united states army fm90-10x1 - 12 may 1993 - part09.pdf

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* A P P E N D IX K

C L O S E Q U A R T E R S C O M B A T T E C H N IQ U E S

A la r g e p ortio n o f c omba t in b uilt-u p a rea s ta ke s p la ce a t ve ry clo se

q ua rte rs , o fte n b etw ee n sm a ll g ro up s o f c om ba ta nts w ith in th e c on fin es

of a single room . Because of this, individual com bat actions can flareup quickly and be over in a matter of seconds. Success or failure is

open determined by life or death decisions made and actions takenalm ost instinctively by individual soldiers and sm all team s as they

encounter differing com plex situations in each new room . O ne of the

com plexities often encountered particularly during OO TW , is the

in te rm ixin g o f c om ba ta nts w ith n on co mb ata nts in th e sam e b uild ing ,

o ften in th e sa me ro om s. E mp lo yin g clo se q ua rters co mb at tec hn iqu esis open the m ost effective means of achieving victory w bile minimizing

friendly losses, avoiding unnecessary noncom batant casualties, and

conse rv ing ammun it ion and demo liti on s f or sub sequen t ope ra ti on s.

K-l. BATTLEDRILLS AND CLOSE QUARTERS COMBATC lose quarters com bat techniques do not replace battle drills. They aretechniq ues to b e u sed when th e tac tica l situ atio n calls fo r ro om -by-ro omclearing of a relatively intact building in w hich enem y com batants andnoncombatants may be intermixed. These techniques involve increased r isk inord er to clear a b uild ing metho dically , rather th an using ov erwhelm in gfirep ower to n eu tra lize all its in hab itan ts. C ertain clo se qua rters combattechniques, such as methods of movement , f ir ing stances,weapon posi tioning,an d reflexive shoo ting , are useful for all combat in con fin ed areas. O th er

te chnique s, such a s ente ring a room withou t fir st n eu tra liz ing known enemyocc up an ts, are appropriate in only some tac tica l situ atio ns. Gen erally , if aro om o r build in g is o cc up ied by a n alerte d e nemy fo rce th at is d eterm in ed tore sis t, a nd if most o r a ll noncomba tants a re c le ar, ove rwhelm ing firepowershould be em ployed to avoid friendly casualties. In such a situation,suppor ting f ir es , demoliti ons, and f ragmentation grenades shou ld be used toneu tr aliz e a space befo re f rie nd ly troops ente r. In some combat s itu ations ,however, the u se of h eav y sup porting fires and demolitio ns would causeunacc ep tab le co llate ral d amage. In o th er situ atio ns, o ften durin g OOTW,enemy combatants are so in term ixed w ith n oncombatants th at US forcescannot in good conscience use all their available supporting fires, and

room -by -ro om clearin g may b e necessary. A t such tim es, close qu arterscombat techniquesare most appropriate.

K -2. PR INCIPLE S OF CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT

A s in all other m ilitary operations, battles that occur at close quarters, such asw ithin a room or hallw ay, m ust be planned and executed w ith care. U nits m ust

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C lf FM 90-10-1

train, p ractice, and rehearse close quarters comb at techn iqu es un til each fire

team and squad operates sm oothly as a team . Each mem ber of the unit m ust

u nd ersta nd th e p rin cip les o f c lo se q ua rters c omba t an d th e p art h is ac tio ns p layin their successful execution. The principles of close quarters com bat are

s u rp r is e , s p e e d , and c o n tr o l le d v io le n t action.

a.Surprise

is th e key to a successful assau lt at close quarters. T he fire teamor squad clearing the room m ust achieve surprise, if only for seconds, bydeceiving, distracting, or startling the enem y. Sometim es stun or flashgrenades m ay be used to achieve surprise. T hese are m ore effective against anonale rt, p oo rly tra in ed enemy th an aga in st a le rt, we ll-tra in ed so ld ie rs .

b. S p e e d p ro vid es a measu re of secu rity to th e clearin g u nit. S peed letssold iers use th e first few vital seco nds pro vid ed by su rprise to their m aximumad vantage. In clo se qu arters combat, sp eed does n ot m ean incautio us h aste. Itc an bes t b e des crib ed a s "c are fu ll hurry ."

c. Cont ro lled v io lent acti on elim inates or neutralizes the enem y whileg iv ing h im the le as t c hanc e o f in flic tin g frie nd ly c asu altie s. Contro lle d v io le ntaction is not lim ited to the application of firepow er only. It also involves a

sold ie r mind-set o f comple te dominat ion .

E ach of th e princip les o f close q uarters combat h as a synergistic relatio nship

to the others. C ontrolled violence coupled w ith speed increases surprise.Hen ce, successful surp rise allows in creased sp eed .

K-3. FUNDAMENTALS O F CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT

T he ten fundam entals of close quarters com bat address actions soldiers takewhile moving along confined corridors to the room to be cleared, while

preparing to enter the room , during room entry and target engagem ent, and

a fte r co nta ct. T eam membe rs must-

a. Move tactically an d silen tly w hile secu rin g the corrid ors to the ro om to

be cleared. Carry only the m inim um am ount of equipm ent. R ucksacks andlo ose items ca rried b y so ld iers tire th em and slow th eir p ac e, a nd ca use n oise .

b. Arrive undetected at the entry to the room in the correct order ofe ntran ce , p rep are d to e nter o n a sin gle command.

c. E nter quickly and dom inate the room . Move immediately to positionsthat allow com plete control of the room and provide unobstructed fields offire.

d. Elim inate all enem y w ithin the room by the use of fast, accurate, andd is crim inating f ir es .

e. Gain and maintain im mediate control of the situation and all personnel

in the room .

f. Confirm w hether enem y casualties are w ounded or dead. D isarm ands eg rega te th e wounded. Sea rch a ll e nemy casua ltie s.

g. Immediately perform a cursory search of the room . Determ ine if adeta il ed sea rch is r equ ir ed .

h. E vacu ate all w ound ed and any frien dly dead.

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Clf FM 90-10-1

i. M ark th e room as cleared, using a sim ple, clearly iden tifiable m arking inaccordance w ith th e u nit SOP .

j. M aintain security at all tim es and be prepared to react to more enem ycontac t at an y momen t. Do not n eg le ct re ar sec urity .

