkish officials declared that Ankara intended to establish a "security zone" inside Iraq along the Iraqi-Turkish border. The Turkish plan led to strong criticism from Baghdad and other Arab capitals, and generally was unfavorably received in the West. Given the regional and international reaction, and with the end of the fighting, Turkey refrained from implementing the plan.

The PKK threat has exacted a heavy toll on Syrian-Turkish relations, which had been strained for most of the cold war ~ e r i 0 d . l ~ Ankara views Damascus as the PKK's principal source of external logistical support and training.16 While Turkish officials have suspected Syrian involvement in their country's domestic political problems since the mid-1970s, they had been generally muted in their criticism of Syria's policies until the escalation of PKK activities in the 1990s. As PKK activism intensified, Turkish politicians and the media began openly to denounce Syria and to urge the government to take more forceful measures to stop Syria's support to the ~urds ."

Turkish PM Necmetth Erbakan embraces Pres. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani of Iran outside the presidential palace in Tehran, 11 August 1996. (AP Photo/ Burhan Ozbilici)

Although the Turkish government also has sought Syria's cooperation over the Kurdish issue,'' it has become increasingly apprehensive and mistrustful of Syrian policies.

While denying Turkish charges concerning its ties to the PKK, Syria has increased its criticism of Turkey's use of water from the Euphrates River and sought to mobilize other Arab states against Turkey on this issue. Syria, along with Iraq, opposes Turkey's plans to divert water from the Euphrates for its massive irrigation development scheme called the Great Anatolian Project, or GAP.'^ ~ u r k e ~rejects their claim of "acquired rights," as well as the Syrian and Iraqi charges that the GAP project will reduce their supply of water. In- stead, Ankara maintains that the allocation of the waters among the three countries should be based on technical and scientific criteria that aim at max- imum equitable utilization of water resources in the region2'

Despite their earlier reluctance to admit a linkage between Syrian support for Kurdish separatism and the water issue, many Turkish officials now state that Syria is using the PKK mainly to get concessions from Ankara over the supply of water to downstream c~untr ies .~ ' In fact, former Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal reflected prevailing Turkish opinion when he said: "some cir- cles may claim that they need additional water to wash the blood of terrorism from their hands."22 Syria's efforts to rally support among other Arab countries led, for example, to a communique issued after the January 1996 meeting in Damascus of the foreign ministers of seven Arab states criticizing

Turkey and calling for a permanent water-sharing agreement to replace the provisional accord under which Ankara allows the flow of 500 cubic meters of water per second to ~ y r i a . ~ ~

The worsening of Ankara's relations with Damascus is partly responsible for the new military training and education agreement that Turkey signed with Israel in February 1996. Formally, the main objective of the accord is "to facilitate cooperation between the two countries in military education" through a series of measures including joint air force training, naval visits, military personnel exchanges, and joint training in military academiesz4 Is- raeli and Turkish aircraft will visit each other's country four times a year, for a period of one week per visit, but the Israeli planes will not be armed or equipped with electronic intelligence devices during these visits. A separate agreement signed in December 1996 calls for Israel's aid in upgrading Tur- key's fleet of F-4 Phantom jets at an estimated cost of $650 million.

Turkish officials have sought to play down the strategic implications of the agreement with Israel and repeatedly have emphasized that it is not a formal alliance, nor is it intended against any third party; rather, it is similar to the military training and education agreements that Turkey has with more than a dozen other countries.25 Despite these disclaimers, it is clear that Tur- key expects to accomplish several strategic objectives as a result of its increased military cooperation with Turkey expects to Israel. One is to offset the possible negative conse- accompl&lz several quences to Turkey of the increased military ties be- strategic objectir~es as a tween Syria and Greece, two neighbors with whom result of its itzcwemed Ankara's relations are strained.26 Another objective is miliaTY coopwagon alith to find alternative sources for weapons systems and Ismel.

military equipment in view of growing difficulties in obtaining sophisticated weapons from the United States due to the opposition from anti-Turkish ethnic lobbies and human rights groups. An additional reason for Turkey's decision to expand its military ties with Israel is to send a message to Syria about the increased security risks of pursuing adversarial policies.

