united nations security council study guide

AMSTERDAMUNIVERSITYCOLLEGEMODELUNITEDNATIONS

UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil

StudyGuide

5th–7thApril2019

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TABLEOFCONTENTS

WORD OF WELCOME 4 UN SECURITY COUNCIL 5

HISTORY 5 MANDATE 6

Relevant UN Charter Articles and Chapters 6 Peacekeeping Missions 6

REFERENCES 6

UNSC SPECIFIC ROP 7 MOTIONS: 7

Motion to declare a vote substantive 7 VOTING PROCEDURE: 7

Majority 7 Veto 7 Abstaining 7

WRITTEN WORKS 8 Sponsors and signatories 8 Presidential statement 8

TOPIC A: RE-EVALUATING THE ROLE OF THE UNSC RESOLVING THE KASHMIR CONFLICT 9 INTRODUCTION: 9 OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUE: 9

Overview of Region: 9 Demographics 10 Magnitude of the Conflict 10

GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF KASHMIR 11 Location 11 Water 11

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT 12 Origins of the Conflict 12 Incidents between 1980 and 2000 13 Recent Developments in the Region 14

TIMELINE OF IMPORTANT EVENTS: 15 KEY ACTORS 16

India 16 Pakistan 16 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) /Hizbul Mujahideen/Al Qaeda/ Kashmir 17 China 18

PREVIOUS INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS: 18 Full List of UNSC Resolutions on Kashmir (Excluding resolutions on The Indo-Pakistan relationship including nuclear development): 18 Historical Development: 18 Other (potentially) relevant UN resolutions: 20

PREVIOUS NOTEWORTHY BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 20 Indus Waters Treaty (1960) 20 Tashkent Agreement (1965) 20 Simla Agreement (1972) 20 Lahore declaration (1999) 21 Agra Summit (2001) 21

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION COULD ANSWER 21

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CLOSING REMARKS 22 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH: 23 REFERENCES 24

TOPIC B: STABILIZING EASTERN AFRICA THROUGH THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN IN PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS 26

INTRODUCTION: 26 OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUE 27

Region 27 Magnitude of the Problem 28

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT 29 Overview of Key Conflicts in the Region 29 Women in African Countries 30

CURRENT SITUATION 31 Poverty 31 Democratisation 32 Regime type 32 Population structure 32 Repeated violence 33 A ‘bad neighbourhood’ 33 Slow growth and rising inequality 33

KEY ACTORS 34 Eastern African Countries 34 United Nations 34

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION SHOULD ANSWER 34 CLOSING REMARKS 36 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH: 36 WORKS CITED 37

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WORDOFWELCOME

DearDelegates,

Welcome to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), we are Calvin Smid and IshvarLalbahadoersing.WearebothwellknowntotheworldofMUNaswellastoAUCMUN.WewillconveneinAmsterdamforAUCMUN,wherewebothstudiedsopleasedonothesitatetoaskmeanyquestionsaboutvenues,schedules,orAmsterdam.Itisagreatpleasuretobeco-chairingthisveryextremelyinterestingcommitteewithcomplextopicstobediscussed.Wehopeyouwouldshowapassionfortheissuestobediscussedandforthedebatethatwilltakeplace.Wecan’twaittowelcomeyoutoourpastuni:AmsterdamUniversityCollegeinthebeautifulAmsterdam,weare also verymuch looking forward to seeing you all in debate and reading your wonderfulpositionpapersandeventuallyresolutions.Mostimportantly,let’smakefriendsandhavefun!

Yours,

CalvinSmidandIshvarLalbahadoersing

ChairsoftheUNSC|AUCMUN2019

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UNSECURITYCOUNCIL

HISTORY

TheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(UNSC)isoneofthesixprincipalorgansoftheUnitedNations(UN). Its tasks are tomaintain international peace and security in addition to accepting newmembers to the UnitedNations and approving any changes to the UnitedNations Charter.Itspowersincludetheestablishmentofpeacekeepingoperations,theimplementingofinternationalsanctions,andtheauthorizationofmilitaryactionthroughSecurityCouncilresolutions.Assuch,itistheonlyUNbodywiththeauthoritytoissuebindingresolutionstomemberstates.

TheSecurityCouncilwascreatedafterWorldWar II to replace itspredecessor, theLeagueofNations,inmaintainingworldpeace;thefirstmeetingwasheldonthe17thofJanuary,1946.InthebeginningtheUNSCwasalmostnotactivebecauseoftheColdWarwhichcausedthedivisionbetweentheUSandUSSRincludingtheirrespectiveallies.

AftertheSovietUnioncollapsed,theUNSCbecamemoreeffectiveintheireffortswhileincreasingthequantityofmissionsandissuestheCouncilwasinvolvedin.Forinstance,itauthorizedmajormilitary and peacekeepingmissions in Namibia (1989-1990), Cambodia (1991-1993), Kuwait(1991-2003), Somalia (1992-1995), Rwanda (1993-1996), Bosnia (1995-2002), and Sudan(2005-2011).

TheSecurityCouncilconsistsoffifteenmembers.Russia,theUnitedKingdom,France,China,andtheUnitedStatesserveasthebody'sfivepermanentmembers,oftenreferredtoastheP5.ThesepermanentmemberscanvetoanysubstantiveSecurityCouncilresolution,includingthoseontheadmissionofnewmemberstatesorcandidatesforSecretary-General.TheSecurityCouncilalsohas tennon-permanentmembers, electedona regionalbasis to serve in two-year terms.Thebody'spresidencyrotatesmonthlyamongitsmembers.

SecurityCouncilresolutionsaretypicallyenforcedbyUNpeacekeepers;thesearemilitaryforcesvoluntarilyprovidedbymemberstatesandfundedindependentlyofthemainUNbudget.Asof2016, 103,510 peacekeepers and 16,471 civilians were deployed on sixteen peacekeepingoperationsandonespecialpoliticalmission.

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MANDATE

The UNSC mandate is established by the UN Charter, and determines that the primaryresponsibilityofthecouncilis:‘themaintenanceofinternationalpeaceandsecurity’.Inordertosuccessfullyfulfillitsimportantrole,theUNCharter,especiallyunderChapters6and7,allowsthecounciltousemoreforcefulmethodsthananyotherorganoftheUN,suchasbindingresolutionsandpeacekeepingoperations.Asmentionedbefore,traditionally,theUNSChas15members,ofwhichtheP5membershavevetopowers.StateswhodonotcurrentlyholdaseatintheUNSCarecalledobserverstatesandcanparticipateinUNSCproceedings,yetwithoutvotingprivileges.1

RELEVANTUNCHARTERARTICLESANDCHAPTERS

o Article29:allowsforthecreationofsubsidiaryorganso Article 33:Calls upon nation states to peacefully settle issues through traditional

diplomaticmeanso Articles34&36:Investigatedisputes,andrecommendprocedureso Article 41:Demand certain issue-specific (non-military) measures to be taken in

ordertoresolveissueso Article 42:Should thesemeasures be deemed inadequate, or turn out ineffective,

militaryactionsmaybetakeno ChapterXI:thedeclarationregardingnon-self-governingterritories

PEACEKEEPINGMISSIONS

TheUNSChasthediscretiontodeployapeacekeepingmission,andindoingsoithastobespecificinprovidingthemissionsmandate,whicharetailoredtothespecifictopicathand.However,adegree of consistency between peacekeeping missions show aspects of typical peacekeepingmandates.Thereforepeacekeepingmissionsarecommonlyusedto:

- Preventconflictorspilloverofconflict- Stabilizepost-conflictsituations- Assistinmoderatingpeaceagreementsortalks- Leadstatesthroughtransitionalperiods

REFERENCES

UN Peacekeeping. (2019, March 12). MANDATES AND THE LEGAL BASIS FORPEACEKEEPING. Retrieved from Peacekeeping.Un.Org:https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mandates-and-legal-basis-peacekeeping

1UNPeacekeeping,2019

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UNSCSPECIFICROP

MOTIONS:

MOTIONTODECLAREAVOTESUBSTANTIVE

TheP5nationshavetherighttodeclareanyproceduralvotesubstantive,meaningtheywouldhave the right to veto a certain procedural matter, or allowing other nations registered as“present” to abstain fromvoting.Themotiondoesnot require a seconding, andpasses at theChair’sdiscretion.

VOTINGPROCEDURE:

MAJORITY

TheUNSCsimplemajoritystandsat9/15votes,notthestandard50%.Thismaybesubjecttochangedependingonthequorumofthecommittee.

VETO

Thefivepermanentmembers(P5),namelytheUnitedStatesofAmerica,theUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIreland,theRussianFederation,thePeople’sRepublicofChina,andtheRepublicofFrancehavetherighttovetoanymotionbroughtforwardunderasubstantivevote. The right to veto is a nation’s power to overrule the standardmajority voting rules ofprocedure.Avetovoteneedsnosupportfromothernationspresenttopassandbeenacted.

ABSTAINING

ShouldaP5membernotagreewitharesolution,butalsonotwishtovetoagainst it, theycanabstain.

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WRITTENWORKS

SPONSORSANDSIGNATORIES

Minimumof5total.

PRESIDENTIALSTATEMENT

If thecommittee fails topassa resolutionand there isnoconsensus in the foreseeable futurewhilsttheconferencecomestoanend,ChairsmayconsidertoreleaseaPresidentialStatement.Thisisnotamotion,andmustbebroughtforthattheChair’sconsiderationalthoughdelegatesmayaskwhetheritisappropriatebeforethematterispresented.

