Unit 3Fisheries Enforcement: major

aspects

Coastal Fisheries Policy and Planning Course, 28/01/08 – 8/02/08 Apia, Samoa

Peter Manning - FAO

Secretariat of the Pacific Community

FMR: Main components

Fisheriesmanagement

system,

FMS

Monitoring,control &

surveillance,MCS

Fisheries judicial system,

FJS

•All links in the same chain•Interdependent•Each must be designed w.r.t. the others

WHAT DO WE MEAN BY MCS?

Monitoring – collection and analysis of data and information on fishing activities– information for improving fisheries management

- data generation monitoring• biological• economic

– information for enforcing existing rules – enforcement monitoring

MCS – meaning...

Control –terms and conditions under which resources can be harvested

Surveillance – observations required to maintain compliance with the regulatory controls

Enforcement monitoring...

....of biological restrictions– gear restrictions – area restrictions– closed seasons– other biological restrictions (eg minimum

fish size)

Enforcement monitoring...

....of direct economic restrictions:– effort restrictions– TAC

....of indirect economic restrictions:– taxes– property rights

MCS – integrated into management system

• Management strategies and plans must be enforceable

• If not, credibility of fisheries management authority undermined

Questions in devising management measures from MCS perspective:

• Practical requirements to implement• Previous successes or failures• What will encourage compliance• Consequences of non-compliance• Cost of implementing management measures,

cost of non-compliance

note well...

need to consider level of compliance in relation to costs eg:

- 100% at high cost- 75% at low cost

Table 2.12 Fisheries Management Costs Year: 1997 (Source: Primarily Wallis and Flaaten 2000)

Countries MCS-costs as a fraction of revenues (%)

MCS-costs per volume of landings USD/metric tonne

Australia* 11% 408

Canada 8% 153

Greece 9% 236

Italy 4% 139

Iceland 2% 9

Japan* 4% 104

Mexico 2% 14

New Zealand 8% 66**

Norway 7% 34

Spain 1% 37

UK 8% 94

United States 18% 143

EU (total) 6% 87

OECD (total) 6% 71

* Enforcement costs not included. ** Author’s estimate (From: R Arnason’s course note)

MCS costs(especially enforcement)

EffortEcomp

MCScosts

The Sustainable Fisheries Model

Value,$

Effort

Biomass

Costs

Sustainablerevenues (yield)

Sustainablebiomass

MSYOSY

Impact of MCS costs on the optimal fisheries policy

Costs without MCS

Costs with MCS

EffortE* E**

Is it worth breaking the rules:

• Expected value of a violation, V(z): Let z be a violation Let (z) be the (expected) profits from

the violation Let C(z) be the expected penalty for

committing the violation => V(z)=(z)-C(z)

Example of C(z)C(z)= p1(discoveredz)p2(guiltydiscovered)p3(penaltyguilty)penalty p*penalty

Expected costs of violations

P1 P2 P3 P*0,1 0,5 0,8 0,0400,5 0,5 0,8 0,2000,5 0,1 0,5 0,0250,1 0,1 1 0,010

Arithmetic of probabilities

So basically p* will not be large in most cases!!

V(z)=(z)-C(z)

• C(z)=p*penalty• But p* is usually very low

• penalty will have to be high to make V(z) negative

compliance vs enforcement

- participation in management decision-making engenders ownership of rules

- management measures legitimate? ie fair and workable

- public perception of management authority can have an effect on overall compliance

surveillance...

• by whom – peer surveillance? fisheries enforcement officer? local police?

• how – depends on management measures• when – constant or periodic• where – might be at sea, at landing sites etc

Fisheries judicial system....

• legislative framework adequate• courts need to be aware of value of the gains

from violations– seminars for judges, magistrates– establishment of special courts