undermining mexico's dangerous drug cartels, cato policy analysis no. 688

8/3/2019 Undermining Mexico's Dangerous Drug Cartels, Cato Policy Analysis No. 688

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Executive Summary

Since President Felipe Caldern launched amilitary-led offensive against Mexicos power-ful drug cartels in December 2006, some 42,000people have perished. The situation is so badthat the Mexican governments authority inseveral portions of the country, especially alongthe border with the United States, is shaky, andthe growing turbulence creates concerns thatMexico is in danger of becoming a failed state.

Although such fears are excessive at this point,even that dire scenario can no longer be ruledout.

U.S. political leaders and the American peo-ple also worry that Mexicos corruption and violence is seeping across the border into theUnited States. That danger is still fairly limited,but the trend is ominous. Both the number andseverity of incidents along the border are rising.

Experts propose several strategies for dealingwith Mexicos drug violence. One suggestion isto apply the model used earlier to defeat the Co-lombian drug cartels. But the victory in Colom-bia is not as complete as proponents contend,

and the situation in Mexico is far less favorableto using that strategy. Another suggested ap-proach is to try to restore Mexicos status quoante, in which the government largely lookedthe other way while drug traffickers sent theirproduct to the United States. But too much haschanged politically in Mexico for that approach,which would be only a temporary Band-Aid so-lution in any case.

The only lasting, effective strategy is to de-fund the Mexican drug cartels. Reducing theirbillions of dollars in revenue requires the Unit-ed States, as the principal consumer market forillegal drugs, to abandon its failed prohibitionpolicy. That move would eliminate the lucrativeblack-market premium and greatly reduce thefinancial resources the cartels have available tobribe officials or hire enforcers to kill competi-tors and law enforcement personnel and intimi-date the Mexican people. A refusal to abandonprohibition means that Mexicos agony willlikely worsen and pose a significant securityproblem for the United States.

Undermining MexicosDangerous Drug Cartels

by Ted Galen Carpenter

No. 688 November 15, 2011

Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books and more than 500 articlesand policy studies on international issues. His latest book, The Fire Next Door: Mexicos Drug Violenceand the Danger to America, is forthcoming in 2012.


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The victimsin Mexicos

increasinglychaotic, violent

drug war comefrom all walks

of life, includingpolice officers,

soldiers, andelected officials.

Introduction:Mexicos Agony andWashingtons Worry

Jaime Zapata, a special agent for U.S. Im-migration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)dealing with issues of drug smuggling, wason assignment at the U.S. embassy in Mex-ico City from his normal post in Laredo,Texas. On Valentines Day 2011, Zapata andanother ICE agent were returning to thecapital after meeting with law enforcementofficials in the northern state of San LuisPotos. The two agents were traveling alonga federal highway in their SUV when they

were stopped at what appeared to be a mili-tary checkpoint. Such checkpoints have be-come routine, especially in northern Mexico,where the war between the government ofPresident Felipe Caldern and several drugcartels rages with special intensity.

In this case, though, the armed men atthe checkpoint were not government troopsbut soldiers of one of the most powerful andruthless cartels, the dreaded Zetas. As soonas Zapata and his partner slowed their vehi-cle, the gunmen opened fire, killing Zapata

and seriously wounding the other agent.The two men had become the latest vic-

tims in Mexicos increasingly chaotic, vio-lent drug war. But they are hardly the onlyones. At the time of their encounter withthe Zetas, the death toll since Caldernlaunched his military-led offensive againstthe drug traffickers in December 2006 hadalready climbed to nearly 35,000.1 By someestimates, it is now more than 42,000.

The victims come from all walks of life. Amajority are participants (usually at the low-

est levels) in the multi-billion-dollar trade inillegal drugseverything from marijuana tococaine to methamphetamine. But othersare police officers and soldiers tasked withbringing down the cartels. Still other vic-tims include appointed or elected officials,who increasingly face an ultimatum fromthe crime syndicates:plata o plomo? (silver or

lead?). In other words, take a bribe or riskassassination. All too many officials whorefuse to be corrupted pay for that decisionwith their lives.

The drug gangs have become bold

enough to target even the most prominentpolitical leaders. Rodolfo Torre Cant, thenominee of Mexicos Institutional Revolu-tionary Party (PRI), was the overwhelmingfavorite to be the next governor of the im-portant northern border state of Tamauli-pas (just south of Brownsville, Texas) in theJuly 2010 elections. He was even regarded asa rising political star with possible nationalambitions. In late June, though, gunmenambushed his motorcade on the road to theairport outside Ciudad Victoria, the state

capital. The attackers sent a hail of bulletsinto their target, killing Torre as well as sev-eral aides and bodyguards. It was a sophis-ticated operation worthy of an elite militaryunit, but these assassins were professionalkillers working for one of the cartels.2

That incident came on the heels of an-other episode that shook Mexicos politicalestablishment. Just a few weeks before TorreCants assassination, Diego Fernndez deCevallos was abducted while driving fromhis home in Mexico City to a ranch that he

owned three hours away. His white SUV wasfound the next day on an unpaved countryroad near his ranch, with blood stains on thefront seat.

What made that abduction so frighten-ing was the identity of the victim. Fernndezde Cevallos had been the National ActionParty (PAN) candidate for president in 1994The PAN is the current governing party, ledby President Caldern, and Fernndez deCevallos remained one of the most visiblepolitical figures in Mexico. A comparable

event in the United States would be if themafia had kidnapped Al Gore or Bob Dole Although Fernndez de Cevallos was ultimately released (reportedly after his familypaid a huge ransom), the message to Mex-icos political and economic elite was clearno one is immune from the power of thedrug cartels.3


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The chaos isworst in theborder cities,such as Tijuanaand CiudadJurez, butthat plague isspreading topreviously quiet

areas.

And while the chaos is worst in theborder cities, such as Tijuana and Ciudad Jurez, which lie along the main drug traf-ficking routes into the United States, thatplague is spreading to previously quiet ar-

eas. Throughout the 1990s and the earlyyears of the following decade, Mexicos chiefindustrial city, Monterrey, was thought tobe virtually immune from the damage thatturf fights between the drug gangs causedin such places as Tijuana and Nuevo Laredo.Television journalist Sam Quiones, whohad lived in Monterrey for a decade until2004, recalled wistfully that it was the saf-est region in the country when I lived there,thanks to its robust economy and the sturdysocial control of an industrial elite.4 An in-

ternational consulting group in early 2005even named Monterrey the safest city in allof Latin America.

Just how far Monterrey has descendedinto the abyss of drug violence becameevident in July 2010, when authorities un-covered a dump site east of the city, in thetownship of Benito Jurez. Excavations soonrevealed that there were at least 51 bodiessome intact and others in piecesburied atthe site.5 That made the Monterrey dump-ing ground the second biggest mass grave

uncovered in Mexicos drug wars. Fears ofkidnappings have swept affluent neighbor-hoods in the city, and orders for bullet-prooflimousines and private security guards havesoared.

Even prominent resort areas such as Can-cn and Acapulco are no longer immune.Acapulco especially is beginning to resemblethe bloody border cities. Any doubt on thatscore evaporated in April 2010 when a wildshootout took place in broad daylight onthe main boulevard in Acapulcos principal

tourist area that left six people dead anddozens more dashing for cover. The violencehas reached the point that sarcastic residentsnow refer to the city as Narcopulco.6 And itcontinues to get worse. During a single week-end in early January 2011, police discovered30 bodies, 16 of which were found withouttheir heads, in and around Acapulco.7

A Troubled Neighbor andFears of Violence Spreading

Over the Border

There is a growing, hotly contested de-bate about two important issues. First, isthe carnage in Mexico reaching the pointthat the country is in danger of becominga failed state? Second, is the drug-relatedcorruption and violence in Mexico a prob-lem only for that country, or is it now seep-ing over the border and posing a nationalsecurity threat to the United States? Neitherquestion has an easy answer.

And the most important questions of allnow confront officials in both Mexico City

and Washington. Can the growing power ofthe cartels be reversed? And if it can, what isthe most effective strategy for doing so?

