unclassified mine warfare requirements brief briefto minwara spring conference, may 11 majgen t. c....
TRANSCRIPT
UNCLASSIFIED
MINE WARFARE REQUIREMENTS BRIEF
TOMINWARA Spring Conference, May 11
MajGen T. C. “BT” Hanifen, USMCDirector, Expeditionary Warfare Division
UNCLASSIFIED
PROJECTENGAGE RESPOND
OPNAV N85
Director, Expeditionary Warfare (N85)
Naval Special Warfare Branch (N851)
Mine Warfare Branch (N852)
Amphibious Warfare Branch (N853)
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Branch
(N857)
• NSW Requirements• Information Warfare
• Airborne• Surface• RMS• ABS• Unmanned MCM
Vehicles• Mining
• In-service Amphibious Ships
• Future Amphibious Ships
• NBE• NSFS• MPF(F)• LCAC/SSC/LCU/JHSV
• NECC• NCF• MESF• EOD/JEOD• COMCAM• ECRC• ELSG• NEIC• JNLW• MCAST
• Resource Sponsor for all U.S. Naval Mine warfare• CNO’s Staff Subject Matter Expert on Mine Warfare• Expeditionary and Mine Warfare Advocate for the Fleet
Agenda
Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)--“American Style” -Stand Off -Blockades -UUVS/Submarines -Advanced Underwater Weapon Systems (AUWS)
MCM In Support Of Maritime Homeland Defense -LCS Transition -Importance of MCM for Homeland Defense -MCM for Homeland Defense Requirements -“Fly Away” Capability
Mine Counter Measures—Thinking outside the box -Additional Thoughts on MCM -Guinea Pig Ships -Budget
Opening Thought
“Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some
of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double
somersault, land in our rear, and on both of our flanks at the same time… Go back to your command, and try to
think what are we going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going
to do!” ---U. S. Grant
A2 / AD Minefields
A2/AD, “American Style”
“The Navy should develop … smart mobile mines capable of autonomous movement to
programmed locations over extended distances” --AirSea Battle Concept
“Deploying smart mobile mines might prove particularly effective in attriting submarines and/or blocking them from access to their
bases” --AirSea Battle Concept
Sub Base
Sub Base
A2/AD “American Style”
• In time of conflict the USN must own the maritime domain• The seas are ours; we must control our adversaries’ ability
to access that domain Exit and chokepoint control techniques
Submarines Airpower Mining
Boundaries and shielding techniques Mining
• Investment and current capability is not aligned with level of warfighting contribution of mining Current stockpile of mines only covers the shallow water No significant S&T investment in recent years USN proficiency in mining has declined
Give the A2/AD problem to our Potential Adversaries
Concepts for the Future
Encapsulated Weapons
Unmanned Vehicles
Long-range Weapons
Expendable Target Detection Devices
• Weapons
– Wide Area Coverage
– Stand Off Delivery
– High Volume Placement
• Sensors
– Target Detection
– Target Discrimination
• UUV
– Delivery / Re-position
• On Demand Command & Control
– RECO, Change Mission, IFF
– Dual Mode weapons
• Long Duration
– Rechargeable Power source
– In theatre rearming
Current
LD-UUV Weapons with Mobile Warheads
Legacy Weapons (QuickStrikes)
Reduces number of weapons---Increases utility
Autonomous Weapons w/ Mobile Warheads
Near-Term
Far-Term
From Current Mines to an Advanced Underwater Weapon System (AUWS)
Value of an AUWS
SHALLOW INTERMEDIATE DEEP SHALLOW INTERMEDIATE DEEP
Traditional Mining(strategic, autonomous)
Deliver Arm / EngageDecide
Days Days - Months
Sterilize/Destruct
Months
Clear
Transformational AUWS(tactical, controlled)
Deliver ArmDecide Engage
Days Minutes+
Destruct/DisArm
HoursHours
Extract
Minutes+
Quickstrike SLMM (through FY12)
400 Traditional Mines 1 Transformational Mine
Distributed Sensors
Minutes+
Eases Delivery & Clean-up; Provides Tactical Flexibility
LD-UUV w/ Mobile Mines or Torpedoes
UAV, USV, UUV, UGV
Adapt to new Goal
Risky Delivery & Extensive Clean-up
Transition from Mining to an AUWS
Quickstrike
UUV
USV
LCS
SSN/SSGN
Capability
Technology
NextUnmanned delivery,
Precision emplacement, Controlled engagement
NowManned delivery,
Estimated emplacement, Ambiguous engagement
FutureAutonomous delivery,
Precision positioning, Cooperative engagement
UAV
Sensors
Vehicles
Weapons
Distributed Sensors / TDDs
LWT
SDV LD-UUV
SLMM
Transition to Smart Mobile Mines and Unmanned Vehicles
AUWS
CDV
ImprovedStandoff / Precision AUWS
