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UNCLASSIFIED / SENSITIVE MATERIAL
Report on the Status of the Adaya Nuclear Site and Recommendations for
Health and Risk Assessment*
A Report Provided to the United States Department of State ISN/NESS and the Ministry of Science and
Technology, February 2011.
Inspection Team:
Dr. Ronald K. Chesser, Mr. Eric K. Howell. Center for Environmental Radiation Studies. Texas
Tech University
Mr. Ross A. Miller. Sandia National Laboratories.
Iraqi Representatives on‐site at Al Jesira:
Mr. Ali Majeed Mahmood and Mr. Abbas Hammood Zaboon, Ministry of Science and
Technology, Government of Iraq.
Logistical support provided by:
United States Department of State, Provincial Reconstruction Team, Ninewa, Iraq. Mr. Mark
Humphries, Rule of Law, Acting Section Chief, and Ms. Erfana Andrabi, ECON, Section Chief.
Tactical Support Provided by:
USF‐I and Iraqi Army.
*The intent of this document is to provide assistance to the Government of Iraq for remediation of
contaminated areas and to store the radioactive waste. It should be noted that the responsibility and
authority for performing the work and for decision‐making on all tasks to be performed at all sites in Iraq
are the sole responsibility of the Government of Iraq and its ministries. Recommendations made herein
in no way indemnify the United States in regards to present or future financial obligations.
UNCLASSIFIED / SENSITIVE MATERIAL Brief History of Adaya Nuclear Site
Historical Function: Adaya (36.206018,42.749434; see Figures A, B, and C) was not an historical
component of Iraq’s nuclear program, but rather was a dump site created in February, 1991. In an effort
to conceal the nuclear program at Al Jesira subsequent to Operation Desert Storm, destroyed
equipment, concrete rubble, and miscellaneous solid wastes were transported from Al Jesira and hastily
buried on a hillside near the villages of Adaya and Tall ar Ragrag. The material was buried in deep
trenches and covered in topsoil. Much of the material was contaminated with uranium compounds
(yellowcake, ammonium diuranate [ADU], UO3, UO2) as a result of operations at Al Jesira and the
dispersion of uranium by coalition bombing. In 1994, the site was partially excavated, confirming the
presence of equipment and uranium compounds. The site was then re‐closed until 2004 when Adaya
was opened to search for WMDs. A local contractor salvaged some equipment items and shipped the
items abroad, yet the status of remaining contaminated equipment/material was unknown. In 2004, the
radiation dose rates at Adaya were measured as 0.05 – 1 mrem /hr, or about 30 times background. The
inventory of uranium compounds buried at Adaya was estimated by UN Inspection Teams (1991) as
5000 kg. There have been no known removals of uranium barrels from Adaya.
Since 2004 there have been unsubstantiated reports of health problems in persons living near Al Jesira
and Adaya. Locals speculated that contaminated groundwater was the source of these health problems.
To our knowledge, there have been no efforts to obtain and evaluate well water from this region. In
response to requests for assistance, the Radiation Protection Center of the Ministry of Environment
mobilized a team to perform health assessments. From their reports, it appears that residents from the
village of Adaya were examined. As will become clear below, we feel that residents of the nearby village
of Tall ar Ragrag are experiencing greater potential health risks due to runoff through the contaminated
Adaya burial site.
Environmental Setting of the Adaya Site
The Adaya site is located about 27 km west of Mosul, Iraq and about 23 km south‐southwest of Al Jesira,
where most of its contents originated. The burial grounds lie on the western slope of a mountain ridge.
The site was likely chosen because it has deep soil deposited as alluvium from the upper slopes of the
mountain ridge. Two villages are visible from the site: Adaya is about 4 km north and Tall ar Ragrag is
about 3 km west. The terrain is gently rolling hills separated by deeply carved ravines resulting from
water runoff resulting from periodic rains. Water erosion is very evident within the dumpsite with deep
trenches traversing the mounds. The trenches converge upon a main drainage channel that flows
westward toward the nearby village of Tall ar Ragrag. The aerial photographs (Figures A, B, and C) show
that water occasionally pools adjacent to the road near the village. Some channels have been dug to
direct the water towards fields and artificial ponds near the village. Obviously, water is a precious
resource in this region and much effort is expended to collect and preserve the available water. The fact
that the water for Tall ar Ragrag flows directly through the burial site raises concerns for long term
health impacts for the villagers and their livestock.
UNCLASSIFIED / SENSITIVE MATERIAL Photographs of the Adaya burial site (36.206018,42.749434) 27 km west of Mosul. (photographs
provided by Geospatial Services, US Embassy Baghdad.)