Mexico as a Possible Failed StateAllegations that their country could pos-

sibly become a failed state infuriate Mexicanofficials. In a March 2009 speech, PresidentCaldern scorned those who suggested thathis country was in danger of that awful fate.It is absolutely false, absurd that anyoneindicate that Mexico does not have control

over one single part of its national territory,Caldern fumed. I challenge anyone whosays that to tell me what part of the countrythey want to go to, and I will take that per-son there.8

Respected U.S. observers echo his views.Former Drug Enforcement Administrationchief Robert C. Bonner dismisses the failed-state theory. He acknowledges that the spikein killings during Calderns presidencyhas led some to conclude that the violencein Mexico is out of control. Others have sug-

gested that the country is on the verge ofbecoming a failed state (or in the words ofa 2008 U.S. military report, at risk of rapidand sudden collapse.) But he concludes:The former is a gross exaggeration, andthe latter is simply untrue.9 According toCouncil on Foreign Relations scholar Shan-non ONeil:


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A number ofbusiness and

political elitesare so worried

about the securityenvironment

that they havesent their lovedones out of the

country.

The question is not whether theMexican state will fail. It will not.The Mexican state does, and will con-tinue to, collect taxes, run schools,repair roads, pay salaries, and man-

age large social programs throughoutthe country. The civilian-controlledmilitary has already extinguished anyreal guerrilla threats. The governmentregularly holds free and fair elections,and its legitimacy, in the eyes of itscitizens and of the world, is not ques-tioned.10

George W. Grayson, a prominent U.S. ex-pert on Mexico, argues that only a Cassan-dra in a deep funk could conclude that Mex-

ico will implode as is possible in Afghanistanor Pakistan. There are too many factors . . .to let this happen. Yet in the next breath,Grayson emphasizes that Caldern and hissuccessors must act to prevent ungovern-ability in cities like Ciudad Jurez and Ti-juana, and in states like Guerrero, Durango,Sinaloa, and Michoacn.11 Thats a ratherlarge and important chunk of the coun-trysome 15 percent of Mexicos territory,including such major tourist destinations asAcapulco and Mazatlan.

There are other worrisome indicators.One of the earliest warning signals thata country has at least the potential to be-come a failed state is when members of thebusiness and political elites are so worriedabout the security environment that theysend their loved ones out of the country.Mexico may have entered that stage, sincethere are numerous and growing examplesof prominent figures acting in that manner. A case that received considerable attentionin Mexico in late 2009 was the admission by

Mauricio Fernndez, mayor of the affluentMonterrey suburb of San Pedro Garza Gar-ca, that he had sent his family to live in theUnited States while he ran for office. Theyremained in the United States, he admit-ted, because right now things are not safeenough for them to return.12

Alejandro Junco de la Vega runs GrupoRe-

forma, the largest print-media company, notonly in Mexico, but in all of Latin America. Yet this media mogul moved his family toTexas in 2008 because of growing personalthreats from drug cartel operatives. And in

the United States they stay.In the worst centers of violence, such asCiudad Jurez and Tijuana, there are unmis-takable signs of an even more worrisomeprecursor of a failed state: large numbers ofupper-class and middle-class families exit-ing the country. Since late 2008, the num-ber of abandoned homes in Jurez, manyin previously affluent neighborhoods, hasskyrocketed. The number is growing so fastthat officials have trouble keeping track.

Despite these developments, fears that

Mexico is on the brink of becoming a LatinAmerican version of Somalia are overblownThe country still has a number of insti-tutional strengths, including entrenchedwell-organized political parties; a sizable, in-fluential business community; a significantmilitary establishment; and an especiallypowerful moral forcethe Roman CatholicChurch. Such institutions are largely ab-sentor at least are far weakerin countriesthat have become failed states or are at riskof doing so. Mexicos major political, eco-

nomic, and religious players are not likelyto capitulate and cede the field to the drugtraffickers. Yet the overall trend is troublingEven an outspoken skeptic of the failed-statethesis like Bonner admits that Mexico is inthe throes of a battle against powerful drugcartels, the outcome of which will determinewho controls the countrys law enforcement, judicial, and political institutions.13 Theprospect of violent criminal organizationscontrolling the principal institutions of thestate is not all that far removed from a failed-

state scenario.

A Spillover of Violence into the UnitedStates: Myth or Reality?

Worries about the extent of a spilloverimpact on the United States have generatedeven more controversy. There is no doubtthat U.S. officials are deeply concerned


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The drugcartels might betargeting U.S.diplomatic and

law enforcemenfigures, butordinaryAmericans alsoare at risk whenthey travel orwork in parts ofMexico.

about such a scenario. At the moment, thegreatest worry is about Americans who liveor work in Mexicoincluding U.S. govern-ment officials. Investigators speculated thatthe Zetas may have targeted the vehicle car-

rying Jaime Zapata and his partner becausethey were U.S. law enforcement personnel. An earlier incident in Ciudad Jurez

raised similar suspicions. In March 2010, an American citizen, Lesley Enriquez Redelfs,an employee of the U.S. consulate there, wasshot to death in her car along with her hus-band, Arthur, also an American citizen, inbroad daylight after leaving a childrens partysponsored by the U.S. Consul. The husbandof another consular employee was killed andtheir two children seriously wounded on the

same day in a separate drive-by shooting.Two killings of individuals connectedwith the U.S. consulate in such a brief periodsuggested that the incidents were not ran-dom killings or cases of mistaken identity.The subsequent investigation, though, cre-ated more doubt than clarification. Whenapprehended later, one of the assassins con-tended that Arthur Redelfs, a deputy at theEl Paso jail, was the real target, allegedlybecause he mistreated gang members in hiscustody.14

But when Mexican authorities arrestedthe alleged mastermind of the hit, JessErnesto Chvez, in early July 2010, he toldthem Lesley was the target, and that he or-dered her killed because she had been illegal-ly supplying U.S. visas to members of a rivalgang. U.S. officials immediately discountedChvezs allegation, and there was no evi-dence that she had even been in a position toapprove such visas.15 But if the enforcers forthe Jurez cartel believed that she had doneso, that could have been sufficient motive to

order her assassination.Evidence also surfaced during the inves-

tigations indicating that the attacks mayhave been intended to send a warning to theU.S. consulate in response to Washingtonspush to place U.S. drug intelligence officerswithin the Jurez police department. Fur-ther indications that a strategy of attacking

U.S. government personnel and installationsmight be underway occurred in early April2010, when assailants tossed an explosivedevice at the U.S. consulate in Nuevo Laredo.And then the attacks on the ICE agents took

place, providing the strongest indication yetthat the drug cartels might be targeting U.S.diplomatic and law enforcement figures.

Ordinary American civilians also aremore frequently getting caught in the cross-fire when they travel or work in parts of Mex-ico. Kidnapping incidents, especially thoseinvolving Americans of Mexican heritage,are on the rise. Worries about U.S. militarypersonnel being put at excessive risk whilespending furloughs south of the borderhave caused base commanders to declare

some cities, especially Tijuana and Jurez,off-limits. An especially horrific case of what can

happen to Americans who run afoul of thecartels occurred in Ciudad Jurez, where aseven-year old Texas boy, Ral Ramrez, waskilled while visiting his father. Gunmen at-tacked the vehicle his father was driving, fir-ing at least 18 rounds from 9mm weapons.The elder Ramrez died in the vehicle. Ralescaped the car and tried to flee, but was shotin the back. Police were uncertain whether

the attackers thought that his father wasinvolved in the drug trade, but the incidenthad all the characteristics of a cartel hit, andRal was an innocent victim in any case.

U.S. officials also fret that the cartels maybe targeting Americans even on U.S. soil. Fol-lowing a major nationwide anti-drug raid inJune 2010, Kevin L. Perkins, assistant directorof the FBIs Criminal Investigation Divisiontold reporters that drug trafficking acrossthe U.S. southwest border was not onlyleading to a surge of drugs in our neighbor-

hoods across the country, but was leadingto increased border violence, kidnapping,extortion and human smuggling.16

The cartels are clearly expanding their op-erations north of the border, either directlyor by forging ties with American affiliates.Corruption is also migrating northward.Not surprisingly, the Customs and Border


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Mexicandomination of

the drug trade inthe United States

carries the riskthat turf battlesin Mexico could

become proxywars in U.S.

communities.

Protection agency is a high-priority targetfor trafficking organizations that seek toundermine or seduce law enforcement per-sonnel. And they have been successful. JamesTomsheck, the assistant commissioner for

internal affairs at Customs and Border Pro-tection, confirmed that investigators hadseen many signs that drug organizationswere making a concerted effort to infiltratethe agencys ranks. There have been verifi-able instances, Tomsheck stated, wherepeople were directed to C.B.P. to apply forpositions only for the purpose of enhancingthe goals of criminal organizations.17 Mostof those individuals were selected becausethey had no criminal records, which meantthat they could pass a background check

with little problem.But has the violence that is so plaguingMexico also come over the Rio Grande? Theevidence is less clear on that point. The in-creasing Mexican domination of all phasesof the drug trade in the United States cer-tainly carries with it the risk that the turfbattles in Mexico between rival cartels couldbecome proxy wars in U.S. communities.There are some indications that such strug-gles may already be underway. In at leastthree cases, members of the La Familia car-

tel kidnapped competing drug dealers inHouston and held them for ransom. Similarevents have occurred in Phoenix, Las Vegas,and other U.S. cities.