Oncebrought forth, delegatesmaydraftupa statement.ThePresidential Statement followsasimilar format to a resolution, but has no distinction between preambulatory and operativeclausesandisnotlegallybinding.

Aswitharesolution,thestatementmustfirstbecheckedbytheChairsbeforebeingpresented.Shoulditbefinalized,theChairswillpresentthestatementdirectlytothecommittee,afterwhichthecommitteemovesdirectlyintovotingprocedure.

Pleasenotethat thestatementmustbepassedbyconsensus;shouldtherebeobjections, thedelegatesmustaddresstheseinarewriteofthestatement,ordropthestatementaltogether.

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TOPICA:RE-EVALUATINGTHEROLEOFTHEUNSCRESOLVINGTHEKASHMIRCONFLICT

INTRODUCTION:

Datingasfarbackas1947,theKashmirconflictisoneoftheoldestongoinginternationalconflictsinmodernhistory.InitsessenceaterritorialquestionbetweenIndiaandPakistanarisenoutofthemismanagementoftheColonialdepartureoftheBritish,theregionhasalwaysbeenoneoftheprimarycausesofconflictsbetweenthetwonuclearpowers.Tensionshaverecentlyreignited,most notably last February (2019) when, firstly, a suicide bomber with links to al-Qaeda inPakistan killed 44 indian soldiers. India responded with airstrikes on suspected terroristlocations, to which Pakistan retaliated with its own airstrikes. Despite many bipartisan,multilateralandUN-efforts toresolve thedispute, littleprogresshasbeenmade in the last70years.IntheSecurityCouncilofAUCMUN2019,byreopeningthediscussion,weaimtofinallychangethispatternofinaction.

Pleasenotethatthisresearchreportisabriefreportontheorigins,contextandintricaciesoftheconflict,andshouldserveasthestartingpointoftheresearch,notthefinish.

OVERVIEWOFTHEISSUE:

OVERVIEWOFREGION:

TheKashmir and Jammuregion (hereafter referred to asKashmir) is a region surroundedbyPakistan,ChinaandIndia.Theregioncomprisesof139,000km2,andiscurrentlysplitbetweenPakistan(35%),China(20%)andIndia(45%)(BBCNEWS,2019).ThedivisionarylinebetweentheIndianpartandthePakistanipartisknownasthe‘LineofControl’(LoC),howeverallpartiesclaimfullorpartialownershipovertheregion.

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DEMOGRAPHICS

TheIndiancontrolledpartofKashmir(blueinthemap)isdividedintothreeparts,KashmirValley,Jammu,andLadakh.Thetotalpopulationis12,541,000withapproximately67%Muslims,30%Hindusand3percentmiscellaneous(mostlySikhs).2Belowyouwillfindatablewiththeethnicdivisionperregion,andamapidentifyingthedifferentregions.

MAGNITUDEOFTHECONFLICT

TheKashmirconflicthasnotbeenofthesamemagnitudeassomeoftheothermoreprominenttwentiethcenturyconflicts(Bosnia,Sudanetc.),howeverestimatesofcasualties’rangebetween20,000and100,000andmanymorewoundedanddisplaced,withmostsourcesclaimingittobearound45,000-60,000.3Asisoftenthecaseinconflictslikethese,it isdifficulttomakeagoodestimate of the scope of the problem due to conflicting (state) media reports on the sameincidents. Furthermore, the timeframeof the conflict and thedifferent sub-conflicts andwarsmakeitmorecomplicated.

Beyondthelossoflife,theconflicthashadseriousramificationsfortheregion,withanestimated22%of thepeople inKashmir livingbelow thepoverty line.Tourism, an important sourceofincomeofKashmirduringlesscontentiousperiodsoftheconflict,isdiscouragedbytheloomingconflict.Intheperiodof1989-2002(amoreturbulentperiodasbecomesclearlater)therewasanestimatedlossof27milliontourists,amountingto3.6billionUSD.Moreover,inthesametimeperiod,over1,151governmentbuildings,643educationalbuildings,11hospitals,337bridges,10,729privatehousesand1,953shopshavebeendestroyedinapproximately5,268attacksoninfrastructure.4Estimatesindicatethatina5-yearperiod(2004to2008)theconflictleadtoaloss

2BBCNEWS,2019

3ProjectPloughshares,2016

4Kalis&Dar,2013,p.121

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of 12.25 billion USD.5 Moreover, especially in the predominantly Muslim areas of Kashmir,illiteracyratesarerelativelyhighandaccesstoschoolsisnotalwaysavailableduetotheongoingconflict.6

GEOPOLITICALIMPORTANCEOFKASHMIR

Fundamental to understanding the Kashmir dispute is understanding the region and thegeopolitical importance of the area. Therefore, this section outlines some of the features ofKashmirthatmakeitanimportantregionforbothIndiaandPakistan.

LOCATION

Kashmirislandlocked,andcanbeseenasthegatewaytoAfghanistanforbothPakistanandIndia,inadditiontoRussiaandChina(amongstothernations).ThisisofimportancebecauseofthefactthatthetraditionaltraderouteofthemainsilkroadgoesthroughKashmir,anditisthegatewayoftradeforbothPakistanandIndia.7Butit’sgeographicalimportancegoesbeyondmeretraderoutes.ForbothIndiaandPakistan,Kashmirisofextremestrategicimportance.Indiahastwomaincompetitorsintheregionwithwhichithashadproblemsinthepast:1)Pakistanand2)China. Surrendering Kashmir would make the two countries neighboring states, which isconsideredabigthreattoIndia,whichisespeciallyevidentintheSiachenconflict(whichwillbediscussedlater).Moreover,thefactthattheareaisextremelymountainousmeansitoffersbothanaturalprotectionagainsteachother,aswellasacoverforpotentialmilitaryoperations,bothofwhichareofstrategicimportanceforPakistanandChina.

WATER

Secondly,KashmirisimportantbecauseitcontainstheInduswaterbasin,andthestartofmanyofthelargeriversintheregion.India,butespeciallyPakistandependsonthiswaterinflux,andgivingthesourceofthewateruptoIndiawouldessentiallyleavethesurvivaloftheircountryinthehandsofIndia.ThewaterfromtheriversandBasinisusedmainlyforagriculturalpurposes,butalso for fishingandelectricity.8Currently the IndusWaterTreatymanages thedivisionofwaterbetween the twonations, however therehavebeen several violationson this treatyoneitherside.Moreover,climatechangeandenvironmentaldegradationarealso threatening theBasin,andnewwaysofwatermanagementmightbenecessaryinthefuture.

5Ibid.

6Kalis&Dar,2013

7Kalis&Dar,2013,p.122

8binShamsuddin,2014,p.30-34

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HISTORICALOVERVIEWOFTHECONFLICT

ORIGINSOFTHECONFLICT

TheKashmirConflictisaresidueoftheaftermathoftheterritorialdivisionthatfollowedtheendoftheSecondWorldWar.UndertheBritishcolonialrule,theKashmirregionhadenjoyedasemi-autonomousstatus,howeverwiththeBritishdeparturein1947,the‘princelystate’ofKashmirwas pressured into either joining Indian or Pakistani Rule. The division between India andPakistanlargelyreliedontheethnicbackgroundofthetwo,IndiahavingalargeHindumajority,whereasPakistanhasaMuslimmajority.9

Whereasmost ‘Princelystates’ thathadenjoyedthesamestatusasKashmirweresuccessfully‘persuaded’tomergewitheitherIndiaorPakistan(mostlyIndia),theKashmirPrincemanagedtoholdoutonthedecision, inanattempttogain independenceinstead.Thisresultedinthefirstviolentstrugglein1947,whichendedwithaPakistani-backedinvasionofKashmirbyPashtuntribesmen. In response, the Prince, Maharaja Sir Hari Singh, who had been given the legalauthoritytomaketheaccessiondecisionbytheBritish,decidedtosidewithIndia-whichwasthecondition for them to send military troops to the Maharaja in order to be able to fight thePakistani-backedrebels.ThisdecisioninspiredastrongresponseamongtheMuslimmajorityoftheKashmirregion,especiallyconsideringthatthePrincewaspartoftheHinduminority.ThisresultedinawarbreakingoutbetweenKashmiriMuslimsbackedbyPakistanandtheKashmiriHindusbackedbyIndia.Allegedly,thegovernmentofIndiaagreedtohelpfightthiswarsothatitcouldsecureasafeplebisciteontheselfdeterminationofthedifferentcommunitiesintheregion.However,PakistanaccusedIndiaofmastermindingthismove,inordertoinheritmoreterritoryintheregion.10

Afterthisinitialinvasionandbreakoutofskirmishes,theconflictmovedintoastalematesituation.In1949,underthesupervisionoftheUNmilitaryobservergroup,atemporaryCease-FireLineAgreementwasdrawnupandratifiedbybothparties,solidifyingastatusquo.Thefiringofgunsstopped,however,becauseofconflictingdemandsfromnegotiationsbetweenIndiaandPakistan,the stalemate remainedcontentious.11Forawhile, theKashmir situationhad takenmoreof abackseat in international politics, notwithstanding continuous tension, occasional borderincidents,andservingasanimpedimentonPakistan-IndianRelations.Itisimportanttonotehere,thatneitherbilateralnegotiationsnormovestowardsaplebisciteweremade.Anyelectionthattookplaceregardingtheissuewasaccusedofbeingsomehowrigged.

In1965, the stalematewas suspendedbetweenApril andSeptemberwhenPakistan launchedoperationGibraltar,designedtoinfiltrateforcesintoJammuandKashmirtoinspireaninsurgency.

