un statebuilding at a turning point: what’s new about the

UN statebUildiNg at a tUrNiNg poiNt

touko piiparinen Fiia brieFiNg paper 144 • November 2013

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

144

What’s NeW aboUt the iNterveNtioN brigade

aNd peacekeepiNg droNes?

• LastMarchtheUNSecurityCouncilauthorisedtheso-calledInterventionBrigadetoundertake‘targetedoffensiveoperations’against illegalarmedgroupsoperatingintheEasternpartoftheDemocraticRepublicof theCongo (DRC).TheBrigade,whichundertook itsfirstoperations inAugust,differsfromtraditionalUNpeacekeepingintermsofitsrobustmandateandmobility.

• TheUNhassimultaneouslyadoptedanewtechnology,unmannedaerialvehicles(UAVs),intheDRC,whichrepresentsthefirst-everuseofUAVsasapartofUNpeacekeeping.UAVswillbedeployedintheDRCattheendofNovember,andstartoperatinginearlyDecember.

• The Intervention Brigade andUAVs have been hailed as a turning point inUN peacekeeping.However,theyshouldnotbeperceivedascompletelyneworstandaloneinstrumentsofUNconflictmanagement.Theycouldinsteadbebestunderstoodasacontinuumandextensionofthelong-heldstatebuildingdoctrineappliedbytheUN.ThesenewinstrumentsenabletheUNtoperformoneofitskeyfunctionsofstatebuildingandprotectionofcivilians,namelycontrollingandpolicingthewholeterritoryofastatewhereaninterventionhasbeenundertakenmoreeffectivelythanbefore.

• ThelessonslearnedfromtheUNpeaceoperationintheDRC indicatethattheUN statebuildingdoctrineremainsself-contradictoryonaccountofthetendencyofUNstatebuildingmissionstospilloverintowarsandthemismatchbetweentheambitiousgoalssetforstatebuildingandthechroniclackofresources.

• The Intervention Brigade andUAVs can potentially help theUN to resolve that mismatch byenhancingtheUN’s statebuildingandprotectioncapacities.However, theycannotresolvetheothermajordisadvantageofstatebuilding,namelycollateraldamageinflictedinstatebuildingwars,andmayevenaggravatethatproblem.

UN statebUildiNg at a tUrNiNg poiNt

Fiia briefing paper 144

November 2013

What’s NeW aboUt the iNterveNtioN brigade aNd peacekeepiNg droNes?

Global Security research programme

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

touko piiparinen

Reseacrher


the FiNNish iNstitUte oF iNterNatioNal aFFairs 3

TheUNpeaceoperationintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,MONUC(Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo),wasestablishedin1999bySecurityCouncilResolution1258asanobserverandmonitoringmis-siontoassistintheimplementationandmonitor-ingoftheLusakaCeasefireAgreement,whichhadtemporarilybroughtanendtotheSecondCongoWar.ThisfirstphaseofMONUCentailedfunctionsoftraditionalUNpeacekeepingsuchastheobservationandmonitoringofceasefires.

Inthesecondphase,MONUC’smandate,providedinSecurityCouncilResolution1856(2008),wassig-nificantlyexpandedtoenableittoundertakemuchmoredemandingandambitiousstatebuildingtasks,includingtheprotectionofcivilians,thepromotionof the ruleof law,and theextensionof the stateauthorityofthecentralgovernment–byforce,ifnecessary.TheSecurityCouncilauthorisedMONUCtoperformcomprehensivereformsandreconstruc-tionoftheDRC,expandingitssizeto19,815militarypersonnel.ThestabilisationofthesecuritysituationintheDRC,particularlyinitsEasternpart,becametheprimaryaimofthemission.

InJune2010theSecurityCouncildecidedtoestab-lish the UN Organization Stabilization Mission(MONUSCO,Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en RD Congo) tocon-tinueMONUC’swork.ThenewmandateprovidedinSecurityCouncilResolution1925(2010)putsfurtheremphasisontheprotectionofcivilians,authorises

theconcentrationofmilitaryforcesintheEasternpartsofthecountry,andunderscoresassistancetosecurityandjusticesectorreforms.