Some experts, though, insist that allega-tions of a serious spillover effect are exagger-ated. Gabriel Arana, writing in the Nation,contends that if media reports are to bebelieved, an Armageddon-like rash of drug-related violence has crossed from Mexicointo the United States. He responds thatthe numbers tell a different story.18

Other analysts reach a similar conclu-sion, noting that some southwestern U.S.cities, including El Paso, Jurezs sister city,have violent crime rates lower than the na-tional average.New York Times writer AndrewRice, who spent weeks in early 2011 study-ing the effect of the drug violence in Jurezon El Paso, concludes that spillover was

notable for its scarcity. He notes furtherthat while Jurez suffered more than 3,000homicides in 2010, El Pasoa city of some600,000 peoplehad an astonishingly lowtotal of five.19

Nevertheless, there are some worrisomesigns. Cartel threats against U.S. law en-forcement personnel are escalating. Policein Nogales, Arizona, went on heightenedalert in June 2010 after receiving a threat,relayed through an informant, that officerswould be targeted if they continued to carryout drug busts while off duty. Apparentlytraffickers considered it within the rules ofthe game for police to engage in such raidsas part of their job when they were on duty,but that it was a gratuitous affront to do so

on other occasions. When off duty, the car-tel warned, police were to look the other wayand ignore any drug shipments that cameacross the border, if they valued their lives.20

Perhaps the most jarring incident oc-curred in early August 2010, when reportssurfaced that a Mexican cartel had put a $1million bounty on the life of Arizona sher-iff Joe Arpaio, the colorful and controversialchief lawman in Maricopa County (whichincludes Phoenix and many of its suburbs)The threat originated in Mexico and was

conveyed via a disposable cell phonestan-dard operating procedure for all of the druggangs.21

There is no doubt that the Mexican car-tels loathe the man. His department is one ofthe most active in the southwestern states inintercepting drug shipments. Consequently,state and federal law enforcement agenciestook the threat against Arpaios life quite se-riously. They did so perhaps even more thanusual in the summer of 2010, because justweeks earlier, the Drug Enforcement Admin-

istration had warned that the cartels wereabout to take their war from Mexico northof the border and attack U.S. law enforce-ment personnel.

An incident in August 2009 confirmedthat cartel enforcers are already operating inthe United States against rivals, even in gen-erally peaceful El Paso. Police announced the


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Combatingtraffickers inMexico and othe

source countriesis at best abrutally uphillstruggle, and atworst a futile,utopian crusade

arrest of three men and charged them withcapital murder in what was apparently thecontract killing of Jos Daniel Gonzlez Ga-leana, a lieutenant in the Jurez cartel. Kill-ers shot him to death in the front yard of his

elegant Mediterranean-style home. And theyclearly took no chances with their taskshooting him eight times at close range.

That case was especially troubling. First,Gonzlez Galeana did not operate out of Jurez, but instead lived in a quiet, upscaleneighborhood in El Paso, where he ran sev-eral ostensibly legal businesses. Second, oneof the accused hit men was a U.S. Army private based at Ft. Bliss, suggesting that thecartels may now be trying to infiltrate theU.S. military.22 Such an achievement could

give the drug lords a new source of highlytrained assassinsand U.S. citizens, whowould be especially useful for going aftertargets inside the United States.

For some communities directly along theborder, there are already very direct spillovereffects. Officials and residents in El Pasowere badly shaken in late June 2010 whenseven bullets struck the upper floors of cityhall. Apparently, the shots came from an al-tercation in Jurez, and it was possible thatMexican federal agents may have fired the

stray bullets. But whatever the details, the in-cident was a chilling reminder that Mexicosviolence was no longer confined to Mexicanterritory.

Ranchers and farmers in the borderlandsof Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas havecomplained for several years that smugglersand illegal immigrants use their propertieswith impunity as routes to enter the UnitedStates. And the level of fear is rising as moreand more of the uninvited seem to be in-volved in drug smuggling or human traffick-

ing, rather than being ordinary people look-ing for work and a better life in the UnitedStates.

Matters came to a head in March 2010when Robert Krentz, a 58-year-old ranchernear Douglas, Arizona, was found mur-dered. Authorities quickly concluded thatan intruder from Mexico was the perpetra-

tor. Tracks at the murder scene led back overthe border into Mexico, and Krentzs ranchhad long been an active route for illegal im-migrants and drug shipments. He probablystumbled upon a scout for a trafficking ship-

ment and paid for that encounter with hislife. Since the Krentz episode, complaintsfrom farmers and ranchers along the bor-der about brazen intimidation by apparentcartel enforcers have been building to a cre-scendo.23

Another worrisome indicator emerged inAugust 2010, when the federal governmentposted signs along a 60-mile stretch of In-terstate 8 between Casa Grande and GilaBend, Arizona, more than 100 miles northof the border with Mexico. The signs warn

motorists that they are entering an activedrug and human smuggling area, wherethey may encounter armed criminals andsmuggling vehicles traveling at high ratesof speed. Pinal County sheriff Paul Babeu,whose jurisdiction is in the heart of thatsmuggling route, goes further than the fed-eral warning signs, contending that he andhis deputies are totally outnumbered andoutgunned. Mexican drug cartels literallydo control parts of Arizona, Babeu stated.24

Such developments may be a harbinger

of deterioration of the security situation onour southern border. At a minimum, thatpossibility deserves to be taken seriously.

Economic Realities andthe Mexican Cartels

The robust nature of global consump-tion of illegal drugs makes efforts to combattraffickers in Mexico and other source coun-tries at best a brutally uphill struggle, and at

worst a futile, utopian crusade. The trade inillicit drugs is estimated to be at least $320billion a yearand the actual amount couldbe much larger. Mexico is now the singlemost important theater in that commerce.That country is involved in almost everyphase of the illegal drug trade, and domi-nates many of those phases. Mexico is a ma-


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The Mexicanorganizations are

taking controlof trafficking

routes andgaining access to

potential marketsin portions ofSub-Saharan

Africa and theMiddle East, as

well as in Europe.

jor supplier of marijuana and cocaine. Forexample, a large region in southern Chihua-hua, along the borders with Sinaloa and Du-rango, is now often termed Mexicos GoldenTrianglereminiscent of the same term for

the opium-producing center in Southeast Asia. One-third of the population in Mex-icos version of the Golden Triangle is esti-mated to receive its primary income fromthe illegal drug trade.25

Mexican traffickers also still derive con-siderable revenues from transporting anddistributing cocaine and other drugs fromthe Andean countries, which were formerlythe dominant players in the trade. And Mex-ican entrepreneurs have become the leadingpurveyors of methamphetamine, perhaps

the fastest-growing drug in popularity in re-tail markets in the United States and someother countries. All in all, the Mexican car-tels control a major chunk of the $300-plusbillion-a-year commerce.

The frustration of Mexican officials atthe extent of the demand in the UnitedStates repeatedly boils over. President Calde-rn fumed that the demand is strengthen-ing the cartels and fueling the violence in hiscountry. In a June 2010 manifesto justifyinghis administrations military-led offensive

against traffickers, Caldern asserted thatthe origin of our problem of violence liesprimarily with the fact that Mexico is lo-cated next to the country that has the big-gest consumption of drugs worldwide. Itis as if we had a neighbor next door who isthe biggest addict in the world, with the ag-gravating factor that everyone wants to selldrugs through our house.26 The cartels hadgrown rich and bold, he wrote, because ofbillions of dollars in profits flowing to themfrom U.S. consumers.27 U.S. officials adopt a

similar view. Our insatiable demand for ille-gal drugs fuels the drug trade, Secretary ofState Hillary Clinton told her Mexican hostsin March 2009.28

Yet U.S. demand is only one part of theequation. Even a dedicated drug warrior likeRobert Bonner concedes that point, notingthat the major markets for the Mexican car-

tels are not just in the United States but alsoin Mexico itself and as far away as Europe.29

Bonner actually understates the breadth ofthe problem. The Mexican organizationsare taking control of trafficking routes and

gaining access to potential markets in por-tions of Sub-Saharan Africa and the MiddleEast, as well as in Europe.

