union cav at chickamauga

8/13/2019 Union Cav at Chickamauga

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THE ROLE OF UNION CAVALRYDURING THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

JOHN J. LONDA MAJ USAB.S. United States Military Academy. 978

Fort Leavenworth Kansas1991

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF UNION CAVALRY DURING THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN byMAJ John J. Londa, USA, 142 pages.This study s a historical analysis of the effectiveness ofUnion cavalry during the Chickamauga campaign. GeneralWilliam S Rosecrans' desire to develop Union cavalry in theArmy of the Cumberland into an effective counter to superiorConfederate cavalry is compared to the results achievedduring the Chickamauga campaign. The Chickamauga campaignwas the first major test of the consoldiated Cavalry Corpsin the Army of the Cumberland. The contribution of thecavalry failed to meet expectations in developingintelligence on General Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennesseeand in influencing the outcome of the two day battle.First, this investigation addresses Rosecrans' operationplan for the Chickamauga campaign and what role heenvisioned the cavalry would play. Secondly, it describesthe state of Union Cavalry in August 1863 in terms oforganization, strength, training and leadership. Analysis ofoperations by the cavalry focuses on how the cavalry wereintegrated into the campaign, the success of their missions,and strength and weaknesses in their employment. Finally,this study attempts to answer the question How could theUnion cavalry have been better utilized during thecampaign?This study concludes that the improvements in the Unioncavalry in terms of arms and equipment were not matched bydevelopment of senior cavalry leaders that had a clearvision of how to employ the instrument of their own making.a consolidated Cavalry Corps.


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T BLE OF CONTENTS

hesis pproval Pagebstractable of Contents ivist of Maps v

hapter 1 The Chickamauga Campaign 1Chapter 2 The State of Union Cavalry 8Chapter 3 The Cavalry on the Left Wing 7Chapter 4 The Cavalry on the Right Wing 0Chapter 5 Conclusions 108ppendix A Union Order of Battle 30ppendix B Union Cavalry Casualties 137Bibliography 39Initial Distribution List 42


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MapMap 2Map 3Map 4Map 5Map 6Map 7Map 8Map 9Map 1MapMap 12Map 13

LIST OF MAPSPAGE

Tullahoma Campaign 6Chickamauga Campaign 1ovement to the Tennessee River 44Actions on the Tennessee River 8Movement to Chickamauga Creek 6Alexander s and Reed s Bridges 2Wilder s Brigade at Chickamauga 65The Right Wing above the Tennessee 2rossing the Tennessee River 79Reconnaissance in Will s Valley 2Reconnaissance around Alpine 88Consolidation at Crawfish Springs 4Chickamauga Battlefield 9


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CHAPTER 1- THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN

On January 4 1864 General William S. Rosecrans,former Commander of the Army of the Cumberland, sentBrigadier General Robert B. Mitchell and Colonel John T.Wilder s reports of their operations during theChickamauga campaign along with his comments to the U.S.Army Adjutant General. He praised the Union cavalrystating:

I cannot forbear calling the special attention ofthe General-in-Chief and the War Department to theconspiciaus gallantry and laborious services ofthis arm. Exposed in all weather, almost alwaysmoving, even in winter, without tents or wagons,operating in a country poorly supplied withforage. combating for the most part very superiornumbers, from the beginning of one year ago, whenits operations were mostly within infantry lines,it has become master of the field, and hesitatesnot to attack the enemy wherever it finds him. l

Rosecrans praise for the cavalry focused on thecavalry s improvement and the hardships that theyendured. His lavish praise for the part cavalry playedin the Chickamauga campaign is noticeably missing.

,Union cavalry im the Army of the Cumberland couldhave contributed much more to the Chickamauga campaign.An examination of the role of Union cavalry in thiscampaign underscores the point to which Union cavalryhad progressed. By August 1863 the development ofUnion cavalry in terms of arming, equipping, training ofsoldiers and leaders, and doctrine development had notprogressed in a balanced manner. As a result, during

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the Chickamauga campaign, the cavalry failed to make amajor contribution to the Union effort.

Rosecrans' remarks reflect the concern that he hadfor developing an effective counter to Confederatecavalry. The demands that Rosecrans placed uponWashington for improved weapons and new mounts for hiscavalry, when met, had to pay off with results.Rosecrans concluded that the investment in cavalry byWashington would harvest significant rewards on thebattlefield. During the Chickamauga campaign, he wouldnot reap the benefits.

When Rosecrans took command of the Army of theCumberland, he inherited an undisciplined string ofunits that were poorly trained. The lack in the numbersof cavalry was further aggravated by their dispersalthroughout the army. He had to contend with Confederatecavalry that could raid behind his army to interdict hissupply lines. Rosecrans saw that this weakness had tobe rectified. The improvement in Union cavalry becameone of his highest priorities. Rosecrans felt he madeprogress in the development of the cavalry. In hisJanuary 864 comments to the Army Adjutant General, hestated:

This great change, due chiefly to the jointefforts of both officers and men has been greatlypromoted by giving them arms in which they hadconfidence, and by the adoption of the determineduse of the saber.


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To Maj. Gen. D.S. Stanley s justly duegreat credit for his agency in bringing aboutthese results, and giving firmn ss and vigor tothe discipline of the cavalry.This study will examine how Rosecrans envisioned usinghis cavalry during the campaign, the state of Unioncavalry in August 1863, how the cavalry executed itsmissions, and how Union cavalry could have been moreeffectively employed.

Tbe strateaic SettinqBy the summer of 1863, the tide appeared to be

turning for the Union cause. Victories at Gettysburgand Vicksburg promised to provide stepping stones to theeventual Confederate defeat. The victory at Gettysburgin the opening days in July showed that General RobertE. Lee was capable of being beaten. Finally, after twoyears of losses to the Army of Northern Virginia, theArmy of the Potomac proved itself in battle: Vicksburg.which also fell in early July, opened the MississippiRiver to the gulf and severed the Trans-MisslssippiConfederate States. General Edmund Kirby Smith,commander of all Confederate forces west of theMissisippi, was told by Jefferson Davis that he wouldhave to be almost entirely se lf -~ uf fi ci en t. ~

Jefferson Davis realized that the South was in tsdarkest hour. n the previous two years, the South had


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lost nearly half of the territory t had claimed in1861 The loss of territory reduced the lands thatsustained the Confederate armies. General BraxtonBragg, Commander of the Army of Tennessee, held fertilemiddle Tennessee near Tullahoma. Middle Tennesseeproduced a record wheat crop in the summer of 1863,which Bragg did his best to harvest for his army.4 WithRosecrans army in the vicinty of Murfreesboro,Jefferson Davis expected the Union to try to slice theConfederate states east of the Mississippi in half.Davis could not let that happen and he would have toreinforce Bragg s army.

After the Battle of Stones River, the Army of theCumberland remained at Murfreesboro for six monthsrefitting and building up supplies. Rosecrans saw hismission as keeping Bragg s forces from reinforcingGeneral Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston, commander ofConfederate forces in the west, failed to coordinateBragg and Pemberton in an attempt to defeat Grant andlift the seige on Vicksburg. The inactivity ofRosecrans permitted the Army of the Cumberland toprepare for a summer offensive against Bragg s army.Washington did not appreciate Rosecrans lengthy delayin resuming the advance on Bragg. General HenryHalleck, General-in-Chief of Union armies, thought thatonly by actively maintaining contact with Bragg could


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Rosecrans keep Bragg tied up in Tennessee. On June 23d.the Army of the Cumberland began it s advance on Braggto bring him to battle near Tullahoma. General Halleckwas very much relieved when he learned that Rosecransarmy was on the move.

Bragg s forces occupied a line north of the DuckRiver with Polk s Corps establishing a strong point atShelbyville and Hardee s Corps at Wartrace.Hardee sposition blocked three gaps: Hoover s, Liberty, andBell Buckle (Map 1 . Bragg had to cover a wide area buthis position was well selected for defense or retreat.6

Rosecrans intended to manuever Bragg out of hisprepared positions and then bring him to battle. Heplanned to turn Bragg s right and threaten to cutBragg s line of retreat. Rosecrans gave Braggindications that his army would advance throughShelbyville. By using parts of his cavalry and ReserveCorps, Rosecrans conducted fients on the Confederateleft. He pinned Bragg s forces with one corps and senttwo corps around Bragg s right. Bragg s subordlnateswere not prepared to receive an attack. The quickseizure of Hoover s Gap by Colonel John Wilder s brigadeof mounted infantry on June 24th turned the operationinto an exploitation for the Army of the Cumberland.


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On June 29th. Bragg abandoned his defenses in theTullahoma area and withdrew south of the Elk River. Hedestroyed the bridges over the river and continued hiswithdrawal south of the Tennessee River, falling back onhis base of supplies in Chattanooga. Rosecrans'exploitation failed to catch Bragg's army. Sixteen daysof rain starting the 24 of June turned the roads intoquagmires. Heavy rains and bad roads slowed the army'sadvance such that Bragg was able to safely effect aretreat.

The Tullahoma campaign cleared the Army ofTennessee out of middle Tennessee with only 57 killed,wounded, captured, or missing in act ion.7 Major GeneralStanley, Rosecrans' Chief of Cavalry, in his memoirspraised the campaign stating:

If any student of the military art desires tomake a study of a model campaign, let him take hismaps and General Rosecrans' orders for the dailymovements of the campaign. No better example ofsuccessful strategy zas carried out during the warthan this campaign.Despite the success of the Tullahoma campaign,

Rosecrans had to hold his army for six weeks to repairthe rail line to the Tennessee River. General Halleckwas impatient with the lack of progress to advance.Halleck continued to pressure Rosecrans to begin thecampaign to defeat Bragg.


