Dr Marko Babić

Two faces of Islam in the Western Balkans: Between Political

Ideology and Islamist Radicalization

Abstract

The paper aims to explain specificities of Islam in the post Yugoslav political space today

described as the Western Balkans. It focuses on two aspects of Islam in the region: Islam understood

as political ideology and Islam through its Islamist face providing some basic concepts related to both

phenomena. To what extent these aspects of Islam have been “imported” and do they truly impose a

real threat to political stability in the region? Can we consider any threats in terms of terrorist acts in

the region? These are some questions and doubts the paper, by using the descriptive method of

analysis, tries to give answers.

Key words: Islam, Islamization, Western Balkans, Wahhabies, terrorism

Introduction

Various issues related to Islam should be simultaneously viewed through two axes:

paradigmatic and syntagmatic. The paradigmatic axis includes a set of several stable constants

and general permanent markers of Islam itself. Such timeless Islamic paradigm has been

intersected for centuries with syntagmatic levels of their specific “earthly” realization: in

different historical contexts and various political constructions [1]. Historical challenges Islam

has been facing as transhistorical category and one of the great world religions have always

been connected with its instrumentalization in the processes of creating new states and/or

through nationalistic abuses of different kinds. The region we today describe as the Western

Balkans1 and the states that emerged from the ruins of former Yugoslavia are not an

exception.

Prior to dissolution of the country, Yugoslav Muslims in general perceived as a

national community, could not have been considered religiously inclined2 [2]. Moreover, their

1 The Western Balkans includes the countries of former Yugoslavia (with Albania, without Slovenia) and:

Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo (under the 1244 UN Resolution) 2 It is interesting to mention the meanders of identity of Muslims in Yugoslavia after World War II. Since they

were not recognized as a separate nation Muslims were given the opportunity for “national self-determination” (nacionalno opredeljivanje). During the first post-war census in 1948, Muslims had the opportunity to opt either voluntarily or by administrative measures as members of other nations (Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, etc.), or to choose the category “unspecified” (neopredeljen). During the 1953 census all

national identity, in the modern European sense, was not sufficiently crystallized neither. In

the eve of the civil war in Yugoslavia they found themselves in an ideological vacuum.

Descended from the same ethnic substrate as Croats and Serbs, but unlike them, Muslims did

not have their authentic national traditions, programmes or institutions. It seemed obvious to

return to the only shelter of their unique identity – Islam. Possible ways of filling this

ideological vacuum were through Islamism understood as political ideology and religious

radicalization mostly interpreted as Salafism.

Neither one of the two phenomena were the products of Muslim communities in the

region. Yet, both were accepted and adjusted to local circumstances and conditions. The first

part of the paper will focus on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an example of a vivid

connection between Islam and nationalism, and will use the descriptive method of analysis.

The second part will explain the appearance of the Salafist radical Islamist movement in the

region and its consequences. In order to put the issues in perspective, a brief background is

provided at the outset of each chapter as well as a consideration of some of the basic concepts

related to both phenomena.

Islamist Movement and Political Ideology

A conservative American analyst, Daniel Pipes explains that traditional Islam seeks to

teach humans how to live in accord with God's will, whereas Islamism aspires to create a new

order. The first is self-confident, the second deeply defensive. The one emphasizes

individuals, the other communities. The former is a personal credo, the latter a political

ideology [3].

The appearance and rise of Islamist movements can be explained looking at different

angles: from a chronological point of view, the strengthening of Islamist ideas in the Middle

East, and then in the world, can be traced down to the humiliating military Arab defeat by

Israel in 1967. New impetus for the expansion of this process gave the anti-imperialist Iranian

Islamic Revolution in 1979. In the following decades, this process would gain new intensity

and dimension associated with the jihad in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and geo-strategic

