turkey and the middle east

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TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST: AMBITIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

Europe Report N203 7 April 2010


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i

I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1

A. RIGIDITY AND OPPORTUNISM.......................................................................................................1B. FUNDAMENTALS IN TURKEY-ISRAEL TIES....................................................................................2C. THENEARABROAD:SYRIA AND IRAQ .........................................................................................3

II. NEW ACTIVISM.............................................................................................................. 4

A. REBUFFS FROM EUROPE,STRAINS WITH THE U.S.........................................................................6B. THE ISLAM FACTOR.....................................................................................................................7C. THE TRADING STATE ...................................................................................................................9D. BUILDING REGIONAL INTEGRATION...........................................................................................11

III.TURKEY AS FACILITATOR....................................................................................... 14

A. SYRIA-ISRAEL PROXIMITY TALKS..............................................................................................14B. CONCILIATION WITH IRAN .........................................................................................................16C. OPENING UP TO HAMAS .............................................................................................................18

IV.LIMITS TO AMBITION................................................................................................ 20

A. MIDDLE EASTERN PERCEPTIONS OF TURKEY ............................................................................20B. DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS...........................................................................................................22C. DISPUTES WITH ISRAEL ..............................................................................................................23D. WESTERN ADMIRATION AND CONCERNS ...................................................................................25

V. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................ 29

APPENDICESA. MAP OF THE MIDDLE EAST REGION.................................................................................................30B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................31C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE .......................................................................32D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................33


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Turkey is launching initiative after ambitious initiativeaimed at stabilising the Middle East. Building on thesuccesses of its normalisation with Syria and Iraq, it isfacilitating efforts to reduce conflicts, expanding visa-free travel, ramping up trade, integrating infrastructure,forging strategic relationships and engaging in multilat-

eral regional platforms. For some, this new activism isevidence that Turkey is turning from its traditional alliesin Europe and the United States. In fact, its increasedrole in the Middle East is a complement to and evendependent on its ties to the West.

This report assesses Turkeys growing engagement withthe Middle East within the broader frame of Turkishforeign and trade policy. The process is still in its infancy,faces official scepticism in Arab governments and hasdivided opinion among Turkeys Western allies. Yet, theattempts to grow the regional economy, create interde-

pendence and foster peace have positive potential. At atime when negotiations to join the European Union (EU)have faltered, Ankara has adopted early EU gradualistintegration tactics for post-Second World War peace inEurope as a model for strengthening long-term stabilityand healing the divisions of the Middle East.

Turkeys self-declared zero-problem foreign policyto end disputes with its neighbours has worked well inSyria and Iraq, and its facilitation role in some MiddleEast conflicts has booked some success, for instance inhosting Syria-Israel proximity talks in 2008. Ankara has

been less effective, however, in intractable matters likethe dispute between Fatah and Hamas. The sharpeningtone of Turkey-Israel relations has raised Turkish leaders

popularity among Middle Eastern publics but has under-mined trust among traditional allies in Washington,Brussels and even some Arab capitals.

Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalknma Par-tisi, AKP) leaders rhetoric, and their new regional activ-ism extending from Persian Gulf states to Afghanistan,Pakistan and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference

(OIC), have given rise to perceptions that they havechanged Turkeys fundamental Westward direction tobecome part of an Islamist bloc, are attempting to revivethe Ottoman Empire or have turned to the East. These

are incorrect. The basic trends in the countrys regionalactivism seen today were well established before AKPcame to power, and NATO membership and the rela-tionship with the U.S. remain pillars of Turkish policy.

While Turkey is bitter over attacks by France, Germany

and others on its EU negotiation process between 2005and 2008, half of its trade is still with the EU, and lessthan one quarter of its exports go to Middle East states

a proportion typical for the past twenty years. Theglobal nature of Turkeys realignment is underlined bythe fact that Russia and Greece have been among the

biggest beneficiaries of its regional trade boom.

Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War, Turkey hasbeen shifting its foreign policy priority from hard securityconcerns to soft power and commercial interests andmoving away from being a kind of NATO-backed

regional gendarme to a more independent player deter-mined to use a plethora of regional integration tools inorder to be taken seriously on its own account. TurkeysU.S. and EU partners should support these efforts towardsstabilisation through integration.

Ankara has many balls in the air and sometimes promisesmore than it can deliver, over-sells what it has achievedand seeks a role far away when critical problems remainunsolved at home. Turkeys new prominence is partlyattributable to confusion in the region after the U.S. in-vasion of Iraq, a situation that is not necessarily perma-nent. Some Middle Eastern governments are also waryof the impact on their own publics of emotional Turkishrhetoric against Israel or about implicit claims to repre-sent the whole Muslim world.

Turkey should sustain the positive dynamics of its bal-anced relationships with all actors in the neighbourhoodand its efforts to apply innovatively the tactics of earlyEU-style integration with Middle East neighbours. Whiledoing so, however, it should pay attention to messaging,

both internationally, to ensure that gains with MiddleEastern public opinion are not undercut by loss of trustamong traditional allies, and domestically, to ensure thatall Turkish constituencies are included, informed andcommitted to new regional projects over the long term.


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Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and ConstraintsCrisis Group Europe Report N203, 7 April 2010 Page ii

Also, it will gain credibility and sustainability for itsambitions if it can solve disputes close to home first, likeCyprus and Armenia.

Middle Eastern elites worry about any sign of Ankaraturning its back on its EU accession process. Much of

their recent fascination with Turkeys achievements de-rives from the higher standards, greater prosperity, broaderdemocracy, legitimacy of civilian rulers, advances to-wards real secularism and successful reforms that haveresulted from negotiating for membership of the EU. At

the same time, Turkey and its leaders enjoy unprece-dented popularity and prestige in Middle Eastern publicopinion, notably thanks to their readiness to stand up toIsrael. Turkeys new strength, its experience in buildinga strong modern economy and its ambition to trade andintegrate with its neighbours offer a better chance than

most to bring more stability and reduce the conflictsthat have plagued the Middle East for so long.

Istanbul/Brussels, 7 April 2010


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I. INTRODUCTIONFor many decades after its establishment in 1923, modernTurkey ignored and at times scorned the Middle East.Republican founder Mustafa Kemal Atatrk and the newrulers blamed conservative Islamic ideas for holding back

progress in the region and turned their faces towards themodernity represented by Europe.1 There was bitternessamong many Turks, who saw Arab collaboration withthe British during the latters seizure of the region ashaving knifed the Ottoman Empire in the back.2 And,when the Arab world won independence after the Sec-ond World War, several states blamed many of their illson Ottoman Turkish misrule.

Alongside these basic dynamics during the early repub-lican era, Turkeys relationships with the Arab world andIsrael were subjected to great and sometimes emotional

swings between enthusiasm and deep distrust. Anothercharacteristic was a lack of planning or thinking aboutthe region, a problem that endured until the late 1990s.3

The end of the Cold War in 1991 was a turning point inboth Turkeys self-image and its regional role. Turgutzal, prime minister from 1983, and president from1989 until his death in 1993, inherited a country highlydependent on Western alliances and with poor to badrelations with its region.4 Breaking many taboos, he

1See Crisis Group Europe Report N184, Turkey and Europe:The Way Ahead, 17 August 2007.2As Turkish author Yaar Kemal put it, the Arabian deserts arealready full of our bones. See Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope,Turkey Unveiled: a History of Modern Turkey (London 1997),

p. 219.3There was no Middle East policy. Whenever I wrote articlesabout the region, people thought I was promoting an alterna-tive to the West. I was just saying that we should at least havea vision. Crisis Group interview, Meliha Altunk, dean,International Relations Department, Middle East TechnicalUniversity, Ankara, 12 February 2010.4During the Cold War, Turkey foreign policy was completelylinked to the West. Turkey implemented whatever was decidedin Washington, Brussels and London. Now the world haschanged. Sami Kohen, Milliyetsenior foreign affairs com-mentator, Istanbul Policy Centre speech, 7 December 2009.

started improving relations with eight often difficultneighbours. 5

Another key figure in articulating a new, all-round Turk-ish foreign policy was the late smail Cem, foreign min-ister between 1997 and 2002. He was the co-architectwith his Greek counterpart of one of the major regional

breakthroughs of the past decade, normalisation between

Turkey and Greece. He initiated meetings between theEuropean Union (EU) and the Organisation of the IslamicConference (OIC), a harmonious new approach to neigh-

bours, engagement with Israel and the Palestinians andcooperation for more economic interdependence.6 Themove from near armed conflict with Syria in 1998 toremarkable demonstrations of integration was largely theresult of actions taken by Cem and the highly secularistadministration that preceded the Justice and Develop-ment Party (Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi, AKP).

A. RIGIDITY AND OPPORTUNISMAfter the Second World War, Soviet threats to seize con-trol of north-western and north-eastern Turkey forcedAnkara into close alliance with the U.S. and membershipof the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Tur-key created a Cold War role for itself as a U.S.-backedregional gendarme, opposing itself to countries in theMiddle East that were often aligned with the SovietUnion. The rigidity and regional loneliness of the rolefitted in with Turkeys early republican development

5Turkeys direct neighbours are Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia,Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Syria, and it shares sea bor-ders with Russia and Cyprus. For the purposes of this report,the Middle East means Arab League members and Iran.6AKP makes it look like theyre first to say everything, buteven the idea that Turkey should be a central country wasfirst said by [the late Turkish leader] Ecevit. Crisis Groupinterview, Meliha Altunk, dean, International Relations De-

partment, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 12 Feb-ruary 2010. When I travelled with [the late Foreign Minister]Cem, we first suggested lots of these initiatives but didntreally have an impact, because our image was different. Turkey

has changed now. We have a strong government, Davutoluhas a clear vision, and he is pushing the neighbourhood pol-icy to the maximum. Crisis Group interview, senior Turkishofficial, Ankara, March 2010.