MONUSCOprovidesatypicalexampleofthestate-buildingdoctrinewhichhasevolvedinUNpeace-keepingsincethe1980s.Statebuildingisprimarilyaimedatfacilitatingthehostgovernmenttoextendits state authority and judicial control over sub-stateactors,includingmilitiagroups,tocoverthewholeterritoryofthetargetstatebyallnecessarymeans,includingtheuseofforce.

Extendingtheadministrativecontrolofastate isexpectedtoimprovecomprehensivehumansecuritybyenabling thewholepopulation toaccessbasicsecurity,healthcareandpublicservicesprovidedbythegovernment,evenintheremotestareas.Inthisway, statebuilding operations aim to ensuremoresustainableandlong-termhumansecurityforcivilians.Themeansappliedtoachievethatobjec-tive includecomprehensiveandmulti-functionalreconstructionandpeace-buildingofweak,fragileandfailedstates,includingsecurityandjusticesec-torreform,theextensionoftheirstateauthority,andthestrengtheningoftheirruleoflaw.1

1 ToukoPiiparinen,‘ResponsibilitytoProtect:TheComingof

AgeofSovereignty-Building’,Civil Wars,15(3),2013,pp.

380-405.

General Basir Bonapa and Lieutenant

General Carlos Alberto Dos Santos

Cruz of MONUSCO in the trenches of

Munigi hill as the Intervention Brigade

launches its first artillery strikes on M23

positions. UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti.


The purpose of this briefing paper is to examinewhether the adoption of two new instrumentsbyMONUSCO during recentmonths, namely theInterventionBrigade andUAVs (unmanned aerialvehicles),signifiesadeparturefromtheUN’sstate-buildingdoctrinetowardsanewtypeofUNpeaceoperation, or merely constitutes a statebuildingcontinuum.

UN engagement in the DRC:

Two contradictions of statebuilding

MONUSCO provides a classic example of theUNstatebuilding doctrine and its sheer ambitious-ness.TheUNCapstoneDoctrinepublishedin2008,whichconstitutestherulebookforcontemporaryUNpeacekeeping,outlines themainobjectivesofstatebuilding.TheCapstoneDoctrinearguesthatthedeploymentofUNtroopsandcivilianpolicemustbeaccompaniedbyinternationaleffortstorestorethestate’smonopolyoverthelegitimateuseofforce,tore-establishtheruleoflaw,tostrengthenrespectforhumanrights,tofostertheemergenceoflegiti-mateandeffectiveinstitutionsofgovernance,andtopromotesocio-economicrecovery.

However,MONUSCOalsoprovidesaclassicexam-ple of the ubiquitous potential of statebuildingoperationstospilloverintostatebuildingwars,inwhichtheUNsupportsandfacilitatesthenationalarmytooccupyterritoriesfrominsurgencygroupsinorder to (re-)establishtheostensiblyresponsi-ble stateauthority in thoseareas– in thecaseofMONUSCO,particularly intheEasternpartof thecountry. Jointmilitary operations conducted byMONUC/MONUSCOandthenationalarmy,FARDC(Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo), againstdiversemilitia groupshaveocca-sionallyprovedcounterproductiveintermsoftheoverall improvementofhumanitarianconditionsonthegroundbecauseofthelackofhumanrightstraininganddisciplineofFARDCsoldiers,andcol-lateral civilian casualties resulting from the jointoperations.

OperationKimiaII,thejointoperationbetweentheCongolesegovernmentandMONUCagainsttheFDLR(Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda)rebelgroup,launchedinMarch2009,causedpar-ticular controversy on moral and humanitariangrounds.AstheUNinvestigationconcludes,“Ina

bleakcalculationbythecoalition,foreveryrebelcombatant disarmed during the operation, onecivilianhasbeenkilled,sevenwomenandgirlshavebeenraped,sixhousesburnedanddestroyed,and900peoplehavebeenforcedtofleetheirhomes”.2

AlthoughasingleoperationbynomeanspaintsthewholepictureoftheUNengagementintheDRCandtheprimaryresponsibilitytoprotectcivilians,andaccountabilityforthemisconductofFARDCsoldiersfallstotheCongolesegovernment,thecaseinpointhereillustratestheinherentself-contradictionsofstatebuilding:theprimaryaimofUNstatebuildingintheDRCistoprotectcivilians,butindoingsoithastoengageinawaragainstillegalarmedgroups,which,inturn,paradoxicallycausesorenablesfur-therciviliancasualties.

