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UDI: A Grim ScenarioAuthor(s): Norman GibsonSource: Fortnight, No. 232 (Jan. 27 - Feb. 9, 1986), pp. 4-5Published by: Fortnight Publications Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25550707 .

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UDI?A GRIM SCENARIO Since the Hillsborough Agreement was signed Unionists have again been accused of steering Northern Ireland towards a unilateral declaration of independence. NORMAN GIBSON examines the

independence option and claims it would be a nightmare.

IT IS some twelve years since independ ence was first widely discussed as a poss ible option for Northern Ireland. The

notion has since reappeared from time to

time, notably in the late 1970's and now

again following the Anglo-Irish agree ment.

When political or constitutional uncer

tainty as perceived by some loyalists in creases and particularly when they feel

betrayed by and distrustful of Britain, the

independence idea gets a new lease of life. Thus for some loyalism is in the end condi

tional; what ultimately matters is the

Ulster?Protestant identity. If British

policy towards Northern Ireland seems to

threaten that identity then the "union" with

Britain is no longer sacrosanct. In the end

the union is expendable.

Loyalist Phenomenon

If the foregoing is a realistic and fair assessment of some of the thoughts and

feelings underlying the resurgence of the

independence option, then it is essentially a loyalist phenomenon and by implication, alien to the outlook of nationalists.

The ideal of a negotiated independent Northern Ireland which would be widely acceptable to Protestants and Catholics?

let alone loyalists and nationalists?does

not then arise. It becomes irrelevant even

to consider it. Indeed there is also a sense

in which the Anglo-Irish agreement supercedes it since the inter-governmental conference gives the Dublin Government the right to discuss matters that are likely to affect the interests of the minority.

Clearly negotiated independence is un

likely to appear on the conference agenda.

Scenario for Independence

If negotiated independence, acceptable to both the majority and minority com

munities, is not a realistic option then how

might independence come about? it is difficult to avoid the nightmare conclusion that a prelude to independence would be

widespread violence, accompanied by serious social and economic disruption.

The violence would likely involve major confrontations between loyalists and the

British security forces. Inter-communal

violence would seem in such circum

stances to be inevitable. Large movements

of population would probably take place with the appalling and lasting suffering that that should entail.

Loyalists in the border areas would pre

sumably feel more threatened than ever

and begin to move north and east in the

hope of some protection. Nationalists in

the north and east would correspondingly

probably seek protection in the west and

south and in the Irish Republic. It is hard to see how the Republic could avoid being embroiled in the conflict.

A Smaller Northern Ireland

Faced with this terrible scenario the British Government and Parliament might feel forced to negotiate some form of in

dependence for a residual or smaller Nor

thern Ireland. There would seem to be no

prospect in these conditions that the six

county Northern Ireland would survive.

Just what size of Northern Ireland would

emerge is at best a guess but an obvious

natural boundary would be provided by the river Bann.

Loyalist strategists would probably con

clude that this was the maximum land area

that they could maintain and defend, es

pecially when surrounded by a hostile and

enlarged Irish Republic and one which had been drawn into the conflict, possibly in

support of British security forces in and around the original border areas. It would

certainly be in the interests of Britain and the Irish Republic to collaborate fully and to avoid any conflict between their respec tive forces.

It is, of course, possible that Britain

would resist granting independence to Northern Ireland, whatever its size, on the

ground that it would be likely to maintain

indefinitely an unstable position on her western flank. It might be that in adopting this stance she would be strongly sup

ported by western Europe, the United

States and the Irish Republic. In these conditions there might be powerful forces

W.S.P.

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determined to bring about some form of

united Ireland as the best hope of achiev

ing stability in the longer term. Northern

Ireland, like every other part of the world,

does not exist in a power vacuum. It could

expect to have few friends in the western world.

