ukraine’s party system evolution: 1990-2017 · 2017. 9. 14. · 7 this approach is used in...

2017

UKRAINE’S PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION: 1990-2017

The publication is supported by the Ukrainian Office of Konrad Adenauer Foundation

RAZUMKOV CENTRE

UKRAINE`S PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION: 1990-2017/ Edited by Yu.Yakymenko. – Kyiv: Razumkov Сentre, 2017. – p.62

© Razumkov Centre, 2017 © “Zapovit Publishing House”, 2017

This publication presents an abridged version of the Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre that examines the emergence and further transformation of Ukraine’s party system in 1990-2017.

We have examined key drivers of change at each evolution stage, such as legislation on political parties and elections; political regime; most significant societal cleavages, nature and consequences of their influence; analysed current trends in Ukraine’s party system development.

The publication will be useful for everyone interested in post-independence nation-building processes in Ukraine, development of political parties and the party system, experience of political transformations in post-Soviet countries.

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Political parties are an important institution of a democratic society, which ensures aggregation and articulation of the interests of various social groups. Interaction among parties in their struggle for power and the exercise of political power by them form a party system.

The process of party system formation in Ukraine has been going on for more than 25 years. This publication represents a shortened version of the Razumkov Centre’s report, which examines the fundamental stages of the party system formation in 1990-2017, including intra-party processes, institutional legal and socio-political conditions for their activities and inter-party relations.1

1. STUDY METHODOLOGYThe Razumkov Centre’s study uses an approach that combines elements

of quantitative and qualitative approaches to the analysis of party system dynamics and takes into account changes of the three following components that define party system and/or affect it.

First, intra-party processes (primarily in parties that are part of the system). The characteristics that can be considered as “indicators” of certain changes should include the intensity with which new parties are being formed; the formation process and the nature of parties formed; the intensity of intra-party processes (splits, mergers, management changes); changes in leading parties’ ideology.

Second, processes in the party system environment.2 These comprise: the electoral legislation; form of government; a constitutionally determined role of parties in government formation process; political regime and conditions for the opposition activity; main (actual, politicised) societal cleavages and issue dimensions that shape party system3 and other peculiarities caused by internal processes in the country (in particular, the influence of business groups) and external factors.

UKRAINE’S PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION: 1990-2017

1 The full version of the report in Ukrainianl is published in the monograph of Razumkov Centre “Transformation of the Party System: Ukrainian Experience in a European Context”.2 The surroundings of the party system imply the specific socio-political (including political, legal, socioeconomic and sociocultural) conditions, within which political parties in particular countries function. Look: Shveda Y. Political parties: encyclopedic dictionary. – Lviv, 2005, p.194, 247.3 Given the simultaneous use of the concepts of societal cleavage and issue dimensions, it is advisable to determine their correlation in more detail. Thus, the concept of cleavage (in the generic definition of A. Riomelle) in this work is used to characterise the main spheres in which the contradictions between the positions of different social groups define the lines of cleavage between the main political forces at a certain time period, and the concept of issue dimension – to characterise the intensity of use of these cleavages in inter-party competition. Thus, the actuality of a certain societal cleavage can be expressed through the intensity of the corresponding issue dimensions.

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n UKRAINE’S PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION: 1990-2017

4 Blondel J. Types of Party Systems. – From Peter Mair (ed.) The West European Party System. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, р.302-310.5 Sartori G. Parties and Party Systems: a Framework for Analysis. – ECPR Press, University of Essex Print Centre, 2006, p.117-118.6 Sartori G., Op. Cit., p. 109-110. Aware of certain limitations associated with the use of Western instruments to the analysis of the party systems in its formation, the authors consider the G. Sartori typology to be the most suitable for the research of the process of forming the party system of Ukraine, taking into account the peculiarities of the domestic context (in particular, in defining the ideological differences and distance between parties).

To assess the structural parameters of the party system of Ukraine, the typologies of O. Niedermayer and A. Siaroff were also being used.7 This approach is used in particular by K. von Beyme. Look.: Beyme Klaus von. Political Parties in Western Democracies. – New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985, р.255-264.

Third, processes in the party system and its characteristics:

• number of subjects of a party system (considering the peculiarities of Ukraine’s electoral legislation, we have proposed to consider political parties that independently participated in elections by party lists and blocs of political parties before they were banned);

• relative size of parties (based on the classification of J. Blondel, adapted to national conditions, large political parties have more than 40% of votes, medium-sized – more than 20%, small to medium-sized – more than 15%, small – 10% and very small);4

• number of “centres” (poles) of a party system;

• main division lines between parties;

• presence of anti-systemic parties (as defined by G. Sartori);5

• type of system (as defined by G. Sartori).6

The specifics of the chosen approach is that the selection of stages is carried out on the basis of the choice of certain defining criteria – events, processes, tendencies in a particular component or several components that had the greatest influence on political parties and relations between them and could cause (but not necessarily) change of the party system type. At the same time, in our opinion, it is permissible to distinguish the difference between stages on the basis of changes in various components.

The starting point for analysing the process of forming a party system was the date of legalisation of the first non-communist political party on the territory of the former USSR – the Ukrainian Republican Party (URP), the constituent congress of which took place on 29 April 1990, and the official registration on 5 November 1990. Thus, this survey covers the formal period of a multi-party system formation in Ukraine.

The criterion for assigning parties to the party system is obtaining at least 2% of the votes in elections to the Verkhovna Rada by party lists.7 Until 1998, the number of parties in the party system is proposed to

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be determined by their representation in the Verkhovna Rada. The assessment of the dynamics of the results of the parties’ participation in parliamentary elections starts with the 1994 elections, when political parties and blocs officially received the right to nominate candidates.

Taking into account the impossibility to precisely define changes in the party system by the degree of their intensity based on the quantitative data, some evaluative terms in this research are used in relation to the nature of such changes, taking into account, first of all, the structure of inter-party competition and the main division lines between parties.

2. FUNDAMENTAL STAGES OF PARTY SYSTEM FORMATION IN UKRAINEThe process by which the party system of an independent Ukraine was

formed dates back to the moment when the first party was formed and legalised, which broke the CPSU-CPU monopoly on representing the political interests of the country’s citizens. Over the course of this process, which continued for over twenty-five years, party life in Ukraine was characterised by a high level of intensity. That is true both with respect to intra-party developments, relations among them in the struggle to attain and exercise power, their activities and how they were perceived by society. Despite such significant variability, the use of the above-mentioned instruments makes it possible to distinguish six stages during which the party system of Ukraine was formed – time periods that saw substantial changes in the appearance of the system. Given a broad timeframe and how heavily saturated it is with events, the characteristics of the stages are given in a generalised form, with only the most significant features, tendencies and facts indicated.

THE EMERGENCE OF A MULTIPARTY SYSTEM: 1990-1995

The main feature of this stage was the mass creation of political parties claiming to represent the central current political ideologies. Public organisations, movements, informal associations, political clubs and the like served as the organisational foundation for the creation of most parties. Party leaders were mostly a humanitarian and scientific and technical intelligentsia, as well as former party members.

This “bottom-up” approach to forming parties, remained typical during the first half of the period (until the 1994 elections); after that, we see a gradual transition to “top-down” party formation. During the creation of new parties, the importance of more pragmatic factors grew – the first parties created by representatives of business structures appeared (in particular, the Ukrainian Party for Solidarity and Social Justice, led by Eduard Lashutin, the Liberal Party of Ukraine (LPU), led by Ihor Markulov, and the People’s Party

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of Ukraine (PPU), founded by Leopold Taburyansky). In 1994, first of the most successful (for a period of time) parties of this type was legalised – the All-Ukrainian Association “Hromada” (Community).

Programmatic and ideological principles played a significant role in determining the structure of the party system being formed. Active participation of leading political parties in state-building, their connection with certain social environments, and the desire to position themselves as bearers of “classic” political ideologies have led to a considerable attention being paid to the content of their programme documents.

