undergraduate dissertation
TRANSCRIPT
Trident: Protecting Britain or Britannia
Undergraduate Dissertation Completed as a Requirement forInternational Relations BA
Ryan Baldry
Abstract
This thesis attempts to answer the question of whether or not Britain’s nuclear weapons Programme, Trident, is actually providing adequate protection for Britons or if it is merely being used to protect Britain’s position and image, Britannia, on the world stage and in institutions such as NATO and the United Nations Security Council. Since the 1980s, under Thatcher’s Conservative Government, Trident has been at sea protecting Britain from the threat of nuclear attack. However, in today’s changing international system, it is argued by many parties, governmental and private, that the programme is no longer required. By looking at sources such as parliamentary reports, party manifestos and legal documents such as treaties, it will be possible to see the reasoning behind one of the countries largest military expenditures.
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‘I have to subscribe to the view that the abandonment of our nuclear
deterrent would be extraordinarily ill advised and indeed a national act of
folly. We cannot know [...] that any situation will arise in the coming
decades where we will need the threat of our deterrent, but equally we
cannot know that no such situation will arise and indeed arise quite
quickly.’
-William Hague
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INTRODUCTION 5
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 7
METHODOLOGY 21
CASE STUDY 22
CONCLUSION 33
BIBLIOGRAPHY 36
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Introduction
Since the end of the Second World War, British influence on the world stage has
been seen to reduce as the international community looks towards the United
States for leadership on global issues. However, as this paper will argue, this has
not stopped consecutive British governments from attempting to halt this
decline and ensure Britain’s continued relevance and influence through the use
of the Trident nuclear at-sea deterrent. Before the Cold War, Britain renewed its
ageing nuclear deterrent, Polaris, and replaced it with another American system
called Trident. Based on the same concept and agreement with the US, the 1958
‘Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence
Purposes’ (or the ‘Mutual Defence Agreement), Trident would allow Britain to
maintain its constant at-sea deterrent for a further 50 years1. To date, the UK has
maintained a nuclear presence at sea since 1968.2
The aim of this thesis is to look into whether or not the United Kingdom is
maintaining its nuclear deterrent because of the influence of key government
departments, specifically the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO). In short, whether or not the Trident programme is
in fact protecting the citizens of the state or the position of the institutions within
1 United States and United Kingdom Governments. 1958. “Agreement between the United Kingdom and United States for co-operaton of the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes.” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). 3 July. Accessed August 9, 2014. http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/56_4.pdf?_=13166279132 Governments of the United Kingdom and United States. “Polaris Sales Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom.” American Society of International Law 2, no. 3 (May 1963): 595.
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the state and thus the reputation that Britain attempts to project onto the world
stage.
This thesis will approach the debate by analysing each aspect of it in turn. Firstly,
it will explore the theoretical explanations as to why the Trident programme still
operates. This will be achieved by analysing the theories of defensive realism,
constructivism and path dependency. Together, these will be able to
appropriately explain the reason for the political decisions to maintain the
programme. Secondly, this thesis will explain the methodology behind the paper
and discuss the various sources and materials that will be utilised in the
exploration of the subject. Thirdly, this paper will explore the key case study of
the Trident programme. This will entail the discussion of its establishment
within British Foreign Policy, its history, political implications and the
uncertainty of its future. Finally, this paper will conclude by bringing together
the key arguments put forward in this paper and suggest that the Trident
programme is primarily being used by consecutive British Governments in order
to maintain its place on the world stage and that the system itself has a reduced
place on the current world stage as it represents the mind set of a cold war
nation with cold war fears and perspectives of the international community and
its self.
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Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the extent to which Britain is still relevant
in the international stage or if British foreign policy is constructed around its
relationship with the United States. The Trident nuclear programme is seen to be
used, by the British government as a way to stay relevant in the international
system.
British Foreign Policy towards the United States of America is an area of
diplomacy and domestic interest that is becoming the subject of increasing
debate. There are some academics and parliamentarians that believe that the
‘special relationship’ is no longer relevant. On the other hand, there are a number
of individuals who still believe that the relationship with the United States
remains vital to British national interests. The key questions that this thesis will
attempt to answer are to what extent does British Foreign Policy and its relations
with the United States depend on the Trident Nuclear Deterrent program?
Secondly, the question of whether or not this program is still required in today’s
international system or whether its reasoning has been constructed by
consecutive British Governments in order to maintain a level of influence in the
international system will also be asked. The primary aim of this thesis is to
discuss the Trident Nuclear Missile Programme as a tool of British Foreign Policy
and analyse the way in which it is seen by the British executive and the political
establishment through the lens of Structural Realism, Constructivism and Path
Dependency Theories.
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To be able to understand the intricacies of this relationship, these theories will
be outlined and critiqued. Alongside these theories, this paper will explore the
concept of path dependency and how this applies to Britain and its foreign policy
aspirations. These theories will shed light on why Britain is persistent to
maintain its position on the world stage and relationship with the United States.
