united nations treaty bodies and special procedures

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United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures

of the Commission on Human Rights--Complementarity or Competition?

Rodley, Nigel S.

Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 25, Number 4, November 2003, pp.

882-908 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/hrq.2003.0051

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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Human Rights Quarterly25 (2003) 882908 2003 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

United Nations Human Rights TreatyBodies and Special Procedures of theCommission on Human RightsComplementarity or Competition?

Sir Nigel Rodley*

ABSTRACT

There are two broad clusters of United Nations human rights machinery:those set up under international human rights treaties (treaty bodies) andthose established by the UN Commission on Human Rights (special

procedures). They are compared and contrasted, in terms of their potentialfor duplication and the cooperation or competition attendant on it. The twoclusters are distinguished from the perspective of their implicit purposes(mainly multilateral for special procedures, mainly bilateral for treatybodies) and working methods (examined in terms of general country work,case-specific work, and general overview activity). The incidence of directcooperation is also addressed. The article concludes that the possibilities ofduplication are not as numerous as might be expected, they are generallyavoidable or can be accommodated administratively where they exist andthat, on balance, the clusters perform complementary functions.

* Sir Nigel Rodley is a Member of the Human Rights Committee (since 2001); former UNCommission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on the question of torture (19932001);and Professor of Law, University of Essex.

The author is grateful to Jan Doerfel for his diligent research assistance for this essay which

began as a talk to an International Law Association (British Branch) Regional Seminar,University of Nottingham, 2 May 2001. He is also indebted to Daniel Atchebro, ChristinaSaunders, and Markus Schmidt, all of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights, for providing him with important information. The present text which will appear asa chapter of the forthcoming Human Rights Committee 25th anniversary Festscrift (2004)seeks to take account of developments as of 31 May 2002.


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2003 UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies 883

I. INTRODUCTION

For historical reasons, the United Nations (UN) is presently endowed with

two sets of human rights monitoring procedures: those established underhuman rights treaties1 and those set up by the UN Commission on HumanRights, variously called special procedures,extra-conventional mecha-nisms, or Charter-based bodies. The latter may be divided into country-specific and thematic mechanisms.2 It is the thematic mechanisms that are

1. The treaties and treaty bodies are: International Convention on the Elimination of AllForms of Racial Discrimination, adopted21 Dec. 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered intoforce 4 Jan. 1969), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) (ICERD)/Committee on the

Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD); International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights, adopted16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force3 Jan. 1976)(ICESCR)/Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR); InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., No., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered intoforce 23 Mar. 1976) (ICCPR)/Human Rights Committee (HRC); Convention on theElimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted18 Dec. 1979, G.A.Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/36 (1980) (enteredinto force3 Sept. 1981), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980) (CEDAW)/Committee on theElimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Committee); Convention AgainstTorture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted10Dec. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51(1985) (entered into force26 June 1987), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), substantivechanges noted in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) (CAT)/Committee Against Torture (CAT Commit-tee); and Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted20 Nov. 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25,U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force2 Sept. 1990), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989) (CRC)/Committee on the Rights of theChild (CRC Committee). A seventh treaty, the International Convention on Protection ofthe Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, adopted 18 Dec. 1990,G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. GAOR 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (MWC), entered intoforce on 1 July 2003. It too has a Committee, bearing the same title, which will doubtlessshare subject-matter jurisdiction with the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of

migrants. While it will not be further studied here, what is said about existingrelationships will be relevant to that one. The following works deal with the treaty systemas a whole: THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING (Philip Alston & JamesCrawford eds., 2000); THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMINTHE 21ST CENTURY (Anne F. Bayefskyed., 2000); ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM (2001).

2. The following thematic mandates are in existence at the time of writing: Working Groupon Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; Working Group on Arbitrary Detention;Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions; Special Rappor-teur on the independence of judges and lawyers; Special Rapporteur on the question oftorture; Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons; SpecialRapporteur on Religious Intolerance; Special Rapporteur on the Question of the use ofMercenaries; Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to

Freedom of Opinion and Expression; Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms ofRacism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance; Special Rapporteuron the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography; Special Rapporteur onViolence against Women, its Causes and Consequences; Special Representative of theSecretary-General on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders; Special Rapporteur onthe Adverse Effects of the Illicit Movement and Dumping of Toxic and Dangerous


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Vol. 25884 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

most relevant for the comparative analysis of this essay, the first of which(the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances) was notcreated until 1980, that is, some thirty-five years after the founding of the

UN.This delay reflected a belief by many of the states members of the

organization in its early days that scrutiny of any individual states humanrights practices constituted improper intervention in matters essentiallywithin the domestic jurisdiction of states, as excluded by Article 2(7) of theCharter of the United Nations.3 Even though, as early as 1950, the bold andpioneering commentator Sir Hersch Lauterpacht argued that mere discus-sion of a states human rights performance was not precluded under theCharters non-intervention rule4; that view was not to prevail for some two

decades.On the other hand, no such problem existed if a state voluntarily agreed

to the monitoring activity by means of adherence to a treaty that providedfor it. In the words of one of the most renowned framers of the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights,

il aurait t difficile de contester que les Etats pouvaient par la voie dinstrumentsjuridiques particuliers prendre des engagements qui faisaient ressortir les

Products and Wastes; Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants; IndependentExpert on Structural Adjustment and Foreign Debt; Special Rapporteur on the Right toEducation; Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing as a component of theright to an adequate standard of living; Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food; SpecialRapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of IndigenousPeople; independent expert on the question of human rights and extreme poverty;independent expert on the right to development; and Special Rapporteur on the Right toHealth. The following country mandates are in existence at the time of writing: SpecialRapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan; Special Rapporteur on theSituation of Human Rights in Iraq; Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights

in Myanmar; Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinianterritories occupied by Israel since 1967; Special Rapporteur on the Situation of HumanRights in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; SpecialRapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan; Special Rapporteuron the Situation of Human Rights in Burundi; Special Representative of the Secretary-General for human rights in Cambodia; independent expert on the situation of humanrights in Somalia; and independent expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti. Thefollowing works deal with the special procedures system: JOHN CAREY, UN PROTECTIONOFCIVILAND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1985); TON J.M. ZUIJDWIJK, PETITIONING THE UNITED NATIONS (1982);M.E. TARDU, HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTERNATIONAL PETITION SYSTEM (1979); A. DORMENVAL, PROCDURESONUSIENNESDEMISEENOEUVREDESDROITSDELHOMME (PUF, Paris, 1991); MIKO LEMPINEN, CHALLENGES

FACING THE SYSTEM OF SPECIAL PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS(Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademi University, Turku/Abo, 2001), whose chapter8 also addresses the relationship between the special procedures and the treaty bodies.

3. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, 7, signed26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans1153 (entered into force24 Oct. 1945).

4. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAWAND HUMAN RIGHTS 16873 (1950).


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obligations quils assumaient ainsi en matire des droits de lhomme dudomaine de leur comptence interne.5

Thus, supervisory procedures were envisaged as a necessary part of the two

treaties that, with the Universal Declaration, were to complete the Interna-tional Bill of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Economic,Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)6; and the International Covenant onCivil and Political Rights (ICCPR).7 As it happened, the protracted process ofagreeing on the Covenants made it possible for the specialized InternationalConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination(ICERD)8 to be adopted a year earlier, with its own supervisory body. Thedrafting of the three other specialized conventions now in force: theConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination againstWomen (CEDAW)9; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)10; and the Conven-tion on the Rights of the Child (CRC)11 began before the beginnings of thethematic special procedures.

As evidenced by the current debate as to whether the envisagedConvention against Enforced Disappearance should have its own supervi-sory body,12 it may be speculated whether the treaty bodies would havebeen created had extra-conventional mechanisms with a comprehensive

mandate been achievable at the birth of the UN.