9BBCNEWS,2019

10Wirsing,1996

11Kalis&Dar,2013,p.117-118

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Indiaretaliatedwithafull-scalemilitaryattackonPakistan.Thefightingcontinuedfor17daysandacease-firewasdeclaredfollowingaUN-InitiativebackedbytheUSandSovietUnion.12

AspartoftheendoftheIndo-PakistaniWarof1971,awarbetweenthetwofoughtprimarilyinandovertheregionofDhaka(notKashmir),theSimlaagreementwasdrawnupbetweenthetwonations.NotonlytheindependenceofBangladesh(formerlypartofPakistan)wassecuredinthisagreement,but italsocreatedastatusquoinKashmir.TheSimlaagreementdrewupthefirstformalcease-firelineinKashmir(theLoC)andheldthatnopartyshallseektochangethislineunilaterally.Furthermore,itholdsthattheconflictshouldberesolvedbybilateralnegotiationsexcludinganythird-partyinvolvement.

INCIDENTSBETWEEN1980AND2000

AlthoughhavingestablishedtheLoC,tensionsbetweenthetwoweremaintainedthroughouttherestofthe1970’sand1980’s.Theplannedbilateralnegotiationsnevermaterialized,andanoddstatusquoarose,inwhichnoneoftheunderlyingproblemswereresolved.Atseveraloccasionsthe tensions boiled over into incidents or conflicts,most notably the Siachenwar (1984), theMuslimuprisingsin1990,andtheKargilwar(1999).

TheSiachenwarlastednearly20years,inwhichbothIndiaandPakistanclaimedcontrolovertheSiachenregion.Theresultofashortcomingofthe1947ceasefireagreement,andasubsequentoversightoftheSimlaagreement,theSiachenglacierareaintheNorth-EastofKashmirwasnotdivided. Due to its barren soil, few inhabitants and the relative unimportance of the area toKashmir as awhole, itwasnot deemed ‘worthy’ to include in the agreement. This ‘oversight’resultedina20yearwarwitharound10,000casualties.Bothsidesremainheavilymilitarizedinthearea.13

In the 1990’s the conflict gained another dimension with insurgent uprisings from withinKashmir, rather than intra-statewarfare. Theuprisings are a conflict largely betweenMusliminsurgentsintheIndianruledpartofKashmir(Kashmirvalleyinparticular).However,especiallyinthebeginning,theinsurgencylackedorganization,assomemilitantsadvocatedanaccessiontoPakistan, whereas others fought for self-determination. Lack of democratic development inKashmirintheIndian-ruledpartissaidtohaveinspiredtheinsurgency.Intheyearsleadingupto1990,severaldemonstrations,strikesandpoliticalattackstookplace,andtensionsboiledoverin1990resultinginIndia’slargestdomesticconflictwhichhasresultedinbetween25,000and50,000deathssince.14

12NewWorldEncyclopedia,2018

13Chari,2013

14Kalis&Dar,2013

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TheKargilwar(1999)wasaresultofPakistaniinfiltrationontheIndiansideoftheLoC.Pakistaniauthorities claimed that thewarwas a result of an uprising of theMuslimmilitantswithoutPakistani involvement, however India claims to have documentation linking the Pakistanigovernment to the militants. In two months, the Indian forces had recaptured most of theinfiltratedareasontheirsideoftheLoC.15

Theturnofthecenturyin2000,unfortunately,didnotentailaturnofthepageintheKashmirconflict.Tensionsreachedextremelyhighlevelsin2001and2002afterbothPakistanandIndiaallegedly successfully acquiredWeapons ofMassDestruction, after years of developing them.AfteranattackontheIndianparliament,bothcountriesheavilymilitarizedtheLoCresultinginastand-off.IndiaclaimsthattheattackwascarriedoutbyaPakistan-basedterrorgroup,howeverPakistanfirmlydeniestheallegations.Ontheotherhand,Westernconcernsontheissuewereprimarilyaboutbothcountries’nuclearcapabilities.DiplomaticmediationbytheUK(amongstothernations)helpeddiffusethetensionin2002andresultedinamutualdemilitarizationoftheLoC.Themediationhowever,failedtoprovideanystructuralorlongtermsolutions.

RECENTDEVELOPMENTSINTHEREGION

AlthoughbothIndiaandPakistanmaintainedtheirstalematethroughoutthe2000’s,violenceintheregionwasstillarelativelycommonoccurrence.Severalmilitantgroups,suchasAl-Qaeda,mostlyoperatingfromPakistanregularlyattackedfacilities,andnumberofvictimsonbothsidescontinued to risewith theongoing insurgencyagainst Indian rule in theKashmirValley.Thatbeing said, the first recentnotable conflict since the early2000’s between India andPakistanoccurredbetween2014and2015,whenonceagainconflictconcerningtheLoCarose.

In2014,bothcountriesaccusedeachotherofviolatingtheunspokentermsoftheLoC,following‘unprovoked’ firing on both sides claiming approximately 120 casualties,most ofwhichwerecivilians. Both sides regularly reminded the other of their nuclear capabilities. In 2015 bothpartiesagreedtomaintainingthestalemateandstoppingtheprovocations.16

In2016,theIndiangovernmentkilledBurhanWani,acommanderofoneofthemajor‘insurgencyorganizations’ in Kashmir: Hizbul Mujahideen. In response anti-Indian protests eruptedthroughouttheareaoftheKashmirvalley,whichhadbeentheprimaryoperationbaseofHizbulMujahideen.TheIndiangovernmentrespondedtotheseprotestswithashowofforce:imposingcurfew,raisingmilitary-andpolicepresence,andbreakingupprotests.17

15TNN,2018

16Miglani,2001

17Fahad,2018

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Moreover, within a day of the first protests, the Indian government suspended the access tointernetonmobiledevicesinKashmir.ItaimedtopreventKashmirinewssourcesfromprintingnewspapersormagazinesinthefollowingmonth;bothclaimsweredeniedtobeintentionalbytheIndiangovernment.Moreover,arrestsofseveralhumanrightsactivists,deniedrequestsforhumanrightsupervisionbytheUN,andreportsofmediacensorshipputinternationalpressureonIndia.18IndiawasaccusedbyPakistan,AmnestyInternationalandtheHumanRightswatchofviolatinghumanrightstreaties.Especiallytheuseof‘pelletguns’asamethodofprotestdispersionbytheIndianGovernmentwasheavilycriticized.Theseuprisingsresultedintheallegeddeathof90civilians,andover15,000injured.19

Mostrecently,inFebruaryofthisyear,tensionsrosetolevelsithasnotriseninyears.Followingasuicidebombattackthatkilled46IndianmilitarypoliceofficersintheIndian-administeredpartofKashmir,Indiavowedto“completelyisolate”Pakistan.20TheattackswereclaimedbyJaish-E-Muhammad(JEM),oneoftheterroristorganizationsoperatinginKashmir.IndiablamesPakistanfornotcrackingdownonterroristorganizationswhereas,Pakistandeniesanyinvolvementintheattacks. India responded by recalling its diplomats and conducting airstrikes on PakistaniTerritorywhichonsuspectedJEMlocations.TheseairstrikeswerethefirststrikesbyeithersideontheoppositesideoftheLoCsince1971.21Atthetimeofwritingthesituationremainshighlycontentiousanddelegatesareadvisedtokeepaneyeoutfornewsonfutureevents/incidentsintheKashmirregion.

TIMELINEOFIMPORTANTEVENTS:

1947-1948 –FirstIndo-PakistaniWar

1965-1965 –SecondIndo-PakistaniWar

1971-1971 –SimlaAgreement

1984-2003 –SiachenWar

1990-present–InsurgencyintheKashmirregion.

1998-1998 –PakistanandIndiaenter‘nuclearclub’

1999-1999 –KargilWar

2014-2015 –BorderSkirmishesbetweenIndiaandPakistan

2016-2017 –KashmirUnrest

2019-present–PulwamaUnrest

18Mathur,2016

19BBC,2016

20BBC,2019

21Ibid.

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KEYACTORS

INDIA

IndiahasrepeatedlystatedthatKashmirisanintegralparttotheircountry.Originally,atthestartof theconflict in1947, theywerewillingtosupport toaplebiscitedeterminingthe fateof theKashmirregion,theynowbelievethathistoryhasshownthatKashmirhaswillinglybecomepartofIndia.ThePrincehadlegalpowertodecidethefateofKashmir,andchoseforanaccessiontothe State of India.Moreover, the Kashmir people have been integrated in the Indian politicalinstitutions,havebeengivenampleopportunity to internal self-determination, and inas suchhavenogroundsforexternalself-determinationoraccessiontoPakistan(oranyotherstate).ItbelievestheargumentthattheMuslimpopulationbelongstoPakistanfortheirsharedreligionisunsound,as Indiaconsiders itselfamulticulturalnation,andmoreoverhas thesecond largestMuslimpopulationintheworld(120,000,000)(onlyIndonesiahasmore).Thecurrentdiscontentin Kashmir is a result of Pakistani infiltration and propaganda, which is why it is currentlyunwillingtoenterintonegotiations.2223

PAKISTAN

PakistanmaintainsthatKashmiristhejugularveinofPakistan,meaningthatwithoutcontroloverKashmirPakistancannotlive(ananalogyespeciallysuitablebecauseoftheimportanceofwaterforPakistan).TheybelievethatIndia’slegalclaimtotheregionisinvalidbecausethePrincewhosignedtheaccessionpaperwas1)atyrantnotsupportedbythepeople,and2)putunderpressurebyIndiantroops.Moreover,PakistanaccusesIndiaofmanyhumanrightsviolationsagainstthepeopleofKashmir.Theyblame Indian forces for themurderingofKashmiri civilians, and therapingoftheirwomen.