However, there are shortcomings associated with each theory that raise a
number of issues concerns regarding their ability to effectively critique this
relationship. These will also be discussed at a later stage of this chapter.
Structural Realism, in combination with Constructivism and Path Dependence
Theory, help to explain why successive British governments have maintained
their commitment to Trident despite the changed global security circumstances
and the threats that the UK faces. For example, the threat that allows for
Trident’s existence has been constructed throughout the post-cold war period.
This claim relates to constructivism and path dependence because of the way in
which the level of threat to the UK has been constructed by consecutive UK
governments and their respective departments to justify its expense. This is
enforced by Path Dependence theory because it is the institutional memory of
the government departments, such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and
Ministry of Defence that strive to ensure Trident’s survival in order for them to
maintain their current levels of stature and funding.
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In an age of increased stability and interdependence, there is little need for a
deterrent aimed at deterring a national security threat such as the USSR, which
no longer exists. There have also been strong influences on foreign policy
decisions by the domestic political establishment and the political elite within
the bureaucracies of government institutions and departments such as the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence.
This paper will begin by outlining the three theories in question and offering a
critique of each on order to identify any weaknesses that they may possess. It
will then go on to offer a conclusion regarding the effectiveness of these theories
in relation to the question being posed by the thesis.
Often referred to as Neo-Realism, Structural Realism ‘is [about] the structure or
architecture of the international system that forces states to pursue power’.3 In
the case of this thesis, the structure in which the United Kingdom is attempting
to retain its power in is the United Nation’s Security Council and its importance
to the United States. The only way that Britain feels it can retain its relevance is
to remain a nuclear power.
This thesis will be utilising Kenneth Waltz’s concept of Defensive Realism that
states ‘it is unwise for states to try to maximise their share of world power,
because the system will punish them if they attempt to gain too much power. The
3 John Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism." In International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p.79.
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pursuit of hegemony […] is foolhardy’.4 Waltz’s theory can be directly applied to
this thesis because there is the assumption that the United Kingdom is assuming
a Defensive Realist position in the international system as the state is attempting
to purely maintain its current level of influence rather than increase it. This
particular strand of realism is of interest to this thesis because it could be argued
that the Trident programme that is used by the United Kingdom is purely an
attempt at maintaining the position of Britain in the international system rather
than an attempt to gain greater powers. If the UK was to disband this
programme, it is likely that the relationship would falter, as Britain would lose its
status as a one of the United State’s greatest strategic allies because Britain
would cease to be a nuclear power and would also not be partner to nuclear
agreements which have proved to be financial beneficially to the United States.5
In another article, Keohane suggested that ‘state power will remain crucially
important, as will the distribution of power among states’.6 The point made here
by Keohane is important because it directly compliments the key question of the
thesis that asks why states desire this power? More importantly, it is possible to
argue the reasons as to why the United Kingdom is seeking to maintain its
prestige and influence on the world stage. By utilising this argument, it will be
possible for the thesis to further analyse the US and UK relationship in terms of
power relations and the UK’s desire to maintain their place in the international
4 John Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism." In International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p.78.5 HC Deb 11 March 1982, c9766 Robert Keohane and Joseph S Nye. "Globalisation and Domestic Governance." In Power and Governance in a Partially Globalised World, by Robert Keohane, 204-208. London: Routledge, 2002, 204.
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community. As previously mentioned, here Keohane is stating that despite the
increasing amount of interdependence and cooperation that exists within the
international system, the power that an individual state can wield still holds
significant value. For example, Keohane suggested that the ideal international
system would consists of a number of states where no single one can wield a
great amount of power, such as a hegemon, but that states rely upon one another
through interdependence and reliance. This is particularly interesting in the case
presented in this thesis because the United States, although still powerful, does
not wield a great deal of power without the contribution of other states in the
form of coalitions. Should Britain shut down the Trident programme, the United
States would no longer be able to rely upon it in the international system and
would thus have to seek for a powerful coalition partner elsewhere in the
international system. This also works the other way around where Britain would
lose America as a key diplomatic and military partner and would then have less
influence and stature on the international stage. If Britain loses its nuclear power
status, it may lose its place on the Security Council. Through this assumption it
can be concluded that Britain is maintaining its position as a nuclear power
because it still wants to be able to influence actions of others through both hard
and soft power when needed. It would be considerably difficult for the state to do
this should its nuclear capability be removed. However, it could be argued that
its relationship with the United States is ‘special’ because it is in the national
interest of the United States to ensure that the economic benefits of the
relationship continue to weigh favourably on the US.
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Another important fact for the British Government is that should Trident be
removed, France will be the only European power to still possess nuclear
capability. This implies that interest in the United States would immediately turn
to France and it is likely that there would be a new ‘Special Relationship’ that
does not directly involve the British Government. This would also have a
devastating impact upon the status of the UK in the international system because
it would no longer be as influential without nuclear weapons. Despite the
seemingly strong argument that Structural Realism puts forward, there are still a
number of questions that the theory raises.
