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TWO OPPOSING PARADIGMS OF CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN

CONSTITUTIONAL THINKING: AUSTRIA AND GERMANY

I. INTRODUCTION

Comparative constitutional lawyers of common law countries might be tempted to

identify German and Austrian constitutional thinking as similar—not only because

both are German-speaking countries, but also because comparative law textbooks

(based mostly on private law) present them as being in the same ‘legal family’ or ‘legal

circle’.1 This assumption would, however, be wrong. The German doctrinal figures,

more or less well known amongst comparative constitutional lawyers throughout

the whole world, do not apply in Austria automatically, and even that which seems

familiar at first sight (for those who know German public law) often appears in a

foreign light. Scrutiny of such differences promises insight into the merits and draw-

backs of each alternative; therefore, this article seeks to compare and contrast the two

systems. The focus is not on specific tenets of Austrian or German public law but on

its set of doctrinal concepts and style of argumentation, compared and contrasted. To

facilitate the contrast, the statements of Austrian and German authors and the various

schools of thought will be somewhat amplified.

This article does not attempt to itemize or list all the doctrinal differences; instead,

it seeks to reveal the foundations of the two systems. With this in mind, the hypotheses

to be proven are as follows. (1) The theoretical background of Austrian public law

doctrine is the Kelsenian pure theory of law, and the bases of German public law

doctrine are determined by the Schmittian decisionism, the Smendian integrationism,

and natural law.2 All these theoretical presuppositions, as we will see, have concrete

consequences as to how to define basic concepts and how to reason in constitutional

law. (2) Austrian legal doctrine is worked out in painstaking detail especially in the

areas of sources of law and constitutional adjudication, at times even more consistently

than their German counterparts. This concentration on theory of norms in public law is

also part of Kelsen’s heritage. (3) In certain points, the curiosity of Austrian public law

doctrine has diminished, partially due to increased German influence. By no means,

however, does this imply the disappearance of distinctive features; one can merely

observe some degree of convergence. (4) Finally, certain startling doctrinal solutions

have emerged, not for reasons of differing conceptualizations of the law, but very

simply by historical and political accident.

1 For valuable suggestions and insightful criticism on the first German version of this paper, Iwould like to thank Armin von Bogdandy, Rainer Grote, Ulrich Hufeld, Otto Pfersmann, MarkusRau, Alexander Somek, Robert Walter, Ewald Wiederin for the same on the English version, theparticipants of the Comparative Constitutionalism section at the XXIII World Congress ofPhilosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in (IVR) in Cracow (Poland), 1–6. August 2007, andthe anonymous reviewer of the ICLQ. Email: [email protected]

2 Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law seeks to avoid moral and political or social considera-tions in legal analysis (this explains its name ‘pure’). Carl Schmitt’s decisionism emphasizes themoment of political decision and political fight in constitutional law; Rudolf Smend’s in-tegrationism regards the main function of the constitution is integrating society.

[ICLQ vol 58, October 2009 pp 933–955] doi:10.1017/S0020589309001420

II. BASIC CONCEPTS

A. Constitution

In both countries, formal constitution means the specific legal document which can be

modified only by a higher majority in the Parliament, whereas the material constitution

means the ‘most important legal provisions’ of a country.

The question is of course, what we mean by ‘most important’. Whereas the material

constitution, in Germany, usually denotes the sum of fundamental decisions3 or the

basic legal order of the community,4 in Austria it is often understood as only the sum of

the rules governing the creation of norms.5 TheAustrian legal discoursemakes no use of

the decisionistic term ‘fundamental decisions’, or the term ‘community’ (Gemeinschaft)

borrowed from an integrationist approach, because these terms imply a blurring of

factual and normative arguments: either it means an argument from the constellation of

power (that is, who makes the ‘fundamental decisions’) to a constellation of law

(‘constitution’), or it presupposes a highly abstract term, namely, the existence of a

‘community,’ without however clarifying to what extent it is determined either by law or

by other factors. From an Austrian standpoint, the critique of the latter proceeds as

follows: the presumption of a non-legal community for modern, pluralistic societies

is not sociologically tenable, the community is therefore necessarily (only) legally

constituted, and the definition of the constitution based on the ‘community’ becomes

circular, because the constitution is defined by a term (‘community’) that, in turn, can

only be defined by the law. Thus, the decisionistic and integrationist definitions of the

constitution are either ‘not purely legal’ (partially sociological) or based on circular

reasoning. The latter is unacceptable for German legal scholars (if they recognize the

circularity) as well, while the former would probably only be unacceptable in Austria.

The fact that many Austrian jurists would comprehend the material constitution

primarily, or even exclusively, as the rules governing the creation of norms is a result

of the Stufenbaulehre (doctrine on the hierarchical structure of the legal order, or

literally ‘step structure doctrine’). According to this theory, the validity of norms in the

legal order is to be traced back to the constitution.6 The idea can also be transferred into

the German legal order and is not diametrically opposed to the German doctrine in

public law. However, only a few German authors, thus far, have made use of it.7

3 K Doehring, Allgemeine Staatslehre (3rd edn, CF Muller, Heidelberg, 2004) para 302 ff;P Badura, Staatsrecht (3rd edn, CH Beck, Munich, 2003) 7–8; H Maurer, Staatsrecht I (3rd edn,CH Beck, Munich, 2003) 11 (framing constitutional principles as fundamental decisions).

4 K Hesse, Grundzuge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (20th edn,CF Muller, Heidelberg, 1995) 10.

5 See R Walter and H Mayer, Grundriß des osterreichischen Bundesverfassungsrechts (9th

edn, Manz, Vienna, 2000) para 4 (defining ‘material constitution’ in its classic definition); but seeT Ohlinger, Verfassungsrecht, para 14 (5th edn, Facultas Wuv Universitatsverlag, Vienna, 2003)(defining ‘material constitution’ by the typical regulatory content). See also L Adamovich,B-C Funk and G Holzinger, Osterreichisches Staatsrecht I (Springer, Vienna, 1997) para 01.003ff (surveying the various opinions).

6 For further references to Austrian literature and for the history of this doctrine see A Jakab,‘Problems of the Stufenbaulehre’ (2007) 20 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 35 ff.

7 Eg, T Schilling, Rang und Geltung von Normen in gestuften Rechtsordnungen I.(Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, Berlin, 1994) 59 ff; R Lippold, Recht und Ordnung: Statikund Dynamik der Rechtsordnung. (Manz’sche, Vienna, 2000) 369 ff; D Heckmann, Geltungskraftund Geltungsverlust von Rechtsnormen: Elemente einer Theorie der autoritativen Normgel-tungsbeendigung (Mohr Siebeck, Tuebingen, 1997) 143 ff.

934 International and Comparative Law Quarterly

Both countries fill out the term ‘formal constitution’—ie the statute(s) which can

be modified only in a specially difficult procedure—with the same content, but its

function is differently perceived. In German doctrine, the formal constitution’s main

function is the legal stabilization of the material constitution. In Austrian doctrine, two

different theories are frequently juxtaposed.8 According to the previously dominant

theory, the formal constitution determines the rules of the game called politics

(Verfassung als Spielregel); according to the other, newer theory, it also defines an

order of values. The former theory exemplifies the formalistic and technical approach

taken by the traditional Austrian doctrine of public law.9 The expansion to include the

value order can be seen as a softening of the strict, classic (Kelsenian) viewpoint,

associated in Austrian constitutional law with the names Gunther Winkler, Peter

Pernthaler, Bernd-Christian Funk, Karl Korinek, and Ludwig Adamovich,10 which has

played an increasingly large role since the end of the 1960s.11 The two definitions,

however, are not mutually exclusive but are often put forward together.12

B. Sovereignty and the State

The term ‘State’ seldom appears in any reasoning used in Austrian public law,13 nor

do ‘statehood’ or ‘sovereignty.’14 Even in the context of the extent of European

integration, one speaks of an ‘integration-proof constitutional core’ instead of a

German-type ‘preservation of statehood’. Equally seldom does one come across the

8 See, eg, F Koja, ‘Die Verfassung’ in HMayer et al (eds), Staatsrecht in Theorie und Praxis:Festschrift fur Robert Walter (Manz’sche, Vienna, 1991) 349 ff.

9 See eg, H Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (2nd edn, Scientia, Aalen, 1929)53 ff.

10 Ludwig Adamovich, Jr, should be kept distinct from his father, Ludwig Adamovich, Sr,who was also President of the Constitutional Court (1946–1955) but was an adherent to the olderschool. See A J Noll, Sachlichkeit statt Gleichheit? (Springer, Vienna, 1996) 99. His son held thesame office (President of the Constitutional Court ) from 1984 to 2002. Just to clarify, it is not ahereditary office. The President of the Constitutional Court is appointed by the Federal Presidenton the recommendation of the Federal Government.

11 Even the very titles set the program: G Winkler, Wertbetrachtung im Recht und ihreGrenzen (Springer, Vienna, 1969) about ‘Value-Perception in Law and Its Limits’; G Winkler,Glanz und Elend der Reinen Rechtslehre (Europa Institute, Saarbrucken, 1988) about the‘Glory and Poverty of the Pure Theory of Law’; L Adamovich and B-C Funk, OsterreichischesVerfassungsrecht: Verfassungslehre unter Berucksichtigung von Staatslehre und Poli-tikwissenschaft (Springer, Vienna, 1982); N Wimmer, Materiales Verfassungsverstandnis(Springer, Vienna, 1971); K Korinek, Grundrechte und Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit (Springer,Vienna, 2000); P Pernthaler, Osterreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht (Verlag Osterreich, Vienna,2004). But, for a turn more towards social reality, see F Ermacora, Osterreichische Verfassung-slehre (Braumuller, Vienna, 1970).

12 Eg, Ohlinger ibid (n 5) para 15 ff. See also M Holoubek, ‘Typologie und Abwagung: KarlKorinek und die Wissenschaft vom Offentlichen Recht’ (2005) 127 Juristische Blatter 750 ff.(discussing the Kelsenian topoi used by Korinek, a leading proponent of the anti-formalistschool).