The Israeli-Turkish accord was perceived as a pragmatic move that would help bolster Turkey's military ~trength.~' The fact that the Turkish military had initiated this new agreement, coupled with the widely-held perception that Israeli-Turkish security cooperation would help Turkey in its fight against the PKK, gave the accord additional public support. However, the new agreement was criticized strongly by Turkey's Islamist political forces and the media.28 Refah's leadership bitterly denounced increased political and economic relations with Israel during the December 1995 campaign for parliamentary elections. After the agreement was signed in February 1996, Erbakan and other Refah leaders vowed to scrap it when they came to power.

The Turkish-Israeli accord was criticized by the Arab states and Iran. Egypt, with which Turkey has built relatively good relations during the past

decade, officially asked for an explanation about its nature and purpose. Af-ter a two-day summit in June 1996 in Damascus, the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria issued a joint statement expressing their concern and de- manding that Turkey reconsider the agreement. At the Arab summit meeting in Cairo later that month, a similar call was issued, although Syria failed to obtain an outright condemnation against Turkey, thanks largely to strong opposition from ~ o r d a n . ~ ~

Since the historic breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian relation^,^' Turkey has been a strong supporter of the Middle East peace process not only as an important step toward regional stability but in the belief that the peace process will increase regional economic cooperation and provide new opportunities for trade and investment. The Turks also expect that an Israeli-Palestinian agreement will release Turkey from the onerous difficulty of bal- ancing between its commitment to maintaining diplomatic and political ties with Israel against its efforts to show solidarity with the Arab and Islamic world in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, in seeking to pursue these two seemingly incompatible goals, Turkey frequently came under criticism from both sides, especially from the Arab states.

Since 1992, Turkey has participated in the multilateral working groups re- lated to the peace process, especially those dealing with economic development, water, and arms control issues.31 At the same time, Turkey has lent its support to the new Palestinian government. Turkey was one of the first countries-and the only member of NATO-to extend diplomatic recogni- tion to the Palestinians in November 1 9 8 8 . ~ ~ Since December 1991, when Turkey upgraded its relations with both the PLO and Israel to ambassadorial level, Ankara has sought to establish closer economic and political ties with the Palestinians and has offered to help with housing and other infrastructure projects. Ankara and the Palestinian Authority (PA) have hosted high- ranking visiting Palestinian and Turkish delegations, respectively, and PA Chairman Yasir Arafat has opposed strong Arab criticism of Turkey over the signing of the Israeli-Turkish agreement.

Although Turkish officials have positive expectations regarding regional stability and economic cooperation from the peace process, they also are concerned about its impact on Syria's military and strategic posture vis-A-vis Turkey. Turkish policymakers believe that when and if an agreement is reached between Israel and Syria, Damascus will be in a better position mili- tarily to press its charges against Turkey over the water issue, and possibly even on the question of Turkish sovereignty over Hatay (or Alexandretta) province.33 Another issue concerns the U.S. position on Syrian-Turkish difficulties. Ankara perceives Washington as not being fully supportive of Tur- key's criticism of Syria's ties to the PKK because of the importance it attaches to brokering an agreement between Israel and Syria.

The outcome of Turkey's parliamentary elections in December 1995 underscored the growing domestic strength of political Islam. The Refah party received 21 percent of the national vote and captured 158 seats in the 550-member parliament. Led by Necmettin Erbakan, Refah managed to come to power through a coalition with the center-right True Path Party in July 1996 after an earlier coalition between two center-right parties fell apart. Refah's rise to power and the growing strength of political Islam represents a major new development in Turkish Internally, it poses a significant challenge to the country's secular form of government and highlights the problem of Turkey's identity. Since the founding of the republic in 1924, the Turkish ruling elite, in keeping with the legacy of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, has sought to identify the country more with the West than the Middle East and the Islamic world. This pro-Western identity played a central role in Ataturk's strategy of modernization and social change. Although Turkey has experienced a gradual reassertion of Islam since the transition to democracy and multiparty politics in 1950, Ataturk's vision and founding principles had not been challenged seriously until recently.