ImprovedStandoff / Precision
Next Gen Mine
MCM VISION:Field a Common Set of Unmanned,
Modular MCM Systems Employable from a Variety of Host Platforms or Shore Sites that can Quickly Counter the Spectrum of
Mines to Enable Assured Access with Minimum Risk from Mines
• Slow• Heavy
• Large footprint• Stovepiped
• Primarily CONUS-based• Manpower Training
Intensive
• Fast and Agile• Precise• Lethal
• Modular• Organic
• Optimized Manpower Requirements
Mine Countermeasures Roadmap
• Distributed and Netted• Unmanned Operations• Cooperative Behavior• Computer Aided Detect/Classify• Common Operational Picture• Sea Warrior Transformation
Removing the Sailor from the MinefieldTo Increase Clearance Rates
MCM Force in Transition
MH-60SMH-60S
MH-60SMH-60SMH-60SMH-60S
LCS 1 (LM)LCS 1 (LM)
LCS 2 (GD)LCS 2 (GD)
AMNSAMNS
OASISOASISAQS-20AAQS-20A
RMMVRMMV
AQS-20AAQS-20A
MQ-8BFire Scout
VTUAV
MQ-8BFire Scout
VTUAV
MH-60SMH-60S
LCS 2 (GD)LCS 2 (GD)
LCS 1 (LM)LCS 1 (LM)
ALMDSALMDS
OASIS: Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep / AMNS: Airborne Mine Neutralization SystemRMMV: Remote Multi Mission Vehicle / UISS: Unmanned Influence Sweep System / ALMDS: Airborne Laser Mine Detection System
UISSUISS
Detect, Classify & IdentifyDetect, Classify & Identify Engage (Neutralize)Engage (Neutralize) Engage (Sweep)Engage (Sweep)
LCS Mine Countermeasures Concept
AMNS NEAR SURFACE UPGRADEAMNS NEAR SURFACE UPGRADE
MH-60SMH-60S
LCS Mine Countermeasures Concept
Buried Mine –Promising Potential
with Low Frequency Broad Band
Unmanned Surface Sweep System / Organic Airborne and Surface Influence
Sweep
Airborne Laser Mine Detection System
IOC: FY13/FOC: FY25
Laser (Hunt)
Buried Mine DetectionIOC: FY16/FOC: FY24
Propelled Expendable Neutralizer (Kill)
Airborne Mine Neutralization Near-
Surface UpgradeIOC: FY13/FOC: TBD
Minefield Detection and Neutralization
Assault Breaching System
IOC: FY13/FOC: FY22
Magnetic/Acoustic Influence Sweep
Sonar (Hunt)IOC: FY15/FOC:
Remote Minehunting System & MH-60S AN/AQS-20A
Organic/LCS-Based Mine Countermeasures (OMCM)Mission Package (MP) Systems
OASIS
IOC: FY14/ FOC: FY26
Surface Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Underwater Vehicle and Low Frequency Broadband
UISS
IOC: FY16/FOC: TBD
AN/AQS-20A
IOC: FY12/ FOC: FY25
RMS
IOC: FY15/FOC: FY25
Airborne Mine Neutralization System
Propelled Expendable Neutralizer (Kill)
IOC: FY13/FOC: FY25
LCS Based MCM System Components
MCM for Maritime Homeland Defense: Why is this important?
• In 2008, U.S. ports imported and exported nearly 7.6 billion tons of cargo
• International trade via our ports accounts for more than 32 percent of the U.S. GDP
• There is $3.8B worth of goods moving in and out of U.S. seaports each day
• All U.S. ports are “minable”
MCM for Maritime Homeland Defense
• Responsibilities for defending our ports is prescribed in Presidentially directed and validated Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) USCG lead in port defense against terrorist attack
DOD support for MCM Navy is only DOD MCM capability
DOD lead in port defense against state actors Navy is only DOD MCM capability
• Response time, capacity and prioritization being defined by NORTHCOM
• N85 is studying and resourcing UMCM forces with rapid fly-away capabilities to counter this threat
Looking for additional ideas and cost-saving COTS solutions…
Other Thoughts on MCM
• In-Stride Neutralization
• Non-traditional methods
• Rapid clearance enablers/Assault Breaching Systems
• Real Time Communications to allow for real time MIW analysis
• UxV decoy systems
Mine Resistant Vessela.k.a. “Guinea Pig”
Ahead of the force, validates MCM clearance, reduces riskAhead of the force, validates MCM clearance, reduces risk
• We can do this with an out of service tanker?• Can we do it with a USV or autonomous vessel?
• COTS solution?• Command and
Control Solution?• Hardening of Existing
Vessels for Use
Navy Budget
• PB12 is currently on the “Hill”
• Navy TOA for PB12 is $161.4B, $.8B more than FY11
• N8 Warfare Sponsors control $54B; 33% of Navy TOA
• N85 PB12 TOA is $6.2B in 76 Programs of Record which is 4% of overall budget
• Mine Warfare budget is $930M across 14 programs, which is .6% of Navy TOA*
*LCS Ship SCN/MH-60S APN Costs excluded
• N852 allocated 33% of FY11 budget to legacy systems; this decreases to ~20% by FY17 as organic systems enter fleet