13 There are occasional exceptions, especially in more recent literature. See eg, W Berka, DieGrundrechte (Springer, Vienna, 1999) para 186 f (framing the State as bearer of the duties flowingfrom fundamental rights).

14 In the treatise by Adamovich et al (n 5) not a single passage deals with the ‘State’, althoughits title, Osterreichisches Staatsrecht (Austrian State law), might lead one to expect otherwise.

Continental European Constitutional Thinking 935

notion of the Willensbildung of the State, or the State’s intent. At most, discussion

about ‘legislative intent’ can be found.

Explaining these differences turns attention initially to Hans Kelsen. In his norma-

tive theory of the State, the State as such becomes the legal order, which is to say that,

in law, it only makes sense to speak of the constitution. The German literature makes

frequent use of the idea of a pre-legal state, an institutionalized authority distinct from

the people and with its own decision-making capacity.15 Such a conceptualization,

however, is foreign to the Austrian literature.16 There, the State as a personification of

the legal order cannot form intent in order to make decisions; at most, State institutions

(eg the legislature) might be thus personified. This disembodiment of a sociological

concept of the State may be a result of the experience with the political reality of the

Austro-Hungarian monarchy. As a highly multi-ethnic state, it had a constitution (and

an army which held the State together in crisis situations) but obviously lacked other

integrative factors, such as common culture, language, and civic solidarity.17

This rejection of the German concept of a pre-legal State also yields a difference in

the legal doctrine on state of emergency. Quite a few German legal scholars ascribe to

the State a pre-legal power of self-preservation, even if this power is subsequently

displaced by positive constitutional law. In contrast, the relevant Austrian scholarship

is strictly bound to the text of the constitution.18 In Austria, regulation of national

emergency is considered lex specialis to constitutional law, without any mention of

State powers that either pre-exist the law or derive from natural law.19

Traditional Austrian doctrine, however, faces a difficulty: The word ‘State’ does

occur in the wording of statutes with a sense that cannot be understood as ‘legal order’.

To manage this difficulty, Adolf Merkl, one of Kelsen’s disciples, developed the theory

of a threefold definition of the State, according to which ‘State’ can mean (1) the sum

of public and private institutions serving to actualize the legal order (thus comprising

not only law-making, adjudication, and administrative agencies, but also private par-

ties to a commercial or employment contract); (2) a narrower concept: that part of the

first definition which is typically characterized by enforcement institutions authorized

to issue mandatory instructions (that is, executive bodies or organs for the most

part); or (3) an institutional complex, functionally maintained by centralized funds

from legally regulated sources of revenue (that is, central administrative agencies ex-

cluding any autonomously administered institutions like local authorities).20 The three

15 On the different perceptions of sovereignty amongst European countries (incl Germany andAustria), see A Jakab, ‘Neutralizing the Sovereignty Question: Compromise Strategies inConstitutional Argumentations before European Integration and since’ (2006) 2 EuropeanConstitutional Law Review 375 ff.

16 In German, Anstaltsstaat. See C Schonberger,Das Parlament im Anstaltsstaat: Zur Theorieder parlamentarischen Reprasentation in der Staatsrechtslehre des Kaiserreichs (VittorioKlosterman, Frankfurt Am Main, 1997) 369 (on Kelsen’s, Duguit’s, Krabbe’s, and Preuß’scriticism on the Jellinekian premise of the state pre-existing the law; and citing further references).

17 R Aladar Metall, Hans Kelsen: Leben und Werk (Deuticke, Vienna, 1969) 22.18 See A Jakab, ‘German Constitutional Law and Doctrine on State of Emergency: Paradigms

and Dilemmas of a Traditional (Continental) Discourse’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal 453 ff(surveying the theoretical presuppositions of the German literature with remarks on Austria).

19 See F Koja, Der Staatsnotstand als Rechtsbegriff (Pustet, Salzburg, 1979) (discussing theissue in depth and citing further references).

20 A Merkl, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (Springer, Vienna, 1927) 291 ff; F Koja,Allgemeine Staatslehre (Springer, Vienna, 1993) 24 ff.


definitions form concentric circles, with the first as the widest circle and the third as the

narrowest. Obviously, none of the three definitions corresponds to the German concept

of the State, which approximates most closely the Austrian term ‘republic,’ itself a

positive law term.21

The use of the term ‘sovereignty’ also displays significant differences, again trace-

able to Kelsen, who was decidedly critical of the traditional notion of sovereignty.

The traditional understanding of sovereignty, he maintained, fails to keep legal and

sociological arguments apart (that is, it mixes the normative with the descriptive).22 If

one keeps these two sorts of argumentation apart, sovereignty can be understood in two

possible ways: sovereignty is either factual (sociological) sovereignty, which forces

it to confront the fact that, factually, absolute independence is impossible.23 Or, if

sovereignty is a legal term, two legal definitions become possible: either it denotes

a catalogue of State competences, which is ultimately arbitrary and theoretically un-

justifiable,24 or sovereignty describes a feature of the legal order. Kelsen opted for the

latter. As a starting point, Kelsen viewed this feature as ‘non-derivability’.25 According

to his pure theory of law, sovereignty is a feature of a system of norms, whose validity

derive directly from the hypothetical basic norm without any intervening norm of

positive law.26 If one further adds a monistic view of international law’s primacy, then

sovereign States cannot exist, as they derive from international law. Only international

law itself would be sovereign.27

As a result of this complicated line of reasoning, the term ‘sovereignty’ was es-

sentially banished from Austria for reasons of constitutional law.28 Questions relating

to sovereignty are also answered without reference to the term; one tends to speak of

democracy instead of the sovereignty of the people, or of the increased difficulty in

amending the constitution’s fundamental principles instead of the preservation of State

sovereignty. For purely normative scholarship, everything can only be a norm or a

complex of norms. Along these lines, Kelsen rejects the idea of a personified State

21 Eg article 6(1) and article 8(1) of the Austrian Constitution. For the sake of convenience,the primary constitutional document in Austria, the Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (abbreviated‘B-VG’), will be referred to as the Austrian Constitution, although strictly speaking the consti-tution comprises numerous texts and statutes (see n 80–84 and accompanying text).

22 For Kelsen’s criticism on the sociologically based sovereignty (eg F Somlo, JuristischeGrundlehre (Meiner, Leipzig, 1917) 93, 97–98,102, see H Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveranitatund die Theorie des Volkerrechts: Beitrag zu einer reinen Rechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck, Tubingen,1920) 31. 23 Kelsen ibid 7.

24 H Kelsen, ‘Der Wandel des Souveranitatsbegriffes’ in 2 Studi filosofico-giuridici dedicati aGiorgio del Vecchio (Sec Tipogr Modenese, Modena, 1931) 8 f. 25 Kelsen (n 22) 10.

26 ibid 13; H Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Springer, Berlin, 1925) 103; H Kelsen, ‘Lesrapports de systeme entre le droit interne et le droit international public’ (1926) Recueil des Cours251, 256.

27 H Kelsen, ‘Die Einheit von Volkerrecht und staatlichem Recht’ in Abhandlungen zumVolkerrecht: Festgabe fur Aleksandr N Makarov (Kohlhamer Verlag, Stuttgard and Cologne,1958) 240.

28 Later (after emigration), Kelsen understood sovereignty as directness in internationallaw (Volkerrechtsunmittelbarkeit). See H Kelsen, ‘The Principle of Sovereign Equality of Statesas a Basis for International Organization’ (1944) 53 Yale LJ 207, 208. That is, a legal orderis sovereign when its validity follows directly, immediately from international law. Withsuch a definition, it makes sense to speak of State sovereignty, as opposed to the non-sovereign(sub-)states within a federal State. This, however, did not continue to find reception in Austrianconstitutional scholarship.


capable of forming intent and making decisions, and the dominant view among

Austrian constitutional scholars still follows Kelsen’s lead. Kelsen instead sees the

State as merely a complex of norms, whose sovereignty can only be a feature of norms,

namely, their non-derivability or their directness in international law.29

C. Democracy

The term ‘democracy’ is found in the first article of the Austrian Constitution as a

fundamental principle, abolishable or amendable only by referendum. Here, it is

understood as freedom, equality, and a parliamentary system of government.30 This

definition may surprise the reader with its elements of ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’, both part

of Kelsen’s legacy, though this time not from his pure theory of law but from one of

his political works, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (On the nature and value

of democracy). He does define democracy primarily in a formal sense, that is, on the

one hand, the governing are the same as the governed31 and, on the other, democracy is

necessarily indirect (ie to be run by elected leaders).32 This formal approach, however,

does not mean that democracy cannot also be organizationally and structurally in

favour of certain values. And, Kelsen continues, these values are equality and liberty

because democracy, with its formality and value-neutrality, secures to the individual

the highest levels of liberty and (formal) equality.33 In Germany, these elements tend to

fall under the protection afforded by fundamental rights and, thus, are part of the rule of

law.34

The key element of the German understanding of democracy is, however, the

so-called ‘chain theory’. According to this, the constitutional principle of democracy

requires that all State power can be traced back to the people (through a few or maybe

numerous links like in a chain).35

The German formulation, ‘[a]ll state authority is derived from the people’

(Art. 20(2) Grundgesetz) does not occur in the text of Austria’s constitution itself;

instead, the same content is delivered without the traditional terminology: ‘[the

republic’s] law emanates from the people’ (Art. 1 B-VG). This formulation traces back

to Kelsen’s equating the State with the legal order, which necessarily implies that no

authority (but only mere force) can exist outside of the law.36

D. Federalism

In Austria, the term federalism comprises the following elements: (1) a constitutional

division of State functions between the federal government and the component states

(Lander); (2) the possibility for participation of the Lander in federal legislation; and

29 See, eg, Koja (n 20) 34. cf also A Jakab, ‘Kelsen’s Doctrine of International Law betweenEpistemology and Politics’ (2004) 9 Austrian Review of International and European Law 49, 55 f.

