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INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEEPRINCIPALS MEETING

Final Summary and Action Points

9 December 2014IOM, Geneva

Circulated: 16 January 2015

1. Introduction

A meeting of the IASC Principals, chaired by Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, was hosted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Geneva on 9 December 2014. The IOM Director-General welcomed everyone and in his opening remarks reflected on the global context, including the unprecedented number of simultaneous conflicts and humanitarian emergencies and lack of viable political processes to resolve these conflicts in the immediate or short term. He recalled that 2014 marked 25 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The initial euphoria and hopes for democracy this sparked had now evaporated, with a world seemingly in disarray, and an erosion of international control, authority and governance.

This reality made partnerships even more important and underscored the essential role of the Emergency Relief Coordinator and Inter-Agency Standing Committee. The IASC had fostered humanitarian coordination through, for example, the Transformative Agenda, the strategic use of CERF, and the Emergency Directors Group. It had helped the humanitarian community to make progress on the key issues of accountability to affected people (AAP) and protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA). It was “a partnership that helped us to stay together in difficult times”. The Agenda for the meeting had two main areas of focus: with initial sessions ‘looking outward’ at external challenges, followed by ‘looking inward’, with discussion on the findings of the IASC review.

2. Collective Response in 2014: Challenges and Opportunities

Initial interventions by designated Principals paved the way for discussion of key areas affecting humanitarian response, including the politicization of humanitarian response, the impact of integration on humanitarian action, learning from IASC L3s to date, and bridging the relief to development gap.

a. Politicization of humanitarian response

The ERC and the Chair of the ICVA Board started the discussion. The ERC noted that, with the high number of conflicts, there had never been so much pressure to politicize the humanitarian agenda, citing Syria and Iraq as major examples of this. Humanitarian organizations also faced considerable pushback from member states in countries like South Sudan. Changing the way the Security Council thinks of humanitarian action, and addressing its attempts to politicize humanitarian work remained

IASC Principals, 9 December 2014: Final Summary and Action Points

extremely challenging. There was a need for the IASC to work collectively with Member States, at different levels, to manage the risk of politicization.

The Chair of the ICVA Board drew attention to the impact of politicization not only on humanitarian organizations but also on affected people. There was no way to hold the Security Council to account for its failure to find political solutions. Levels of aid were also determined by politics rather than need: for every dollar spent per person for the Haiti earthquake response in 2010, 13 cents per person was spent in South Sudan, and 4 cents per person in CAR. The average aid per person per year in DRC is US$10 and US$74 in Afghanistan. She highlighted key questions for consideration:

1. How to encourage emerging and existing donors to follow principles, especially the principle of providing aid based on need? There is no common position on this issue.

2. How do we ensure more equal inclusive discussions and engagement in our ways of working and structures?

3. How do crisis-affected people access aid they are entitled to? This is not only a logistical, but also a political question. There is a need to review the added value of humanitarian workers, including whether we still have the necessary impartiality for negotiation, and can be more creative in finding ways to respond. Positive examples of private sector partnerships were Western Union and private sector markets which were used for the Somalia response.

4. How do we protect humanitarian workers to enable access, while still ensuring that access is not used for other purposes? Humanitarian organizations must be accountable, and work better together. For example in Syria, medical workers are targeted, yet the humanitarian community does not do enough to speak out together against this.

In discussion, the lack of accountability of politicians and the gap between the rhetoric and action of Security Council (SC) members were highlighted. SC members speak of the importance of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, yet do little in the face of flagrant violations. Humanitarian organizations should take a more collective stand in calling Security Council members to account on their use of humanitarian debate as a proxy for discussing geopolitical issues, in increasing pressure on political organs to resolve conflicts that have catastrophic humanitarian consequences, and in responding to the counter-terrorism agenda. Humanitarian actors need to rethink the way they talk about humanitarian issues.