K-4. IN IT IAL ACTIONS TO CLEARA BUILDINGThe in itia l a ctions to c le ar a build ing are no d iffe re nt during clo se qua rte rscombat t han during any o ther MOUI .

a . The unit iso la te s th e build ing u sing d ire ct o r indire ct fire s b efo re th elead e lemen tmoves to the b reach poin t. The unit-

(1) Coversmounted avenues of approach with ant i a rmor weapons .(2)Covers dismounted avenues of approach with automat ic weapons .b . The unit supp resses e nemy fire s a nd neu tra liz es su spected and lik ely

enemy pos itions a s the b reach ana c learing teams move in to pos ition. The unito bscu res th e movemen t o f th e b reach an a clearin g teams to the b uild in g b yusing smoke .

c. B reach an d clearin g teams secu re a fo oth old in th e b uild in g. T eamsmov e alo ng co vered an d concealed ro utes an d en ter at th e h ig hest p ossiblelev el o f th e bu ild in g. T he unit sh ifts fires to o th er flo ors or b uildin gs as th ec le aring teams ente r. If possib le , clea ring te ams cle ar h allway s and roomsfrom the top of the build ing down .

K-5. COMPO SITION OF THE CLEARING TEAM

C lo se q uarters combat clearing techniques are desig ned to be executed by th estandard four-man fire team . Because of the confined spaces typical ofbuilding- and room -clearing operations, units larger than squads quickly

becom e unw ieldy. W hen shortages of personnel dem and it, room -clearing

op erations can be con ducted by tw o- and three-m an team s, but fou r-m an team sare optim um . U sing few er personnel greatly increases the com bat strain and

the r isks to the par ti cipan ts .

K-6 . BREACHING

An integral part of close quarters com bat is the ability to gain access quickly

to the room to be cleared. B reaching techniques vary w idely based on the type

of construction encountered and the types of munitions available to the

breaching force. Techniques range from sim ple m echanical breaching to

complex , spec ia lized demoli tions .

a. A simple meth od o f b reach ing is th e s h o tg u n b a l l i s tic b re a c h for forcedentry of standard doors. A 12-gauge shotgun loaded w ith buckshot or slugscan be used to breach m ost standard doors quickly. W hen done properly, theshotgun breach requires only a few seconds. The two standard shotgunb reach ing tech niq ues are th e d o o rk n o b b re a c h and the h in g e b re a c h . Whenattem pting either technique, the gunner approaches the door from an angle,avoiding standing in the area directly in front of the door. W hile holding the

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Clf FM 90-10-1

stock of the shotgun in the pocket of his shoulder, the gunner places themuzzle t igh tly agamst the door , a iming down a t a 45-degreeang le .

(1 ) For th e doo rknob b rea ch , th e aim poin t is a sp ot h alfway b etween th edoorknob and the fram e, not at the doorknob itself. The gunner fires tw oqu ick sho ts in th e sam e lo catio n, ensuring th at th e seco nd sho t is aim ed ascarefu lly as the first. W eak lo ck s m ay fly ap art w ith the first sh ot, b ut th e

g un ner sh ou ld alw ay s fire tw ice. S ome lo ck s th at ap pear to be b lown ap artnave par ts s till c onnected that w ill d elay entry . If th e10ck is not def ea ted bythe second shot, the gunner repeats the procedure .

(2) The hinge breach technique is perform ed m uch the sam e as thedoorknob bread l, excep t the gunner a ims a t the h inges .H e f ires three sho ts perhinge-the first at the m iddle, then at the top and bottom (Figure K-1). Hefire s a ll sho ts fr om le ss than an inch away from the h inge . Because t he h inge sa re often h idden f rom view, the h inge breach i s more d if ficult.

Figure K-l. Aim points for shotgun breach of a

stan dard d oo r.

Regardless of w hich technique the gunner uses, immediately after he fires, hekicks the door in or pulls it out. He then pulls the shotgun barrel sharply

upw ard and quickly turns aw ay from the doorway to signal that the breach

point has been cleared. This rapid clearing of the doorway allows the

follow ing m an in the fire team a clear shot at any enem y w ho m ay be blocking

th e immed ia te b re ach s ite .

K-4



C l, FM 90-10-1

b. D emolitio ns are often n eed ed to d efeat more elabo rate b arriers or toproduce a desired effect to aid the initial entry. See Appendix L for adiscussion of expedient demolit ions for breaching common urban barriers.

c. M echanical breaching is not addressed here, but it is an assum edcapab ility w ithin all units. Wh eth er o r n ot to take th e tim e to defeat w eak

barriers, such as doors or windows, by means of crowbars, saws,sledgehammers, or axes is a decision that must be made based on theconditions o f METT-T .Mechan ic al b re aching should a lways be p lanned a s abackup to a ball is ticor explosivebreach.

K -7. BREA CH PO INT

C learing team m embers m ust approach the breach point quickly, quietly, andin standard order. T his approach preserves the elem ent of surprise and allow s

for quick entry and dom ination of the room .

a. The order of m ovem ent to the breach point is determ ined by the m ethodof breach and the intended actions at the breach point. T he m em bers of the fire

team are assigned numbers 1 through 4, with the team leader alwaysdesignated num ber 3. If one mem ber of the clearing team is arm ed with theSAW rather than an M16 rifle or carbine, he should be designated num ber 4.

(1) The order of m ovement for a shotgun breach has the shotgunner upfront, followed by the number 1 man, number 2 man, and then the number 3m an (team leader). A fter the door is breached, the shotgunner falls to the rearof the lineup and acts as the num ber 4 m an.

(2) The order of movement for a demolition breach is number 3 (team

leader), num ber 2, num ber I, and then num ber 4. The team leader providessecurity at the doorw ay. T he num ber 2 m an carries the dem olition charge andplaces it. N um ber 1 carries a fabricated blast shield. N um ber 4 provides rear

security. After the demolition charge is placed, number 2 falls in behind

num ber 1 (w ith the blast shield), and num ber 3 (team leader) falls in behindn umber 2 , re-fo rm in g th e sta nd ard I, 2 , 3 , 4 co nfig uratio n.

(3) If neither a shotgun nor a dem olitions breach is required, the order of

mov ement is th e stan dard 1 ,2 ,3,4 c on fig uratio n.b . T he cle arin g team must alw ay s b e alert. T eam members p ro vid e sec urity

at the breach point and to the rear, laterally dow n corridors, and upw ard if nearstairs or landings. The tw o basic techniques for m oving down hallw ays aresh own in F ig ure K -2 .H a llw ay in te rsec tio ns a re d an gero us are as an d sho uld b ea pp ro ach ed cau tio usly as sh own in F ig ures K -3 an d-K -4 .

( 1 ) T h e s e r p e n t in e te c h n iq u e is used in narrow hallw ays. The num ber 1m an provides security to the front. His sector of fire includes any enem ysoldiers who appear at the far end of the hall or from any doorways near the

end. The number 2 and number 3 men cover the left and right sides of thenum ber 1 m an. T heir sectors of fire include any soldiers w ho appear suddenlyfrom nearby doorways on either side of the hall. They cover the number 1

m an's flanks. The num ber 4 m an, norm ally carrying the SAW , provides rearp ro tectio n ag ain st an y e nemy so ld iers su dd en ly a pp earin g b eh in d th e clea rin g

team.