Adaya
Adaya
burial site
Tall ar Ragrag
A
UNCLASSIFIED / SENSITIVE MATERIAL
Tall ar Ragrag
Runoff flow path
Northern
Southern
B
C
UNCLASSIFIED / SENSITIVE MATERIAL Objectives of 2011 Visit
Our team, including two individuals from Texas Tech University and the Center for Environmental
Radiation Studies (Dr. Ron Chesser and Mr. Eric Howell) and one from Sandia National Laboratories (Mr.
Ross Miller) were accompanied by representatives from the Ministry of Science and Technology (Mr. Ali
Majeed Mahmood and Mr. Abbas Hammood Zaboon) to assess the present condition of the Adaya
Nuclear Site. Our assessment includes the condition of any structures, terrain alteration,
documentation of any physical/chemical/radiological hazards, and current use of the site. We utilize
GPS and the analysis of soil/water samples collected at the site to meet our objectives.
Site Survey Preliminary Findings
The Adaya site is a very large burial ground on a gradually sloping mountain side with evidence of
excavation and concealment by the dumping of rubble. The site is made up of large (5 meter high)
mounds of rubble (soil, concrete, ceramic tile, metal, etc.) surrounded by natural sloping terrain. There
are two separate dumping grounds. The larger site (northern) is approximately 500 meters by 100
meters (~50,000 square meters). The southern site appears to be roughly half the size of the northern
site. However, it appears that the southern site continues across a ravine that has been highly eroded
since its development (see photograph C). The two dumping sites are separated by only 50 meters. It is
unclear whether this separation was insipient with the site construction or was due to water erosion
over the past 20 years. Transects were constructed (~20 meter spacing) to sample surface
contamination of soil. A total of 52 surface soil samples were taken to be analyzed for radioisotope
contamination at the International Radioecology Laboratory in Slavutych, Ukraine and at Texas Tech
University in Lubbock, Texas.
Of interest, surface contamination with radioactive material was detected at specific locations at Adaya.
Many contaminated barrels were exposed on the surface (see photographs D and E) with radiation
levels (~2 million counts per minute) in specific locations, reading well above previous report for this
site. In the USA, these levels would merit immediate site remediation. In addition, we observed surface
layers of radioactive yellowcake (see photographs F and G) of up to 10 cm deep. Separately, one deeply
excavated location (~4 meters deep) housed a contaminated barrel containing a bag of radioactive
material (see photographs H and I). Numerous other locations were noted as sounding “hollow”
indicating the potential for many more contaminated barrels under the surface. It appears that much of
the rubble and dirt mounds at the site may have been layered above burial sites of barrels containing
uranium compounds. In some areas, partially hidden barrels could be seen but were not accessible.
There is no way to determine the extent of the burial grounds without extensive excavation or use of
ground‐penetrating radar.
UNCLASSIFIED / SENSITIVE MATERIAL
Of note, the highest surface contamination observed appeared to be in a rain water wash‐way,
suggesting the potential for runoff and leaching of radioactive material. Furthermore, this wash‐way
leads down the mountain into the nearby village of Tall ar Ragrag with apparent irrigation systems
stemming from this water source (see photographs A, B, and C).
Recommendations for Future Actions
The surface contamination present at Adaya merits immediate containment of the site by constructing a
fence around the contaminated area. Extensive excavation and core sampling efforts will be required to
determine the extent of underground contamination. Radioactive material should be removed from the
site and stored in approved containers at radioactive waste facilities. However, the procedures required
to clear the site will require extensive planning and preparation working in coordination with the RPC
regulatory body and the Ministry of Health.
A health/risk assessment should be performed in the nearby village of Tall ar Ragrag to elucidate the
extent to which the radioactive material at Adaya may be affecting the health of its inhabitants. Water
samples from wells, irrigation sources, and drinking water collected in the village need to be analyzed
D E
F G
H I
UNCLASSIFIED / SENSITIVE MATERIAL for potential contamination. Furthermore, biological samples (hair, blood, urine, etc.) should be
collected from willing residents of the village and analyzed for radiation contamination and potential
biological insult.
We propose that the Ministry of Environment (Radiation Protection Center) designate 10 trained
personnel to the sampling of village inhabitants and their water sources. Training of scientists from
MoST and MoEN conducted by our group in June 2008, April 2010, and October 2010 should provide
qualified personnel for the objective to be met. Specifically, we recommend that biological samples
from a minimum of 75 residents should be collected over 4 days. We recommend that a group from
RPC collect samples from volunteer residents at Al Jesira on one of these days. Due to the nature of the
laboratory analyses, certain analytical tests are required to be performed within 24 hours of sampling,
suggesting that a temporary laboratory (requiring electricity) be made available in the immediate
vicinity of the sampling site for these initial analyses. Subsequently, the remaining samples should be
transported to the laboratory at the Radiation Protection Center in Baghdad for the completion of
analysis. Although Iraqi scientists from MoST and MoEN have been trained on the required analytical
methods and techniques, oversight by individuals from our group is required both on site at Adaya and
in the subsequent analysis at RPC in Baghdad.