One of the major critiques of Structural Realism is provided by Steve Forde who
argues that Structural Realism emphasises the structure of the international
system and fails to take into account the effects of other factors such as
economics, human nature or domestic politics.7 This is an interesting criticism
because it raises a number of problems for the thesis in question. The first of
which is the link between the Trident Program and domestic politics. A second
criticism that can be identified is the lack of definition with regards to the
‘anarchic system’ that is so often mentioned in realist schools of thought. With no
agreed upon definition of what constitutes anarchic, it will prove increasingly
challenging for this paper to be able to identify the system with which the United
Kingdom is operating in and what it is aiming to achieve with the construction of
the Trident Programme.8
7 Steve Forde, ‘International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism’, International Studies Quarterly, 1995, Vol. 39, No.2, p. 142.8 Steve Forde, ‘International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism’, International Studies Quarterly, 1995, Vol. 39, No.2, p. 146.
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However, it could also be argued that the UK’s place on the world stage is
entirely constructed by consecutive governments and that the Trident
Programme exists solely to maintain this constructed position. For example, due
to path dependency, the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office would
identify new global threats and put forward cases as to why Trident is still
required. Even though the original threat, that of the Soviet Union, has long
dissipated. Theories such as constructivism and path dependency have the
potential to assist in the analysis of this constructed political reality. Combined,
these theories are beneficial to this thesis because we allow greater insight into
the reasoning behind the continuation of the Trident programme. As this next
section will demonstrate, the aforementioned theories will contribute to the
analysis of the United Kingdom’s position that has already been provided by
Structural Realism.
Christian Reus-Smit states that constructivism is ‘characterised by an emphasis
on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of
identity in shaping political action and on the mutually constitutive relationship
between agents and structures’.9 This is particularly relevant because it helps to
explain the way in which the ‘agents’ or politicians, act within the ‘structure,
which in this case is the political establishment. This notion of a constructed
reality within the international system is one that was discussed on a number of
occasions by Alexander Wendt. In the article Anarchy is What States Make of it,
9 Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism” In Theories of International Relations by Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p.217.
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Wendt utilises an argument made by Peter Berger who aims to outline the ways
in which states operate in the international system. 10 Berger stated that ‘the
commitment to and the salience of particular identities vary, but each identity is
an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors
collectively hold about themselves and one another and which constitute the
structure of the social world’. 11 By applying this theory to the case of Britain,
Berger’s observation is of particular interest to this thesis because it suggests
that Britain’s reputation is crucial for the development of a specific role in the
international system. It could be suggested that Berger argues that the idea of
British influence on the world stage has become engrained in the minds of those
within the political establishment because it is through this outlook that the
wider world is observed and acted within. Due to the institutional memory of the
bureaucracy, government departments and institutions have constructed their
own reality regarding what their role may be in the international system. Due to
the age and prestige of these departments, this construction is likely to have
arisen from the department’s experiences during the height of the British Empire
and influence in Europe.
The idea of institutionalism is often overlooked with international relations as it
is assumed that the state will make a decision that is then immediately enacted.
However, it is the case that ‘no matter how influential… a single leader cannot
implement foreign policy by himself or herself’.12 Constructivism takes into
10 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of It” in International Organisation, vol. 46, no.2, pp. 398. 11 Peter Berger, “Identity as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge”, European Journal of Sociology, vol. 7, no. 1, 1966, pp. 32-40.12 Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007, p.65.
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consideration a number of elements that could all affect the decision making
process. This element of constructivism is particularly significant because it is
important for this thesis to understand the influence that the political institution
can have on the decision maker. For example, government departments such as
the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence will be able to exert a great deal of
institutional pressure in order to influence the decision making process.
However, constructivism is also not without its problems. Primarily, there has
been an issue where the ‘meaning of constructivism has been shaped by specific
debates within IR’.13 Christian Reus-Smit observes:
‘Institutionalised norms and ideas define the meaning and identity of the
individual actor and the patterns of [...] activity engaged in by those
individuals [...] and it is through reciprocal interaction that we create and
instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we
define our identities and interests.’14
In other words, the ideas that actors, in this particular case the United Kingdom
can become engrained in the minds of politicians through institutional memory
and traditions. This is an area of particular interest because it reiterates the
conclusion that constructivism is unique to the individuals who are involved in
the construction of particular realities and political structures.
13 K. M. Fierke, "Constructivism." In International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p.189.14 Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism” In Theories of International Relations by Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p.225.
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This makes critiques of the theory substantially more difficult as it is difficult to
find an agreed upon definition of what the academic community sees as the
definition of the theory of constructivism. In other words it is a highly contested
concept.
This issue was then complicated further by J. Samuel Barkin who suggested that
constructivism is not necessarily a theory in itself, but a methodology or
epistemology. It is possible that Barkin reached this opinion because it could be
argued that constructivism is merely a means to understand why an actor
behaves in a particular way that fits into the larger scope of another theory.