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Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and ConstraintsCrisis Group Europe Report N203, 7 April 2010 Page 2

model, in which its rulers tried to construct a self-sufficient country with a state and one-party rule thattook all major political and economic decisions.

Turkeys image as an agent of American policy in theMiddle East appeared confirmed to the new nationalist

governments of the Arab world when, in 1955, it rashlypushed for the creation of the Baghdad Pact, a short-lived, U.S.-backed attempt to bring every nation in theregion into an alliance against the Soviet Union.7 By1958, Turkey had signed a secret accord with Israel andIran, joining forces against the Arabs. Then Turkey tookFrances side in opposing Algerian independence. TheArab attitude was summarised by Egypts President

Nasser, when he publicly declared Turkey persona nongrata in the Arab world a sentiment many Turks recip-rocated with folk sayings like never get mixed up in theaffairs of Arabs.8

Turkey began to open up again to the Arab world after1964, when the U.S. denied Ankara support in theworsening Cyprus dispute.9 Then, after the first oil boomof the 1970s, Turkey saw an opportunity in the petro-dollar wealth of its neighbours. New Arab markets laidthe foundations for Turkeys first boom in external trade

beyond its former mainstays of hazelnuts and dried figs.Many of Turkeys construction companies got their startin this period and went on to become major regional

players. This was accompanied by an upsurge of sym-pathy with the Palestinians then based not so much ona shared perception of Muslim identity as on a sharedleftist ideology. However, even then, the overridingmotivation was a sense of economic interest.10

However much Turkeys new activism has improved itsrelations with the Middle East and other neighbours, itshistory anchors it in European and Western institutions.It is a member of NATO since the 1950s, indeed of al-most every European organisation except the EU, whichit is negotiating to join. In the UN, it has always been

part of the Western European and Others Group. Sincebecoming a non-permanent member of the SecurityCouncil in 2008, it has not conspicuously represented

7Turkey pursued a Middle East policy that was ill-informedand lacked judgement. Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms:Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (London, 2003)

pp. 241-249.8Pope and Pope, Turkey Unveiled, op. cit., pp. 223-227.9Turkish leaders and public opinion were shocked when Presi-dent Lyndon Johnson sent a letter warning Ankara that the

U.S. would not protect Turkey if its actions over Cyprus pro-voked a Soviet intervention. Crisis Group interviews, Turkishofficials, Ankara, March 2010.10Robins, Suits and Uniforms, op. cit., pp. 241-249.

or acted as a spokesman for any specifically Arab orIslamic agenda.11

B. FUNDAMENTALS IN TURKEY-ISRAEL TIESTurkey became one of the first countries to recognisethe State of Israel in 1949, and diplomats were exchangedin 1952. These actions were due to its wish to consolidateits place in the Western alliance, to its historically goodrelationship with Jewish communities in the Middle East12and a bad relationship with the new Arab nation states.13

For Israel, a good relationship with Turkey fitted into apolicy of making alliances, covert and overt, with coun-tries on its periphery, whether Arab or non-Arab. Turkeywas the most important and public component of thisstrategy,14 and Ankara remains one of Israels most im-

portant diplomatic missions.

The relationship went through a golden era in the 1990s,as Turkey sought to encourage the Oslo Process thatappeared to be bringing a settlement between Israel andthe Palestinians; to gain leverage in its problematic re-lationship with Syria; to have access to sophisticatedIsraeli weaponry; and to win pro-Israel U.S. lobbyinggroups as allies against the Armenian diaspora, which wasseeking U.S. official recognition of Ottoman-era mas-sacres of Armenians in 1915 as genocide. Israeli touristsflocked to Turkish resorts. Oil prices also reached rock

bottom, wiping out the spending power of the rest ofthe Middle East.

11As a Security Council member, Turkey has shown itselfbalanced in its general positions, professional in handling thecommittee on North Korean sanctions and not notably differ-ent in actions on Iran from non-Middle Eastern countries likeBrazil or China. A threat in 2009 by Prime Minister Erdoanthat Turkey would raise in the Security Council Chinese ac-

tions against Turkic Uygurs at the time of disturbances inXinjiang did not materialise. Crisis Group interviews, UNdiplomats, New York, February-March 2010.12Turkey also takes pride in the welcome it has offered Jewsfleeing European persecution, notably from Spain in 1492and Jewish academics from Germany in the 1930s and 1940s.13The Soviet presence in the region, and its alliances, madeTurkey feel very insecure. The presence of [Israel] was seen

positively, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Similarly,after the Cold War, Syria was a threat, Iran was a threat, inter-nationally and domestically. Our number one and number. twothreats were directly connected to Iran and Syria. Crisis Groupinterview, Gen. (ret.) Haldun Solmaztrk, 10 February 2010.14For Jerusalem, the intimacy between the two governmentswas second only to U.S.-Israel relations. Efraim Inbar, direc-tor, Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies, Israeli-TurkishTensions and Beyond, Turkish Policy Quarterly, fall 2009.


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Turkey upgraded its diplomatic envoy to ambassadoriallevel in 1992. It signed a military partnership withIsrael in 1996, including permission for Israel to useTurkeys wide highlands for aerial exercises. Intelligencesharing and counter-terrorism cooperation grew. Turkeywas also interested in military technology modernisa-

tion of its American M-60 tanks and F-4 warplanes andthe purchase of unmanned drones which, unlike theU.S. and the EU, Israel was willing to supply quicklyand without uncomfortable conditions.

Nevertheless, the relationship has fluctuated greatly. Therehas always been Turkish popular sympathy for the plightof the Palestinians. The relationship hit lows under non-AKP governments after the 1967 Israeli-Arab war and in1980, when Israel declared Jerusalem its capital. Ten-sions also rose during the first and second Palestinianintifadas. Indeed, during Israeli occupations of West

Bank towns in April 2002, the firmly secular late PrimeMinister Blent Ecevit characterised Israeli actions asgenocide.15 The relationship has come under morestrain as Turkish politics has become more subject to

public opinion16 and at all times of worsening Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

C. THE NEARABROAD:SYRIA AND IRAQDuring the late twentieth century, Turkeys most prob-lematic Middle Eastern relationships were with Syria

and Iraq. It is emblematic of its new success that rela-tions with Damascus and Baghdad are now among the

best.17 The strategic aim of a deliberate focus on thesetwo countries is to make 45 million consumers moreaccessible to Turkish trade and to reverse more than adecade in which they had been the source of subversionand armed attacks.

Syria had particularly strong anti-Turkish feelings be-cause Turkey, thanks to a colonial-era gift by France,had taken over the valuable province of Alexandrettaand turned it into the Turkish province of Hatay. The

two countries were also at opposite poles of the ColdWar, with Turkey solidly in the NATO camp and Syriamostly aligned with the Soviet Union. Especially after

15People think Turkey has turned its back on Israel [in 2009]because AKP is an Islamist party with a hidden agenda.That is not true [since criticism of Israel has been done by allkinds of previous governments]. brahim Kaln, chief foreign

policy adviser to the Turkish prime minister, interview withal-Majalla, 26 November 2009.16Israelis and Americans have felt in the past that if youregood with the Turkish military, then things work. This is notthe case any more. Sami Kohen, speech, op. cit.17We want close relations with these two countries especially.Crisis Group interview, senior Turkish official, January 2010.

the 1980s, Turkey began building extensive dams on theTigris-Euphrates river system, reducing water flows into

parched northern Syria.

Syria used its political prestige as a leading Arab state toturn the Arab League and the broader Arab world against

Turkey. Its state-run media frequently attacked Turkey.Partly due to a suspicion that Syrian domestic opponentsfound safe haven in Turkey, Syria allowed Turkish Kurdmilitants of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) to setup military training camps in Lebanon and let PKKleader Abdullah calan base himself in Damascus.

Turkeys frustration, along with Syrian weakness as Rus-sian support waned, brought matters to a head in 1998.Amid Turkish military posturing on the heavily armed

border, a top Turkish general issued what amounted toan ultimatum. Soon Damascus asked PKK leader calan

to leave, paving the way to his capture in Kenya. Almostimmediately, Turkey switched to a policy of embracingits former Syrian antagonists, setting the stage for theextraordinary blooming of trade and political relationsover the next decade.

Political differences between Ankara and Baghdad werealways far less than between Ankara and Damascus, butIraqs instability after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait madeit a more immediate security problem. Internationalsanctions meant Turkey lost its second-biggest trading

partner overnight, and in April 1991, 500,000 Iraqi

Kurdish refugees fled to and over the Turkish border.Sudden unemployment along the trade route encouragedrecruits to Turkeys ethnic Kurdish militant insurgency.The situation was made even worse for Ankara by theway the U.S.-led reversal of the Kuwait invasion wasfollowed by years of a security vacuum just over the

border in northern Iraq, accompanied by what might bethe beginnings of an independent Kurdish state. A newgeneration of challenges appeared after the U.S. inva-sion of Iraq in 2003, with a real possibility of Iraq

breaking up and a redrawing of Middle Eastern bordersand strategic balances.