Laboratory analyses include the creatinine clearance assay, the Acridine orange assay, karyotype
analysis, scanning electron microscopy of hair samples, inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry
(ICP‐MS) of urine and water samples. Analysis of uranium concentrations in urine and water samples by
ICP‐MS will verify exposure to uranium. Since uranium is a nephrotoxin, negative effects are often
observed as kidney dysfunction. The creatinine clearance assay will determine the kidney function
efficiency in the test subjects. Any deficiency in creatinine clearance levels indicates kidney dysfunction,
which may be attributed to uranium exposure. Ionizing radiation at high doses is known to cause DNA
damage. The Acridine orange assay utilizes fluorescent microscopy of blood samples stained with
Acridine orange to visualize micronucleus formation. Significant increases in micronucleus formation
indicate an increase in DNA double‐strand breaks (DNA damage). Finally, scanning electron microscopy
will be used to analyze the presence of specific elements both along and at the base of the hair. The
Iraqi scientists will be expected to provide all sampling and analysis equipment and supplies, including
plate reader, creatinine clearance assay kits, functional fluorescent microscope, pipettes, pipette tips,
sample tubes and bags, all reagents and buffers, etc.
We recommend that the Iraqi scientists collect samples at the homes of the residents to ensure comfort
and privacy of the residents. Volunteers will complete health questionnaires and consent forms. All
human sampling will be performed in accordance to Texas Tech IRB number 502229, which permits the
use of adult human subjects. We recommend that RPC join forces with representatives from the
Ministry of Health to assess the health of the volunteers and to determine if regular health assessments
should be conducted in the village. Samples will be transported to a temporary laboratory enclosure
near the Adaya nuclear site. This temporary laboratory will require electricity, refrigeration, and
working benches/desks. Within 24 hours of collection, the urine samples will be analyzed using the
creatinine clearance assay. The samples will then be prepared for transport to Baghdad where the
acridine orange micronucleus assay will be performed at the laboratory at RPC. The ICP‐MS and
UNCLASSIFIED / SENSITIVE MATERIAL scanning electron microscopy analyses will be performed at Texas Tech University in Lubbock, Texas and
the International Radioecology Laboratory in Slavutych, Ukraine. These two analyses require very
expensive and intricate equipment which are not available in Iraq.
The RPC should work to install at least 12 groundwater sampling wells between the Adaya burial site
and the village of Tall ar Ragrag. The water sampling pumps recently purchased by RPC should be
employed to conduct regular water sampling and analysis of the wells.
We further recommend that the Ministry of Science and Technology commence with measures to fence
the burial grounds, post signage warning of potential radiation hazards at the site, and plan for
excavation of the hazardous materials at the site. In preparation for excavation, a runoff diversion
barrier should be constructed above the burial grounds to divert (not collect) water flow around the site.
This barrier, although temporary, will require compacted rock and soil bulldozed to a height sufficient to
curtail rainwater runoff for the duration of excavation (3 – 4 years). Barriers should be designed below
the site to collect and pool runoff to prevent scouring of topsoil transport of contamination toward the
village. Although these pools will probably not be sufficient to contain runoff from a major rainfall
event, they should reduce the flow and erosion rates.
We recommend that no active excavation of the site proceed until the area is prepared to prevent wind
and water erosion and the work area has been established to deal with radioactive materials and
possible emergency situations. As such, a period of planning and preparation is required before
remediation work can begin.
The fenced area should not only contain the burial grounds, but also should be sufficiently large to
accommodate:
1. Staging area for barrels and containers to be used for radioactive soil and rubble
encountered at the site. Also, over‐packing containers for contaminated barrels need to be
housed.
2. Sorting areas for staged characterization of rubble, scrap, and soil encountered at the site.
Large concrete slabs would be best suited for this purpose to permit easy pickup by front
loading machines.
3. Stacking area for material cleared of radiation. This material may be used to fill the site
after closure of pits.
4. Parking, turning, and movement areas for bulldozers, backhoes, cranes, and hauling trucks.
Of course, the conditions of entry roads and movement areas must be examined to ensure
that large, heavy equipment can readily traverse the areas. Some gravel, compacted roads
may need to be constructed.
5. Office/break buildings, and areas for changing into protective clothing, storage of tools,
personal protective devices, radiation detectors, should be accommodated.