In contrast to the Kemalist vision, the Islamists have maintained that Tur- key should identify itself as part of the Islamic community rather than as a member of the Western political, military, and economic organizations. Pub- lic opinion polls underscore both the divisions among Turks on this issue and the trend toward in- f'it[l/ lc o] ) t t / t o t1/xJ//.s creasing identification with the Muslim ~truler.,~ fr t~t fd1 ))-(+ / j 1 ( 1

Perceptions of negative European attitudes toward tau t i?<[f k ~ ii c [{.5i~,t,(

UidukzTurkey (as manifested in the EU's reluctance to ac- ~ i ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ? / f ~ ~ ~ ~ f ( / ? l

cept Turkey as a full member) and of Western indif- t ~ / l ~ t t i ? - i ~ \

ference to the plight of the Bosnian Muslims and Azeri Turks have contributed to the shifting mood in Turkey regarding the country's relations with the West.

Refah's rise has intensified the public debate over Turkey's identity between prosecular and Islamic forces.36 1slamist parties have denounced Tur- key's pro-Western foreign policy orientation, its membership in NATO, its efforts to join the EU, and its bilateral security and political relations with the United States. At the same time, they have called repeatedly for closer ties with all the Islamic countries and for the improvement of Turkey's relations with its Arab neighbors and 1ranS3' Indeed, Erbakan has often stated his wish to see Turkey take the lead in the establishment of a "Union of Muslim Coun- tries" that would increase the power of Islamic states in world politics and extricate Turkey from its "dependence" on and "control" by the

Since coming to power, Refah has vacillated between moderating its position and fulfilling its often-stated pledges on a number of important foreign policy issues. For example, the Islamists have dropped their opposition to

Turkey's membership in NATO and the Customs Union agreement that An- kara signed with the EU in 1995. Refah's vociferous criticisms of the United States and Europe have been toned down considerably, and party officials have declared their willingness to pursue friendly relations with Turkey's Western allies.39 1n line with his decades-long attacks on Turkey's ties with Israel, Erbakan had denounced the 1996 Israeli-Turkish military education and training agreement and vowed to abrogate it when Refah controlled governmental power. However, faced with the possibility of a major con- frontation with the Turkish military-the principal supporter of the agreement-the new government ratified the accord despite considerable opposition from the Islamist groups and media.

Erbakan also has taken steps to demonstrate his commitment to aligning Turkey with the Islamic countries and to implement his grand plans to forge an alliance of Muslim nations. For example, Erbakan, in contrast to his pred- ecessors who commonly visited Western capitals on their first official trips abroad, went east to Iran. In Tehran, he signed a $23-billion natural gas agreement. Although the agreement had been initiated under the previous coalition government and reflected Turkey's concerns about the need to meet its energy requirements, it was criticized sharply by ~ a s h i n ~ t o n . ~ ~ On his next official trip, defying warnings at home and from Western powers, Erbakan traveled to Libya for what he hoped would be an important step toward Islamic solidarity. Instead, he got a rude shock when Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qaddafi assailed Turkey for its U.S. ties and Kurdish policy.41 In addition to his controversial trips abroad, Refah's leader has used both formal and informal diplomacy, including sending emissaries to Damascus and Baghdad, to improve Turkey's relations with its Arab neighbors. In marked departure from the established position of the Turkish governments in the past, Refah officials have sought to absolve Syria and Iran for support of the PKK and have indicated that Turkey may pursue a more accommodating policy over the water dispute with its Arab neighbo~-s.42