Most of the parties at the time were concentrated on the right (including right-wing radicals) and centre-right (national-democratic) of the political spectrum. Centrist parties formed as representing major political ideologies (e.g., Social Democrats, “Greens” or Liberals) or as “generally democratic” parties (e.g., the Party for the Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine (PDRU)).

The left was represented by parties that arose out of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR, banned in 1991 (the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) and the Peasant Party of Ukraine (PPU)), as well as smaller left radical parties (for example, the AUCP(b)), as well as other parties with the aim of restoring the Soviet Union (the Civic Congress of Ukraine (CCU), the Party of Slavic Unity of Ukraine, etc.). In 1993, two of what would later become the most influential political parties were legalised – the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) and the People’s Movement of Ukraine (PMU), which were in principle ideological opponents.

Political parties (other than the Communist Party of the USSR) were unable to officially take part in the 10 March 1990 elections to the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR (hereafter, the “Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the first convocation”); in reality, they did designate their candidates. The structuring of the deputy corps by party affiliation took place directly in the process of Parliament’s activity. At the beginning of its first session, about forty-five parliamentary groups were created on the basis of regional, professional and political attributes.8

The basic principle by which the deputy corps was structured was the distinction between left and non-left political forces, which organised themselves into the pro-communist majority – the “Group of 239” (with 239 deputies) and the National-Democratic “People’s Council” (consisting of 125 deputies). According to data from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, in November 1990, nearly 80 deputies out of 190, who worked on a permanent basis on committees in the

8 Ukraine: political history. From the Twentieth to the beginning of the Twenty-First Century. [editorial council: Lytvyn (chairman) and others; editorial collegium: Smoly, Levenets (co-chairmen) and others]. – K.: Parliamentary Publishing House, 2007, p.929.

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Verkhovna Rada, were “representatives of the opposition and activists belonging to parties and political groups with an anti-socialist orientation”.9

As a result of the following parliamentary elections, in 1994, fourteen political parties were represented in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Left parties held a relative majority (133 deputies) with 53 for the right and right centrists, and 14 for the centrists. The majority of the deputy corps consisted of non-partisan deputies. When the Verkhovna Rada of the second convocation wend into session, eleven parliamentary factions and groups were formed, both along party-ideological basis and on regional and corporate bases. In terms of the political parties’ representation in parliament, the left had a numerical advantage, but insufficient to allow them to form a majority on their own. Voting outcome depended primarily on the position taken by “non-partisan” groups.

The parties had the right to nominate candidates in Ukraine’s presidential elections (held in 1991 and 1994). In the 1991 elections, three of seven candidates were leaders of legalised parties (Levko Lukyanenko of the URP and Leopold Taburyansky of the PPU) or public associations that would later become parties (Viacheslav Chornovil of the PMU). In the 1994 elections one candidate – Oleksandr Moroz of the SPU – was a party leader. Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, both former Communist Party officials and formally non-partisan politicians, won the elections.

Throughout this first stage, a dynamic process led to the formation of a legal and regulatory basis for creation and conduct of parties, as well as electoral legislation. The legal basis for the operation of parties was provided by the Constitution of the USSR, which was at that time still in force, together with amendments adopted on 24 October 1990 and the Law of Ukraine “On the Association of Citizens”, adopted in 1992. After the adoption of the Law “On Elections of People’s Deputies of Ukraine” in November 1993, elections were held in accordance with a majority voting system requiring an absolute majority. Parties and blocs were entitled, through their local branches, to nominate candidates in voting districts electing a single deputy.

The democratic nature of the political regime during this first stage led to conditions relatively favourable for the political opposition. This stage, too, saw a combative relationship between the President and the Verkhovna Rada. Governments were formed on a non-partisan basis.

The main societal cleavage over the course of the first stage was between the “post-communists” (the “heirs” of the Communist Party) and the “democrats”; this divide reflected the configuration of the party system. There were three fundamental issue dimensions in the party system. Socioeconomic and foreign policy dimensions generally coincided with each other and structured the party system along “left-right” lines; the cultural-ethnic dimension was

9 Ukraine: The Establishment of an Independent State (1991-2001). – K., 2001, p.160.

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reflected in the distinction between the “left” and “integrationist” parties (national-democratic and nationalist parties).

The impact of business groups on the party system at the beginning of the stage was minimal, but was expressed in the creation of first business- based parties, a process that became increasingly intense and widespread after the 1994 elections.

External influence on the party system largely manifested itself in the form of support (both in moral and political, and also in material and financial terms) by party or community structures in foreign countries for the analogous political parties of various bents (in particular, national-democratic parties were supported by Ukrainian diaspora in the West, while Russian assistance was directed towards leftist and “pro-integration” parties).

The party system during this stage includes as many as fifteen of most active political parties that would form the basis for formation of a multi-party system. The main poles of the party system were the left (e.g., the CPU, SPU and PPU) and the right (e.g., the PMU and the URP), respectively, and the main line of division was the confrontation between leftist and national-democratic parties.

The main “anti-systemic” party was the CPU, working with small radical left organisations. The centrist parties that formed during this period were considerably less significant than those that were clearly in one camp or the other.

If to take parliamentary representation as a criterion, only the CPU could be considered a centrist party; the others were small, although, given the peculiarities of the electoral system at that time and the nature of parties, this criterion can be applied only conditionally. As the result of the weakness of parties and instability of relations among them, the party system during the first stage was atomised, with a distinct tendency towards polarisation. Given the distinguishing features of this first stage, it can be defined as a period when a multi-party system emerged.

THE RISE OF “POLARISED PLURALISM”: 1996-1999

This stage is characterised by vigorous creation of new parties – twenty-four of them were established in 1999 alone. The nature of the party creation differs significantly relative to the previous stage. The first “parties of power” were formed at this point: the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the Agrarian Party of Ukraine (APU); state structures were used for their organisational development – central and local executive authorities in general (in the case of the PDP) and certain industries (in particular, the agro-industrial complex and the forestry industry – in the case of the APU).

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The role played in the process of party construction by separate business entities and other structures concentrated in the financial and industrial sectors, which already have considerable economic power, has considerably increased. The evidence for this new trend include:

• The creation of political parties attached to the aforementioned business structures (for example, the National Economic Develop- ment Party of Ukraine (NEDPU), the All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna” (Fatherland), the Democratic Union Party, or the Regional Development Party of Ukraine (RDPU));

• The establishment of control (mainly through financial means) over existing parties, involving a change of leadership (either partial or total) or putting representatives in the parties’ governing bodies (the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united), SDPU(u) or the All-Ukrainian Union of Christians (AUUC));

• The partial funding of “parties of power” in exchange for support and assistance from government structures.

The degree of influence exerted by business interests and structures on political parties can be demonstrated through expert assessments, which show that over 90% of campaign funds of political parties and blocs in the 1998 elections were attributable to contributions from legal entities, i.e. companies, enterprises, etc.10

A significant number of parties created in the second stage can be considered “personal projects” of particular politicians, some of them businessmen,11 who had participated in splits that occurred within existing parties and became leaders of the splinter structures (Natalia Vitrenko of the PSPU and Serhiy Peresunko of the SDC) or who held government positions and created “safety-net positions” in the form of such parties.12

A significant number of parties emerged, claiming to represent the interests of certain national, confessional, sociodemographic and professional groups, but none of these had any noticeable success. Only some of the newly formed parties had an ideological character (in particular, the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU), which later transformed into the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” (Freedom)). Most of the new parties (with a very few exceptions) combined elements of social-democratic and liberal ideas in their programmes (largely on the level of rhetoric) and declared their position

10 Irina Kresina Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine: Legal and Political Issues: A Monograph. – K.: The Koretsky Institute of State and Law of NAS of Ukraine, 2003, p.50.11 This is an element these parties (the Uniform Family Party, “For a Beautiful Ukraine!”) have in common with the previous category.12 Political Parties on the Eve of Parliamentary Elections: Status and Trends. An Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2001, No.12, p.20.

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a “centrist” one. As a result, formally, more parties placed themselves in the political “centre” than on any other part of the spectrum.