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Clf FM 90-10-1

(2 ) The rolling- T techniqueis used in w ide hallw ays. The num ber 1 andnum ber 2 m en m ove abreast, covering the opposite side of the hallw ay fromthe one they are walking on. The number 3 man covers the far end-of thehallway from a position behind the number 1 and number 2 men, firingb etwee n th em . Once a gain , th e n umber 4 man p ro vid es rea r se cu rity .

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SURPENT INE TECHNIQUE

FOR NARROW HALLWAYSR OL LIN G-T TE CHNIQ UE

FOR W ID ER H ALLW AYS

F ig ure K -2 . H allw ay clearin g tech niq ues.

K-6



Clf FM 90-10-1

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INTERSECTION CLEARING POSITIONS

Figure K-3. T-s haped hal lway in te rs ec ti on. clearing posi tions.

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Clf FM 90-10-1

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K-8. INDIVIDUAL MOVEM ENT AND WEAPONS CONTROL

A s in all com bat situations, the clearing team must m ove tactically and safely.

Individuals w ho are part of a clearing team m ust m ove in a standard m anner,

u sin g p ra ctic ed te chniq ue s known to a ll.



C lf FM 90-10-1

a. W hen moving, team members hold their weapons with the muzzlepointed in the direction of travel. They keep the butt of the rifle in the pocketof their shoulder, w ith the m uzzle slightly dow n to allow for unobstructedvision. Soldiers keep both eyes open and sw ing the m uzzle w ith their head soth at th e rifle is alw ay s aimed whe re th e so ld ier is lo ok in g.

b. Team m embers avoid "flagging," or leading, with the weapon when

w orking around w indow s, doors, com ers, or areas w here obstacles m ust benegotiated. Flagging the w eapon gives advance w arning to anyone looking inthe soldier's direction, m aking it easier for an enem y to grab the weapon.S old iers must k eep th eir w eap on s u nd er co ntro l at all tim es.

c. T eam memoers shoulcf k eep w eapons safe (selector sw itch on SAFE andindex finger outside of trigger guard) until a hostile target is identified andengaged. A fter a team m em ber clears his sector of all targets, he returns hisweap on to th e SAFE positio n.

a. If a soldier has a m alfunction w ith his w eapon during close quarterscombat, he should imm ediately drop to one knee and conduct immediateaction to reduce the m alfunction. O nce the w eapon is operational, there is non eed to re tu rn to th e stan din g p ositio n to en gag e targ ets u nle ss th e so ld ie r must

m ove to another firing position. V aluable tim e is saved by resum ing targetengagem ent from the kneeling position. W hen other m em bers of the team see

a soldier drop to one knee, they know immediately that he has a m alfunctiona nd th at th ey sh ou ld en gag e targ ets in h is se cto r.

K -9. ACTIONS OUTSIDE THE PO INT OF ENTRY

Actions outside the point of entry must be quick and well rehearsed. The

doorw ay or breach point is a dangerous position. T he clearing team is focused

on entry and could be surprised by an enem y appearing unexpectedly in thecorridor.

a. C learing team m embers' positions relative to the door are im portant as

are their w eapons' carry positions. Team m embers stand as close to the entrypoint as possible, staying in a crouched position. They hold their weaponseither in the high-carry or the low -carry position. T hey ensure the m uzzle isn ot p oin ted at an oth er te am member.

b. A ll team members must signal one another that they are prepared beforethe team enters the room . The last m an taps or squeezes the arm of the m an infront of him , and each one passes this signal along. Team m em bers avoid the

use o~ a verbal signal, which m ay alert the enem y and destroy the elem ent ofsurpnse.

c. A ll individual equipm ent that is carried must be selected carefully and

prepared properly to ensure that it is quiet and not cum bersom e. EssentialItem s only should be carried during close quarters com bat. Protective vests

and helmets should be worn by an team members. Additional protectiveequipm ent, such as gloves, kneepads, or goggles, m ay be worn, depending onth e situ atio n an d th e u nit's lev el o f train in g.

K-9



Clf FM 90-10-1

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Figure K-5. Path of#1 m an center door and corner door.

K-I0 . ACT IONS UPONENTRYThe en tire team sho uld enterthe room as quickly and assmooth ly as poss ib le and c lear

t he doorway immediate ly .a. The door is the focalp oin t o f a nyone in th e ro om . Itis known a s the " fa ta l funnel,"because it focuses a ttention a tthe precise point w here theindiv idua l te am membe rs a reth e mos t v uln era ble . Movingin to the room quickly reduce sthe chance t hat anyone will b ehit by enem y fire directed atth e doo rway . The se qu en ce o f

movements described below isshown in Figures K-5 th roughK-14.

b. O n the signal to go, thec lear ing team moves tnroughth e door quicklyand takesuppos itions in side the room thatallow it to completelydominatethe room and elim inate thethreat. T eam m embers stopmovementonly after they havecle ared th e doo r a nd rea ch ed

their designated point ofdomination.

(1) T he first m an to enterm oves in as straight a line aspos sib le toward the come r fo rw hich he is responsible. H emay th en turn and mov e d eepinto the far corner of the room .The depth of his m ovement is

determ ined by the size of therobin, any obstacles in theroom such as furniture, and bythe number and location of

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enemy and noncomba tants inth e ro om (F ig ure K -5 ).

(2) T he second man enters

and m oves toward the corner

K-IU



Cl, FM 90-10-1

in th e o pp osite d ire ctio n, fo llowin g th e wall, b ut n ot d ire ctly a gain st it (F ig ureK - 6 )

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CENTER DOOR, NUMBER 2 MAN

CORNER DOOR, NUMBER 2 MAN

Figu re K-6. Path of #2 m an, center door and corner door.

K-ll



Clf FM 90-10-1

K-ll

(3) T he num ber 3 m an (team leader) buttonhooks inside the room at least

1 m eter from the door, but between the number 1 m an and the door (FigureK-7).

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CENTER DOOR, NUMBER 3 MAN

CORNER DOOR, NUMBER 3 MAN

Figure K-7. Path of #3 man, center door and comer door.

(4) T he squad leader can either use the num ber 4 m an (norm ally the SAW

gunner) as rear security at the breach site, or he can have him enter w ith therem ainder of the team . If he enters, the num ber 4 m an m oves in the directionof the num ber 2 m an and buttonhooks in the sam e w ay between the num ber 2man and th e doo r (F ig ure K - 8 ) .