Barkin continued to suggest that there should be a ‘perceived tendency for
constructivists to be idealists or utopians’.15 This proves to be an interesting
point in regards to the question of British Foreign Policy because it is possible to
conclude that other than those outside of the political elite, it is relatively
unknown as to why the Trident Programme is still being operated. Reus-Smit
suggests that only those involved will know the reasons as it is they who have
‘constructed’ a reality in which it is still important to maintaining the United
Kingdom’s position on the world stage. However, this construction is not
voluntary. It is a result of past experiences, values, norms and institutions. Thus
enforcing the claim that it is a Path Dependent event.
15 J. Samuel Barkin, ‘Realist Constructivism’, International Studies Review, 2003, Vol. 5, No. 3, p.325.
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Path Dependency is another concept that is derived from historical
institutionalism. This will compliment this thesis because of the theory’s ability
to suggest reasons as to why a policy decision will be difficult to overturn or
block because of the way in which the political institution has been socially
constructed.
One understanding of path dependence, suggested by Paul Pierson, argues that
‘particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to
reverse’.16 Path dependency originally began as a theory aimed primarily
towards the sphere of economics in the sense that individuals would utilise the
theory of path dependence in order to increase their returns. However, it has
since become an increasingly prevalent theory within political science because of
its ability to analyse the behaviour of the political establishment using historical
context as it takes into account the rate of ideas on institutions.17 This goes
beyond the narrow explanations of realisms that focus on the role of state
interests.
This theory is of increasing relevance to the thesis question of British Foreign
Policy because the Trident programme is a politically and financially costly
investment. This then helps to explain a policy puzzle; why does the British
establishment commit itself to an expensive nuclear deterrent system. Pierson
suggests that because institutions protect themselves, they ‘may create rules that
16 Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, p. 251.17 Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, p. 251.
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make pre-existing rules hard to reverse’.18 Scott E. Page argues that path
dependence means that current and future states, actions, or decisions depend
on the path of previous states, actions, or decisions’ then reiterates this point.19
However, despite the support that path dependency may demonstrate towards
this thesis, there are two criticisms that can be made.
The first of such criticisms is that the foundations of path dependency theory are
based on a limited number of case studies and hypotheses.20 This is one of the
key criticisms that Pierson identifies within his article and is particularly
relevant to the case study in question. He goes on to observe that:
‘[Path Dependency] is institutionalist because it stresses that many of the
contemporary political implications of these temporal processes are
embedded in institutions-whether formal rules, policy structures, or norms.
Of these two elements, the institutional side generally has received greatest
attention’.21
This is an important description of the theory because it demonstrates a
significant institutionalist focus and simplifies the influence of other factors such
as the individuals involved in the process. This means that by choosing to
observe case studies from the institutional level, there is a chance that key,
18 Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, p. 258.19 Scott E. Page, ‘Path Dependence’, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2006, No. 1, p. 88. 20 Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, p. 265.21 Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, p. 265.
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influential factors throughout the decision making process can be overlooked.
For example, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence
could both be seen to hold significant powers of influence within British
Government and their ability to obstruct the actions of elected politicians must
be considered. The influence they hold could be due to the individual’s
personality, political ideology or past experiences. One final supporting piece of
evidence for path dependency is that the academic community has changed since
Pierson wrote the article critiquing the theory. Now, there are numerous articles
and scholars which all identify the importance of the theory22.
Based on the aforementioned theories and debates, it is possible to conclude that
the three theories of constructivism, structural realism and path dependency all
successfully contribute to the explanation of the case study in question.
Structural realism goes some way in explaining the rational as to why the Trident
programme remains in service. The defensive realist approach supports the
notion that Britain is attempting to retain its place in the international
community by committing vast amounts of resources to the maintenance of the
international status quo.
However, in order to maintain this programme, it is essential that there is a
reason for Trident’s existence. It is for this purpose that constructivism can
provide an explanation. Constructivism puts forward the idea that particular
individuals or groups can create certain cultural realities. In this case those
individuals and groups are politicians and the political establishment. In this
22 Howlett, Michael, and Jeremy Rayner. “Understanding the Historial Turn in Policy Sciences: A Critique of Stochastic, Narrative, Path Dependency and Porcess-Sequencing Models of Policy Making over Time.” Policy Sciences (Springer) 39, no. 1 (March 2006): p.2.
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case, the idea that the Trident Programme delivers a consistent deterrent against
threats to national security is the idea that has been created. Once the ‘reality’
has been constructed, the theory of path dependence attempts to suggest
reasons as to why the programme remains rather than being changed.
Path dependency suggests that once a decision has been made, it can be
exceptionally difficult to reverse when such a vast amount of resources have
been committed to the decision. This means that there may have been efforts by
the political establishment to limit the reversal of the programme in order for
them to maintain their funding and influence over the political decision making
process. From this, it is possible to see why the topic of Trident divides political
opinion in such a drastic way and makes the topic difficult for all parties in
Britain.