Fears that the U.S. invasion would further destabilise theregion and consolidate a Kurdish emancipation process,

buttressed by massive Turkish popular opposition toany war, lay behind the parliaments unexpected refusalto allow the passage of U.S. troops through Turkey toIraq on 1 March 2003.18 This decision led to four years

18This decision included a paradox: Turkish nationalist depu-ties opposed allowing U.S. troops to transit because the U.S.

action might lead to an independent Kurdish state, whileTurkish Kurd deputies opposed it because they believed Turk-ish troops might follow the Americans into northern Iraq andcrush the fragile Kurdistan regional government.


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of stress with Washington and the new U.S.-dominatedregime in Iraq. However, in October 2007, Turkey andthe U.S. came to an entente that included a Washington-

brokered understanding between Turkey and the Kurdi-stan Regional Government in northern Iraq, in whichthe Iraqi Kurds pledged solidarity with Ankara in its

fight against PKK insurgents.19

The long-standing strategy of allowing its businessmento bind the Iraqi Kurdish economy tightly into Turkeyacquired a real political dimension, as dialogue withIraqs Kurdistan Regional Government began. In March2010, this reached a high point with the arrival of aTurkish consul-general in Arbil, the seat of the IraqiKurdish administration. From Turkeys perspective, afundamental shift occurred when Syria and Iraq stoppedgiving covert support to Kurdish militants.20 And ifTurkish warplanes bomb PKK militant camps deep in

Iraq, it often happens that Iranian artillery is shellingrelated PJAK21 camps in the same area on the same day.

19See Crisis Group Middle East Report N81, Turkey andIraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperation?, 13 November 2008.20Ironically, Turkeys Kurdish reforms mean that Syria now fearssuppressed Kurds may look to Turkey to demand more rights.21The PJAK (the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan) is closelyrelated to the PKK but principally active in Iran.

II. NEW ACTIVISMSince sweeping to power in 2002, the AKP has changed

both the style and the substance of Turkeys policy to-ward the Middle East. But debate continues on how much

is really new, whether the policy treats the Middle Eastdifferently from neighbouring countries elsewhere, whetherthere is a specifically Muslim or even Islamist dynamicand whether this policy replaces or supplements Turkeyslong-running post-Second World War alliances with

NATO and the EU.

Principal AKP actors have included Prime Minister RecepTayyip Erdoan, President Abdullah Gl and ForeignMinister Ahmet Davutolu. These centre-right, religious-minded leaders were at least sympathetic to Islamism intheir youth, when Erdoan and Gl were prominent in

the religious-oriented former Welfare Party (Refah Partisi,RP). All are noticeably warmer and more outgoing toMuslim and Eastern partners than Turkeys traditionalWestern allies.22 While Prime Minister Erdoan stayedaway from Brussels for four years until January 2009,23he and other AKP leaders have visited Middle East stateswith dizzying frequency. On top of his long-standingtendency to fiery denunciations of Israel, Erdoan in

particular has espoused a rhetorical enthusiasm for Mid-dle East actors seen as hardline in the West.

Many AKP leaders grew more cautious about Middle

East engagements after domestic and international re-buffs during their short period in power with the Wel-fare Party in 1996/1997.24 While he used to see Turkeyas an integral part of the Middle East,25 President Glnow prioritises an EU perspective and describes Turkeys

philosophy as feeling responsible to take care of the

22Crisis Group interviews, Turkish officials, Ankara, February-March 2010. When [former Turkish leaders Tansu] iller and[Turgut] zal visited [Western capitals] theyd take a fewhours to wander round. Erdoan feels out of place. He feels

more comfortable in Tehran and Damascus. Sami Kohen,speech, op. cit. Nevertheless, Erdoan sent his children to beeducated in the U.S. and Italy and did take time on a recentvisit to Rome to go with his family to agelateria.23Prior to 2005, however, Erdoan had been a relatively fre-quent visitor to Brussels.24Most notable internationally was an incident in which Libyanleader Muammar Gaddafi insulted Prime Minister NecmettinErbakan over the Kurdish question during a meeting aired liveon television in his tent in Libya. Domestically, Middle East-ern involvements helped build sentiment against the WelfareParty and played a role in the Turkish Armed Forces indirectousting of its government in February 1997.25As a parliamentarian in the mid-1990s, Gl expressed Tur-keys regional ambition as: We dont want to be the last ofthe foxes. We want to be the head of the sheep. Yeni Yzyl,9 June 1996.


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region around us. Some problems are directly related tous. With some we dont have a direct link. We want tocontribute to a resolution of them all.26

The key Turkish foreign policy actor of the past decadeis Foreign Minister Davutolu. An academic who has

written about history and geography as the key sourcesof Turkeys strength,27 he became the chief foreign pol-icy adviser to Prime Minister Erdoan in 2003 and wasappointed foreign minister in May 2009. He nowepitomises the new activism.28 He lists his goals as theconsolidation of democracy and the settlement ofdisputes, which directly or indirectly concern Turkey.29Once described as part Machiavelli, part Rumi,30 hehimself says he balances realism and idealism.31 He also

positions himself politically somewhere between the soft-spoken President Gl and the more combative PrimeMinister Erdoan.32

Davutolu describes his policy as a proactive diplomacywith the aim of strengthening prosperity, stability andsecurity cultural harmony and mutual respect utmostintegration and full cooperation in Turkeys neighbour-hood, a geopolitical crossroads in which he includes theBalkans, the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea,the Mediterranean and the Middle East from the Gulf to

North Africa.33 Moving away from the defensive ap-proach of some of his predecessors, which focused cau-tiously on the consolidation of an inward-looking Turk-ish nation state, he asserts:

Turkey enjoys multiple regional identities the uniquecombination of our history and geography brings withit a sense of responsibility a call of duty arising fromthe depths of a multi-dimensional history for Turkey.34

26Crisis Group interview, Ankara, 3 March 2010.27For a good prcis of Davutolus bookStratejik Derinlik,Trkiyenin Uluslararas Konumu [Strategic Depth, TurkeysInternational Position] (Istanbul, 2001), see Joshua Walker,Understanding Turkeys Foreign Policy Through Strategic

Depth, Transatlantic Academy paper, November 2009.28Davutolu is the driver, the intellectual force, saying thatwe cant just hunker down if we want to be the country wesay we want to be. Crisis Group interview, European dip-lomat, Ankara, January 2010.29Ahmet Davutolu, Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in2010, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Fall 2009.30Meaning that he combines the pragmatic ruthlessness ofthe mediaeval adviser to Italian princes and the mystical di-vine inspiration of the Persian/Turkish poet.31Yigal Schleifer, Ahmet Davutolu: A Thinker in the Hallsof Power, World Policy Review, 2 February 2010.32Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Ankara, Febru-ary 2010.33Davutolu, Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010,op. cit.34Ibid.

Beyond history, geography, and expanding exports, Tur-key has good security reasons to minimise differenceswith Iran, Syria and Iraq,35 which have at various times

been the source of real attempts at destabilisation, ter-rorist attacks and political subversion.36 With one footin Europe and the other in the Middle East, Turkey is

alarmed that it will be torn in two by Western talk ofclash of civilisations, or a main victim if global fearsthat Tehran is developing a nuclear weapon lead to a newround of UN sanctions or military action.37 Solving prob-lems with neighbours, or being seen trying to do so, givesTurkey greater geopolitical stature.38 Finally, AKP lead-ers perceive it as a way of building domestic support.39

Sami Kohen, a commentator closely following Turkishforeign policy since the early 1950s, says the MiddleEast activism has a selfish as well as an idealistic side:

Any government that engages like this has a selfishpurpose, a sense of mission, that this area is in tur-moil, and that since we are in this area we are muchmore qualified [to intervene]. It has in mind the roleof an important regional power. In fact whetherTurkey is successful or not, if it gains prestige, thatgives a lot of good feelings to people in Ankara; theyfind it very profitable for increasing their influence.40

35If some say the economy is the main goal of our expan-sion, I could easily counter that security is equally important.Crisis Group interview, Turkish diplomat serving in theMiddle East, February 2010.36Our approach is very simple. We want stability. We sufferedmost. We were importing lots of security problems from theMiddle East, arms, terrorist training. We have decided thatwe cannot remain indifferent. Crisis Group interview, senior

Turkish official, February 2010.37They see themselves as potentially on the front line of a newCold War, just like they were on the front line against theSoviets. Crisis Group interview, EU official, Ankara, Feb-ruary 2010.38Once Turkey solves problems with its neighbours, it hasnothing to worry about. Then Israel will certainly need Tur-key more than Turkey needs Israel. Crisis Group interview,Arab diplomat, Ankara, February 2010. All these involve-ments help Turkey to gain ground. Turkey turns into an accept-able and influential player. Turkey was always outside the dis-cussions. Arabs never like a foreign actor involved in Arabaffairs. [Early on] I felt it personally. It was like I was a total

alien. Crisis Group interview, Blent Aras, Middle East ex-pert, Ankara, 11 February 2010.39Ibid.40Speech, op. cit.


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A. REBUFFS FROM EUROPE,STRAINSWITH THE U.S.