30 Walter and Mayer, (n 5) para 147 ff; Ohlinger (n 5) 66; Adamovich et al (n 5) para11.001 ff.

31 Kelsen (n 9) 14, 99. 32 ibid 27. 33 ibid 9.34 K Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2nd edn, CH Beck, Munich,

1984) 20.III.1.35 ‘Ununterbrochene Legitimationskette’, see BVerfGE 83, 60 (72 f); 93, 38 (67).36 T Ohlinger, ‘Hans Kelsen und das osterreichische Bundesverfassungsrecht’ Address at the

Conference ‘Die osterreichischen Einflusse auf die Modernisierung des japanischen Rechts’ 2(20 March, 2003) available at www.univie.ac.at/staatsrecht-oehlinger/php/get.php?id=143.


(3) the autonomy of the Lander, including their ‘relative constitutional autonomy’.37

One interesting doctrinal figure in this area is the ‘creeping total revision of the federal

constitution’. This describes the notion that individually insignificant amendments to

Austria’s federal constitution could accumulate, eventually practically abolishing a

fundamental principle, which would properly require a national referendum.38 The

figure is almost always used in reference to the issue of the States’ (Lander) losing

powers to the federal government, and so abolishing the principle of federalism in the

constitution. The German term describing the similar political reality, ‘unitary federal

state’,39 is not widespread in Austria.

Briefly even used by Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court40 and still prevalent

in Austria is Kelsen’s three circle theory of the federal State (Dreikreise-Theorie

des Bundesstaates),41 which confers equal ranking on both federal and Lander gov-

ernments, thereby presuming a third legal circle: the State as a whole (Gesamtstaat).

The former two circles are subordinate to the State as a whole. The ‘constitution

of the state as a whole’ (Gesamtverfassung), however, is not identical to the federal

constitution but forms instead only the legal core of its division of powers.

Organizationally, the state as a whole comprises the review institutions (constitutional

court, administrative court, auditing authority), the federal president in some of

his functions (eg, as foreign representative), and the national assembly as federal

legislature (that is, in the exercise of Kompetenz-Kompetenz).42

The problem with this original idea was its lack of clarity in terms of positive law; it

was unclear exactly what the ‘constitution of the state as a whole’ described. Thus, the

recent revision of the theory proceeds as follows:43 (1) the constitution of the State as a

whole is actually the federal constitution itself; (2) the legal circle of the federal

government includes federal statutes (but not the federal constitution!) and the legal

acts based on them; and (3) the legal circle of the Lander encloses the State constitu-

tions and the states’ legal acts based on them. The second and third legal circles are

equally subordinate to the first.

One consequence of this theory is that Austrian constitutional law knows no conflict

of powers between federal and State law.44 Germany’s constitutional provision that

federal law takes precedence over Land law is similarly foreign: the ‘constitution of the

37 F Koja, Das Verfassungsrecht der osterreichischen Bundeslander (Springer, Vienna, 1967)1, 14, 23 ff, 39. The Austrian Constitutional Court has also accepted this. See eg VfSlg 6783/1972; VfSlg 7653/1975; VfSlg 7791/1976; VfSlg 11669/1988.

38 Article 44(3) of the Austrian Constitution. See eg, VfSlg 11.829/1988.39 K Hesse, Der unitarische Bundesstaat (Muller, Karlsruhe, 1962) (in German, unitarischer

Bundesstaat).40 BVerfGE 6, 308 (340, 364); subsequently, the court switched over to the now predominant

two-State theory.41 H Kelsen, ‘Die Bundesexekution’ in Z Giacometti and D Schindler (eds), Festgabe fur

Fritz Fleiner (Mohr Siebeck, Tuebingen, 1927) 127 ff; Ohlinger (n 5) para 218 ff.42 The term ‘organ’ is also differently defined in the Austrian literature: a strongly normative

definition as a bundle of rights and duties. See Koja (n 20) 152. German definitions with socio-logical connotations, such as in E-W Bockenforde, ‘Organ, Organisation und juristische Person’in Fortschritte des Verwaltungsrechts: Festschrift fur Hans J Wolff (CH Beck, Munich, 1973)269 ff, are not widespread.

43 E Wiederin, Bundesrecht und Landesrecht (Springer, Vienna, 1995) 40 ff.44 One exception is the power to make international treaties. Conflicts here are resolved

according to the lex posterior rule. See Ohlinger (n 5) para 257; Wiederin (n 43) 208.


state as a whole’ divides powers between the federal and Lander legal circles. These

two subordinate circles only conflict when the federal order of powers in the State as a

whole is also violated. Then, the constitutional court has to guard the federal division

of powers in the State as a whole.

Aside from this fundamental theoretical difference, several terminological differ-

ences are noteworthy. Germany’s Bundestreue (‘federal loyalty’) is formulated as the

Berucksichtigungsprinzip (‘principle of consideration’) in Austria, denoting in both

countries the reciprocal obligation of federal and Lander legislatures to take the other

into consideration. And different terms are used for the same issues of implied legis-

lative powers over areas not enumerated but necessary to carrying out the express

power: in Germany, Annexkompetenz (‘annex power’), and in Austria, Adhasion-

stheorie (‘adhesion theory’).

E. The Rule of Law, Separation of Powers, and Republic

The principle of rule of law (Rechtsstaat) is unanimously recognized in both countries.

In Germany it comprises the requirements which are basically known to common

law readers as Lon Fuller’s eight principles (‘rule of law in a formal sense’),45 but

it comprises also further elements, most importantly the separation of powers and

protection of fundamental rights (‘rule of law in a substantive sense’).

In Austria, however, separation of powers and protection of fundamental rights are

not perceived as part of the concept of rule of law. This of course is not meant to

suggest that they do not exist in Austria. But separation of powers is usually understood

as a discrete fundamental principle, while protection of fundamental rights is con-

sidered a principle of ‘liberalism’.46 The latter can be explained historically: in the

immediate aftermath of the First World War, when the constitutional law now in force

was birthed, protection of fundamental rights was still seen as a liberal value and not as

a self-evident value.

Both countries define separation of powers as the limitation and division of

legal empowerments. Austria, however, does not emphasize the classic (and also in

Germany accepted) triad of governmental branches. This rejection of the traditional

concept of separation of powers, too, is part of the inheritance of Kelsen’s doctrine

on the hierarchical structure of the legal order (Stufenbaulehre). Instead of three

equally ranking branches, the hierarchical theory posits a legislature superior to the

executive and judiciary, because the executive and judicial branches base the validity

of their legal actions on statutes. Ultimately, this means there are only two basic

functions (or powers), namely, legislation and implementation (Vollziehung). Within

the latter, then, distinct executive (Verwaltung) and judicial (Judikative) components

carry out respective duties.47 Thus, the Stufenbaulehre incidentally also provides

a specialized terminology and legal legitimization of parliamentary democracy

(ie, supremacy of the legislature over the executive).48 Austrian legal scholars refer to

45 L Fuller, The Morality of Law (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969) 33 ff.46 Sometimes, though, protection of fundamental rights is defined as falling under a

‘substantivized’ notion of the rule of law. See eg, Adamovich et al, (n 5) para 14.015.47 T Ohlinger, Der Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung (Manz, Wien, 1975) 29; Adamovich et al,

(n 5) para 15.004 (representing the situation on a very informative drawing).48 Ohlinger (n 47) para 32.


this novel constellation of the three branches as the ‘hierarchy of branches of state

powers’.49

As in Germany, ‘republic’ in Austria also describes primarily a rejection of mon-

archy;50 however, the respective second elements of the term are different. In Austria,

republicanism further demands a separation of church and State (a secularized State) as

well as religious neutrality.51 This division is lacking in Germany as a result of

the persisting ecclesiastical compromise of the Weimar Republic (refusing the total

separation of State and church in article 140 of the German Basic Law referring to

articles 136–139 and 141 of the Weimar Constitution as its ‘integral parts’).52 In

response to the National Socialist regime, though, the German understanding of the

term ‘republic’ also implies a liberal, non-totalitarian state of affairs.

Having removed protection of fundamental rights and separation of powers from the

concept of ‘rule of law,’ the Austrian term is left with only legal certainty, access to

justice, the supremacy of statutes over law made by the executive (Gesetzesvorrang),

and reserved domain of statutes (Gesetzesvorbehalt) (article 18 of the Austrian

49 ibid 30 (in German, Stufenbau der Staatsfunktionen).50 In contrast to his German colleague, the Austrian federal president is elected directly. The

Federal Assembly, a State organ comprising members of the National Council and the FederalCouncil (ie, the lower house and the upper house of the federal legislature), is the supervisorybody that can initiate impeachment proceedings. 51 Ohlinger (n 5) para 69.

52 Article 140 Grundgesetz: ‘The provisions of Articles 136, 137, 138, 139, and 141 of theGerman Constitution of August 11, 1919 shall be an integral part of this Basic Law.’ 1919German (Weimar) Constitution: ‘Religion and Religious Societies. Article 136 (1) Civil andpolitical rights and duties shall be neither dependent upon nor restricted by the exercise of re-ligious freedom. (2) Enjoyment of civil and political rights and eligibility for public office shall beindependent of religious affiliation. (3) No person shall be required to disclose his religiousconvictions. The authorities shall have the right to inquire into a person’s membership in areligious society only to the extent that rights or duties depend upon it or that a statistical surveymandated by a law so requires. (4) No person may be compelled to perform any religious act orceremony, to participate in religious exercises, or to take a religious form of oath. Article 137 (1)There shall be no state church. (2) The freedom to form religious societies shall be guaranteed.The union of religious societies within the territory of the Reich shall be subject to no restrictions.(3) Religious societies shall regulate and administer their affairs independently within the limitsof the law that applies to all. They shall confer their offices without the participation of the state orthe civil community. (4) Religious societies shall acquire legal capacity according to the generalprovisions of civil law. (5) Religious societies shall remain corporations under public law insofaras they have enjoyed that status in the past. Other religious societies shall be granted the samerights upon application, if their constitution and the number of their members give assurance oftheir permanency. If two or more religious societies established under public law unite into asingle organization, it too shall be a corporation under public law. (6) Religious societies that arecorporations under public law shall be entitled to levy taxes on the basis of the civil taxation listsin accordance with Land law. (7) Associations whose purpose is to foster a philosophical creedshall have the same status as religious societies. (8) Such further regulation as may be required forthe implementation of these provisions shall be a matter for Land legislation. Article 138 (1)Rights of religious societies to public subsidies on the basis of a law, contract, or special grantshall be redeemed by legislation of the Lander. The principles governing such redemption shall beestablished by the Reich. (2) Property rights and other rights of religious societies or associationsin their institutions, foundations, and other assets intended for purposes of worship, education, orcharity shall be guaranteed. Article 139 Sunday and holidays recognized by the state shall remainprotected by law as days of rest from work and of spiritual improvement. Article 141 To the extentthat a need exists for religious services and pastoral work in the army, in hospitals, in prisons, or inother public institutions, religious societies shall be permitted to provide them, but withoutcompulsion of any kind.’