C lf FM 90-10-1

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c . T o make close quarters combat te chniq ue s work , ea ch membe r o f th eteam m ust know his sector of fire and how his sector overlaps and links w iththe sectors of the other team members. Team members do not move to thepoint of dom ination and then engage their targets. T hey engage targets as theymove to their designated point. However, engagements must not slowm ovem ent to their points of dom ination. Team m em bers m ay shoot from asshort a range as 1 to 2 inches. T hey engage the m ost immediate enem y threatsfirst. E xamples o f immed ia te th rea ts are en emy p erso nn el who -

. Are arm ed and prepared to return fire immediately.

. B lo ck mov emen t to th e p ositio n o f d om in atio n.

. A re w ithin arm 's reach of a clearing team m ember.

. A re w ithin 3 to 5 feet of the breach point.

K-13



Cl, FM 90-10-1

1

CORNER DOOR

4 3

CEN TER DOOR

Figure K -9. Points of dom ination and sectors of fire

( four -man t eam)

K - 1 4

d. Each clearing teammember has a designated sectorof fire that is unique to himin itia lly b ut ex pan ds to o verlapsectors of the other teammembers.

(1) The number 1 andnumber 2 men are initiallyconcerned with the area alongthe wall on either side of thedoor or entry point. This area isin their path of movem ent, and itis their primary sector of fire.

Their alternate sector of fire isthe wall that they are movingtow ard, sw eeping back to the farc o r n e r .

(2) The number 3 andnumbe r 4 men sta rt a t th e ce ntero f th e wall o pposite th eir p oin tof entry and sw eep to the left ifmoving toward the le ft, o r to ther igh t if moving toward the r igh t.They stop short of theirrespect ive team member (eithe rth e numbe r 1 man o r th e number2man) .e. W hile the team m embers

move toward their points of

dom ination, they engage alltargets in their sector. Teamm em bers must exercise firecontrol and discrim inatebetw een hostile and non com -b atant occu pan ts of th e ro om .Shooting is done withoutstopping, using reflexiveshooting te chnique s. Becausethe soldiers are m oving andshoo tin g at th e same time, th eymust move using care fu l hurry .

They do not rush with totaldisregard for any obstacles.F ig ure K-9 shows all fo ur teammembersa t the ir po in ts o f domi-n ation an d th eir ov erlap pin gsectorsof fire.



Clf FM 90-10-1

f. When fu ll fo ur-manteams a re not av aila ble fo rroom clear ing, three -manan d two-m an team s can b eused. Figures K-IO andK-ll sh ow th e p ath s, p oin ts

o f domination, and sec to rsof fire for a three-manclearing team . Figures K -12

and K-13 show the sameth ing for a two-manteam.

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Figure K -IO . Points of dom ination and sectors of fire

(th re e-man te am ).

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Cl, FM 90-10-1

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I'lpre X -H . Points of dom ination and B ecton of fire

(tbree-m aa team , ~ter door).

K-16



C l, FM 90-10-1

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rigure K -U . PoiD u of dom ination aad sectors of fire

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K-17



Clf FM 90-10-1

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Figure K-13. Points of dom ination and sectors of fire

(tw o-m an team , ce nter d oo r).

K-IM



Clf FM 90-10-1

K-ll. REFLEXIVE SHOOTINGDuring c lo se qua rte rs combat, th ere is little o r no ma rg in fo r e rro r. Too s low ashot a t a n en emy, to o fas t a s ho t at a n on combata nt o r in accu ra te s ho ts ca n allb e d is as tr ou s fo r th e c le aring te am . P rope r weapon carry te chnique , s ta nc e,aim in g, sh ot p lacemen t, an d trig ger man ip ula tio n co nstitu te th e a ct o f r e f l e x i v e

shooting. This method of shooting is the only way for the clearing teammembe rs to con sis te ntly s uc ce ed w ithou t exc es siv e c asua ltie s.

a. W eapon Ready Positions. The two weapon ready positions are low

re ady' a nd h igh re ady.(1 ) L ow rea dy p ositio n. The butt of the weapon is placed firmly in the

pocket of the shoulder w ith the barrel pointed down at a 45-degree angle. T hisis the safest carry position. It should be used by the clearing team while insideth e ro om , e xcep t when ac tu ally en te rin g a nd cle arin g.

( 2 ) H ig h r e a d y position. The bu tt of th e weapo n is held un der the armpit,w ith the barrel pointed slightly up, keeping the front sight assembly under theline of sight but w ithin the gunner's peripheral vision. T o engage a target, thegunner pushes the w eapon out as if to bayonet the target. W hen the weapon

leaves the armpit, he slides it up into the firing shoulder. T his technique is bestsuited for the lineup outside the door.

~.

I~

~

"'

I

;-

Figure K-14. The low ready Iwsition for the

M16A2.

Figure K -15. The high ready position for the

M16A2.

b . S tance. The f ee t a re kep t about shoulder -w id th apa rt. Toe s a re poin teds tra ight to the front (d ire ction o f movemen t). The firing s ide foot is s lightly

K-19



Clf FM 90-10-1

staggered to the rear of the non-firing side foot. K nees are slightly bent and theupper body is leaned slightly forw ard. Shoulders are square and pulled back,not rolled over or slouched. The head is up and both eyes are open. W henengaging targets, the gunner holds the w eapon with the butt in the pocket ofh is snou lder.

c. A im . The four aim ing techniques all have their place during com bat in

b uilt-u p a reas, bu t th e a im ed q uic k-K ill tech niq ue is th e o ne most o ften u sed inc lo se qua rte rs combat.

(1 ) Slow aim ed fire. This technique is the m ost accurate. It consists of

taking up a steady, properly aligned sight picture and squeezing off rounds. Itis normally used for engagements beyond 25 meters or when the need foraccuracy ove rr id es speed .

(2 ) Rapid a imedJire . This te ch niq ue featu re s a n imperfe ct sig ht pictu re in

which w in dag e is critical b ut elev atio n is o f lesser im po rtan ce. Wh en th e fro ntsight post is in line with the target, the gunner squeezes the trigger. Thistechnique is used against targets out to 15 m eters and is fairly accurate andv ery fa st.

(3 )Aimed q u i c k kill. This te chniq ue consis ts o f u sin g a good spo t weldand placing the front sight post flush on top of the rear peep sight. It is usedfor very quick shots out to 12 m eters. W indage is im portant, but elevation isnot critical w ith relation to the target. This technique is the fastest and m osta cc ura te . Wi th p ra ctic e, s old ie rs c an b ec ome deadly s ho ts a t c lo se ra ng e.

(4 ) In stin ctive fire. This technique is the least desirable. The gunner

focuses on the target and points the w eapon in the target's general direction,

using m uscle m em ory to com pensate for lack of aim . T his technique should be

u se d only in eme rg en cie s.d. Shot Placement In close quarters combat, enemy soldiers must be

incapacitated immediately. S hots tnat m erely w ound or that are m ortal but don ot in cap acitate th e targ et in stan ta ne ou sly are o nly slig htly b etter th an clean

m isses. M em bers of clearing team s should concentrate on achieving solid,w ell-placed head shots. T his shot placem ent is difficult for som e soldiers tolearn , h av ing b een ta ug ht p re vio usly to aim a t cen ter o fm a ss.