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The O~erational etting

Chattanooga was strategically importantbecause of the rail lines that joined there. Richmondand Chattanooga were linked by a 5 mile stretch ofrail line that passed through the Appalachian Mountains.As long as the Cumberland Gap remained in Confederatehands, the rail line could be used to bringreinforcements and supplies from Virginia to Bragg sarmy.9

Chattanooga represented a strong point that couldnot be directly assaulted. In the vicinity ofChattanooga, Lookout Mountain, Walden s Ridge, and theTennessee River all converged. They greatly constrictedan army s movement giving a great advantage to thedefender. The strength of the position at Chattanoogamade Rosecrans consider a more indirect approach. Theplan that Rosecrans developed t o capture Chattanoogaresembled the plan for Tullahoma. Rosecrans would usemanuever to dislodge Bragg from Chattanooga.

The obstacles between Rosecrans and Bragg wereformidable. Rosecrans faced having to cross theCumberland Plateau, the Tennessee River, Sand Mountain,and Lookout Mountain. The rugged nature of the terraingreatly restricted movement. t also had the effect ofscreening the movement of both armies from each other.


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The army that could best develop accurate intelligenceconcerning their enemy would gain a great advantage.

Rosecrans wanted to capture the key city ofChattanooga and to bring Bragg s army to battle. Hefaced many difficulties closing his army on Bragg s.The flanks of his army would not be secure. His armywould have to cross a major water obstacle, theTennessee River. He had to continue to advance withoutbeing able to extend his railroad supply lines beyondthe Tennessee. The terrain that his army would crosslacked forage and would barely support his horses. Theworst problem of all was that he had little accurateintelligence about Bragg s disposition, strength, andintentions.

The Army of the Cumberland was organized into fivecorps: XIVth. XXth, XXIth, Reserve, and Cavalry Corps.Rosecrans started the campaign with 80,000 men.I0 Hisforces, however, had to maintain a long supply line fromNashville. Rosecrans had to use two thirds of hisReserve Corps to guard his supply lines reducing hiseffective strength to around 65,000.

Jefferson Davis, who knew that Bragg had to holdhis own against Rosecrans, ensured that Bragg wasreinforced. Bragg. who in mid August had 44,000 men,was to receive reinforcements from Knoxville, SimonBolivar Buckner brought 8,000 men, from Mississippi, Joe


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Johnston sent 11,500 under John C Breckinride andW.T.H. Walker, and Lee sent James Longstreet with 12.000from Virginia. I When Bragg did meet Rosecrans atChickamauga he would have the advantage in numbers oftroops.

Rosecrans planned to advance his army on threeaxes to the Tennessee (Map 2 . He would try to deceiveBragg as to where he would cross the Tennessee and thenuse the mountainous terrain to mask his movement.Rosecrans planned to conduct a demonstratlon with aportion of his cavalry north of Chattanooga whileconducting a deliberate river crossing operation southof the city. By moving south of Chattanooga, heintended to interpose the Army of the Cumberland betweenBragg s army and Atlanta, forcing Bragg to fight onground that he would pick. The movement south of theTennessee would also be on three widely dispersed axeswhile moving over Sand and Lookout Mountain.

Bragg was initially unsure about what course ofaction to pursue. He was concerned that Rosecrans andAmbrose Burnside. Commander of Department of the Ohio,would conduct a joint move against his army. By thetime Rosecrans reached the Tennessee, Bragg decided toconcentrate hls army southwest of Chattanooga and go onthe offensive. I2 He hoped to attack at the time andplace of his choosing.


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m e attle of Chickamausq

When Rosecrans army emerged from behind LookoutMountain, XIVth, XXth, and XXIst Corps were widelyscattered. Major General Alexander McCook s XXth Corpswas the farthest south of the three corps with MajorGeneral Stanley s Cavalry Corps operating to his front.McCook s corps was 5 miles south of Chattanooga whenhis corps reached Alpine. Major General George ThomasXIVth Corps came into McLemore s Cove at Steven s Gap.He was 15 miles from the northern most corps,Crittenden s corps. Major General Thomas L. Crittendenmoved directly into Chattanooga after Bragg hadevacuated it He continued toward Ringgoid beforeThomas uncovered Bragg s location.

With the three corps so widely dispersed. Bragg hadan excellent opportunity to fall on each corps anddefeat each seperately. The Army of Tennessee hadconcentrated at La Fayette and could defeat Rosecrans indetail. First, Bragg tried to launch an attack againstThomas. His subordinates unfortunately balked atconducting the attack. Bragg, next, turned hisattention to Crlttenden s corps which had moved up toLee and Gordon s mills. Once again, Bragg ssubordinates failed to press an opportunity to attack.


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Rosecrans realized the perilious position of theArmy of the Cumberland. He ordered a hurriedconcentration of his army in the vicinity of Lee andGordon s mill. McCook s corps and Thomas s corpsconducted forced marches and closed on Crittenden scorps before Bragg could strike. The cavalry on theleft flank, on September 18th. guarded the crossing ofthe Chickamauga Creek gaining time for Rosecrans tosolidify his position along the La Fayette Road. TheCavalry Corps on the right flank of the army closed into support McCook s corps.

Bragg s plan of attack was based upon flankingRosecrans left. His intent was to gain the La FayetteRoad, therefore cutting Rosecrans off from Chattanooga.On the morning of September 19th. as Bragg continued tosend his units across Chickamauga Creek, Thomas launchedan attack against what he thought wa s an isolatedConfederate brigade. The fight on the 19th continued toescalate throughout the day as new units were throwninto the action. The fight developed into a generalengagement as the two lines met. Bragg continued topush to reach Rosecrans left. The day ended in astalemate with each side sustaining a large number ofcasual ties.

Bragg decided to press the issue the next day andattacked once again. He continued to try to turn


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Rosecrans left. At around 10 M on the 20th, an orderfrom Rosecrans headquarters to Brigadier General ThomasJ. Wood, a division commander in Crittenden s corps,directed Wood to close up on Major General Reynoldsdivision. This created a gap in the Union line. Atabout the same time, Longstreet attacked with threeConfederate divisions through the gap. Longstreet sattack completely ruptured the Union defense causing theUnion right to flee the field for Chattanooga. TheUnion left under Thomas was bent back but established ahasty defense at Snodgrass Hill. The fragments of unitsthat rallied on Snodgrass Hill continued to hold. Thearmy s Reserve Corps under Major General Gordon Grangermarched to Thomas s assistance. Thomas continued tohold the hill until late in the day before withdrawingto Chattanooga.

The Battle of Chickamauga was one of the bloodiestfights of the civil war. The losses for Rosecransincluded 1 656 killed, 9 749 wounded, and 4 774 missing;a total of 16 179 casualties. Bragg suffered 2 673killed, 16 274 wounded, and 2 003 missing for 20 950 intotal. The col lapse of the Union right causedRosecrans, McCook, Crittenden and many other seniorofficers to flee the field. Shortly after the Battle ofChickamauga, Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden wererelieved of command. The Union army continued to hold


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Chattanooga only to find themselves under seige in thecity. Rosecrans campaign that began so gloriouslyafter his success at Tullahoma culminated in disasterfor Rosecrans and only a partial victory for Bragg.

ander s Vision for the Cavalrv

Rosecrans was a meticulous planner and tended toclosely manage his subordinates. His plan for the useof the Union cavalry was characterized by those twotraits. The initial orders for the campaign detailedthe size of cavalry forces to be employed on each flankand specified the units to be used. He assigned specificmissions for the two cavalry brigades on the left flank

Stanley on histhe cavalry on thelank and conduct

but gave more leeway to Major Generalright flank. The primary mission ofleft flank was to screen the army s fthe demonstration above Chattanooga. The right fwould exploit the attainment of the enemy s flankconducting a raid to cut Bragg s supply lines.

ankby

Rosecrans vision of how to use his cavalry seemedto end as they arrived on the battlefield. The cavalryrepresented a critical intelligence asset that Rosecransneeded to utilize to see the battlefield. They alsorepresented considerable potential combat power whichRosecrans needed.


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ENDNOTES1. The War of the Rebellion A Compilation of theQfficial Records of the Union and Confederate ArmiesVol XXX Pt 1 p. 79.2. O . R . Vol XXX Pt 1 p 79.3. Catton Bruce Never Call Retreat p. 207.4. Catton p. 206-208.5. Van Horne Thomas B. Historv of the Armv ofthe Cumberland p. 298.6. Van Horne p. 302.7. Boyington H.V. The Chickamauaa Campaian in

Campaians in Kentucky and Tennessee p. 323.8. Stanley David S. Personal Memoirs ofMajor-General David S. Stanley p. 150.9. Catton p. 239.10. Catton p. 241.1 1 . Catton p. 241.12. Connelly Thomas L. Autumn of Glorv p. 149.13. Tucker Glenn Chickamauaa: Bloodv Battle ofthe West p. 388 389.


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advantage in numbers. The Federal Quartermaster sDepartment and the Ordnance Bureau provided some re1 ief.On October 30th. Union cavalry in the Army of theCumberland wa s composed of eight regiments. Thestate of Union cavalry. however, still did not meetRosecrans satisfaction.2

Rosecrans telegraphed General Henry Halleck.General-in-Chief of the armies, on October 30th.requesting that Brigadier-General David Stanley beassigned to the newly created Army of the Cumberland asChief of Cavalry. Rosecrans wanted Stanley to be givencommand of the cavalry rather than serve strictly a s anadministrative staff officer. Stanley wa s considered bymany as the type of cavalry officer capable of whippingthe cavalry into shape. Rosecrans had his way, and onNovember 24 Stanley wa s assigned to command all of thecavalry in the Army of the Cumberland. During theinitial years of the Civil War, cavalry regiments wereassigned to infantry divisions. Stanley saw hi s firsttask as consolidating the cavalry. Stanley set about toform the cavalry into brigades and dlvlsions.Initially, the cavalry was organized into three brigadeunder General Stanley and had a strength of about fourthousand.