Thesecondself-contradictionofMONUSCOrelatestothemismatchbetweenitsambitiousstatebuildingfunctions,ontheonehand,andthelackofmaterialcapacitiestoperformthosefunctions,ontheother.InspiteofthelargenumberofdeployedUNpeace-keepers, MONUC/MONUSCO has been unable tofulfilitsinitialobjectivetotransformtheDRC.Thatispartlybecauseofthelackofanadequatelogisticalbaseandaerialsupportcapacitytoconductopera-tionseffectivelythroughouttheterritoryoftheDRC–thesizeofallWesternEurope.Themissiontendstoresort toshort-sighted ‘peacekeepingthroughremote-controlling’tactics,occupyingandpolicingareasforalimitedtimeandprotectingciviliansinthoseareas,andremovingtroopstonewhotspotswheretheyareneededmoreurgently.

AlthoughSecurityCouncilResolution1856(2008)providesMONUC/MONUSCOwiththehighestprior-itisationfortheprotectionofciviliansofanyCouncilmandategrantedtoUNpeaceoperationstodate,itsactual impactsonbringingabouthumansecurityinitsareaofresponsibility(AOR)remainwantingtodate.In2011,forexample,thelackofhelicoptercapacity inMONUSCOwas considered so criticalthattheoperation“isnolongerabletoimplement

2 VictoriaHoltandGlynTaylor,Protecting Civilians in the

Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Set-

backs and Remaining Challenges,Independentstudy

jointlycommissionedbytheDepartmentofPeacekeeping

OperationsandtheOfficefortheCoordinationofHumani-

tarianAffairs(NewYork:UnitedNations,2009),p.286.


criticalpartsofitsprioritymandatedtasksrelatedtoprotectingcivilians,addressingthepresenceofarmedgroupsandsupportingelections”.3

On theonehand, the remote-controlling tacticsapplied byMONUSCO provide it with flexibility,mobilityandagility,allowingtherapiddeploymentoftroopstoareasofpriorityintermsoftheprotec-tionofcivilians.Whenthelevelofthreattohumansecurityinthoseareassubsidesordecreases,theUNtroopsarerelocatedtonewareaswherethethreatisassumedtobehigher.Ontheotherhand,aUNreportrevealsfatalflawsinthatmodeofaction.AttheheadquarterslevelofMONUC,oneseniormili-taryofficernoted:“Youcandominateasmallareaforamonthorsixmonthsandchangenothingintheoverallpicture”.4Thereportsummarises:“[I]ntheabsenceofastrategytoconsolidatethemedium-tolong-termsecurityinthefirstareaofdeployment,thethreatoftenintensifiesaftertheyarerelocated.Oneformermilitaryofficerdescribedthisas‘agameofcatandmouse’.”5

Themetaphorofacat(theUNoperatingalongsidethe central government) chasingmice on a vastandruggedsweepoflawn(approximately30illegalarmedgroupsoperating in theEasternDRC)per-fectlycapturesthedynamicsoftheUNstatebuildingwarintheDRC.Inthecaseinpointhere,the‘cat’isequippedwithattackhelicoptersandSpecialForces,buteventhosespecialisedassetsandformedunitshave at least thus far failed to sustainMONUC’s/MONUSCO’scontroloverthewholeterritoryoftheDRC,andtopoliceit.