Pakistanblames India for the failureoforganizingaplebiscite, andrefers to the ‘two-nations’principle inarguingthat theMuslimmajorityareasshouldbelongtoPakistan.Moreover,withregards to the Simla agreement, Pakistan holds that it entailed exploring the possibility forbilateralnegotiationswithoutexcludingthehelpoftheUNorthirdparties.Moreover,thefactthattheSimlaagreementcallsforseekingtoresolvetheconflictwithbilateralnegotiationsdoesnotsupersedetheearlierUNSCresolutionsthattriedtoestablishtheplebiscite.

Pakistanhowever,alsohasitsdomesticproblems.Pakistanhasalongstandinghistoryofpoliticalinstability, and the current government, although stable, faces tough decisions with strongopposition.AccordingtotheWorldBank’sPoliticalStabilityIndex,Pakistanhasbeeninastateofweakpoliticalstabilitysince2006,scoringbetween-2.4and-2.8onascalewherewhere-2.5isweak, and 2.5 is strong. Corruption, frequent leadership changes and conflict between thedifferentbranchesofgovernmenthavecreatedproblemsforPakistan.Moreover,theyareaccused(amongstothersbyIndia)ofhavingconnectionswithseveralterroristorganizations.24

22EmbassyofIndiainWashingtonDC,2009

23Kalis&Dar,2013

24Ibid.

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JAMMUANDKASHMIRLIBERATIONFRONT(JKLF)/HIZBULMUJAHIDEEN/ALQAEDA/KASHMIR

Seenasfreedomfightersbysome,andasterroristsbyothers,manymilitantgroupsarecurrentlyoperatingfromeitherPakistanorKashmir.Mostofthesegroupsarecurrentlystilloperatingforeither an accession to Pakistan, but mostly for independence of Kashmir. Some of the moreprominentorganizationswillbebrieflyoutlinedbelow:

o JammuandKashmirLiberationFront(JKLF):Originallyamilitantorganization,ithasrecentlytriedtoconvertitselfintoapoliticalparty.ItassertsthepositionofaKashmiriindependence, despite having strong ties with - and being trained by - Pakistan.HistoricallytheJKLFhasbeensplitandreunitedintoseveralfactionswithdifferentideason how to gain Kashmiri Independence, whether through means of violence and/orpolitics.TheyrepresentthelargemajorityofKashmirthatwantstogainindependence,with polls indicating that between 87% and 95% of the local population want anindependent Kashmir. However, the validity of these numbers may be questioned.Moreover, scholars have questioned the ability of Kashmir to become an independentnationdueto,amongstotherthings,thelackofresourcesandinfrastructure.25

o Harkat-ul-Mujahideen(HUM)andJaish-e-Mohammed(JEM):Thesearethetwomostactive terrorist organizations operating in Kashmir, and both groups have allegedconnections to largerorganizations suchasal-Qaeda.Whereas theHUM is fighting forindependenceofKashmir, the JEMwants toaccede toPakistan.Especially the JEMhasrepeatedlybeenconnectedtoPakistan,howeverofficiallythegrouphasbeenrecognizedas a terrorist organization by both Pakistan and India since 2002. Both groups arecurrentlystillactivelyperpetratingattacksonIndianfacilities,inaguerrilla-warfashion.Moreover recently, ISIS has claimed incidents in the region, and ISIS flags have beenspottedinKashmir.However,recentreportsindicatethattheirfootholdintheregionisstillnotaslargeasthatoftheHUMandJEM.26

Combined,organizationslikethisexpressthefeelingsoftheKashmirpeople.Thisisapositionthathastobetakenintoaccountaswell.Moreover,thefactthatKashmirisabreedinggroundof(potential)terroristorganizationsshouldbothinspiremoreinterestinthesituation,aswellasbeingtakenintoaccountintheresolution.

25Kalis&Dar,2013;GlobalSecurity,2019

26BBC,Pulwamaattack:WhatismilitantgroupJaish-e-Mohammad?,2019;Kalis&Dar,2013

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CHINA

China,asanothernationborderingtheKashmirregionhasastronginterestinthematter.TheybelievethatthepartborderingChina(AksaiChin)shouldbecomeapermanentpartofChina.TheydonotrecognizethebordersofKashmirasdrawnupbyBritainin1947.Moreover,ChinaleanstowardssupportingPakistanontheissue,becauseofitscomplicatedhistorywithIndia,sincetheIndo-Chinawarin1962.Thewarwasaresultofaborderdisputebetweenthetwocountries,andendedwhenChinaunilaterallydeclaredaceasefirewhenithadobtaineditsclaimedterritories.BothpartiesthenestablishedtheLineofActualControl(LAC)thatsetthebordersbetweenChinaandPakistan.ThesebordersarecurrentlystillsomewhatcontestedbyIndia,andIndiaclaimsthatChinaoccasionallystillviolatestheterms,suchasin2013.Inresponsetotheseclaims,ChinaandIndianegotiatedaborderagreementthatpreventsborderpatrolsturningintoincidents.27WithregardstoKashmirChinacurrentlyformsamajorblockintheroadwithregardstocombattingtheJEM,astheyholdthatthedefinitionsofterrorismemployedbyIndiaarenotcongruentwiththeirowndefinitionofTerrorism.Moreover,theeconomiesofPakistanandChinaareincreasinglyintegrating.28

PREVIOUSINVOLVEMENTOFTHEUNITEDNATIONS:

FULLLISTOFUNSCRESOLUTIONSONKASHMIR(EXCLUDINGRESOLUTIONSONTHEINDO-PAKISTANRELATIONSHIPINCLUDINGNUCLEARDEVELOPMENT):

UNSCResolutions:#38,#39,#47,#51(1948),#80,#91,#96,#98(1950-1952),#122,#123,#126(1957),#209,#210,#211,#214,#215(1965),#303,and#307(1971)

HISTORICALDEVELOPMENT:

TheattentionoftheUNwasfirstdirectedtotheconflictaround1948.ThiswasinthemidstoftheongoingbattlebetweenIndianandPakistanitroops,atatimewherePakistanhadreclaimedlargepartsoftheKashmirregion.IndiabroughtforwardaformalcomplaintintheUNSCastheyheldthatthePakistaniInvasionwasanunlawfulactofaggressionfollowingthelegalaccessiontoIndiaby the Prince a year earlier. In response, the UN passed several (#38, #39, #47, and #51)resolutionsthatcalledfortheimmediateceasefireoftheconflictedandsuggestedthesettlementof the dispute should result from a ‘democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite’.MoreoverseveralUNorganizationsweresetup,suchastheUNCommissionforIndiaandPakistan(UNCIP),andtheUnitedNationsMilitaryObserversGroup(UNMOG).29

TheUNCIP consistedof five individuals,noneofwhichwereborn inAsia. From itsonset, thecommissionwasmetwithhostilitybybothIndiaandPakistan.AftermultiplevisitsandtalkswithIndiaandPakistan,theyunanimouslyadoptedResolution47whichconsistedofthreeparts:1)Ceasefire,2)TruceAgreement,3)Apost-truceConsultation.Thisresolutionimplicitlyconfirmed

27TimesofIndia,2019

28Panda,2019

29binShamsuddin,2014

19

thepositionofPakistanas the invaderbymakinga truceagreementprecede theconsultationregardingthefutureoftheregion.Moreover,therewasnomentionofaplebiscite.Followingthisinitialresolution,thecommissionstartedtoworkonthetermsoftheceasefire,truceagreementandplebiscite,butwereonceagainmetwithresistancefrombothcountries,andintheendfailedtoproduceaworkingdocument.

Following the failure of the UNCIP (1948), one representative of the UNSC, General A. G. L.McNaughton,informallyconsultedbothIndiaandPakistanregardingademilitarizationplan.Indoingso,hemadenodistinctionbetweenPakistanandIndiaandcalledfordemilitarizationonboth fronts, resulting inresolution80.Amediatorwasappointed,however thesenegotiationsfailedaswell.

In a following attempt to resolve the issue, theUNSC started proceedings to try and create aplebiscite under the auspices of the UN. However, several problems prevented this fromhappening. Firstly, the need for demilitarization, and secondly the degree of control over theplebiscitebybothnations‘toensureafreeandfairelection’.Theseproblemswereattemptedtobesolvedwithresolutions#96and#98.However,in1957,threeresolutionswerepassedthatinessenceadmittedthefailureoftheproposedplebiscite,andwereaimedtomanageandcontainthesituation.

ThethirdwaveofresolutionsbytheUNSCwereacceptedin1965,during,andintheaftermathofthe second Indo-PakistaniWar. Resolutions 209, 210, 211, 214 and 215 urged, in ascendingdegreesofstrength,bothpartiestorefrainfromfighting,andinsteadlistentoUNMOGandrespectthe LoC. All of these resolutions were disregarded, after which resolution #215 demandedrepresentativesofbothIndiaandPakistantomeetwithrepresentativesoftheUNSGtodiscusspossibleplans forward.Thismeetingwasheldand the fighting stopped,howevernoneof thefundamentalissueswereresolvedordiscussedinthemeetings,ratherfocussingonacquiringanimmediatecease-fire.

Following the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, the Simla agreement between India and Pakistanspecificallymentionedaresolutionshouldbesoughtthroughbilateraltrade,thereforeeffectivelyexcludinganyUNinvolvementontheissue.ThelatestUNresolutionontheissuethereforealsodatesback from1971 (#303, and#307)which calledonbothparties to respect the ceasefireagreement,andallowinternationalaid.