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Rosecrans, still not satisfied with the strength ofthe cavalry, continued to press Halleck, Secretary ofWar Edwin Stanton and Quartermaster General MontgomeryMeigs for mounts for his cavalry. Meigs was able torespond by sending 2,000 more horses to Indianapolis.Rosecrans continued to press Washington for more cavalryto counter what he believed wa s Bragg s 10,000 to 12,000cavalry. By December 31st, Stanley reported a strengthof 4425 men in his division as the Army set out forStones River.

Brigadier General David S. StanleyC V LRY DIVISIONColonel John Kennett

FIRST BRIGADE SECOND BRIGADE RESERVE BRIGADECol Robert Minty Col Lewis Zahm BG D.S. Stanley2d Indiana 1st Ohio 15 Pennsylvania3d Kentucky 3d Ohio 1st (5th) MidTennessee4th Michigan 4th Ohio 2d Tennessee7th Pennsylvania ART1 LLERY1st Ohio, Battery D (Section)

UNATTACHED4th U.S. CavalryConfederate cavalry under John Morgan successfully

conducted a raid of the Louisville and NashvilleRailroad from December 22 to 5 January 1863 While inKentucky Morgan s cavalry destroyed the Bacon Creek


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Bridge and several miles of track. The disruption ofRosecrans' lines of communication and the frustration ofnot being able to pursue the Confederate raidersprovided sufficient impetus to get Rosecrans to backColonel John T. Wilder's request to mount his brigade ofinfantry. On January 14th, Rosecrans wired Stantonrequesting authority to purchase five thousand horsesand saddles to mount his infantry. The quick approvalof Rosecrans' request and the vigorous scouring of thecountryside for horses led to the forming of the famousLighting Brigade of Mounted Infantry. The regimentalhistorian of the 72d Indiana Infantry, Sergeant B.F.McGee reported that one or two companies drewconvalescent mounts- a feeble sort of animal. Other

mounts issued at Murfreesboro were undrilled horseswhich McGee states caused problems to the newly mountedinfantry.

We were little less than a mounted mob for alittle while; but we soon gave our horses asaddle, bridle and spur drill which led them tounderstand pretty we1 what we were up to n5This brigade would frequently be ordered to conductcavalry type missions, but as mounted infantry tremained assigned to an infantry division.

Reorganizing the cavalry on April 10 Stanleyformed two divisions of two brigades each. The cavalryhad a total of 22 cavalry regiments and three batteries


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of artillery. The strength of the cavalry regiments wassuch that they were regiments in name only due to a lackof mounts. The average regiment was about 50 strength.

AVALRY CORPSas Ef 30 June 1863~Brigadier General David S. Stanley

FIRST CAVALRY DIVISIONBrigadier General Robert B. MitchellFIRST BRIGADE SECOND BRIGADECol Archibald Campbell Col Edward M McCook

4th Kentucky 2d Indiana5th Kentucky 4th Indiana7th Kentucky 5th Kentucky2d Michigan 2d Tennessee9th Pennsylvania 1st Wisconson1st Tennessee ART1 LLERY1st Ohio, Battery D


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14,000. Rosecrans' army continued to build up suppliesat Murfreesboro while being pressed by Halleck toadvance on Bragg. Rosecrans continued to seek anadditional 6,000 cavalry before moving to the offensive.Between April 27 and August 17 the Louisvillequartermaster wa s to send an additional 12,383 horsesbringing Rosecrans' cavalry to a present for dutystrength of 10,400 8

By August, the cavalry was restructured once againinto two divisions, of three brigades each. The brigadeswere typically composed of four regiments and commandedby a colonel. A cavalry regiment, composed of twelvecompanies, wa s commanded by a lieutenant-colonel.Captains commanded companies with an authorized strengthof approximate1 y one hundred men.9 At the highest pointof Union cavalry strength, Rosecrans' cavalry had fewcompanies at full strength. As soldiers were killed,wounded.or deserted, the companies shrank in size andcapability. The average company, in August 1863, hadbetween 30 to 40 men present for duty. Stanleycomplained in his memoirs;

Instead of raising a fixed number of regimentsand keeping them filled up, they raised newregiments thus giving an opportunity for morecommissions and leaving the first r giments aswell as the new ones inefficient. 1


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Major General David S. Stanley

Br gadFIRST BRIGADECol A.P. Campbe1

FIRST CAVALRY DIVISIONier General Robert B. MitchellSECOND BRIGADE THIRD BRIGADECol E.M. McCook Col L.D. Watkins

2d Michigan 2d Indiana 4th Kentucky1st Tennessee 4th Indiana 5th Kentucky9th Pennsylvanla 2d Tennessee 6th Kentucky3d Tennessee 7th Kentucky1st WisconsinART LLERY1st Ohio. Battery D (Section)

Brigadier General George CrookFIRST BRIGADE SECOND BRIGADE THIRD BRIGADECol Robert Minty Col El i Long Co1 W. Lowe

3d IndianaCBattalion) 1st Ohio 5th Iowa4th Michigan 3d Ohio 10th Ohio7th Pennsylvania 4th Ohio 5th Tennessee4th United States 2d KentuckyARTI.LLERYChicago Board of Trade Battery

Despite Rosecrans' request for revolving rifles forhis cavalry, the primary weapon of the Union cavalrymanwa s the single shot breechloading carbine. Thedecreased length and weight of the carbine coupled withits durability, firepower, and its waterproof cartridgesmade t the perferred weapon of the cavalry. l Althougha wide varlety of carbines were issued, the Sharp's,caliber 52 and the Burnside's carbine, caliber .54,


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Turning in their old Springfield rifles. ColonelWilder's brigade recieved Spencer seven shot repeatingrifles on May 5 1863.16 Through Wilder's initiative tofinance their purchase, circumventing the OrdnanceBureau's opposition to the weapon, his brigade was theonly unit to be equipped with Spencers in August of1863. While Wilder's brigade was for the most partoutfitted with Spencers, the 92d Indiana was onlypartially equipped. Joining the brigade in June, theyhad mostly Enfield rifles and a limited amount ofSpencers. The repeaters were to substantially increasethe Lighting Brigade's firepower and would initiallydemonstrate their value at Tullahoma.

Cavalrv Tacticg

The drill regulations of this period were the 41Tactics or the Pointsett Tactics authorized by J.R.Pointsett, Secretary of War in 1841. They were heavilybased upon French tactics with some minor changes.17The 1826 Scott's Tactics and Cooke's Cavalry Tacticsalso influenced the tactics used by cavalry. Cavalry,considered an arm of secondary importance to infantry,was judged indispensable for reconnaissance before thebattle. The European view of cavalry as critical forcompleting the destruction of the enemy during thebattle was not prevalent during the Civil War. During


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the battle Union cavalry was frequently expected tofight dismounted as infantry. Cavalry wa s also expectedto use its mobility to pursue and destroy a beatenenemy.

During the first two years of the war Unioncavalry was frequently used as outposts scouts andcourriers. l Outposts provided security for the armyand acted as a barrier to the entrance of patrols andspies or to resist sudden movement of the enemy. Theextensive use of cavalry pickets and the use of cavalryto protect lines of communication were responsible fortremendous wear on Union mounts. Infantry pickets andguards were as effective as cavalry and saved thecavalry for what i t did best. The importance ofscouting became apparent and came to be considered as anecessary preliminary to every campaign. Theconsolidation of the cavalry under Stanley eliminatedmuch of the waste of Union cavalry and allowed it toexploit its mobility.

The use of Confederate cavalry to conduct raidsbehind Union lines to destroy railroad lines and supplytrains added a new mission for cavalry. Soldiersstationed along the supply routes protected the Unionrailroads and depots. Infantry and cavalry workedtogether to secure the long supply lines. Due to the


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limited numbers of cavalry. Union cavalry conducted fewraids on Confederate supply lines.

nina the CavalreTraining was a major challenge for the leaders of

the Union cavalry. The general belief was that it tookabout two years to train a cavalryman. This belief wasresponsible for the failure to commit resources at thestart of the war to develop the cavalry. Feeling thatthe war would be won quickly General Winfield Scottresisted accepting volunteer cavalry. As it becameclear that cavalry was needed officers and men of new1ymade cavalry regiments had everything to learn. 9

Training in horsemanship was especially lacking.This was to initially account for much of the waste ofgood mounts. Horses were overloaded marches wereprolonged without adequate rest and forage was notalways readily available. t was experience alone thattrained the cavalry to eventually travel light and carefor their mounts.20

Cavalry being viewed as both mounted anddismounted fighters required training in riding horsecare mounted close order drill dismounted drill andthe manual of arms for saber pistol and carbine.Besides the training required of a cavalryman trainingneeded to be conducted in the usual duties of soldiers


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such as scouting, camp life and military courtesy.Since there was no formal schooling program fortraining, unit commanders were responsible for alltraining, frequently learning one step ahead of theirmen. 2 Men were dri led six hours a day when possible,while the commissioned officers were put through anextra number of hours in the mornings or afternoons. 22As more regiments received their mounts, units wouldconduct company and battalion drills in preparation forRosecrans Tullahoma campaign. 23

The inexperience of Rosecrans and many of hi ssenior cavalry leaders in August of 863 is notsurprising. The Civil War brought into the Union Armymany officers who had limited military experience.General Rosecrans background did not suggest that hewa s clearly the most obvious choice to command the Armyof the Cumberland. He graduated from West Point in 1842and was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers. Failingto serve in the Mexican War, the next ten years ofservice after his graduation wa s unexceptional. He leftthe service, but at the start of the Civil War hereturned to serve as aide to General McClellan a s astate colonel of engineers. In June of 1861, he waspromoted to Brigadier General. Rosecrans commanded an


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infantry brigade during the Battle of Rich Mountain. ByMay of 1862 he found himself directing the left wing ofPope's Army of the Mississippi. When Pope was summonedto the eastern theater, Rosecrans found himself incommand of the Army of Mississippi.24 Rosecrans wasclearly concerned about the state of his cavalry but didnot have the experience to know how to best use them.Stanley stated in his memoirs: As have stated before,Rosecrans had no idea of the use of cavalry . 5

General Stanley, on the otherhand, was aprofessional soldier. He graduated from West Point in1852 and was posted to cavalry on the Indian frontier.In 1861 he was stationed at Fort Washita, Oklahoma andparticipated in the Missouri Campaign. On September 81861 he was promoted to Brigadier General. He spentthe winter of 1861 laid up with a broken leg butreturned in March of 1862 to command a division at NewMadrid and Island His extensive experience withcavalry on the frontier did not prepare him for massedcavalry utilization, yet he strongly held the Europeanbeliefs about the effectiveness of massed cavalry. Heplaced a lot of emphasis in preparing the cavalry to usethe saber over the carbine. He would serve asRosecrans' chief of cavalry until just four days beforethe Battle of Chickamauga began.