Although the United States is the largestsingle retail market in the world, it is actuallyrelatively mature, with overall consumptionnot substantially different from what it wasa decade or two decades ago. The main areasof demand growth are in Eastern Europe, thesuccessor states of the former Soviet Union,and some portions of the Middle East andLatin America. According to the United Na-

tions, there has been a noticeable increasein the consumption of opiates throughoutEastern Europe and Central Asia, especiallythe former Soviet states. In Western Europe,the principal increase has been in the useof cocaine.30 In the Middle East, even sucha politically authoritarian and religiouslyconservative society as Iran is witnessing asurge in both drug trafficking and drug useespecially of heroin. Several years ago, thatproblem had already reached the point thatthe Supreme Leaders representative in one

province labeled drug abuse and traffickingas Iranian societys thorniest problem.31

The bottom line is that global demandfor illegal drugs is robust and is likely to re-main so. Drug cartels are profit-maximizingbusinesses, and the growth in demand out-side the United States creates an irresistibleopportunity. As long as the worldwide pro-hibition policy remains intact, there will bemore than enough potential profits to keepthe Mexican cartels in business. Only if theUnited States abandons prohibition will at

least some of the governments in other ma-jor markets follow suit, thereby dramaticallyreducing the revenues available to the car-tels.

In 2009, the Gulf cartel concluded thatmarket opportunities in Europe, combinedwith the euros strength against the U.Sdollar, justified establishing a more exten-


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At best, efforts adomestic demanreduction haveachieved onlymodest results,and the supply-side campaignhas been evenless effective.

sive organizational presence on that conti-nent. Among other steps, the cartel formedan alliance with Italys powerful Ndranghetaorganized-crime group.32

That sobering reality has ominous impli-

cations for the strategy that advocates of awar on drugs continue to push. Their strat-egy has long had two major components. Thefirst is to shut off the flow of drugs comingfrom drug-source countries, through vari-ous methods of drug crop eradication, de-velopmental aid to promote alternative eco-nomic opportunities, interdiction of drugshipments, and suppression of money-laun-dering activities. The second component isto significantly reduce demand in the UnitedStates through a combination of criminal

sanctions, drug-treatment programs, andanti-drug educational campaigns. At best, efforts at domestic demand re-

duction have achieved only modest results,and the supply-side campaign has been evenless effective. Moreover, with global demandcontinuing to increase, even if drug warriorssucceeded in their goal of more substan-tially reducing consumption in the UnitedStates, it would have only a limited adverseimpact on trafficking organizations. Thereis more than enough demand globally to at-

tract and sustain traffickers who are willingto take the risks to satisfy that demand. Andsince the illegality of the trade creates a hugeblack-market premium (depending on thedrug, 90 percent or more of the retail price),the potential profits to drug traffickingorganizations are astronomical. Thus, thesupply-side strategy attempts to defy thebasic laws of economics, with predictableresults. It is a fatally flawed strategy, andWashingtons insistence on continuing itcauses serious problems of corruption and

violence for a key drug-source and drug-transiting country such as Mexico.

Alternative Strategies toCombat the Cartels

The long record of unsatisfactory results

raises the question of whether the currentstrategyor an enhanced versionhas anychance of defeating the Mexican drug car-tels. Drug warriors contend that the strategycan work, and they point to developments

in another leading drug-source country, Co-lombia, as a model of what can be accom-plishedand what should be donein Mex-ico.33 Two questions immediately arise: IsColombia really a shining beacon of successin the war on drugs, as admirers assert? Andeven if it is, are the conditions in Mexico suf-ficiently similar so that Colombias successcould be replicated there? There are majordoubts about both points.

Colombia: Model or Illusion?

Robert Bonner makes one of the stron-ger arguments that Mexico can dampen thedrug-related violence the same way Colom-bia did. His assertion is straightforward andoptimistic:

Destroying the drug cartels is not animpossible task. Two decades ago,Colombia was faced with a similarand in many ways more dauntingchallenge. In the early 1990s, manyColombians, including police officers,

judges, presidential candidates, and journalists, were assassinated by themost powerful and fearsome drug-trafficking organizations the worldhas ever seen: the Cali and Medellncartels. Yet within a decade, the Co-lombian government defeated them,with Washingtons help.34

Bonner is correctas far as he goes. Butthe success story in Colombia is neither assimple, nor as complete, as he and others

who make similar arguments want us to be-lieve.

The overall level of violence in Colombiaduring the 1980s and early 1990s was indeedeven greater than it is in Mexico today. Butthe context was different in crucial ways. Al-though much of the violence came from thedrug cartels, especially after the Medelln


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Drug warriorspoint to

Colombia as amodel of whatcan be done in

Mexico. But thesuccess story

in Colombia isneither as simple,

nor as complete,as they want us

to believe.

cartel declared war on the Colombian statein 1984 and drug lord Pablo Escobar surgedto the height of his power, the drug traf-fickers were not the only source. There wasalso a political and ideological war being

waged between the Colombian governmentand two radical leftist insurgent groups, theRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(FARC) and the smaller, but still deadly, Na-tional Liberation Army (ELN).

During the early 1980s, the insurgencywas largely confined to the countryside and jungles, so the levels of violence remainedmodest. But in the 1990s, at the time thepower of the Medelln and Cali cartels wasfading, the guerrillas expanded their as-saults to the urban areas. That, in turn, led

to a growth in the number and size of right-wing paramilitary organizations, and thefighting between those groups and FARC-ELN forces caused the violence to spiral up-ward. While drug traffickers were often inalliance with one or more of those contend-ing factions, the capos were not the only, orin many cases even the primary, sources ofthe violence plaguing the country.

In todays Mexico, though, the drug car-tels are the overwhelming source of the car-nage. That distinction is important, because

the violence in Colombia did not really sub-side until lvaro Uribe became president in2002 and went far beyond the efforts of hispredecessors to wage war against the FARCand the ELN. The counterinsurgency cam-paigns of earlier governments had beendesultory and largely defensive in nature.Uribes campaign was vigorous and aggres-sive, and it produced positive results.

He was also lucky because of unusuallyfavorable regional conditions. Not only werethe leftist insurgents weakened by infight-

ing and aging leadership, but the externalsupport that they had enjoyed from the So-viet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua had faded.The Soviet Union had imploded a decadeearlier, so that source was gone. Cubas lossof Soviet support, in turn, inhibited its ownability to foment leftist revolutions in theWestern Hemisphere. Nicaraguas Sandini-

sta regime was out of power and would re-main so for several more years. The left-winggovernment of Hugo Chvez in neighboringVenezuela would eventually become a troublesome source of support for the FARC,

but during the early years of Uribes admin-istration, the meddling from Caracas waslimited. (Now that Chvez is more proactivein aiding the FARC, its power is reboundingsomewhat, creating growing concerns in Bo-got.)

As the threat that the Marxist groupposed started to wane, Uribe prevailed onthe right-wing paramilitaries to lower theirprofiles and let the government take thelead in counterinsurgency efforts. Thosetwo developmentsthe decline of the FARC

and ELN and the restraint of the paramili-tariesled to a dramatic drop in the overallviolence.

Consequently, Bonners argument thatthe decline in violence was largely due tothe defeat of the Medelln and Cali cartelsdoes not hold water. As Bonner himself ar-gues, the Medelln cartel was obliteratedby the end of 1993, and the coup de gracewas the killing of Escobar.35 The Cali cartelwas effectively destroyed by the end of 1996.Yet the violence went on. Indeed, it was still

so bad in 2000 that the United States pro-posed and funded Plan Colombia, a multi-billion-dollar, multi-year program to coun-teract the threat that drug trafficking posedto that country and its neighbors. Bonnerand others who see the defeat of the Medel-ln and Cali cartels as a model for defeatingthe Mexican cartels and ending the scourgeof violence in that country need to explainwhy the violence in Colombia did not sub-stantially subside until nearly a decade afterthe Medelln and Cali organizations were

history.There is another problem with the as-

sumption that the Colombian strategy canbe applied to Mexico. Bonner asserts thatBogot was wise to wage war on one cartelat a time instead of trying to take on both si-multaneously. But once again, the context inMexico is different. And it is far more daunt-


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The task facingthe Calderngovernmentand its allies

in Washingtonis not merelyto defeat twocartels, as wasthe challenge inColombia, but tdefeat multiplepowerfulorganizations.

ing. The Medelln and Cali cartels domi-nated the illegal drug trade throughout the1980s and early 1990s, and within Colombiaitself, they had no serious competitors.