Constitution).53 The domain reserved to statutes also describes—as it does in

Germany54—the obligation of the legislature sufficiently to determine permissible

executive action. The legislature’s failure to meet this obligation through the bianco

empowerment of agencies to pass necessary ordinances is a constitutional violation

known as ‘formal statutory delegation’ (formalgesetzliche Delegation).55

F. Basic German Terms Missing from Austrian Legal Doctrine

From the German side of the doctrinal border, Austria’s public law landscape looks

different not only in that some of the terminology has different content, but also lacks

certain basic terms typical of German public law. These have already been hinted at,

but here explicitly are the most important ones: integration (as defined by Smend), the

separation of State and society (very rare in Austria),56 division of public law and

private law (not a single Austrian constitutional law textbook analyzes this termino-

logical pair),57 State interest (in its place: public interest, which sounds less etatistic),

sovereignty (usually not even mentioned in constitutional law textbooks), the peoples’

sovereignty (although it is of course used, as a term of natural law, in the sections on

constitutional history in textbooks),58 legitimacy vs legality,59 and State functions

(more likely in the Austrian legal literature: powers or branches [Gewalt], but only two

of them, as detailed above). As Austrian constitutional law—as opposed to article 20

of the German Grundgesetz60—makes no positive reference to a principle of the social

welfare state, this term is absent from legal scholarship, as well.61

53 See eg Walter and Mayer, (n 5) para 165 (representing the old school); but see VfSlg11.196/1986 (interpreting the rule of law more broadly and less formalistically in a case involvingthe minimum standard of actual efficiency in institutions of protection of rights).

54 F Ossenbuhl, ‘Vorrang und Vorbehalt des Gesetzes’ in J Isensee and P Kirchhof (eds),3 Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (CF Muller, Heidelberg, 1988)· 62, para 23. 55 Ohlinger (n 5) para 583 (in German, formalgesetzliche Delegation).

56 The differentiation of ‘State’ and ‘society’ implies the term Anstaltsstaat (see n 16 andaccompanying text), which is a sociological and pre-legal term and, thus, does not appear alongthe Austrian classical, normativistic approach. See eg Bockenforde (n 42) 295 f, (exhibiting atypically German perspective on the State as Anstaltsstaat); but see C Mollers, Staat als Argument(CH Beck, Munich, 2000) 67, 161 f, 173 ff, esp 228 ff (critiquing the perspective thoroughly).

57 See D Wyduckel, ‘Uber die Unterscheidung von offentlichem Recht und Privatrecht inder Reinen Rechtslehre’ in W Krawietz and H Schelsky (eds), Rechtssystem und gesellschaftlicheBasis bei Hans Kelsen (Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 1984) 113 ff (discussing Kelsen’s opinionon this differentiation).

58 For an exception, see Pernthaler (n 11) 35 f, 55 ff.59 For a groundbreaking treatise on this differentiation, see C Schmitt, Legalitat und

Legitimitat (Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 1932). Legitimacy is irrelevant for a purely legal-normativistic scholarship because it deals with an extra-legal (or pre-legal) problem.

60 Art 20(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal State.61 The Austrian Constitution’s concept of the human being is one of the liberal individual and

not—as in Germany—one of the social being. See H Schambeck, ‘Menschenbild undMenschenrechte im osterreichischen Verfassungsrecht’ in W Geiger (ed), Menschenrecht undMenschenbild in den Verfassungen Schwedens, Deutschlands und Osterreichs (CF Muller,Heidelberg, 1983) 60, 70; W Geiger, Menschenrecht und Menschenbild in der Verfassung derBundesrepublik Deutschland, ibid 46. Another liberal current can be seen in the fact that, until asrecently as 1992, there was no right to review judicial decisions for violation of fundamentalrights. This is because, from a liberal world view, the actual threat to liberty is the administrativeagency, and the judiciary is the guardian against this threat. See F Ermacora, ‘Holprige Wege im


The absent terminology can be traced back partly to the positive constitutional law,

and partly to Kelsenian methodological objections. The fact that sometimes even the

Austrian ‘non-Kelsenians’ argue using these Kelsenian objections, can be explained by

the situation that, even today, there are a great many Kelsenians in Austrian consti-

tutional discourse: for purposes of disseminating scholarly views, it is advisable to use

‘non-Kelsenian’ arguments only when absolutely necessary to the presentation of

one’s own standpoint.62 Such a case is the issue of constitutional interpretation.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

Two main schools stand in opposition in Austrian constitutional interpretation: (1) the

older, formalistic-reductionist style; and (2) the value-oriented (substantive or

German) style.

Until the end of the 1960s, the first school was predominant, and proponents of

the contemporary version of the pure theory of law still advocate it today.63 This

approach’s first premise is a view of the constitution as rules of procedure

for the political process (constitution as playing rules). In consequence, this

formalistic concept of the constitution excludes the interpretative use of substantive

(value-based) arguments (that is, arguments from principles).64 The other premise

of this theory is a bifurcation of interpretation into an objective (heteronomous)

and a subjective (autonomous) component.65 The subjective element implies

Grundrechtsschutz’ (1993) 48 Osterreichische Juristen-Zeitung 75 ff (discussing complaints forviolation of fundamental rights before the Austrian Supreme Court of Justice). The fundamentalrights complaint at the Austrian Supreme Court of Justice, however, can only be submitted withrespect to protection of personal liberty (BVG on protection of personal liberty, BGBl 684/1988and article 5 ECHR). Complaints for omission in Austria can be filed only against administrativeagencies. See A H Schuler, Die Verfassungsbeschwerde in der Schweiz, der BundesrepublikDeutschland und Osterreich (Schultess, Zurich, 1968) 161, 165 (citing further references). Asopposed to Germany’s Basic Law, Austria’s Constitution (B-VG) and its State Basic Law (StGG)were not shaped in fearful reaction to National Socialist totalitarianism; rather, the fear was ofclassically anti-liberal tendencies: the Constitution dates from 1920, the State Basic Law from1867. See generally A Sajo, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism (CentralEuropean University Press, Budapest, 1999) 1 ff (identifying the influence on constitution-makingof fear of a return of negative historical experiences).

62 On the other hand, it should be noted that many methodological objections against basicterminology of etatism, natural law, or sociology in the traditional German scholarship are indeedwell-founded. See Mollers (n 56) 418 ff (making similar observations).

63 Eg Walter and Mayer (n 5) para 122 ff. For a sampling of the older literature, see LAdamovich, Sr, ‘Probleme der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit’ (1950) Juristische Blatter 73 ff.; LAdamovich, Sr, ‘Die verfassungsmaßige Funktion des Richters, 9 Osterreichische Juristen-Zeitung 1954 409 ff. See also Noll (n 10) 99 (speaking, in this context, of an Austrian ‘valueasceticism’).

64 See H Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarke (1929) 5Veroffentlichung der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 68 ff (expressing generalskepticism as to value-based terminology); K Korinek, ‘Gesetzesprufungsrecht als Kern derVerfassungsgerichtsbarkeit’ in E Zwink (ed), Salzburger Symposion zum Jubilaum 60 JahreBundesverfassung (Landespressebuero, Salzburg, 1980) 109 (discussing the traditional scepticismof the Constitutional Court as to arguments from democracy and citing further references).

65 O Pfersmann, ‘Rechtstheorieverstandnis als Voraussetzung des Rechtsverstandnisses:Skizze fur einen Landervergleich Frankreich, Deutschland, Osterreich’ in J Jurt et al (eds),Wandel von Recht und Rechtbewusstsein in Frankreich und Deutschland (Arno Spitz Verlag,Berlin 1999) 56 ff.


arbitrariness,66 meaning this element should be minimized and precedence should be

given to the objective element. This leads to a strict interpretation of the wording of the

text with an historical accent because these two types of argumentation (plain meaning

and legislative history) are the most objective (which is to say, most concretely veri-

fiable). Even these two arguments are ranked: textualist arguments are more objective,

so the plain meaning is decisive, and only when the wording is ambiguous does the

historical intent of the lawmaker come into play.67 As can be expected, purposive

arguments are neglected—the constitution has no ‘objective purpose’ but only that

purpose given to it by the historical constitution-maker (to be discovered from the text

of the constitution). The goal of interpretation is the greatest possible conformity with

the original intent of the lawmaker.68

The consequences of this theory are the following typical topoi (each still used with

frequency by the Austrian Constitutional Court): (1) precedence given to the

plain meaning, (2) the theory, or principle, of petrification (Versteinerung),69 and

(3) eloquent silence (the answering nature of the lack of certain provisions in the

constitution).70 The problem with this interpretive theory is its inability to make any

significant use of fundamental rights or catalogues of the State’s objectives.71 In these

cases, one must make purposive arguments, as the mere wording is too lapidary;

66 A Somek, ‘Wissenschaft vom Verfassungsrecht: Osterreich’ in A von Bogdandy et al (eds),2, Ius Publicum Europaeum (Max-Planck Institut, Heidelberg, 2008) para 11, calls this mentality‘scepticism as to balancing’ (Abwagungsskeptizismus) because it banishes the irrational act ofbalancing that should be kept to a minimum.