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Robert B. Mitchell, who was to replace Stanley aschief of Cavalry for the remainder of the Chickamaugacampaign, served in the Mexican war with the 2d Ohio.He returned to Ohio in 1855 where he went into politics.By 1856 he had moved to Kansas. At the outbreak of thewar, he was commissioned Colonel of the 2d KansasInfantry. He was badly wounded at the battle of WilsonCreek in August 1861. His promotion to BrigadierGeneral on 8 April 6 was followed by command of a mixedinfantry and cavalry brigade at Fort Riley. AtPerryville he commanded the 9th Division of Gilbert'sCorps. 7 Rosecrans placed him in command of the FirstDivision of the Cavalry Corps over Stanley's objections.Mitchell's experience with cavalry was primarily underStanley as a division commander. He remained thecommander of the Union Cavalry for only a brief periodbased upon his performance at Chickamauga. Before theBattle of Chattanooga, he was called to Washington.Stanley's opinion of Mitchell was that he was Apolitician, always thinking of the votes he could makein Kansas 8 Crook also held a low opinion ofMitchell's worth as a commander. 9

Brigadier General George Crook, who commanded theSecond Division of the Cavalry Corps, graduated fromWest Point in 1852. He was commissioned in the 4thInfantry and served until the outbreak of the war in the


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northwest; northern California and Washington. OnSeptember 2 1861, he was promoted to Colonel of the36th Ohio and served in West Virginia. In August of1862, he was promoted to Brigadier General. He tookpart in the Battles of South Mountain and Sharpsburg.On July 30, 1863, he was transfered to Tennessee and wasgiven command of the Second Division. He had thereputation as a leader who shared hardships and dangerswith his men and was considered an excellent officer. 30

Colonel Edward M McCook, a politician who turnedsoldier, was to become the Flrst Division commander whenMltchel became the chief of cavalry. On May 8, 1861,he was commissioned as a lieutenant of cavalry in theRegular Army. He was quickly promoted to major,lieutenant colonel, and colonel with the 2d IndianaCavalry. He was to command a brigade at Perryvilleconsisting of the 2d Indiana and three Kentuckyregiments.3 McCook did not have any mi l taryexperience before the start of the Civil War. Hebecame, nevertheless, an effective divisional cavalrycommander despite his limited background.

Brigade commanders in the cavalry corps hadsimiliarly mixed levels of experience. The best Unioncavalry leaders were Colonel Robert H. G. Minty andColonel Eli Long, both in Crook s Divlsion. ColonelWilder, while not a cavalry brigade commander, was a


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superb leader. He amply demonstrated at Tullahoma hisbold leadership.

Eff orts to improve cavalry by increasing tsnumbers and improve its training made substantialprogress toward providing the Army of the Cumberlandwith an adequate cavalry force. By the cavalry sconsolidation, Rosecrans tried to bring his cavalry tothe level expected of European cavalry. Stanley s goalfor the cavalry wa s to have a force that could conduct amassed cavalry charge with sabers and be decisive on thebattlefield. The increased range and lethality of theinfantry rifle was to decrease the.effectiveness ofmassed cavalry charges. The cavalry had the mobility

and firepower it needed to allow t to conduct securityoperations but not the firepower to defeat massedinfantry.

Despite the initative to consolidate the Unioncavalry into a cavalry corps, utilization of the cavalrywa s at times fragmented. Brigades were attached toinfantry divisions, dependent upon the needs of themission. Rosecrans shortage of cavalry, coupled withmarginally trained cavalry regiments and the limitedexperience of senior officers in employing massed


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cavalry played an important role in how Union Cavalrywas employed during the Chickarnauga campaign.


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EN NOTES

1. m e ar of the Rebellion: A Comwilation of thefic a1 Reco ds of the Union and Confed rate Armi es.128 Volumes, Washington, D.C.: War Department,1880-1901. Vol XVII, Pt 2 p. 148.

2. Starr, Stephen 2 The Union Cavalrv in theCivil War. 3 vols. Baton Rouge: Louisiana St UniversityPress, 1985 p. 109.3 . Cavalry of the Civil War, ItsEvolution and Influences , in The Cavalrv, Volume 416-38. Francis T. Miller, editor, The Photoara~hicHistorv of the Civil W ~L. New York: The Review ofReviews Company, 1910 p. 254.4. O.R.. Vol XX, Pt 1 p. 182.5 McGee, B.F.. Historv of the 72d IndianaV lunteer In antrv of the Mounted Licahtina Briaa*.LaFayette, Indiana: S Vater Co., 1882 p. 109 115.6 . O.R. Vol XXIII, Pt 1 p. 418.7 O.R. Vol XXII, Pt 2 p. 29.8 . Starr, p. 255.9. Shannon, Fred A. m e raanization andAdministration of the Union Armv. 1861-1865. Cleveland:The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1928 p. 270.10. Stanley, David S Personal Memoirs of MaiocGeneral D. S Stanlev. U.S.A.. Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press, 1917 p. 137.11. Van Horne. Thomas B. Historv of the Armv odt e Cumberland: Its Oraanization. Cam~aians. ndBattles. Wilmington. N.C.: Broadfoot Publishing Company,1988. pp. 384-385.12. Miller, p. 56.13. McGee, B.F. Hietorv of the 7 d IndianaVolunteer Znfantrv of the Mounted Liahtnina BriaadeLaFayette, Indiana: S Vater and Company. 1882 p. 120.


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14. Thiele Thomas F The Evolution of Cavalrv inthe American Civil War: 1861-1863. PHD dissertationUniversity of Michigan. 1951 p 29.15. Miller p 58.

17. Miller p 60.18. Herr m e tory of U.S. Cavalrv. p 118.19. Mlller. pp 60 70.20. Miller p 70.21. Thiele. p 56.22. Carter. W. R Historv of the First Reaiment ofTennesse Volunteer Cavalrv in the Great War of thebbe11im. Knoxville. Gaut-Ogden Company 1902 P 6023. Carter. pp 60-61 72.24. Warner Ezra J Generals in Blue. Baton Rougeand London: Louisiana state University Press 1964 p410.25. Stanley p 158.26. Warner p. 470.27. Warner. p 329.28. Stanley p. 135.29. Cook George General Georse Crook. HisAutobiosraohv. Norman. Oklahoma: University of OklahomaPress 1946 p 107.30. Warner. p 103.31. Warner p 296.


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First Brigade of the Second Cavalry Division. On thest of August, Minty's brigade was detached from the

Cavalry Corps to the left wing. General Crittenden'sXXIst Corps. In Rosecrans' order of the 15th of Augustthat initiated the campaign. Minty's cavalry receiveddetailed instructions. Minty's brigade acted under theorders of General Van Cleve, Crittenden's corps.Minty's orders were:

to move w th two brigades of Van Cleve'sciivisiontl.Rosecrans' orders to Van Cleve concerning Minty werespeclflc; move:

the main body of the caval y via Sparta, clearingthe rebels out from Caney .The second mission called for the cavalry to gather

intelligence concerning the Army of Tennessee'slocation, strength, and disposition. Unknown toRosecrans was whether Bragg would actively resist hiscrossing of the Tennessee River. Minty and Wilder'sbrigades were to share this mission.

Rosecrans' initial order required that Van Clevehave

two battalions of Minty's cavalry accompany theInfantry co umn which will move, via Spenser, onPikeville .

After clearing the left flank and posting a cavalrybattalion at or near Sparta to watch the flank of


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would rejoin him at Pikevilinitial order:

on arriving at Pickvil

e. Van Cleve, from the

e, he [Van Clevel will

Van Cleve's route, the remainder of Minty's brigade

without delay push a strong cavalryreconnassiance, i f possible, to the TennesseeRiverMinty was to recon the river crossing at Blythe's Ferryand at Washington.

Wilder's mounted brigade, remaining under thecontrol of Reynolds, Thomas' corps, was:

'to make a demonstration on Chattanooga andHarrison's Landing.Crittenden's other two divisions were to supportWilder's reconnaissance and subsequent demonstration.General Palmer would support the move on Harrison withan infantry brigade while General Wood would support themove opposite Chattanooga. 7

Rosecrans decided that he would cross the Tennesseesouth of Chattanooga. His intent for Crittenden's corpswa s to conduct a demonstration to the river and if theConfederates had withdrawn south to search for crossingsites. While conducting the reconnassiance mission, thethird mission for the cavalry on the left wing was tosupport a demonstration to confuse Bragg as to thearmy's movement. Bragg could not be sure whetherBurnside would in fact link up with Rosecrans.crossing north of Chattanooga would permit the two


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Brigadier General. He was breveted to Major-General forhis battlefield successes but declined a commission inthe regular army after the war. He was considered apopular and highly competent officer, yet many felt hisservices were not rewarded with promotion in a timelymanner.