5. REN CASSIN, HAGUE RECUEIL 27, 310 (1951). It would have been difficult despite that Statescould, by way of particular judicial instruments, take on commitments that also entailassuming obligations, including domestic human rights practice.

6. ICESCR, supra note 1; see generallyMATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTONECONOMIC, SOCIALAND CULTURAL RIGHTS (1995).

7. ICCPR, supra note 1; see generallyDOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITSROLEINTHE DEVELOPMENTOFTHE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTON CIVILAND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1990); INEKEBOEREFIJN, THE REPORTING PROCEDUREUNDERTHE COVENANTON CIVILAND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1999).

8. ICERD, supra note 1; see generallyNATAN LERNER, THE UN CONVENTIONONTHE ELIMINATIONOFALL FORMSOF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1980).9. CEDAW, supra note 1; seegenerally L. REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PRPARATOIRESOF THE

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONONTHE ELIMINATIONOF ALL FORMSOF DISCRIMINATIONAGAINST WOMEN(1993).

10. CAT, supra note 1; see generallyJ. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONSCONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOKONTHE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTUREAND OTHER CRUEL,INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENTOR PUNISHMENT (1988); AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE UN CONVEN-TIONON TORTUREANDTHE PROSPECTSFOR ENFORCEMENT (1999).

11. CRC, supra note 1; see generallyA. GLENN MOWER, JR., THE CONVENTIONONTHE RIGHTSOFTHECHILD (1997); SHARON DETRICK, A COMMENTARYONTHE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONONTHE RIGHTSOFTHE CHILD (1999).

12. See Report submitted by Manfred Nowak, independent expert charged with examiningthe existing international criminal and human rights framework for the protection ofpersons from enforced or involuntary disappearances, pursuant to paragraph 11 ofCommission [on Human Rights] resolution 2001/46, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum.Rts., 58th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 11, 99102, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/71(2002).


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Similarly, the existence of the treaty bodies, once on the horizon, led toearly concerns that special procedures should not duplicate their work and,indeed, that the very existence of the special procedures should be

reviewed once the treaty bodies were in operation.13In fact, we seem now to be at the stage where, despite periodic reviews

of each of the two systemstreaty bodies14 and special procedures15thereis no serious proposal to roll back one system in favor of the other. Rather,this article explores to what extent the two systems act separately and actcooperatively, and concludes that by and large their activities are comple-mentary.

II. SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS

It would require a substantially deeper and broader examination than spacehere permits to consider every aspect of actual and potential overlap of themandates of all six treaty bodies and twenty odd thematic special proce-dures. Indeed, the subject-matter of the mandates of the two general treatybodies, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) established under the ICCPRand the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)established under the ICESCR, is potentially co-extensive, with each a part

of each special procedures mandate. However, as will appear, the functionsand methods of operation of the two types of body are substantiallydifferent. To the extent of that difference, their work is manifestly comple-mentary. It is also evident that any potential overlap is mainly applicable inrespect of states parties to the treaties.

While some limited attention will be given to commonalities anddifferences between the work of the general treaty bodies and that of the

13. SeeE.S.C. Res. 1235 (XLII), U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 17, 4, U.N. Doc.E/4393 (1967), reprinted in part in HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMANRIGHTSIN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 389 (1996); E.S.C. Res. 1503 (XLVIII), 48th Sess., at8, 10, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1 (1970).

14. See PHILIP ALSTON, INDEPENDENT EXPERT, U.N. Docs. A/44/68; STATUS OF PREPARATION OFPUBLICATIONS, STUDIESAND DOCUMENTSFORTHE WORLD CONFERENCE (INTERIM REPORT), U.N. GAOR,World Conf. on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.11/Rev.1 (1993); EFFECTIVEFUNCTIONINGOF BODIES ESTABLISHED PURSUANTTO UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS (FINALREPORT), U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74(1997).

15. SeeEnhancing the effectiveness of the mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights,U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/DEC/2000/109 (2000); Reportof the Intersessional open-ended working group on enhancing the effectiveness of themechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts.,U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/112; E.S.C. Res. 2000/3, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts.,Agenda Item 2, 20, U.N. Doc. E/2000/INF/2/Add.1 (2000).


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special procedures, the main focus will be on the commonalities anddifferences where mandates appear substantially closer, namely, the CATCommittee and the Special Rapporteur on Torture; the CEDAW Committee

and the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women; the ICERDCommittee (CERD) and the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms ofracism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; and theCRC Committee and the Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, childprostitution and child pornography. If disproportionate attention seems to begiven to the work of the CAT Committee and the Special Rapporteur onTorture, it is hoped that this may be as much a reflection of bothmechanisms consistent efforts at cooperation as the result of this writersinevitably special familiarity with their respective activities.

III. PURPOSE OF ACTIVITIES

While there might be extensive overlap or potential overlap in the mandateof treaty bodies on the one hand, and special procedures on the other, thereis little, if any, in their purpose.

The treaties are silent as to the purpose of the functions attributed to thetreaty bodies, as are the resolutions establishing or continuing the mandates

of the special procedures. Nevertheless, there are differences in context thatclearly elucidate their respective purposes. Essentially, it is suggested thatthe treaty bodies should be conceived of as functioning on a bilateral plane,while the special procedures operate on the multilateral plane. Whilemainly a matter of formality, the distinction has substantive implications.

In formal terms, the treaty bodies are typically elected by one multilat-eral cluster and report to another. That is to say, they are elected by ameeting of states parties and report to the General Assembly.16 Since thereports of the treaty bodies are not before the meetings of states parties(substantive items on their agendas are usually confined to electing thetreaty bodies members), it is understandable that those meetings not beconcerned with the treaty bodies conclusions and views of compliance orotherwise with the respective treaties.17 Meanwhile, the General Assemblysimilarly ignores the country-specific substance of the reports. Arguably, it

16. The CESCR is anomalous in this respect, as it is established by the Economic and Social

Council (ECOSOC), the original body designated to receive and consider states periodicreports (ICESCR, supra note 1, arts. 1617). Accordingly, it is elected by and reports toECOSOC.

17. It should be noted, however, that some members of the HRC have hinted that a morecountry-specific substantive role for the meetings could be appropriate: CCPR/C/SR.1999 (2002).


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may be thought inappropriate, unless the treaty were to provide otherwise,18

for a body, like the Assembly, composed of members not confined to statesparties, to take positions on the behavior of those states that haveassumed

the respective treaty obligations.Accordingly, it may be inferred that the essential relationship as regards

the treaties is between the treaty bodies and each individual state party. Thisview is underlined by the current core function of all of them, namely, theconsideration, in dialogue with each state party, of the reports submitted tothe treaty bodies by the states parties.

By contrast, the special procedures are typically elected by and reportto the same multilateral body, the Commission on Human Rights. Theirreports frequently provide the subject matter of discussion, not least in

respect of their country-specific reporting, which may even be invoked indebates on whether or not to adopt country-specific resolutions.

In addition, as far as the thematic procedures are concerned, they areexpected to make recommendations aimed at states generally19 (these areoften reflected in resolutions on the subject matters of the mandates) and,through the Commission, to other parts of the UN and the internationalcommunity, including nongovernmental organizations.

Of course, in response to the political impossibility, in their early days,of the treaty bodies adopting country specific observations, they developedthe techniques of the general comment. These are expositions of the treatybodys understanding of the scope and nature of states obligations underthe treaty in question. They have proved to be important, authoritativeguides to states, especially when preparing their periodic reports. As suchthey may cover similar territory to that covered by the special procedures inthe recommendations that may be found in their annual reports.

Space does not allow for a detailed comparison of the two types ofcontribution. Any interested reader is invited to compare the HRCs generalcomment on ICCPR Article 7 with the compilation of recommendationsmade by the Special Rapporteur on torture,20 to perceive the different natureof both exercises. In brief, the general comment adopts an expository style,identifying key obligations perceived to be explicit or implicit in the

18. As the formally constituted treaty body for the ICESCR is ECOSOC, it evidently couldhave members not states parties reviewing reports of states parties.