The principles can be used by humanitarian organizations as a 'default position' which assumes a shared view/understanding of a situation. UN and civil society must work together to understand what the principles mean in specific situations and seek to re-establish support for humanitarian principles by governments. The difficulty of mobilising the Security Council and a public increasingly desensitized to extreme violence and brutality through extensive media coverage was emphasized, as well as the challenge of sustained engagement with civil society, grassroots movements and key political constituencies through public campaigns. It was agreed that humanitarian actors need to be more “politically savvy”, e.g. by recognising the national interests of political actors and leverage these: by shaping the ‘political agenda’ in the right places; translating political solutions into practical ones; and re-mastering the art of negotiation.

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Looking forward, advocacy suggestions included developing creative and positive communications strategies to build support for humanitarian action, to overcome public desensitization and put pressure on global leaders to reach political solutions. The World Humanitarian Summit provided an opportunity to challenge leaders and hold them to account. Dialogue with parties to conflicts should also focus on what humanitarian principles mean in practice, in specific situations. IASC Principals agreed to work on a joint statement on counter-terrorism, building on the draft prepared by the Task Team on Revitalizing Principled Humanitarian Action.

It was recognized that countries and issues are ‘value variable’ with some receiving greater investment. Private sector funding is valued, but also extremely difficult to obtain. It was suggested that organizations should make the case with donors for un-earmarked funding, and explore what can be done to allocate their own core funds to redress the balance in the resources going to different crises. Effective programming should also address the imbalance in assistance and inconsistent standards across different settings. Organizations should advocate with donors for increased resources for the CERF under-funded window, and its strategic use by HCTs.

Under the politicization of humanitarian response, IASC Principals agreed that:

• Based on the discussion and further consultation, a set of concrete actions to address the politicization of humanitarian response should be developed for consideration by the Principals. Action by: Penny Lawrence (OXFAM), Chaloka Beyani (Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of IDPs), Kate Gilmore (UNFPA) by the end of February 2015.

b. Impact of integration on humanitarian action

InterAction and WFP opened the discussions. InterAction emphasized that a policy framework is already in place, and the focus should be on implementing existing frameworks. Implementation is currently inconsistent, with structural integration being the default model. Referencing the background paper 'Initial Results of the review of impact of integration on humanitarian action' prepared for the meeting by InterAction and WFP, he noted that the Task Team on Revitalizing Principled Humanitarian Action would conduct a survey of humanitarian practitioners and present the results in February 2015. Three questions were posed to the IASC Principals:

1. Are there certain operational contexts where the IASC Principals see the need for current integration arrangements or practices to be adapted in order to be more conducive to neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian operations?

2. Is there a need for the IASC Principals to undertake dialogue and establish a common agenda for action with SRSGs and senior UN mission personnel to shape integration arrangements conducive to humanitarian operations?

3. Is there a need for IASC Principals dialogue with key UN Member States and the Secretariat (DPKO and DPA) regarding integration arrangements conducive to humanitarian operations?

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The challenge of integration as a principle, versus integration as a structure, and of policy versus reality, was highlighted by WFP, as well as the need for assessments to determine what integration means in particular situations. The different approaches and attitudes to integration within the UN, and among IASC partners, were noted. For some UN humanitarian actors integration is about partnership, including with NGO partners, but for some parts of the UN, it is about the UN as one. Structural integration is of concern for some in conflict situations as it can compromise the neutrality of humanitarian activities. For others integrated missions can help get issues on the agenda and personnel on the ground, e.g. in the domain of human rights.

Many emphasized the importance of transparent dialogue and sharing information between humanitarian and the military Mission components, as well as better understanding of the overall goals of a Mission. Mutual respect for respective mandates and modes of operation, and ensuring a continued focus on affected people were important. The role that peacekeeping missions play in the protection of civilians in many countries was recognized. The ‘Swing School of Common Sense’ highlighted the need to find practical ways to manage disagreements, and a pragmatic approach to engaging and working together to ensure some form of cohesiveness. The benefits of integration must, however, be worth the cost.