The growing electoral strength of the Islamists well could start a new era in Turkey's Middle East policy. If Refah stays in power, and, more importantly, if it succeeds in capturing a parliamentary majority in the next elections and forming a government alone, Turkey probably will search for closer ties with the Islamic states while lessening its political and security relations with the United States and ~ u r o ~ e . * ~ At present, however, there are a number of important constraints on Refah's efforts to accomplish foreign policy objectives that include major changes in Turkey's relations with the Middle East. One constraint is Refah's coalition partnership with the center- right True Path Party led by Tansu Ciller, who is foreign minister. Although Erbakan has managed to circumvent the Foreign Ministry at times and work through his own network of emissaries and foreign policy advisers, he needs to be sensitive to the concerns of his coalition partner on issues such as Tur- key's relations with the EU. He also has to take into account the views of the Turkish military, wary of a major realignment in Turkey's foreign and de-

53 Tu- AND THE MIDDLEEAST LN THE 1990s

fense policies and committed to Turkey's membership in NATO and to its pro-Western orientation in world politics. In addition to these domestic constraints, Refah's goal of radically revising Turkey's approach to the Middle East also will be limited by regional factors. These include the lingering negative historical legacies of Turco-Arab relations, the real concern felt by several Arab regimes such as Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia about Refah's ties with militant Islamic opposition groups in their countries, and Refah's unrealistic vision of solidarity and cooperation among the Muslim countries in the Mid- dle East and North ~ f r i c a . ~ ~

1. See Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, "Turkey's Security and the Middle East," Foreign Affairs 62, no. 1(Fall 1983), pp. 157-75; Christine Moss Helms, "Turkey's Policy Toward the Middle East: Strength Through Neutrality," Middle East Insight 6, no. 3 (Fall 1988), pp. 40-46.

2. Sabri Sayari, "Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis," Middle East Journal 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 9-21; Kemal Kirisci, "New Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior," in Canan Balim, et al., eds., Turkey: Political, Social, and Economic Challenges in the 1990s (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995).

3. See Andrew Mango, Turkey: %e Challenge of a New Role (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Re- lations, 1994); Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, eds., Turkey's New Geopolitics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Kenneth Mackenzie, "Turkey's Circumspect Activ- ism," %e World Today 49, No. 2 (Febru- ary 19931, pp. 25-26.

4. For Ozal's views on Turkey's new foreign policy options and prospects, see his interview, "Ozal: Turkiye'nin Onunde Hacet Kapilari Acilmistir," in Turkiye Gunlugu, No. 19 (Summer 1992), pp. 5- 23.

5. Although Ozal played a key role in shaping Turkey's response to Iraq's inva- sion of Kuwait, he failed to attain some of his goals such as the deployment of Turkish troops in Saudi Arabia. For a useful analysis of his involvement in the policy-making process during the Gulf War, see Oguz Eris, "Korfez Krizi ve Turkiye'de Karar Alma Sureci," in Degisen Dunya ve Turkiye, ed. Faruk Sonmezoglu (Istanbul: Baglam Yayinlari, 1995). For Turkish press coverage of the criticisms

of Ozal, see Foreign Broadcast Informa- tion Service-Western Europe (FBIS-WEU), 13 and 14 August 1990. See also "Turkey's Ozal, U.S. Ally in Gulf Crisis, is Facing Mounting Opposition at Home," Wall Street Journal, 6 December 1990; "As Leader Keeps Nation War Role Secret, Many Turks Express Alarm," New York Times, 22 January 1991.

6. On Ozal's expectations concerning the outcome of the Gulf crisis, see "Tur- key's New Middle East Role as Ozal sees it," and "Will the Gambit Pay Off?," both in Briefing (Ankara), 11 February 1991.

7. For Turkish estimates, see Milliyet (Istanbul), 17 January 1995. According to Suleyman Demirel, Turkey's current president, Turkey received about $3 or $4 billion worth of compensation from "our friends in the Gulf." See "Turkey, Hurt by Iraq Curbs, Asks Help," Washington Post, 5 June 1994.