Yugoslavs with previous “identity unspecified” were introduced a new statistical category “Yugoslav – undefined”. The 1961 census introduced another statistical category “Muslims in an ethnic sense”. The 1971 census introduced for the first time “Muslim in the sense of nationality”. The 1981 census introduced the option of “Muslim” (without any additives, equal to other national categories). Starting from the general census of 1971 we can see a change in the formal treatment of Bosnian Muslims (the appearance of the name “Muslim” – with a capital letter – as an electoral category).

processes in the Persian Gulf region in the 1990s. On the other hand, Islamist movements can

be viewed as the attempt to create an ideological counterpart to the once dominant conflicting

ideologies of capitalism and communism and their narrative of struggle and control over that

part of the world. It can be also viewed as a reflection of the Muslim world frustrations due to

their lagging behind the technically and scientifically superior West and the consequences of

brutal colonization. The consequences of the colonization were to impose a system of thought

and values that Muslims considered foreign and therefore they decided to return to their own

traditional values generally based in Islam in order to develop their own vision of revival and

renovation that would guarantee them prosperity and welfare [4].

Although Islamist ideas in former Yugoslavia started spreading in mid-1970s (which

coincides with the general strengthening of Islamism throughout the Islamic world) some

specificities should be mentioned. The status of Muslims in the country was privileged when

compared with Muslims in other European countries, particularly the countries of the

Communist Bloc (for instance, in Todor Živkov’s Bulgaria in 1980s). The renewal of Islamist

ideas was influenced by the fact that the Yugoslav Slavic-origin Muslims were then

recognized as a constituent nation according to the Constitution of 1974, which significantly

contributed to their emancipation especially in their religious and spiritual dimension.

Freedom to travel and to obtain religious education in other countries allowed the Muslims of

Yugoslavia to maintain and expand their contacts with the Islamic world. As a result, a

growing number of Muslim students from Yugoslavia studied in Islamic countries. However,

in their totality, Muslim masses in the region remained away from Islamist influences until

early 1990s – the problem of Islamist radicalism and its socio-political influence was almost

unknown. This does not mean that some radical groups and movements – especially in urban

communities were not active particularly in the deepening Yugoslav economic and political

crisis of the 1980s [5]. Some contacts between the Muslim institutions in Bosnia and

Herzegovina and those in Islamic countries were established at the time. Nevertheless, this

way of obtaining political power and radicalization of Muslim in the region from abroad were

not important issues in the security policy.

Islamism as Nationalism. The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

In symbolic terms, Alija Izetbegović and his 1970 “Islamic Declaration, a Programme

of Islamization of Muslims and Muslim peoples” [6] is a starting point of the appearance of

political Islam – Islamism in the Balkans. This publication resembled the political programme

of Egyptian “Muslim Brotherhood” or similar Islamic modern programs but without

fundamentalist puritan activism typical for Salafi radicals. It seems that a comparison with

Islamic nationalists such as “Muslim Brotherhood” gives a relevant insight into Izetbegović’s

Declaration. They were concerned primarily with Islamizing national politics: “Some people

think of us as a group of preachers, concerned only to call people to virtues and abstain from

sins. Others believe it is a mystical trend. We are not any of those, we call to return for true

Islam, which is a belief and application, a home and a nationality, a religion and state, a spirit

and body, and a Qur’an and sword.” [7] Among the objectives set out in Izetbegović’s

Declaration were the establishment of the Islamic state and the establishment of “Islamic

governance”. Available U.S. sources show that Izetbegović approached the Iranian spiritual

leaders in the late 1970s: “After the power takeover by Khomeini in 1979, Izetbegović

stepped up its efforts to establish an Islamist government in Bosnia and was arrested by the

Communists in 1983” [8]. He was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment, but was released in

1988. In 1990 he established the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the same year was

elected to parliament and became the first president of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Western

experts and the American deputies were suspicious of Izetbegović and his party due to

fundamentalist elements of his politics: “Radical tendencies prevailed in the party especially

during the war in 1992-1995 where instead of being a tolerant, multi-ethnic government they

claimed to be, it was evident that the party leadership around Izetbegović was guided by the

principle of radical Islam” [9]. As Darko Tanasković notices: “(during the war) Izetbegović

could not dare to be what he actually was – an Islamic fundamentalist, and as far as

circumstances allowed, a pragmatic unitary Bosniak nationalist” [10].