This stage saw no, significant changes in ideologies and programmatic documents of the leading political parties. Intra-party activity, however, played a central role. A considerable number of the existing political parties broke up or underwent changes in leadership.

In particular, the split of the PMU and, to significant extent, the tragic death of Viacheslav Chornovil, the leader of the party, led to the formation of the Ukrainian People’s Movement, which later became the Ukrainian People’s Party (UPP). Out of the Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine (CDPU) came the Christian-People’s Union (CPU) and the AUUC; part of the SPU split off, which led to establishment of the PSPU; the Liberal Party of Ukraine (renewed) LPU(r) separated from the LPU; the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP) and the SDS split off from the SDPU(u); the Republican Christian Party (RCP) split off from the URP; and so on, and so forth.

In the 1998 parliamentary elections, which took place under a new electoral law providing for a mixed electoral system, the majority of registered political parties (40 out of 52) took part via party lists – twenty-one participated independently, as parties, while nineteen were part of the nine electoral blocs. The 4% barrier for participation in the elections was overcome by seven parties: the CPU, PMU, Party of Greens of Ukraine, NDP, the All-Ukrainian Association “Hromada” (Community), the PSPU, and the SDPU(u), and one bloc, the SPU-PPU; deputies elected in single-mandate districts represented thirteen more political parties. Thus, as a result of the elections, the Verkhovna Rada of the third convocation included twenty-two political parties.

According to experts, these parliamentary elections were the first in which the government used administrative resources and “peculiar” political technologies.13

In the early days, the Verkhovna Rada included factions from all eight political forces that overcame the electoral barrier; 395 deputies belonged to those factions. Later, however, the factional structure of the Verkhovna Rada underwent significant changes; factions arose representing parties that had split (for example, the PMU and the PMU-I), as well as factions of newly created parties and parties not represented in parliament when the elections were concluded. This happened, first of all, because people’s deputies shifted parties and due to frequent transitions between factions. The president was an important factor influencing these processes; his interest here was to create a parliamentary majority loyal to the head of state.

13 See The Parliament in Ukraine: Trends and Problems in its Development. Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2003, No.2, p.6.

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However, no permanent parliamentary majority arose in the Verkhovna Rada in 1996-1999.

Governments were formed on a non-partisan basis. Among the politicians who headed the Cabinet of Ministers during this period (Vitaliy Masol, Yevhen Marchuk, Pavlo Lazarenko, Vasyl Durdynets, and Valeriy Pustovoitenko), Pavlo Lazarenko was the leader of a political party (the All-Ukrainian Association “Hromada” (Community)), which, in essence, was his personal political base, while Valeriy Pustovoitenko was a member of the NDP leadership.

Political parties participated actively in the 1999 presidential elections. Thirteen candidates out of fifteen were nominated by political parties or blocs of parties. Although Leonid Kuchma, the winner of the elections, was nominated by voter assemblies, he was supported by the “Our Choice is Leonid Kuchma” Bloc, which included twelve political parties of a predominantly centrist orientation. The active use of the “leftist threat” as an incentive to consolidate the non-leftist political forces around the candidacy of the current President, as well as the discrediting of Oleksandr Moroz and Natalia Vitrenko, his competitors, ensured Kuchma’s victory over the CPU leader Petro Symonenko in the second round.

Significant changes had been made to the legislation governing the activities of political parties. The Constitution of Ukraine, adopted on 28 June 1996, fixed the status and functions of political parties (Article 36), as well as restrictions on their creation and activities (Article 37). The place of parties in the governmental system was limited to their right to participate in elections. Thus, Ukraine joined the European countries, where the status of political parties is determined by a constitution. However, the role and place of parties in the system of government was left essentially unchanged relative to the prior period.

In October 1997, a new Law “On Elections of People’s Deputies of Ukraine” was adopted, providing for a mixed (in a 50/50% ratio) proportional majority system with nationwide electoral party lists and a proportional barrier of 4% for party participation.

The relationship between the President and political forces represented in the Verkhovna Rada had a significant influence on the party system and its configuration. There was an ideological conflict between the left political forces that desired a return to the previous social order and the presidential “reform path”, which, according to the findings of prominent scholars involved in its development, was predominantly liberal.14 The government viewed this conflict as a “leftist threat”.

14 A. Alekseev “Anatoliy Galchynsky: “Yanukovych plus the donesation of the whole country – this is the essence of the “new order” built by the regionalists”. – Mirror of the week, 28 August – 3 September 2010, http://gazeta.dt.ua/ ECONOMICS/anatoliy_galchinskiy_yanukovich_plyus_donezatsiya_vsieyi_krayini__taka_sut_novogo_poryadku,_ yakiy_vi.html.

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“LEFTIST THREAT” IN THE SECOND PART OF THE 1990sThe government viewed this conflict as a “leftist threat”. That phrase meant that left-wing

political parties could achieve their political goals in the framework of the existing political system and parliamentary path: the restoration of the Soviet system on the territory of Ukraine; preventing market reforms in the economy, particularly in property relations; the restoration of the dominant role of the Communist Party and the curtailment of democracy; entering into an alliance with Russia, Belarus and other former Soviet republics, etc. These goals were actually asserted by the leftist political forces in such ways that made it possible to “get around” constitutional limitations to achieve their purposes.

It should be noted that society at that time provided a very favourable environment for such notions as “communist comeback”. The period 1994-1998 is marked by a steady trend characterised by deterioration of socioeconomic and social well-being for the majority of the population, which meant an increase in left-wing sentiment and support for left-wing forces.15 The latter enjoyed consistently high support in most regions of Ukraine (in particular, the East, the South and the Centre), which made it possible to speak of the existence of a “red belt”.

So, in the 1998 elections, left-wing parties and blocs came in first in elections by party lists in 20 out of 27 regions of Ukraine. The CPU, the SPU-PPU bloc and the PSPU received most of the mandates on a proportional basis – 127 out of 225 – and also had another 45 candidates elected in single-mandate districts. The parliamentary factions of these political forces included 192 people’s deputies overall.16

The mass political activity of the citizens was high in supporting the actions organised by the left forces, in particular in the spring and autumn “workers’ assault on the government”. Thus, the left political forces, although they did not have a permanent majority in the Verkhovna Rada and the consequent opportunity to form their own Government, were able to have a significant influence on the legislative process and activities of the executive branch. In addition, they retained the potential to mobilise citizens and make use of their ability to protest.

Thus, at that time, there were real prerequisites in place for leftist parties to achieve their political goals by democratic means, which could be interpreted as a restoration of the prior social order and the liquidation of Ukraine’s independence.

This made it possible to identify the left-wing opposition to the presidential power with opposition to the Ukrainian state as such, and this was used to stimulate loyalty to the President (or, at a minimum, neutrality) on the part of non-leftist parties, primarily the national democratic parties.17 This

15 Serhiy Makeev Change in the definition of the situations that occurred in 1998. – Ukrainian Society-2003. Sociological monitoring (ed. Valeriy Vorona, Mykola Shulga). – K.: Institute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine, 2003, p.146-151.16 The Parliament in Ukraine: Trends and Problems in its Development. Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2003, No.2, p.7.17 During this period, the executive branch actively used the image of the “leftist threat”, trying to support the bipolar division of political forces into left and non-left and avert the formation of an opposition on other points on the political spectrum.

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phenomenon was reflected in the term “constructive opposition”, which was used to denote moderately critical attitude of certain non-leftist political forces towards the President of Ukraine, in contrast to destructive criticism of the left-wing opposition.

However, sharp contradictions in the process leading to the adoption of the Constitution in 1995-1996 led to the appearance of a centre-right opposition to the President in Parliament (a group of deputies who later became the core of the Reforms and Order Party (ROP)). The source of conflict was, first of all, a divergence in views on the meaning of the new Constitution, in particular the correlation between the presidential power and parliamentarism. At the same time, most of the centre-right and centrist factions (and the political parties associated with them) supported the head of state. The pro-presidential position was also typical of the majority of centrist parties, including those created by government and business groups. This position was connected with a clear ideology based on the criterion of “supporting the presidential course”.