But the drug trade in Mexico is more dis-

persed. Until a year or so ago, the Sinaloaand Gulf cartels appeared to be the lead-ing players, but even then they hardly enjoyed the kind of dominance the Medellnand Cali organizations did in their heyday.Now, both the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels arefighting several very aggressive competitorsjust to hold on to their positions. The Zetasespecially seem to be on the rise, and havealready significantly eaten into the terri-tory and power of the Gulf cartel. And suchgroups as the Beltrn Leyva and Jurez car-

tels, and the splintered La Familia organiza-tion, although weaker than they once were,are still serious competitors. So the task fac-ing the Caldern government and its alliesin Washington is not merely to defeat twocartels, as was the challenge in Colombia,but to defeat multiple powerful organiza-tions.

Bonner emphasizes that in Colombia, thedrug trafficking groups that filled the vacu-um created when the Cali and Medelln car-tels were destroyed are smaller, more frag-

mented, and far less powerfuland, mostimportant, they no longer pose a threat toColombian national security.36 But by thatlogic, the situation in Mexico should be get-ting much better, not steadily worse. The il-legal drug trade there is already fragmentedin a way that it never was in Colombia dur-ing the 1980s and early 1990s.

In fact, Mexican authorities have defeat-ed the leading cartels of the day on numer-ous occasions. At one time, such groups asthe Guadalajara, Tijuana, and Jurez cartels

were the most powerful players, but they arenow either secondary factors or have com-pletely unraveled. Yet their successors arejust as successful. And the newer lead play-ers seem to be even more violent and pose aneven greater threat to the Mexican state. Thenotion that Mexico can duplicate Colom-bias victory over the Medelln and Cali car-

tels in a very different, much more challeng-ing, environment is at best overly optimistic.

Yet U.S., Mexican, and Colombian of-ficials act as though the Colombian modelthat extinguished those cartels can be used

as a template for dealing with the situationin Mexico. Mexico has what we had someyears ago, which are very powerful cartels,Colombian President Juan Manuel Santosstated. What we can provide is the experi-ence that we have had dismantling those car-tels.37 Over the past few years, some 7,000Mexican security forces have received train-ing from their Colombian counterparts.Much of that training has been conductedby Colombias police commandos, who hadleading roles in the armed struggles against

leftist guerrillas and drug traffickers. Wash-ington is paying for part of that training,apparently as an alternative to sending largenumbers of U.S. police and military person-nel to Mexico for such a missionsome-thing that most Mexicans would regard aspolitically very sensitive.

To his credit, Bonner does not overstatethe breadth of the success in Colombia theway some others do, who insist that Colom-bia can be a model for defeating the drugcartels in Mexico. He emphasizes that in Co-

lombia, the objective was to dismantle anddestroy the Cali and Medelln cartelsnot toprevent drugs from being smuggled into theUnited States or to end their consumption.He fully acknowledges that there are stilldrug traffickers in Colombia, and cocaine isstill produced there.38

That is something of an understatement. A 2008 report from the Government Ac-countability Office showed that cocaine ex-ports from Colombia had actually increasedsince the end of the 1990s. And that flow

has eased just marginally over the last twoyears.

But the distinction between drug traffick-ing and drug violence may point the way toat least a partial solution to Mexicos prob-lem. By focusing on containing the violence,rather than trying to stem the flow of drugs,the Uribe government managed to bring at


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Prospects fora policy of

accommodation,or appeasement,

are dim, even ifCaldern wouldcountenance it

which seems veryunlikely.

least some measure of peace to Colombia.It certainly appears that throughout Uribesadministration, Bogot did just enough onthe anti-trafficking front to placate Wash-ington without provoking the traffickers to

the extent of disrupting a relatively stabledomestic environment. Even with such re-straint, the level of violence in Colombia isbeginning to rebound. According to a Feb-ruary 2011 UN report, there was a 40 per-cent rise in massacres in 2010, mostly attrib-uted to new drug gangs that have arisen inrecent years.39

There is one other problem with the Co-lombia model, especially the version thatemerged following the adoption of PlanColombia in 2000 and the election of Uribe

in 2002. A widening investigation by theColombian attorney generals office has un-covered some disturbing information aboutPlan Colombia and the conduct of Uribesadministration. An August 20, 2011, storyby Karen De Young and Claudia J. Duque inthe Washington Post stated: American cash,equipment and training, supplied to eliteunits of the Colombian intelligence serviceover the past decade to help smash cocaine-trafficking rings, were used to carry out spy-ing operations and smear campaigns against

Supreme Court justices, Uribes political op-ponents, and civil society groups.40

Indeed, six former high-level officialsof Colombias Department of Administra-tive Security have already confessed to suchabuses of power, and more than a dozen oth-ers are currently on trial. The investigationkeeps expanding. Several top political aidesof Uribe, and even the former president him-self, are now under scrutiny. The burgeoningscandal in Colombia should be a cautionarytale to those who advocate using the same

approach to bring down the Mexican drugcartels.

An Appeasement Strategy: Restoring theStatus Quo Ante

Another suggested approach to tame thedrug violence in Mexico is the adoption ofa policy of accommodation, or appease-

ment. That was the essence of the proposalput forth in 2008 by Calderns former di-rector of communications, Rubn Aguilarand which former president Vicente Foxurges the government to consider. Doing so

would be an attempt to return the countryto the situation that existed during the eraof political dominance by the PRI. Yet pros-pects for a successful deal along those linesare not favorable, even if Caldern wouldcountenance itwhich seems very unlikely.

First of all, the Mexican cartels are ex-tremely powerful, and several of them seemintent on achieving both dominance in theillegal drug trade and invulnerability fromthe authority of the Mexican governmentReaching even an implicit agreement with

such strong and violent actors would be amajor challenge. After all, Bogot was neverable to achieve amodus vivendi with the Me-delln and Cali organizations. During theirheyday, neither cartel was interested in acompromise with the Colombian govern-ment. Only their weaker, fragmented suc-cessors seem willing to mute their challengeto the state. Its hard to imagine that Mexi-cos leading cartels, which are growing morepowerful, would have much interest in sucha deal with the Caldern government.

Mexicos fractious multiparty systemmakes it even less likely that officials can en-gineer a return to the status quo ante underthe PRI. That arrangement worked preciselybecause the PRI was the only meaningful po-litical actor in the country. Drug lords knewthat as long as they kept the money flowingto PRI appointees, they could conduct theircommercial activities with a minimum ofdisruption. The current and prospective po-litical environments make such calculationsfar less reliable. Even if a cartel successfully

bribes a PAN official in a city or state, for ex-ample, the next election could bring a PRI orParty of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)leader to power with a whole new set of ap-pointees, and the process would have to be-gin all over again. Hedging political bets re-quires traffickers to bribe multiple politicalfactions, significantly raising the financial


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There is only onpolicy changethat would havea meaningfulbeneficial impac

ending theprohibitioniststrategy andlegalizingcurrently illegaldrugs.

costs and making that approach less secure.Given the underlying political uncertainty,the cartels are not likely to let their robustenforcement branches atrophy merely onthe promise of government restraint.

Mexicos political leaders could perhapsact as the brokers in a market-sharing ar-rangement among the cartels. But the exis-tence of so many powerful trafficking orga-nizations would make such an arrangementinherently unstableeven in the unlikelyevent that the bloody rivals could reach aninitial agreement. The number of powerfulplayers is too large, the Mexican politicalsystem too multipolar, and the prize of theU.S. consumer market for illegal drugs bothtoo large and too near to make an appease-

ment policy a workable option over the longterm. There are huge obstacles to returningto the relatively stable period of accommo-dation between the Mexican governmentand the drug traffickers during the PRI era.Too much has changed, politically, econom-ically, and socially, in the past decade.

At best, an appeasement policy mightbuy Mexico a precarious, probably short-lived truce. And even that would require thetacit consent of the United Statessome-thing that is not likely to be forthcoming

from Washington. After all, the adoption ofan appeasement policy by Mexican authori-ties would mean that the flow of illegal drugsinto the United States would be unimpeded.It would also mean that drug kingpins thatU.S. drug warriors have pursued for yearswould effectively be off-limits. It is hard toimagine the U.S. government accepting,much less approving, such an arrangement.