Recognising that some aspects of integration are particularly difficult for NGOs, conversations on integration should include NGOs at every step: in planning, implementation and reporting. The narrative on integration should be addressed, moving from ‘siloed’ UN reports to a truly integrated analysis of the conflict dynamics and UN strategy in a country. There was consensus on the importance of dialogue between Principals and SRSGs, at the outset of SRSG appointments, during SRSG retreats, and when complex issues arise in the field. Dialogue to resolve field issues could be triggered at any stage, with the onus on respective Principals to highlight concerns emerging on the ground, when they become aware of these.

Under the impact of integration on humanitarian action, the IASC Principals agreed:

• The need for proactive dialogue with SRSGs. IASC Principals should communicate problems posed for humanitarian action by integrated missions to the ERC, with copy to other colleagues. The Principal traveling to the country in question next can then be asked to raise concerns with the SRSG and other stakeholders. Action: All IASC Principals effective immediately with outcome to be reviewed by InterAction and WFP by the end of 2015.

• IASC Principals should participate in the annual SRSG Retreats, induction and end of mission briefings. Action: ERC to write to DPKO to request IASC Principals participation in the next SRSG Retreat by the end of January 2015.

• The UN Secretary-General to be asked to review and revise the format of his reports to the Security Council on multifaceted conflict situations. Action: ERC and High Commissioner for Human Rights to suggest new reporting format to the Secretary-General by the end of February 2015.

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c. Learning from L3s to date

The ERC noted that, while L3 protocols had initially been developed for sudden onset disasters, the only IASC System-Wide Level Three (L3) response of this sort had been for the Philippines. The four other declared L3's were for conflict situations, where their application has posed challenges, particularly around the issue of protection.

WHO and ICVA opened the discussion. WHO referenced the December 2010 Principals meeting, the admission by IASC Principals of collective failure in the responses to the two ‘mega’ disasters of Haiti and Pakistan, and their commitment to change. L3s were meant to act as a trigger mechanism to fill the gaps and scale up response, but lessons learned highlighted the unintended consequences of an L3 declaration and raised issues for consideration, including on protection of people and accountability. ICVA raised issues of L3 definition, triggers and deactivation. Based on a recent survey, ICVA shared NGO perspectives of humanitarian response in L3 crises. While there had been significant improvement in surging capacity for leadership and coordination, there had not been similar progress in improving speed of delivery, recovery and protection. Increased funding for L3 emergencies had not translated sufficiently into broader operational coverage, while core issues of protection, gender and accountability had been sidelined. Two questions were posed for consideration by IASC Principals:

1. How to do better to speed up and support implementing partners?

2. How can the IASC improve its collective understanding of what L3 activation actually can and cannot do, what gaps it can and cannot address? Clarifying this was seen as vital as L3 means different things to different people.

In discussion, the need to ensure an appropriate balance between flexibility and speed of response was highlighted. Given different perceptions, including by donors, of the purpose of an L3 declaration, there is an urgent need to clarify the purpose and meaning of L3. Originally an internal IASC preparedness mechanism to ensure an immediate injection of capacity, it had been interpreted as a reflection of the severity of a crisis. The terminology has even been picked up by the media. This poses significant challenges for deactivation and exit, particularly in a country like Syria, where the situation continues to deteriorate. Some suggested ensuring greater clarity through changing terminology: avoiding the use of the words ‘declare’ and ‘emergency’, which implies an external audience, and renaming it as a ‘level 3 surge mechanism’, to be used only when there is a need for the surge itself, even if the situation continues to be serious or to deteriorate. Others felt that the IASC should welcome the fact that “L3” is now being used by media and donors to describe a severe crisis and build on this success for external communication purposes in order to mobilize support for humanitarian action in protracted crises.

The question of deactivation led to a discussion on classification and what to call the situation once the L3 surge was reached. There were different views on whether further ‘classification’, namely defining L1/L2 for the whole system would be useful. One participant suggested having a new category (L2 or other) at the end of the 6 months period that would ensure continued support for coordination mechanisms and raise additional funds but is not a surge mechanism. Another participant noted that

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there was confusion around the L1/L2 terminology that was internal to agencies and not system-wide. “L3” was qualitatively different, bringing a mandatory, collective response. Another suggested that when planning its exit strategy from the L3 surge, the IASC needed to demonstrate that it is leaving capacity behind to provide adequate support.