67 F Koja, ‘Interpellationsrecht und Verschwiegenheitspflicht’ in M Imboden et al (eds),Festschrift fur Adolf J Merkl (W Fink, Munich, 1970) 155.

68 See H Schaffer, Verfassungsinterpretation in Osterreich (Springer, Vienna, 1971) (ana-lyzing this interpretive style in depth); see also H Schaffer, ‘Die Interpretation’ in H Schambeck(ed), Das osterreichische Bundesverfassungsgesetz und seine Entwicklung (Speyer & Peters,Berlin, 1980) 70 (defining the Constitutional Court’s role as ‘guardian,’ but not ‘lord,’ of theconstitution (Huter and not Herr, respectively)).

69 This means that the wording of the division of competences between Lander and federaljurisdictions still have the original meaning from the time of their incorporation in the text of theconstitution. Most of the provisions on division of competences (articles 10–14 of the AustrianConstitution) date back to 1920 or 1925; thus, the Constitutional Court, when dealing withempowerment issues, analyzes statutes and ordinances that were in force in 1920. Often, theseare imperial orders from the 18th or 19th century. See, eg, H Mayer, Das osterreichischeBundesverfassungsrecht:Kurzkommentar (Manz, Vienna, 2002) 17 ff. While this historicalmethod is not completely unknown to Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, it is not followedin such an extreme form. See BVerfGE 7, 29 (44); BVerfGE 33, 125 (152 f.); BVerfGE 42, 20(29); BVerfGE 61, 149 (175); BVerfGE 68, 319 (328).

70 As with the principle of petrification, this ‘answering nature’ (Antwortcharakter) is a sortof historical argument. See Adamovich et al (n 5) para 03.016; C Braun, Die Interpretationwirtschaftsrelevanter Grundrechte in Osterreich und Deutschland: ein Vergleich der Methodenund Ergebnisse der Verfassungsinterpretation (Dissertation, University of Regensburg, 2000) 38.Here, however, the focus is not on what the wording says but on what it fails to say: the reason agiven norm does not regulate a situation, which to us seems questionable, is that the situation wasso clear at the time the norm was created that the issue did not even come into question. Thus, forinstance, there is no explicit provision on whether the Federal Government’s (Cabinet’s) decisionsmust be unanimous or merely by majority; when article 69 of the Austrian Constitution waspassed, the legal situation was undisputed, specifically in favor of unanimity. Presumably, thenthe constitution still implies tacitly as much. See B Raschauer, ‘Artikel 69’ in K Korinek andM Holoubek (eds), Osterreichische Bundesverfassungsrecht (looseleaf collection 2003) para 28.

71 Ohlinger (n 5) para 33, 686 ff.


furthermore, novel difficulties, unforeseen by the historical constitution-maker,

inevitably arise and must be resolved. This insight led to the founding of another

interpretive theory, the theory of value-oriented (material) constitutional interpretation

(Theorie der wertorientierten (materialen) Verfassungsauslegung).

This second theory is associated with the names Gunther Winkler, Peter Pernthaler,

Bernd-Christian Funk, Karl Korinek, and Ludwig Adamovich and can be said to

have been the majority view since the 1980s.72 Its most important characteristic is the

priority given to purposive interpretation. The Austrian Constitutional Court, here,

follows the path taken by the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European

Court of Human Rights. Yet this school (sometimes referred to as ‘critical evaluative

legal science’73) also defers to the Kelsenian tradition: it also distinguishes carefully

between the subjective and objective components of interpretation.74 However,

Kelsen’s traditional division limits legal scholarship to the determination of hypotheses

of possible meanings of norms (that is, cognition),75 whereas, according to critical

evaluative legal science, the selection (that is, valuation) also falls to legal scholars.76

It is also stressed, however, that one must be careful to keep the two analytical steps

clearly separate and recognizably discrete. To put it another way, syncretistic mixing

of the two levels must be avoided: one must be conscious of her or his own method-

ology, making it transparent.77

The current prevalence of this second interpretive style does not mean that Austria’s

Constitutional Court has completely abandoned the previous style and the arguments

typical of it; rather, it has expanded the earlier school, in particular, in the areas of

fundamental rights and constitutionally prescribed general objectives (Staatsziele).

Consequently, the Court’s current case-law tends to exhibit some methodological

divergence: now a strict interpretation according to the plain meaning, now judicial

activism bordering on unrestrained law-making.78 The reasons underlying such

divergence have also to do with the varying constitutional cultures and epochs of

72 See (n 11). The shift in scholarly opinion is provocatively characterized by Bruno Binder,‘Der materielle Gesetzesvorbehalt der Erwerbsfreiheit (Art 6 StGG): Uberlegungen zur neuenJudikatur des VfGH’ (1988) 15 Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht 1 (‘TheConstitutional Court has discovered constitutional adjudication’ [author’s translation]).

73 Adamovich et al (n 5) para 03.013 (self-identification, in German, kritische Wertungsjur-isprudenz).

74 ibid para 02.014 (‘Experience teaches us that there is a particularly great danger of inter-changing or intermixing the perspectives of constitutional scholarship and constitutional policy,and this danger can especially manifest itself in an interpreter’s—conscious or unconscious—presentation of a given moral evaluation as the content of positive law’ [author’s translation]).

75 H Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (2nd edn, Mohr Siebeck, Tuebingen, 1960) 349 (‘Scholarlyinterpretation of the law can reveal nothing other than the possible meanings of a legal norm. Ascognition of its object, such interpretation cannot decide among the possibilities it discovers; itmust leave this decision to the legal institution that the legal order has determined is competent toapply the law in the given case’ [author’s translation]).

76 K Korinek, ‘Zur Interpretation von Verfassungsrecht’ in H Mayer et al (eds), Staatsrecht inTheorie und Praxis (n 8) 367 (‘Application of the traditional interpretive methods, under certainpresumptions—that must be disclosed—permits one to make certain assertions as to the separate,competing normative hypotheses . . . . In this way, the preference of a specific normative hy-pothesis can be better rationalized than the pure theory of law assumes . . .’ [author’s translation]).

77 Adamovich et al, (n 5) para 02.014.78 T Ohlinger, ‘Verfassung und Demokratie in Osterreich zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts’ in

C Brunner et al (eds), Festschrift fur Manfried Welan (Bohlau Verlag, Vienna, 2002) 222.


origin, out of which the respective parts of positive constitutional law in Austria has

emerged (ECHR 1950, the Austrian Federal Constitution 1920, or Austria’s State Basic

Law of 1867).79

IV. SYSTEM SOURCES OF LAW

Austrian legal scholarship has at its disposal a thoroughly elaborated and sophisticated

body of terminology on the system of sources of law. The surprisingly high level of

interest in this topic stems from Kelsen’s normativistic legacy. Because of the doctrinal

supremacy of the Austrian doctrine in this field, it seems to be fruitful to structure the

comparison as a catalogue of the central Austrian doctrinal figures of the system of

sources of law contrasted with their German counterparts wherever it is possible to

do so.

A. The Fragmented and Multi-Layered Constitution

Austrian federal constitutional law comprises many federal constitutional laws or

acts, beginning with the State Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals of

21 December 1867 (Staatsgrundgesetz vom 21.12.1867 uber die allgemeinen Rechte

der Staatsburger fur die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Konigreiche und Lander), and

including international treaties with constitutional status (eg the ECHR and the Treaty

of Saint-Germaine) and individual constitutional provisions in ordinary statutes

(eg article 1 of the Data Protection Act). The core text of the federal constitution is

the Austrian Constitution or B-VG (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz; literally, federal con-

stitutional statute) of 1920.80 In German, this document is hyphenated, in contrast to

the other (equally ranking) constitutional statutes (eg the Bundesverfassungsgesetz or

BVG on comprehensive environmental protection, BGBl 491/1984). The reason for

this is the lack of an incorporation requirement such as is laid down in the first sentence

of article 79(1) of the German Basic Law. This fragmented situation leads to a lack of

clarity and has prompted the self-criticism of the constitutional law as in ‘ruins’.81

79 Ohlinger (n 5) para 35.80 The B-VG was drafted in 1920 by the constitutional committee of the Constitutional

National Assembly, which, in addition to delegates from the seven parties, also included Kelsenas an ‘expert.’ See R Walter, Die Entstehung des Bundes-Verfassungsgesetzes 1920 in derKonstituierenden Nationalversammlung (Manz, Vienna, 1984) 15. Aside from a few technicaldetails, the Weimar Constitution had no influence on the drafting of the Austrian Constitution. SeeC Sima, Osterreichs Bundesverfassung und die Weimarer Reichsverfassung (Peter Lang, Vienna,1993). The B-VG is not programmatically oriented, nor does it have a preamble. One reason forthis is the fact that Kelsen wanted to draft it as non-ideologically as possible. See H Schaffer,Verfassungsinterpretation in Osterreich (Springer, Vienna, 1971) 64, fn 19 (citing further refer-ences). Another reason was the inability of the parties to find common ground on ideologicalelements. Thus, Austria’s central constitutional text was construed as a model for lawmaking andthe necessary oversight of legal conformity. See ibid 64.