In the following half-a-century, no more UNSC resolutions were produced. This is partiallybecauseoftheSimlaAgreementbetweenPakistanandIndiathatstipulatesbilateralagreementsshouldbemadewithoutthird-partyinvolvement.Scholars,however,havealsoarguedthatthereisagenerallackofinterestbypowerfulnationsinresolvingtheconflict.ItisinterestingtonotethatthenucleardevelopmentoftheDPRK,IranandIraqweretopprioritiesforboththeUNand

20

themajorpowers(primarilytheUS).Incomparison,however,theacquiescenceofWMDforbothIndiaandPakistanhaveyieldedquitetameresponses.[30,31,32]30

OTHER(POTENTIALLY)RELEVANTUNRESOLUTIONS:

-Resolution#1172(1998):EssentiallycondemnsbothIndiaandPakistanfordevelopingNuclearcapabilities,andoffersmediationontheKashmirissueinreturnfordenuclearization.

-UNSCresolution#1373(2001):Abindingresolution(underCh.VIIoftheUNstatutes)whichfocusesonpreventingnationstatesfromfunding/supportingTerrorismorganizations(amongstotherthings.Pakistanhasbeenaccusedofaidingterroristorganizations.

PREVIOUSNOTEWORTHYBILATERALNEGOTIATIONS

INDUSWATERSTREATY(1960)

BecauseoftheimportanceofwaterintheKashmirregion,tobothnations,in1960thewaterinthe regionwas divided between the two. The treatywas brokered by theWorld Bank. It tooestablishedthatIndiacould(somewhatlimitedly)usesomeofthewaterfromPakistan’sriversbecause of the fact that they receivedmorewater flow. Thiswater could be used for limitedirrigation, but fully for fishing, power generation and other non-consumptive uses. Since thetreaty,therehavebeennofurtherwaterwars,disputeshavebeensettledinlegalcourts.31

TASHKENTAGREEMENT(1965)

ThisagreementendedtheSecondIndo-PakistaniWar,afterbeingpushedbytheUnitedNationsSecurity Council, particularly the US and the USSR. The agreement tried to create a morepermanentsettlement,withtheoutcomeoftheagreementbeingareturnoftheterritoriesthateithersidehadclaimedinthewar.Nofurtherprogresswasmade,althoughitisworthnotingthatthethen-IndianprimeministerdiedinTashkentundersuspiciouscircumstances.32

SIMLAAGREEMENT(1972)

Aspreviouslymentioned,theSimlaagreementendedtheIndo-Pakistaniwarof1971,andcreatedtheindependentstateofBangladesh.ItalsoestablishedthatIndiaandPakistanmustresolvetheKashmirissuethroughbilateralnegotiations,andreaffirmedtheLoCasitwaspriortotheconflict,andthatneithersideshallseektoalterthislineunilaterally.AccordingtoIndia,thisagreementhasmadeUNMOGirrelevant,asthisbilateralagreementsufficesasamethodofmaintainingtheLoC.33

30Bukhari,2016;Chakravarty,2016;Wani&Suwirta,2014

31Kalis&Dar,2013;binShamsuddin,2014

32EditorsofEncyclopaediaBritannica,2019

33MinistryofExternalaffairsIndia,1972

21

LAHOREDECLARATION(1999)

AbilateralagreementbetweenIndiaandPakistanthatestablishesamutualunderstandinginthedevelopmentofnuclearweapons.Providedamutualconfidenceinwhichthethreatofanucleararmsracewasavoided.Whereasinitiallyagreatsignofcooperationbetweenthetwo,thestartoftheKargilwarseveralmonthslaterplacedanotherstrainontheIndo-Pakistanirelations.34

AGRASUMMIT(2001)

AsummitaimedatreducingnucleararsenalsandsettlingtheKashmirissues.Howeverthesetalkscollapsedwithin twodays.Theconclusionof thissummitwasthatneitherpartywasreadytomakeconcessionsyet.35

QUESTIONSARESOLUTIONCOULDANSWER

TheKashmirconflictisoneofthelongestandmostintricateongoingconflicts.Inassuch,ithasmanydimensionsinwhichresolutionscouldcontributetoresolvingtheissueofKashmir.Thesedimensionsneednotallbeincluded,assometimesbabystepsinaresolutionarebetterthannostepsatall.However,thisisa(andbynomeansexhaustive)listofsomeofthemosturgentissues.

WHOSHOULDRULE(ANDOVERWHATPART)OVERKASHMIR?

Firstandforemost,theissueofterritorialityshouldbediscussed.Asthisproblemisessentiallyaproblemaboutterritorialityorself-determination.Youhavethreebroadoptions,KashmirjoiningPakistan,KashmirjoiningIndia,OrKashmirbecomeindependent.Thentothese3generaloptions,therearemanysub-optionssuchasadivisionofKashmiranddividingthembetweentheseveralactors involved. The fact that the area is of such strategic importance to all sidesmakes theterritorialdivisionevenmoredifficulttorealize.

Whereasthisisthecoreissue,itwillbeextremelydifficulttocometoaterritorialdivisionintheSecurity Council, not in the least place because of the fact that India maintains bilateralagreementsonthedivisionarerequired.Therefore,focusingonfacilitatingconditionstoestablishapotentialbilateralagreementonterritorialdivisionsshouldalsobetakenintoconsideration.Moreover, the mandate of the Security Council is to maintain peace and security, territorialdisputesareunderminingtheseprinciples,butithasnoauthoritytojudgeonself-determination.What it can do, is lay out conditions that will decrease the violence in the area, reduce thecontentionbetweenIndiaPakistanandChina,andtrygainsometractionintheconflict.

HOWCANDEMILITARIZATIONOFTHEPRESSUREPOINTSBEACHIEVED?

OneofthewaystodothatisthroughademilitarizationoftheLoC.Currently,onallsidesthereisa largeMilitarypresence,asashowof forcetotheother.Notonlydoesthisresult infrequentincidentsbetweentroops,italsoindicatesthelackoftrustbetweentheparties.Areductionofthesetroopscouldbeoneofthebabystepsinbuildingtrustbetweenthenations.

34MinistryofExternalAffairs,1999

35MinistryofExternalAffairsIndia,2001

22

HOWCANACTSOFTERRORISMANDPOLITICALVIOLENCEBEBETTERPREVENTENTED?

AnotherimportantpartoftheproblemisthepoliticalviolencethatishurtingKashmir.Whereasthedifferentgroups,albeitterroristormerelypoliticalgroups,havelargebasesofsupportwithinKashmir,awaytocrackdownonviolentincidentshastobesought.ThiswouldlikelynecessarilyinvolveboththegoodwillofPakistanandIndia,andpropagandacampaignsofbothnationswilllikelyhavetobesuspendedsomehowbeforesuchastepcanbetaken.Thiswillneedacooperationofallparties involved,anda levelof intelligencesharing thatbothcountriesarecurrentlynotcomfortablewith,althoughintelligencesharingbetweenthetwodoesoccur.Anotherimportantstepcouldbeguaranteeingabetterpathtoself-determinationforthepeopleofKashmir.

HOWSHOULDTHEACCESSOFWATERFROMTHEDIFFERENTREGIONSBEDIVIDED?

Another important aspect to take into account is thewatermanagement. As thewater in theKashmirregionisoffundamentalimportancetobothIndiaandPakistan,possiblerevisionoftheIndusWateract,orthebetterenforcementofsaidactmighthelpremovethewatermanagementasapointofcontention.

INWHATWAYSCANWEENSURETHERESPECTOFHUMANRIGHTSINKASHMIR?

Indiantroopshavebeenaccusedofthekillingofciviliansandrapingofwomenunderthepretenseofthembeingpartoftherebels/terroristorganization.MeasuresthatwillguaranteetheHumanRightsoftheKashmirpeoplearelikelydecreasetheirattractiontoterroristorganizations,andwouldgenerallyincreasepeaceintheregion.Findingawaytoenforceviolations,makingsurethat fewerviolationsoccurcouldbe twoways todo this.Thesearehowevermoredifficult torealizeinpractice.

ISTHEREAPOSSIBILITYFORDENUCLEARIZATION?

EventhoughtheLahoreDeclarationandtheAgraSummithave laidsomefundamentals inthemanagementofNuclearWeapons,theUNSCshouldkeeptheseweaponsinmind,andapossiblereduction of both arsenals may be sought to 1) build trust, and 2) realize the goal ofdenuclearization.However,willbothnationsbeupforthis,oraretheystickingwiththetheoryofNuclearpeace?

CLOSINGREMARKS

Onceagain,wewouldliketostressthattheissueofKashmirisextremelycomplicated,andthatacomprehensiveresolutionresolvingalldifferentaspectsoftheconflictshouldbesoughtbutisnotrealistic.Welookforwardtobothyourpositionpapersandyourideasforresolvingtheissue.

23

SUGGESTIONSFORFURTHERRESEARCH:

o ReportonHumanrightsviolationsin-andthegeneralpoliticalsituationof-Kashmiraftertheviolentuprisingsin2016.BytheOfficeoftheUNCommissionforHumanRights

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IN/DevelopmentsInKashmirJune2016ToApril2018.pdf

o UNarchivefilesontheissueofKashmirhttps://search.archives.un.org/personnel-matters-living-conditions-in-kashmir

o BBC overview of the different territorial divisions that have been proposed and/orsuggested

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_future/htmo AnonlinebookwhichoutlinesthedevelopmentofKashmiriaccessiontoIndia,froman

Indianperspectivehttps://web.archive.org/web/20111105091213/http://www.kashmir-information.com/kashmirstory/chapter1.html

o UNSCresolution#47http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/47

o SimlaAgreementhttps://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?19005/Simla+Agreement+July+2+1972

o WaterIndusTreatyhttps://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497-1105737253588/IndusWatersTreaty1960.pdf

24

REFERENCES

AFP.(2011,August10).40,000peoplekilledinKashmir:India.Tribune.