This example demonstrates how the objective of‘policingthespace’inUNstatebuildingoperationsisnever fully realisedbecauseof, interalia, theirchronic lack ofmaterial resources.This, in turn,generates disillusionment with the objectives offull-fledged state-building initially set for thesemissions,aproblemwhichappearsstrikinglysimilartothepredicamentofISAF(InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce)inAfghanistan.Thenextsections

3 UnitedNations,‘ReportoftheSecretary-Generalonthe

UnitedNationsOrganizationStabilizationMissioninthe

DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo’,UNDoc.S/2011/656,24

October2011,p.16.

4 HoltandTaylor,Protecting Civilians,p.168.

5 HoltandTaylor,Protecting Civilians,p.233.

willexaminewhether theUN’snew instruments,namelythe InterventionBrigadeandUAVs,couldsolve these inherentproblemsof statebuilding intheDRC.

The added value of the

Intervention Brigade for UN peacekeeping

InMarch2013theUNSecurityCouncilauthorisedthedeploymentoftheso-called‘InterventionBri-gade’toneutraliseanddisarmmilitiagroupsoper-atingintheEasternDRC,particularlyinNorthernKivu.The Council’s decision has been perceivedasareactiontothefailureofMONUSCOtopreventthecityofGomafromfallingunderthecontrolofanotoriousrebelgroup,Mouvement du 23 mars (M23),inNovember2012.

TheInterventionBrigade,composedofmorethan3,000 troops, is expected to protect the civilianpopulationmoreeffectivelyintheEasternpartofthe DRC, where approximately 30 illegal armedgroups–withatleastfourofthemhavingtiestoneighbouringgovernments–continuetofightoverterritoryandexploitnaturalresources,committingatrocitycrimesagainstcivilians.SecurityCouncilResolution2098establishingtheInterventionBri-gadeisthefirsttimetheCouncilhaseverusedtheterm‘neutralise’6initsmandategiventoaUNpeaceoperation.

The InterventionBrigade iswidelydescribedasasignificantinnovationinUNpeacekeepinginthatit signifies greater willingness and readiness onthepartoftheUNtoapplytheuseofforcefortheprotectionofcivilians.Itisviewedasanindicationorhallmarkofthecurrentparadigmshift,orinter-ventionistturn,ofUNpeacekeepingawayfromtheconservativevisionpromotedbyIndia(alongwithsomeothermembersoftheNon-AlignedMovementat theUN) towards an interventionist approachpursuedbymembersoftheAfricanUnion(AU)andWestern governments.The former vision empha-sisestheprinciplesofneutralityandimpartialityofpeacekeepers,theconsentoftargetstates,respectfortheirsovereignty,andstrictlimitsontheuseof

6 UnitedNations,‘SecurityCouncilResolution2098’,UNDoc.

S/RES/2098(2013),28March2013,p.7.


forceinpeacekeeping.Thelattervisionadvocatesmorerobusttacticsandstrategiesinpeacekeeping.

African governments, notably South Africa andTanzania,playedapivotalroleinlobbyingfortheauthorisationanddeploymentoftheInterventionBrigade in the DRC, while India unsuccessfullycampaignedagainstit.InadditiontotheInterven-tionBrigade,anothermanifestationofthecurrentinterventionistturnofUNpeacekeepinghasbeentheUN peacekeeping operation in Côte d’Ivoire(UNOCI, Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire).InApril2011UNOCIresortedtotheuseofforcetodestroythemilitaryinstallationsandheavyweaponsoftheformerPresidentLaurentGbagbo’sregime.

SecurityCouncilResolution2098emphasises thesui generisnatureoftheInterventionBrigadeandthusattemptstoplaydownitspotentialapplicationasaprecedentinfutureUNpeacekeeping.Ontheonehand,theInterventionBrigadehasaclearandinnovativeconceptualframeworkandmodality:itenvisages a rapid reaction forcedesigned to con-duct‘targetedoffensiveoperations’againstmilitiagroupsinaflexibleandswiftmanner,whichcouldpotentiallybereplicatedinfutureUNpeacekeeping.Attheparadigmaticlevel,however,theInterventionBrigadedoesnotrepresentanythingsubstantiallynewinUNpeacekeepingfortworeasons.

