Turkishlinesand

Russianpipelines

December 16. 2015.

T.D.

On November 13, Paris terrorist attacks gave a fresh sense of urgency to fighting terrorism and provided world’s leaders

with another opportunity to find common ground on important issues. It appeared as a legitimate common cause, once

again.

In the days that followed, the World expressed condolences and pledged

support to France, for the second time in a year. On November 15 and 16, the

G20 summit was held in Turkey where, instead of economics, politics and

security were discussed. Next, Francois Hollande was announced for a

presidential visit to Moscow and Washington. Deeper French military

involvement in Syria and close military collaboration with Russia was about to

ensue. On November 17, Vladimir Putin issued orders to the Russian military

to cooperate with the French as allies.

It all looked like ISIL’s days are numbered and there were serious opinions that Russia is becoming indispensable as a

partner to the West. I even read “21st

century’s entente” somewhere… As if geopolitics became an unknown concept to

so many.

And then, on November 24, a Russian military jet was downed by the Turkish air force.

***

Turkey is a major NATO member and 18th

world’s economy, geographically located in a position of great strategic

importance and a former empire with significant historical, cultural and economic ties in the entire region surrounding

it. And it wants to reemerge as a regional power.

Among Turkey’s biggest problems

is the Kurdish rebellion, namely

the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

and its desire to create a separate

state. Kurds form an estimated 10-

30% of the country’s population,

depending on who has provided

the estimate, and mostly live in its

southeast, with a porous border

separating them from the rest of

the Kurdish people living in Syria,

Iraq and Iran.

In September, at the height of the migrant crisis, with

emotions at their highest peak globally in the aftermath

of the three-year-old Alan Kurdi’s death by drowning on

the way to Europe, Turkey was asked by the EU to do

more in reducing the flow of migrants who pass through

it and was offered a billion in Euros to support those

efforts, with the prospect of a visa liberalization

agreement in the near future. But Turkey, aware of EU’s

needs and of its own national interests, proposed to, in

addition, create a buffer zone stretching 80km south of

its border, into Syria and probably Iraq, so that the

refugees could have a “safe zone” and stop moving

farther from there. That sounds like a reasonable idea,

but there is a much deeper cause for it.

By asserting military control over that 80km wide

stretch of land Turkey would split the Kurds and

therefore weaken them significantly. It would also likely

take under control key strategic infrastructures, such as

the Mosul dam, and become able to regulate the flows

of the entire Tigris-Euphrates river system, which is vital

to both Syria and Iraq, without affecting flows on its

own territory. An opportunity to attain such a

leverage may be of historic importance, moving Turkey

farther on the path to regional dominance. 80km

farther south from its border. That’s where Turkey

wants to draw the line.

There is also the energy issue, with Turkey’s main gas provider being Russia. Iranian gas is expensive, capacities for

bringing more from Azerbaijan are still insufficient and plans to bring it from the Gulf depend on the situation in the

region where, previously to war, the obstacle was the opposition of the Assad family to any such prospects, which was

designed to support Russian interests.

Since Ukraine has destabilized in late 2013 and consequently began falling apart, Russian influence in it has declined and

the flow of gas came into question. This pushed the Russians to try to accelerate the South Stream project, but it was

blocked through the use of political force, as EU refused to issue permits for it to proceed through EU member states.

The alternative tried by Russia was to develop another project that would use the already built Black Sea part of the

South Stream’s infrastructure and take the pipeline to Europe through Turkey. Project Turkish Stream was blocked for

the first time by complex instability developing last Spring in Macedonia, threatening to extend to neighboring

Serbia and Kosovo, along or next to the planned route of the pipeline. To diffuse the crisis, regional leaders met at the

end of May in Tirana, the Albanian capital, where Serbian prime minister declared that Serbia “will accept U.S. calls to

reduce dependency on Russian gas.” and went on to explain that energy safety and security are what caused the shift in

policy (which was firmly on the Russian side until then), and that Serbia will accept the proposal of an American-backed

pipeline from Azerbaijan… Downing of a Russian military aircraft by the Turks has blocked the Turkish Stream once

more, in a much less subtle and far more serious form, and has made Turkey even more determined to seek gas

alternatives. A recent meeting between the Turkish president and the Qatari emir was a move in that direction.

If enough gas could be supplied to

Europe through a pipeline from

the Gulf via Turkey, Russia’s

importance as the biggest supplier

of gas to Europe (and Turkey)

would decline even more

dramatically than it already has

and its economy based on energy

exports would suffer enormously.

This is one of the main reasons for

Russians to support Assad and

why they sent their military to

Syria and initiated air raids on

September 30.

Another reason is increasing their military relevance in the Mediterranean, but this matter still depends on Turkey’s

willingness to allow passage through Bosphorus and Dardanelles, just as it depends on UK’s willingness to allow passing

through the strait of Gibraltar. Countering Turkish ambitions to expand influence in the region matters too. After all,

rivalries between Turks and Russians date back to the 16th

century. They have fought twelve wars against each other

since then… Also, by including ISIL into the list of targets, Russia hoped to repair the image created since the conflict in

Ukraine has begun and decrease the political and economic pressure coming from the West. Aiding the Iranians in their

regional efforts, for the sake of another set of interests, is important as well, but I will not get into that.

Russian intervention in Syria is, from the Turkish standpoint, intolerable.

Russians are not only helping Assad remain in power, but also act as a

deterrent against Turks who were preparing to send troops into northern

Syria and Iraq. Only a modest number of soldiers and equipment were sent

close to Mosul recently, on a pretense that they are going to “provide

security for our soldiers providing training there” as Turkish foreign minister

said. But perhaps the Turks were testing a less spectacular way to put their

plans into action. Faced with strong demands to withdraw coming from the

Iraqi government backed by Iran and Russia, Turkey stood its ground at first,

but after intense negotiations, today seems to have decided to move back,

closer to the border, but still on Iraqi territory.

***

Regardless of the official statements of support issued by NATO and its member states’ officials, there is a tremendous

pressure on Turkey to de-escalate the crisis. Russia has entered Syria at the invitation of the Syrian government. That is,

as Russians put it, in accordance with the international law. In the case of an uninvited Turkish ground operation new

incidents would become possible and that carries a risk too big to be accepted by anybody. For now. T.D