Biting the Bullet: Legalize Drugs andDe-Fund the Cartels

Given the healthy state of global demand,there is little prospect of endingor evensubstantially reducingthe trade in illegaldrugs. And prospects for weakening theMexican cartels to the point that they posea lesser security threat to Mexico and theUnited States are just marginally better. Thedisappointing four-decade record of the war

on drugs has led more and more knowledge-able people to argue that there is only onepolicy change that would have a meaningfulbeneficial impact: ending the prohibition-ist strategy and legalizing currently illegal

drugs. Needless to say, though, that remainsa highly controversial proposal.The brutal reality is that prohibition

simply drives commerce in a product under-ground, creating an enormous black-marketpotential profit that attracts violence-pronecriminal elements. Even the U.S. State De-partment has conceded that point, althoughit remains staunchly committed to a prohi-bitionist strategy. Its International Narcot-ics Control Strategy Report explains:

Drug organizations possess and wieldthe ultimate instrument of corrup-tion: money. The drug trade has accessto almost unimaginable quantities ofit. No commodity is so widely avail-able, so cheap to produce, and as easilyrenewable as illegal drugs. They offerdazzling profit margins that allowcriminals to generate illicit revenueson a scale without historical prec-edent.41

That is the depressing, unassailablepoint. And it needs to be asked whether apolicy that puts literally hundreds of bil-lions of dollars per year into the hands of or-ganized crime is a sensible policy, whateverthe rationale or motives.

Defenders of the current policy, whenpressed, usually concede that there are prob-lems with it, but they insist that the unin-tended side effects of legalization would beeven worse. The Drug Enforcement Admin-istration contends that legalization would

lead to much greater drug use and levels ofaddiction. The agency supports that claimby emphasizing that use rates (and societalcosts from addiction) are much higher foralcohol and tobacco, which are legal, thanthey are for currently illegal drugs.42

Such reasoning is flawed on multiple lev-els. The notion that usage rates of currently


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The notion thatusage rates of

currently illegaldrugs would rival

those of alcoholand tobacco

if prohibitionwere abandoned

is shockinglysimplistic.

illegal drugs would rival those of alcoholand tobacco if prohibition were abandonedis shockingly simplistic. Personal prefer-ences and cultural influences have majorimpacts on use rates for any substance; the

legality-illegality aspect is only one factoramong many. DEA analysts do not explainwhy usage levels for cocaine and heroin aremuch lower than those for marijuana, eventhough all of those drugs are strictly illegal.Clearly, some other factor plays a key role.

Measuring societal costs of differentmind-altering substances solely with respectto problems of addiction is also inherentlymisleading. That sort of analysis even leadsthe DEA to dismiss as nothing more than amyth the perception that the Prohibition

era of the 1920s did not work. The agencyarrives at that astonishing conclusion byemphasizing statistics showing that alcoholconsumption levels and rates for drunken-ness and alcohol-related diseases declinedduring Prohibition.43

But stressing those benefits without afull, candid acknowledgement of the societalcollateral damages of Prohibition is akinto measuring the strength of a corporationby listing its assets, while ignoring the liabili-ties side of the ledger. By that standard, En-

ron, WorldCom, Bear-Stearns, and AIG wereall well-run, fabulously profitable enterpris-es. Yes, Prohibition workedif one ignoresthe surge of corruption and violence thataccompanied the Noble Experiment. TheDEA tries to finesse that problem by assert-ing that organized crime was around bothbefore and after Prohibition, implying thatoutlawing alcohol had little effect on thatproblem. Such an impression is misleadingat best. Rates of both corruption and vio-lence at the hands of organized crime were

dramatically higher during the 1920s thanin earlier and later decades.

The DEAs obsession with the social costsof legal drugs like alcohol and tobacco, com-bined with the agencys idealized version ofthe Prohibition era, creates the suspicionthat at least some drug warriors would liketo have another fling at banning liquor. At

a minimum, their reasoning provides an in-sight into why they seem blind to the uglynegative consequences of the current war ondrugs.

Even the DEAs core argumentthat

use and addiction rates would soar if drugswere legalizedis deeply flawed. Portugalsdrug reform, the most comprehensive in theworld and now a decade old, rebuts that the-sis. After Portugal decriminalized the pos-session of all drugs, including cocaine andheroin, in July 2001, the predicted surge inusage and associated problems did not ma-terialize. Glenn Greenwald, whose 2009 CatoInstitute White Paper is a thorough studyof Portugals reform, notes that the empiri-cal data indicate that decriminalization has

had no adverse effect on drug use rates inPortugal, which, in numerous categories, arenow among the lowest in the EU, particular-ly when compared with states with stringentcriminalization regimes. Moreover, whilepostdecriminalization usage rates have re-mained roughly the same or even decreasedslightly when compared with other EUstates, drug-related pathologiessuch as sex-ually transmitted diseases and deaths due todrug usagehave decreased dramatically.44

Those results stand in marked contrast

to the parade of horrors that the DEA andother supporters of prohibition trot outevery time even modest steps toward legal-ization or decriminalization are proposedMoreover, even if there were a modest up-tick in drug use following legalization, onewould need to measure the resulting nega-tive consequences against the array of nega-tive consequences under drug prohibitionEven though our society has serious prob-lems with alcoholism and drunk driving,few people outside the DEA and other cita-

dels of drug-war zealotry would argue thatprohibition in the 1920s was, on balance, abetter policy. By the same token, given theawful effects of the drug war in the UnitedStates and internationally, it is hard to imag-ine a system that would be worse.

Governments around the world seemto be gradually awakening to the problems


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Disenchantmentwith the drug wais growing withiMexicos politicelite.

caused by a strict prohibitionist strategy.Such countries as the Netherlands and Por-tugal have adopted decriminalization mea-sures (de facto or de jure) for possession anduse of small quantities of drugs.45 Sentiment

for such harm-reduction approaches is tak-ing hold in the Western Hemisphere as well.The president of Argentina has endorsedthe decriminalization of drug consumption,and the then-president of Honduras, Manu-el Zelaya, went even further, embracing thelegalization of drug use.46

A 2010 report by the Latin AmericanCommission on Drugs and Democracy, theroster of which included more than a doz-en former political leaders, diplomats, andother dignitaries, strongly criticized the war

on drugs. Three leaders of that commission,former Brazilian president Fernando Her-ique Cardoso, former Colombian presidentCsar Gaviria, and former Mexican presidentErnesto Zedillo, subsequently published anop-ed in the Wall Street Journal highlightingthose criticisms. They stated their thesis cat-egorically: The war on drugs has failed. Andits high time to replace an ineffective strat-egy with more humane and efficient drugpolicies. . . . Prohibitionist policies based oneradication, interdiction and criminaliza-

tion of consumption simply havent worked. Violence and the organized crime associ-ated with the narcotics trade remain criticalproblems in our countries.47

A comprehensive report published in June 2011 by the Global Commission onDrug Policy reached a similar conclusion.48The global war on drugs has failed, withdevastating consequences for individualsand societies around the world, the reportstated flatly. The report went on: Vast ex-penditures on criminalization and repres-

sive measures directed at consumers of il-legal drugs have clearly failed to effectivelycurtail supply or consumption. Apparent victories in eliminating one source or traf-ficking organization are negated instantlyby the emergence of other sources and traf-fickers.49 The commissioners urged gov-ernments to break the taboo on debate

and reform. The time for action is now.50Members of that blue-ribbon panel includedfour former heads of state (including Car-doso); the current prime minister of Greece,George Papandreou; former U.S. Secretary

of State George P. Shultz; former UN Secre-tary General Kofi Annan; and former Chair-man of the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker.

Ernesto Zedillos byline on the Wall StreetJournalop-ed is just one indication that dis-enchantment with the drug war is growingwithin Mexicos political elite. The PRD,the third major party in Mexicos triangu-lar political competition, has called for druglegalization, and even President Caldernembraced more-limited reform measures.51That campaign bore fruit in 2009, when the

Mexican Congress enacted, and Calderonlater signed, a bill that decriminalized pos-session of small amounts of illegal drugs,including not only marijuana, but cocaine,ecstasy, heroin, and crystal meth. Under thenew law, anyone caught with the equivalentof about as many as five marijuana joints orfour lines of cocaine can no longer be arrest-ed or finedmuch less imprisoned. Policesimply give them the address of a rehabilita-tion clinic and urge them to overcome theirhabit.52

Former president Vicente Fox took thedebate to a new level in August 2010andstunned both Mexican and U.S. politicalleaders who had long considered him anadamant drug warrior. Bush administrationofficials had repeatedly praised Foxs coop-eration with Washingtons anti-drug effortsas significantly better than those of his pre-decessors. Writing on his blog, Fox brokesharply with his previous positions. Weshould consider legalizing the production,distribution, and sale of drugs, he wrote.