Islamism and nationalism are conventionally thought of as antithetical ideologies, yet

there is in fact often a nationalistic dimension to Islamism. Henry Munson makes an

interesting parallel between the relationship between Marxism, Islamism and nationalism: “In

principle, Marxists condemn nationalism, as do Islamists. Yet the revolutions waged in the

name of Marxist ideology since World War II were all fuelled by nationalistic resentment of

foreign domination. Such resentment, among other things, also fuelled the principal Islamist

movements of the late 20th century. In both cases, an ostensibly universalistic ideology has

actually often had a more parochial nationalistic character in practice” [11]. Peri Pamir

explains that the sources of dogmatic fundamentalism, whether of the nationalist or of the

religious variety, appear to spring from the same psychological roots, the principal component

of which is probably the question of identity. “In this case, religious faith is used as a means

to assert or reaffirm a separate identity, which is why we consider it to be a manifestation of

nationalism”3. This was the case of political Islam of Alija Izetbegović. His Islamist ideology

of “Islamizing Muslims” [12] has transformed into Islamist ideology of “nationalizing

Bosniaks” in Bosnia and Herzegovina of, this time a religious leader, Grand Mufti of the

Islamic Community (IC) – (Islamska Zajednica, IZ)4 [13] of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Mustafa Cerić.5

After the dissolution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav

Islamic Community disappeared. New independent states of the former Yugoslavia created

their own Islamic Communities and rather stayed under dominant influence of the IC of B&H.

This Islamic Community derives its importance and power from the number of believers as

well as from its territorial range. In fact, this community includes Muslims not only from

Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also from of Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia and part of the Raška

region in southern Serbia (also known as Sandžak).6 Therefore, the IC of B&H strives to

maintain a dominant influence on the newly formed Communities in these countries.

Relations between the IC of B&H and the IC of Serbia can also be viewed as a part of the

politics of “nationalizing Bosniaks wherever they live”. The IC of Serbia (Islamska Zajednica

Srbije) with its headquarters in Belgrade7 wants to be independent and completely separated

from the IC of B&H. But, there is another Islamic Community that calls itself Islamic

Community in Serbia (Islamska Zajednica u Srbiji)8 with headquarters in Novi Pazar (the

Raška region – Sandžak) supporting the dominant role of the IC of B&H and staying in legal

union with the latter according to the 1997 Constitution of Islamic Community of B&H [14].

Both Communities accuse each other of being illegal and illegitimate. The unwillingness of

Mufti Cerić to come to terms with the independence of Serbian Muslims from Sarajevo

3 As we read in his Declaration.

4 There was a slow process for the IC to become a major Islamic political player in the region, and not only. As

Eldar Sarajlić explains: “There is little doubt that the IC is now one of Bosnia’s major Islamic foreign policy actors, a reflection of the emergence of Bosnian Muslims as autonomous political actors. However, the IC’s transformation from a communal organization to a political actor is not a recent phenomenon. Its development can be traced to the late 1960’s, when Bosnian Muslims slowly transformed from a religious community to a political (or ethnic) one. Especially indicative of this shift was the change in the official title of the IC in 1969. Namely, following the official recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a distinct ethnic (instead of religious) community by the Yugoslav Communist authorities in 1961, the IC changed its name from the Islamic Religious Community (Islamska vjerska zajednica) to the Islamic Community (Islamska zajednica) of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This change indicated a clear tendency to transform the IC into a national institution of Bosnian Muslims that would fill the absence of Bosnian Muslims’ cultural institutions in socialist Yugoslavia. Indeed, the IC eventually became the ‘national church’ of Islam in Bosnia.” 5 Officially he was in position of Grand Mufti between 1999 and 2012. Unofficially, he has led the Islamic

Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1993. 6 This region is usually reffered to as Sandžak by local ethnic Bosniaks or by its official administrative name of

Raška District (Raška oblast). It is a southern province of the Republic of Serbia. 7 Its leader is Mufti Adem Zilkić.