19. See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur, Sir Nigel Rodley, submitted pursuant toCommission on Human Rights resolution 2001/62, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts.,

58th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 11(a), Annex I, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/76 (2001);Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, C.H.R. Res.2002/38, 115, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/38 (2002).

20. Id. res. 2001/62; Compilation of General Comments and General RecommendationsAdopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Note by the Secretariat, at 139, HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 5/(2001).


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prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-ment. The compilation of recommendations uses more lapidary languageand goes into greater detail with respect to desirable measures. Indeed, the

very fact that the Special Rapporteurs functions include not just identifyingthe specifics of legal obligation, but also proposing the measures that mightbe considered good practice with a view to prevention, inevitably affectsthe content and nature of the two approaches.

So, while much of the work of the special procedures is carried out bymeans of bilateral communication between each special procedure andindividual UN member or observer state, it is done with a view to informingthe action of a multilateral body. That action may be country specific, butneed not be. The procedures function of permitting the Commission to

understand certain phenomena on a comparative and global basis is at leastas important, for then it is able to address further the phenomena on thesame basis.

In this contextthe essentially bilateral focus of the treaty bodies andthe essentially multilateral focus of the special proceduresan examinationof working methods of both type of mechanism needs to be situated.

IV. WORKING METHODS

An examination of the working methods of each type of mechanism showsthat there is little in the way of overlap and duplication of function.

The treaty bodies have up to four types of activity. First, all have a corefunction in common. They examine reports to be submitted periodically bystates parties. Second, three may consider interstate complaints: CERD, onan obligatory basis (ICERD Articles 1113),21 the HRC (ICCPR Articles 4143),22 and CAT Committee (CAT Article 21),23 on an optional basis. Third, onan optional basis, four committees may consider complaints of violations ofthe rights of individuals (CERD under ICERD Article 14,24 HRC under ICCPROptional Protocol,25 CAT Committee under CAT Article 22,26 CEDAWCommittee under CEDAW Optional Protocol).27 Fourth, two committees,

21. ICERD, supra note 1, arts. 1113.22. ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 4143.23. CAT, supra note 1, art. 21.24. ICERD, supra note 1, art. 14.25. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted16

Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force23 Mar. 1976), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967).

26. CAT, supra note 1, art. 22.27. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

against Women, adopted 6 Oct. 1999, G.A. Res. A/54/4 U.N. Doc. A/54/4 (1999)(opened for signature10 Dec. 1999).


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the CAT Committee (CAT Article 20)28 and the CEDAW Committee (CEDAWOptional Protocol)29 may investigate of their own motion apparent system-atic torture practices or violations of CAT and CEDAW respectively. These

investigations may include on-the-spot visits to particular state parties, withthe parties permission.30

The special procedures that engage in systematic actions on allegedviolations within their mandates typically undertake the following actions:first, transmittal of allegations of violations and legislative or institutionalaspects conducive to violations to governments for their comments; second,sending urgent appeals (usually in individual cases)31 to prevent possibleimminent violations; and, third, undertaking on-the-spot visits to countrieswith an apparent extensive problem, with the permission of the state in

question.The interrelatedness or otherwise of the activities of both sets of bodies

may best be understood by approaching them from three perspectives:general country work, case specific work and general overview activity.

General country work may itself be divided between routine work,investigation workusually involving on-the-spot fact-finding missionsand, occasionally, urgent appeals. Beginning with routine general countrywork, it is evident that the styles of work between the two types of bodiesare very dissimilar. The typical core work of the treaty bodies involves an

examination of reports, article by article, submitted periodically by statesparties. The reports, whose quality assuredly varies, are usually dealt withaccording to a standard formula. The committee in question or a designatedsub-group will approve written questions to the government of the stateparty which then sends a delegation to a session of the committee to presentthe report and respond to the questions, as well as to oral questionsmembers may choose to put by way of follow-up. Thus, the report is thebasis of the exercise and the main formal source of information.

Except for the CESCR and the CRC Committee, NGOs will have noformal role and their information no formal status. In practice, the Secre-tariat makes arrangements to facilitate the transmission of NGO informationto individual committee members and to permit NGOs to brief interested

28. CAT, supra note 1, art. 20.29. CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 27.

30. While the CAT art. 20 procedure is automatically applicable in principle, it may beexcluded by a reservation made under art. 28. CAT, supra note 1, arts. 20, 28. Similarly,the CEDAW procedure may be excluded by means of a reservation made under OptionalProtocol art. 10. CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 27, art. 10.

31. The technique may also be used for more general urgent matters: see infra note 33 andaccompanying text.


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committee members.32 It is evident that the NGO information looms large inthe ability of the committee and its members to pose the kinds of questionsnecessary to elicit from the state partys delegation a fuller sense of the

actual practice in that state than typically is apparent from the state partysreport. The questions, particularly written ones, normally will be formulatedin general terms, although they may well be based on individual cases. Ofcourse, individual cases taken up by the committees that have dealt withsuch cases in their optional procedures may well figure in the questions.Despite having no formal status, NGO information effectively provides asort of continuing education or refresher course to enhance the expertise ofcommittee members for the purposes of the exercise at hand. As will beseen below, treaty bodies, or at least their members, increasingly have

access to other independent sources of information, such as the findings ofother treaty bodies and of the special procedures themselves.

The centrepiece of the exercise is the dialogue with the governmentdelegation.33 In response to the written and oral questions, the delegation isable to clarify legal and factual questions and give important contextualorientation. Follow-up oral questions can elicit direct responses, prevarica-tion, or no response, all of which permit the committee in question to assessthe reality sought by the questions.

Even in the days before the committees began formulating concluding

observations on the basis of the exchange, there were, as there remain, atleast three important outcomes of the exercise. One was the learningprocess for the state party preparing the report, as it examined its own legalsystem from the perspective of the requirements of a seriously undertakeninternational instrument. The second outcome was having to submit to andabsorb critical reactions by members from all parts of the world, to whoseelection they had been a party. The third, however intangible andunsusceptible of measurement, yet perhaps the most important, was thedialogue itself. A delegation, typically consisting of senior officials respon-sible for law enforcement and the administration of justice and diplomats,flanks the committee chairperson and faces the committee in a formally

32. This of itself represents an evolution: in the early days of the HRC, for example, NGOshad to post or distribute personally to individual members willing to receive it, anymaterial they wished to be considered; the argument was that since the material had noofficial status, the Secretariat should not be involved in processing or disseminating it.SeeBOEREFIJN, supra note 7, at 21620.

33. There has been a tentative trend towards conducting a review where the state party failsover a long period to submit a due report or where it constantly delays sending adelegation. The main purpose here is to prod the state into submitting the report orappearing, not to have a hearing in absentia: seeRules of Procedure of the Human RightsCommittee(Basic Reference Document), Commn on Hum. Rts., 71st Sess., Rules 69A,68(2), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev. 6 (2001).


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arranged chamber; it has come for the purposes of undergoing an act offormal and public accountability regarding the extent to which the stateparty it represents has given effect to a set of obligations that it has solemnly

assumed by ratifying or acceding to the treaty in question. No individualspecial rapporteur, special representative or advisory services expert underthe special procedures system has anything comparable. Certainly, the fewspecial procedures working groups may, like their one-person counterparts,have meetings with representatives of states, in respect of which they areseeking to elucidate facts or arrange possible missions. But these are ad hoc,informal, and private. They have nothing of the ceremonial nature of thereviews by treaty bodies of state reports.