Finally, it is important to note that only together can these theories be
successfully utilised in order to full understand the ways in which British foreign
policy is made and conducted. Individually, the theories may not necessarily be
able to offer a satisfactory analysis because each theory overlooks a particular
aspect that the other may cover.
Methodology
The purpose of this analysis will be to identify the root causes of controversy
within the Trident programme and to discuss whether or not the programme is
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merely trying to protect British interests on the world stage rather than
contribute to the protection of the population.
This thesis will be conducting a case study analysis of the United Kingdom’s
constant at-sea nuclear deterrent, Trident. The case study will lead into an in
depth study of the UK-US relationship, will analyse why decisions to renew the
nuclear programme have become one of the most divisive topics in British
politics. Although some data will be used, the majority will be qualitative23. I will
be conducting this study by looking into a wide range of primary and secondary
sources to look for the answers posed by the thesis question. Primary sources
will include official government documents and departmental reports,
Parliamentary debates between MPs and Ministers of State, the 2010 manifestos
of all Westminster parties (which will include the Coalition agreement that was
created between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives following the
2010 General Election) and House of Commons Library research papers. In
terms of the secondary sources that will be used, I will be utilising think tank
reports, opinion articles by key politicians and political commentators. Some of
these figures will include politicians such as Nick Clegg, the Deputy Prime
Minister, and Liam Fox who has held the office of Secretary of Defence.
Case Study
Since coming to power in 2010, the Conservative led coalition government has
been discussing potential replacements for, or refurbishments of, the Trident
programme. Predictably, this has not been a straightforward decision as the
23 Greetham, Bryan. How to write your undergraduate dissertation. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.181.
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ideological difference of the two parties hindered the negotiation process. There
is popular opposition and support for the programme on all sides of the political
spectrum. This is one of the key reasons as to why the decision to renew the
programme has been postponed until after the 2015 election24. The politics of
agreeing to disagree will also be discussed as a contributing factor to the
postponement of a decision as it is crucial to understand the influence of
coalition on the process of decision making in all sectors of government.
However, it is not necessarily the reasons for this postponement that will be
discussed in this chapter, but rather the factors that lead to Trident becoming
such an increasingly polarized topic within British Politics and more specifically,
the way in which it became an essential aspect of British Foreign and defence
policy. To do this, there will be an in depth analysis of the key parties involved in
the decision making process and what they gain to win or lose should a decision
be made.
This chapter will begin by outlining the issues and explaining what is at stake for
the British Government and its Trident programme. Secondly, it will present a
brief history of Britain's nuclear deterrent programme, focusing on the debates
in foreign policy circles but also on the positions of political parties. Next, this
thesis will explain the role of Trident in sustaining the special relationship and
then a significant section of this case study will focus on examining the current
debate about the imminent renewal of the programme. Finally, it will discuss
what is at stake, what is the degree of consensus between the parties, examine
24 House of Commons Library. The Trident Successor Programme: an update . Update, International Defence and Affairs Section, London: House of Commons, 2014, p.3.
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the cost-effectiveness of the programme and how, if at all, it would contribute to
the special relationship.
Some analysts and politicians argue that Trident is an outdated programme that
no longer serves the military needs of the UK. For example, this is the current
opinion of the UK Green Party who claims that Trident is ‘immoral’25. This is also
in line with a number of MPs on both Labour and Liberal Democrat benches who
have claimed that the renewal programme would go against their beliefs and
break Britain’s treaty obligations. The most apparent of these being nuclear
disarmament. However, the maintenance of the special relationship with the US
is amongst the key reasons as to why the leadership of the three main parties,
which often needs to be differentiated from the parliamentary party and its
members, argue in favour of the renewal of Trident, albeit on varying scales. The
extent to which the political parties within Britain agree on the necessity of
Trident will be discussed at a later stage of this chapter.
To be able to understand the ways in which Trident has such far-reaching
implications in British politics it is important to understand the reasons as to
why the programme was introduced in the first place and the process that it has
undergone to become one of the nations most prized assets. As noted in the
Trident Commission’s Final Report, ‘the UK’s approach was heavily influenced by
a sense of global status [and] the need to be taken seriously by the Americans’26.
25 Green Party. Green Party General Election Manifesto 2010. Manifesto, London: Green Party, 2010, p.43.26 British American Security Information Council (BASIC). The Trident Commision: An independent, cross-party inquiry to examine UK nuclear weapons policy. Inquiry, London: BASIC, 2014, p.10.