After it came to power in 2002, the AKPs focus was onTurkeys traditional Western allies.41 AKP leader Erdoanwas received by the U.S. president even before he be-came prime minister. The AKP put its emphasis on pur-suing negotiations for full EU membership, proving thisin 2003/2004 by ending decades of hardline policy onCyprus and supporting the ill-fated Annan Plan.

Two setbacks undermined this pro-Western commitment.The first was in March 2003, when Turkish deputiesdecided not to allow U.S. troops to transit Turkey ontheir way to invade Iraq, a surprise parliamentary upsetthat turned AKP leaders faces visibly pale. For thenext four years, bilateral relations suffered great strain,compounded by Turkish popular disapproval of theU.S. invasion of Iraq.42 At its lowest point, the numberof Turks approving of the U.S. sank to 9 per cent, thelowest rating in the world.43

The second upset came in April 2004, when Greek Cyp-riot voters overwhelmingly rejected the UNs Annan planfor a Cyprus settlement, even though it was backed bythe Turks and Turkish Cypriots, as well as the EU andU.S. Turkish and especially EU leaders failed to man-age the great difficulties that resulted, and six yearslater, Turkeys EU negotiations remain hostage to the

Cyprus dispute. This has been compounded by opposi-tion to Turkeys EU accession by populist politicians inFrance, Germany and other EU states44 and a shift inWestern perceptions of Turkey after its leaders outburstsagainst Israels Gaza war in 2008/2009.

Both these developments put pressure on AKP leadersto give voice to new ideas.45 Building on political open-

41Ironically, Turkeys nationalist and secularist camps haveconsistently accused AKP of somehow being slaves of the

West who are implementing its plans. Best-selling books havealso portrayed Prime Minister Erdoan and President Gl asIsraeli stooges.42U.S.-Turkish relations have seriously deteriorated. F. StephenLarrabee, Troubled Partnership: U.S.-Turkish Relations inan Era of Global Geopolitical Change (Santa Monica, 2010).43Pew Global Attitudes Project, 27 June 2007.44Turkey and its leaders are disenchanted with the EU. TheEUs treatment of Turkey borders on humiliating. Crisis Groupinterview, Turkish official, Washington DC, November 2009.45Most Turks now feel the plan to join the EU is not realistic.It makes people think about a new world order, a revenge-seeking mindset, well show them. Its very dangerous, a

drift towards an alliance of authoritarian states, and authori-tarianism means that militarism could make a comeback. lterTuran, speech to Transatlantic Academy, Washington DC, 17

November 2009.

ings in the Middle East was an obvious choice, much asit was after a U.S. rebuff over Cyprus in 1964 (seeabove). Turkeys goal has long been to stabilise its

backyard and advance trade. But the new, highly activeapproach triggered a debate over whether Turkey haschanged the style or substance of its policy.

In the past it was the opposite, we wanted nothing todo with the region [the Middle East]. The foreignministry saw it as a swamp that we shouldnt get into.AKP wants to use soft power, interdependence andcooperation, that is, getting rid of the realist schoolof the 1990s, which emphasised the role of militaryand hard power. AKP wants regional solutions to

problems, which is the old Ottoman style. And AKPwants to speak with everyone, whereas previousgovernments did not.46

To some extent, Turkeys rhetoric may have a mainspringin the bitterness it feels at EU statements and policies.47Foreign Minister Davutolu hinted as much, sayingTurkeys Middle East activism is linked to its wish to

be taken more seriously in the West, or, as he often putsit in reference to the Central Asian origins of the Turks,like the drawing back of the bow to make the arrowfly farther.48 Similarly, in a closed meeting, he report-edly said that he was deliberately putting Turkish em-

bassies in prestigious sites in North African capitals, sothat wherever [French President] Sarkozy goes hellsee a Turkish flag.49

Watching the economic and strategic stumbling of Europehas made Turkish intellectuals pose new questions. 50Career officials of the Turkish foreign ministry, the most

pro-EU institution in the country, say they have lost theirawe of and respect for Europe.51 Senior AKP appointees

46Crisis Group interview, Meliha Altunk, dean, InternationalRelations Department, Middle East Technical University, An-kara, 12 February 2010.47Punning on the Turkish and Arabic word for Syria and itssurrounding region, Sham, Erdoan said: They may have theSchengen visas in the EU, so we decided to create a Shamgenvisa. Interview with Al Arabiya television, 14 October 2009.48A senior Turkish official put it in plainer language: Well betaken more seriously in the West if were stronger in the East.Crisis Group interview, Washington DC, November 2009.49Erhan Seven, Sarkozy gittii her yerde bizi grecek [Sarkozywill see us everywhere he goes], Yeni afak, 24 November 2009.50Apart from the negative signals concerning Turkeys EUmembership, the growing feeling is that there is somethingseriously amiss in Europe, both politically and economically,that Turks should look at more closely in trying to chart theirfuture. Semih Idiz, Suddenly, the EU seems less attractive

for Turks,Hrriyet Daily News, 18 February 2010.51I used to be in awe of Europe when I went to European cities.I felt very different today, Im just not so impressed. Nowwhen I come back to Turkey I think were doing just fine.


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judge that there is no longer a convincing Western axis.52Turks now have money to spend, are angered by humili-ating requirements to obtain visas to EU states and areready to try new horizons. Attention lavished on Turkey

by Middle Eastern newspapers and visitors has natu-rally affected the public too.53brahim Kaln, the prime

ministers chief foreign policy adviser, said the policyhad some new style, some new substance:

[It] includes proactive diplomacy, zero-problem di-plomacy, not confrontation but engagement, and softpower. Turkey exercises power according to invari-ables its position at a crossroads of energy andsecurity, its geopolitical position and its history,including the heritage of the Ottoman Empire andvariables, including a young population, democracy,strong non-governmental organisations and a strongeconomy that is the sixth biggest in Europe and the

seventeenth biggest in the world.54

B. THE ISLAM FACTORTurkey says its main strategic relationships remain withWestern alliances like NATO and the EU, and that itszero-problem with neighbours foreign policy is basedon equal distance with all players in the region. Butsome AKP leaders rhetoric at least implies they may

be laying the ground for the creation of a Muslimbloc.55 AKP leaders have at times talked of Prime Min-

ister Erdoan as being the representative of the 1.5 bil-lion Muslims of the world.56

Such thinking is reinforced by the fact that in all majorareas, the Caucasus, Balkans, the Middle East and Cyprus,Turkey is the champion of the Azeris, Bosniaks, Pales-

Crisis Group interview, senior Turkish official, Ankara, De-cember 2009.52Turkey is no longer a stagnant country living in the shadowof superpowers in a Cold War world. History no longer flows

from west to east If we know what we are doing at a timewhen Europe and America are feeling muddled, whose faultis that? brahim Kaln, chief foreign policy adviser to PrimeMinister Erdoan, interview with al-Majalla, 26 November 2009.53We Turks are emotional, we react quickly. Weve alwayshad sympathy for the Palestinians, but when the Arab world

begin to say such nice things about us, we began to feel muchmore interested. Crisis Group interview, Turkish university

professor, March 2010.54Speech, Middle East Institute, 9 October 2009.55There is an illogical element in these relations with theleaders of Sudan, Iran, Hamas. You wonder if these guys arenot pursuing an Islamic bonding policy. The rhetoric is there.

It may turn into reality. Prof. Soli zel, Turkish commenta-tor, speech to the Propeller Club, Istanbul, 20 January 2010.56Crisis Group interview, Egemen Ba, Turkeys state min-ister and chief EU negotiator, 19 February 2009.

tinians and Turkish Cypriots; that is, supporting a Mus-lim side against non-Muslims.57 The popularity of AKPsleaders in the Middle East is as much because of theiranti-Israel positions as the signs of Turkish progress.58

Prime Minister Erdoans rhetoric in particular raises

eyebrows.59

On a visit to Saudi Arabia, he said in aspeech that cooperation with Riyadh was for him just asimportant as EU membership.60 He praised Turkeysrediscovery of Syria by saying my brothers the riverhas found its riverbed.61 Erdoan also often comparesAKP to the Palestinian militant group Hamas, sayingthat this is because both won an election and then facedobstacles to taking power.62 Most noticeable in thisregard was his comment appearing to defend SudansPresident Omar al-Bashir when he was indicted by theInternational Criminal Court for atrocities in Darfur:Let me say this very openly and clearly. It is absolutely

impossible for someone who is part of our civilisation,someone who has given himself over to our religion ofIslam, to commit genocide.63

The Turkish academic elected in 2004 to head the OIC,Ekmeleddin Ihsanolu, has gone as far as to proposethe formation of an Islamic Court of Justice and anOIC Peace and Security Council, as well as a joint peace-keeping force drawn from Islamic countries.64 Turkey has

57There is a sense that there is exaggerated support for Islamistparties in conflicts, and an exaggerated bias against the non-Muslim side. Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat,Ankara, January 2010.58Crisis Group interview, Arab diplomat, Ankara, January 2010.59He is turning into a hero, hes the only one raising his voice[eg, against Israel]. Its his style. His advisers are trying tochange his style, but its his preference. Crisis Group inter-view, Blent Aras, Middle East expert, Ankara, 12 February2010.60Erdoan: AB ne ise, Saudi Arabistan da o [Erdoan: what-ever the EU is [to us], that is what Saudi Arabia is too],Radikal,19 January 2010. A Saudi official in the region said

Erdoan was wrong in this analysis. Crisis Group inter-view, February 2010.61Speech to businessmen in Syria, 23 December 2009.62Indeed, the mainstream religious-oriented political partiesin Turkey, particularly AKP, have never had anything to dowith armed struggle. Nevertheless, as one Turkish commen-tator noted, when [Erdoan] talks of Hamas and says whenwe won the election they said a town hall politician cant runTurkey, but it didnt turn out that way, hes creating a sub-conscious equivalence between himself, his party and Hamas.Sedat Ergin,Milliyet, 27 January 2009.63Speech to AKP Istanbul officials,Radikal,9 November 2009.Erdoan also said he was one of the few world leaders who

had actually been to Darfur and brought aid, and that even ifhe did not believe he saw evidence of a genocide, he wasable to say to Bashir what needed to be said.64See www.oic-oci.org/topic_detail.asp?t_id=3246.