8 Its leader is Mufti Muamer Zukorlić

indicates the distinct ethnic and political role assumed by Bosnian Islamic leadership. This

role is also indicated by the conflict between the two different institutional cultures of Islam –

one independent and politically sovereign, and the other dependent and state-related [15].

Furthermore, on 29 December 2012 Great Mufti Mustafa Cerić and Mufti Muamer

Zukorlić of Sandžak jointly established the World Bosniak Congress (Svjetski Bošnjački

Kongres, SBK) in Sarajevo. The founding documents claim that “Bosnia and Herzegovina is

the homeland of all Bosniaks” and that Bosniaks wish to have “all that the other peoples of

the Balkans also have: a self-aware nation and a sovereign state” [16]. The SBK defines itself

as a “national, supra-party organization” that will monitor “national policy in securing the

vital national interests of the Bosniaks, the majority people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and

Sandžak”. It calls for replacing decision-making in B&H by consensus among its three

constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, M.B.) with majority rule (that would

evidently prefer Bosniaks, M.B.). Esad Hećimović, Sarajevo’s journalist and publicist warns

that this might create: “(…) an explosive mix of Islam and nationalism in B&H and Sandžak

[that can easily get out of control]. One Islamic terrorist can certainly make some damage if

he is allowed to carry out his act, but it is nothing compared to the damage which Reis Cerić

can make fuelling Bosniak nationalism and frustrations” [17].

Radical Islam and Terrorism – Salafi movement in former Yugoslavia

First we need to answer the question: what is terrorism? Despite a broad research

interest in this phenomenon, a generally accepted definition of terrorism has not been

achieved yet. Walter Laqueur [18] was correct when he argued in the 1970s that there was no

definition of terrorism as no definition can fully cover all versions of terrorism throughout its

two centuries’ long history [19]. Moreover, his predictions that such a definition would not be

achieved even in the foreseeable future [20] have proven to be true. Nevertheless, every

terrorist act is related to the question of power, will and domination. Imposing violence (or

terror) on others means imposing will. Terrorism is linked to political processes characterized

by political actors’ attempts to achieve political change, to exercise power and domination. As

a political strategy [21], terrorism is focused on achieving political changes by taking over

power or maintaining political status quo (struggle for power and attaining power), while on

the other hand it is the expression of power itself.

Suggestions of an American economist, John Kenneth Galbraith, regarding the types

of power can be very helpful for the purpose of our analysis. He suggests there are three types

of power: compensatory power in which submission is bought, condign power in which

submission is won by making the alternative sufficiently painful, and conditioned power in

which submission is gained by persuasion [22]. But power alone cannot do much. Adolf Berle

in his “Power without property” warns that no collective category, class or social group has

power in itself now can it use power alone. Another factor that must always be present is the

organization [23]. Galbraith claims that increase of his third type of power – conditioned

power – encourages the creation of the organization, and vice versa.9 It is necessary to

emphasize that conditioned power has a special significance in analyzing terrorist

organizations. Conditioned power means that from the organization as a form of connecting

people with similar interests, values and perceptions, follows the persuasion necessary for the

submission to objectives of the organization [24]. Another dimension of terrorism lies in its

social and political contexts: it reflects the crisis, social contradictions and dissatisfaction with

political and social movements as well as different and conflicting interests. Terrorism means

conflict. Conflict means the interaction of opposing parties trying to achieve their own,

mutually different, interests and goals by securing superior position and defeating an opposing

side. Tore Bjørgo claims that terrorism is a (tactical) radicalization of other types of political

conflict. It is beyond dispute that the social deprivation of some groups, ethnic or religious

discrimination, as well as mass victimization in post-conflict environment can lead to a

polarization of society (“us against them”) and the occurrence of violence motivated by hatred

with extreme political leadership [25].