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This alone is an important factor to take into consideration when discussing the
uses of the Trident Programme because one of its key aims was to encourage a
relationship with the United States. Before the introduction of the Trident
Programme in the late 1980s, the British Government had invested in its
predecessor programme, Polaris. This programme was the first of its kind where,
as a result of the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of
America for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence
Purposes, the two countries would share knowledge, personnel and materials in
order to progress the nuclear powers of both nations27. In 1980, it was
announced by the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher that it would
be replacing the Polaris programme with a new American deterrent that used an
updated Trident missile launching system28. Despite strong Labour opposition to
the programme, Thatcher went on to win the 1983 General Election with a
substantial majority in the House of Commons and 42% of the vote that allowed
the programme to be implemented upon her return to parliament29.
With the development of Trident, it was then possible for the UK to retain its
position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
27 United States and United Kingdom Governments. “Agreement between the United Kingdom and United States for co-operaton of the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes.” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). 3 July 1958. http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/56_4.pdf?_=1316627913 (accessed August 9, 2014).28 The Defence Council. The Future United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Force. Advisory Paper, London: The Defence Council, 1980, p.2..29 ouse of Commons Information Office. General Election Results, 9 June 1983. Factsheet, London: House of Commons, 1984, p. 1.
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and as a key contributor to the NATO task force30. This aspect was of great
importance to both the MOD and the FCO. Through this agreement, they would
be able to play a larger role on the world stage through their renewed
importance in global institutions. With the Trident programme behind them,
negotiations and agreements would be easier to arrive at and would thus allow
both institutions to use these experiences to influence policy making on the
domestic scale to a similar extent.
This meant that even in the era of apparent declining British influence on the
international stage the British state still had an important role to play in the
arena of international diplomacy and peace keeping. However, despite the
clauses in the Trident sales agreement which would allow Britain to retain a final
say over how and when its missiles were to be used, in the event of a sever threat
to the security of the nation, critics still stated that the defence system was
entirely dependent on the following of American foreign policy decisions31. It is
this criticism that would be raised upon the programmes renewal in 2014. This
demonstrates the extent to which consecutive British Governments and their
bureaucracies have relied upon nuclear military technologies as a means of
holding onto their position on the international stage even at the risk of
appearing to be beholden to the American government for the ability to possess
nuclear weapons. As the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament stated in a recent
briefing: ‘…a direct involvement in Britain’s nuclear weapons technology, the US
30 The Defence Council. The Future United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Force. Advisory Paper, London: The Defence Council, 1980, p.5.31 The Defence Council. The Future United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Force. Advisory Paper, London: The Defence Council, 1980, p.1.
25
exercises significant leverage over the UK’s foreign and defence policy.’ 32 Despite
being strongly opposed to the project at its introduction, the Labour leadership
would eventually reach the decision to maintain the project when they came to
government under the Premiership of Tony Blair as a result of the 2005 Strategic
Defence Review. It is at this stage that it is important to understand the stances
of the key Westminster parties on the idea of maintaining Trident as a nuclear
deterrent now that the programme is approaching the renewal timeframe.
In their manifestos for the 2010 General Election, each of Westminster’s main
parties outlined their plans for Trident in the event that they were elected. The
standpoints of these parties is of particular interest to observe because what is
stated here, in the case of Labour in the 1980s, will usually differ from the stance
they take once in a position of power in the government.
The Conservatives stated that they were “committed to a full replacement for
Trident” which would consists of four new nuclear submarines based on the
Trident missile system33. This was of course an obvious policy considering that
the programme was originally introduced under Thatcher’s Conservative
government in the 1980s. What is also unusual about this stance is that under a
programme of cuts and spending reductions that they had planned, the funding
for the Trident Programme would not be touched in any way despite being one
of the largest expenditures by the government and the Ministry of Defence. The
Liberal Democrats stated that they would not “commit to replace the Trident
32 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Mutual Defence Agreement. Briefing, London: Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 2014, 2.33 The Conservative Party. Invitation to Join the Government of Britain - The Conservative Manifesto 2010. London: The Conservative Party, 2010, p. 106.
26
nuclear weapons system on a like for like basis”.34 This is not an unpredictable
stance for the party to take. The Liberal Democrats are well known for being the
party that occupies the centre ground on the spectrum of political ideologies in
Westminster. The stance of making no commitment but instead carrying out
reviews was a way of maintain popularity on both the left and right of the party.
This way they could suggest the programmes maintained but on a smaller scale
than that which is currently in place. Both of these views then differ from what
was finally agreed upon in the Coalition Agreement of 2010. In this agreement
between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, a compromise was settled
upon whereby “the renewal of Trident should be scrutinised to ensure value for
money”. However, the coalition standpoint will be discussed in greater depth at a
later point in this chapter.35 Labour has said that, if they were to have been re-
elected in 2010 under Gordon Brown, “a strategic defence review will look at all
areas of defence, but we will maintain our independent nuclear deterrent”.36
Another party of interest to observe is UKIP (United Kingdom Independence
Party). This is due in part to the fact that the party is made up of those who have
defected from the mainstream parties in Westminster, most commonly from the
Conservatives. Their view of Trident is that it should be renewed as long as it is
renewed with “four British built submarines and US built missiles”.37 This view is
predictable because of the right wing perspective it has of the international
system and the role that Britain should be fulfilling.