On the timeline, several Principals suggested that a time-limit for activation be set, with various periods proposed, including an initial 3 months, with – in exceptional circumstance - one extension possible to 6 months before automatic de-activation. Ensuring appropriate messaging around this was also highlighted, noting the need for advocacy to ensure continued collective response to the protracted emergency post-L3, investment during the L3 to support recovery, and for the required financial and human resources to maintain an appropriate response. Principals recognized the conundrum faced: despite the challenges, an L3 declaration does help mobilize attention and resources both within organizations, and with external actors.

Under Learning from L3s to date, IASC Principals agreed to:

• Draft a proposal for the way forward for consideration by the IASC Principals, incorporating recommendations made by the Emergency Directors Group and NGOs, and reflecting Principals’ discussions on the terminology, the communication strategy and common messaging, time limits and exit strategies, and the commitment to use the L3 declaration as a collective ‘surge mechanism’ adaptable to different types of emergencies and situations. Action by Nan Buzard (ICVA), Margaret Chan (WHO) and Valerie Amos (ERC) by the end of February 2015.

d. Bridging Relief to Development

FAO, the World Bank, UNICEF and IFRC opened the discussions. FAO reflected on the general agreement to link development and humanitarian action, noting that, while humanitarian action is being used to resolve current problems, it is not addressing underlying problems. The paper 'Making the Links Work: how the humanitarian and development community can help ensure no-one is left behind' , prepared by FAO and the World Bank and based on outcomes from a panel of experts, calls for a common agenda, understanding, and analysis of the system, as well as shared leadership and partnership, particularly with government. Two specific recommendations were presented for consideration by the IASC Principals: firstly to identify one or two countries and develop a 10-15 year overall strategy based on a common understanding of risks, led by the government and supported by humanitarian and development actors; and secondly, to pilot the development of an incremental exit strategy for the humanitarian community in certain countries of the Sahel.

The World Bank Group noted the respective challenges of support to middle versus low income countries. For the latter, there is generally strong international development engagement, while the former tend to receive limited support despite sometimes carrying global burdens (for example Syria’s neighbours). He noted the challenges that development actors face in engaging in fragile and conflict contexts. The World Bank Group has created a special Crisis Response Window (CRW) for low income countries, with CRW grants recently used to finance Ebola response efforts. Based on recent experiences and recognized demand, he reiterated the World Bank Group’s commitment to scale-up engagement in disaster and crisis risk management.

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UNICEF reflected that rather than “building a bridge” between relief and development, there should be a “seamless contiguum” as development and humanitarian work often need to go on at the same time, not sequentially. Terminology, conceptual and organizational frameworks all create self-imposed boxes. Every action taken during humanitarian response should be considered with an eye to longer term effects. Both UNICEF and IFRC emphasized that communities and the affected people should always be at the center of the response. It should always be kept in mind that irrespective of whether the work was considered relief or development the communities and the people were the same. Investing in people was the only way to ensure sustainability. IFRC stressed the need to focus on fostering trust and commitment through long-term programming. National capacity e.g. as for the response for Fukushima, should be respected. At the same time, in other situations, communities faced the same challenges repeatedly.

In discussion, it was noted that, while the last 20 years had seen some progress in understanding the link, this has not resulted in practical change. It has posed a ‘wicked’ problem, where concrete ways to move forward have been difficult to identify, and the ‘authorizing environment’ (both governing bodies and donors) have yet to recognize that the current system does not reflect the reality on the ground. Addressing this needs a systemic change that focusses on the needs of people, ensuring that ‘no-one is left behind’. The IASC multi-mandated agencies, working on both humanitarian and development issues, could play a stronger role, including through pre-determining areas of intervention, ‘pre-packaging’ response to enable quick delivery, and ensuring complementarity of the tools currently available. The IASC Principals noted that, in respect of the first proposal, such initiatives were also being taken forward by other actors, such as IGAD. They were supportive of the second proposal on piloting ways in which to ‘graduate’ international humanitarian caseloads to government/development support such as safety nets.