For the last ten or so years, there has been a much more concrete

outcome of the review process carried out by the treaty bodies, namely, theconcluding observations.34 The crucial parts are their findings under thenotion ofsubjects of concern and the recommendations made to the stateparty to address the concerns. Where the concerns relate to factuallycontested matters, they will usually refer to allegations of violations ratherthan to violations tout court. Nevertheless, the very inclusion of theallegations will at least signify that the state party has failed effectively torefute their credibility. Moreover, in the practice of at least one committee,the HRC, the seriousness of the concerns will be reflected in the follow-up

information or action requested of the state party in the concludingobservations. The actual follow-up may also affect the timing of thesubsequent periodic report.35

The approach of the action-oriented special procedures is very differ-ent. Most of the material they transmit to governments is in the form ofindividual case allegations, to which the governments may or may notrespond. The main source, which will be authorized as a source by theresolutions establishing their mandates,36 will be NGOs. Where the allega-tions they receive include general material, for instance, assessing the scopeof the practice or describing legal impediments to the prevention of thephenomenon, then states will also be invited to comment on these. In theearly years of their mandates, the country entries in their reports to the

34. Until 1992, the HRC was not prepared to interpret its power to make generalcomments, under ICCPR art. 40(4), as empowering it to make country-specificcomments, as opposed to comments of a general nature. SeeBOEREFIJN, supra note 7, at30306.

35. SeeHRC Rules of Procedure, supra note 33, Rule 70A.

36. See e.g. Summary or arbitrary executions, E.S.C. Res. 1982/35, U.N. ESCOR, 28thplenary meeting, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1982/35 (1982), which, on the recommendation ofthe Commission, established the mandate of the special rapporteur on summary orarbitrary executions and determined that the special rapporteur would seek and receiveinformation from governments and international governmental and nongovernmentalorganizations.


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Commission on Human Rights tended to restrict themselves to a summary ofallegations transmitted and any replies received. To the extent that thisrepresented a dialogue, it was primarily a written one. Many subsequently

formulated observations on the correspondence, in the way of provisionaljudgment and rather general recommendations. These generally consist of afew sentences. They are inevitably limited by the fluctuating informationthey may receive in any given year and the limited nature of the informationon the political and legal context in which the allegations of individualviolations are said to occur. Accordingly, while their reporting is annual,they have little of the sustained consideration of the issues that the treatybodies reviews of periodic reports evince. On the other hand, the wealth ofcase specific material can give a sense of the scope and gravity of a problem

that is missing from the process of periodic reporting to the treaty bodies.Only two of the treaty bodies are expressly empowered to engage in

investigative country work, including the use of on-the-spot visits. So anyarea of potential overlap with the special procedures only applies to theCAT Committee (Article 20)37 and the CEDAW Committee (OptionalProtocol).38 The latter so far has no experience since the power has onlyrecently been granted and as yet only a small number of states are parties tothe Optional Protocol. The CAT Committees power applies to all statesparties except the few which have availed themselves of the option in CAT

Article 28 to exclude the power.39 Yet, here too the experience is limited. Itis understood that there have been six inquiries into suspected systematicpractices of torture. The summary reports of three are in the public domain:Turkey,40 Egypt,41 and Peru.42 The reports on Turkey and Peru are based onon-the-spot fact-finding visits. The report on Egypt is not, the governmenthaving availed itself of the right to refuse to receive a committee delegation.

The three published reports show the value of sustained study. Theydeal with a broad range of allegations and consider in detail the legal andinstitutional framework in which the problem is manifested. The Turkey andPeru reports suggest that the in-country experience permits the committee tomake less tentative conclusions (the Egypt report makes greater use ofallegations to qualify its assessment), more detailed analysis of the legal

37. CAT, supra note 1, art. 20.38. CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 27.39. CAT, supra note 1, art. 28.40. Activities of the Committee against Torture pursuant to article 20 of the Convention

against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment:Turkey, U.N. GAOR., 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/48/44/Add.1 (1993).

41. Report of the Committee against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 44, 180222, U.N. Doc. A/51/44 (1996).

42. Report of the Committee against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 44, 14493, U.N. Doc. A/56/44 (2001).


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issues, and more specific recommendations reflecting the greater under-standing of the local scene. In sum, they demonstrate the undoubted valueof an on-the-spot visit to come to grips with the legal and practical realities

of the human rights situation.The country visit has become routine for most special procedures. Of

course, states remain free to refuse access, but a substantial number set amore positive example. Indeed, there is now a practice of states givingblanket prior agreement to visits by any special procedure, some thirty-eighthaving done so at the time of writing.43 The interest of the specialprocedures in country visits is assuredly because of the benefits describedabove. Direct access to civil society and most relevant levels of officialdompermits an immersion course in the historical, constitutional, legal, and

operational framework of the problems being studied. Insistence on theconditions of access contained in the standard terms of reference for fact-finding visits make possible, in this writers experience, substantial uncover-ing of those aspects of the reality that governments prefer to conceal andwhich, indeed, may be unknown to important higher-level decision makers,whether by preference or inadvertence.

So far the potential for overlap has applied only to the CAT Committeeacting under CAT Article 20 and the Special Rapporteur on Torture. Anysuch overlap or duplication has been avoided by the Special Rapporteurspolicy of not seeking to visit a country in respect of which the CATCommittee has initiated an Article 20 inquiry. On the other hand, there isevidently room for complementary action. Thus, in 1997, five years after theCAT Committee visited Turkey, the Special Rapporteur also sought a visit,which took place in 1998.44 Since neither mechanism has the resources thatwould make follow-up visits practicable, the Special Rapporteurs visit wasable to serve as a de factofollow-up to the Committees visit. More recently,the CAT Committee is understood to have engaged in a mission to a countrypreviously visited by the Special Rapporteur, with potentially equallysymbiotic effect. In addition, in the light of Egypts refusal of access to the

43. See the website of the Association for the Prevention of Torture: at www.apt.ch/un/hrc58.

44. Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, Submitted Pursuant to Commis-sion on Human Rights resolution 1995/37, Addendum, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum.

Rts., 55th Sess., Item 11(a) of the provisional agenda, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/61/Add.1(1991). The Special Rapporteur sought the invitation in 1995 (seeReport of the SpecialRapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human RightsResolution 1995/37, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 52d Sess., Item 8(a) of theprovisional agenda, 178, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/35 (1996)). The Committees visithad taken place in 1992.


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Committee, the Special Rapporteur did not hesitate to seek an invitation tovisit that country,45 albeit no such invitation was forthcoming.

One final aspect of special procedure activity relevant to general

country work, for which there is no counterpart in the methods of the treatybodies, is the urgent appeal. As will be noted below, urgent appeals arenormally used by special procedures in individual cases, by way of seekingto avert harm to individuals feared to be at risk. However, the techniquemay occasionally be resorted to for a more general purpose. For instance,four procedures jointly appealed to Peru to refrain from adopting aconstitutional amendment aimed at permitting an amnesty for crimescommitted by security forces in counter-emergency operations.46 The onlyanalogous treaty body measure available is the request for a special report

from the state party.47To the extent that some treaty bodies and several special procedures are

engaged in case specific work, this at first sight could be a source of overlapand duplication. A closer look reveals that the perception is largely illusory.The area of potential overlap is, in any event, limited. It covers onlyindividual cases that could be the subject of communications to the HumanRights Committee in respect of state parties to the Optional Protocol to theICCPR48; to the CAT Committee in respect of states parties that have madethe requisite declaration under CAT Article 2249; to the CERD in respect of

states parties that have made the requisite declaration under ICERD Article1450; and to the CEDAW Committee in respect of states parties to theCEDAW Optional Protocol.51

Moreover, the nature of the activity of the two types of mechanism isgenerally different. The treaty bodies, when considering individual cases,do so for the purpose of formulating views as to whether or not there has

45. The Committee reported in 1996 (see supra note 30) and the Special Rapporteur soughtthe invitation in 1997 (see Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley,Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/38, U.N. ESCOR,Commn on Hum. Rts., 54th Sess., Item 8(a) of the provisional agenda, 4, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/1998/38 (1998).