Firstly, formore than a decade, theUN SecurityCouncilhasbeenaccustomedtoauthorisingpeaceoperationstouseforce,ifnecessary,toprotectcivil-iansunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharter,includingtheoperationsundertakeninHaiti,Sudan,Liberia,andCôted’Ivoire.Infact,theterm‘peaceenforce-ment’wasintroducedinAn Agenda for Peace(1992)publishedbythethenSecretary-GeneralBoutrosBoutros-Ghali,whichsignalledamoreactiveandresolutecollectivesecuritysystemfortheUNaftertheColdWar paralysis.The term ‘peace enforce-ment’was later transformed into the expression‘ChapterVIIoperations’inUN jargon,referringtothefactthattheUNSecurityCouncilhasthecom-petenceunderinternationallaw,namelyundertheUNCharter,toauthoriserobustenforcement-typeoperations.

ThewillingnessoftheSecurityCounciltoauthoriseChapterVIIoperationshasincreasedcontinuouslyfromtheearly1990suntilthepresentday.Therefore,

thecommonlyapplieddescriptionsoftheInterven-tionBrigadebypolicy-makersasa‘stepchangeinpeacekeepingoperations’,‘extraordinarymeasure’and‘turningpoint’inUNpeacekeepingseemlikeoverstatements.7

UNpeacekeepinghas traditionallybeenbasedonincrementalismwithregardtotheuseofforce.Alloperations,regardlessofwhethertheyaredeployedunderChapterVIorVIIoftheUNCharter,areattheoutsetexpectedtoapplytheminimumuseofforceandrespecttheconsentofallparties,whicharealwayspreferredovercoercivemeasures,andtograduallyintensifytheuseofforceonlyifneces-sary.TheInterventionBrigadesignifiesadeparturefromthatincrementalistruleofthumbinthattheunusuallyrobustandassertivelanguageadoptedinitsmandateindicatesitsreadinesstoapplyrobustuse even at the outset ofthemission.However,itsactualcapacitytoconductcoerciveoperationswillultimately dependon itsmaterial capacities pro-videdbytroop-contributingcountries(TCCs)whichareneighbouringstatesoftheDRC.

Thesecondreasontoadoptamorerealisticview-pointonthepotentialaddedvalueoftheInterven-tionBrigadeforUNpeacekeepingresidesinthefactthatitformsonlyapartoftheexistingpoliticalandmilitarywheelworkofUNconflictresolutionintheDRC.TheInterventionBrigadeoperatesunderthecommandofMONUSCOandthusformspartofthewiderUNstatebuildingoperationintheDRC.

Thenormativeandpoliticalfoundationuponwhichthe Intervention Brigade was established is thePeace,SecurityandCooperationFrameworkagree-ment for the Democratic Republic of the Congoandtheregion(‘thePSCFramework’),whichwassignedinAddisAbabaon24February2013bytheneighbouringgovernmentsoftheDRC.TheFrame-workconsolidatesandrenewsthecollectiveattemptby the international, sub-regional and regional

7 SeeforexamplePatrickCammaertandFionaBlyth,Issue

Brief: The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Re-

public of the Congo,3July2013(NewYork:International

PeaceInstitute),p.5;LansanaGberie,‘InterventionBrigade:

EndGameintheCongo?UNPeacekeepingTaskEntersaNew

Phase’,Africa Renewal,August2013.http://www.un.org/

africarenewal/magazine/august-2013/intervention-brigade-

end-game-congo.


communities toextendthestateauthorityof theDRC,whichhasbeenthe long-heldstatebuildingmissionofMONUSCO.

Thus, the Intervention Brigade constitutes onlyanadditionaltool–notthetool–ofMONUSCOtoextendthestateauthorityoftheDRCagainstmilitiagroups.Itispartoftheoverallpoliticaltrajectoryofstatebuildingmaintainedbytheinternational,sub-regionalandregionalcommunitiestocreatespaceforthecentralgovernmentoftheDRC inEasternareascontrolledbysub-statearmedgroups,ratherthanastandalonemilitarytrajectory.