(1) The only shot placement that guarantees immediate and total

incapacitation is one roughly centered in the face, below the m iddle of theforehead, and above the upper lip. Shots to the side of the head above thehorizontal line passing through the ear opening to just below the crow n of thesk ull an d from th e ch ee kb on es rea rw ard to th e o ccipital lo be are also effec tiv e.W ith practice, accurate shot placem ent can be achieved. (S ee Figure K-16 fo rp rope r sho t p la cemen t.)

(2) Shots to the spinal colum n below the jaw and above the sternum can

n eu tralize a targ et immed iate ly . H owev er, th e spin al c olumn is a n arrow targ et

and m isses by only a few centim eters m ay cause no immediate reaction or adelayed reaction in the target. Even though severely wounded, the enem ysoldier m ay be able to return effective fire.

(3) Shots to the center of the chest that enter the lung/heart region are

n orm ally fatal bu t m ay tak e sev eral seco nds to in ca pa cita te th e targ et. D urin g

this tim e, the opponent m ay be able to return effective fire. T his region of the

K-20



body may also be shielded by m ilitary equipm ent or protective vests that cano fte n defle ct o r abso rb rounds and p revent immed ia te in capa cita tio n.

IMMEDIATE

INCAPACITATION

ZONE

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,~-

...v/"',

'--J

...-

IMMEDIATE

INCAPACITATION

ZONE

\' ,

Figure K -16. Proper shot placem ent.

CL FM 90-10-1

K-21



Clf FM 90-10-1

(4) Shots to the abdomen or lower extremities are rarely effective in

rendering an opponent immediately incapable of returning fire, even if theyare ult imate ly fatal .

e. T rigger M anipulation. R apid, aim ed, sem iautom atic fire is the m osteffective m ethod of engaging targets during close quarters combat. A s each

round is fired from the aim ea qU Ick-kill position, tne w eapon's recoil m akesthe front sight post m ove in a sm all natural arc. The gunner should not fightthis recoil. H e should let the w eapon m ake the arc and immediately bring thefront sight post back onto the target and take another shot. This tw o-shotcombin atio n is k nown as a d o u b l e tap. S oldiers must practice the double tapuntil it becom es instinctive. C learing team members continue to fire doubletaps until the target goes dow n. If there are m ultiple targets, team m embersdouble tap each one and then return to reengage any enem y left standing orwho a re still try in g to resist.

(1) C ontrolled three-round bursts fired from the M16A 2 rifle are better

th an fu lly au tomatic fire, b ut th ey are o nly slig htly faste r an d n ot a s ac cu rate o re ffe ctiv e a s rapid , a imed s em iautomatic fire .

(2) F ully autom atic fire w ith the M16A2 rifle or carbine is rarely effectiveand m ay lead to unnecessary noncombatant casualties. Not only is fullyautom atic fire inaccurate and difficult to control, but it also rapidly emptiesammunition magazines. A clearing team member who has expended hisammunition while inside a room w ith an arm ed, uninjured enemy soldier w illb ecome a casu alty u nless h is fe llow team membe rs c an q uick ly in terv en e.

K-12. TARGET DISCRIMINATIONTarget d iscr imina tion i s the act o f qu ickly d is tingu ishing between comba tantand non combata nt p erso nn el a nd e ng ag in g only th e combata nts. US fo rce sen gage in clo se qu arters combat in o rder to app ly d iscrim inatin g combat

powe r and lim it unneces sa ry c asua ltie s among noncomba tants . The re fo re ,ta rget d is crim ination is v ita l in c lo se qua rte rs combat. If th ere is no need forselectiv e eng ag emen ts, that is, o nly combatan ts attempting to resist arep re sent, a much le ss d is crim inating use o f fire power is pos sib le . However ,ev en if an area is k nown to b e fre e o f non comba tan ts , o th er so ld iers mov ingthrough the a rea may be mistaken as enemy and engaged un less c lear ing teamm em bers are disciplined and w ell-trained in fire control and targetd iscr imina tion . Even wi th we ll- tr ained, d iscip lined sold ie rs , c lose quar te rscom bat can result in unintentional casualties am ong noncom batants.Commande rs must re cogn iz e t his and take s teps to re lie ve the s tre ss it c au se ssoldiers.

K -13. SA FETY AND FORCE PROTECTION

C lose quarters combat is extrem ely dangerous, and even training for it can behaz ardou s. On ly well-tra in ed , d is cip lin ed so ld ie rs w ill b e able to exe cu te th es e

te chnique s su cc es sfu lly . In tra in ing and in combat, s afe ty and fo rc e p ro te ction

a re v it al command conside ra tions .

K-22



Clf FM 90-10-1

a. Leaders at all levels must enforce safe handling of weapons andd emolitio ns. T he co nc ern th at in div id ual so ld ie rs n ot b e in ju re d in acc id en ts isessential to m ission accomplishment. U nintention al and unsafe w eapons fireor detonation of explosives or m unitions can jeopardize the m ission of thec le aring te am and subsequen tly th e entire unit.

b. Soldiers engaged in dose quarters combat should wear all of theirpro tect ive equipment.(1) Soft body armor, such as the standard Army-issue Kevlar vest, is

effective in preventing death or serious inju ry from high-v elo city fragmentsthat strike the torso area. A lthough the K evlar protective vest is effective,flexible, and relatively com fortable, it is not designed to stop bullets. A s arule, soft body arm or w ill stop som e low -pow er handgun rounds but not rifleo r carbine ammuniti on .

(2) Som e versions of hard body arm or w ill stop alm ost any round fired at

it. T hey tend to be heavy and stiff but have been proven effective during close

quarters com bat. If a commander know s his unit w ill be conducting lengthyclose quarters combat, he should request a special issue of threat level III

p ro te ctiv e eq uipmen t. T his e qu ipment is ex cellen t, b ut so ld iers must train an drehearse wearing it before they enter com bat. A ll close quarters com bat istiring, and soldiers wearing threat level III vests will tire or overheat m orequickly.

(3) T he standard A rmy Kevlar helm et and ballistic p rotective eyeglasses

h av e a lso b een p ro ve n to sig nifica ntly re du ce ca su altie s d urin g c lo se q ua rte rscombat. H isto ically, eye injuries caused by sm all m etal fragm en ts o r pieces ofstone or co ncrete have been a large percentage o f casualties durin g combat inbuil t-up areas.