46. The four procedures were the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappear-ances and the Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, ontorture, and on the independence of judges and lawyers. See Report of the SpecialRapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human RightsResolution 1995/37, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 52d Sess., Item 8(a) of theprovisional agenda, 13336, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/35 (1996).

47. For example, the Committee against Torture sought a special report from Israel in 1996,

which was submitted in 1997. SeeConsideration of Reports Submitted by States PartiesUnder Article 19 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/33/Add.2/Rev.1 (1997).

48. ICCPR Optional Protocol, supra note 25.49. CAT, supra note 1, art. 22.50. ICERD, supra note 1, art. 14.51. CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 27.


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been a violation. This is the practice of only one of the special procedures.While, as noted earlier, they seek information from states in respect ofallegations of individual violations, they do so in the framework of reporting

the dialogue and perhaps making observations on the problem in general inthe state. Except for the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, they do notsystematically engage in formulating judgmental conclusions on each case.The Human Rights Committee, tellingly, does not generally consider theactivities of the special procedures as procedures of international investiga-tion or settlement, as precluded by ICCPR Optical Protocol Article 5(2)(a).52

The Working Group, on the other hand, has from the beginning had aspecific mandate ofinvestigating cases of arbitrary detention.53 In the lightof this wording, it makes reasoned findings (currently called opinions54)

on whether the case involves a violation of the right not to be subjected toarbitrary detention. This could evidently involve overlap with a case comingbefore the Human Rights Committee, especially under ICCPR Article 9.Indeed, in respect of one case submitted to both bodies, the Working Grouptransmitted the case to the Human Rights Committee, once it became awareof the situation.55 It is also understood that attempts are made in theSecretariat to steer cases in the right direction. For example, in a case wheredomestic remedies have been exhausted, the Secretariat may process itunder the Optional Protocol, while in one where they have not, it may be

processed for the attention of the Working Group. Here, however, muchwill depend on the familiarity of staff members with the different proce-dures, a task rendered more difficult by the fact that the relevant staff workin separate branches.

As far as the treaty bodies and special procedures are concerned, theduplication is not of function, but of potential inconvenience to a statereceiving multiple requests. This can be a problem within the cluster ofspecial procedures, as well as between them and the treaty bodies. Ideally,

52. For example, the HRC was not precluded from dealing with a case also under study bythe Special Rapporteur on summary or arbitrary executions. See Baboeram et al. v.Suriname (146/1983 and 148-54/1983), Annex X, 9.1, U.N. Doc. A/40/40 (1985).

53. Commission res. 1991/42, 5 Mar 1991.54. Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/50, required the Group to give views,

rather than decisions.See Question of arbitrary detention, U.N. ESCOR, Commn onHum. Rts., 64th Meeting, 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1997/50 (1997). In response, it haschosen the word opinions.

55. Arredondo Guevara v. Peru, Opinion 4/2000 (Opinions adopted by the Working Group

on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 57th Sess., Item 11 (a) ofthe provisional agenda, 61-2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 (2000); the HRCconsidered that the case remained admissible in the light of the groups reference of thecase to the HRC without any expression of its views. See Report of the Human RightsCommittee,U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex IX E, U.N. Doc. A/55/40, Vol.II (2000).


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systems in the Secretariat would ensure that in such cases, states are invitedto make their responses to each of the mechanisms involved.

As noted earlier, the special procedures have developed the method of

issuing urgent appeals to states in circumstances where a violation withintheir mandates is feared to be about to take place or to be taking place. Theyconstitute routine preventive work for several of the procedures that usethem, especially the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappear-ances, the Special Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial, Arbitrary or SummaryExecutions, and on Torture, and the Special Representative on HumanRights Defenders.56

The only comparable measure currently used by the treaty bodies is theinterim measure, whereby the body seeks suspension of a formal measure

believed to be imminent in a state party, pending its consideration of thesubstance of the complaint. Thus, for example, the Human Rights Commit-tee, through its Special Rapporteur on New Communications, is empow-ered under Rule 86 of its Rules of Procedure to request interim measures bya state party to avoid irreparable damage, for instance an execution takingplace before the HRC is able to assess the compatibility of the penalty withthe state partys obligations under the ICCPR.57 The HRC and CAT Commit-tees act similarly in the case of threatened expulsions from states parties tostates where the alleged potential victim would be at risk of torture.58

It is not impossible to conceive that the treaty bodies, resourcespermitting, might adopt an urgent appeals system similar to that of thespecial procedures. However, it is unlikely that they would do so outside theformal framework of action on individual cases pursuant to the optionalindividual complaints procedures. Since the latter involves compliance withthe rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies and the maintenance ofconfidentiality until the case is either declared inadmissible or is the subjectof final views, any urgent action would presumably be likely to beconstrained by the domestic remedies rule and the same confidentiality. Forthe special procedures, there are no similar constraints. They can take up acase, regardless of the stage it may be at in the domestic legal system. They

56. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Seventeen Frequently AskedQuestions about United Nations Special Rapporteurs, Fact Sheet No. 27 (2001), 9; NigelRodley, Urgent Action, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MECHANISMSESSAYS INHONOUROF JAKOB TH. MLLER 279 (G. Alfredsson et al. eds., 2001).

57. A. de Zayas, The Examination of Individual Complaints by the United Nations Human

Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civiland Political Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MECHANISMS, supra note 56,67, 7981.

58. See HRC Rules of Procedure, supra note 33, Rule 108(9); see, e.g., Report of theCommittee against Torture, S. H. v. Norway (121/1998), U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp.No. 44, Annex VIII. B.4, 1.2, U.N. Doc. A/55/44 (2000).


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may, following a mandated requirement to use discretion in their work,59

not usually report publicly on the actions until they issue their annualreports, but there is no rule of confidentiality and some have also used press

releases to draw public attention to the appeal. Indeed, if the work of thetreaty bodies is, as has been seen, characterizable by its formality, that of thespecial procedures is more notable for its flexibility.

V. EXTENT OF DIRECT COOPERATION

One factor representing a pull towards common endeavor is the veryexistence of the relevant treaties. These establish the mandates of the treaty

bodies, but they are also essential sources of legitimacy for the activities ofthe special procedures. Thus, the CAT will frequently be invoked by theSpecial Rapporteurs on Torture and on Violence Against Women, as will theICERD by the Special Rapporteur on Racial Discrimination and the CRC bythe Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children.60 Of course, it is essentialthat the special procedures not seem to arrogate the role of guardians of thetreaties, a role that belongs to the treaty bodies. Rather, they basethemselves on general international law or normative standards. These maybe reflected in various sources, such as declarations, resolutions and other

manifestations of acceptable state practice. For example, the SpecialRapporteur on torture will frequently invoke the 1975 General Assembly

59. See, e.g., Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,C.H.R. Res. 1985/33, 6, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 41st Sess. (establishingthe mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Torture).

60. Report of the Special Rapporteur, Sir Nigel Rodley, submitted pursuant to Commission

on Human Rights resolution 2000/43: Visit to Brazil, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum.Rts., 57th Sess., Agenda Item 11(a), addendum, 14951, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/66/Add.2 (2001); Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causesand consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Com-mission on Human Rights resolution 1997/44: Report on the mission to Haiti, U.N.ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 56th Sess., Item 12(a) on the provisional agenda,addendum, 76, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/68/Add.3 (2000); Report by Mr. MauriceGll-Ahanhanzo, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimi-nation, xenophobia and related intolerance, submitted pursuant to Commission onHuman Rights resolution 1993/20, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess.,Agenda Item 14, 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/66 (1994), (Special Rapporteur onRacism, annual report, describing ICERD as the basic international legal instrument

relevant to his mandate in his annual report; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the saleof children, child prostitution and child pornography, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum.Rts., 58th Sess., Item 13 on the provisional agenda, 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/88(2002) (Special Rapporteur on Sale of Children, Annual Report, describing the CRC andits Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography asthe foundation for determining and developing the scope of the mandate.).