UNofficialsthemselvesemphasisetherelatednessoftheInterventionBrigadetotherenewedpoliticalwillthatemergedinspring2013.AsoneinterviewedUNofficialpointedouttotheauthor,“It’squiteclearthatthisapproach–establishingtheInterventionBrigade–has a lot of political support,which isimportant.It’sthedefiningfeaturethatcharacter-isesthis[InterventionBrigade]frompreviousefforts[bytheUNintheDRC],becauseyounotonlyhavethemandate,butyouhavethepoliticalwilltoactonthismandate.MONUChadaprettyrobustmandateanyway,buttherewasaquestionmarkofwhetheritalwayshadthepoliticalwillandwhetherthetroop-contributingcountriesalwayshadthepoliticalwilltoactonthat.”8

Theterm‘InterventionBrigade’wasinceptedbytheUNSecretariat,buttheinitialidea,modalitiesandrationaleforitstemmedfromAfricangovernments.Atfirst,theideawasbornamongtheAfricansub-regionalandregionalgovernmentsinJuly2012intheaftermathofsetbacksintheEasternDRC,butatthattimeitwasconceivedofonlyasan‘Interna-tionalNeutralForce’tobedeployedinthearea.Atthatstageitwasneithernamedthe‘InterventionBrigade’norenvisagedtobelocatedundertheUNcommand.9TheseinitiativessubsequentlystemmedfromtheUNSecretariat,whichaimedtochanneltherekindledpoliticalwillofAfricancountriesandorganisationsinthesub-regionalcontexttoservethewiderinternationalefforts.

Plainly rendered, the UN ‘harnessed’ the newpoliticalwillemergingfromTanzania,SouthAfrica,

8 AninterviewinNewYorkon25July2013.

9 Interview,NewYork.

ICGLR (International Conference on the GreatLakes Region), SADC (Southern AfricanDevelop-mentCommunity), theAU and others under theUN umbrella. Thus, the Goma incident was nottheimmediatetriggerfortheestablishmentoftheInterventionBrigade, but it functionedonly as acatalyst for thewidermulti-levelprocess involv-ingsub-regional,regionalandinternationalactorswhichwasalreadyinmotion.Throughthatmulti-levelprocesstheconceptoftheInterventionBrigadewasgraduallyshapedandcoined.

The added value of unmanned

aerial vehicles for UN peacekeeping

ThesecondassumedlynewinnovationappliedbytheUN in theDemocraticRepublicof theCongo,namelyunmannedaerialvehicles(UAV),shouldalsobeconsideredmoreasacontinuumandextensionofthealreadyongoingstatebuildingoperationunder-takenbyMONUSCO,ratherthanasagroundbreak-ingnewdevelopmentinUNpeacekeeping.

TheuseofUAVswasapprovedbytheUNSecurityCouncilinJanuary2013toundertakeadvancedcol-lation,analysisanddisseminationofinformationonmilitiaactivities,whichisexpectedtoimprovethesituationalawarenessandtimelydecision-makingofMONUSCO.UNofficialsopenlyadmitthatUAVsarean‘unchartedterritory’fortheUNOrganisationanda‘noveltool’10atitsdisposal.Interestingly,acontractbetweentheUNandanItaliancommercialcompanyregardingtheutilisationofUAVsintheDRCwassignedinsummer2013beforetheSecretariathad developed general procedures on the use ofUAVsandthedisseminationofinformation.11

Oneof theoutstandingquestions iswhetherandhow politically and strategically sensitive andpotentially critical information collated byUAVsregardinganarmedconflictcanbechannelledanddisseminatedtopartiesinsideandoutsidetheUNsystem.Thequestionappearspertinentinlightofthefactthatsomestatepartiesprivytothatinfor-mationmay alsobeparties to the conflictwhichtheinformationcollationbyUAVsconcerns.InthecaseoftheDRC,theproblemconcernsRwandain




particular, which reportedly sponsors the M23whileholdingaseatasanon-permanentmemberoftheSecurityCouncil,whichisthemaindecision-makingbodyontheconflictintheDRC.