Thus, a division between pro-presidential and anti-presidential forces added up to the existing divide between the left- and right-wing political forces. At the same time, the opposition to the President has become bilateral, despite the government’s attempts to avoid precisely this through the use of the “leftist threat” to reinforce the bipolar division of political forces.

Although the opposition had generally acceptable conditions to operate, a tendency on the part of the authorities to apply pressure to opposition forces arose at this stage, leading to unequal opportunities for political competition. According to experts, the 1998 parliamentary elections were the first in which the authorities used the administrative resources and “dirty” political technologies to influence matters; and during the 1999 presidential elections these technologies were applied in full.18

The most relevant socioeconomic cleavage during this stage was the divide between the poor, to which the absolute majority of citizens of Ukraine belonged, and the rich (primarily representatives of big business). This cleavage now actively expressed itself in considerable support for the left-wing forces and in the popularity of the left-centrist (social-democratic) ideology. So, in the 1997-1998 election campaign, about twenty parties and blocs relied on social-democratic ideas.19

To the socioeconomic, foreign policy and cultural-ethnic dimensions relevant to the previous stage, a new dimension – measuring support for the regime – was added. This complicated the distinction among parties by adding a new line of division between pro-presidential and anti-presidential parties.

18 The Parliament in Ukraine: Trends and Problems in its Development. Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre..., p.6.19 Irina Kresina Parliamentary elections in Ukraine: legal and political issues: A monograph..., p.61.

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As noted above, the influence of business structures during this phase was significant and contributed to increasing role of centrist parties in the party system. The influence exerted by foreign countries was moderate and turned out to consist primarily of support for left political forces by their foreign counterparts.

The second stage saw the group of “party leaders” stabilise in the wake of the 1998 elections, as their places in the ideological field and the nature of the relations among them became clearer. Thus, the atomised multi-party system gradually acquired features of a party system.

The party system at this stage includes twelve legal entities (parties and electoral blocs) that received more than 2% of the proportional vote in the 1998 parliamentary elections. The party system included primarily small parties (with the exception of the CPU, which could be classified as a mid-sized party).

At the second stage, the party system took a tripolar form (“left – right – centre”). The formation of a bilateral left- and right-wing opposition to the political centre (the President and pro-presidential forces), as well as the presence of anti-systemic parties (chiefly, the CPU and PSPU), makes it possible to categorise the party system in the second stage as a system of polarised pluralism. The fact that the authorities tried to prevent national democratic parties from nominating a single candidate in the 1999 presidential elections (as it later turned out, successfully) showed a real threat stemming from the right-wing opposition.

Taking into account features of the second stage, we can characterised it as the stage where polarised pluralism emerged.

PARTY SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION TOWARDS MODERATE PLURALISM: 2000-2004

During this stage, the process of political party creation had somewhat slowed down. During this stage, political parties were formed “from above” (top-down). The parties created to represent the interests of financial-industrial groups (FIGs) and individual business structures (for example, Labour Ukraine (LU), Pragmatic Choice, and Solidarity), and the parties which, by their names, claimed to represent the interests of particular social groups, continuing the tendency of the previous period, constituted a majority of the parties formed during this period. Most of the newly formed parties declared a centrist orientation.

It is necessary to distinguish “clone” parties, which require a separate category of their own. These parties had names similar to those of well-known political entities, but were not actually related to them (this distinguishes such parties from parties formed as a result of a split). “Cloning” concerned

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the most prominent opposition parties (in particular, the CPU and PMU) and was used as a political technology since the 2002 elections.

Also, a consolidation process began by which parties with similar orientations began to merge. In 2000, the five centrist political parties united (the RDPU, the Labour Party (LP), the Solidarity Party, the Party For a Beautiful Ukraine!, and the All-Ukrainian Party of Pensioners), resulting in the formation of the Party of Regional Revival “Labour Solidarity of Ukraine”. Structures representing the Donetsk region – the RDPU and the LP – were the foundation for the united party. A year later, the party changed its name to the Party of Regions (PR).

During this stage, the programmes of some leading political parties, and in particular the SPU and the SDPU(u), were revamped.

The stage is characterised by a rather moderate level of activity in terms of internal party processes, as new political parties, including “clones”, were formed largely not from party splits (although there were such cases), but as newly established structures.

Elections to the Verkhovna Rada in 2002, like previous elections, were held under a mixed electoral system. Over eighty political parties participated (on party lists and in single-mandate districts) – the majority of the registered parties.20 Party lists were nominated by twenty-one political parties and twelve blocs. The tendency towards the “personalisation” of party politics begins at this stage and can be seen in the creation of “personal” blocs. It is a trend that will continue to develop over time.

The main line of distinction was between anti-presidential and pro-presidential forces. The main forces opposed to the President were the left Communist Party of Ukraine and the Bloc of Natalia Vitrenko, the left-centrist SPU, the right-centre Our Ukraine Bloc of Viktor Yushchenko21

(positioned as “moderately anti-presidential”) and the Election Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko22 (which positioned itself as a radically anti-presidential bloc). The pro-presidential forces included “For United Ukraine!” (For UU!), the SDPU(u), the All-Ukrainian Political Union “Women for the Future” and the Winter Generation Team Bloc, among others.

The elections saw an active use of administrative resources and “dirty” political technologies, in particular, the use of “technical” electoral subjects 23

to take votes away from the “main” parties and opposition blocs.

20 This refers to the nomination of candidates on party lists and (or) in single-mandate districts (83 parties); at the 1998 elections this figure stood at 45 parties.21 The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Liberal Party of Ukraine, the Youth Party of Ukraine, the People’s Movement of Ukraine, the Reforms and Order Party, the Solidarity Party, the Christian Democratic Union Party, the “Move on, Ukraine!” party, the Republican Christian Party, the Ukrainian People’s Movement Party.22 The All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna” (Fatherland), the Ukrainian People’s Party “Sobor”, the Ukrainian Republican Party, and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party.23 In particular, the People’s Movement of Ukraine Bloc, the Communist Party of Workers and Peasants and the Communist Party of Ukraine (updated).

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As a result of the elections by party lists, the electoral barrier was overcome by six political forces: the Our Ukraine Bloc (with 23.57%), the CPU (19.98%), the “For United Ukraine!” Bloc (11.77%), the Bloc for Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) (7.26%), the SPU (6.87%), and the SDPU(u) (6.27%). In all, representatives of twenty-eight political parties were elected to the Verkhovna Rada. A parliamentary majority was formed around pro-presidential factions consisting of deputies elected in single-mandate electoral districts, this despite the fact that the opposition forces had won the elections via party lists.

It should be noted that on the eve of the 2002 elections there were consultations between representatives of Our Ukraine and the authorities on whether the bloc might enter into a joint election campaign with the pro-presidential forces or, at a minimum, not oppose the President of Ukraine and become a member of a pro-presidential majority in the Verkhovna Rada. If this scheme had been carried out, it could have lead to the formation of two “loyal” (pro-presidential) blocs in the political centre – the centrist (“For UU!”) and the centre-right (Our Ukraine), and, accordingly, the formation of an analogous party system. For a variety of reasons, however, these projects were not implemented (in particular, due to the competition between business groups supporting certain political forces and/or prospective candidates for the 2004 presidential elections, the “cassette scandal”, etc.).

During this stage, the tendency towards the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers on the basis of “pseudo-party” principles, where the President would submit candidates for the post of the Prime Minister (e.g., Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych) to the Parliament, relying on the majority. Despite a predominantly “external” nature of the majority formation, parliamentary support of the Government was largely situational.

Political parties took an active part in the 2004 presidential elections. Out of twenty-four candidates taking part in the elections, thirteen were nominated by political parties. Viktor Yanukovych, the leader of the Party of Regions, Viktor Yushchenko, Leader of the Our Ukraine bloc, were the candidates in the second round, supported by the Power of the People coalition, which was based on the Our Ukraine Bloc and the BYuT, and which were subsequently joined by the SPU and other parties. Thus, the 2004 presidential campaign reflected the basic division of political forces along pro-presidential and anti-presidential lines. The left political forces (the CPU, PSPU) nominated their candidates (Petro Symonenko and Natalia Vitrenko), but they garnered 6.5% of the vote combined.