81 H Klecatsky, ‘Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und Bundesverfassungsrecht’ in H Schambeck(ed), Das osterreichische Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und seine Entwicklung (Speyer & Peters,Berlin, 1980) 83 ff; H Eberhard and C Konrath, Der Osterreich-Konvent, 2004–2005/01 JAP/Juristische Ausbildung & Praxisvorbereitung 18, 20. See also Ohlinger (n 8) para 291 (addressingthe ‘collapse’ of Austrian constitutional law); L Adamovich, ‘Zur Fortentwicklung des os-terreichischen Verfassungsrechts’ in E Zwink (ed), Salzburger Symposion zum Jubilaum 60 Jahre


During the periods of the grand parliamentary coalition, such federal constitutional

statutes were also passed to ‘correct’ the Constitutional Court’s judgments (in Austria

referred to as Erkenntnisse, literally, realizations or cognitions—as opposed to the

‘German-German’ Urteile meaning judgments).82 Thus, when a statutory provision

was struck down for unconstitutionality, the grand coalition had a majority sufficient to

amend the constitution and simply readopted the provision with constitutional rank.83

When the grand coalition broke apart, this practice thankfully also ended and could not

further fragment the constitutional law.

However, another problem arose: the highly detailed, fragmented regulation of

federal constitutional law makes governance very difficult without a majority sufficient

to amend the constitution. This is why, at the dissolution of the grand coalition, a

new constitution became required and a constitutional convention (the Austrian

Convention) was called in 2003.84

Both German and Austrian scholars are familiar with the term ‘unconstitutional

constitutional law’ (verfassungswidriges Verfassungsrecht). It means that even the

constitution-maker has limitations. In both countries, this has a basis in positive law.

The difference is that article 79(3) of the German Basic Law is an eternity clause,

whereas article 44(3) of the Austrian Constitution is simply in a section of the consti-

tution with an added procedural hurdle for amendment (structural provisions or basic

principles of Austrian federal constitutional law). The additional hurdle is a refer-

endum: proposed abolition or the radical alteration of a fundamental principle requires

a national referendum. This has only taken place once: in 1995 before the accession to

the EU.

Austria’s Constitutional Court has repeatedly considered and discussed the

figure of unconstitutional constitutional law85 and has—in contrast to Germany’s

Federal Constitutional Court—even used it once to strike down ‘ordinary’ consti-

tutional law.86 This might be explained by the greater weight given in Austria to

arguments from theory of norms (and from the hierarchy of sources of law), arguments

that can even outweigh the argument from the constitution-making, democratic

Bundesverfassung (Landespresseburo, Salzburg, 1980) 58 (discussing the ‘atomization’ of theconstitution in constitutional statutes and constitutional provisions); T Ohlinger, ‘Stil derVerfassungsgesetzgebung: Stil der Verfassungsinterpretation’ in Bernd-Christian Funk et al (eds),Staatsrecht und Staatswissenschaften in Zeiten des Wandels: Festschrift fur Ludwig Adamovich(Springer, Vienna, 1992) 502 ff, especially 508 (speaking of ‘casuistry’ in the drafting of theconstitution).

82 P Pernthaler, Der Verfassungskern (Springer, Vienna, 1998) VI, 85 (describing this prac-tice as offhand violation of the constitution and abuse of constitution making).

83 Austria’s Constitution includes no specific provisions on amendment, which is insteadviewed purely technically as a sub-category of legislation with a special procedure. See EwaldWiederin, ‘Grundstrukturen staatlichen Verfassungsrechts: Osterreich’ in Armin von Bogdandyet al (eds), 1 Ius Publicum Europaeum (Max-Planck Institut, Heidelberg, 2008) para 27, 42 f.

84 See ‘Ein Verfassungskonvent fur Osterreich?’ (2003) 11 Journal fur Rechtspolitik 1 (spe-cial issue dedicated entirely to the question of an Austrian constitutional convention); LAdamovich, Eine neue Republik? Gedanken zur Verfassungsreform (Holzhausen, Wien, 2004);W Berka et al (eds), Verfassungsreform:Uberlegungen zur Arbeit des Osterreich-Konvents(Neuer Wissenschaflicher Verlag, Vienna, 2004). For a highly informative website, including theofficially proposed draft of 12 January 2005, see www.konvent.gv.at.

85 VfSlg 11.756/1988; VfSlg 11.829/1988; VfSlg 11.916/1988.86 VfGH 11.10.2001, G 12/00.


majority. Although it is theoretically possible that the German court would thus declare

void ordinary constitutional law, it also seems far less likely.

B. International Law, EC Law, and the ECHR

In Austria, moderate monism is predominant, whereas the German doctrine prefers

a moderate dualism. This difference has a theoretical basis, for both the text of the

Austrian Constitution87 and the text of the German Basic Law can be reconciled with

either approach.88 The causes can be retraced to Kelsen’s and Verdross’s influence in

favor of monism in Austria89 and Triepel’s influence in favor of dualism in Germany.90

Because the differences between the two positions have already been knowledgeably

dealt with elsewhere, a reference suffices here.91

Austrian scholars attempt to maintain the monistic approach even as regards ques-

tions of the relationship between EC law and Member State law. For this purpose, the

Stufenbaulehre is used as a theoretical model.92 But even this monistic view leads

to a ‘double constitution’.93 Because if you want to perceive the whole (European)

constellation as a unified legal system, the system necessarily must have a ‘double

constitution,’ namely, a European and (from an Austrian perspective) an Austrian one.

But the German approach views both the national and the EU legal orders as each

with its own constitution, though of course they are connected at many points.94 An

expression such as ‘double constitution’ in reference to European integration would

seem bewildering in the German legal doctrine. Austrian scholarship and adjudication,

on the whole, are more receptive to EC law than are their German counterparts. One

indication of this is the fact that Austria’s Constitutional Court has already initiated

several preliminary references to the ECJ.95 As yet, Germany’s Federal Constitutional

Court has not engaged in such self-subjugation to the ECJ.96

87 T Ohlinger, Der volkerrechtliche Vertrag im staatlichen Recht (Springer, Vienna, 1973)110 ff.

88 M Schweitzer, Staatsrecht III: Staatsrecht, Volkerrecht, Europarecht (8th edn, CF Muller,Heidelberg, 2004) 161.

89 Kelsen (n 22) 123. See also J von Bernstorff, Der Glaube an das universale Recht:Zur Volkerrechtstheorie Hans Kelsens und seiner Schuler (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2001) 70 f; A Verdross, ‘Volkerrecht und einheitliches Rechtssystem: Kritische Studie zuden Volkerrechtstheorien von Max Wenzel, Hans Kelsen und Fritz Sander’ (1923) 12 Zeitschriftfur Volkerrecht 415 ff.

90 H Triepel, Volkerrecht und Landesrecht (CF Hirschfeld, Leipzig, 1899).91 C Amrhein-Hofmann, Monismus und Dualismus in den Volkerrechtslehren (Duncker und

Humblot, Berlin, 2003).92 T Ohlinger, ‘Unity of the Legal System or Legal Pluralism: The Stufenbau Doctrine in

Present-Day Europe’ in A Jyranki (ed), National Constitutions in the Era of Integration (KluwerLaw International, The Hague, 1999)163 ff.; H R Laurer, ‘Europarecht und osterreichischeRechtsordnung: Rechtsnormen in einem einheitlichen Stufenbau?’ (1997) 52 OsterreichischeJuristen-Zeitung 233 ff.

93 P Pernthaler, ‘Die neue Doppelverfassung Osterreichs’ in H Haller (ed), Staat und Recht:Festschrift fur Gunther Winkler (Springer, Vienna, 1997) 773 ff.

94 See A von Bogdandy, ‘Zweierlei Verfassungsrecht’ (2000) 39 Der Staat 163 ff.95 See G Holzinger, Der Verfassungsgerichtshof und das Gemeinschaftsrecht, in S Hammer

(ed), Demokratie und sozialer Rechtsstaat in Europa: Festschrift fur Theo Ohlinger. (WUUniversity Press, Vienna, 2004) (citing further references) 153 ff.

96 A recent decision of the Federal Constitutional Court on the the Lisbon Treaty exemplifiesthe court’s EC-unfriendly adjudication. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2236/04 of June 30, 2009. See


The ECHR is directly applicable to constitutional law in Austria.97 This situation

has two causes. First, no modern catalogue of fundamental rights has yet found

general agreement, and the State Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals of

21 December 1867 (StGG) is obviously outdated.98 Second, international law enjoys a

very high level of trust in Austria, as national independence and even the existence

of the Austrian State, is based on international law (Austrian Independence Treaty,

signed in Vienna in 1955); the influence of both Kelsen and Verdross reinforced this

trust. Thus, Austria was not reluctant to apply an international treaty as a national

catalogue of fundamental rights. Mention should be made here, though, of a third

factor in the methodological dilution of the classical Kelsenian approach.99 In addition

to German influence100 and the school of ‘critical evaluative legal science’, the ECHR

has played a significant role. The Austrian Constitutional Court always adjudicates

in harmony with the European Court of Human Rights (which uses a purposive-

substantive approach) and, with brief delays, adopts that Court’s argumentation in its

own interpretation of the ECHR as national constitutional law.101

C. Specific Legal Acts as Individual Norms

The Austrian scholarship denotes individual legal acts (court judgments, administrat-

ive rulings) as ‘individual norms.’ To a German ear, this expression might seem

Cschonberger, ‘Lisbon in karlsruhe: Maastricht’s Epigones At Sea (2009) 10 German Las Journal1201 ff.

97 Austria ratified the ECHR in 1958 but elevated it to constitutional rank only in 1964. SeeBVG BGBl 59/1964.

98 Inability to reach compromise on the following issues was in 1920 already the reason thatthe Basic Law of 1867 (StGG) remained in force: the legal relationships between State andchurch, State and education, and State and family, the function of property, the role of the labour,etc. See F Ermacora, ‘Die Grundrechte in der Verfassungsfrage 1919/1920’ in Die osterreichischeVerfassung von 1918 bis 1938 (Verlag fur Geschichte und Politik, Vienna, 1980) 53 ff. Without anew catalogue of fundamental rights, the Austrian Constitution thus remained a mere torso. SeeF Ermacora (ed), Die osterreichische Bundesverfassung und Hans Kelsen (W Braumueller,Vienna, 1982) 37 f. The 1867 Basic Law (StGG), even today, still has the force of bindingconstitutional law.