ThedeploymentofUAVsintheDRCmarksthefirsttimethattheirusehasbeenexplicitlyauthorisedunderaUNpeacekeepingmandate.TheDRCcasealsoservesasalaboratoryforthepossiblefurtherapplicationofUAVsinsubsequentUNpeaceopera-tions.Ifthattestcaseprovessuccessful,thedeploy-mentofUAVswillconstituteanewbestpracticeforUNpeacekeepingandtheywillbeappliedinfurtherUNpeaceoperationsinplaceslikeCôted’IvoireandSouthSudan.

UAVshavetypicallybeenviewedwithsuspicionbysomeUNmemberstatesonaccountoftheirpoten-tial(mis)useforintelligencepurposesatthepresentstageandthefactthattheycouldbeweaponisedatalaterstage,althoughthelatterprospectremainsaremotepossibility.PerhapsthemainreasonforcautionamongmemberstatesregardingUAVssim-plyrelatestotheirnoveltyassuch:intheabsenceof prior lessons regarding their applicability andviabilityinactualpeaceoperations,memberstateshaveadopteda‘waitandsee’approach.

ThetacitapprovalofUAVsbycountrieslikeRussiaandPakistanwasthefirstvictoryfortheUNSec-retary-GeneralandforotherreformistUNofficialsanddiplomats,whohaveadvocatedtheuseofUAVsfora longer time,but thereare substantialopen-endedlegalandfinancialquestionsconcerningtheirusewhichneedtoberesolvedattheUNinthenearfuture.The real political wrangling betweenUNmemberstatesonthosequestions,particularlytheoneconcerningthedisseminationof information,hasnotyetbegunandwillultimatelydeterminethefateofUAVs.

Despite theirnoveltyat thetacticalandstrategiclevels, at the paradigmatic level the applicationofUAVs, like thedeployment of the InterventionBrigade, formspart of the already existing state-building operation undertaken byMONUSCO intheDRC,ratherthanaturningpointintheoverallpeacekeepingdoctrine.UAVswillpotentiallypro-vide critical support toMONUSCO in performingthekeystate-buildingfunction,namelycontrollingandpolicingthevastterritoryoftheDRC.Under-taking that function by means of deploying UN

peacekeepers– ‘painting thecountryblue’–hasproved to be practically andmaterially difficult,unviable or impossible in a vast country like theDRC.UAVscouldprovideapracticalsolutiontothisperennialproblemofstatebuilding.

UAVscouldenablea state-buildingoperation likeMONUSCO to undertake targeted, more preciseactionagainstmilitiasbyprovidingitwithaccurateinformationandasituationalanalysisofmovementsbymilitiagroups,andbyenablingtheprojectionofforceagainst thosegroupswithin itsvastAOR, iftheuseofUAVswasefficientlysynchronisedwiththerapidreactionforcesandreconnaissanceunitoftheoperation.Byenablingsuchrobust,flexibleandswiftoperations,UAVscould,metaphorically,enablethe‘cat’tofly.Furthermore,theycould,atleastinprinciple,renderlargeinfantrybattalionsorhelicopterunitspreviously applied for similarpurposesuselessand free themup toserveothertasks,althoughthisprospectalsoremainsaremotepossibilityatpresent.

Conclusions: What’s new about UN peacekeeping

on the Eastern front – and globally?

BoththeInterventionBrigadeandUAVsconstituteacontinuumofthealreadyongoingstatebuildingeffortsoftheUNintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo.

Thusfar,theInterventionBrigadehasbeenabletofulfilitsmandate,asM23rebelshavebeenpushedtowardstheNorthandtheynolongerposeadirectandimmediatethreattoGomaanditspopulation.That situation,however,maynot last, and ithasbeen largely due to the fact that the capacity ofMONUSCOandtheInterventionBrigadetoholdtheirgroundhasnotyetbeenseriouslytestedbymilitiagroups.That,inturn,ispartlybecausetheM23hasbeenweakened internally and externally, as evi-dencedbythesurrenderofitsformerleader,BoscoNtaganda,–alsoknownas‘theTerminator’–totheInternationalCriminalCourton22March2013.