(4) H ard plastic knee and elbow protectors are available upon special

request. They are useful, especially during prolonged search and clearoperation s. T hey prevent injury from rubble and bro ken glass w hen kneeling

o r p rone .c. D etailed know ledge of w eapons and m unitions effects is im portant to

the safety of members of the clearing team , as well as to m issionaccom plishment. M ost interior walls of buildings do not stop rifle fire.Fragments from grenades often penetrate interior walls. Standard homefu rn ish ings o r o ffic e fu rn itu re o ffe r little p ro te ction f rom h igh- ve lo city rounds .Excessive am ounts of dem olitions used to breach a w all m ay knock it dow ninstead , perhap s even bring th e roo f of the bu ild ing down also.

K -14. CLO SE QUARTERS COMBAT DURING DARKNESS

Miss ion accomplishment is the most import an t c rit er ion of n igh t operations,

no t the use of spec ia l equ ipment. Al l the special ized n igh t v is ion equipment inth e US armory can no t replace a train ed , skilled so ld ier in tent o n m issionaccomp lishment. Even in today's e ra o f h igh te chno logy , no fa ils afe sys temex is ts th at allows an in div id ua l s old ier to e ffec tiv ely id en tify a nd e ng ag etargets in total darkness . The commander must carefullyconsider the situa tion

K-23



Clf FM 90-10-1

and the equipm ent available to him before he decides w hether to use visible,in vis ib le , o r no a rtific ia l lig ht during c lo se qua rte rs combat.

a. E qu ipmen t. S ome sp ecia liz ed n ig ht v isio n eq uipmen t is av ailab le to th eso ld ier n ow ; o th er eq uipmen t w ill b e av aila ble in th e fu tu re.

(1 )ANIPAQ-4 a im ing light. This dev ic e p ro je cts a puls ing dot o f IR light

along the w eapon's line of sight. The dot is invisible to the naked eye, but itc an b e seen b y p erso nn el wea rin g n ig ht v isio n g og gle s. Gunners w ith weap on sequipped w ith the AN jP AQ-4 aim ing light sim ply place the projected spot onth e ta rg et a nd fire .

(2 ) ANIPVS -5 and ANIPVS -7 n igh t vision goggle s. These goggles arelightw eight, battery-pow ered passive devices w orn on the head. E acn has anIR-emi tt ing light sou rce for c lose -up il lumination .

(3 ) Tact ical l ights . The se dev ic es a re sma ll, lig htweight, b atte ry -powered

w hite lights that can be attached to w eapons. The light is activated by either apressure switch or an onloff switch. An IR filter can be attached to mosttactical lights to provide covert illum ination. T he most common example of atactical light is sold under the name M aglite. This light can be attached to

wea po ns u sin g h ose c lamps o r h eav y ta pe. T hey must b e ch ec ked p erio dic ally ,b ec au se th ey c an lo osen an d sh ift.

(4 ) R ed d ot sig hts. The se dev ic es a re lightweight, b atte ry -powered optic al

sights attached to the top of the weapon. A red dot in the sight aligns theweapon and the target. These sights are for use in low light levels, not totald arkne ss . They do not a ss is t in id en tify ing ta rg ets .

(5 )Active laser devices .These devices are l ightweight, ba ttery-powered,visible light-em itting sights. T he device projects a red dot onto the target thatcorresponds to the point of bullet im pact. T hese devices are not effective insunlignt.

(6 ) Var ious thermal weapons sights. In the nea r fu tu re , th erma l weaponssights w ill b e ava ila ble to dete ct ta rg ets in to ta l d arkne ss .

b. Use of W hite Light. Although not covert, white light has severaladvantages:

. T he e qu ipmen t is read ily av aila ble an d reliab le .

. No add it iona l t ra in ing i s r equi red.

. It offers the fastest m eans of identifying targets and searching a room .

. It al lows colorvision.The m ain disadvantage is that an active light source can com prom ise ac le aring te am 's pos ition in side a room or build ing. Another d is advantage isthat a light m ay be activated too soon and alert the enem y to the clearingteam's presence.

K-24



* A P P E N D I X L

EMPLOYMENT OF ARMED HELICOPTERS IN

BUILT-UP AREAS

Wherever in f a n t r y fo r c e s a r e s e n t in t h e w o r ld , w h e th e r fo r c o m b a t

o p e r a t io n s o r o p e r a t io n s o th e r th a n w a r , t h e y w i l l o p e r a te p a r t o f t h e

t im e in b u i l t - u p a r e a s . O p e r a t in g a lo n g s id e a n d s u p p o r t in g th e m w il l

b e a rm e d h e l ic o p t e r s f lo w n b y te c h n ic a l ly s k i l le d a n d ta c t ic a l ly

p r o f i c i e n t U S a v ia to r s . T h e c o m m a n d e r o r s m a l l - u n i t le a d e r o n th eg r o u n d a r e r e s p o n s ib le fo r e n s u r in g th e a c t io n s o f t h e s e p o w e r fu l

a i r c r a f t a r e s m o o th ly in te g r a te d in to th e c o m b in e d a rm s te a m . J o in t

o p e r a t io n s w i l l m e a n th a t t h e a i r c r a f t s u p p o r t in g g r o u n d fo r c e s m a y b e

A rm y o r U S M C . D u r in g c o m b in e d a n d c o a l i t io n o p e r a t io n s , e s p e c ia l ly

d u r in g O O TW , i t is m o r e a n d m o r e l ik e ly th a t a rm e d h e l ic o p te r s f r o m

o t h e r n a t io n s m a y s u p p o r t U S f o r c e s . I n th o s e c a s e s , d e ta i le din fo rm a t io n o n th e ir c a p a b i l i t ie s a n d e m p lo y m e n t te c h n iq u e s m u s t b e

o b ta in e d th r o ug h l ia is o n c h an ne ls .

L - l . M IS S IO N S O F A R M E D H E L IC O P T E R S S U P P O R T IN G M O U T

I n f a n t r y u n i t s m a y b e s u p p o r te d b y a v a r ie t y o f a rm e d h e l ic o p te r s r a n g in g

f r o m f i l ly m o d e r n iz e d A H - 6 4 s o r s o m e w h a t le s s c a p a b le A H - ls , t o l ig h t ly

a rm e d b u t a g i le O H - 5 8 D s a n d A H - 6 s . R e g a r d le s s o f th e s p e c i f ic t y p e o f a rm e d

h e l ic o p t e r a v a i l a b le , t h e s a m e m is s io n s a n d t a s k s c a n b e a c c o m p l is h e d d u e t o

th e in h e r e n t f le x ib i l i t y o f A rm y a v ia t io n u n i t s .

a . T h e m o s t c o m m o n m is s io n s a s s ig n e d to a rm e d h e l ic o p t e r s d u r in g

M O U T a re t h e f o llo w in g :( 1 ) E s c o r t o f t r o o p - c a r r y in g a i r c r a f t d u r in g a i r a s s a u l t s .