34 Liberal Democrats. Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010. London: The Liberal Democrats, 2010, p. 57.35 HM Government. The Coalition: Our Programme for government. London: Cabinet Office, 2010, p. 15.36 The Labour Party. The Labour Party Manifesto 2010: A Future Fair for All. London: The Labour Party, 2010, p. 69.37 United Kingdom Independence Party. UKIP Manifesto - Empowering the People. London: United Kingdom Independence Party, 2010, p. 7.
27
What is interesting to observe here is that the parties who have opposed Trident
in the past, once coming to power, decide that it must be kept to some degree
even if it is in a reduced readiness or made up of fewer submarines. Even though
this may be reducing the number of submarines by one. Those such as the Green
Party want to decommission the Trident programme as soon as possible. It is
likely that they hold this opinion because they have never been in government
and have never faced the problems of bureaucratic pressure from Whitehall
departments such as the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. Secondly,
they would be ideologically opposed to the idea of nuclear energy and weapons.
Another point to consider is that the Liberal Democrats, despite being opposed
to a like for like replacement, did not rule out keeping the programme operating
in some form. As previously mentioned, the policy of the coalition upon entering
government in 2010 was that the decision to renew Trident would be postponed.
This is important to consider because the politics of coalition weigh greatly on
the foreign policy decisions of the government.
As previously mentioned, the effect of the Liberal Democrats on Conservative
foreign policy decision-making has been clear. ‘Junior partners to a coalition –
like the senior party – can be assumed to seek influence on coalition foreign
policy in order to ensure that it furthers, or at least does not harm, their domestic
political prospects’.38 This point is evident in the example of the British
government because it can be seen how the Liberal Democrat influence has
38 Kai Brummer & Klaus Oppermann, “Patterns of Junior Partner Influence on the Foreign Policy of Coalition Governments.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 16, no. 4 (2014): 557.
28
helped to postpone the decision on Trident renewal until the next parliament.
This is important is it represents a key problem with the politics of coalition for
both sides. The logic of ‘agreeing to disagree’ is evident as neither party wishes
to lose support from their own bases. In this instance, postponement, although
not obviously a policy, was the most effective policy that could have been
implemented, as it was one that would ensure continued support from their MPs,
as neither had the capacity to implement the desired legislation alone.
So that both sides did not appear to the public to be doing nothing on the subject,
reports were ordered into the feasibility of a replacement to Trident and were
carried out by the Cabinet Office. This report concluded that the most effective
policy would be to replace Trident as ‘[no other system] offers the same degree
of resilience as the current posture of Continuous at Sea Deterrence, nor could
they guarantee a prompt response in all circumstances’.39 It is possible to
conclude that the proposals put forward in this review will not be implemented
until the next parliament at the earliest because of the need for a single party to
hold the majority required to put forward the renewal. Also important to note is
that it is not just domestic coalitions that have an impact on the conducting of
foreign policy. International coalitions can be crucial on the world stage and
none are seen to be more important to the UK than the ‘Special Relationship’ that
has evolved between the United Kingdom and the United States of America since
the end of the Second World War.
Whilst discussing the importance of domestic institutions on the making of
foreign policy decisions, it is of course important to identify the importance of
39 HM Government. Trident Alternatives Review. Review, Cabinet Office, London: HM Government, 2013, p.10.
29
the ‘Special Relationship’ in the process. It has been made clear throughout this
paper that the relationship with the United States is one of significant
importance to the United Kingdom. With the Trident missile system being
constructed by America and the warheads being stored in American territories, it
is a relationship that cannot be overlooked. However, it is one that is often
viewed in different ways by parties on both sides of the Atlantic. The British
often view the ‘Special Relationship’ as crucial to British interests and one that is
unique within the international system. In 2009, the House of Commons Foreign
Affairs Committee noted that ‘the US inextricably affects and is affected by the
UKs broader international strategic position and policy’.40 With both the United
States and the United Kingdom having just renewed the Mutual Defence
Agreement, allowing for the continued sharing of nuclear material and
information, it is unlikely that this relationship will become less significant in the
future. Rather, it is likely that this relationship will only strengthen and deepen
as time progresses and the international system maintains its pace of rapid
change and multi-polarity.41
On the other hand, the strengths and benefits of the Special Relationship are
often overstated. Dr. James D. Boys, who gave evidence to the House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee, suggested that:
40 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. Government foreign policy towards the United States - Eight Report of Session 2013-14. Committee Report, London: House of Commons, 2014, p.11.41 House of Commons Library. UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement . Research Paper, London: House of Commons, 2014, p.5
30
‘[T]he cultural and historical links that exist with the US tend to lead UK
policy makers into an assumption of familiarity and similarity with
respect to the country, and an unwillingness to ask difficult or strategic
questions about the United States’ policy or future direction’.42
This point demonstrates that the British government can often exaggerate the
importance of the UK-US partnership because it believes that it holds intense
links with the US on a variety of levels and platforms. Although this may be true,
these links cannot be used as evidence of an undying relationship when the US