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Declaration against Torture,61 especially vis--vis states not party to the CAT,as well as other soft-law instruments.62 Yet, where a particular rule or typeof recommended behavior promoted by the Special Rapporteur is covered

by the CAT, it would be perverse for him to refrain from invoking therelevant CAT provision in communication with states that are, in fact,parties to the Convention. Certainly, a special procedure should be carefulin adopting a controversial interpretation of a human rights treaty monitoredby a treaty body, especially if that interpretation is at odds with that of thetreaty body. Yet, the silence of the treaty body need not necessarily precludethe special procedure from staking out a position. For instance, the specialrapporteur, where constrained to address the appropriateness of includingcorporal punishment within his mandate, could not but explore the

relevance of the CAT in support of his contention that the practice did fallwithin the mandate.63 The CAT Committee appears subsequently to havetaken the same view.64

The special procedures also typically promote ratification of the treatiesof most concern to their mandates, with some also advocating acceptanceof their optional complaints procedures.65 This is a role proper to them thatwould be minimally appropriate for the treaty bodies themselves. In doing

61. These references will be in letters transmitting allegations to governments, but do notappear in the heavily summarized versions found in the annual reports; it also figured inhis analysis of the relevance of his mandate to the problem of corporal punishment. SeeReport of the Special Rapporteur[on torture], Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant toCommission on Human Rights resolution 1995/37 B, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., Item 8(a)of the provisional agenda, 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/7 (1997).

62. See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant toCommission on Human Rights resolution 1992/32, U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess., Item 10(a)of the provisional agenda, 135, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/31 (1994), referring to theBody of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention orImprisonment, U.N. GAOR, 76th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 (1988).

63. See Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant toCommission on Human Rights resolution 1995/37 B, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., Item 8(a)on the provisional agenda, 68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/7 (1997).

64. SeeConclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Saudi Arabia ,U.N. Comm. against Torture, 28th Sess., 3(e), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/28/5 (2002).

65. See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant toCommission on Human Rights resolution 1995/37: Visit by the Special Rapporteur toPakistan, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., Item 8 on the provisional agenda, 102, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/1997/7/Add.2 (1996); Report by Mr. Gll-Ahanhanzo, Special Rapporteur oncontemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intoler-ance, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/26: Missionto South Africa, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., Provisional Agenda

Item 6, Addendum, 90(6), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/15/Add.1; Report of the SpecialRapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. RadhikaCoomaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution1997/44: Report on the mission to Haiti, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 56th Sess.,Item 12(a) of the provisional agenda, addendum, 76, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/68/Add.3 (2000); Report of the Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution


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so, they are inevitably promoting the importance of the work of the treatybodies. After one visit (to Sierra Leone), the Special Rapporteur on ViolenceAgainst Women even recommended that the authorities submit a report to

the CEDAW.66While they may not formally invoke the country-specific findings of the

special procedure, the treaty bodies routinely have access to and cite in theoral dialogue the findings of special procedures. This is especially the casewhere the findings are those of a country-specific special procedures or of athematic one which has recently reported on a country visit. For example,the report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture on his visit to Brazil in 2000was referred to in the CAT Committees dialogue with that country in2001.67 While, in view of the confidentiality of Committee discussions of

the list of issues to be presented to a state party in advance of the review andof their concluding observations, the point cannot be documented, it is thiswriters experience with the Human Rights Committee that the findings andrecommendations of these special procedures reports will also influence theissues identified in the list of issues and recommendations in the concludingobservations. It is also understood that the same is true for other treatybodies, notably the CAT Committee.

The work of the treaty bodies may also inform that of the specialprocedures. Thus, the findings of the CAT Committees mission to Turkeyand its concluding observations on Mexico loomed large in the discussions

and child pornography, Ms. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos: report on the mission of the SpecialRapporteur to the United States of America on the issue of commercial sexualexploitation of children, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 53d Sess., Item 21(b) ofthe provisional agenda, addendum, ch. VII, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/95/Add.2 (1997);inexplicably the former Special Rapporteur on the sale of children omitted to recom-mend that the Russian Federation ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on theRights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography,

adopted by G.A. Res. 263, 25 May 2000, after her visit to that country in Oct. 2000(Report of the Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and childpornography, Ms. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos: report on the mission to the Russian Federa-tion, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 57th Sess., Item 13 of the provisional agenda,addendum, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/78/Add.2 (2001)).

66. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes andconsequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commissionon Human Rights resolution 2001/49: Mission to Sierra Leone, U.N. ESCOR, Commn onHum. Rts., 58th Sess., Item 12(a) of the provisional agenda, addendum, 115, U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.2 (2002).

67. In its concluding observations, the Committee requested information concerningmeasures taken by the public authorities to implement throughout the country, the

recommendations . . . of the Special Rapporteur on torture to which the state partydelegation referred during the dialogue with the Committee. SeeCommittee againstTorture: Summary Record of the First Part (Public) of the 471st Meeting, U.N. Comm.against Torture, 26th Sess., 39 (Gaer),U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR. 471 (2001); SeeReport ofthe Committee against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 44, 120(i), U.N.Doc. A/56/44 (2001).


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with the authorities during the visit of the Special Rapporteur on torture tothose countries.68 The same Special Rapporteur has routinely included in hisobservations at the end of country visits entries in his annual report

reference to the findings of the HRC and the CAT Committee in theirconcluding observations.69 While this may not be standard practice for thespecial procedures, the work of the treaty bodies may inform theirrecommendations in other ways. For instance, in the report of her visit toColombia, the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women urged thegovernment to comply with the CEDAW recommendations after its reviewof Colombias fourth periodic report.70 On the other hand, the CERD in1999 took the unusual step of publicly lamenting that the Special Rappor-teur on Racism appears to completely overlook the relevance of the

ICERD.71 While it is unfortunately true that he had apparently overlookedthe CERDs concluding observations in the reports on several countryvisits,72 in that very year he did refer to them in his annual report in respectof the scheduled tribes and castes of India.73 It may be speculated whetherthis reflected an awareness of the concern within CERD. Certainly, by 2001,the report of his visit to Australia made reference to CERDs concludingobservations.74

68. See Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant toCommission on Human Rights resolution 1995/37: Visit by the Special Rapporteur toTurkey, U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., Item 11(a) of the provisional agenda, 104, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/1999/61/Add.1 (1999); the report of the visit to Mexico is, regrettably, silent onthe point, which is a matter of the authors personal recollection. See Report of theSpecial Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant to Commission on HumanRights resolution 1997/38: Visit by the Special Rapporteur to Mexico, U.N. ESCOR, 54thSess., Item 8(a) of the provisional agenda, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/38/Add.2 (1998).

69. See, e.g., most recently, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submittedpursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/43, U.N. ESCOR, 57th Sess.,Item 11(a) of the provisional agenda, 50 (Argentina), 63 (Armenia), 68 (Australia),

167 (Belarus), 231 (Cameroon), 23536 (Chile), 33031 (China), 349 (Congo), 47576(Egypt), 688 (Kyrgyzstan), 843 (Peru), 857 (Portugal), 1223 (United States), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/66 (2001).

70. SeeU.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/Add. 2, 120.71. Kevin Boyle & Anneliese Baldaccini, A Critical Evaluation of International Human Rights

Approaches to Racism, in DISCRIMINATIONAND HUMAN RIGHTSTHE CASEOF RACISM 135, 18384 (Sandra Fredman ed., 2001); see Report of the Committee on the Elimination of RacialDiscrimination, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 18, 666, U.N. Doc. A/52/18(1997).

72. SeeTheo van Boven, United Nations Strategies to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimi-nation; A Sobering but not Hopeless Balance Sheet, in THE ROLEOFTHE NATION-STATEINTHE21ST CENTURY 251, n261 (Monique Castermans-Holleman et al. eds., 1998).