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taken no official position on these suggestions, but suchideas have fed domestic arguments between pro-Islamicand pro-secularist commentators about what AKP is reallyaiming for, since the AKP government supported hisappointment.65 At least one Turkish academic believesthe partys embrace of the Middle East as our civilisa-

tion may be an attempt to change Turkeys self-imageas a secular nation.66

Secularist critics in Turkey are particularly suspiciousof AKPs ultimate intentions and warn that it aims forregional leadership under an Islamic banner. Accordingto General (ret.) Haldun Solmaztrk:

They live in a different world. In Erdoans mind,the world is black and white, between our civilisa-tion, meaning Islam, and the rest. The foreign min-ister talked in Pakistan about using our imam hatip

[religious high] schools as a model, suggesting thata mild Islam is the idea, and that we may be next.[AKP leaders] love to talk about Gaza and Hamas. Ifeel the same as they do about the wrongs done [inPalestine]. But what about what went on in Iran, inSudan, now in Nigeria? What is the reason for thisdouble standard?67

Some argue that Prime Minister Erdoans rhetoricalexcesses are part of a strategy to gain the confidence ofsome Middle East hardliners that is essential becausemore moderate Arab governments like those of Egypt,

Saudi Arabia and Jordan are hesitant to make space forTurkey.68 Others believe it is simply Erdoans personalsense of being an outsider that makes him back any third-world representative against the West.69

65If most conflicts are happening in the Middle East or Is-lamic World, then we have to encourage the mechanisms to

prevent these clashes. Commentatorbrahim Karagl, Yeniafak, 29 January 2010. There seems to be no such commoninterest between the Islamic countries. While the Western

world is debating a clash of civilisations [which Turkeycriticises], I do not know what to say about the dream of es-tablishing a common military force for religious reasons.Commentator Mehmet Ylmaz,Hrriyet, 29 January 2010.66The academic pointed out that one of the pioneers of thenew all-round Turkish foreign policy, smail Cem, always talkedof Turkeys many civilisations. Crisis Group interview,Meliha Altunk, dean, International Relations Department,Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 12 February 2010.67Crisis Group interview, Gen. (ret.) Haldun Solmaztrk, An-kara, 10 January 2010.68Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Ankara, Febru-ary 2010.69Erdoan was brought up in the rough Istanbul neighbour-hood of Kasmpaa, whose men are a byword in Turkey formacho toughness. Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat,Ankara, February 2010.

Turkish officials, however, insist that Turkeys officiallanguage is one of optional cooperation, not Islamic unityor coercion,70 and underline that the prime minister givesvoice to an essential Middle Eastern demand for morerespect.71 Erdoan himself talks of Turkey being a share-holder in the building of a new Middle East in order

to spread peace and trade, based on a common region,a common geography.72 He says he takes positions not

because of Muslim identity, but because a batteredregion73 needs normalisation.74 One official, noting

booming Israeli Turkish trade, tourist arrivals and dip-lomatic contacts in 2008, said recent Israeli censurewas particularly unfair:

Israel regards Turkeys criticisms in the last year asa reflection of [the AKPs] increasingly Islamic pro-

pensities. Turkey rejects this strongly. [Turkey-Israel]relations peaked in 2008 on every level six years

after AKPs rise to power.75

For now, Turkeys relations with Middle Eastern statesare based on a host of common interests, not mainly onthe idea of creating a Muslim or Islamist global option.76Western diplomats in Ankara tend to view Erdoansoutbursts as emotional rather than established policy.77His Turkish supporters usually try to dilute commentslike a Muslim cannot commit genocide, not seize them

70The [Persian] Gulf is more afraid of Iran as a hegemonicpower. Crisis Group interview, Turkish official, Ankara,March 2010.71One can talk of a certain populism, but this is also a nec-essary voice that needs to be raised for dignitys sake. With-out this, all diplomatic activity is condemned to failure. Youhave to take account of the landscape of the Middle East. CrisisGroup interview, senior Turkish official, Ankara, March 2010.72We will build the future of the Middle East as a share-holding structure. This will strengthen not just the foundation

and infrastructure of Turkey-Syria relations but also that ofMiddle East peace. Recep Tayyip Erdoan, speech to busi-nessmen in Syria, 23 December 2009.73The Middle East being named as a region of blood andtears makes our hearts ache. Recep Tayyip Erdoan, speechon acceptance of King Faisal prize for Service to Islam,Riyadh, 9 March 2010.74Is raising Turkeys trade volume with Syria a shifting ofaxis? Or is it normalisation? Of course its normalisation.Recep Tayyip Erdoan, speech in Syria, op. cit.75Crisis Group interview, Turkish diplomat in the Middle East,February 2010.76Larrabee, Troubled Partnership, op. cit.77On at least two occasions, Davutolu has privately told West-ern partners that Erdoans more radical statements were emo-tional outbursts rather than state policy. Crisis Group inter-views, Ankara, February 2010.


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as radical rallying cries.78 A leading Turkish commenta-tor agrees:

Turkey is not abandoning the West, and doesnt wantto. The EU remains the main incentive for the reform

process. Ive never seen the parliament work day

and night for anything else. We want Turkey to be acivilised modern country. Lets not forget that our

priority is the West. But our posture in the world isenhanced by this policy [of Middle East activism].79

There is also no doubt that under the AKP Turkey hasmade ground-breaking efforts to solve its problems withits Christian neighbours, the Armenians and GreekCypriots, even if they have failed so far. A leadingindependent academic believes that the government ofTurkey would be pursuing the same policies even iffate had made it Christian.80 Conversely, AKPs embrace

may have helped ensure the survival of the secular re-gime of mainly Muslim Syria.81 Some Syrians believe itis precisely the moderating influence of AKPs religiousside that is appealing to Damascus, whose secularistregime has in the past bitterly fought opponents fromthe Muslim brotherhood.82

Turkeys activism has not just been in Muslim or Mid-dle Eastern countries either. Its concept of High-LevelStrategic Relationships was pioneered with Europeancountries. Facilitation between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina helped make the appointment of a Bosnian

ambassador to Belgrade possible after several years ofstalemate. Turkey is now also facilitating talks betweenBosnia and Croatia. In January, the Parliamentary As-sembly of the Council of Europe elected an AKP dep-uty as its new president. In 2008, Turkey actively wooed

78In an 11 November 2009 Turkish state television interviewErdoan himself explained: I cant talk comfortably to [Is-raeli prime minister ] Netanyahu but I can comfortably talkto Bashir. I can easily say what youre doing is wrong. Isay it to his face. Why? A Muslim shouldnt do such a thing.

A Muslim cannot commit genocide. If there is any such thing,we say so openly. Turkey is at ease with itself in this respect.It has that self-confidence, at least. www.cnnturk.com/2009/turkiye/11/08/erdogana.gore.darfurda.soykirim.yok/550901.0/index.html.79Sami Kohen, speech, op. cit.80Turkeys regional politics are not mainly ideologically driven,

but structurally driven. If Turkey was a successor of the Byz-antine Empire and Christian, it would by and large pursue thesame policies. ... theres more continuity than change. CrisisGroup interview, Soli zel, Istanbul, 1 March 2010.81AKPs moral and economic support came to the aid of Syriashighly secularist Baathist regime at its most vulnerable point

in 2003-2004. Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, An-kara, February 2010.82Crisis Group interview, Syrian businessman, Damascus, 26January 2010.

dozens of African states to win election to a non-permanent UN Security Council seat for 2009-2010.While AKPs foreign policy has sometimes been calledecono-Islamist,83 it is pursuing the same trade rela-tions with Russia84 and African countries.85

Politics have almost always been more important thanreligion. For example, Turkeys opposition to Anders FoghRasmussens candidacy to become the new NATO Sec-retary General in 2009 had less to do with Muslim sen-sitivities over Danish cartoons of the Prophet Moham-med than with bilateral secular objections: his protectionof a Copenhagen-based satellite television station thatspeaks for the militant Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK),responsible for much bloodshed in Turkey; Rasmussensopposition to Turkeys membership of the EU; the sup-

port for him by the leaders of France and Germany, whohave done their utmost to block Turkeys process of con-

vergence with the EU; and the way Turkey felt frozenout of prior consultations on the selection of a new sec-retary general by big EU states, despite having NATOssecond biggest army and volunteering for many deploy-ments in the military alliance.86

C. THE TRADING STATETurkeys big economy produces the equivalent of halfthe entire output of the Middle East and North Africa,including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt and Israel.87 For-

eign Minister Davutolu has singled out economic inter-

83Commentator Soner aaptay sees this policy as viewingthe world from a perspective of religious and economic gains.AKPnin d politikas Neo-Osmanlc deil [AKPs foreign

policy is not Neo-Ottomanist],Referans, 6 May 2009.84Trade volume with Russia has more than doubled, from$11 billion in 2004 to $23 billion in 2009, thanks to Turkeysincreasing energy imports. Although in 2009 Russia lost itstop trade partner title to Germany, it is still Turkeys sec-ond largest trade relationship.852005 was declared the year of Africa in Turkey by the AKPgovernment. While still relatively small in volume $16 bil-lion as of 2009 Africas share in Turkeys total exports rosefrom 5 per cent in 1996 to 10 per cent in 2009, mainly ex-

ports to north Africa.86They were registering their anger at the way the EU runson a kind of secret code and secret handshakes done long inadvance. Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Ankara,February 2010. In addition, Turkeys objections linked to theDanish cartoons on the grounds of Muslim sensitivities alsomade political sense because all NATOs deployments arein the Muslim world. Crisis Group interview, Western dip-lomat, Ankara, February 2010.87The World Banks report on the Middle East and NorthAfrica Region 2008 Economic Development and Prospectsshowed total MENA gross domestic product in 2007 as $1,593

billion; Turkeys the same year was about $800 billion.