Under bridging relief to development, the IASC Principals agreed:

• To pilot the development of an incremental exit strategy for the humanitarian community in certain countries of the Sahel (possible country candidates that can be considered are Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and/or Senegal). These 3 countries are launching social safety net programmes (often with the World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF and EU involvement) which could potentially provide an effective bridge between humanitarian actors and Government programmes, offer an opportunity for humanitarians to exit and avoid these countries becoming a permanent member of the Sahel annual humanitarian appeals. Action by: World Bank and FAO to lead, working closely with other organizations including UNDP and the concerned country teams by the end of 2015.

3. Urban Agenda

The presentation by UN-Habitat highlighted three ‘game-changing’ practices to address gaps in the system and make IASC humanitarian responses more effective, as outlined in the background paper prepared by UN-Habitat in consultation with the Reference Group on 'Meeting Humanitarian Challenges in Urban Areas': (a) adopting area-based approaches, (b) surging IASC assistance within local governments and partners, and (c) facilitating direct engagement by affected communities.

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Humanitarian responses are often more complex in urban settings. While considerable progress has been achieved in past years through partnerships, increased capacity to address urban issues, new tools, and a greater focus on resilience, a substantial amount of work still needs to be done. Principals recognized that people affected by disasters or conflict are increasingly finding shelter in urban areas and other human settlements rather than in conventional IDP and refugee camps, and that this is having a huge impact on urban communities and social processes.

The failure to give greater recognition to this global phenomenon creates the risk of perpetuating the problem, and while responding to humanitarian crises in urban settings presents significant challenges, it also presents opportunities for capacity building and resilience through urban planning, and creating a link between humanitarian aid and development. Emphasis was placed on the need for humanitarians to adopt an area-based approach and to work with existing governmental and community-based structures rather than developing parallel structures. A new approach was required to expand collaboration with new partners such as mayors, local governments, law enforcement and urban planners in order to address complex issues of governance and urban planning, including establishing clear norms and standards. The difference between rural and urban planning was acknowledged, and the need to reassess the assistance modalities in view of this.

Several IASC Principals stressed the need to ensure, and reflect in the paper, the protection dimension, noting that urban warfare and urban violence posed unique challenges to crisis management and law enforcement. The need for development actors to consider and engage in the issue of protection was further reiterated. Urban planning in conflict situations can also present opportunities for conflict prevention, enhancing preparedness and increasing community resilience. There was a general consensus on the need for a shift in mind-set and to reconsider the current humanitarian and development paradigms in order to adapt thinking and programming in line with the challenges faced in urban environments. Discussion on these issues will be taken further in the next IASC Principals meeting in May 2015 in Nairobi.

Under the urban agenda, IASC Principals agreed that:

• UN-Habitat should incorporate feedback from the discussion into the paper on “The Implementation of the IASC Strategy and Action Plan on Meeting Humanitarian Challenges in Urban Areas”. IASC Principals should send comments and recommendations to the UN-Habitat Deputy Executive Director to further refine the IASC agenda for meeting humanitarian challenges in urban areas. Action by: UN-Habitat and IASC Principals by the end of February 2015.

• IASC Principals should use the World Humanitarian Summit, the Conference on Urbanization and Human Settlement in 2016 (Habitat III) and the IOM 2015 Conference on Migration and Cities to make recommendations to improve the protection and assistance to displaced populations in urban settings. Action by: All IASC Principals by the end of 2015.

4. Update by Valerie Amos on the World Humanitarian Summit8


The large number of challenges currently faced in the humanitarian sector and the potential for fragmentation, have prompted a need to think through how humanitarian actors work together and with partners and listen to what non-IASC actors are saying. The World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) process provides a multi-sector/multi stakeholder platform that is enabling consultation across a range of partners, including national consultations with private sector organizations and NGOs; regional consultations; and engagement by organizations at field level. The consultations to date have been particularly successful in eliciting in-depth discussions around some key themes, such as managing risk. There has been less engagement around how to best serve and protect civilians in conflict. The ERC noted that some interesting outcomes have been identified in the process so far. She also advised that given the challenges facing the humanitarian sector in terms of financing, the UN Secretary-General has agreed to establish a high level panel on humanitarian financing. IOM reiterated its commitment to the process and said that a staff member would be seconded to work with the IASC secretariat on WHS from 1 January 2015.