Then he added a succinct, damning indict-ment of both Calderns drug policies andthose of his own administration: Radicalprohibition strategies have never worked.53

Fox stressed that legalization did not im-ply that drugs were good or that they didntharm those who consume them (althoughhe did note that countries that had adopt-


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Unless thepossession,

production, andsale of drugs is

legalized, theblack-market

premium willstill exist and

law-abidingbusinesses will

still stay awayfrom the trade.

ed serious drug-law reforms had not expe-rienced an explosion of either drug use orcrime rates.) But his reason for abandoningprohibition was based on a realistic assess-ment of economic realities. People should

look at legalization, Fox argued, as a strat-egy to strike at and break the economicstructure that allows gangs to generate hugeprofits in their trade, which feeds corrup-tion and increases their areas of power.54

Advocates of reform in the United Statesare understandably encouraged by such de-velopments. Allen St. Pierre, who heads theNational Organization for the Reform ofMarijuana Laws, argues that Mexicos leg-islation reflects changing global attitudesregarding the criminalization of drug use.

Cultural social norms are shifting aroundthe world and in the United States. Therewill likely come a point when the majoritysee that prohibition is expensive and simplydoesnt work.55

It certainly is expensive for U.S. taxpay-ers. Harvard University senior lecturer ineconomics Jeffrey A. Miron and KatherineWaldock of New York University estimatethat legalizing drugs and halting enforce-ment of drug prohibition would save morethan $41.3 billion per year in government

expenditures. Some $25.7 would be saved atthe state and local level, and another $15.6billion at the federal level. They also esti-mate that legalizing drugs would yield taxrevenues of some $46.7 billion. Merely legal-izing marijuana would put $8.7 billion inthe tax coffers annually.56

The reforms in such countries as Portu-gal, Mexico, and other countries are modeststeps in the right direction, and they certainlyare more sensible than a knee-jerk adherenceto comprehensive prohibition. Legalizing, or

even decriminalizing, drug possession hasthe beneficial effect of not stigmatizing (andsometimes ruining) the lives of users. Andsuch reforms have the salutary effect of notfilling prisons with nonviolent offenders.

But even those desirable reforms do notget to the causal root of the violence thataccompanies the drug trade. Mexicos 2009

reform, for example, makes no change re-garding the penalties for drug sales. Indeed,the new law states explicitly that any personconvicted of selling any quantity of any drugwill be sent to prison. Some experts specu-

lated that a key motive for the measure wasto divert police attention and resources awayfrom pursuing small-time users, thereby en-abling authorities to escalate their campaignagainst traffickers.57 Even Portugals other-wise bold drug reform regarding possessionand use kept trafficking in drugs strictly il-legal.

Yet unless the production and sale odrugs is also legalized, the black-market pre-mium will still exist and law-abiding busi-nesses will still stay away from the trade. In

other words, drug commerce will remain inthe hands of criminal elements that do notshrink from engaging in bribery, intimida-tion, and murder. Wall Street Journal colum-nist Mary Anastasia OGrady aptly makesthat distinction with respect to the drug-lawreform that Mexico enacted in 2009:

Mexican consumers will now haveless fear of penalties and, increas-ingly in the case of marijuana, thatstrue in the United States as well. But

trafficking will remain illegal, and toget their product past law enforce-ment the criminals will still have anenormous incentive to bribe or to kill.Decriminalization will not take themoney out of the business, and there-fore will not reduce corruption, cartelintimidation aimed at democratic-government authority or the terrorheaped on local populations by druglords.58

Because of its proximity to the huge U.S.market, Mexico will continue to be a cock-pit for that drug-related violence. By itsdomestic commitment to prohibition, theUnited States is creating the risk that thedrug cartels may become powerful enoughto destabilize its southern neighbor. Theirimpact on Mexicos government and society


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If Washingtonabandoned theprohibitionmodel, it is very

likely that othercountries in theinternationalcommunitywould do thesame.

has already reached worrisome levels. Worstof all, the carnage associated with the black-market trade in drugs does not respect na-tional boundaries. The frightening violencenow convulsing Mexico could become a fea-

ture of life in American communities, as thecartels begin to flex their muscles north ofthe border.

When the United States and other coun-tries ponder whether to persist in a strategyof drug prohibition, they need to considerall of the potential societal costs, both do-mestic and international. On the domesticfront, Americans prisons are bulging withpeople who have run afoul of the drug laws.Approximately one-third of inmates in stateprisons and nearly 60 percent of those in

federal prisons are incarcerated for drugtrafficking offenses. Most of those inmatesare small-time dealers. Prohibition has cre-ated or exacerbated a variety of social pa-thologies, especially in minority communi-ties where drug use rates are higher than thenational average and rates of arrests and im-prisonment are dramatically higher. Thoseare all serious societal costs of prohibition.

Conclusion

The most feasible and effective strategyto counter the mounting turmoil in Mexicois to drastically reduce the potential revenueflows to the trafficking organizations. Inother words, the United States could sub-stantially defund the cartels through thefull legalization (including manufactureand sale) of currently illegal drugs. If Wash-ington abandoned the prohibition model, itis very likely that other countries in the in-ternational community would do the same.

The United States exercises disproportion-ate influence on the issue of drug policy, as itdoes on so many other international issues.

If prohibition were rescinded, the profitmargins for the drug trade would be similarto the margins for other legal commodities,and legitimate businesses would becomethe principal players. That is precisely what

happened when the United States ended itsquixotic crusade against alcohol in 1933. Tohelp reverse the burgeoning tragedy of drug-related violence in Mexico, Washingtonmust seriously consider adopting a similar

course today with respect to currently illegaldrugs.Even taking the first step away from

prohibition by legalizing marijuana, indis-putably the mildest and least harmful ofthe illegal drugs, could cause problems forthe Mexican cartels. Experts provide a widerange of estimates about how important themarijuana trade is to those organizations.The high-end estimate, from a former DEAofficial, is that marijuana accounts for ap-proximately 55 percent of total revenues.

Other experts dispute that figure. EdgardoBuscaglia, who was a research scholar at theconservative Hoover Institution until 2008,provides the low-end estimate, contendingthat the drug amounts to less than 10 per-cent of total revenues. Officials in both theU.S. and Mexican governments contend thatits more like 20 to 30 percent.59

Whatever the actual percentage, the mar-ijuana business is financially important tothe cartels. The Mexican marijuana tradeis already under pressure from competitors

in the United States. One study concludedthat the annual harvest in California aloneequaled or exceeded the entire national pro-duction in Mexico, and that output for theUnited States was more than twice that ofMexico.60 As sentiment for hard-line pro-hibition policies fades in the United States,and the likelihood of prosecution diminish-es, one could expect domestic growers, bothlarge and small, to become bolder aboutstarting or expanding their businesses.

Legalizing pot would strike a blow

against Mexican traffickers. It would be dif-ficult for them to compete with Americanproducers in the American market, giventhe difference in transportation distancesand other factors. There would be little in-centive for consumers to buy their productfrom unsavory Mexican criminal syndicateswhen legitimate domestic firms could offer


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A failure tomove away from

prohibition inthe United States

creates the riskthat the already

nasty corruptionand violence next

door in Mexico

may get evenworse.

the drug at a competitive priceand adver-tise how they are honest enterprises. Indeed,for many Americans, they could just growtheir own supplya cost advantage that thecartels could not hope to match.

It is increasingly apparent, in any case,that both the U.S. and Mexican governmentsneed to make drastic changes in their effortsto combat Mexicos drug cartels. GeorgeGrayson aptly summarizes the fatal flaw inthe existing strategy. It is extremely diffi-cultprobably impossibleto eradicate thecartels. They or their offshoots will fight tohold on to an enterprise that yields Croesus-like fortunes from illegal substances cravedby millions of consumers.61

Felipe Calderns military-led offensive

is not just a futile, utopian crusade. Thatwould be bad enough, but the reality ismuch worse. It is a futile, utopian crusadethat has produced an array of ugly, bloodyside effects. A different approach is needed.The most effective way is to greatly reducethe Croesus-like fortunes available to thecartels. And the only realistic way to do thatis to bite the bullet and end the policy ofdrug prohibition, preferably in whole, but atleast in part, starting with the legalization ofmarijuana.