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dependence as the most important tool allowing Turkeyto gain depth in its neighbourhood, while pointing tothe prominent role of private sector firms in driving thecountrys foreign policy and strategic vision.88 Along-side the efforts to create a broader free trade area, it hasintroduced a new and positive language of cooperation

rather than conflict.89 A leading Turkish academic be-lieves that Davutolus zero problems with neighboursconcept simply restates the foreign policy of a tradingstate.90

Turkey wants to be an export-led power and has seenforeign trade grow steadily as a share of its overall econ-omy.91 AKP regards regional trade as a major synergyvehicle of continuous and sustainable economic devel-opment, especially to strengthen relations with Islamiccountries.92 Some economic initiatives clearly aim toreward domestic supporters of the AKP government.93

While Turkeys total exports grew four-fold in 1996-2009,exports to the 57 countries of the OIC soared seven-fold, reaching 28 per cent of total exports in 2009.94

However, the expansionary trend favouring Muslim andMiddle Eastern countries was well established beforethe AKP came to power. And even though Turkeystrade with the Middle East has risen faster than tradewith Europe in the past decade, this ratio rises and fallsin line with oil prices. While the region took 22 percent of Turkeys exports in 1988, the share went downto 10 per cent in 1998 during the oil price swoon and in2008 rose back to 19 per cent.95 The Middle Eastern re-lationship is particularly lucrative. While Turkey runs a

88From an interview with Turkeys foreign minister AhmetDavutolu, dnyas artk d politikann nclerinden[The business world is now among the leaders of foreign pol-icy], Turkishtime, April-May 2004.89Who was speaking the language of economic interdepend-encies and diplomatic dialogue before that? Turkey used to

be part of the zero-sum game, power- and proxy-politics thatdominated the region. Crisis Group interview, Meliha Al-

tunk, dean, International Relations Department, MiddleEast Technical University, Ankara 11 March 2010.90Kemal Kirii, The transformation of Turkish foreign pol-icy: The rise of the trading state, New Perspectives on Tur-key, no. 40, 2009, pp. 29-57.91Ibid. Several multinationals, such as Microsoft, BASF Chemi-cal Company and Coca Cola among others, use Istanbul as a

base for their regional operations in the Middle East, NorthAfrica and sometimes Central Asia as well.92AKPs 2007 party program, available on http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html#3.6.93Crisis Group interview, Turkish diplomat in the MiddleEast, February 2010.94Turkish Statistical Institute, www.tuik.gov.tr.95In 2009, there was a 25 per cent drop in exports to theMiddle East in line with a 23 per cent drop in Turkeys over-all exports. Ibid.

deficit in its overall trade with the world, it had an $8billion surplus with the Middle East in 2009.96

Iraq has historically been one of Turkeys biggest trad-ing partners. As it recovered from the crippling post-Kuwait invasion sanctions regime, total bilateral trade

volume increased from $900 million to $6 billion be-tween 2003 and 2009.97 As of September 2009, 500Turkish companies had invested in Iraq, and Turkey asa country was among the top ten foreign investors.98 Turk-ish contractors are ubiquitous, building roads, bridges andother infrastructure projects.99 In northern Iraq, Turkishcompanies now dominate markets for consumer goods,with penetration of over 80 per cent in some.100 Ankarasupplies electricity to the region and by March 2010 hadsigned 48 new agreements such as trade and develop-ment protocols. Turkey has acted as a conduit for oilexports and could do the same for gas as well.

With Syria, booming economic links have also cementeda new political friendship since 1999.101 The two sideshad signed 51 protocols by March 2010 on trade, de-velopment and cultural exchanges, shelving for now dif-ferences over their long-standing disputes over Hatayand sharing the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.102 The $1.7

96You can achieve more [trade growth] on the eastern front[than with Europe]. Crisis Group interview, Blent Aras,

Middle East expert, Ankara, 11 February 2010. Turkeys ex-ports to Europe grew only 29 per cent in the last five years(compared to a 62 per cent increase in overall exports) and274 per cent since 1996 (versus a 340 per cent overallgrowth). Turkish Statistical Institute, www.tuik.gov.tr.97There was also a 60 per cent rise in exports in 2009, whenTurkeys overall exports shrank 23 per cent. Turkish Statisti-cal Institute, www.tuik.gov.tr. Turkey mainly exports electri-cal machinery and equipment, parts and components, animaland plant oils, iron and steel.98Dr. Khaled Salih, chief adviser to the Kurdistan RegionalGovernments prime minister, as quoted in Kuzey Irakta500 Trkirketi yatrm yapyor [500 Turkish companies in-

vest in northern Iraq],Hrriyet, 13 September 2009. AmongTurkish investments in Iraq are Anadolu Groups bottlingfacility in Arbil (opened in April 2008), Genel Enerjis sub-sidiary Taq Taq Petroleum Refining Company, which investsin the Taq Taq field, and Pet Oils A&T Petroleum, whichdrills for oil.99Rod Norland, Rebuilding its economy, Iraq shuns U.S. busi-nesses, The New York Times, 12 November 2009.100Iraq-Turkey railway link re-opens, BBC News, 16 Febru-ary 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8518109.stm.101The tensions ended in 1999 when Syria expelled TurkishKurd militant leader Abdullah calan.102As time passes and relations deepen, they will become eas-ier to solve. on the Euphrates [water] issue, they have beenhonest and are committed to the amount they promised. Cri-sis Group interview, senior Syrian official, Damascus, 1 Feb-ruary 2010.


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billion volume of bilateral trade in 2009 makes up lessthan 1 per cent of Turkeys total trade, but exports toSyria nearly quadrupled during the past five years androse almost 30 per cent in 2009 at a time when overallexports were contracting.103

Indeed, some Syrian officials have begun to worry thatthe balance of payments is now in Turkeys favour, andwonder whether northern Syria, parts of which are onlyloosely connected to Damascus in terms of infrastruc-ture, services and even identity, may slip into a Turkishsphere of influence.104 The Al Jazeera satellite newsservice, generally pro-Turkish, aired a segment in Feb-ruary 2010 on Turkish goods putting Syrian merchantsunder pressure. As one Arab official put it:

Turkey talks about everything, solving problems, mul-tilateral economic cooperation, interdependence. The

only problem is that they are the main beneficiary.They have the industries, the skilled labourers. Wehave only oil and gas in our favour. Whether [MiddleEastern] countries will accept not having a balanceof trade in their favour is questionable in the longterm.105

Turkish officials respond that Ankara felt the same com-petitive challenge when it opened its borders to a cus-toms union with the EU in 1996, but that it was goodfor the country in the end.106 Turkey is not just encour-aging new legislation as its banks set up in Damascus,

but also helping Syria work through the same painfulprocess of liberalisation from state control that it starteddecades ago.107 Some in Damascus believe this is good forSyria too, and that a first step of opening up to Turkishcompetition is preferable to opening the floodgates toan even more powerful Europe.108 As an economic ad-viser to the Syrian government put it, when [the banks]start moving in, we will benefit from secondary invest-

103Turkish Statistical Institute, www.tuik.gov.tr. Turkey mainlyexports cement, electricity, cables, pipes, oils, iron and steelconstruction parts to Syria. In 2009 Syria bought 1.5 billionKW/hours of electricity from Turkey, according to the For-eign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), a Turkish NGO.104Crisis Group interviews, Syrian officials, January and Feb-ruary 2010.105Crisis Group interview, Arab diplomat, Ankara, February2010.106There was some resistance to Free Trade Agreements inthe beginning, but its now seen to be mutually beneficial....Customs Union forced us to begin producing quality products.Crisis Group interview, Turkish official, Ankara, March 2010.107This is a gradual transformation that will be good for all.Crisis Group interview, Turkish official, Ankara, March 2010.108It definitely is a challenge, but a challenge that we will

benefit from standing up to. Crisis Group interview, Syrianofficial, Damascus, 25 January 2010.

ments and transfers of technology, meaning that whatthe Turks took from Europe will impact us here. Thiswill compensate the balance of trade deficit.109