The legal basis for political party activities has changed significantly. The Law “On Political Parties in Ukraine”, which regulated the procedure for

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creation and operation of political parties, was adopted in April 2001, after nearly five years of efforts. The law was aimed at stimulating the development of nationwide political parties, their consolidation and regulation of their relations with government agencies. Despite the short-term positive effects, however, legislative regulation has not become an effective factor in achieving the goals set forth in the process of drafting and adopting the Law (in particular, to reduce “small-party” element).24 In November 2003, legislation approving state funding of party activities conforming to the parties’ charter documents was passed; in practice, however, that funding was never actually provided.

The processes within the party system were significantly hampered by a sharp struggle between the President and parliamentary opposition for influence in the Verkhovna Rada. In February 2000, structures subordinate to the President and supported by business groups had resorted to “brute force” to eliminate the (leftist) Parliament leadership and formed a majority, which included almost all non-left associations of deputies.25 However, this majority subsequently collapsed amid a growing “cassette scandal” and the resignation of the Yushchenko government, which was still supported by some centre-right factions and groups in the Parliament.

In order to limit powers of the Parliament and provide the President with additional tools for exerting influence upon it, structures subordinate to the President initiated a nationwide referendum, in whose preparation pro-presidential parties played an active role. The referendum was held on 16 April 2000, but the Parliament did not implement its outcome, adding to the conflict between Parliament and the President.

The “cassette scandal” and the Georgiy Gongadze case became highly significant factors of change in the distribution of political power. The political forces of the centre-left (the SPU), centre-right and right wings took radical anti-presidential positions and established lines of cooperation in the framework of the “Ukraine without Kuchma” movement. At the same time, the leading centrist political forces supported the position of the President. Left parties (CPU, etc.) declared anti-presidential positions, but abstained from active participation in protest actions. The aforementioned processes contributed in significant degree to reducing the relevance of the “left-right” divide and to increasing the chasm between anti-presidential and pro-presidential forces.

This stage is characterised by sharply conflicting relations between the government and the opposition, pressure exerted by the government upon

24 Yuriy Yakymenko Political parties in Ukraine one year before the elections: the future that begins today. – National Security and Defence, 2005, No.3, p.2.25 For more detail see: Parliament in Ukraine: trends and problems of formation ..., p.9.

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the opposition forces, their leaders and business groups that supported them, including the use of security forces, information blockade, and public campaign to discredit them. These factors prompted the opposition forces to radicalise and resulted in a high level of conflict within the party system.

A peculiar feature of this stage was also an active creation of electoral blocs, including “personal” blocs (associated with Viktor Yushchenko, Yulia Tymoshenko and Natalia Vitrenko), relying on the electoral attractiveness of popular leaders, something that later became a trend.26 When joining blocs of that kind, that were attached to certain parties that arose during the first stage of the party system development and had distinct ideological identities (for example, the PMU and the URP), this, along with other factors, led to the loss of their positions and their gradual marginalisation.

During the 2002 election campaign, the division of citizens’ electoral sympathies in various regions, on the basis of socio-cultural differences, largely coincided with the division on the basis of sympathies for pro-government or opposition forces. In particular, the Our Ukraine and BYuT blocs, which were part the opposition and had a national-democrat cast, gained the largest number of votes mainly in western and central regions of Ukraine, with less favourable results in the East and South. “For UU!”, the main pro-government bloc, in contrast, was less supported in the West and enjoyed the greatest support in the Donetsk region (the only region where it came in first).

This trend has expanded in the 2004 presidential elections, and, among other things, was artificially stimulated with the use of political technologies to help the government’s candidate win.

If previously, socioeconomic cleavage was a politically polarising issue, since the 2002 elections sociocultural orientations of residents from different regions became a factor exerting the greatest influence on the configuration of the Ukrainian party system.

Throughout this stage, the level of support for the regime came to the fore among the issue dimensions, to a great degree overlapping with cultural and ethnic issues. These dimensions characterised the distinction between the anti-presidential and pro-presidential forces. The distinction between left- and right-wing political forces was characterised by socioeconomic, foreign policy and cultural-ethnic considerations.

26 The Constitution of Ukraine, as amended on 12 December 2004, actually equates the status of political parties and electoral blocs of political parties (Article 81). This creates the grounds for considering parties and electoral blocs as equivalent entities and treating them all as entities subject to the party system.

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The influence of business groups on the party system was significant. In general, the process by which the main financial-industrial groups created their own “instrumental parties” (in different ways), for the most part, ended. Given a strong presidential power and threats to “disloyal” (to the government) businesses, parties created or controlled by financial-industrial groups had a predominantly pro-government character. However, a certain proportion of the business structures, despite government pressure, supported the political opposition, linking their prospects with that of the opposition leaders.

This stage was characterised by an increasing influence of external factors on Ukrainian political processes. This was largely due to the actions of the Ukrainian government, which had international resonance (the “cassette scandal”, the Gongadze case, and the “Kolchuga scandal”).

External influence exerted by Western states and international organisations (for the most part public) was primarily aimed at ensuring a level playing-field for political competition, honesty and transparency in the electoral process, freedom of the media, encouraging an active civil society for the protection of political (primarily electoral) rights and freedoms, that would objectively work to the advantage of the opposition parties and blocs. Influence exerted from the East (Russia, largely covert) was aimed at supporting pro-government political forces and their candidates in presidential elections.27

One of the most effective external factors was the “import” of foreign political technologies, which was achieved by bringing in political technologists (spin doctors) from countries supporting one side or the other, to participate in the organisation of electoral campaigns in Ukraine. Often, the “imported” (primarily Russian) political technologies were destructive in nature, since they provided for the use of “dirty” technologies and were aimed at discrediting political opponents and deliberately exacerbating the existing interregional sociocultural differences (the politicisation of sociocultural divisions).

Thus, at the beginning of the third stage, the party system retained features of a polarised pluralism system. However, under the influence of processes going on around it, the relevance of the “left-right” coordinates gradually decreased, and the divide between anti-presidential and pro-presidential forces increased. There were three “poles” in the party system, but the importance of one of them – the “left” – had decreased. The basis for considering this stage a stage of transformation in the party system is a reduced relevance of ideological distinctions and a corresponding increase in distinctions drawn in terms of attitude towards the government, a consequence of which was the emergence of a tactical alliance between left- and right-wing parties.

27 Irina Kresina Parliamentary elections in Ukraine: legal and political problems: A monograph..., p.155-157; “The external factor in the 2004 presidential elections”. Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2004, No.5, pp.2-35.

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The number of legal subjects of the party system active during this stage decreased from twelve to nine. Such changes can be considered a sign of evolution towards a system of limited (moderate) pluralism. In terms of size, the system mostly included small parties.

These rather significant changes provide grounds to characterise this stage as a stage of transition to a system of moderate pluralism.

PARTY SYSTEM STABILISATION: 2005 - FEBRUARY 2010

The stage is characterised by active creation of new parties, 177 of which were registered as of 10 May 2010. The peak in party formation came in 2005 (when twenty-four new parties were registered), spurred by the imminence of the elections in 2006.

The 2004 election campaign and the Orange Revolution influenced the process whereby new parties were created. It resulted in the formation of parties, like the People’s Union “Our Ukraine” (PUOU, which later became the Our Ukraine Party), the Pora Civic Party, the Third Force, the New Democracy Party, and others.

The creation of parties as personal projects of individual politicians continued (in particular, Mykola Katerynchuk’s European Party of Ukraine (EPU), Vasyl Volha’s Union of Left Forces (ULF), Pavlo Zhebrivsky’s Ukrainian Platform (UP), etc.). The ideological identification of newly created political forces was limited either to membership in the so-called “orange” or “white-blue” camps or, alternatively, a claim to play the role of a “third force”.