8. George E. Gruen, "Dynamic Pro- gress in Turkish-Israeli Relations," Israel Affairs 1, no. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 63-64; George E. Gruen, "Turkey's Poten- tial Contribution to Arab-Israeli Peace" in Turkish Review of Middle East Studies Annual 1993 (Istanbul: Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies, 1994).

9. For an analysis of Turkish perceptions and policy regarding OPC, see Kemal Kirisci, "Provide Comfort or Trouble: Operation Provide Comfort and its Impact on Turkish Foreign Policy" Turkish Review of Middle East Studies Annual 1994-95 (Istanbul: Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies, 1995).

10. See, for example, Suleyman Demirel's statement reaffirming Turkey's traditional position on the issue of a Kurdish state in the Middle East in FBIS-WEU, 12 November 1992.

11. On the Kurdish issue in Turkey, see Mango, Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role, chapter 2; Graham Fuller, "The Fate of the Kurds," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 108-21; Bilge Nur Criss, "The Nature of PKK Terrorism in Turkey," Conflict and Terrorbm 18 (Jan- uary-March 1995), pp. 17-36.

12. See Suha Bolukbasi, "Ankara, Da- mascus, Baghdad and the Regionalization of Turkey's Kurdish Secessionism," Jour-nal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 14, no. 4 (Summer 1991), pp. 15-36; and Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1991-1995: From the Gulf War to the Incursion into Iraq," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 1 (Fall 1995), pp. 1-30.

13. See Mahmut Bali Aykan, "Turkey's Policy in Northern Iraq, 1991-95," Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 4 (October 1996), pp. 351-54.

14. "Turkey Hints at a New Flexibility Toward Saddam," Washington Post, 24 September 1996; "Turks, Opposing U.S., Urge Iraq to Take Control of Kurdish Area," New York Times, 21 September 1996.

15. David Kushner, "Conflict and Ac- commodation in Turkish-Syrian Rela- tions," in Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv, eds., Syria Under Assad (London: Croom Helm, 1986).

16. For a statement of the Turkish view, see Syria and International Terror- b m (Ankara: Turkish Democracy Founda- tion, 1996); Sukru Elekdag, "Two and a Half War Strategy," Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs (Ankara) 1, no. 1 (March-May 1996), pp. 33-57.

17. See, for example, Erhan Yarar, "Turkiye'nin Suriye Stratejisi Degismeli!," Yeni Yuzyil (Istanbul), 13 January 1997. High-ranking Turkish officials such as President Demirel and former Prime Min- ister Ciller publicly have raised the issue of Syrian support to the PKK on various occasions. See Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, Tur- .

key's Political and Security Interests and Policies in the New Geostrategic Environ- ment of the Expanded Middle East (Washington: Henry L. Stinson Center, July 19941, p. 20.

18. In November 1993, Syria and Tur- key signed a "security protocol" to coor- dinate their actions against terrorist groups, including the PKK. See Newspot

(Ankara), 2 December 1993. In August 1994, the Iranian, Syrian, and Turkish foreign ministers met in Damascus to discuss regional problems, especially the security implications of the Kurdish issue. See ~ur&e t (Istanbul), 23 and 24 August 1994.

19. On the water issue, see Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, chapter 8; John Bulloch and Adel Darwish, Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East (London: Gollancz, 1993).

20. For the official Turkish perspec- tive, see Turkish Ministry of Foreign Af-fairs, "Water Issues Between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq," Perceptions:Journal of International Affairs 1, no. 2 (June- August 1996), pp. 82-112.

21. For the views of Turkish observers and analysts on the linkage between Syrian support for the PKK and the water dispute, see Sabahattin Sen, ed., Su Sorunu, Turkiye, ve Ortadogu (Istanbul: Baglam Yayinlari, 1993).

22. Former Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal, quoted in the Turkish Probe (Ankara), 5 January 1995.

23. Hurriyet (Istanbul), 2 January 1996.

24. For the text of the agreement, see Hurriyet (Istanbul), 14 June 1996

25. See "Turkey's Military Training Co- operation Agreement with Israel" Turkish Embassy Press Release, Washington, 10 April 1996.