73. See Report by Mr. Gll-Ahanhanzo, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms ofracism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, submitted pursuant toCommission on Human Rights resolution 1998/26, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts.,55th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 6, 88100, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/15 (1999).

74. See Report by Mr. Maurice Gll-Ahanhanzo, Special Rapporteur on contemporaryforms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, submitted


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As far as direct contact between the special procedures and the treatybodies is concerned, it appears that only the Special Rapporteur on Tortureand the CAT Committee consistently have joint meetings.75 The main topic

of these is to insure precisely that the two mechanisms maximize thecomplementarities of their work and minimize duplication. On one occa-sion, responding to a Committee members question, the Special Rapporteurgave reasons why he thought there would be difficulties for the SpecialRapporteur to submit situations that the Committee might study under CATArticle 20.76 At their most recent meeting, cooperation in respect of Article20 was further explored.77 Another topic of the meetings has becomeagreeing on a joint text, together with the Voluntary Fund for Victims ofTorture and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, to commemorate the

International Day in Support of Victims of Torture (26 June).78 However, thenew Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children recently had a meeting withthe CRC Committee with a view to seeking closer cooperation with theCommittee and attended a thematic meeting convened by the Committee.79

His predecessor had attended similar thematic meetings.80

pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/5: Mission to Australia, U.N.ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 58th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 6, Addendum, 1,U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/24/Add.1 (2002).

75. See, e.g.,Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant toCommission on Human Rights resolution 1992/32, U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess., Item 10(a)of the provisional agenda, 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/34 (1995); see Report of theHuman Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Vol. I, 17, U.N.Doc. A/55/40 (2000).

76. SeeCommittee against Torture: Summary Record of the First Part (Public) of the 187thMeeting, U.N. Comm. against Torture, 12th Sess., 1921, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR. 187

(1994).77. Press Release, U.N. Comm. against Torture, Committee against Torture Holds Dialoguewith Special Rapporteur on Torture (28th sess., 25 May 2002).

78. See, e.g.,Report of the Committee against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No.44, 1718, Annex V, U.N. Doc. A/55/44 (2000).

79. SeeReport of the Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and childpornography, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 58th Sess., Item 13 of the provisionalagenda, 34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/88 (2002); Report on the Twenty-Eighth Sessionof the Committee on the Rights of the Child, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. On Rts. Of the Child,28th Sess., 670, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/111 (2001).

80. She attended the CRC Committees day of discussion on state violence against children.SeeReport of the Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child

pornography, Ms. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 57thSess., Item 13 of the provisional agenda, 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/78 (2001); so didthe Special Rapporteur on torture. See Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S.Rodley, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/43, U.N.ESCOR, 57th Sess., Item 11(a) of the provisional agenda, 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/66 (2001).


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In general, a recent study considers the cooperation between SpecialRapporteurs and both Committees to be an exception.81 It finds that thesame does not apply to the relationship between the CEDAW Committee

and the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women or that betweenCERD and the Special Rapporteur on Racism.82 The same source indicatesdissatisfaction by these treaty bodies with the absence of contact,83 althoughit is this writers understanding that the Special Rapporteur on Violenceagainst Women has sought such contact with the CEDAW Committee.84 It ishoped that by 2003 a meeting may take place. Except for an initial,apparently positive, exploratory meeting in 1995,85 the only contactbetween CERD and the Special Rapporteur on Racism that the author hasbeen able to identify is the attendance by the former at a one-day meeting

on Roma convened in 2001 by the CERD.86 On the other hand, the SpecialRapporteur apparently had a meeting in 2001 with the Secretary of theCERD which considered ways and means of enhancing cooperationbetween them.87 In the light of the positive relationship between the torture-related and child-related mechanisms, it is difficult to comprehend why thatof the others should not be similar. It cannot be excluded that a (misplaced)perception of potential competition is a factor.

There is no doubt that the Human Rights Committee has not soughtsystematic contacts with the special procedures, respectful as it may be of

their contribution, through their reports, to its work. Since most of them arerelevant to its work, a practice of holding meetings with them would be anadded burden on an already overcharged agenda. Presumably juridicalconsiderations do not loom large. It is true that there is nothing in the ICCPRenvisaging such contacts, but a similar absence in the ICERD, CAT and theCRC has not prevented the contacts referred to. Certainly, the CESCR, as asub-organ of ECOSOC has no formal inhibitions, nor does it apparentlyhave practical ones. In 2001 it had an exchange of views with the SpecialRapporteur on Adequate Housing with a view to exploring the scope of

81. SeeANNE F. BAYEFSKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM 56 (2001).82. Id.83. Id.84. Information kindly provided by the human rights officer who services the mandate of the

Special Rapporteur, on file with the author.85. See Elimination of Racism and Racial Discrimination: Note by theSecretary-General,

U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 103, 2632, U.N. Doc. A/50/476 (1995); seealsoBoyle & Baldaccini, supra note 71.

86. See Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights oncontemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intoler-ance: Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess, Item 114 of the provisionalagenda, 19, U.N. Doc. A/55/304 (2000).

87. Information kindly provided by the human rights officer who services the mandate of theSpecial Rapporteur, on file with the author.


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appropriate cooperation between the Committee and the Special Rappor-teur.88 In the same year, evidencing that this was no isolated incident, theCommittee announced that it would

[L]look into ways of further strengthening its cooperation with the relevant

special rapporteurs of the Commission on Human Rights (including the specialrapporteurs on adequate housing, on the right to education, on the right to food,on violence against women, its causes and consequences, on the sale of

children, child prostitution and child pornography and on the human rights ofmigrants) and with its independent experts (on the right to development, on thequestion of human rights and extreme poverty and on structural adjustment and

foreign debt.89

What is clear is that at the group level both sets of procedures havebeen keen to develop an annual consultation. Starting with the attendancein 1996 of the chairperson of the third annual meeting of special proceduresat the seventh session of the meeting of persons chairing human rights treatybodies,90 the chair of that session of the treaty body meeting attended thefourth special procedures meeting in 1997, as did the chair of the CESCR.91

The following year the chair of the Committee against Torture attended.92 By1999, the scheduling of both meetings was such as to permit the first jointsession of the chairs of treaty bodies and the special procedures, of which

by the time of writing there have been a further two.93

88. Report on the Twenty-Fifth, Twenty-Sixth and Twenty-Seventh Sessions, U.N. ESCOR,Comm. On Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts., Supp. No. 2, 1066, U.N. Doc. E/2002/22, U.N.Doc. E/C.12/2001/17 (2002).

89. Id. 1050. The author is grateful to University of Essex colleague Professor Paul Hunt,who is also Rapporteur of the CESCR, for providing him with this information.

90. SeeU.N. Doc. A/51/482 (1996), 8, 53.91. See Further promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-doms, Including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of theCommission Follow-Up to the World Conference on Human Rights: Note by the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts.,54th Sess., Items 9 and 21 of the provisional agenda, 9, 3443, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/45.

92. SeeU.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/3, 10, 3342.93. SeeEffective Functioning of the Human Rights Mechanisms: Note by the United Nations

High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 56th Sess.,Items 4 and 18 of the provisional agenda, 3031, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/5 (1999),(first); Effective Functioning of the Human Rights Mechanisms: Note by the United

Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts.,57th Sess., Items 4 and 18 of the provisional agenda, 7176, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/6 (2000), (second); Effective Functioning of the Human Rights Mechanisms: Noteby the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Commn onHum. Rts., 58th Sess., Items 4 and 18 of the provisional agenda, 6975, Appendix V,U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/14 (2001) (third).


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It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the details of thisevolving cross-system dialogue. Perhaps the most significant aspect of it isthat it manifestly corresponds to a shared perceived need. One facet of the

need is that of improving mutual knowledge and understanding of eachgroup of mechanisms. Inevitably, the meetings can only help partially: eachof the six treaty bodies can convey what it wishes to the assembled specialprocedures, but not all the special procedures can do the same in a briefmeeting, nor can the treaty body chairs reasonably be expected to be aneffective conduit to the whole membership of the Committee he or sherepresents. Moreover, the regular turnover of special procedures mandateholders and treaty body chairs limits the possibility of entrenching theinformation and ideas exchanged.