Ideological parties were not created in this period. No impression can be formed of these newly formed parties due to their lack of activity. The ideological foundations of leading political forces remained almost unchanged (with the exception of the PR), as the main focus was on their election programmes.

The most nationwide election campaigns were held during this stage – for the parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2007 and the presidential elections in 2010. Election processes and relations among parties were largely influenced by such factors as the “political inertia” of the 2004 presidential campaign, “imperfections” in the constitutionally defined mechanisms governing actions of higher government institutions and their interactions; the upcoming 2010 presidential elections.

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THE 2006 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Lists of candidates were nominated by forty-five legal subjects of the electoral process (seventeen blocs and twenty-eight parties). In total, this was the largest number of political parties – 94 – in the history of Ukrainian elections. Only five of them ended up with representation in Parliament, however – the Party of Regions (with 32.14%), the BYuT (22.29%), the Our Ukraine Bloc (13.95%), the SPU (5.69%) and the CPU (3.66%).

The main line of distinction for political forces at the time the elections were held was support for one or the other of the main candidates (Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych) in the 2004 election campaign.

The inability of the overwhelming majority of the electoral participants to even approach the electoral barrier (only six parties and blocs garnered 1-3% of the vote), together with a significant deterioration in the CPU’s results (from 19.98% in 2002 to 3.66% in 2006), indicated the formation of a new “group of leaders” in the party system and, accordingly, that the leading parties were losing the positions they had established during the first stage.

The results of the election indicated the emergence of a new alignment of forces in the party system. In it, two poles had been formed – on the one hand was the PR, and on the other – the BYuT and Our Ukraine. The positions of the left forces and other parties that emerged during the first and second stages significantly weakened.

The failed attempt of factions of the BYuT, Our Ukraine and SPU to form a coalition ended in the formation of a coalition of Party of Regions, CPU and SPU factions, together with individual deputies of Our Ukraine. This process led to a developing parliamentary crisis and the early termination of the powers of the Verkhovna Rada.

THE EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 2007

The results of the early parliamentary elections, held in 2007, confirmed the presence of relevant trends. Significantly fewer legal entities – twenty in all (eleven parties and nine blocs) – participated in them, for an overall total of forty-three parties. The electoral barrier was overcome by five political parties: the Party of Regions (34.37%), the BYuT (30.71%), the Bloc OUNS (14.15%), the CPU (5.39%) and the Lytvyn Bloc (3.96%). Only two political forces achieved as much as 1-3% of the vote.

Political forces differentiated themselves according to the same pattern as in 2006. The competition between political forces in the “orange” camp, however, grew more intense, with focus on Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. Therefore, the coalition of the BYuT, OUNS and Lytvyn Bloc was unstable, vulnerable to manifestations of political competition between its subjects and their situational arrangements with the Party of Regions.

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THE 2010 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Eight out of eighteen candidates were formally nominated by political parties (blocs). The candidates nominated by the two most powerful political forces – the Party of Regions and the BYuT, – advanced to a second round, and the winner was the leader of the PR – Viktor Yanukovych.

The candidates who finished between third and ninth, each winning more than 1% of the vote, were all formal or informal leaders of political forces.28 Candidates who claimed to be an alternative to the current political elite (Serhiy Tihipko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Anatoliy Hrytsenko) created their own parties and political projects in the process of the election campaign, including the use of previously registered but insignificant or dormant parties.

During this period, the legal basis for functioning of political parties changed significantly. Under the constitutional amendments of 12 December 2004, which came into force in full after the parliamentary elections of March 2006, parties were given the right to form a coalition of parliamentary factions, whose powers would include the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers (with the exception of the posts of the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs). Thus, a model of government organisation was introduced in Ukraine which significantly increased the role of parties in the process of formation and implementation of state policy. The parties became the main entities exerting influence not only on the legislative, but also on the executive branch of government, and, indirectly (via parliamentary majority) – on the judicial branch.

An important aspect of these constitutional changes was the introduction of elements of the “party” (“imperative”) mandate (Article 81 of the Constitution), aimed at the stabilisation of the Parliament’s political structure and establishing restrictions on deputies’ transitions from one faction to another. Despite the fact that this provision was not fully implemented,29

it contributed to the strengthening of party control over elected deputies.

Along with amendments to the Constitution, new laws were passed on the election of people’s deputies of Ukraine (in March 2004) and on elections to local self-government bodies (in April 2004). According to the new Law on elections to the Verkhovna Rada, all of its members were to be elected from party (bloc) lists in a single multi-mandate nationwide district. The electoral barrier was lowered from 4% to 3%. The members of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regional, district, and city councils should be also elected via party lists.

28 Serhiy Tihipko – A Strong Ukraine, Arseniy Yatsenyuk – the Front For Change, Viktor Yushchenko – Our Ukraine, Petro Symonenko – the Bloc of Left and Left-Centre Forces, Volodymyr Lytvyn – the People’s Party, Oleh Tiahnybok – the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” (Freedom), Anatoliy Hrytsenko – the Civic Position.29 Largely because of resistance within the deputy corps itself, as this limited the autonomy of individual deputies, and also because of negative assessments of this step by foreign institutions as inconsistent with European practice.

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As a result of these constitutional and legislative changes, parties became the sole mechanism for forming the Parliament and most of the local self-government bodies, received the greatest possible ability to influence their activities, and as a result to implement their own political programmes at both national and local levels.30

This stage witnessed a high level of conflict between leading political forces and higher government institutions with occasional escalations and political crises (2007 and 2008).

The Party of Regions and political forces, which supported Viktor Yanukovych as a presidential candidate, did not recognіse the legitimacy of the second round of elections and the victory of Viktor Yushchenko, considering the Orange Revolution to be a product of outside interference in favour of the winner. Accordingly, the main force driving these political actors was the desire to regain lost political ground, the main task being to ensure the stability of the electoral district that had voted for Viktor Yanukovych until the next parliamentary and presidential elections. This, as well as the insufficiently balanced policy of President Viktor Yushchenko, helped to fix the division of the electorate on a regional basis following its attachment to one of the two candidates. This division reflected (and, to a large extent, was a consequence of) sociocultural differences in orientations between citizens from different regions and was the most relevant social division of this period.31

The imperfection of constitutional mechanisms for organising state power was the objective basis of conflict between the President and the Prime Minister, the President and the Parliament, within the Parliament regarding the creation of a coalition, etc.32 In addition, the Constitution’s shortcomings were actively used by those interested in the political struggle. This factor caused constant tensions between political forces and prevented the normal functioning of parliamentary coalitions.

The approaching of the 2010 elections marked an increasing level of personification of party and political processes. The concentration of key political leaders, including those who held official positions, on their own presidential rating was manifested in growing populism of relevant political forces and determined their situational political behaviour. This factor also caused continual organisational and structural changes in the

30 For more information on the redistribution of authorities in the system of power after the adoption of amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, see: Constitutional reform in Ukraine: progress, condition and prospects. Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2007, No.1, pp.20-22.31 For more details, see: Yuriy Yakymenko, Oleksandr Lytvynenko. Regional aspects of the ideological and political orientations of Ukrainian citizens in the context of the 2006 election campaign. Article by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2006, No.1, pp.2-18.32 For more information, see: Constitutional reform in Ukraine: progress, condition and prospects. Analytical report by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2007, No.1, pp.23-28.

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environment of the “orange” political forces33 and was the main thing that led to their defeat in the 2010 presidential elections. The effect of this factor also resulted in significant activity in creating parties – the political “leadership” projects of presidential candidates.

The relationship between the President and the Parliament varied over the course of this stage. Before the 2006 elections, it was formed according to the pattern “strong President – weak Parliament”. After the 2006 elections, the balance of powers changed in favour of the Parliament, in which a majority opposing the President was created (illegitimately). The period before the 2007 early elections was characterised by extremely high tensions between the President, the Parliament (coalition) and the Government.