must attempt to focus on other aspects of its own foreign policy, for example,
that with its South American partners or the relationships that it must build in
the Pacific. Trident then becomes an unusual factor within the relationship
because it can be seen as an extension of American foreign policy and a securing
of their interests in Europe, but equally, it can be seen as an attempt by British
governments in Westminster to maintain the states’ military power that can be
projected onto the world stage. Most notably in the case of the latter, a projection
of power towards Europe and the influence on the Security Council. In a report
carried out by the US Congressional Research Service, it stated that ‘[t]he term
“special relationship” has often been used to describe the high degree of mutual
trust between the two countries in cooperating on diplomatic and political
issues. The special relationship also encompasses close intelligence-sharing
arrangements and unique cooperation in nuclear and defense matters’.43
42 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. Government foreign policy towards the United States - Eight Report of Session 2013-14. Committee Report, London: House of Commons, 2014, p.48.43 Congressional Research Service. The United Kingdom and U.S.-UK Relations . Research Paper, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013, p.1
31
Throughout the entirety of the research paper, the term ‘Special Relationship’ is
only mentioned 5 times whereas the British equivalent mentioned the term 13
times. Although this is not concrete evidence for the founding of an argument, it
does demonstrate the aforementioned point that British politicians do apply
imagine the relationship to be special to a greater extent than their American
counterparts. However, this thesis does not argue that the relationship is not
important. To the contrary, this paper believes that the transatlantic partnership
does continue to be an important alliance in an ever-changing and unstable
international system. The relationship that Britain has with the United States is
in line with the defensive realist position that was put forward in the previous
chapters. Through this relationship, the UK government can maintain its global
position even in the face of ever growing threats and other global powers in a
multi-polar world.
Conclusion
In summary, Britain’s governmental institutions, and the politicians themselves,
must accept that the state has become an average power within the international
system and is thus not able to influence global politics in the way it once did.
Despite still holding significant respect from other states, the UK no longer has
the military capabilities that a global superpower requires in order to remain an
effective leader. However, the nuclear programme has existed in some form since
the late 1960s and is thus likely to continue to operate for years to come due to
the way in which the bureaucracy has established itself within the functions of
government. It is possible to conclude from the analysis that has been put
forward in this thesis that due to the power currently held by Whitehall
32
departments, specifically the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, government policy regarding the nuclear deterrent will
continue to be heavily influenced regardless of the party that holds power. As
this paper has discussed, despite the programme being introduced under a
Conservative government under Thatcher, the programme was supported by
Blair’s Labour government upon the nearing of its renewal and then is not fully
opposed by Liberal Democrats in their coalition with the conservatives. This
alone demonstrates the influence that the path dependency of Whitehall has on
government policy regardless of their original position on the ideological
spectrum.
The theories which have been utilized and developed by this paper all go some
way as to explaining the behavior of government institutions within the British
political system. Despite all being slightly different, the compliment one another
in such a way that together they can create a reasonable explanation as to why
Britain retains the Trident programme. For example, the construction of threats
and the UK’s place on the world stage alongside the defensive realist approach
where the government maintains the programme purely to remain at its current
position of influence. There is very little interest within the government for
gaining more influence and power, solely to remain relevant.
This paper has demonstrated the way in which government institutions can
refuse to accept change by constructing a scenario in which they still play an
important role on the world stage. By utilizing international relations such as ‘the
Special Relationship’ with the United States, Britain can still influence global
33
policy and events through international organisations such as the United Nations
Security Council. It has also been demonstrated throughout this paper that
Trident, despite being an outdated programme, is need of replacement if Britain
wishes to maintain its influence and power projection onto the world stage.
However this thesis identifies that replacement of the programme is a key topic
of debate within the political establishment because no consensus can be agreed
on what the programme should be replaced with. Also, whilst no single party
holds the majority in Westminster, compromise and postponement will be likely
to continue until one party can wield the majority needed to make a decision.
This is an interesting position because the time to identify a successor
programme or life extension plan is running out. This delay in decision is, as
previously mentioned, primarily due to the effect of the current government
coalition on the making of policy. In this case, the Conservatives and the Liberal
Democrats ‘agreed to disagree’ and postponed the decision until the next
parliament. This means that any new programme will not be decided until 2015
at the earliest, if at all.
Finally, it is in the opinion of this thesis that the question put forth at the
beginning of this paper has been answered. Consecutive governments are in fact
protecting ‘Britannia’ rather than Britain. Although Trident is important, it is not
needed on the same scale that currently exists. Unless Whitehall continues to
create scenarios where Trident is still required, it is likely that this will be the
case for future governments, regardless of their position on the political
spectrum.
34
WORD COUNT: 9,428
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