The constant theme in the reports of their first three joint meetings is theintense focus on the importance of promoting full awareness by mecha-nisms of each group of the activities and output of the mechanisms of theother group. The key role of the Secretariat in making that happen isevidenced by increasingly insistent demands for feedback on the recom-mendations, notably, those requesting the Secretariat to put in place systemsthat would facilitate the desired information exchange.94

The joint meetings have, with some nuance that doubtless reflects acertain diffidence by some treaty bodies, given their blessing in principle to

the notion of bilateral meetings between treaty bodies and relevant specialprocedures. In the words of the recommendation from the first meeting:The joint meeting encouraged the treaty bodies to call, as they feltnecessary, for the cooperation of the special procedures, including thepossibility of a direct exchange of information during their respectivesessions.95

By the third joint meeting, the tone, albeit in the passive voice, seemedsomewhat less doubtful: Increased emphasis should be placed on organiz-ing meetings between special procedures mandate holders and the treatybodies.96

In terms of the overall theme of this essay, the will towards cooperationrather than competition was best stated in the first sentence of the first

94. Id.95. SeeEffective Functioning of the Human Rights Mechanisms: Note by the United Nations

High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 56th Sess.,Items 4 and 18 of the provisional agenda, 31(b), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/5 (1999). The

present author chaired that years meeting of special rapporteurs and co-chaired the jointmeeting.96. SeeEffective Functioning of the Human Rights Mechanisms: Note by the United Nations

High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 58th Sess.,Items 4 and 18 of the provisional agenda, Appendix V, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/14(2001).


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recommendation of the first joint meeting: The joint meeting emphasizedthat the work of each group of mechanisms is equally and mutuallyimportant.97

VI. CONCLUSION

It may be that, had the UN from the beginning been ready to establish ahuman rights monitoring system analogous to that found in the currentspecial procedures system, it might not have then gone on to create thesystem of treaty bodies. Yet the existence of the two systems cannot beproperly understood as creating duplication and overlap.

The implicit purpose of each system is substantially different. Thestructural features of the elective and reporting constituencies of the type ofmechanism places them on essentially separate planes: bilateral for thetreaty bodies, multilateral for the special procedures. This is connected witha different style of communication; characterized by dialogue, in the case ofthe treaty bodies, and fact-elucidation, in the case of the special procedures.The main focus of the treaty bodies, particularly through their core functionof reviewing states reports is to promote enhanced respect for the humanrights enshrined in the treaty obligations, with general comments being

merely an attendant product aiming to give states guidance on the natureand scope of other obligations for their reports. A main focus, if not the onlyone, of the thematic special procedures is to provide the whole UNmembership with comparative and global understanding of the humanrights problem in question, as well as with guidance on how to deal with it.

As far as actual working methods are concerned, there is surprisinglylittle overlap. The special procedures have no equivalent of the treatybodies review of periodic reports. The concluding observations of the treatybodies at the close of the review is of a much more sustained analysis of thecountrys human rights problems and recommendations to address themthan the observations in the country entries in the special proceduresannual reports. Meanwhile, the special procedures are able to engage in yetmore sophisticated fact-finding (and consequent recommendation-making)through the use of on-the-spot visits. Only the CAT and CEDAW Commit-tees have similar powers, the former exercising them sparingly, the latter notyet having had the chance to test them. Any overlap or duplication was

97. SeeEffective Functioning of the Human Rights Mechanisms: Note by the United NationsHigh Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Commn on Hum. Rts., 56th Sess.,Items 4 and 18 of the provisional agenda, 31(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/5 (1999).


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avoided by the Special Rapporteur on tortures refraining from seeking tovisit a country subject to a CAT Article 20 inquiry by the CAT Committee.

As far as case work is concerned, the special procedures, with one

exception (the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention) do not pursueindividual cases to a formal conclusion on whether or not there has been aviolation, whereas the treaty bodies do just that. In the case of theexception, the problem has been solved in the one case it has arisen, by theWorking Group on Arbitrary Detentions deferring the case to the HRC. Ifthat had not happened, it cannot be excluded that such an incident couldlead to the HRCs considering the case to be inadmissible by reason ofhaving been submitted to an alternative procedure of international investi-gation or settlement. That no such thing happens in respect of cases

submitted to the other special procedures, testifies to the difference infunction between the two types of procedure. Also, improved informationmanagement systems within the Secretariat can contribute substantially tothe avoidance of duplicative case work.

By contrast the special procedures use of urgent appeals has no realcounterpart in the treaty bodies methods. In the rare cases where anapparent similar practice exists, it is used by the treaty bodies to preservethe possibility of determining whether or not a violation could occur. Thepurpose of the special procedures urgent appeals is to prevent, inhibit orstop any feared violations.

In general, the activities of the treaty bodies reflect the formality of thesolemn legal instruments that gave birth to them; those of the specialprocedures have the flexibility appropriate to their genesis in a UN politicalbody. This does not mean that the special procedures should considerthemselves free to act inconsistently, without an established (common orprocedure-specific) methodology. Rather, a key aspect for the specialprocedures is to seek to have some effect and give some guidance in a shorttime frame, whereas for the treaty bodies the very nature of periodic reportsand the necessarily protracted process of reaching views on individual casesrequire a longer term perspective.

This analysis suggests that any area of potential overlap and duplicationof work between the two types of mechanism is largely illusory. Whereoccasionally, it is real, it is avoidable by the application of the treaties ruleson admissibility, by improved information management systems in theSecretariat and by a spirit of cooperation, whereby the special proceduresdefer to the activities of the treaty bodies.

Underlying any legitimate concern of potential cross-system duplica-tion and overlap is the assumption that the state whose activity in questionis a party to the relevant treaty and that, where optional, it has accepted thetreaty bodies scrutinizing or complaints functions. It is, therefore, axiomaticthat there can be no such duplication or overlap in respect of states that


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have not adhered to the treaty or accepted the optional procedures. Thatacceptance would also have to be, as is not presently the case, irrevocable.98

Pursuing the same logic, it would also be necessary for the treaty bodies

that do not at present engage in on-the-spot fact-finding visits to do so. Thiswould raise the question as to whether they have the implied power to doso or would need a treaty amendment or optional protocol to give them thatpower (the CEDAW Optional Protocol may be invocable as suggesting, acontrario, that there is no such implied power.) The treaty bodies would alsohave to be able to engage in urgent appeals beyond those merely aimed atpreserving their adjudicative functions.

It will be evident that this sort of evolution would in fact involve atransformation in the nature of the treaty body system to approximate that of

the special procedures system. Any transformation of this sort cannotreasonably be expected in the near future. More universal ratification of thetreaties is still a depressingly distant goal, despite sustained attempts atpromoting it.99 Presumably acceptance of the optional procedures is yetfurther off.

It would appear that, for the foreseeable future, the two systems willremain what they have been so far, highly complementary means ofpromoting accountability for compliance with human rights norms. Thecomplementarity is increased by the ability of each system to build on the

work of the other. Of course, from the perspective of the state, interest frommore than one body, however different the basis of that interest, representsprobably unwanted, increased pressure to address the problem. The humanrights perspective must, however, particularly in view of the non-coercivenature of the actions, be that of the potential victim. From that perspective,multiple activity can only help.

98. For example, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago have denounced the OptionalProtocol to the ICCPR.99. Most recently, the strategy of promoting urgent ratification of the six principal human

rights treaties; see Road map towards the implementation of the United NationsMillennium Declaration; Report of the Secretary-General. See Roadmap towards theimplementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Item 40 of the provisional agenda, 204, U.N. Doc.A/56/326 (2001).

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