All of the above theoretical explanations can be applied to the historical context and

Islamic radicalization (including terrorism) in former Yugoslavia. The main elements for

understanding it were the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in 1990s, long-term

economic crisis, lack of prospects and, above all, the absence of serious vision for the future

in the region. The collapse of communism followed the re-nationalization of all national

groups in post-communist countries of the Soviet Union, through Eastern Europe to the

Balkans. In 1990s Muslims in former Yugoslavia became autonomous political actors. This

evolution was a logical consequence of the collapse of communism and a sign that the

Muslim population was part of the process of European – not only political – modernity.

9 In terms of power, the organization has to be able to point out three important characteristics. First is its

bimodal symmetry, meaning that it achieves goals beyond itself, provided that it achieved subjugation inside itself. The second characteristic is the association of all three forms of power (condign, compensatory and conditioned power) and other sources of power (person and property). Third, there is a connection between the power of an organization and the number of various objectives for which it was formed. Galbraith (1983), ibidem.

Modern society is characterized by a process of rationalization in many areas of life such as

the division of public and private spheres, the state and society, church and state, the

dominance of the scientific perception of the world, a division of reason and mind,

instrumental and substantial rationality10

[26]. This in many aspects can be applied to Muslims

particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina as their intellectual and spiritual life as well as their

culture was more developed than in any other Muslim ethnic group in the Balkans. At the

same time, they were placed under some sort of ideological glass bell which largely kept them

isolated from the ideological and other turmoil in the rest of the Muslim world. That glass bell

was broken in the flame of war that occurred in the former Yugoslavia after the collapse of

the Communist regime [27]. As Muhamed Jusić, Islamic theologian from Bosnia and

Herzegovina explains: “Muslims of the region and their religious communities did not have

enough time to gain the necessary experience and knowledge in order to cope with the

invasion of ideas, ideologies, sects and other social phenomena inspired by Islam that

splashed Bosnian society destroyed by the war. Due to half a century isolation to which

Bosnian Muslims were subjected, they have not been able as a community in the early years

of the war and post-war to develop some kind of “immunity” to an ideological interpretation

of Islam, nor to form a clear attitude towards pluralism within the Islamic thought (…) (which

might, M.B.) keep them away from religious and ideological adventures” [28].

Of various movements and sects in the Islamic world, the greatest attention in the

region has been drawn by the Salafi movement (popularly known as the Wahhabis). Due to

the number of its supporters and incidents in which they were involved in the last decade, the

movement has attracted significant media attention for their activities [29]. Salafis (Arabic:

salaf – predecessors of the first generation of Muslims) or the Islamic traditionalist movement

was created around the teachings and actions of Muhammad ibn Wahhab (1703-1787), a

reformer from the Arabian Peninsula. This is a movement that insists on the preservation of

the Islamic doctrine of monotheism opposing to all innovations in the Muslim practice and

teaching11

[30]. They see themselves as a movement aspirating to return to the original

10

According to Zygmunt Bauman, one of the essential characteristics of modernity is the revolution in the mindset of people - rely on your own understanding and mind, searching for new opportunities, belief in the power of reason 11

“The most extreme form of Salafi ideology has evolved under the influence of militant Islamist movements from Egypt who on Afghan battlefields and training camps combined Salafi religious conservatism with ideas of Takfir (declaration of Muslim communities and individuals who live in them infidel, or non-believers) and can be classified into a group Selefijjetu al-Jihad al-Takfir and international jihadists tend to Takfir. Due to the fact that the Salafi movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina came along with the Arab volunteers, very often those who in Afghanistan were in contact with carriers of ideas of Takfir, which in that time still was in its beginning, traditional Bosnian Muslim community was again targeted by another Islamist ideology. The organizational and

teaching of the Qur’an – the holy book of Muslims, the Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet

Muhammad) and the practice of the first generation of Muslims [31].

According to Oliver Potežica, the activities of the radical movement in the Western

Balkans have gone through four phases since the 1970s [32]12

. In the first phase that lasted

from the first half of 1980s to 1992 and the outbreak of civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

the main supporters and followers of Salafi teachings were graduates of Islamic Studies

educated in Saudi Arabia and Islamic universities under Salafi influence in other countries.