26. Reports of a military pact between Athens and Damascus, including landing rights for Greek war planes in Syria, have been circulating since 1995. Greek officials, such as Defense Minister Gerasi- mos Arsenis, publicly have hinted at its existence while calling for the building of an anti-Turkish alliance among all of Turkey's neighbors. See FBIS-WEU, 4 April 1996.

27. See, for example, "Turkey-Israel Forge Closer Ties," Turkish Probe (An-kara), 15 March 1996; "Israil'le Yeni Projeler," Milliyet (Istanbul), 29 August 1996.

28. See, for example, Salih Berber, "Halka Ragmen TC-Israil Isbirligi," Sebat (Istanbul), June 1996.

29. "Syria Fails to Turn Summit into an Anti-Turkish Forum," Turkish Probe (An-kara), 28 June 1996.

30. See Sami Kohen, "On the Future of the Middle East," Perceptions: Journal

TURKEYAND THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE 1990s

of International Affairs 1, no. 2 (June- August 1996); Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey in Search of Security in the Middle East," Perceptions: Journal of International Af-fairs 1, no. 1 (March-May 1996), pp. 151-68.

31. George E. Gruen, "Turkish-Israeli Relations: Crisis or Continued Coopera- tion?"Jerusalem Letter, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 15 July 1996.

32. See Mahmut Bali Aykan, "The Pal- estinian Question in Turkish Foreign Pol- icy From the 1950s to the 1990s," International Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 1 (February 1993), pp. 91-110.

33. Former Turkish ambassador to Washington Sukru Elekdag has written, "When peace is struck between Syria and Israel, Damascus can be expected to pursue her objectives concerning Syrian demands over Hatay and the waters of the Euphrates much more actively. This would inevitably lead to strong tensions in Turkish-Syrian relations." Elekdag, "Two and a Half War Strategy," p. 52.

34. See Sabri Sayari, "Turkey's Islamist Challenge,"Middle East Quarterly 3, no. 3 (September 1996), pp. 35-43.

35. According to the public opinion polls conducted for the U.S. Information Agency in 1996, 47 percent of Turks see Turkey as part of the Muslim community, 27 percent view it as belonging to Eu- rope, and 15 percent say it is a member of "both." See "Turks Shift Toward Is- lamist Orientation, Staunch Secularism Declines," Opinion Analysis, U.S. Infor- mation Agency, Washington, 12 Septem- ber 1996.

36. For different perspectives and analyses of the identity issue in Turkey, see "Kimlik Tartismalari ve Etnik Mesele," Turkiye Gunlugu, no. 33 (March-April 1995).

37. See Sayari, "Turkey's Islamist Challenge."

38. Ibid. 39. See, for example, Erbakan's state-

ment in Huwiyet (Istanbul), 28 December 1996.

40. See "U.S. Decries Turkey's Gas Deal With Tehran," Washington Post, 13 August 1996; "Turkey-Iran Gas Deal: A Test of U.S. Law on Terror?" New York Times, 13 August 1996.

41. The Libyan leader's statements created a major uproar in Turkey, and Erbakan was criticized severely by the secularist parties and the media. See "Turk's Libya Trip Causes Political Crisis at Home," Washtngton Post, 8 October 1996; Sedat Ergin, "Erbakan'in Turkiye Cumhuriyetine Ayibi," Hurriyet (Istanbul), 10 October 1996.

42. See Huwiyet (Istanbul), 9 August 1996.

43. The next parliamentary elections are scheduled in 2000. However, there is a strong likelihood that Turkey will have early elections before the end of the full term of the current legislative session.

44. Refah has maintained close relations with Islamic groups such as Hamas and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. Repre- sentatives of several Islamist groups were present at the party's annual congress held in Ankara in August 1996. See Yeni Yuzyzl (Istanbul), 14 October 1996.

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