As a result of the 2007 elections, a majority “politically akin” to the President was created in the Parliament; however, relations of the Head of State with the BYuT and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko remained hostile. At the same time, in order to weaken their opponent, the parties resorted to temporary cooperation with the main rival, the Party of Regions.

After the victory of Viktor Yanukovych in the 2010 presidential elections, the formation of a pro-presidential parliamentary coalition and the illegitimate restoration of the Constitution in the wording of 1996, the President received decisive influence on all branches of power, including the judicial branch.

During this period, Governments were formed on the basis of different constitutional norms, and the parties took an active part in these processes. The position of Prime Minister was held by the BYuT leader, Yulia Tymoshenko (twice); the leader of the Party of Regions, Viktor Yanukovych; and the representative of Our Ukraine, Yuriy Yekhanurov.

The conditions for activities of the political opposition during this phase were generally favourable. The exception is the first period (2005), when a number of politicians from the opposition to President Viktor Yushchenko’s camp were persecuted, as well as the period after the 2010 presidential elections, when the new government resorted to similar actions against political opponents.

The main (and the most politicised) social division during the fourth period was the sociocultural division, reflected in two sets of citizens’ ideas (based on their language preferences and their belonging to cultural traditions) and, accordingly, political sympathies.34

33 In particular, changes in the composition of the blocs based on Our Ukraine and the BYuT in 2006-2007, intra-party processes in the PUOU, and reorganisation and change of leadership in the parliamentary faction of the Our Ukraine and the Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defence Blocs.34 For more details, see: Yuriy Yakymenko Transformation of the Ukrainian party system in 2004-2007. – Political Management, 2008, No.2, pp.96-97.

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Cultural, ethnic and foreign policy were the most intensive issue dimensions of this period, defining the distinction between “orange” political forces and their opponents. Based on their foreign policy focus, the leading political forces were conditionally divided into two groups: “pro-Western” (supporting European and/or Euro-Atlantic integration) and “pro-Russian” (supporting economic, political and sociocultural integration with Russia).

The importance of the issue dimension of regime support decreased due to, among other things, constitutional changes and an increase in the parties’ ability to shape legislative and executive powers. The importance of the socioeconomic dimension, which at the beginning of the stage fell into the background, began to grow again after the start of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and continued to grow during the next stage.

This stage saw a decisive influence of FIGs on the parties’ (blocs’) activities. For the first time, the influence of FIGs spread to all leading parties and blocs, regardless of their ideological orientation or attitude towards power.35 The main reason for their dependence was a significant increase in expenditures on election campaigns and the inability to provide for them at the expense of other sources. The position of FIGs largely determined the political behaviour of the respective parties and blocs.36 Thus, ideological differences between parties and blocs were irrelevant in the process of the formation and realisation of power.37 In addition, the electoral nature of the parties (blocs) largely caused the dependence of their popularity on the media (first and foremost, electronic ones), which were also under the control of FIGs; this provided the latter with additional leverage to influence parties.

The illegitimate influence of the FIGs and political corruption became direct components of the process of forming electoral lists of parties (blocs) at elections of all levels, and influenced the adoption of decisions by the Parliament and other institutions. As a result, the FIGs could be considered a dominant factor of influence on the party system.

The influence of external factor during this stage may be defined as high. This was manifested in financial support from the Russian Federation (via various channels) of “pro-Russian” political parties and civil organisations in Ukraine (primarily in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea), in the direct disclosure of political sympathies towards Ukrainian political forces

35 First of all, because of high tariffs for political advertising on television.36 See: Political corruption in Ukraine: the situation and means of countering it. Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2009, No.7, pp.8-19.37 In particular, the CPU, in spite of its publicly declared “anti-oligarchic” principles, twice entered into a coalition with the Party of Regions, supported by the richest businessman of Ukraine, Rinat Akhmetov.

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and individual politicians by higher officials of the Russian Federation, and in the activities of Russian “experts” in political technologies in the election headquarters of domestic political forces and presidential candidates.

Seven legal entities can be included in the structure of the party system of Ukraine at this stage, among which two were medium-sized (the PR, BYuT), and the others were small.

The party system of Ukraine can be characterised as a system of moderate pluralism. On a quantitative basis, it tends to evolve from a multi-party system towards a system of “two and a half” parties or a “two-bloc system”. Anti- systemic parties either changed their character (CPU) or were marginalised (PSPU). Over this period, two poles, represented by the largest political forces – the Party of Regions and the BYuT,38 were created in the party system; left-wing parties lost their positions as a separate pole of the party system.

However, at the end of this period, during the 2010 presidential election campaign, “new” political forces, which “did not fit” a bipolar scheme, emerged.39

The fourth stage, in its results, can be described as a stage of stabilisation of the party system, which had taken the form of a system of moderate pluralism.

MOVEMENT TOWARDS A “HEGEMONIC PARTY”40 SYSTEM: 2010-2013

The starting point of this period is the second round of the Ukrainian presidential elections and the victory of Viktor Yanukovych.

The process of creating new political parties continued: in the period of 2010-2011, over 25 of them were registered. As of November 2012, there were 200 political parties registered in Ukraine, but most of them still existed only formally.

Among the newly-formed parties that were active, almost all were “leadership” parties (in particular, Serhiy Tihipko’s Strong Ukraine Party, Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s Front for Change, Vitaliy Klychko’s UDAR, and Anatoliy Hrytsenko’s Civic Position). Somewhat later, Andriy Sadovyi’s “Samopomich” (Self-Reliance) and the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko were formed. Also during this phase, separate parties were created on the basis of public initiatives (for example, the Democratic Alliance).

The period of 2010-2013 saw two electoral campaigns: the 2010 elections to local government bodies and the 2012 parliamentary elections.

38 The ideological qualifications of these parties in terms of “left-right” is problematic, and both political forces can be classified as centrist ones.39 Strong Ukraine, Front for Change, and Civic Position, mentioned above.40 According to the definition of Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner, hegemonic party systems are “quasi-authoritarian systems dominated by a single party”. See: Political parties and political development (edited by Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner). – Princeton University Press, 1966.

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THE 2010 ELECTIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT BODIESThe new Law of Ukraine “On Elections of Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of the

Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Local Councils and Village, Town and City Heads” replaced the proportional system of elections to a number of local councils with a mixed one; electoral blocs were removed from the list of electoral subjects. This was done to ensure the dominance of the ruling political forces in local government bodies. The elections themselves were held amid large-scale use of administrative resources in favour of the Party of Regions, pressure on the opposition and limited participation of its representatives in the elections, including with involvement of judicial authorities.41

The election results demonstrated that the government was able to achieve the goal it had set. In particular, in the elections to councils at various levels by party lists, a total of 39.39% of deputies were elected from the Party of Regions,42 and together with its “political satellites” (Strong Ukraine, CPU, People’s Party) this figure amounted to more than 55%. For comparison, the leading opposition force, “Batkivshchyna” (Fatherland) Party, had 16.34% of elected candidates, while other opposition parties (“Svoboda” (Freedom) Party, Our Ukraine) had 4.47% and 3.26%, respectively.

The elections showed rather prominent support of the “new” parties such as the Front for Change and Strong Ukraine, which had 8.03% and 5.37% of the deputies, respectively, according to party lists.

Some “old” extra-parliamentary political parties (the PSPU, Union Party, SPU, PMU, SDPU(u), and others), as well as new political projects (the Unified Centre, UDAR, Civic Position, Conscience of Ukraine, etc.) also took an active part in the elections.

The Party of Regions took first place in the elections by party lists to 17 regional councils and the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, including in the central and some western regions, and had the largest number of deputies (including majoritarian districts) elected to 19 regional councils and the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. In some regional councils (Zaporizhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk regions), the proportion of the Party of Regions deputies ranged from 76% to 93%.

In the elections to local councils, especially in the central and western regions, the success of the Party of Regions was mostly determined by the mobilisation of representatives of local authorities, heads of enterprises and institutions of various ownership types and public employees (doctors, teachers, cultural workers) to its ranks as candidates. On the other hand, a prerequisite for the success of the “party of power” became the dispersion of opposition forces, which proved unable to consolidate.