6. A staging area for emergency treatment in case of personal injury.
7. A laboratory and data‐records building.
8. Radioactive waste staging area for short term storage before being moved to storage sites.
UNCLASSIFIED / SENSITIVE MATERIAL We recommend that water trucks with spray diffusers be used to reduce dust dispersion during
excavations and transfer of materials. Personnel should wear Tyvek coveralls, boot covers, head covers,
and respirator masks during excavations.
After the work site has been secured and prepared we recommend the following sequence of tasks:
1. The rubble and burial area should be walked by persons about 2 meters apart, scanning and
looking for signs of radiation and equipment/piping. All radioactive areas should be marked
with flagged stakes and the GPS coordinates and radiation readings noted. This walk‐through
should progress slowly to give thorough coverage. The entire burial/rubble site should be
covered.
2. All exposed barrels, scrap metal, equipment, and contaminated soil should be removed from the
exposed surface. Contaminated materials should be transferred into appropriate containers
and moved to a waste storage area.
3. After all obvious exposed contamination has been removed, the next step will be to remove all
overburden of dumped rubble on the site. The removal of mounds of rubble should proceed in
spatially organized steps. Areas approximately 10m x 10m would be dug using front‐loaders.
The material will be spread onto the staging areas where teams would carefully scan all material
for radiation (primarily alpha meters). Material free of contamination may be piled in a set‐
aside region to be used later as filler material. All waste would be transferred to
barrels/containers in the waste area. Samples of each mound would be taken for more detailed
laboratory analysis.
4. The inspection of each 10m x 10m section would progress until all of the rubble and soil
overburden has been eliminated.
5. At this point the site should be free of all surface material and excavations are ready to proceed.
Again, the site should be excavated in sections (possibly about 10m x 10m). We have seen
barrels at about 2.5 meters depth and suggest that excavations be performed at 3 meters depth.
6. Barrels encountered should be carefully extracted (using claw‐hand lifter) and placed into an
over‐pack container. GPS coordinates of each barrel should be noted. Barrels may then be
moved to the temporary storage site and partially opened to sample contents and estimate the
volume of material. Metal, pipes, and other contaminated materials should be handled in a
similar manner.
7. Soil around each contaminated container should be sampled and measured to ensure that all
spillage has been recovered.
8. Soil from the dig sites should be examined by the characterization teams in the same manner as
before at the staging/sorting areas.
9. The large waste tanks at Al Jesira should be considered as a secure site for temporary storage of
contaminated barrels and materials from Adaya. These tanks may be used until a site for
permanent storage can be identified.
10. No refilling of the excavation area should be done until the entire region has been cleared.
After all excavation has been competed then core samples should be made throughout the area
to determine if uranium compounds have moved deep into the soil. If so, further excavation
may be warranted.
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UNCLASSIFIED / SENSITIVE MATERIAL Timeline of Work Activities
Wednesday – Thursday, 18 – 19 May 2011Portable buildings transported to Adaya dump site. Ground leveledand generators attached. Area fenced. Site should be about 300 meters from dump site.
Sunday, 22 May 2011Lab equipment installed in lab buildings. Preparations made for sampling.Heavy digging, lifting, and hauling equipment moved to site.
Monday, 23 May 2011RPC/MoST team collect blood, urine, hair samples in Tall ar RagragConsent forms and Health SurveysSamples transported to laboratory for preparationWater and soil samples collected in and around the village.
Tuesday, 24 May 2011RPC/MoST team collect blood, urine, hair samples in Tall ar RagragConsent forms and Health SurveysSamples transported to laboratory for preparationWater and soil samples collected in and around the village.
Wednesday, 25 May 2011RPC/MoST team collect blood, urine, hair samples in Tall ar RagragConsent forms and Health SurveysSamples transported to laboratory for preparationWater and soil samples collected in and around the village.
Thursday, 26 May 2011RPC/MoST team collect blood, urine, hair samples in Tall ar RagragConsent forms and Health SurveysSamples transported to laboratory for preparationWater and soil samples collected in and around the village.
UNCLASSIFIED / SENSITIVE MATERIAL Support from the U.S. Government
Support for the recommended actions will require assistance from the U.S. government. The needs
requested are as follows:
‐ Transportation to and from the Adaya site on four separate days.
‐ On‐site security.
‐ Housing/life support at PRT Ninewah.
‐ Temporary laboratory facility at the Adaya site (equipped with electricity, refrigeration, and
bench/desk space).
‐ Generators to power the required laboratory equipment.
‐ On‐site uranium analytical equipment ($80,000).
Although we request that the sampling and laboratory supplies be provided by the Iraqi ministries
(MoST and MoEN), the role of TTU/CERS/SNL in this project are contingent upon extension of our
current contract (DOS/ISN/NESS) throughout the projected time until completion (3‐4 years).