Under the World Humanitarian Summit update, the IASC Principals agreed that:

• The ERC will keep IASC members informed of the process and IASC members will continue to engage with the process at all levels. Action by: the ERC and IASC Principals by end of 2015.

• The ERC to share the paper on the outcome of the Lausanne meeting of the WHS thematic teams. Action by: ERC and IASC Principals by the end of January 2015.

5. Challenges and Opportunities of Protection

ICRC and UNHCR opened the discussion. ICRC lamented the gap in protection at all levels in contexts such as Syria, South Sudan and Yemen. There is awareness among governments, and the public, of conditions of detention in prisons, but a lack of political will to address protection issues. Despite international norms, there is more pushback where norms are not respected. IASC organizations need to be humble, as what can be done by them is limited. At the same time, commitment to protection is still necessary and may be best realized through being selective and in a focus on specific issues, such as protecting people from sexual violence. There is also a need to explore emerging areas, such as data protection, and to think through how the humanitarian community responds on this. To move forward, actors with different perspectives, such as Human Rights Watch, should be brought around the table. There is a need to look at leveraging the different relationships that members of the humanitarian community have with key stakeholders, and to explore how to engage with actors such as the Taliban. The collective must push issues.

UNHCR also noted the need to be humble, and framed protection as a set of actions guaranteeing the full enjoyment of rights. In this context, international organizations must do all they can to ensure that governments face their responsibilities and respect the rights of people while managing unrealistic expectations of what humanitarian actors can do. Humanitarian actors must be on the ground and have working relationships with groups that are in charge, in order to advocate against rights being violated and save lives. At the same time, the limits of what country offices can do, if they are to maintain access and space to operate, has to be recognized. Protection must permeate all humanitarian activities, as per the IASC Principals’ statement on the Centrality of Protection, of December 2013. There also needs to be a link between early warning and early action (which does not happen in practice), with an

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emphasis on a prevention capacity. A whole-of-system review of protection is under way with results to be presented in 2015.

In discussion, frustrations emerged over the lack of humanity displayed by political leaders, that human rights violations are on the increase, and impunity is rampant. The administration of justice in countries that experienced the Arab Spring has also proven extremely disappointing. The vulnerability of women and children is of utmost concern. A recent IOM survey of loss of life along migratory routes noted that governments do not even keep statistics of those who die on their borders. It estimates that at least 4000 migrants died in 2014 and at least 40,000 since 2000. The figure could be much higher as many deaths are never recorded. There has been no serious attention to addressing human trafficking and smuggling. Some IASC Principals felt powerless in the face of kidnappings or to respond to abuses perpetrated by governments.

Principals noted the need to ensure a multi-agency approach to protection, as well as ensuring that key groups – such as IDPs – are not left on the sidelines in advocacy. There is a need to work with HCs and HCTs, to plan more coordinated advocacy strategies to influence key players and at times, take more risk, be more specific in addressing key protection concerns with parties concerned. Ensuring presence and proximity on the ground is essential. A collective voice is needed to create momentum beyond the Security Council, and to rethink how protection is reflected in public messaging and ensure more consistent engagement with partners such as HRW. Not all the tools they possess are being used by humanitarian actors: there are frameworks of laws and norms, but these are not being used to hold governments, or non-state actors, to account. There is a need to be more specific when raising accountability issues with governments, and to reduce the risk to national and international staff.

The protection of data and of people to which they pertain was also raised as an important emerging issue, and building trust around data, data protection, and cyber security should be on the humanitarian agenda in the future. There must be ways of sharing knowledge and expertise.