In general, the Party of Regions, together with the Communist Party of Ukraine and Strong Ukraine, dominated in the East and South; together they had significant representation in the Centre and in the West. “Batkivshchyna” and Front for Change were relatively better represented in the West and in the Centre, while “Svoboda” and United Centre were better represented in the West.

41 See: Local elections – 2010. The pulse of the state (edited by A. Kogut, K. Sidash). – K., Laboratory of Legislative Initiatives, 2011, 228 p.; Statement of the Public Network “Support” for conducting local elections 31 October 2010 – Website of the Public Network “Support”, 5 November 2010, http://oporaua.org/news/867-2010-11-04.42 Local elections. – The official website of the CEC, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vm2010/wp001.

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THE 2012 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONSIn December 2011, the new Law of Ukraine “On Elections of People’s Deputies of Ukraine”

came into force. Its main innovations were the return to a mixed electoral system, the increase of the election threshold to 5%, a prohibition on electoral blocs participating in elections, and the restoration of the institution of self-nomination. According to experts, these and other innovations reduced the role of parties in the formation of the Parliament, and also were aimed at providing pro-government political forces and candidates with more favourable conditions for victory in the elections.43

21 political parties took part in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine held on 28 October 2012 by party lists. In fact, there were even more parties, as due to the prohibition on forming electoral blocs, representatives of some parties ran on the lists of other forces as non-partisan candidates (including the representatives of Front for Change, People’s Movement of Ukraine, Reform and Order Party, Civil Position, “For Ukraine!”, and People’s Self-Defence, which stood for elections by the lists of the “Batkivshchyna”, while representatives of the People’s Party ran on the list of the Party of Regions). In total, 87 parties participated in the electoral process.

The elections were held with the extensive use of administrative resources by the authorities, and their results were affected by fraud, especially in single-mandate districts.

Five parties overcame the electoral barrier – the Party of Regions (30% of votes), “Batkivshchyna”, (25.54%), the UDAR (13.96%), the CPU (13.18%) and “Svoboda” (Freedom) (10.44%).

The 2012 election campaign slightly shifted the balance of power in Ukrainian party system. The Party of Regions and “Batkivshchyna” retained their dichotomy. The CPU increased its electoral outcome primarily at the expense of disillusioned supporters of the Party of Regions.

A number of political parties established in the early or mid 1990s either had completely lost or substantially weakened their position. The Socialist Party of Ukraine, the Peasant Party of Ukraine, the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (unified), the Ukrainian Republican Party, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian People’s Party essentially disappeared from the political arena. The positions of the People’s Movement of Ukraine, the Reform and Order Party and the People’s Party weakened significantly, and they practically lost their subjectivity. The same is true of some parties formed following the Orange Revolution, especially the Our Ukraine Party.

The parties, claiming to be “new” political forces, perfectly fitted in the existing “government – opposition” chasm: Strong Ukraine decided

43 The Parliament and the 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine: political situation, social attitudes and expectations. Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre. – National Security and Defence, 2012, No.7-8, pp.19-27.

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to merge with the Party of Regions, the Front for Change became part of the United Opposition “Batkivshchyna”, with UDAR joining it later in the Verkhovna Rada.

According to the election results, the territorial division of supporters of the leading political forces was largely preserved. As in the previous parliamentary elections, this is rooted in cultural differences between the residents of different regions of Ukraine. In particular, the Party of Regions and the Communist Party gained leading positions in the East and South of Ukraine, while “Batkivshchyna” led in central and western regions, and “Svoboda” in the West.

Despite certain expectations, in the 2012 election campaign, no political force could claim a uniform support of voters across all regions of Ukraine and become a nationwide party. Such expectations were initially placed on “new” political players, including the Front for Change and UDAR. However, the bipolar nature of the campaign did not provide any opportunities for “third forces”, requiring that the parties define themselves in terms of “government – opposition”.

During this stage, there were significant changes in the regulatory framework that determined the principles of party participation in the political system. The Resolution of the Constitutional Court as of 30 September 2010, adopted under pressure from Viktor Yanukovych, restored the validity of the 1996 wording of the Constitution. This Resolution significantly reduced the role of parties in the process of developing and implementing state policy, in particular by depriving the parliamentary factions of the right to form the membership of the Cabinet of Ministers and to programme its activities through a coalition agreement.44

Significant changes were implemented in electoral legislation both for local and parliamentary elections. Based on the results of both campaigns, these changes improved the election results for the ruling parties and candidates.

Separate amendments were made to the Law “On Political Parties”, particularly aimed at ensuring gender equality, and the possibility to cancel membership by a party member. The work of parties was indirectly influenced by amendments to the legislation on civic associations. As a result of the Law “On Civic Associations” losing its force, with some of its provisions also applying to political parties, certain gaps emerged in legislative regulation of the latter.45

44 For more details see: The Parliament and the 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine: political situation, social attitudes and expectations…, pp.3-7.45 For more details see: Political parties of Ukraine: expert opinion. – National Security and Defence, 2015, No.6-7, p.76.

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The legal conditions for the opposition activities and opportunities for equal political competition among parties deteriorated considerably. Under the pretext of restoring the 1996 wording of the Constitution, the parliamentary opposition was deprived of legislative guarantees of its rights and powers in the Verkhovna Rada – the sections and provisions concerning both the coalition of parliamentary factions and the opposition were removed from the text of the Law on the Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.46

During this stage, the political regime saw a strengthening of authoritarian tendencies. The aforementioned resolution of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the restoration of the Constitution in the wording of 1996 created the basis for this.

Criminal procedures were instituted in 2010-2011 against the opposition leaders – the BYuT of Yulia Tymoshenko and the People’s Self-Defence Party of Yuriy Lutsenko, with both of them imprisoned as a result of it. Thanks to long negotiations with authorised representatives of the EU, Yuriy Lutsenko was released on amnesty; however, the authorities persistently evaded the issue of releasing Yulia Tymoshenko, leader of the largest opposition party at that time, the All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna” (Fatherland).

The situation regarding the protection of civil rights and freedoms significantly deteriorated.47 In particular, the president’s entourage managed to monopolise the information space (primarily television), and pressure on journalists (including physical pressure) was intensified. The access to national broadcasting and the most popular TV channels was restricted for opposition.

Citizen rights to peaceful assemblies were continually violated using courts and law enforcement bodies, as well as semi-criminal structures organised and patronised by the authorities. The government resorted to using judicial and law enforcement bodies to exert pressure on opposition political powers, civic organisations, protest movements, and some politicians and public figures.

Over the course of the 2012 elections, a legal framework favouring the ruling forces and candidates was purposely shaped by authorities, administrative resources were applied on a large scale, voters were bought, and direct fraud, involving courts and law enforcement bodies, took place.48

Authoritarian tendencies saw further development in 2013. All the efforts of the authorities were directed at its maximum centralisation, gaining full control over the judicial branch and local authorities, and concentration of power in the President’s hands.

46 The Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine” dated 8 October 2010.47 The Parliament and the 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine: political situation, social attitudes and expectations,…, pp.32-43.48 Ukraine 2013: between the elections and in the face of choice (analytical assessment). – The Razumkov Centre, 2013, pp.3-4.

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In particular, in October 2013, the Verkhovna Rada tentatively approved the presidential draft amendments to the Constitution, which strengthened the dependence of the judiciary on the President.49 The adopted Law “On All-Ukrainian Referendum” (as of 6 November 2012) was to facilitate the implementation of these and other constitutional changes. Amendments were added to the legislation (October 2013), which could prevent participation of Vitaliy Klychko, the most popular candidate from the opposition at that time, in the next presidential elections in 2015.50 Funding for security forces (other than the army) was significantly increased, and mainly representatives of Donetsk region were assigned to executive positions in them.51

The final stage in this process was the Mykola Azarov governme

ukraine’s party system evolution: 1990-2017 · 2017. 9. 14. · 7 this approach is used in...

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