BBC.(2016,July11).KashmirclashesovermilitantBurhanWanileave30dead.BBC.

BBC.(2019,March6).PakistandetainsrelativesofJeMmilitantleaderafterKashmirattack.BBC.

BBC.(2019,March9).Pakistan'sdilemma:Whattodoaboutanti-Indiamilitants.BBC.

BBC.(2019,February15).Pulwamaattack:Indiawill'completelyisolate'Pakistan.BBC.

BBC.(2019,February15).Pulwamaattack:WhatismilitantgroupJaish-e-Mohammad?BBC.

BBC NEWS. (2019, March 6). The Future of Kashmir. Retrieved from news.bbc.co.uk:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_future/html/

binShamsuddin,M.N.(2014).THEROLEOFTHEUNITEDNATIONSINTHEKASHMIRCONFLICT:ANANALYSIS.TheJournalofDefenceandSecurity,25-43.

Bukhari, S. S. (2016).Managing theKashmirConflict:ACollaborativeApproach. Journalof theResearchSocietyofPakistan,149-158.

Chakravarty,I.(2016,September26).TheUNinKashmir:Apottedhistoryofresolutionsthatlednowhere.Scroll.in.

Chari,P.(2013,October02).RELEVANCEOFSIMLAAGREEMENT:ACLOSELOOKAFTERFOURDECADES.Tribune.

CNN.(2019,March1).KashmirFastFacts.CNN.

Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2019, March 12). Tashkent Agreement. Retrieved fromEncyclopaediaBritannica:https://www.britannica.com/event/Tashkent-Agreement

Embassyof India inWashingtonDC. (2009, July).AComprehensiveNoteon Jammu&Kashmir.Retrieved from Kashmir Library.org:http://www.kashmirlibrary.org/kashmir_timeline/kashmir_files/Indian_Position.html

Fahad,S.(2018,July10).Kashmir:2YearsAfterBurhanWani.TheDiplomat.

GlobalSecurity.(2019,March12).JammuandKashmirLiberationFront(JKLF).RetrievedfromGlobalSecurity.org:https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/jklf.htm

IndiaTimes.(2019,January2).PresenceofISISinKashmirnotthatbig:J&KDGP.IndiaTimes.

Kalis, N., & Dar, S. (2013). Geo-political Significance of Kashmir: An overview of Indo-PakRelations.JournalOfHumanitiesAndSocialScience,115-123.

Kumar, H., & Anand, G. (2016, November 14). Kashmir Is Paralyzed by an ‘Adored’ Band ofMilitants.NewYorkTimes.

Mathur,B.(2016,July9).MobileinternetservicessnappedinJammu.GreaterKashmir.

Miglani,S.(2001,December14).12dieinIndianparliamentattack.Guardian.

Ministry of External affairs India. (1972, July 2).SimlaAgreement. Retrieved frommea.gov.in:https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?19005/Simla+Agreement+July+2+1972

25

Ministry of External Affairs India. (1999, February 2). Lahore Declaration February, 1999.Retrieved from mea.gov.in: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999

MinistryofExternalAffairsIndia.(2001,July25).Agrasummit,inbrief.Retrievedfrommea.gov.in:https://mea.gov.in/articles-in-indian-media.htm?dtl/18606/Agra+summit+in+brief

New World Encyclopedia. (2018, December 21). Operation Gibraltar. Retrieved fromNewworldencyclopedia.org:http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Operation_Gibraltar

OfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissioner.(2018).ReportontheSituationofHumanRightsinKashmir.NewYork:UnitedNationsOfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights.

Panda,A.(2019,March4).Jaish-e-MohammedLeader’s‘GlobalTerrorist’DesignationIsOverdue.TheDiplomat.

ProjectPloughshares.(2016).ArmedConflictsinIndia-Kashmir.Canada:ProjectPloughshares.

Puri,L.(2011,July28).IndiaandPakistan’ssurprisinglysuccessfulnegotiations.ForeignPolicy.

Raghavan,S.(2010).WarandPeaceinModernIndia.London:PalgraveMacmillan.

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TheEconomicTimes.(2019,March6).INDOPAKbilateraltalks.IndiaTimes.

TimesofIndia.(2019,March12).AllyouwanttoknowabouttheLineofActualControl(LAC).TimesofIndia.

TNN.(2018,July26).AllyouneedtoknowaboutKargilWar.TheEconomicTimes.

Wani,H.,&Suwirta,A.(2014).UnitedNationsInvolvementinKashmirConfflict.KajianSejarah&PendidikanSejarah,41-50.

Wirsing,R.(1996).TheKashmirConflict.CurrentHistory,171-176.

Zuthsi,C.(2019).KashmirconflictisnotjustaborderdisputebetweenIndiaandPakistan.TheConversation.

26

TOPICB:STABILIZINGEASTERNAFRICATHROUGHTHEINCLUSIONOFWOMENINPEACEBUILDINGEFFORTS

INTRODUCTION:

EversinceAfricancountrieshavebecomeindependent,devastatingconflictshavebecomeanormratherthananexception.Atleast24ofthe54nationshaveexperiencedconflictinoneformoranother.36AnoverwhelmingamountoftheseconflictstookplaceinEasternAfrica,especiallyintheHornofAfrica,whichovertheyearsexperiencedbothintraandinter-stateconflicts.

Themostsignificantmilitaryconflictsinclude:

- EthiopianCivilWar(1935-1937)

- EritreanWarofIndependence(1961-1991)

- Eritrean-EthiopianWar(1998-2000)

- OgadenWar(1977-1978)

- SecondSudaneseCivilWar(1983-2005)

- SomaliCivilWar(2009-present)

- BurundiCivilWar(1993-2005)

- Lord'sResistanceArmyinsurgencyinUganda(1987-present)

- RwandanGenocide(1994)

- Uganda-TanzaniaWar(1978-1979)

Contrary to the themeofpolitical instability in theregion,Kenyahasenjoyedrelativelystablegovernments. The peace has beenpunctuated at times by instances of violence, including theattemptedcoupd’étatin1982,buttheseonlytookplaceforashorttimeandthecountryisoverallstable.BurundiandRwandasufferedcivilwarsandactsofgenocideduringthetwentiethcentury,whileSomaliaontheotherhandispunctuatedbymilitaryconflict.

Theroleofmenandwomenhasbeenverydifferentintheseconflictswiththelatterbeingmoreadverselyaffectedintermsofdeaths,physicalinjuries,displacementandlossoflivelihood.Effortshavebeenmadetoincreaseparticipationofwomeninsolvingtheseconflicts,mainlythroughtheuse of international legal systems to lobby for the inclusion ofwomen, proactive activities ofwomen groups and activists, as well as international support and solidarity for the plight ofwomen inEasternAfrica. Countries in the regionhave someof thehighest success rates (e.g.Rwanda,Ethiopia)inthesematter,aswellassomeoftheworst(e.g.Somalia,Sudan).However,

36ACLED,2014

27

the results of these efforts are not as expected and not very visible in terms of numbers.Consequently,thisencouragesstatestocooperateandlearnfromeachother.

IntheSecurityCouncilofAUCMUN2019,thisproblemshouldbetackledandaneffectivewayoftheinclusionofwomeninpeacebuildingeffortsshouldbefound.Thisresearchreportisabriefreportontheorigins,contextandcomplexitiesoftheconflict,andismeanttogivethecommitteea general understanding of the topic in order to build further upon the report find specificsolutions.

OVERVIEWOFTHEISSUE

REGION

██EasternAfrica(UNsubregion)

██EastAfricanCommunity

██CentralAfricanFederation(defunct)

██ geographic East Africa, including the UN subregion and East AfricanCommunity

28

EasternAfricaisshowninthemapabove37.Itcanbedefineddifferentlyaccordingtodifferentsources; for thepurposesof this conferencewewill considerEasternAfricaasdefinedby theUnitedNations.Itconsistsoftwoparts:EastAfricaandtheHornofAfrica.EastAfricaismadeupofKenya,Tanzania,andUganda.TheHornofAfricaismadeupofSomalia,Djibouti,Eritrea,andEthiopia.EgyptandSudanaresometimesconsideredtobepartofEastAfricaduetogeographicalreasons,butthedefinitionoftheUnitedNationsincludes:

- MozambiqueandMadagascar–sometimesconsideredpartofSouthernAfrica

- Malawi,Zambia,andZimbabwe–oftenincludedinSouthernAfrica,andformerlyoftheCentralAfricanFederation

- BurundiandRwanda–sometimesconsideredpartofCentralAfrica

- Comoros,Mauritius,andSeychelles–smallislandnationsintheIndianOcean

- RéunionandMayotte–FrenchoverseasterritoriesalsointheIndianOcean

MAGNITUDEOFTHEPROBLEM

NotonlywithinEasternAfricaistheinclusionofwomeninpeacebuildingastruggle.Structurallywomenareoftenexcludedwhichcanbeseenfromthesefacts:

- Between1990and2017,womenconstitutedonly2%ofmediators,8%ofnegotiators,and5%ofwitnessesandsignatoriesinallmajorpeaceprocesses.38

- Women’sparticipationinpeacenegotiationsincreasesthedurabilityandthequalityofpeace.Arecentstudyinvestigating82peaceagreementsin42armedconflictsbetween1989and2011foundthatpeaceagreementswithfemalesignatoriesareassociatedwithdurable peace. Additionally, this study shows peace agreements signed by femaledelegatesdemonstratehigherimplementationrateforagreementprovisions.39

- Gender-sensitive language in peace agreements is critical to setting a foundation forgender-inclusionduringthepeacebuildingphase.Yet,datashowadownwardtrendsince2015;only27percentofpeaceagreementssignedin2017containedgender-responsiveprovisions.40

- Insufficientattentionhasbeenpaidtotheimplementationofgenderprovisionsinpeaceagreements.Ofpeaceagreementssignedbetween2000–2016,onlysevenpercentrefertospecificmodalitiesforimplementationofgenderprovisions.41

37Wikipedia,2018

38Kalis&Dar,2013,p.117-118

39NewWorldEncyclopedia,2018

40UNSecurityCouncil,2018

41Bell&McNicholl,n.d.