State and Government

If a smaller and independent Northern Ire

land did emerge, what kind of state and

government would come into being? For

mally, the state would be outside the

European Community and all similar

groupings. Its first responsibility would be to secure its defence and continued exist

ence. This could be extremely difficult and

perhaps impossible to achieve. It would also be costly?economically and other

wise. The government, for instance, might feel pressed to seek support from eastern

Europe or certain north African states.

But if it did, it might make it impossible to

negotiate any tolerable trading and fin

ancial relationships with Britain, the EEC and the United States.

Any government that was to survive in

these inhospitable conditions would have

to be ruthlessly determined and have the

full backing of its security forces. The price might in fact be a military government. But even if the latter were avoided life in such a state could hardly be other than

bleak and terrible.

A central responsibility of the govern ment would be to establish an administra

tive organisation. In the aftermath of

much violence and dislocation this too

would be a very difficult task. Much of the

existing organisation might have collapsed and the funds required limited or unavail

able. If collapse did take place then one could expect that the whole social security

system would be in disarray, as would the

health and educational systems.

Economics and Finance

The economic and financial position of a

smaller Northern Ireland, achieved in the

wake of violence would be bound to be

very precarious. Its economic activity would have been seriously disrupted; in

dustry and commerce would have found it

difficult to continue in operation; funds

would have fled the country and unem

ployment and deprivation would have in

creased. Access to markets would have to

be negotiated which could be slow and

subject to severe economic and other

conditions.

But perhaps the most pressing eco

nomic problem would be the financing of

the government. A British administration

following violent confrontation with its

security forces and which reluctantly con

ceded independence to a smaller Northern

Ireland, could scarcely be expected to

provide open-ended financial support to

the new regime. At present the government transfers

some ?1,500 million to Northern Ireland

each year to sustain public expenditure of

4 Fortnight 27th January 1986

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around ?4,500 million. The remaining

?3,(XX) million required to balance the

budget and putting aside borrowing, is by and large raised here through taxes. A

smaller Northern Ireland with perhaps a

population of one million or less?de

pending on population movements and

migration?would clearly not need to sus

tain total expenditure at this level. But it

would have additional expenditures to in

cur as an independent state, especially in

the areas of defence and foreign affairs.

A crude guess might be that a smaller

Northern Ireland would need revenue of

some ?3,(XX) million to maintain present standards of expenditure. It is very diffi

cult to hazard even a guess of what rev

enue might be raised through taxation,

particularly in the early years of such a

state?at best perhaps ?1,500 million or

thereabouts. But this would leave deficit

of the same amount.

Britain might give some aid, possibly mixture of grants and loans, but these

would likely decline over the years. It is

impossible to know what amounts would

be involved but even if they totalled ?500 million annually that would still leave a

deficit of perhaps ?1,000 million before

taking any account of the need to repay the loan component. It is utterly improb able that this remaining ?1,000 million could be raised annually through grants or

loans.

The outcome would be a catastrophic fall in the standard of living between 25 and 50 per cent, depending upon the par ticular circumstances. Some recovery

" Loyalist demonstrators tear down the gates of Maryfield?the site of the Anglo-Irish secretariat?

_ following the anti-accord march from Derry.

would come in time, provided conditions

were favourable, but it could take decades

rather than years.

Where To From Here

Surely it is high time the idea of inde

pendence for Northern Ireland was put aside. The people?all the people? deserve better and are capable of better.

Can there not be a society which values

equally Protestant and Catholic?Planter

and Gael? If there could, the old mutual fears of violence, dominance and suppres sion would become but a haunting

memory. The future would hold out a new

security, a new hope, a new trust. No

doubt such a society would require im

aginative and novel institutional forms;

forms which would break with the old modes and conceptions of sovereignty.

11 II

10th January-1 st February

LANDSCAPES

New Works Thomas Joshua Cooper Hamish Fulton

Roger Eckling David Tremlett

14th February-1st March

LOCAL AMATEUR ARTISTS

Fortnight 27th January 1986 5

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