Wilder s brigade was composed of the 17th and 726Indiana, the 92d, 98th and 123d Illinois InfantryRegiments and the 18th Indiana battery. Colonel John TWilder was raised in New York but traveled west as ayoung man to make a living. He gained experience infoundary work and at the outbreak of the Civil War wasmaking cannons at his foundary in Greensburg, Indiana.He tried to raise an artillery battery but instead wasmustered in as infantry. He rose quickly in rank andwas appointed to colonel of the 17th Indiana InfantryRegiment. In the reorganization of the Army of theCumberland in December 1862. Wilder was appointed tocommand the brigade.9 Wilder was a dynamic leader whomolded his men into an effective fighting force. ByAugust of 1863, Wilder s brigade had gained some initialexperience with their Spencer repeaters. The firepowerof the Spencers provided them a capability far superiorto any other brigade size units on either side. Much ofthe credit for the effectiveness of this brigade isattributable to Wilder s foresight and leadership.


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Draanization Problems of the Left WingThe command relationship between the cavalry and

the corps commanders was unclear from the openning daysof the campaign. Critenden was clearly unsure of hisrelationship to Minty. Crittenden asked Garfield,Rosecrans' Chief of Staff, as late as the 24th of Augustto clarify the situation.

In clause of the marching orders, you stateMinty will act under the orders of Van Cleve,according to special instructions of theCommanding Gener should like to know theseorders, if any.

Garfield responded to Crittenden by clarifying that:Minty's comman is under your [Crittenden'sldirect orders

The command relationship also posed problems forCrittenden in gathering intelligence. Minty reported toVan Cleve while Wilder reported to Reynolds. Crittendenhad to rely upon reports from the infantry brigadessupporting Wilder's brigade to find out what washappening out in front of the right wing of his corps.The brigades were several miles behind Wilder at timesand were reporting solely what they thought thesituation was out in front.


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The Ca m~ ai an eaing

The order to start the Chickamauga Campaign wasissued on the 15th of August, with units to movestarting the 16th. Minty s brigade, started fromMcMinnville as the campaign began. The total strengthof Minty s brigade on the 15th was approximately 1,700troopers. l 2 His brigade was substantially short the 5days of forage that Rosecrans order stated that theyneeded for the operation. On the 15th, Minty reportedhaving only day of forage on hand. A shortage ofhorses wa s also a problem. Minty was to leave 200 menin McMinnville due to a lack of mounts. Despite theshortage of forage, Minty started his movement at 0200on the 17th. Forage was scheduled to be brought in byrail to McMinnville but wa s to remain a constant problemon the move to the Tennessee. 13

Wilder started from Decherd on the 16th. Wilder sbrigade moved by way of University and Tracy City toTherman s (Map 3 . A t Therman s, Wilder would link upwith Wood s infantry brigade.

A Brush with Dibrell Cavalry at Sparta

Minty was to link up with Van Cleve on the 18th atPikeville after clearing Dibrell s cavalry brigade from


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Sparta. Having attempted to clear Dibrell out of thevicinity of Sparta on the 4th and 9th of August,Minty s brigade was familiar with the rebel brigadeactivities. Minty found Dibrell 2 miles from Sparta onMonday afternoon, 17 August with a strong force andaccording to Minty's report attacked and routed him ,pursuing and capturing 23 prisoners. The Union losseswere reported at 16 casualties. Minty left the ThirdIndiana Cavalry battalion at Rock Island to watch therebels that had been in the vicinity Sparta.14

Continuing on to the linkup at Pikeville, Mintyarrived the evening of the 19th. Upon reachingPikeville, Minty had only about 1 200 men with him. Therough terrain and the shortage of forage was taking itstoll on his mounts. Van Cleve, in his report toCrittenden, stated that Minty would start thereconnaissance to the Tennessee on the next day takingabout a 1.000 men. 15

From the Seauatchie Vallev To the Tennessee

Minty's one day delay in arriving at Pikevilhim behind Rosecran's schedule, however the delayinsignificant as the remainder of the XXIst Corps

le putwaswas

moving equally as slow. Van Cleve's brigades arrived atPikeville in the Sequatchie Valley earlier in the day onthe 19th.


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Wilder's brigade on the 18th was 3 miles in frontof Wood's division in the vicinity of Pruden's and hadreceived reports that possiblily two regiments ofConfederate cavalry were in the Sequatchie Valleyblockading the Anderson road over Walden Ridge. AtP.M. on the 19th. Wilder's brigade arrived at Dunlapthe Sequatchie Valley. Upon arriving in the SequatchValley, Minty's lead regiment, the 92d Illinois, madecontact with Confederate pickets, surprising andcapturing 4 Confederate soldiers. Wi lder by nowbelieved that the Confederates had no major units northof the Tennessee and sent this up in his reports.General Palmer's division arrived an hour after Minty'sbrigade reached Duniap. 6

On the morning of the 20th both Minty's andWilder's brigades left Sequatchie Valley and started theclimb of Walden's Ridge. The steep, rugged climb slowedmovement but by 9 AM on the 21st Minty had reachedMorgantown where:

His scouts to Washington drove a force of 150rebels from Morgantown to Tenneyqee River, whichthey crossed below Washington .Minty was responsible for the crossings at Washingtonand Blythe's Ferry. When Minty's scouts reach Blythe'sFerry, they reported finding two Mississippi regimentsbusy throwing up entrenchments on the far side of theriver.


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Wilder, on the other hand, had reached Poe s Tavernon the 20th. A small party of Confederate soldierswere surprised and captured at Poe s Tavern. Wilder, onthe 21st. pushed two of his regiments to Harrison with 2guns and the remainder of the brigade on to opposite ofChattanooga. Wagner/s infantry brigade by this timewas on the south side of Walden s Ridge on the road thatran out of Anderson. They were to remain on the highgound overwatching Wilder s progress and reporting backto General Wood.

From the 2 st of August until the 9th of September,Minty s and Wilder s brigades remained in the TenneesseValley where they provided useful intelligence ofactivities along the river from Chattanooga to Kingston


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MAP 4ACTIONS ON THETENNESSEE RIVERP AU LU8T- 11 SEPTEMBER

PLATEAUOF THECUMBERLAND


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information that Forrest's cavalry was crossing backacross the Tennessee at Sale Creek. The August 22dcontact of a forage party with rebel forces atWashington and observations of five artillery piecesand 900 men arriving at Blythe's Ferry caused Minty tobecome very concerned about the distance between hisbrigade and Wilder's. Minty was afraid that his brigademight get cutoff from the rest of the army. Withoutorders, early in the morning of the 23d. Minty moved thebulk of his command south toward Poe's Tavern closing inon Wilder. He posted small forces along the Tennesseeto watch the crossing at Washington, Blythe's Ferry, andSale Creek to comply with his mission. This decisiondid not meet with either Crittenden's or Rosecrans'approval 9

Crittenden, initially unsure who ordered Minty'smove to Poe's Tavern, was still highly concerned withthe threat to his left flank. Crittenden told Van Clevethat Minty must maintain contact with his division andto mind the exposed condition of your left 20 VanCleve, n response, ordered Minty to move back toSmith's crossroads near Morgantown or rejoin him atPikeville. Minty returned to Smith's Cross-roads on the25th and continued to post 2 man pickets along theroads leading to the crossing sites with a 24 man picketat Blythe's Ferry. The remainder of the brigade on the


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25th commenced to conduct reconnaissance north along theriver toward Kingston. The Confederate activity duringthis period wa s confined to the threat by Forrestfurther up the Tennesse River. Reports of 5,000Confederate cavalry at Kingston greatly concerned bothMinty and Crittenden.

On the 22d, Wilder began to shell Chattanooga andthe Confederate positions at Harrison. His artillerysank one steamboat, the Paint Rock, and disabledanother, the Dunbar, as well as causing a good deal ofactivity in Chattanooga. From opposite Chattanooga,Wilder was able to monitor the movement of trains in andout of Chattanooga and the location of units around theclty. His report on August 22d stated:

I believe that the rebels are leavingChattanooga. I distinctly saw two locomotivesleave there drawing eight other locamotives to-dayat p.m. There does not appear to be as manytroops in the vicinity as there was yesterday .On the 23d, Wil

to Sale Creek whereopportunity for theintelligence and Min

der sent two of his regiments norththey met Minty. This was the firsttwo brigades to exchanget y was able to pass on information

on what he thought was going on toward Kingston. Thelinkup no doubt came as a relief to Minty and togetherwith Van Cleve's orders gave Minty confidence inpatrolling further north along the river. Wildercontinued to maintain pressure on Chattanooga by


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shelling everyday and giving the appearance of a muchlarger force. On the 30th. Wilder sent three of thescouts from the 17th Indiana across the river and up onRacoon Mountain to determine the strength of Braggaround ~ h a t a n o o g a . ~ ~couting missions from August 30thon were expanded to the south toward Bridgeport.

Friar's Island, the best fording site on theTennessee river north of Chattanooga, was scouted onAugust 25th. Fording the Tennessee at this point waspossible except during periods of heavy rain. Wilder'sscouts found t heavily picketed; guarded by a batteryof artillery behind earthworks. The 72d Indianaconducted scouting missions to the island everyday butcontinued to be opposed. Wilder's brigade wa s checkedfrom crossing all along the Tennessee at the crossingsites by emplacements south of the river. 4

Minty's report of the 27th, on his efforts to finda crossing of the Tennessee, was bleak. He reported:

not a boat to be had on the r'ver. The rebelshave possession of them all . 5Minty continued to observe activity on the far bank ofthe river while pushing the 4th Michigan north towardKingston.


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Crittenden's Corps Moves to the Crossina Site

Preparation for crossing the river south of

Chattanooga however were moving along well. By the 28thRosecrans had a pontoon bridge across at Caperton'sFerry. Rosecrans pushed two infantry brigades acrossand started to ford the cavalry n the south on thenight of the 28th; At 10 PM on the August 30th,Rosecrans ordered XXIst Corps to move down theSequatchie Valley to cross the Tennessee River.26Rosecrans continued his deception with actions on theleft wing while he moved the rest of the Army to thecrossing sites at Bridgeport and Caperton's Ferry.