( 2 ) O v e rw a t c h a n d s u p p o r t in g a t t a c K s in te g r a te d w i th t h e g r o u n d

c o m m a n d e r 's m a n e u v e r .

( 3 ) I n te r d ic t io n a n d d e s t r u c t io n o f e n e m y a rm o r e d v e h ic le s m o v in g a g a in s t

f r ie n d ly fo rc e s .

( 4 ) P r e c is io n e n g a g e m e n t o f h a r d e n e d p o in t ta r g e ts .

b . I n a d d i t io n t o t l ie m is s io n s l is t e d a b o v e , a rm ed h e l ic o p t e r s m a y b e c a l le d

o n to p e r f o rm s o m e a d d i t io n a l , n o n t r a d i t io n a l r o le s d u r in g M O U T . T h i s is

p a r t ic u la r ly t r u e d u r i n g O O T W in u r b a n a r e a s . A d d i t io n a l m is s io n s m a y

in c lu d e t h e f o llo w in g :

( 1 ) A s s is t in g , f o r limited p e r io d s , in t h e c o n t r o l a n d c o o r d in a t io n o f f i r e s

w i t h th e m an e u v e r o f g r o u n d to r c e s .

(2 ) P r o v id in g l im it e d r e la y o f r a d io m e s s a g e s f r o m is o la t e d g r o u n d u n i t s .

(3 ) M a r k in g o r id e n t i f y in g s p e c i f ic b u i ld in g s a n d a r e a s b y s m o k e , f i r e s , o r

ta rg e t in g la s e rs .

( 4 ) V id e o t a p in g r o u te s o r o b je c t iv e s fo r la te r a n a l y s is b y g r o u n d

c o m m a n d e r s .

(5 ) P r o v id in g n a v ig a t io n a l a n d d i r e c t io n a l a s s is t a n c e to g r o u n d u n i t s .

L-l



Clf FM 90-10-1

(6 ) P rovid ing lim ited a re a illum ination by in fra red o r wh ite light u singeither on-board sources or illum ination rockets.

(7 ) P rovid in g coun te rsn ip er a nd coun ter-mortar/ro ck et armed rec on -naissance patrols around friendly unit locations.

L -2. PLANNING CONSIDERAT IONS FOR ARMED HEL ICOPTEREMPLOYMENTAl though a rmed heli cop te rs p rov ide a f lexibil ity and responsiveness a lmos tunequaled by any o ther means of f ir e suppor t, deta iled p lann ing i s requ ired toe ffec tively in tegrat e them wi th ground operat ions to accompli sh the overal lm iss io n. The fo llow ing mus t b e cons id ere d when p lannin g emp loymen t o farmed helicopters.

a. Increased E xp osure to D irect F ire. T he gro un d-fire th reat to arm edhelic op te rs in cr ea se s during MOUT. Urban a re as fo rc e the concentra tion o funits and p rovid e e xce lle nt cover a nd c on ce almen t fo r en emy gunne rs . Inorder to l imi t exposure to heavy anti air craf tweapons, heli cop te rs may have tostay low and m ove quickly. This increases their vulnerability to lightsmall -a rms fi re .

b. O bstacles to Flight. O bstacles w ithin urban areas are m ore num erousand dangerous than in any other environm ent. T hese obstacles include suchth ings a s-

(1 ) P ower lin es an d p ower ca ble p ylo ns.(2 ) Hard -to -se e te le phone lin es, tro lle y c ab le s, a nd tra ffic lig ht c ab le s.(3) L ight pole s, roo ftop antennas , and telecommunication tower s.(4) Tow ering buildings that m ay prevent rapid vertical m aneuvering of

heavily loaded aircraf t.c. N avigational D ifficulties. E ven though pilots can often see better than

obs erv ers on th e g round, b ec au se most maps do not s how the vertic al d evelopmen to f u rban te rr ain , p ilo ts can eas il y become temporar ily miso ri en ted. Navigat iona laids, such as eps, have lessened but not eliminated this problem. Rapid

d isp la cemen t from positio n to pos itio n c an sometime s c re ate con fu sion betweenaerial and ground oDserversas to cardina l d irec tions or loca tions .Mission planningshould include the use of upgraded photoim agery whenever possible. N ew lydeveloped areas or buildings m ay not show on recent m aps. Som e advancedcompute r s imu la tion a ids a re now ava ilable to generat e th ree-dimens iona l aer ia lview s, w hich can be very useful especially during OOTW. D iffering datum sbetw een the ground unit's m aps and the aerial unit's GPS can cause significant

confus ion unless compensated for .d. W eapons Lim itations. M any characteristics of operations in urban

a re as lim it weapons emp loymen t.(1) W eapons use m ay be lim ited by the short arm ing/slant ranges w ithin

th e u rb an are a. P re cisio n wea po ns, su ch a s TOW and He1 lfire m issiles, req uireabout 500 meters m inim um range to reliab ly arm and stabilize on the intendedta rg et. O fte n, fire from longer ranges a ctu ally imp rove s a ccura cy .

(2 ) Ex ten siv e u se o f p recisio n weap on s b y se veral u nits in c lo se p ro xim ity

may cau se coo rd in ation p roblems w ith ta rg et id en tific ation and designa tion.

L-2



(3) L aser d esignation b y b oth grou nd and aerial sy stem s may be d eg rad ed

by the large expanses of polished, flat reflective surfaces common in m anyurban a reas .

(4) W ith the obvious exception of precision strikes by TOW or H ellfire,

aerial fires can rarely destroy a target or kill large num bers of enem y forces

w ith in b uild in gs. T hese fires p ro vid e ex celle nt su pp re ssio n, h owev er, a nd ca ndrive enem y forces aw ay from firing positions or fix the enem y in place untilground m aneuver forces can destroy him . Enem y positions that have beenstruck by fire can no rm ally be reo ccupied qu ickly by th e enemy.