TheemergingnewtechnologiesofUNpeacekeeping,includingUAVsandthestrengthenedreconnaissanceunit of the Intervention Brigade, also offer newopportunitiesforTCCs.ThecontributionsofWest-ernTCCstoUNpeacekeeping,particularlythoseoftheNordic countries, have been remarkably low


sincethe1990scomparedtodevelopingcountries,whichalsoconsequentlybeartheheaviestpoliticalandhumanpriceofUNpeacekeepingintheformof fallenUN soldiersandotherriskstothesafetyandsecurityoftroopsinchallengingandcomplexsecurity environments like MONUSCO’s AOR inNorthKivu.

Thismismatchhascausedrecurrentpolitical ten-sions andgridlocksbetweenUNmembers of theglobal South and those of the global North, par-ticularlyattheC34,theUNSpecialCommitteeonPeacekeeping.Westerngovernmentshaveprovedunwilling to fulfil their part of political commit-mentsunder theResponsibility toProtect (RtoP)frameworkestablishedattheUNWorldSummitin2005,whichrequiresthemtoprovideinternationalassistanceandsupporttofailed,fragileandweakstatesliketheDRC.

Theprotracted civilwar in theDRC poses one ofthegreatestthreatstohumansecurityofallarmedconflicts,butithasthusfarfallenofftheradar,orbeyondthe‘humanitariangaze’,ofbroaderinter-nationalconcern.TheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCrossestimatesatotalof5.4millionwar-relateddeathsinthecountryfortheperiodfromAugust1998toApril2007,whichcomesclosetothenumberofpeoplelivinginFinland.

TheUNistheonlyinternationalorganisationwhichhas engaged in comprehensive conflict manage-mentandstabilisationeffortsinthecountry,butitsoperationalcapacityisseriouslyhamperedbythelackofpoliticalwillonthepartofmemberstatesto providematerial resources.The technologicalturnofUNpeacekeepinggivesWesternTCCsanewopportunitytobemoreactiveandengagedinUNpeacekeepingandtobeartheirpartoftheoverallburdenofconflictresolutionandRtoPintheDRCandofthecollectivesecuritysystemoftheUNatlarge,asitcreatesanewdemandforsophisticatedtechnologieswhichonlyWesternTCCscanoffer.Itisnoteworthy,however,thattheUNSecretariatdidrequestUAVcontributionsfromTCCsinthecaseoftheDRC,butdidnotreceiveany.Instead,thecon-tractwassignedwithacommercialcompany.12


To summarise the main findings of this briefingpaper,thenewinstrumentsadoptedintheDRC–theInterventionBrigadeandUAVs–canassisttheUNtoresolveoneperennialproblemofstatebuilding,namelythelackofresourcestocontrolavastAOR.However,theirusemaysimultaneouslyaggravateanotherkeyproblemofstatebuilding,namelythesideeffectsofstatebuildingwars.

Accordingtooneassessment,theuseoftheInter-vention Brigade may instigate militia groups tostepup retaliatory attacks against soft targets ofMONUSCO,includingunarmedcivilianprofession-alsworkingforMONUSCO.Thusfar,however,thedeploymentoftheInterventionBrigadehasman-agedtocreateasecureenvironmentaroundGoma,inwhichNGOsandhumanitarianagenciescannowoperatefreely,unimpededbymilitiaattacks.TheInterventionBrigadealsocontributedtotherecentmilitarydefeatsoftheM23,whichannouncedon5November2013thatitwoulddisarmanddemobilise.

Ultimately, thegreatestaddedvalueof the Inter-ventionBrigadeandUAVsdoesnotrelate to theirmilitarycapacity,buttothefactthattheyembodythe new political determination and concerted efforts among regional actors, includingAfricangovernmentsandorganisations,totacklethecivilwarintheDRC.Inmanysimilarcasesofstatebuild-ingwars, includingthecaseofAfghanistan,suchregionalpoliticalsupportvitalforstatebuildingislacking.


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and internationally. The Institute undertakes quality control

in editing publications but the responsibility for the views

expressed ultimately rests with the authors.

un statebuilding at a turning point: what’s new about the

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