Despite the recent relative rise in Turkeys Middle Easttrade, it is important to keep the relationship in propor-

tion with its overall interests and history. Even the Ot-toman Empire was always more interested economicallyin the Balkans, then known as Turkey-in-Europe. TheEU has long been responsible for half the countrysoverall trade, a solid, multi-faceted relationship withoutthe huge dependence on energy of the Russian or Ira-nian relationships. Even more importantly, nine-tenthsof Turkeys foreign investment in 2008 came from theEU,110 the 200,000 Turkish workers and residents in theMiddle East cannot be compared to more than four mil-lion in Europe, and, of Turkeys 27 million foreign visi-tors in 2009, only just over one-tenth came from the

Middle East and North Africa.111

D. BUILDING REGIONAL INTEGRATIONAKP leaders sometimes compare their harmonisationefforts in the Middle East with the EUs beginnings, im-

plying an ambition to use economic integration to pro-gress to political convergence.112 Some EU officials rec-ognise the similarities.113 As Prime Minister Erdoanschief foreign policy adviser, brahim Kaln, put it,regional interdependence is making an environment of

safety for yourself. And every single major issue in-volving Turkey has also been important to the EU orthe U.S.114

Turkey is setting out to change a pattern in which Mid-dle Eastern states do little to encourage intra-regionaltrade, jealously guard home markets and fear infrastruc-ture links that might make them dependent on neigh-

109Crisis Group interview, Damascus, 9 February 2010.110EU Progress Report 2009.1112009 figures, Turkish tourism ministry.112What is the European Union project? It is a way of abol-ishing all borders. In this part of the world we are accus-tomed to the idea of borders as strict as the Berlin Wall. Butwalls are being dismantled around the world. Why cant wedo the same thing here? Of course, it will never be as structured,as rooted in law as is the case with the European Union. Butit means that we look at Syria in a different way now, Iraq ina different way. Rather than state to state relations, it is morea question of improving people to people relations. brahimKaln, interview in al-Majalla, 26 November 2009.113Davutolu is a great admirer of the EU. He sees what theEU has achieved in making peace, stability and prosperity.

He likes the EU model and is trying to implement it, with allthe constraints that the region imposes. Crisis Group inter-view, EU official, Ankara, February 2010.114Middle East Institute speech, Washington DC, 9 October 2009.


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bours who are often rivals. Most regimes traditionallyprioritise strong bilateral relationships with powers out-side the region115 but are now opening up to Turkey.Even Iran, arguably the country most reluctant to inte-grate economically with its neighbourhood, has voicedtheoretical interest in joining in such early EU-style in-

tegration.116 According to a senior Syrian official:

The Turkish role is very constructive. We built thismodel of a strategic relationship. Jordan followed.Lebanon followed. Even Iran, some day, could jointhe scheme. Just imagine if this dynamic extendedto the Gulf in the south, to Azerbaijan in the north.Believe it or not, the Georgian foreign ministry iscoming here in relation with this scheme.117

Turkeys first step was to ease private travel. In late2009, visa requirements were lifted for movement be-

tween Turkey and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Libya,adding to the already automatic airport visa regime forIran. This helped tourism from Middle East countries(excluding Israel) rise 16 per cent in 2008 and another22 per cent in 2009.

Then border gates were opened wider. A new crossingwas inaugurated with Syria and plans set in motion toremove the Cold War-era minefields on that border.Turkey is speeding up traffic through border points andaims to merge customs and passport formalities so thereis just one joint Turkish-Syrian border post, not a sepa-

rate one on each side of the frontier.

The railway line between Turkey, Syria and Iraq wasreopened in February 2010, after investment of $70million.118 A fast train service will soon be added be-tween the northern Syrian city of Aleppo and Turkeyssouth-eastern trading hub of Gaziantep. This activity ismatched by new rail links recently tendered betweenSyria and Jordan and planned between Jordan and Saudi

115Crisis Group interview, former U.S. diplomat, WashingtonDC, November 2009.116Iranian Ambassador to Turkey Bahman Hosseinpour said,why should we not have such cooperation? How could thefriends in Europe do it? They had lots of wars among them-selves. But fortunately they have the EU. If we have ourconsultation, if our relationships improve something I amsupporting this will affect the region positively in manyaspects. The others will follow us. Hrriyet Daily News, 21February 2010.117Crisis Group interview, Damascus, 1 February 2010.118This is a leg of the Ottoman-era Berlin-Baghdad railwaythat closed after Turkey-Syria relations collapsed in the early1980s. It was reopened in 2001 but had to close down againin 2003 after the U.S. invasion plunged Iraq into chaos.

Arabia the line of the Ottoman Empires old HejazRailway.119

Turkey is particularly interested in access to northernIraqi gas to feed into the planned Nabucco trunk pipe-line to central Europe and diversify its own sources of

energy. Egypts small-capacity Arab gas pipeline alreadyruns from Egypt and Jordan and into Syria, and the stretchto the Turkish border is expected to be completed soon.120Ideas for a pan-Middle Eastern, seven-country electricitygrid have languished for years, but since 2009 Turkeyhas been supplying Syria with power, as it has also donefor years to northern Iraq. Friction over Turkish dam-ming of the Euphrates-Tigris river system are givingway to talk of joint irrigation strategies, helped by re-cent good rainfall.121

Turkey has also moved from being a recipient of devel-

opment aid to being a donor. It has been prominent inaid to Afghanistan, focusing on road-building, hospitalsand schools for girls. It has brought 750 Palestinian po-lice officers for training in Turkey. An industrial parkon the border between Gaza and Israel has founderedduring the current conflict, but a new Palestinian-Israeli-Turkish industrial zone, hospital, school and peace cam-

pus are being planned near Jenin on the West Bank,with entrances for some of the facilities open to bothsides.122

Turkish engagement is more likely to be long lasting

and successful because it is multi-faceted. It includessenior, state-to-state cooperation, such as when in 2009it negotiated High-Level Strategic Cooperation Coun-cils with Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, in whichlarge numbers of cabinet ministers meet annually.123 Ithas exchanged drafts of a similar arrangement with Libya.A senior Turkish official believes this is part of a re-alignment of the region towards economic cooperationand away from the politics of confrontation.

119The elements of a regional integration are now being putin place, even if the interconnections have not yet been made.Crisis Group interview, senior Syrian official, Damascus, 24January 2010.120Gas quotas are currently insufficient to meet our ownneeds, regardless of Turkeys. But its unclear to me whetherthere are political constraints [due to soured Syrian-Egyptianrelations] or if the issue is merely capacity. Crisis Grouptelephone communication, Syrian petroleum expert, Damascus,25 March 2010.121See Crisis Group Middle East Report N92,Reshuffling theCards (I): Syrias Evolving Strategy, 14 December 2009.122Crisis Group interview, Turkish official, Ankara, March 2010.123Crisis Group interview, Turkish official, Ankara, March 2010.


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There is a conjunction between the transformation ofTurkey, and the transformation of the Middle East.There is a state of affairs that puts some states out of

business, and brings others in [In the joint Cabinetmeetings] there is a real will, ten ministers on bothsides, everyone with clear instructions. It works, and

there is real follow-up.124

The ambition is considerable, including a common freetrade area already agreed between Turkey, Syria, Jor-dan and Lebanon.125 Beyond the early informal Turkishcommercial engagement with Iraqi Kurdistan of the1990s, Prime Minister Erdoan speaks of his excite-ment and hopes that Turkeys model dealings withSyria will show the way to better relations betweenDamascus, Riyadh and Beirut, and that the bilateralcouncils with Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon will leadto even further broadening:

When all these have been created, the region will belike a pool, and solidarity between us will strengthen.Weve always believed that there is no meaning forTurkey to be in prosperity, peace and security on itsown we are in a common region, sharing a com-mon geography if they have problem, it affects ustoo.126

Turkey has also invested much diplomatic capital in in-creasing its profile in multilateral institutions and plat-forms. Turkey has become an observer at the Arab League

and has hosted foreign ministers of the Gulf Coopera-tion Council in Istanbul. Just as significant was the vic-tory of Ekmeleddin Ihsanolu in the first democraticallycontested election to lead the OIC.127 After the Israelimilitary action against Lebanon in 2006, Turkey also

began contributing ships and 1,000 military personneland engineers to support the UN Interim Force in Leba-non (UNIFIL).128

124Crisis Group interview, senior Turkish official, AnkaraMarch 2010.125 An official explained that Turkey wants to create an areawhere goods move easily, where we have free trade agree-ments, and thats now with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Cri-sis Group interview, Ankara, March 2010.126Recep Tayyip Erdoan, speech to businessmen in Syria,23 December 2009.127When Turkey in 2000 tried to promote a Turkish candidatein an earlier leadership contest in the Saudi-dominated OIC,he failed to win. Crisis Group interview, senior Turkish offi-cial, Ankara, March 2010. Non-Turkish members of the OICare keenly aware of Turkeys use of the organisation andthe 57 countries votes that it can influence in other interna-

tional organisations to promote narrow Turkish concernssuch as recognition and support for the self-declared TurkishRepublic of North Cyprus.128For details, see www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararasi/BM_UNIFIL.htm.

There is some scepticism in Arab states, whose leadersare used to signing protocols pledging cooperation thatnever quite come to life.129 Turkey also may find ittakes longer to achieve results since, unlike in the earlydays of its involvement with the EU, where everythingwas done multilaterally, most of what is being done

now is still bilateral between it and individual MiddleEast states.