99 H Schambeck, ‘Zur Theorie und Interpretation der Grundrechte in Osterreich’ inR Machacek et al (eds), Grund- und Menschenrechte in Osterreich (Band 1) (NP Engel Verlag,Kehl am Rhein, 1991) 91.

100 See H Hausmanninger, The Austrian Legal System (2nd edn, Manz, Vienna, 2000) 147;H Schaffer, ‘Landesbericht Osterreich’ in C Starck (ed), Grundgesetz und deutscheVerfassungsrechtsprechung im Spiegel auslandischer Verfassungsentwicklung (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1990) 56 f; D Merten, ‘Aktuelle Probleme der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in derBundesrepublik Deutschland und Osterreich’ in H Schaffer et al (eds), Im Dienst an Staat undRecht: Festschrift fur Erwin Melichar (Manz, Wien, 1983) 108.

101 But, regarding the German Federal Constitutional Court’s (at least rhetorically) astoundingconfrontation with the European Court of Human Rights, BVerfG, 2 BvR 1481/04 of Oct 14,2004, see J Frowein, ‘Die traurigen Missverstandnisse: Bundesverfassungsgericht undEuropaischer Gerichtshof fur Menschenrechte’ in K Dicke et al (eds), Weltinnenrecht: Liberamicorum Jost Delbruck (Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 2005) 279 ff; M Hartwig, ‘Much AdoAbout Human Rights: The Federal Constitutional Court Confronts the European Court of HumanRights’ (2005) 6 German Law Journal 869 ff. That parts of Germany’s scholarly approach andteaching, which are very receptive to international law (see eg, S Hobe, Der offeneVerfassungsstaat zwischen Souveranitat und Interdependenz (Duncker und Humblot, Berlin,1998) 380 ff [discussing the ‘open statehood’ or offene Staatlichkeit]), seem now to be merelyacademic opinions.


oxymoronic. The reason for the expression is Kelsen’s Stufenbaulehre, according to

which the difference between statutes and ordinances (or statutory instruments), on

the one hand, and rulings and judgments, on the other, is only relative: all are norms.102

The latter (‘individual norms’) are more concrete or specific than are the former,

‘general norms.’ Yet this is more of a merely terminological difference without

any practical relevance. In contrast, the recognition of the legal nature of internal

administrative acts is of high relevance.

D. Internal Administrative Acts

The Stufenbaulehre also views internal administrative policies as legal norms. With the

juridification (that is, the recognition of the legal nature) of internal administrative

policies, this doctrine does a great service for democracy and especially for democratic

administration.103 According to the Stufenbaulehre, administrative policies and orders

are void unless based on a statute, from which they derive their validity. It has the

consequence that administrative activity cannot be legal unless it is grounded in

(statutory) law,104 ie, on the expression of the people’s will. 105

If internal administrative acts are of a legal nature, then courts can also review the

legality of these acts. The non-recognition of the legal nature of internal administrative

policies originally intentionally fulfilled the function of insulating them from judicial

review (the so-called ‘impermeability theory’ meaning that the State, especially the

Executive, is impermeable for judicial review: it has to be conceived as one unified

body which can legally be obliged as to acts directed towards outside of this body).

German doctrine had to travel long and winding detours before arriving at a point

where some internal administrative policies (generally in the form of administrative

regulations or directives) are subject to review.106

E. Supra-Positive Law and Customary Constitutional Law

Austrian legal scholarship does not employ the figure of supra-positive law well-

known in the German natural law tradition.107 This would conflict too obviously with

the strongly positivist Kelsenian tradition.108 As a substitute for natural law, in its

102 See in detail Jakab (n 6) 35 ff.103 J Behrend, Untersuchungen zur Stufenbaulehre Adolf Merkls und Hans Kelsens

(Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 1977) 18. See also H H Rupp, Grundfragen der heutigenVerwaltungsrechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck, Tuebingen, 1965) 11 ff (scrutinizing the legal nature ofadministrative orders in the German literature); N Achterberg, ‘Kriterien des Gesetzesbegriffsunter dem Grundgesetz’ (1973) 26 Die offentliche Verwaltung 298; Mollers (n 56) 154 ff.

104 Ohlinger (n 47) 31; Kelsen (n 9) 69 ff.105 Merkl (n 20) 339; Kelsen (n 9) 70 ff.106 H Dreier, ‘Merkls Verwaltungslehre und die deutsche Dogmatik’ in R Walter (ed), Adolf J

Merkl: Werk und Wirksamkeit (Manz’sche, Vienna, 1990) 76 f.107 BVerfGE 3, 88; BVerfGE 6, 132; BVerfGE 23, 98.108 Resistance comes from both sides: the Kelsenian tradition resists (German) natural law

reasoning, and in Germany Kelsen is (in part) rejected. See N Achterberg, ‘Hans KelsensBedeutung in der gegenwartigen deutschen Staatslehre’ (1974) 27 Die offentliche Verwaltung447. Only recently can one observe a more significant receptiveness for Kelsen. See eg, H Dreier,Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen (Nomos, Baden-Baden,1986); M Pawlik, Die Reine Rechtslehre und die Rechtstheorie HLA Harts (Duncker und


function of external check on internal, national legislation, Austria has opted for an

extremely strong receptivity to international (ECHR) law and EC law (see above).

As a general rule, in Germany—as opposed to Austria—‘law’ (Recht) is understood

to be indivisible from ‘values’.109 The contrast is similar as to customary constitutional

law: Austrian scholarship, with a reference to the posited nature of the constitution,

lacks any recognition of the existence of customary constitutional law.110

V. CONCEPTUAL FRAME OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

The judgments of the German Federal Constitutional Court, according to German legal

doctrine, are only declaratory and not constitutive: an unconstitutional statute is de-

clared void. However, if judgments were truly only declaratory (and thus not con-

stitutive), then the possibility in article 31 LFCC111 of an incompatibility declaration,

distinct from declaring void a statute (and actually declaratory), would make no sense.

Either it should be accepted that a declaration of voidness under article 78 LFCC is

actually an annulment of the given statute (retroactively) from the point of enactment,

or (hardly plausibly) it should be accepted that the incompatibility declaration is itself

constitutive, as it raises an actually non-existent (and void) norm from the dead. For

this reason, too, German scholars also have doubted whether a judgment ‘declaring’ a

statute void is truly only declaratory.112 Such problems do not confront Austrian con-

stitutional doctrine because the constitutive nature of the Constitutional Court’s judg-

ments has always been recognized. In Austria, one speaks of annulment (Aufhebung)

by the Constitutional Court. In this point, the Austrian legal doctrine seems more

persuasive than the German.

As a consequence of the difference between the voidness dogma and the doctrine

of constitutive annulment, the judgments of the German Court have retroactive effect

from the point of original enactment (passage), and the Austrian Court’s judgments

have effect (unless otherwise stated) only from the time of decision.113

Humblot, Berlin, 1993); C Heidemann, Die Norm als Tatsache: Zur Normentheorie Hans Kelsens(Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1997); M Jestaedt, Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein . . . : Vom Nutzender Rechtstheorie fur die Rechtspraxis (Mohr Siebeck, Tuebingen, 2006). See also (n 7); H Dreieret al, Rezeption und Rolle der Reinen Rechtslehre (Manz, Vienna, 2001) 17 ff (discussing theGerman reception of Kelsen).

109 Pfersmann (n 65) 63 ff; Geiger (n 61) 46. See also E-W Bockenforde, ‘Zur Kritik derWertbegrundung des Rechts’ in R Dreier (ed), Rechtspositivismus und Wertbezug des Rechts(Franz Steiner, Stuttgart, 1990) 33, 45 (assessing the relevant case-law of the FederalConstitutional Court); C Starck, ‘Zur Notwendigkeit der Wertbegrundung des Rechts’ in Dreieribid 47, 59 ff (citing further references).

110 Adamovich et al, (n 5) para 04.017; Walter and Mayer (n 5) para 105. In contrast, Germanscholars addressed the topic in depth, though not always in full acceptance. See C Tomuschat,Verfassungsgewohnheitsrecht (C Winter, Heidelberg, 1972).

111 Law on the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz). An Englishtranslation is available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BVerfGG.htm.

112 Heckmann (n 7) 77.113 See B Strehle, Rechtswirkungen verfassungsgerichtlicher Normenkontrollentscheidungen:

Eine vergleichende Darstellung der Entscheidungswirkungen des schweizerischen Bundesger-ichts, des deutschen Bundesverfassungsgerichts und des osterreichischen Verfassungsgericht-shofs (Schultess Polygraphischer Verlag, Zurich, 1980) 103 ff.


VI. LEGAL DOCTRINE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

The differences observable within the body of doctrine on fundamental rights are

slighter. One example is the remarkable, complicated notion of ‘constitutionally

guaranteed rights’ (verfassungsrechtlich gewahrleistete Rechte; anchored in positive

law in article 144 of the Austrian Constitution). This corresponds to German funda-

mental rights (Grundrechte).114 The lengthy formulation is an attempt to circumscribe

natural law connotations associated with the term ‘fundamental rights,’115 although

recently some Austrian authors have used the expression ‘fundamental rights’.116

A second difference involves the resolution of constitutional cases: Austrian case-law

tends to use the principle of equality in the form of the requirement of objective

criteria to differentiate and in the prohibition of arbitrariness.117 This preference

results from the lack of other broad or subsidiary (catch-all) fundamental rights, such

as, in Germany, human dignity or the general freedom of action (allgemeine

Handlungsfreihet).118 But, because the principle of equality gives constitutional judges

greater discretion, some adherents of the older school consider its invocation to be an

illegitimate, political activity by a judge.119

Finally, one feature of the constitutional doctrine on property deserves emphasis:

not all expropriations must be compensated. As a practical matter, most government

seizures do trigger compensation in Austria, but this is not required in constitutional

law. Article 5 of the above-mentioned Austrian State Basic Law of 1867 says absol-

utely nothing about compensation according to the interpretation of the Constitutional

Court’s interpretation,120 and article 1(1) of the First Protocol to the ECHR does not

guarantee compensation under all circumstances either.121 Such an interpretation of

article 5 of the State Basic Law made it possible that the Habsburgs after the

First World War (1919) and the expropriatees after the Second World War (1946–47)

114 See Ohlinger (n 5) para 677 fn 1 (listing the few exceptional uses of the term ‘fundamentalright’ (Grundrecht) in an Austrian legal document).