29

- Atrendanalysison1,500peaceandpoliticalagreementsadoptedbetween2000and2016(140processes)showedthatonly25agreementsdiscusstheroleofwomen’sengagementinimplementation.42

InEasternAfricathistrendisnotalltoodifferentfromtheglobalfiguresshownabove.AsofMarch2013, therewere less than fourpercent femaleUNpeacekeepers in theworld.Andonly1.49percentofthetotalmilitarypersonnelarewomen.AdemonstrativeexampleofthiswouldbetheMbagathiprocess,whichtookplaceduringtheSomaliCivilWar.Therewasintenselobbyingforinclusionofwomenandwomengroups,yetonlyabout55of1,000delegateswerewomen.Ofthese,21wereregisteredasobserversand34asofficialdelegates.Fromthose34,only26tookpartasmembersoffactiongroupsortheTransitionalNationalGovernment(TNG).Thenationalparliament in 2012 comprised only 13.8 percent of women, despite the Transitional FederalGovernment(TFG)targetof30percent.43

HISTORICALOVERVIEWOFTHECONFLICT

OVERVIEWOFKEYCONFLICTSINTHEREGION

Asmentionedbefore,thesituationinEasternAfricahasbeenextremelyunstableintheperiodafterdecolonization.Someconflicts,suchastheSomaliCivilWarandtheLord’sResistanceArmyinsurgency in Uganda are still happening presently. Over the years of conflict, many of thecountriesinthisregionnowsufferfromchaoticandunstablegovernmentinfrastructuressinceindependence.44

The EritreanWar of Independence (1961–1991) lasted 30 years and caused around 150.000deathsinthecountry,aroundthreepercentoftheirtotalpopulation.Consequently,Eritreahadlittletimetostabilizetheregionaftertheirindependencein1947.

TheEthiopianCivilWar(1974–1991)causedamassivenumberofcasualtiesestimatedat theminimum of 1.4 million people. The Ethiopian Civil War was a civil conflict fought betweenEthiopia's communistgovernmentsandanti-government rebels fromSeptember1974 to June1991. The Eritrean-Ethiopian War (1998-2000) caused both countries a total of 300.000casualties.45

TheOgadenWar(1977-1978)wasthestartofunrestinSomalia,whichlaterdevelopedintotheSomaliCivilWar(1991-present).Theseeventsresultedinmorethan500.000casualtiesandover1.1millionpeopledisplaced.ThecurrentconflictinSomaliaisstillongoing.46

42Ibid.

43UN,2013

44UNAfricaRenewal,2019

45UNNews,2018

46Goulding,M.1991

30

TheUganda-TanzaniaWar(1978-1979)andtheLord'sResistanceArmyinsurgencyinUganda(1987-Present)causeaveryunstablesituationinUganda,whichisunfortunatelyongoing.Over100.000havebeenkilledandnearly500.000displaced.47

TheSecondSudaneseCivilWar(1983-2005)wasawarinaseriesofthreecivilwars.Itendedwiththesouthof thecountryhavingsixyearsofautonomyandan independencereferendum.Even though Sudan does not belong to Eastern Africa according to the UN, it should still bementioned.Anestimated1to2millioncasualtiesresultedfromtheSecondSudaneseCivilWar,while the South Sudanese CivilWar is still ongoing with around 400.000 casualties and stillcounting.48

TheBurundiCivilWarwasanarmedconflictlastingfrom1993to2005.ThecivilwarwastheresultoflongstandingethnicdivisionsbetweentheHutuandtheTutsiethnicgroupsinBurundi,justlikewhathappenedinRwanda.Theconflictbeganfollowingthefirstmulti-partyelectionsinthecountrysinceindependencefromBelgiumin1962.Theestimateddeathtollstandsat300.000,withchildrenhavingbeenusedwidelybybothpartiesinvolved.49

TheRwandanGenocide(1994)isperhapsthemostwell-knownoftheseconflicts:thegenocideagainsttheTutsi-samassslaughterofTutsiinRwandaduringtheRwandanCivilWar,whichstartedin1990.ThegenocidewasdirectedbymembersoftheHutumajoritygovernmentduringthe100-dayperiodfrom7Apriltomid-July1994.Anestimated500.000to1.000.000Rwandanswere killed - an estimated 70 percent of the Tutsi population. The genocide andwidespreadslaughterofRwandansendedaftertheTutsi-backedandheavilyarmedRwandanPatrioticFront(RPF), led by Paul Kagame, took control of the capital and the country. This resulted in anestimated2.000.000Rwandans,mostlyHutu,beingdisplacedandbecomingrefugees.50

Everyregion inEasternAfricahasbeenmarredbydevastatingconflict;someof thesearestillongoing.Therehasnotbeenasignificantperiodoftimewhenthewholeregionwasconflict-free,althoughcertaincountrieshavebeenabletokeepthepeaceforlongerperiodsoftime.Allthesewars and conflicts resulted in the dire need of stabilizing Eastern Africa with potentiallypeacebuildingmissions.51

WOMENINAFRICANCOUNTRIES

AtthemomentwomeninEasternAfricafacemanychallengesthatrestrictthemtoproperlybeincluded inhelping theregion tobestabilized.These include the lackofpolitical strength andpoliticalvision:womensufferfrom“politicalilliteracy”.Theylackanideologicalframeworkthatcouldgiveteethtoastrongpositionadoptedbyacollectivewoman.Peacebuildingasapoliticalactivityandthereforerequirespoliticalstrategyforengagement.52

47ibud

48UNMIS,2019

49UNDPPA,2019

50UN,2019


52Dolphyne,F.A.1991;UNWomenAfrica,2019

31

Next,womenalso face the lackofexperience, exposureandskills innegotiation,advocacyandlobbyingtechniques:womenhavealwaysbeenkeptsecludedfromthepoliticalarenaandsphereofdecision-making;therefore,inmanysituationstheyareunabletoparticipate.53

Thisalsomeansthattheyhavealackofapoliticalplatform:withoutapoliticalplatform,womenareonthemarginsofactionandlackconfidenceinparticipatinginthepeacebuildingprocess.Thelackofexperienceandpoliticalplatformnaturallyleadtoalackofvisibility.Women’sconflict-resolutionactivities are confined to the informal sector, veryoftenat theperipheryofofficialpeacenegotiation.Inaddition,evenifwomencontributetothepromotionofpeace,theyarenotinvitedtoparticipateinformalnegotiations.54

Moreover,women inAfricahavea lackof resources (material and financial).Mostof the timewomen’sgroupslackthemeanstobackuptheiractions.Insomeinstances,theyareunabletogetacrosstothemedianetworktoenhancetheirpeacecampaignbecausetheydonothaveabudgetfor multi-dimensional activities. Further, they are not part of main fundraising channels andnetworks.Theyworkonavoluntarybasisatthegrassrootslevels,poolingtheirownresourcestogethertogetanoffice,desk,andphoneline.55

Lastly, women in Eastern Africa have a lack of sustainability in political participation.Representationdoesnotnecessarilymeanmeaningfulandrecognizedparticipationthathasanimpactonsubstantialinputsinpeaceagreement.Inaddition,onceapeaceprocessisover,womenoftenreturntomoretraditionalactivities, losingtheirgainsandpublicpresence.These lossesmakeitverydifficultforwomentoreturntothepublicstagelaterwhenresolutionbegins.56

CURRENTSITUATION

Atthemoment,therearestillconflictsongoinginUgandaandSomalia57.Apartfromthesecases,EasternAfrica isa regionwhich isverysensitive tonewconflicts,whichhas todowithsomesociologicalaspectswhichexplainthattheareahasahighpotentialtoviolence.Theseaspectswillbeexaminedbelow:

POVERTY

Internalarmedconflictismuchmoreprevalentindevelopingcountriesthanindevelopedones.Thisisbecausedevelopingstateslacktheabilitytoensurelawandorder.UpdatedforecastsusingtheInternationalFuturesforecastingsystemindicatethataround37%ofAfricansliveinextremepoverty(roughly460millionpeople).By2030,32%ofAfricans(forecastat548million)arelikelytoliveinextremepoverty.So,whilethetotalpercentageiscomingdown(around5%less),the

53Ibud.

54Ibud.

55ibud.

56ibud.

57PeaceInside,2018

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absolutenumberswilllikelystillincreasebyaround90million.It’sthereforeunlikelythatAfricawillmeetthefirstoftheSustainableDevelopmentGoalsonendingabsolutepovertyonacurrentgrowthpathofroughly4%GDPgrowthperannum58.