Under the challenges and opportunities for protection, IASC Principals agreed that:

• Protection will be included on the agenda for the next HC retreat. Action by: ERC and OCHA by the end of May 2015.

• The IASC Secretariat will ask the CEB whether the CEB paper on protection can be shared with IASC Principals. Action: IASC Secretariat by the end of December 2014.

6. IASC Review

The ODI/HPG Team Leader presented a summary of findings and options from the review of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) which had been commissioned by the IASC Principals Steering Group to ‘enable the ERC and the Principals to review the purpose of the IASC, current working practices, the impact of its policy work and decisions and the membership of the IASC’. The consultants found that IASC is still seen as important and relevant by a wide range of actors, with its decisions having a global mandate, legitimacy and authority. However, IASC working practices need

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reform and are considered inefficient and bureaucratic. The pitch, purpose and conduct of Principals meetings were critiqued, and the subsidiary bodies were not believed to fully support the Principals.

Most importantly, there was a lack of commitment, ownership and investment at Principals level. The level of impact of IASC policy work and decisions was unclear. On membership, the tension between enabling strategic decision-making and inclusivity was highlighted. The IASC is also seen as a ‘western club’. ‘Relevance’ was cited as one potential criterion for membership, but defining or measuring this is problematic. ODI/HPG suggested that, rather than focusing on membership, the focus should rather be on diversifying participation in relevant fora, including through the subsidiary bodies.

Three options, as reflected in the report, were outlined. Option one focusses on strategic improvements to the IASC mechanism as it already exists to improve working practices and enhance strategic decision-making. Option two, ‘revitalisation’, also proposes some structural change including reconfiguring the subsidiary bodies with, inter alia, the Emergency Directors becoming members of a re-configured Working Group or Operations Group. Option three (and three plus), proposes more radical change, devolving more discussion to IASC Regional Working Groups. The Task Teams were retained in each option. The Consultants clarified that the options were not mutually exclusive and different elements might be combined.

Discussion on the report and options presented was Principals-only. The value of the IASC was generally reaffirmed. The need for commitment, trust and ownership by the Principals was acknowledged as being fundamental to the functioning of the IASC and to achieving collective action. While potential conflict of interest between agency-specific governance structures and interests and engagement in the IASC was recognized, it was agreed that commitment and engagement must be strengthened moving forward. There was broad consensus that the focus at Principals level should be on strategic issues, and some policy, rather than operations, but that needs on the ground should be the final determinant of what is discussed and done. The role of the IASC Principals in ensuring coherent advocacy and joined-up messaging was also noted. There was no consensus on any structural change, i.e, of combining the Working Group and Emergency Directors Group into a single body, but the need for ‘form to follow function’ was re-emphasized.

In reviewing ways to enhance ownership and engagement, the option of a rotating Chair for the IASC itself was not taken up, but co-facilitation or leadership on issues within the agenda did receive support. It was believed this could increase ownership, as well as enabling some burden-sharing. Principals favoured having only one main meeting a year and ensuring that this covered a limited number of issues, or sought 1-2 outcomes. The choice of topics would also play a part in encouraging engagement. While there was no proposal to increase IASC membership (and the constitutional constraints of amending GA 46/182 were noted), ensuring relevant participation for discussion of particular issues, including by special invitation, was seen as an option for greater, relevant inclusivity. The value of the Task Teams was recognized, both for taking forward policy issues, and for providing opportunities to increase diversity. It was noted that Task Teams are already time-limited. The concept of regional structures received very limited support – and raised some concern at a further proliferation of structures - but exploring means to ensure regional input into discussions was recommended. There was support for a stronger secretariat, but retaining its primary location in Geneva, rather than New York, albeit with regular travel between the two locations.

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In conclusion, the ERC noted that, given her planned departure early in 2015, the discussion should represent an initial reflection only, to be taken forward under the new ERC. Four key areas would need to be addressed: how to ensure strategy development, norm setting, support operations and improve working practice. There are already existing agreements that have not been put into practice that could have addressed some issues, such as a policy focus and membership for the Working Group. Even pending further discussion on reform, some action can already be taken to improve working practice, to suggest strategic issues for the agenda, or invite relevant organizations or bodies to meetings. Overall, however, the key to successfully moving forward remains mutual trust and commitment.