115 In Germany, however, fundamental rights are conceptualized as pre-legal rights, seeK Stern, Idee der Menschenrechte und Positivitat der Grundrechte in J Isensee and P Kirchhof(eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (CF Muller, Heidelberg,1992) · 108, para 6; Geiger (n 61) 47.

116 Eg, Berka (n 13) (even as title); Ohlinger, (n 5) para 677 ff.117 M Stelzer, Das Wesensgehaltsargument und der Grundsatz der Verhaltnismaßigkeit

(Springer, Vienna, 1991); 202 ff; Noll (n 10) 153 ff; L Adamovich et al, OsterreichischesStaatsrecht 3 (Springer, Vienna, 2003) para 42.013.

118 H Schaffer, ‘Allgemeine Denkstrukturen in der Rechtsprechung europaischerHochstgerichte, vor allem am Beispiel der Grundrechtsinterpretation der Verfassungsgerichtshofein Osterreich und Italien’ in I H Szilagyi and M Paksy (eds), Ius Unum, Lex Multiplex: LiberAmicorum Studia Z Peteri Dedicata (Szent Istvan Tarsulat, Budapest, 2005)163 ff, 174 fn 31.

119 See R Thienel, Vertrauensschutz und Verfassungsrecht (Verlag der OsterreichischenStaatsdruckerei, Vienna, 1990) 39; K Berchtold, ‘Der Gleichheitssatz in der Krise’ in Fortschrittim Bewußtsein der Grund-und Menschenrechte: Festschrift fur Felix Ermacora (Engel, Kehl amRein, 1988) 327 ff. See also C Mollers, ‘Wandel der Grundrechtsjudikatur: Eine Analyse derRechtsprechung des Ersten Senats des BverfG’ (2005) 58 Neue juristische Wochenschrift 1973 ff,especially 1979.

120 R Novak, ‘Die Eigentumsgarantie: Neue Aspekte, alte Fragen’ in Pernthaler et al (n 8)266 ff (citing further references).

121 The issue is only addressed as part of the proportionality test, which makes an un-compensated expropriation possible in extraordinary circumstances. See C Grabenwarter,Europaische Menschenrechtskonvention (2nd edn, Beck, Munich, 2005) para 19 f.


received no compensation.122 Since the ECHR (Austrian accession was in 1958)

foresaw no compulsory change to this situation, the Austrian constitutional doctrine—

despite critical scholarly voices123—remained stuck on this level. The principle of

equality managed to introduce the only innovation—drawing on the German ap-

proach.124 This is the so-called special sacrifice theory (Sonderopfertheorie), which

forbids expropriation amounting to a special sacrifice in violation of equal protection.

In other words, where the redistributive benefits of expropriation accrue equally to

similarly situated parties, there can be no factual justification for discrepancy between

the respective forfeitures of property that they must tolerate without compensation.125

The weak interpretation of the protection of property made a ‘widening of scope’

possible. In Austria it is viewed simultaneously as protection of personal autonomy, so

that property rights under Austrian constitutional law take on some of the functions of

the general freedom of action, which, as mentioned above, is not a legal-doctrinal

figure in Austria. With German doctrine sticking to compensation, such a wide ap-

proach would not have been possible.

VII. STYLES OF ARGUMENTATION

The final section of this article summarizes the most important characteristics of the

style of Austrian argumentation in comparison with the German style. In Austrian legal

doctrine, legal terminology is more often traced back to the underlying issues in theory

of norms. Argumentation tends to be simpler and more readily comprehensible than

in Germany. Austrians consider their own argumentative style to be more elegant

and more modest than the German style. Austrian argumentation seldom includes the

reinforcing, secondary or ‘backup’ arguments typical in Germany. Kelsen’s theoretical

legacy is used frequently (Stufenbaulehre, three circle theory of the federal State). All

in all, his influence is enormous, as arguments based on natural law and sociology are

generally not highly regarded.

German legal doctrine still employs many basic terms from the period of con-

stitutional monarchy.126 In Kelsen’s stead, the key figures are Smend (and Hesse) and

Schmitt, whose lines of argumentation often appear in the Federal Constitutional

Court’s jurisprudence.127 These arguments often make use of terms that do admittedly

122 See M Kadgien, Das Habsburgergesetz (Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 2005) 180 ff (criticizing thelack of compensation for the Habsburgs); L Adamovich, Sr, Handbuch des osterreichischenVerfassungsrechts (6th edn Springer, Vienna, 1971) 556 ff (discussing compensation issues in thepost-war process of nationalization and citing further references).

123 See C Schulz, Die aktuellen Probleme des verfassungsrechtlichen Eigentumsschutzes imRahmen der osterreichischen Rechtsordnung und im Spiegel der deutschen Rechtsauffassungen(Verlag Nottring, Vienna 1971) 145 ff; P Pernthaler, ‘Der Grundrechtsschutz des Eigentums vorallem im Hinblick auf die Beschrankungen durch die offentliche Bodenordnung’ in H Spanneret al (eds),Grundrechtsschutz des Eigentums: Seine Grenzen und Beschrankungen im offentlichenInteresse (Mohr Siebeck, Karlsruhe, 1977) 25 ff, especially 27 fn 10 (citing further references).

124 Pernthaler (n 123) 33. 125 Novak (n 120) 268.126 cf K Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundsrepublik Deutschland 2, (CH Beck, Munich, 1980)

584–586. Reference is frequently made to such traditional platitudes as, for example, the equatingof executive power with the application of the law without any mention of implementing orders.See eg Hesse (n 4) 88.

127 R Ooyen, Der Begriff des Politischen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (Duncker undHumblot, Berlin, 2005).


have an intuitive, descriptive value but cannot be strictly legally defined (for

example, community, integration, or Gesamtheiten).128 This tendency brings with it an

inclination toward compound nouns and somewhat mysterious (or, one could say,

pretentious) rhetorical figures: ‘the law as an ordering factor’129 or ‘the federal order is

a form of federative structure.’130 One often comes across reasoning based on

political science and also occasionally on natural law.131 This style of thinking has the

advantage of facilitating argumentation (‘fruitful lack of clarity’); in exchange,

the disadvantage lies in the unpredictability of the results of such argumentation. In

general, one argues from a greater number of premises and attempts to find more

(alternative) arguments for the desired result. Thus, argumentation follows more than

one line, and these lines are more complicated and less pointed. Germans argue more

often from broad, general principles (democracy, human dignity, etc) to concrete

problems; in Austria, such activist tendencies are more unusual (albeit not unheard of).

As a final remark, one can say that both German and Austrian legal scholars depict

each other as proponents of an outdated methodology. As described above, from a

(traditionally) Austrian vantage point, German constitutional scholarship appears to be

a scholarship stuck at a (pre-)Jellinekian methodological level (that is, the mixing of

legal and sociological arguments; the presentation of personal views on legal policy as

theoretically compulsory legal conclusions). From the other side of the border, in

contrast, the Kelsenian style in Austria is viewed as an absurd and unproductive cari-

cature of an outmoded formalistic Begriffsjurisprudenz.132

In the light of these differences between two countries and two legal cultures, which

stand in such close interaction and exchange, one can imagine how long the road may

be to a common European scholarship of public law (that is, a common discourse space

in Europe for national public law scholars), considering that other countries and legal

orders will be far less familiar with each other. And the German-Austrian differences

are by no means of a merely terminological nature that might simply be resolved

by ‘translating’ into the counterpart term: the terminological differences are only

incidental or symptomatic of the actual divergence of (sometimes only implicit)

theoretical premises. So it is not the case that, with the aid of in-depth analysis of

underlying foundations, these differences can be transformed into compromises. Quite

the contrary: the deeper one digs and the more theoretical one proceeds, the greater the

differences become. The prospects for a public law scholarship common to all of

Europe, therefore, seem to me rather bleak at the moment.

However, a scholarship on the public law of the European Union has already

emerged, although its fundamental argumentative mode has not yet taken shape (if it

can ever become definite at all). The answer to the question, whether the Austrian or

the German way of arguing will eventually find greater reception in this context, will

128 Hesse (n 4) 97. 129 ibid 86 (in German, Recht als Ordnungsfaktor).130 ibid 97 (in German, Bundesstaatliche Ordnung ist Form foderativer Gestaltung). One can

only guess at its meaning.131 Or etatistic combinations of both, such as the figure of a state’s recognition of a right. See

Stern (n 126) 588.132 See eg N Achterberg, ‘Hans Kelsens Bedeutung in der gegenwartigen deutschen

Staatslehre’ (1974) 27 Die offentliche Verwaltung 445 ff (citing, inter alia, H Klenner,Rechtsleere: Die Verurteilung der Reinen Rechtslehre (Mohr Siebeck, Tuebingen, 1972)). Seealso Dreier et al (n 108) 25, 29 (citing, inter alia, Larenz, Heller, Schmitt, and Smend); Dreier(n 108) 19 ff.


depend on how scholars understand the European Union. Factoring out Germany’s

institutionally stronger position, if the EU is regarded as a purely legal community

(Rechtsgemeinschaft)—similar to the multinational state of the Austro-Hungarian

Empire, which provided the context of origin for the pure theory of law—, then

Austrian scholarship might well play a more prominent role; if it is viewed instead as a

community of values, then German scholarship will be more prevalent. In the former

case, we will be able to communicate with each other better in Austrian, but in the

latter case we will be well advised to speak German.

ANDRAS JAKAB*

* Garcıa-Pelayo Fellow (investigador contratado M Garcıa-Pelayo) at the Centre for Politicaland Constitutional Studies (Centro de Estudios Polıticos y Constitucionales, Madrid, Spain).E-mail: [email protected].


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