DEMOCRATISATION

Democratisationcantriggerviolenceintheshorttomediumterm,particularlyaroundelections.Wherethereisalargedemocraticdeficit,asinNorthAfricabeforetheArabspring,tensionbuildsup;EasternAfricaisinasimilarposition,aswellasstillrecoveringfromthevariouscivilwarshavebeenfoughtinrecenttimes.

Ademocraticdeficit–wherelevelsofdemocracyarebelowwhatcanbeexpectedwhencomparedtoothercountriesatsimilarlevelsofincomeandeducation–oftenleadstoinstability.Instabilityisalsofuelledbythemanipulationofelectionsandconstitutionsbyheadsofstatetoextendtheirstayinpower.

REGIMETYPE

Thenatureofthegoverningregimeisanotherstructuralfactor.Moststablecountriesareeitherfulldemocraciesorfullautocracies.ButmostEasternAfricancountrieshavemixedregimeswithsome elements of democracymixedwith strong autocratic features. They present a façade ofdemocracybut lack itssubstantiveelements.Mixedregimesare inherentlymoreunstableandpronetodisruptionsthaneitherfulldemocraciesorfullautocracies.59

POPULATIONSTRUCTURE

EasternAfrica’spopulationisyoung,withamedianageof19.Bycomparison,themedianageis41inFrance(arelativelyyoungcountrybyEuropeanstandards).So,22%ofadultFrenchareintheyouthbulgeof15-29yearscomparedto47%ofAfricans60.

Young countries tend to be more turbulent because young men are largely responsible forviolence and crime. These youngmen are at the prime of theirworking capabilities, and theeconomies of many African states are not capable of supplying the job market with enoughpositionsfortheburgeoningworkforce.Ifyoungpeoplelackjobsandratesofurbanisationarehigh,socialexclusionandinstabilityfollow.61

58Independant,2018


60RogueChiefs,2017

61ibud.

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REPEATEDVIOLENCE

Ahistoryofviolenceisgenerallythebestpredictoroffutureviolence.CountriessuchasSudanand Ethiopia are trapped in cycles of violence62. Historically speaking, these cycles are verydifficulttobreak.Itrequiresahugeeffortandisveryexpensive,oftenrequiringalarge,multi-dimensionalpeacemissionthatonlytheUNcanprovide.But,scalingpeacekeepingbackratherthanscalingitupistheorderofthedayattheUN.63

A‘BADNEIGHBOURHOOD’

Whereacountryislocatedcanincreasetheriskofviolencebecausebordersarenotcontrolled,and rural areas not policed. Most conflict in Africa is the result of a domino-effect fromneighbouringcountries64.Violencespillsovernationalbordersandaffectsothercountrieswhilepoorlytrainedandequippedlawandorderinstitutionsgenerallycannotoperateregionally.

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SLOWGROWTHANDRISINGINEQUALITY

Africaisconsiderablyunequal,sogrowthdoesnottranslateintopovertyreduction.Inaddition,theworldisinalowgrowthenvironmentafterthe2007/8globalfinancialcrisis,withaverageratesofgrowthsignificantlylowerthanbefore.Africaneedstogrowataverageratesof7%ormoreayearifitistoreducepovertyandcreatejobs,yetcurrentlong-termforecastsareforratessignificantlybelowthat.

AllthesefactorsplayaroleandneedtobetackledwhenstabilizingEasternAfrica.Additionally,the role and inclusion ofwomen needs to be discussed. How to outweighwherewomen areessentialandhowtheycanefficientlymakeprocessesmoreeffectiveintermsofpeacebuilding.66

62BBC,2019

63UNPeacekeeping,2019

64Reliefweb,2014

65RiftValleyInstitute,2016

66Ibud

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KEYACTORS

EASTERNAFRICANCOUNTRIES

Governments of these countries obviously have to initiate action in stabilizing thepart of thecontinent.Thiscanbedonethroughpeacenegotiationswithothernations,butthefirststepistoensure that thegoverningof theirowncountry is stable.Additionally, thesociologicalaspectsdiscussedaboveshouldbesolvedinthelongterm,oratleastaplanhastobemade.Moreover,theroleofwomenshouldbediscussedonanational,regionalandinternationalbasisinorderforwomentoplayabiggerroleinensuringpeacebuildingintheAfricanregions.

UNITEDNATIONS

TheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilneedstocometogethertodecidehowothernationscanhelpthesituationinEasternAfrica.Assistingthecountriesbysendingexternalhelpcouldbeanoptionorguidingthecountrieswithsettingupstructures.Sofar,otherthanbuildingbasesincountriessuchasKenya,theUNSChasnotbeenverymuchinvolved,norhasanyotherdepartmentoftheUNinspecific.

QUESTIONSARESOLUTIONSHOULDANSWER

Firstly the sociological aspects that shouldbe tackled, inorder to even create a sableEasternAfrica.Plansorclausesforsolvingtheseissuesshouldbeincluded.Next,asolutionforthelackofwomenshouldbepresentedintheresolution.Theinvolvementofthenationalgovernmentscanplay a rolewithin finding outcomes, but theUN(SC) can also be used to come to an eventualsolution.

Furthermore,thefollowingthemescanbeusedinaresolution:

WOMEN’SPARTICIPATION

Women’s involvement in peace processes have positive impacts in pushing for thecommencement, resumption or finalization of negotiations, particularlywhenmomentumhasstalled,ortalkshavefaltered.Whatshouldbewomen’sinvolvement?Howcanweincorporatecurrentinvolvementswithnewinput?Howshouldwomenparticipate?

PROTECTINGTHERIGHTSOFWOMENANDGIRLSINHUMANITARIANSETTINGS

Increased attention has been paid to violence against women and girls, particularly sexualviolence inconflict, resulting ingreatervisibility,high-leveladvocacy,and thedevelopmentoftechnicaltools.However,toolittlefundingisallocatedtoprogrammingandservicesforsurvivors.How can we ensure more funding is given? Where should this funding come from? How isguaranteedthefundingendsupwell?

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TOWARDANERAOFTRANSFORMATIVEJUSTICE

Justicemustbetransformativeinnature,addressingnotonlythesingularviolationsexperiencedbywomen,butalsotheunderlyinginequalitieswhichrenderwomenandgirlsvulnerableduringtimes of conflict and which inform the consequences of the human rights violations theyexperience.

KEEPINGTHEPEACEINANINCREASINGLYMILITARIZEDWORLD

Thereisneedforalargerfocusondemilitarization,andthedevelopmentofeffectivestrategiesforconflictpreventionandthenon-violentprotectionofcivilians.Moreover,thestudyhighlightsthat women’s presence in the security sector has been found to significantly lower rates ofcomplaintsofmisconduct,ratesof improperuseofweapons,aswellasraisethecredibilityofforces,increaseaccesstocommunitiesandvitalinformation,andleadtoagreaterreportingofsexual and gender-based crimes. Given this information, how can we include women in thesecuritysector?

BUILDINGINCLUSIVEANDPEACEFULSOCIETIESINTHEAFTERMATHOFCONFLICT

Womeninconflict-affectedandrecoveringcountrieslackeconomicopportunitiesnecessaryforsurvival,remainconfrontedbydailyviolenceintheirhomesandcommunities,struggletocopewithheavyburdensofcareanddependency,andcontinuetoenduretheemotionalandphysicalscars of conflict,without support or recognition. In the aftermath of conflict, violence againstwomenoften increases,underliningthe importanceofrebuildingruleof lawinstitutions.Howshouldcanwedecreaseviolenceagainstwomenintheaftermath?Howcanwesupportwomenduringandafteraconflict?

PREVENTINGCONFLICT

States that have lower levels of gender inequality are less likely to resort to the use of force.Strongerrecognitionisrequiredoftheinfluenceofgendernorms,genderrelations,andgenderinequalitiesonthepotentialfortheeruptionofconflict.Howcanweimplementgenderequalityandwhatrolecanwomenorgovernmentplayhere?

COUNTERINGVIOLENTEXTREMISM

Across regions, a common thread shared by extremist groups is that in every instance theiradvancehasbeencoupledwithattacksontherightsofwomenandgirls—therightstoeducation,participationinpubliclifeandautonomousdecision-makingovertheirownbodies.Whatcanwedotocountertheseextremistsbeliefsandgroups?

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CLOSINGREMARKS

Weareawarethatthisissuehastwoproblems:“HowtostabilizeEasternAfrica?”and“Howtoincludewomeninpeacenegotiations?”.Thisiswhatmakesthistopicincrediblydifficulttosolve,sincethecombinationchallengesforcreativesolutionsbutalsomanyclausesinordertosolvetheproblems posed.Wewish you good luck and are looking forward to the position papers andpotentialresolutions.

SUGGESTIONSFORFURTHERRESEARCH:

o ParticipationofWomeninPeaceBuildinginSomalia:ACaseStudyofMogadishuhttp://www.ipstc.org/media/documents/IPSTC_OP_No6.pdf

o BuildingpeaceinEasternAfricahttps://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/building_peace.pdf

o TheRoleofWomeninPeacebuildingandCommunityDevelopmenthttp://www.academia.edu/9710791/THE_ROLE_OF_WOMEN_IN_PEACEBUILDING_AND_COMMUNITY_DEVELOPMENT

o ConferenceonpromotingtheroleofwomeninpeacedevelopmentintheAfricanhornhttps://www.peacewomen.org/content/role-women-promoting-peace-and-development-horn-africa

o AfricanWomenonPeacehttp://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/publications/centrepublications/documents/gender_unifem_african_women_peace.pdf

o NewsarticleonWomen’sPeaceroleso https://www.c-r.org/news-and-views/news/strengthening-womens-peace-roles-east-

and-central-africa

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