A failure to move away from prohibitionin the United States creates the risk thatthe already nasty corruption and violencenext door in Mexico may get even worse.The danger grows that our southern neigh-bor could become, if not a full-blown failedstate, at least a de-facto narco-state in whichthe leading drug cartels exercise parallel ordual political sovereignty with the govern-ment of Mexico. We may eventually encoun-ter a situationif we havent alreadywherethe cartels are the real power in significant

portions of the country. And we must worrythat the disorder inside Mexico will spill overthe border into the United States to a muchgreater extent than it has to this point.

The fire of drug-related violence is flaringto an alarming extent in Mexico. U.S. leadersneed to take constructive action now, beforethat fire consumes our neighbors home and

threatens our own. That means recognizingreality and ending the second failed prohibi-tion crusade.

Notes1. Mark Stevenson, Mexican Official: 34,612Drug War Deaths in 4 Years, Associated Press,

January 12, 2011. Also see Sara Miller LlanaMexico Drug War Death Toll Up 60 Percent in2010. Why? Christian Science Monitor, January 132011.

2. E. Eduardo Castillo, Mexican GovernorCandidate Killed, Cartels Blamed, AssociatedPress, June 10, 2010; and Ioan Grillo, Assassina-tion of a Candidate for Governor Scars Mexico,Time.com, June 30, 2010.

3. Sara Miller Llana, Prominent PoliticianDiego Fernndez de Cevallos Freed in Mexico,Christian Science Monitor, December 20, 2010.

4. Sam Quiones, State of War,Foreign Policy(March/April 2009).

5. Tim Johnson, Grisly Mass Graves in Mexi-co Yield 50 Casualties of Drug War, McClatchyNewspapers, July 24, 2010; and Mark Stevenson51 Bodies Found at Northern Mexico DumpingGround, Associated Press, July 24, 2010.

6. George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violencand a Failed State? (New Brunswick, NJ: Transac-

tion, 2010), p. 108.7. Nicholas Casey, Killings Hit Mexico TouristHub, Wall Street Journal, January 11, 2011.

8. Quoted in Top Mexican Drug Cartel Sus-pect Arrested, Officials Say, CNN.com, April 22009.

9. Robert C. Bonner, The New Cocaine Cow-boys: How to Defeat Mexicos Drug Cartels,Foreign Affairs 89, no. 4 (JulyAugust 2010): 40.

10. Shannon ONeil, The Real War in Mexico,Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 (JulyAugust 2009): 64.

11. Grayson, p. 272.

12. Quoted in Embattled Mexican Mayor SentFamily to Live in U.S., Associated Press, Novem-ber 23, 2009.

13. Bonner, p. 35.

14. James C. McKinley Jr., Suspect Says JurezKillers Had Pursued Jail Guard,New York Times


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March 30, 2010.

15. Morgan Lee, Mexican Suspect: U.S. Consul-ate Infiltrated, Associated Press, July 3, 2010.

16. Quoted in Jerry Markon, 2,200 Arrested inU.S. Crackdown on Mexican Drug Cartels, Wash-

ington Post, June 11, 2010.17. Quoted in Randal C. Archibold, Hired byCustoms, but Working for the Cartels,New YorkTimes, December 18, 2009.

18. Gabriel Arana, The Border Violence Myth,Nation, May 27, 2009.

19. Andrew Rice, Life on the Line, New YorkTimes Magazine, July 28, 2011.

20. Tim Gaynor, Mexico Drug Gang ThreatensArizona Police, Reuters, June 23, 2010.

21. An Illegal Bounty, editorial, Investors Busi-ness Daily, August 3, 2010.

22. William Booth, Mayhem Crosses the Bor-der with Informers, Washington Post, August 17,2009.

23. Paul J. Weber, Texas Farmers Say Drug WarMaking Job Dangerous, Associated Press, March31, 2011.

24. Quoted in Jerry Seper and Matthew Cella,Signs in Arizona Warn of Smuggler Dangers,Washington Times, September 1, 2010.

25. Tim Johnson, For Mexican Cartels, Mari-juana Is Still Gold, McClatchy Newspapers, Sep-tember 2, 2010.

26. Quoted in Felipe Caldern Hinojosa, TheFight for Public Safety, (communique, MexicoCity, Mexico, June 13, 2010). Also see WilliamBooth, Mexicos Drug Violence Claims Hun-dreds of Lives in Five Days, Washington Post, June16, 2010.

27. His tendency to blame U.S. drug consump-tion for Mexicos woes has not softened withtime. Following the bloody attack on the Casino

Royale in Monterrey in August 2011 that claimedmore than 50 lives, Caldern again blamed theinsatiable U.S. consumer demand for drugs.Miguel ngel Guterrez, Mexicos Calderon Be-rates U.S. After Casino Attack, Reuters, August26, 2011.

28. Quoted in Mark Landler, Clinton SaysU.S. Feeds Mexico Drug Trade, New York Times,March 26, 2009.

29. Bonner, p. 37.

30. United Nations, International NarcoticsControl Board, Report of the International Narcotics

Board for 2007, pp. 95, 100, http://www.incb.org/incb/en/annual-report-2007.html.

31. Quoted in A. William Samii, Drug Abuse:Irans Thorniest Problem,Brown Journal of WorldAffairs 9, no. 2 (Winter/Spring 2003): 283.

32. Robin Emmott, Cartel Inc: In the Companyof Narcos, Reuters, January 14, 2010.

33. Shannon K. ONeil, How Mexico Can Winthe Drug War, Colombias Way, Bloomberg.com,

June 17, 2011.

34. Bonner, pp. 3536.

35. Ibid., p. 43.

36. Ibid., p. 42.

37. Quoted in Juan Forero, Colombia SharesIts Cartel-Fighting Expertise with Mexican Forc-es, Washington Post, January 22, 2011.

38. Bonner, p. 42.

39. Jack Kimball, Colombia Crime Gangs SpurMore Massacres in 10: UN, Reuters, February24, 2011.

40. Karen De Young and Claudia J. Duque, U.S.Aid Implicated in Abuses of Power in Colombia,Washingtonpost.com, August 20, 2011.

41. U.S. Department of State, Bureau for In-ternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement Af-fairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,March 2006, pp. 1819.

42. Drug Enforcement Administration, SpeakingOut Against Drug Legalization (2010), pp. 4647, 54.

43. Ibid., p. 9.

44. Glenn Greenwald, Drug Decriminalizationin Portugal: Lessons for Creating Fair and Suc-cessful Drug Policies, Cato Institute White Pa-

per, April 2, 2009.45. However, the Netherlands seems to be waf-fling on its reforms. See Toby Sterling, Amster-dam Moves to Close a Fifth of Coffee Shops, As-sociated Press, November 21, 2008; and ClosedShops: Why Tourists in the Netherlands MayHave to Stop Smoking Pot, The Economist, June23, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18867682.


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46. Legalize Drugs to Fight Trafficking: Zela-ya, Agence France Presse, October 13, 2008. Fora discussion of Zelayas proposal and growingsentiment for drug-policy reform generally in theWestern Hemisphere, see Juan Carlos Hidalgo,President of Honduras Calls for Drug Legaliza-tion, Cato-at-Liberty (blog), October 14, 2008,

http://www.cato-at-liberty.org.47. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Csar Gaviria,and Ernesto Zedillo, The War on Drugs Is a Fail-ure, Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2009.

48. War on Drugs, Report of the Global Commis-sion on Drug Policy, June 2011.

49. Ibid., p. 2.

50. Ibid., p. 3.

51. Miguel ngel Gutirrez, Mexico Seeks toDecriminalize Small-Time Drug Use, Reuters,

October 3, 2008.

52. David Luhnow and Jos De Crdoba, Mex-ico Eases Ban on Drug Possession, Wall Street

Journal, August 22, 2009; and Ioan Grillo, InDecriminalizing Much Drug Use, Mexico May Be

Setting an Example, Time.com, August 26, 2009.

53. Quoted in E. Eduardo Castillo, Ex-MexicoPresident Calls for Legalizing Drugs, AssociatedPress, August 8, 2010.

54. Ibid.

55. Quoted in Grillo.

56. Jeffrey A. Miron and Katherine WaldockThe Budgetary Impact of Ending Drug Prohi-bition, Cato Institute White Paper, September27, 2010, www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12169.

57. Luhnow and De Crdoba.

58. Mary Anastasia OGrady, Mexicos Hopeless Drug War, Wall Street Journal, September 132009.

59. Johnson, For Mexican Cartels, Marijuana IsStill Gold.

60. Ibid.

61. Grayson, p. 254.

undermining mexico's dangerous drug cartels, cato policy analysis no. 688

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