Significant increase of official donations from Islamic countries for the construction of

Islamic centres, mosques and religious schools in the region is the main characteristic of the

phase. Interestingly, late 1980s and early 1990s showed increased tensions between the local

Muslims and the followers of Salafi ideas. Balkan Muslims saw puritanical and conservative

“Arab” Salafi as a “foreign body” and a threat to their identity. The second phase was the

period of civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 when “disagreements”

between traditional Islam in the region and Salafi and other Islamist movements were

overcome. During and immediately after the war, new Islamic groups, often conservative and

some adhering to Salafi teachings appeared in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in

Sarajevo, Zenica, Mostar and parts of Central Bosnia. Muslim foreign fighters were given

official status, when the El Mujahed unit was established as part of the ABH 3rd Corps in

1993. Between 2,000 and 5,000 fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the 1995 Dayton

Peace Accord, after which most were expelled under strong U.S. pressure [33]. Nevertheless,

a number of them remained to live in Bosnia and Herzegovina to become a growing internal

and foreign policy problem for the country. Activities of numerous charitable, humanitarian

and other Islamic non-governmental organizations with vast financial resources were of

essential importance for the second phase of spreading Salafi ideas in the region. Direct

donations from Saudi Arabia alone amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars. Funds from

several Gulf countries and Iran gave substantial financial support, including for several

Muslim organizations to engage in religious activities [34]. Some funds most likely also went

into private pockets and so the distribution of funds was related to a number of frauds and

scandals in Bosnia and Herzegovina [35]. But, probably the most important aspect of the

second phase was the maximization of the number of young people from across the region

ideological strengthening of the rogue Salafis who advocate the incompatibility of Islam and democratic order of society, have found their supporters among the new generation of young Bosnian origin Salafis. For the first time one could meet people who do not recognize the laws of BiH, the court, or do not want to possess identity documents of BiH or any other state”. 12

In this chapter I will use his explanations of the four phases on pages 170-181.

that went to study in Islamic educational institutions in Saudi Arabia, especially at the famous

Salafi Islamic University al-Madinah al-Munawarah (Medina), as well as in other Arab

countries in the Persian Gulf.

The most important feature of the third phase in the 1996-2002 periods was the

increased number of followers of Salafi ideas and teachings among local Muslims as well as

the formation of the first local organizations of the Salafi orientation. Most notable among

them was the Active Islamic Youth (Aktivna islamska omladina, AIO) which was established

in late 1995 in Zenica, a town that had become one of the Salafi strongholds in Bosnia and

Herzegovina. A group of young Bosnian Muslims decided to form an organization to promote

the fundamentalist Islamic teachings they learned while fighting with Arab volunteers in a

unit called El Mujahid. As Ena Latin discovers: “AIO’s mission is to awaken the religious

feelings of Bosnian Muslims who have been deprived of ‘traditional’ Islam for too long, first

by the communist regime of the former Yugoslavia, and later by moderate Muslims. AIO

emphasizes that it aspires to original Islamic teachings as preached by Mohammed, and that it

does not accept any ‘novelties’ in Islam” [36]. Until its final closure in 2006 due to lack of

funds (as many of its former donors stopped sending money because of the bad reputation that

the organization had acquired), AIO remained the target of almost all investigations connected

with terrorist activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina [37].

While the Salafi ideas and teachings during the first three phases met with

understanding and support of the Western powers, the fourth stage saw lack of such support.