On the st of September, Minty made contact withthe advance element of Burnside's Army enteringKingston. The linkup wa s made by the 4th Michigan andgreatly reduced concern for the Army of the Cumberland'sleft flank. Rosecrans ordered Wagner to have Mintymaintain contact with Burnside until his cavalry closesdown upon our eft 7

The Tennessee river, reported Minty, was stistrongly picketed by cavalry and infantry from Srn th'sCrossroads to Kingston but reported, on September 2d,that previously entrenched artillery had been removed.Wilder, at the same time, had taken posssession of


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William's Island and could ford the river. He alsoreported that:

All is quiet in front; but small garrison atChattanoo a. Large camp at Tyner's and atRingold .

Bragg had started to withdraw from the Tennessee northof Chattanooga.

Minty's and Wilder's brigades were to remain intheir current positions supported by Hazen's andWagner's infantry brigades. The command relationshipfor Minty and Wilder would not be formally changed untilSeptember 3d when Rosecrans put them under the commandof Brigadier-General Hazen. With the same date tobrigadier, Brigadier-General Wagner wrote to Rosecransto protest that he had date of rank over Hazen basedupon their dates of colonelcy. On 4 September,Rosecrans returned Wagner's message making him thecommander of the four brigades. Hazen protested that hehad seniority based upon order of appointment. Hazenwould remain in command while Rosecrans sorted out whowas the sen or. 9

Rosecrans' order of September required Minty andWilder to send a regiment to Crittenden and Thomasrespectively. Wilder sent the 92d Illinois to Thomasbut Minty complained that he could not afford to releasea regiment. Minty's 3d Indiana had not been returned tohim when they left Rock Island. Instead, Van Cleve had


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kept them guarding the left flank near Pikeville.3Additionally, the 4th Michigan had a battalion withCrittenden. As a result. Minty kept the remainder ofhis command together. The mission continued to threatenChattanooga. Hazen had the atitude to cross theTennessee at Bridgeport if i t should appear to him thathis services were no longer needed".

On September 5th, Hazen told Minty to begin toclose down on the left. Minty moved his brigade downthe Tennessee Valley to McDonald's mill on Sale Creekwhere they remained until the 11th of September. Hecontinued to overwatch the crossing sites and maintaincontact with Burnsides' cavalry. The threat to the leftflank of the army, while reduced, would require Minty'sbrigade to cautiously withdraw to a safe crossing sitecloser to Chattanooga.

Wilder picked up signs that the Confederate forcesnorth of Chattanooga were withdrawing. He reported thatthe Confederate infantry pickets along the Tennesseewere being replaced by cavalry. division sizedConfederate force was departing Tyner's Station headedtoward Chattanooga. Later that day at 5 P.M., theinfantry and artillery at Friar's Ferry was withdrawn.Forrest demonstrated at the river crossings north ofChattanooga as if to launch a raid to cover the generalwithdrawal south.32


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Braaa Evacuates Chattanooga

Wagner reported that the Confederate forces hadevacuated Chattanooga on September. This report,coupled with Rosectans belief that Bragg wa swithdrawing, led to his belief that the operation hadchanged to a pursuit. The orders to conduct the pursuitrequired a change in command structure. Minty andWilder were to come under Crittenden's command again.Their mission wa s to gain all information possible andcapture prisoners . Wilder's brigade would revert toThomas's command when Crittenden's and Thomas's lines ofmarch merged. Wilder would get orders from both,leading to some confusion as to which commander he wasto respond. On September, he requested aclarification and was told to respond to Crittenden'sorders.

On 9 September at 1300, Wilder crossed his commandat Friar's Ferry (Map 5 . On the 10th Wilder headedsouth toward Ringgold and camped the night at Taylor'sGap. The next day was to be a day of skirmishes withScott's Brigade, Forrest's Cavalry, delaying back towardRinggold. Wilder pressed Scott's Brigade to within 4miles of Dalton spending the night at Tunnel Hill beforebeing ordered to withdraw to ~ i n ~ ~ o l d . ~ ~


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Wilder Returns to Thomas

Thomas complained to Rosecrans on the 12th ofSeptember:

As I m now it is impossible to know the strengthor position of the enemy . The information Idesire, and which is all &portant is beyond reachfor the want of cavalryu.Rosecrans cut Wilder back to Thomas that day.Crittenden, however, could keep Wilder's brigade untilMinty's regiment had closed on Crittenden's position.The 4th U.S. Cavalry Regiment left Minty at 2 3 thatday to report to Crittenden at Gordon's mill.36

While waiting for the arrival of the 4th U.S.Cavalry, Wilder moved from Tunnel Hill to Gordon's mill.Enroute to Gordon's mill, Wilder skirmished withelements of Pegrams' Division of Forrest's Cavalry andobserved an infantry brigade in the vicinity of Leet'san yard ^^ From Wilder's reports, Crittendenincorrectly inferred that the Confederate's were simplyconducting a vigorous rearguard action. Wilder was toperform one last reconnaissance for Crittenden. At thedirection of the Army Headquarters, Wilder was sent upChickamauga Creek toward Thomas and report to Crittendenif it was clear. Wilder was to report that the onlyConfederates that he was to meet up with withdrewtowards Peavine Church. Finally, on the September 14th.


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Wilder returned to Reynolds division after almost amonth of operating on the left flank.

Thomas had written to Reynolds to lay out Wilder snew mission. Wilder was to recon in the direction ofthe two gaps through Pigeon Mountain, Dug and Catlett sGap. Reyonlds sent back to Thomas that Wilder s men andhorses were so worn that the 14th would be spentrecovering. No sooner did the Lighting Brigade returnto Thomas then orders on the 16th returned Wilder sbrigade minus one regiment to Department of theCumberland control. Wilder was to report to Rosecransheadquarters for his next mission. 8 Rosecrans gaveWilder responsibility for securing Alexander s bridge onChickamauga Creek.

Minty Returns to Crittenden

Minty, on September, moved down to near the mouthof the Chickamauga Creek In preparation for a crossing.A dispatch from Rosecrans s headquarters gave Minty twomissions. The first was to seize three steamboats upthe Hiawassee. The second wa s to send Crittenden thecavalry regiment that had been stated in the orders fromSeptember 3rd. Minty responded by informing Rosecransthat the steamboats had been burned the other day andthat he could not afford to send Crittenden a regiment.Minty included in his reply that he had not received an


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order to send a regiment to Crittenden. Minty wastrying to keep his command from being too widelydispersed. The next day, Minty crossed at Friar s Fordand moved into Chattanooga.

On the 12th. Minty decided to send the 4th U SCavalry, as ordered, to Crittenden. Rosecrans gaveCrittenden specific directions for ts employment. The4th U S Cavalry was to be employed on Crittenden sright and front to watch the crossroads leading toPigeon Mountain and to examine Peavine Minty s3d Indiana Cavalry Battalion, which had spent most ofthe campaign operating apart from his brigade, was alsogiven a new mission. Wagner, upon reaching Chattanooga,was given responsibility for the city. The 3d Indianawas to support him by performing picket and courierduty. Minty reported to the Army Headquarters for newinstructions.

Minty s instructions were to guard the approachesfrom Ringgold and La Fayette and secure Crittenden sleft front. At midnight on the 13th. Minty reported toCrittenden at Gordon s mill to carry out his newmission. The first reconnaissance by Minty on the 14thcrossed Missionary Ridge into Lookout Valley and thenreturned to Gordon s mill the next day. On the 15th.Crittenden ordered Minty to move into Peavine Valley andestablish his headquarters at Leet s Crossroads.


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Crossing at Reed's Bridge, Minty established hisheadquarters at Pealer's mill on Peavine Creek. Minty'spatrols to Grayville. Ringgold, Leet's and Rock Springsdetermined the following:

Forrest is at Ringgold, Pegram at Leet's, Bucknerat Rock 3gring. Cleburne and Longstreet atDalton .I t was clear to Minty that the Confederate army wa s notwithdrawing. He met with Crittenden and Rosecrans onthe 16th and did his best to convince them that Braggwas massing on the army's left.

On the 16th. Minty observed three Confederatecolumns in the Peavine Creek Valley and realized thatunless he withdrew toward Reed's bridge the line ofcormunication to Crittenden would be cut. He pulledback but remained on the eastside of Reed's bridge.Minty's decision to defend forward of West ChickamaugaCreek allowed him to provide early warning if theConfederates would try to cross at Reed's bridge. I talso adversely affected his ability to hold the bridge.He forfieted the benefits of a strong naturalobstacle,the creek, between the Confederate and UnionForces.

Alexander's and Reed's Bridaq

The actions of Minty and Wilder's brigades at thetwo bridges bought time for the Army of the Cumberland


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to shift its forces to deal with Bragg's intention tostrike the Union left. Minty was cheered to have Wilderon his right due to the cooperation the two units hadshared in the past. That cooperation would be sorelyneeded on the 18th.

Early on the 18th Minty's patrols reported that theConfederate forces were moving in mass from LaFayetteand Ringgold (Map 6 . The Confederate force coming outof Ringgold threatened to cut off elements of the 4thMichigan, 4th U.S. and his artillery section. Mintywrote to Wilder to request support for his left flank.Wilder sent two regiments, 72d Indiana and 123dIllinios, and two of guns of Lilly's battery to Minty'sassistance.4 By 12 on the 18th. Minty had beenforced back across Reed's bridge. The additionalsupport allowed Minty to continue to hold Reed's bridgeuntil 1430. Minty's men tried to tear up the planking onthe bridge to not avail. Minty continued to contest thecrossing of the creek until he recieved a note thatstated:

Colonel Wilder has fallen back from Alexander'sBridge to Gordon's Mills and the enemy arecrossing at all points in force. 43After receiving that message, Minty decided also towithdraw to Gordon's mill.

Wilder, who was also attacked by a rebel infantrybrigade on the afternoon of the 18th, held Alexander's


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TO McFARLAND SO P

ALEXANDER SREED S BRIDOES18 SEPTEMBER

7 MILE


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bridge. Wilder reported that three Confederate infantrybrigades attempted to crossing at Alexander s bridge.His force repulsed them. Wilder received a report ofrebel infantry getting into his rear. It is not clearhow rebel infantry reached a position to threaten hisflank. This may have been the result of an erroneousreport. At 1530, Wilder decided to withdraw to theChattanooga Rossville Road where he would link u p withMinty. Around 2000, Confederate forces made one lastattack on Minty s and Wilder s brigade which wasrepulsed. Minty spent the night at Gordon s mill beforebeing relieved the next morning.