Unlike post-Second World War Europe, a desire to forgestrong economic bonds as a way of consolidating peace-ful relations is still lacking in the region. Commercialties are fraught with political complications, for instancethose between Syria on one side, and Lebanon, SaudiArabia and Iraq on the other. The difficulty in address-ing key issues is illustrated by the absence of progresstoward a Turkish-Syrian-Iraqi water-sharing agreementregarding the Euphrates, where a multilateral coopera-

tion mechanism is urgently needed. Promoting free trade,facilitating transfers of technology and expertise andcarrying out infrastructure integration projects all evokea win-win attitude which has become a catchphrase ofTurkish diplomacy, by contrast with the zero-sumequation that traditionally has dominated the region.130

Even assuming the scheme succeeds in converting eco-nomic interdependence into political convergence, it wouldstill leave out Israel, with which several key Arab statesare loath to consider any form of normalisation pend-ing breakthrough on an elusive peace process. If thathappens, regional integration would entrench Israelssense of isolation, bolster an Arab front whose disunityhas long been a crucial asset to Israel and place Turkishand Israeli interests further at odds. However, the lackof much multilateral political integration means Ankarasability to rally regional states remains weak. Change iscompelling, nevertheless, at the people-to-people level.Turkish capital, films, television series, music and prod-ucts are putting down roots in Middle Eastern markets,and the convergence that has followed is not all oneway. Ten years after the foundation of CNNs Turkish

TV, Al Jazeera is opening a Turkish news channel. Sofar, Turkey appears to have had more success on thepolitical side than it did with similar outreach to Turkiccountries in Central Asia in the 1990s.131

129The Turks are newcomers. Okay, theyve signed 50 agree-ments with Syria, 50 with Iraq. Its a positive step. But theyretreating them like theyve already produced results. CrisisGroup interview, Arab diplomat, Ankara, January 2010.130Davutolu is very keen that Turkey should play the role ofcatalyst in changing the paradigm. Crisis Group interview,

senior Turkish official, Ankara, March 2010.131When we went like this to the Turkic countries [of Cen-tral Asia], this [convergence] didnt happen. But I think itwill with states that are closer by, have similar laws and are


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III.TURKEY AS FACILITATORWith its growing self-confidence, Turkey under the AKPhas presented itself as a facilitator, mediator and con-venor of rival parties in several regional conflicts. This

role has won it widespread favourable notice in Westerncapitals, domestic opinion and regional media. Besidesstabilising its own backyard, a goal of this activism isalso to increase regional prosperity, and thus Turkishtrade.132

The AKP government began this activism modestly,after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, by organising meet-ings of Sunni Muslim leaders from that country, playinga supporting role in trying to bring them into the newAmerican-brokered order. AKP leaders have also triedto lessen tensions between the U.S. and Iran, Iraq and

Syria, Israel and Syria, Israel and the Palestinians,Hamas and Fatah and the various actors in Pakistan andAfghanistan.

In each case, Turkeys role gradually became more promi-nent. Trilateral meetings with Afghanistan and Pakistan,for instance, built up over four rounds in Istanbul, firstincluding the leaders only to create confidence, thenadding ministers who dealt with the economy, then in-cluding military and security ministers and finally ameeting that addressed the fundamental issue of how to

bring their education system onto a more reasonable track

than that espoused by fundamentalist religious schools.133

Turkey is in the rare position of being able to speak toall sides of the Middle Easts conflicts. Outsiders gaveit some credit in 2009 for nudging the factions in Leba-non closer prior to the Doha summit. Turkey asserts,somewhat inconclusively, that it has contributed to

bringing Damascus closer to Riyadh and Beirut, eventhat it was the prime mover behind reciprocal visits bythe Syrian and Saudi leaders.134 Hosting four rounds ofmeetings to defuse Syrian-Iraqi tensions after a seriesof bombings in Iraq had at least the effect of clarifying

culturally closer. Crisis Group interview, Hasan Kanbolat,director, Centre for Middle East Strategic Studies (ORSAM),Ankara, 10 February 2010.132Economic growth and conflict resolution feed into eachother. Simply put: resolving conflicts in the area generateseconomic growth. Crisis Group interview, Turkish diplomat,Tel Aviv, February 2010.133Crisis Group interview, senior Turkish official, Ankara,March 2010.134Prime Minister Erdoan, interview with Al Arabiya televi-sion, 14 October 2009.

the position of the two countries, which ultimately didnot escalate their arguments.135

However, the Turkish impact is often slight. The flurryof facilitation efforts is not universally popular. Diplo-mats in Ankara often use words like mania, frenzy

and obsession when describing the phenomenon.136

The Turks are obsessed with becoming mediators.They believe theyve invented the wheel. But even asuperpower cant pay full attention to more than twoor three issues. If you spread yourself too thin,youll lose credibility. Turkey will become a laugh-ing stock, nobody will take it seriously. Everyonewill think its just doing it for the show. You seehow Swiss mediators did it with Armenia, the Ger-mans did it with Hezbollah thats how mediationshould be done: behind closed doors.137

Indeed, some Turkish officials, aware of the immensityof their task, underline that they categorise Turkish

brokering as facilitation rather than mediation.138They say Syria, Fatah, Afghanistan and Pakistan had allinvited them to become involved. One official took a

pragmatic approach:

The priority is not mediation or conflict resolutionper se; we are not really achieving many results, andthats perhaps not the point anyway. The point is to

be visible, to look like a power, to make our neigh-

bours like us, to achieve stability which will help eco-nomic growth and to increase trade and investments.139

A. SYRIA-ISRAEL PROXIMITY TALKSThe Turkish facilitation effort that attracted most domes-tic and international attention was five rounds of indi-rect talks brokered between Syria and Israel in 2008,aiming to pave the way for direct negotiations and, ul-timately, a peace deal and the return of Syrias GolanHeights, occupied by Israel since 1967. It was the result

of years of preparation that began in 2004140

and in-cluded Turkish NGOs facilitating contacts between Pal-

135Crisis Group interview, senior Syrian official, Damascus,1 February 2010.136This can be termed mediation mania, as Turkeys searchfor grandeur with such methods looks a bit ridiculous.Efraim Inbar, Israeli-Turkish Tensions and Beyond, op.cit.; Crisis Group interviews, Ankara, February-March 2010.137Crisis Group interview, Arab diplomat, Ankara, January 2010.138Crisis Group interview, Turkish official, Ankara, March 2010.139Crisis Group interview, Turkish diplomat in the MiddleEast, February 2010.140See Crisis Group Middle East Report N63,Restarting Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, 10 April 2007.


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estinians and Israelis, notably in Gaza.141 Turkey also wasmoving into a vacuum left by U.S. disengagement fromSyria-Israel contacts at the time.142

Israeli Prime Minister Olmert expressed interest in Turk-ish help in organising indirect talks with Syria in Feb-

ruary 2007.143

The meetings were announced and startedin 2008, reaching a climax in a fifth round in late De-cember of that year. Erdoan and Olmert joined theirnegotiators in Ankara and met for over five hours. Theyhad dinner, and Erdoan spoke extensively to Basharal-Assad by telephone. Erdoan said, our goal then, tosee if we could move to the next phase which was directtalks between Israel and Syria has been to achieve

peace in the region.144

When Israels Operation Cast Lead started against Gazaa few days later, Erdoan, shocked and betrayed at what

he felt were personal commitments from Olmert, angrilysuspended the process. An Arab diplomatic observercriticised Turkish leaders for naively believing the proc-ess was real, when in his view Syria and Israel werealmost exclusively using the process to give a mere ap-

pearanceof peaceful intentions.145 Yet, Turkeys leader-ship remains convinced that it was on the point of

breaking through to direct Syrian-Israeli negotiations.146

141For instance, it was meetings and contacts hosted by theTurkish Union of Chambers of Commerce that eventually ledto a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Turkish industrial zone betweenGaza and Israel, though as noted above, this has founderedduring the current conflict.142Turkey played a useful role, while all were waiting for theU.S. to step in, and it didnt seem interested in restarting theSyria-Israel track. Crisis Group interview, Nathalie Tocci,researcher, Washington DC, November 2009.143See Crisis Group Middle East Reports N92, Reshufflingthe Cards (I), op. cit., and N93, Reshuffling the Cards (II):Syrias New Hand, 16 December 2009.144Comments at World Economic Forum meeting in Davos,29 January 2009.145Like all beginners in the Middle East, the Turks thoughtthat plenty of apparent success at the beginning meant thatthey were making real progress, that they were succeedingwhere others had failed; it turned their heads. the Turkssay they were one day short of an agreement, or of direct ne-gotiations. I think it was the usual thing. All were benefitingfrom the process. The Syrians broke their isolation. The Is-raelis demonstrated peaceful intent. The Turks proved theycould be mediators. It could have gone on for another twoyears. It was useful. But dont tell me they were on the vergeof something new. Crisis Group interview, Arab diplomat,Ankara, December 2009.146As Erdoan put it, we were making quite good progress,so much so that we were having problems with a few wordsonly, in the language that we were talking. World EconomicForum, Davos, 29 January 2009.

It seems unlikely that Turkey can resume its role withthe current Israeli government.147 Divisions in

turkey and the middle east

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