The fourth stage came after 11 September 2001 and the Western powers began suppression of

all Islamist movements. This phase has lasted until today. Due to the numerous evidence of

connections between “the Bosnian Afghans”, some local Islamists with global Islamist

organizations as well as the increase of religion-based anti-Americanism, the Western

countries and United Nations began to take more radical steps to combat Islamist activity in

the country. For example, in 2002 six Algerians (officially they worked for a humanitarian

organization) were arrested on charges of preparing an attack on the U.S. Embassy in

Sarajevo. Bosnian authorities extradited them to the American Government and later they

were transferred to military custody of the Guantanamo Bay detention camp. Domagoj

Margetić in his “Islamist Terrorism in Southern Europe” [38] explains that protests in

Sarajevo, caused by the extradition of six Arabs proved the intention of Islamists in Bosnia

and Herzegovina to optimally exploit the political and media situation caused by the

extradition. “Demonstration of religious fanaticism unknown in Bosnia and Herzegovina with

the willingness to sacrifice, even invoking the victims and expressing the desire the “Muslim

blood” to flow. These people possess strong motives and ultimate goals. There would not

have been such militant Islamism in Bosnia and Herzegovina had external factors not been

active coupled with domestic ones” [39]. For this occasion a Coordinating Committee of

Islamic Youth Organizations was formed and was consisted of: Youth Circle of Islamic

Community, Active Islamic Youth, Young Muslims, Al Furqan, Bosnian Academic Clubs

and War Veteran Association Fatih. Margetić claims that this Coordinating Committee might

have become the head of the organized activities as logistical support of potential terrorist

activities.

The fourth phase is characterized by not only reduced humanitarian and charitable

activities of Islamic organizations – many of the organizations were even banned. Financial

and material donations from the Islamic world were significantly reduced. Since 2003 openly

radical and aggressive appearance of Salafis followers could be noticed. Arising tensions

contributed to numerous arrests of local Muslims accused of terrorism or links to terrorists.

Public opinion grew more aware of numerous problems associated with the Salafis and other

Islamist groups. “There are no incidents, but that does not mean there cannot be incidents”

[40] says Mehmet Bradarić, a member of the Joint Commission for Defence and Security in

the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Professor of Islamic Faculty in Sarajevo, Adnan

Silajdžić argues that “Salafism is well spread in Bosnia and Herzegovina today and is being

run by local Salafi followers not foreigners or missionaries from other regions as before” [41].

This statement is perhaps the most important feature of this last phase of the expansion of

Salafism in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Salafism in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be analyzed in the context of social and

political circumstances. It is a religious reflection of these circumstances13

. The same

dimension can be applied for other regions of former Yugoslavia under Salafi influence. For

example, the region of Sandžak in southern Serbia is a reflection of developments in B&H,

but on a much smaller scale. The differences are substantial: in Sandžak there was no

presence or influence of foreign Mujahideen fighters, there were no financial donations from

Islamic donors and there was no substantial presence of missionaries from various suspected

Islamic charities. For the same reason, the influence of Salafis in Kosovo and Montenegro

was also much lower than in B&H. Salafism in Macedonia became evident after secession of

the Republic from Yugoslavia in 1992. Its first followers were Imams who returned from

Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia. Relatively small, but strongly organized group of Salafis was

13

The organizations came to Macedonia after the 1999 NATO-Yugoslavia conflict.

spreading its influence especially after 2000 assisted by humanitarian and charitable Islamic

organizations in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates [42]. In the

period from 2003 to 2006 Salafis became more aggressive first towards other Imams of the

Islamic Religious Community of Macedonia. As a result, in 2005 Macedonia’s Reis ul-Ulema

Arif Emini resigned from the post (before his resignation Salafis held him hostage). They

demanded of Emini to appoint only the Imams as theologians who had completed religious

studies in Saudi Arabia [43]. Moreover, “in a related incident just days after Emini’s

resignation, a group of Skopje Imams was attacked and beaten upon returning from a

wedding. The chief Imam of the Skopje Hudaverli mosque, Šaban Ahmeti, later told the

daily Utrinski Vesnik: “The people who attacked us were definitely representatives of radical

Islam, or as we call them, Wahhabis, who for more than a year have been trying to take over

the Islamic Community” [44]. In 2013, some estimation showed that there were about 3,000

Salafis in Macedonia, mostly among the Albanian minority and Bosniaks, in the Skopje

region, Tetovo, Struga and Kumanovo. Their work was financed by donations from Saudi

Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Iran. Especially Iran was concentrated for a deeper penetration into

Europe, using the Balkans as a springboard [45].