Minty was then ordered to report to Granger t oscreen the left flank of the Army. Granger posted Mintyalong the Rossville Road at Missionary Mills Minty sbrigade rested and cared for their horses on the 19th.Minty s brigade contributed to the development of thebattle on the 18th but on the critical days of 19 and 20September, was not a factor in the battle. Minty sentpatrols out on the 20th to Chickamauga Station andGraysville but did not encounter any rebel units. On theafternoon of the 20th. Minty moved toward Red Housebridge and came across Scott s Brigade of Forrest sCavalry Corps. They had a skirmish that lasted for about


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an hour before Scott s Brigade withdrew across WestChickamauga Creek. Minty remained guarding the Red Housebridge until September; long after the Union army hadretreated back to Chattanooga. Minty wiRossville to rejoin the army.45

Wilder s Lightning Brigade, on thewould serve as dismounted infantry cont

hdrew to

19th and 20th,nuing to prove

their worth. On the morning of the 19th, Wilderreceived orders to report to Army Headquarters. He wasordered to take up a position on the right flank on thearmy s line of battle (Map 7 . At 1300, fighting toWilder s front caused Crittenden to order Wilder toadvance from his prepared position. Wildercounterattacked but soon found that he risked beingflanked. He withdrew to his original defensive posand opened a heavy fire from his artillery and therepeating rifles into the attacking rebel columns.Wilder s brigade succeeded in breaking up the attack inhis sector. Wilder s men were not attacked again thatday.46

On the morning of the 20th. Rosecrans directed thatMcCook place Wilder s brigade on the army s right.Wilder established a strong position a quarter of a mileto the south of the Widow Glenn s house. Around 1200, a


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TO MoFARLAND S GAPSNODGRA8S

MAP 7WILDER S BRIGADE

AT THE CHICKAMAUGABATTLEFIELD

18-20 SEPTEMBER

20 SEPT LEE GORDON SP MIL .


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Confederate column attacked on Wilder s left nearlycapturing a Union artillery battery before Wilder wasable to shift forces to counterattack. The counterattackwas successful in driving the rebel forces back from theWidow Glenn s house. The defeat of the attack at WidowGlenn s contributed in slowing the overall Confederatebreakthrough on the morning of the 2 0 t h . ~ ~

Wilder received word of the defeat of the army sright flank from General McCook s Chief of Staff.Wilder, however, did not quit the field after the routof the right wing of the Army. Only after being told byAssistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana to march hisunit to Chattanooga did Wilder leave the field. Afterensuring that the hospitals at Crawfish Spring werewithdrawn and some of McCook s artillery was saved, hemoved his command to Rossville.48 At Rossv I e on the2 st Thomas thanked him for the fine work his brigadeperformed on the previous day.

The left wing cavalry contributed to the campaignin three major ways. First, they were successful inconcealing Rosecrans intent to cross the Tennesseesouth of Chattanooga. This eased the movement of thearmy by allowing the army to cross the Tennesseeunopposed. Secondly, they provided warning to Rosecrans


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of Bragg s attempt to mass sufficient forces on theUnion left to destroy the Union Army. The early warningenabled Rosecrans to shift Thomas to the left ofCrittenden strengthening the Union left. Thirdly,Wilder and Minty conducted successful guard missions onAlexander and Reed s Bridges to buy time for Rosecransto shift his forces. Had they failed to provide theextra day for Rosecrans, Thomas would not have been inposition.

Minty s brigade did not play a significant roleduring the battle. Rosecrans erred by putting the FirstBrigade under Granger and not under Thomas. Wilder sbrigade contributed to the fight on both days of battleas dismounted infantry and demonstrated the worth ofrepeating rifles. The most significant failure, however,for the left wing stems from the failure to get out infront of the army after the Army of the Cumberland ssuccessful crossing of the Tennessee River. The cavalrywa s held too long on the other side of the Tennesseeriver leaving the army blind as t advanced acrossLookout Mountain. The left wing cavalry contributedsubstantially to security of the Army during theChickamauga Campaign but did not contribute n ameaningful way to the outcome on the two days of battle.


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ENDNOTES1. The War of the Rebellion: A Com~ilation f theOfficial Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.,Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 36.2 O.R., Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 36.3. O.R., Vol XXX Pt 3 . 36.4. O.R., Vol X X X Pt 3 p. 36.5. O.R., Vol XXX, t 3 p. 36.6. O.R., Vol XXX, t 3 p. 36.7. O.R., Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 36.8. Warner, Ezra, Generals in Blue, p. 4519. Sunderland, Glenn W., Wilder s LiahtinqBrlaade, p. 19.10. O.R., Vol X X X Pt 3 p. 153.1 1 O.R., Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 153.12. O.R., Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 70.13. O.R., Vol XXX Pt 3 pp. 44 53.14. O.R., Vol XXX, Pt 3 p. 79.15. O.R., Vol X X X Pt 3 p. 79.16. O.R., Voi XXX, Pt 3 pp. 77 78.17. O.R., Voi X X X Pt 3 p. 117.18. O.R., Vol XXX, Pt 3 pp. 100 101.19. O.R., Vol X X X Pt 3 p. 139.20. O.R.. Vol X X X Pt 3 p 140.21. O.R., Vol XXX Pt 3 pp. 151 152.22. O.R., Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 119.23. O.R., Vol XXX, Pt 3 p. 217.


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24. McGee B. F. Historv of the 72d IndianaVolunteer Infantrv of the Mounted Liahtnina Briaade p156.

25. O.R . Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 191.26. O.R . Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 236.27. O.R . Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 349.28. O.R . Vol XXX. t 3 p 327.29. O .R . Vol XXX Pt 3 p 349.30. O .R . Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 32231. O.R . Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 323.32. O.R . Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 386.33. O.R . Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 493.34. O.R . Vol XXX Pt 3 pp. 574 575..35. O .R . Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 564.36. O.R . Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 577.37. O.R . Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 578.38. O .R . Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 626.39. O .R . Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 577.40. O.R . Vol XXX Pt 3 p. 651.41. O .R . Vol XXX. Pt 1 p 922.42. O .R . Vol XXX Pt 1 pp. 447 922.43. O.R . Vol XXX Pt 1 p 923.44. O.R. Vol XXX Pt 1 p. 447.45. O.R . Vol XXX Pt 1 pp. 923 924.46. O.R . Vol XXX Pt 1 pp. 447 448.47. O.R . Vol XXX Pt 1 p 448.48. O.R . Vol XXX Pt 1 p. 449.


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GHT WINGMajor General Stanley commanded the cavalry on the

right wing composed of the remainder of the CavalryCorps. The Cavalry Corps controlled four brigades;three brigades from the First Division and one from theSecond Division. At the start of the campaign ColonelE.M. McCook commanded the three brigades of the FirstDivision. The First Division had two regimentsdetached to the Reserve Corps near Nashvi 1le.I The tworegiments the 3d Tennessee Cavalry of the SecondBrigade and the 7th Kentucky Cavalry of the ThirdBrigade had a total strength of 811 men and would notbe available for the campaign. Colonel McCook assumedcommand on August 3d when Brigadier General Mitchellbecame i I and left the ~ o m m a n d . ~

The Second Division had only the Second Brigadeavailable for the right wing. The First Brigade underMinty was screening the left wing of the army. TheThird Brigade under Colonel Lowe supported the ReserveCorps. The 5th Iowa 10th Ohio and 5th TennesseeCavalry Regiment supported the First Division SecondDivision and Third Division of the Reserve Corpsrespectively 3 Brigadier General Crook the DivisonCommander and Colonel Eli Long the Second BrigadeCommander were both present for duty. The two levelsof command would provide


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redundant command of the Second Brigade. t did permitthe command to be split when the need occurred forsmaller cavalry operations.

By August 13th, the First Division began deployingalong the Memphis and Charleston Railroad fromHuntsville to Stevenson


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MEMPHIS 4

COX S F Y

CAPERTON S F Y

M P 8THE RIGHT WING

...ABOVE THE TENNESSEE

h 13 AUGUST 3 SEPTEMBERQUNTERBVILLE 6 MILES


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rail line as well as patrol down to the Tennessee River.The cavalry could conduct reconnaissance of theTennessee River to find fording sites while Rosecransestablished bridge sites. Scouting missions to theTennessee did develop information on possible crossingsites and the amount of resistance along the river.Until the cavalry crossed the Tennessee in force, theycould not, however, develop intelligence as to Bragg sdisposition or intentions. Agressive patrolling acrossSand and Lookout Mountains would be needed to discoverBragg s intent.

m e riaades

The First Brigade, composed of the 9thPennsylvania, 2d Michigan, and the 1st Tennessee CavalryRegiments, was under the command of Colonel Archibald PCampbell. Campbell came into the Union Army with nomilitary experience and had to learn quickly. Consideredscholarly by his men, he observed successfulprofessional officers and attempted to emulate theirbest qualities. Though respected by both superiors andhis soldiers, he was never to rise above the grade ofcolonel before the end of the war.

The 9th Pennsylvania camped near Mud Creek,guarding the railroad bridge over the creek as well asBellefonte Ford, Gunter s Ford and the mouth of the Mud


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Creek. The 2d Michigan and the 1st Tennesse camped atBolivar guarded Caperton s Ford, COX S Ford and ShallowFord.