Under the IASC Review, the IASC Principals agreed:

• The ERC to prepare a paper, and propose some working modalities that can be applied immediately. Action by: ERC by end February 2015.

7. Updates

a. Update on PSEA

The Chair thanked Mr. Swing for his continued and dedicated leadership on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) as Champion on this topic. Mr. Swing noted that it had been three years since the Principals committed to take firm, collective action on PSEA, beginning with the decision to designate Senior Focal Points to develop and implement work plans on PSEA. The meeting provided an opportunity to take stock on achievements, but also to recognize how much more needs to be done. The vital importance of this initiative was underscored: not only does PSEA harm affected people and communities, but it also impedes and undermines our ability to achieve vital global commitments. PSEA cases result in severe reputational damage for humanitarian organizations collectively, and staff morale can plummet.

In December 2013, IASC Principals endorsed the PSEA progress report to the Secretary-General and the Recruitment report. The Principals also requested that respective agencies work to implement the PSEA Minimum Operating Standards (MOS) and improve organizational recruitment processes in the context of PSEA. The development of Community Based Complaint Mechanism pilots (CBCM) has borne fruit both in Ethiopia and DRC. IOM is now coordinating the inter-agency programs designed to receive complaints and address PSEA cases. UNHCR, the lead agency in Ethiopia, launched a pilot CBCM in December 2013 through its implementing partner IMC.

However, the PSEA Champion noted that the IASC had lost momentum, within each agency and collectively, on the fight to combat SEA. Streamlining and combining AAP and PSEA within a single Task Team has resulted in a loss of equitable focus, although in recent months the Task Team has taken steps to address this concern. In October, the ERC, and the AAP Champion, Ms. Whitbread, agreed that the PSEA Senior Focal Points be reconvened. He suggested at meeting of SFP in March 2015 to review the progress made by each organization in recent months.

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Under the update for PSEA, IASC Principals agreed:

• IOM will convene a meeting of the Senior Focal Points on PSEA in March 2015 to review key achievements, best practices, and implementation challenges, and report on what has been achieved in implementing the minimum operational standards and the recommendations from the report on recruitment in respective organizations. An update will be sent to Principals in May 2015. Action by: IASC Champion PSEA by the end of March 2015.

b. Update on IASC Task Teams/Priorities

The Chair, IASC Working Group provided a brief update on some of the achievements of the Task Teams in 2014 and their plans for 2015. She referenced the detailed briefs on achievements in 2014 and plans for 2015 that had been provided to the IASC Principals. The Chair of the IASC WG commented on the work done in the Task Teams in a wide array of issues, and recognized the hard work done not only by the IASC agencies but others involved in the Task Teams as well.

She noted that the Task Teams bring together a wide range and diversity of participants, with leadership being provided across both UN and NGO organizations, and with high NGO participation. She referred to positive outcome of the internal reviews of IASC bodies in which the IASC Subsidiary Bodies were streamlined to correspond with IASC Priorities, and resulted in being five instead of 12. She noted that having discussions at the regional level might benefit the work of the Task Teams, and provide an opportunity to see their impact on the ground.

c. Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) on the Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines

The Chair, IASC Working Group, informed the IASC Principals that, in 2014, an IAHE was undertaken on the respond to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. The first IAHE for a Level 3 response, the evaluation has formulated a number of recommendations for consideration in later L3 responses. An action plan for addressing the recommendations will be developed by the IASC Working Group in early 2015 and subsequently shared with the IASC Principals.

8. Conclusion

Participants welcomed the frank, robust and constructive discussions during the meeting. In the context of her announced departure at the end of March 2015, the ERC was thanked for her service over the past four years, and for her leadership of the group.

Participants confirmed that the next meeting should be held in Nairobi in May 2015, hosted by UN-Habitat.

Prepared by the IASC Secretariat13

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