Similar to Macedonia, Salafis in Kosovo remain a relatively “closed” community.

They recruit new followers on an individual basis, mainly by attracting “heads of families”

(this is particularly important for Albanian families as family members must respect their

elders, and above all, father whose word means law within the confines of his family) as well

as throughout activities mainly in rural areas [46]. Salafi leaders and their followers retain

rather conspiratorial approach, so it is difficult to collect accurate data on their numbers in

Kosovo. Salafis contributed a great deal to violence throughout Kosovo organized by

Albanian separatists in March 2004, which left 19 killed and 900 injured. The objectives of

violent Albanian nationalism and Islamic radicalism are complementary, claims Russell

Gordon [47]. In 2006, BBC Monitoring Service quoted a statement issued by Raško-

Prizrenska Serbian Orthodox Eparchy from which we learned that since 1999 in Kosovo

around 400 new mosques had been built while 150 churches had been demolished [48].

Gordon points out that this changes the religious “topography” of Kosovo and leaves lasting

political and religious repercussions for the whole region. The fact is that Salafis began to

change the identity of the Albanian community in Kosovo by destroying the famous old

mosques, Islamic historical monuments, changing the spiritual, cultural and historical map of

Kosovo both Christian Orthodox and Islamic, by building Islamic Centres and mosques with

two minarets donated by Saudi Arabia (in the Balkans traditionally mosques were built with

one minaret). They create a new generation of Albanian Muslims in Kosovo more than older

generations open to other Islamic (Arab) countries. There are also tendencies of fighting

against ideas of the Albanian nationalist movement. Without a doubt, Salafis try to delete all

historical traces in the region in creating the “world of pure Islam” [49].

Conclusion

One can understand Islam only as a grand and complex religious system defined not

only by its metaphysical principles and ethical requirements but circumstances and conditions

in which its followers – Muslims as individuals and their Communities as organized groups

live in today’s world.

The process of “ethnicization” of Bosnian identity and growing Bosnian nationalism

through the Bosnian Islamic Community was a Muslims’ response to immense challenges

imposed on them by Croatian and Serbian nationalism in the region. There is no doubt that in

the case of Bosniak nationalism it is religious faith used as a means to reaffirm a separate

identity from the Croatian and Serbian. It is a tool of political mobilization and at the same

time a tool for realization of political goals of the Islamic Community.

The end of socialist Yugoslavia and the vacuum that was created by the breakdown of

the entire social fabric in the region was filled with activities of external actors and their local

proxies. The region’s exposure to external influence also provided a leeway for many Islamic

players to exert their influence and power. The role of Salafist radical movement explains this

element of Islamic presence in the region. The Western Balkans region is still home to

ongoing political processes that foster corruption, organized crime and ethnic disputes which

challenge socio-economic progress. To the extent that these conditions persist, it will

represent fertile ground for radical Islamists. But is there Islamic terrorist threat in the region?

Crisis Group Europe Briefing claims that according to most international experts, Bosnia and

the rest of the Balkans is not a key region for harbouring or funding terrorists. They have only

a secondary role, as a transit or recuperation area. Nevertheless, B&H’s continuing political

and economic problems make it vulnerable to terrorist groups in the future. A senior Bosnian

law enforcement official summarized: “In B&H, like in every other country, there is always a

possibility of a terrorist attack by an individual. However, if we are talking about organised

terrorist groups – we do not see them here at the moment” [58].

However, the fact that Islamist radicals’ efforts have not been particularly successful

to date in the Western Balkans region should not provide comfort or a false sense of security

because many of the conditions that are conducive to the growth of terrorist operations and

recruiting still persist.

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Dr. Marko Babić is Assistant Professor (Adiunct) at the Institute of European Studies

of the University of Warsaw. His research covers contemporary Western Balkans region –

geopolitical position, state building processes, ethnic conflicts including such determinants as

history and religion.