The Second Brigade, composed of the 2d Indiana, 4thIndiana. 2d Tennessee and 1st Wisconsin CavalryRegiments was commanded by Colonel McCook beforeMitchell became sick. Colonel Oscar La Grange hadassumed command of the brigade when McCook took commandof the First Division and would command the brigadeprior to crossing the Tennessee River. Colonel DanielM. Ray, 2d Tennessee, was senior to LaGrange. However,the 2d Tennessee was detached to General PhillipSheridan while the brigade was at Huntsville.* When the2d Tennessee rejoined the brigade, Ray would takecommand of the Second Brigade. Ray s 2d Tennesseesupported Brigadier General Lytle at Bridgeport. Lytle,commander of Sheridan s First Brigade, wa s responsiblefor establishing the bridge site at Bridgeport. Whileworking for Lytle, the 2d Tennessee conducted smallexpeditions to Bel lefonte, Bol ivar, and s per 9 OnAugust 23d, the 2d Tennessee was attached to Reyonldsdivision to act a s couriers for Reynolds to maintaincontact with Wilder. 1

Along the Huntsville Road, the 2d Indiana and the1st Wisconsin went into camp at Larkinville while the4th Indiana was established at Paint Rock Bridge.


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Patrols from the Second Brigade covered Larkin sLanding, Gunterville and Fort Deposit Roads as well asthe rail line.11

The Third Brigade under Colonel Lewis D. Watkinswas composed of the 4th. 5th. and 6th KentucCy CavalryRegiments. Watkins had experience in the militia of theDistrict of Columbia prior to the war. He servedbriefly as an enlisted man prior to being commisionedinto the regular army infantry. Watkins served as Chiefof Cavalry for the Army of Kentucky in December 1862 Hewas appointed to a colonelcy in the 6th Kentucky Cavalryon February 1st. 863 and took command of the brigade onJuly 8th.12

The Third Brigade was initially to go to FlintRiver but Watkins complained about the unhealthyconditions there and would eventually camp at Maysville.The Third Brigade had responsibility for the Flint Riverand Hurricane River bridges and conducted patrols toHuntsville, Whitesburg, and Lemon s Ferry.13

The Second Brigade of the Second Divison wascommand by Colonel Eli Long. His brigade was composedof the 1st 3d, 4th Ohio and the 2d Kentucky Cavalryregiments. Long had attended the Frankfort MilitaryAcademy in Kentucky in 1856 He was commissioned intothe regular army and spent the pre-war years on frontierduty with the 1st Cavalry Regiment. He accepted a


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colonelcy of the 4th Ohio Cavalry in February 863 andtook command of the Second Brigade in March. He waswounded at Murfreesboro and would be wounded again atSelma. Due to his wounds, he retired in 867 as a majorgeneral. 4

On August 19th. Crook and Long departed Winchesterfor Bridgeport. The mission for the brigade was topicket General Lytle's front at Bridgeport and along theriver as far as Cedar Bluffs ~0rd.l' They arrived onthe August 22d at Bridgeport and remained there untilSeptember 2d.

Guerilla FiahtinqPrior to crossing the Tennessee, the Cavalry Corps

had to counter Confederate guerrilla activity. McCookreported on August 2 st that guerrillas ambushed aforage party on the Larkin Landing Road. He included inhis report a description of the methods and results ofdealing with guerrillas:

The country has been pretty well cleared ofthem since I have ordered them when caught to behung and prop rty destroyed in vicinty where theymake attack. 176Due to guerrilla activity at Winchester, Rosecransordered Stanley on August 23d to move a cavalrybattalion from Cowan to Winchester. Limited guerillaactivity remained a problem that the cavalry had to deal


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with. On the 25th of August, bushwhackers, as McCookcalled them, captured five soldiers from the 6thKentucky. McCook ordered that all property in thevicinity of the attack burned. Watkins reported toMcCook that guerrillas destroyed the Indian Creek,Limestone, and Piney bridges on the 26th.17 The threedestroyed bridges along the Memphis and CharlestonRailroad however did not hamper supply operations fromthe north. The 1st Tennessee Cavalry historian W.R.Carter recounted the pleasure of hearing the welcomesounds of the locomotive bringing supplies for the armyduring the last part of August l a

Reconnaissance of the Tennessee

Scouting, picketing and guarding the fords andferries along the Tennessee kept the cavalry busy.While the work to establish bridges continued, thecavalry searched for ford sites and conductedreconnaissance across the Tennessee to developintelligence on Bragg's army.

On August 25th. McCook reported to Stanley thatMajor Leslie of the 4th Indiana had a fight with rebelsat the ferry opposite Fort ~eposi.I9 The briefskirmish led to the capture of prisoners. Theintelligence generated from the questioning of prisoners


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and deserters confirmed to McCook that Bragg's army wasvery demoralized.

The identification of ford sites was important tothe cavalry as they were to initially ford while theinfantry crossed pontoon bridges or by flat boats.Captain James Hawley of the Department of the CumberlandInspector's Office identified a ford on August 26th. Heforded half way across at Hart's Bar, four miles aboveCaperton's Ferry, finding the depth no greater than 4feet 20 Rosecrans directed Stanley to prepare the roadto the ford and mark the site. McCook on the 30th.also, located a ford, 1 mile west of Bellefonte,requiring a 200 yard swim. Stanley, that same day,conducted a personal reconnaissance of this site.2

On the 28th, the 2d Michigan was given specificorders to cross the Tennessee by Rosecrans:

The general commanding directs you to send theSecond Michigan to this place at once, to crossthe river at the ford and drive bushwhackers awayfrom the other side. 22The 2d Michigan forded the Tennessee scouting northalong the river to Running Water Creek before returningto Bridgeport on September 1st On September 2d, the 2dMichigan Cavalry recrossed the Tennessee ascendingRaccoon Mountain at Moore's Gap (Map 9 . They scouted12 miles out before returning to Caperton's Ferry on the3d.23


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Rosecrans, also, ordered Crook on the 28th to sendtwo regiments across at Hart s Bar. Crook sent the 1stOhio, 3d Ohio and the 2d Kentucky to conduct a raidacross Raccoon Mountaln to Trenton, capturing someprisoners and supplies. They returned to the north sideof the Tennessee by the 31st.~

Ray s 2d Tennessee, now in support of Reynoldsdivision, XIV Corps, on the night of the 30th, crossedthe Tennessee. They scouted toward Chattanooga, comingto within 2 miles. King s brigade of Reynolds divisionand Ray s regiment made contact with Confederatepickets. They reported observing a five gun battery onLookout Mountain and capturing 25 prisioners. By 1400on the 1st. they returned to She1 l m o ~ n d . ~ ~

The reconnaissance across the Tennessee did notuncover sufficient information to determine Bragg sintentions. The pickets and guns along Lookout Mountainwere convincing evidence that Bragg s forces were stillin the vicinity of the Tennessee. The cavalry was notable to ascertain whether Bragg was withdrawing orconsolidating in the vicinity of Chattanooga.m Tennesqee to Valley Head

With the completion of the trestle bridge onSeptember 2d at Bridgeport, the Army of the Cumberlandbegan to push across. Rosecrans order for the crossing


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of the Tennessee was issued early on September 3d.Stanley was to take the First Division across atCaperton's Ferry to Rawlingsville. Crook, maintainingcontact with General McCook, would take his division byway of Trenton and Valley Head to Rawlingsville


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MAP 10RECONNAISSANCEIN WILL S VALLEY4 9 SEPTEMBER

RACCOONMOUNTAIN

..'SAND MOUNTAIN.,...... './ .......-...1 ...

.........................

...............

............. LOOKOUT MOUNTAl N

..'

BROOMTOWN VALLEY


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regiments camped in the vicinity of ~ l p i n e . ~ ~n themorning of the 5th, the 2d Tennessee, which had beenposted previously at Jasper in support of Reyonlds,rejoined the Second Brigade at Valley Head. Colonelassumed command of the brigade upon his arrival. 9

The First Brigade crossed the Tennessee on theand camped at Caperton Springs. On September 3d. FiBrigade marched with its two regiments (the 1st

Ray

1strst

Tennessee and the 9th Pennsylvania) arriving at ValleyHead at 8:30 M on the 4th.30 The 2d Michigan,marching seperately, rejoined the First Brigade on the4th just in time to participate in the reconnaissance onthe 5th.

The First Brigade scouted down Will s Valley on the5th in the direction of Lebanon. They initially scoutedto 1 mile south of Rawlingsville, where they encounteredsome Confederate cavalry, before proceeding on toLebanon. At Lebanon, they found the town evacuated sothey returned to Allen s farm, miles from Valley Head,by 8:00 P M . ~ ~

McCook sent the Third Brigade, after their arrivalat Valley Head, to scout to Davis Gap on the top ofLookout Mountain. Watkins scouts crossed at Davis Gapand drove the rebel pickets within 6 miles of Alpine.The 4th Kentucky Cavalry captured 10 prisioners from the4th Georgia. The intelligence from the 4th Kentucky


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reconnaissance located a cavalry brigade, Crew'sBrigade, Wharton's Division, from Wheeler's Corps nearAlpine. 32

Long's brigade on the morning of the 2d ofSeptember crossed over the Tennessee at Hart's Bar. Onthe 3d of September, they ascended Sand Mountain justopposite Caperton's Ferry and moved on to the RaccoonMountain plateau. By nightfall, they caught up withStanley and the cavalry command. Th e Second Brigade ofthe Second Division moved through Winn's Gap and campedat Winston's House at Valley Head by midday on the 4th.Crook's division, on the 5th. conducted a reconnaissance6 miles east of Winston's, crossing Lookout Mountaininto Broomtown Valley. 3

Th e results of the cavalry scouting missionsconfirmed in Stanley's mind the direction to continuehis probes. The recon south toward Lebanon indicatedthat no Confederate forces were there. Thereconnaissance toward Alpine, however, uncovered abrigade of cavalry.

The Failed Raid

Stanley was in position to attempt t o get behindBragg's army and wreck Bragg's lines of communications.On September 5th, Stanley inquired into McCook's statuson claw-hooks, crowbars or any other means of tearing


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up track.u 4 He thought that he could do some damage tothe Western and Atlantic railroad in the vicinity ofRome. McCook replied

union cav at chickamauga

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