(5) T arget identification and m arking m ay be difficult because of heavy

smok e and du st rising from urb an fires and explosions. S om e smok e from firesin industrial areas m ay be highly toxic or irritating. Pilots m ay have to don

ch em ic al p ro tec tiv e e qu ipment th at h in ders targ et d ete ctio n an d en gag emen t.F riend ly unit lo cations an d p erso nnel can be m ark ed w ith colored panels, g linttape, strobe lights, and colored sm oke. T argets can be m arked w ith infraredlaser po inters, such as the GCP -l G rou nd Commander P ointer /Illuminato r,colored M 2 0 3 smoke rounds , M 2 0 3 o r mo rtar fla re s burn ing on th e g round, o r

trac er fire s. In some situ atio ns, imp ro vised sp otlig hts c an also b e u se d.(6) If the combat situ atio n allow s, pilots sho uld m ak e a no nfirin g (dry) run

first b efo re re tu rn in g fo r a firin g p ass. A lth ou gh fire from statio nary p ositio ns

is m ore accurate, running fire is norm ally safer for the aircraft due to enem yground fire. If possible, ground commanders should avoid directing pilotsalong a gun-target line that passes over friendly troops. G un-target runs thata re p erp en dic ular to th e frien dly u nit's fro nt are n orma1 ly b est.

e. A ircraft Pow er Lim itations. The need to deliver hovering fires fromtempo rary b attle positions m ay require the aircraft to carry less th an a full lo adof m unitions or fuel. T his is especially true w ith older m odel aircraft in hot,w et clim ates. R educed loads m ean m ore frequent trips to forw ard area refuel

and rearm points and less tim e o n station.f. Command and Support Relationships. From the ground unit

p ersp ectiv e, a rmed h elic op ters are most e ffe ctiv e when th ey o pera te u nd er th eO PCON of the ground unit commander closest to the enem y. N orm ally, theinfantry battalion is the lowest level granted formal OPCON of armedhelico pters. H ow ev er, in an u rban area the battalio n comman der is rarely ableto identify the precise location of enem y forces or to coordinate aerial fireswith friendly squad and platoon maneuver. He often must pass there spon sib ility fo r c lo se coo rd in ate on o f a rmed helic op te r fire s to th e sma ll-unitcommander or leader on the scene. This commander can direct the efforts of

only a few aircraft at a tim e, norm ally a scout w eapons team consisting of anunarm ed observation aircraft and an attack h elicopter or tw o arm ed aircraft. It

m ay be m ore effective for the aviation unit to retain control of its individualaircraft an d operate by continuou sly rotating arm ed helicopter elem ents intothe battle area where they then coordinate their attacks with the groundcommander's m aneuver. G enerally, the sm aller and m ore decentralized thecomb at actio ns, the better it is to have arm ed aircraft coordin ate directly w iththe sm all-unit leader on the ground. The larger, m ore centralized the com bataction, the better it is to retain control of armed aircraft by the aviation

Clf FM 90-10-1

L-3



Clf FM 90-10-1

headqua rte rs . Wh icheve r command and suppo rt re la tionship is chosen, boththe ground and the avia tion headquar te rs mus t unde rs tand wha t is expec ted ofthe other. Close liaison and unam biguous verbal communication areimportant.

L-3. ARMED HELICOPTER OPERATIONS IN L IM ITED V ISIB ILITYA lthough U S helicopters possess the m ost sophisticated night visionequ ipmen t in the world , a rmed helic op te r ope ra tions in lim ited v is ib ility a rediFficultand require extra care.

a. T he e xten siv e u se o f GPS and h andh eld lase r p oin te rs o r d esig nato rseases the prob lems assoc ia ted wi th n igh t nav igation , o rientation , and ta rgetid en tific a tio n.

b. O perations that involve tw ilight, either daw n or dusk, present specialp ro blem s fo r aircrew s u sin g imag e-in te nsifica tio n NVDs. The rap id ch an ge inthe amount of illum ination m akes it difficult for pilots to observe the groundand see other aircraft. In the confined airspace low over an urban area, w ithfrien dly a nd en emy fo rc es clo se b y an d d an gero us o bstac les, su ch a s an te nn as,h ard to se e, armed h elic op ter su pp ort is d iffic ult an d d an gero us. In fan try u nitsshould seek the advice of experienced aviators when planning nightope ra tions , e sp ec ia lly those th at may extend th rough a period o f tw ilight.

c. Artificially lit urban areas create a hazard for pilots usingimag e-in ten sifica tIo n NVDs. One meth od o f b le ach in g o ut b rig llt c ity lig hts isto use the infrared light found on m ost U S aircraft. This m akes it easier to seeand avoid obstacles, especially rooftop antennas, w hich stand out w ell ininfrared light.

d . Forward-looking in frared dev ices found on OH-58D,AH-64 ,and someSOF aircra ft a re not affe cte d by artificial lig ht and a re g en erally e ffe ctiv eta rg etin g sy stems in u rb an areas . Dep endin g on th e equipmen t u se d by th e

ground commander, these aircraft m ayor m ay not be able to detect laserpointer devices. Close liaison with the aviation unit preventsm isunderstandings and m axim izes the com bat effectiveness of arm edhelicopterssuppor ting infantry maneuver in urban combat .

L-4



* A P P E N D I X M

FIELD -EXPEDIENT BREACHING

OF COMMON URBAN BARRIERS

An integral part of com bat in built-up areas is the need to gain access

to com pounds, buildings, and room s. M echanical breaching of doors

or w indow s u sing w ea pons fire , sled gehammers, bo lt cutters, saws, o r

crowbars is almost always an option for infantrymen attempting to

gain rapid access, but it is som etim es too slow or exposes them to too

m uch risk of enem y fire. Explosive breaching is often the fastest and

most comba t-effe ctive metho d. W ith a little tim e to prep are, units can

use slightly modified standard A rm y d emolitions to breach all common

urban barr ie rs .

M-l. FORCE PROTECT IONAs in all o peratio ns in volv in g d emolitio ns, so ld iers must tak e care whenfabricat ing , car ry ing , and using f ie ld-expedient explosive devices . Leadersmust ensure that all the standard procedures and precautions outlined indoct rina l and t ra in ing mate rial for Army demoli tions act iv iti es a re followed.Th is is d ic ta ted by more than just the commander's conce rn for the s af ety andwelfare of h is in div id ual so ld iers. A ccid en tal o r prematu re d eto natio n o fdemolit ions during combatnot only can in jure or k ill f riendly sold ie rs but a lsocan jeopardize the unit's m ission. D uring combat, soldiers often need toposition them selves close to breach points in order to enter quickly andovercome en emy resistan ce b efo re th e effects o f th e exp lo sio n su bsid e.

H ow ever, a soldier w ho is too close to an explosion and injured by flyingdeb ris is c on sid ere d a c asualty th e same a s one who is shot by th e enemy .Theunit mus t accompl ish i ts miss ion wi thout sus ta in ing f ri endly casua lti es f romits own d emolitio ns. A ll d emolitio ns h av e the p oten tial to cau se in ju ry ton earb y p erso nn el, m ain ly from fly in g d eb ris b ut also from b last an d no iseoverpressure.

M -2. BREACH ING REINFORCED AND NONREINFORCED

EXTERIOR WALLS

T he A rm y issues both bulk explosives (TNT or C 4) and prepackaged satchel

charges that are p ow erfu l eno ugh to breach all but th e most h eavily reinfo rced

exterior w alls. In som e situ atio ns, satchel ch arges m ay b e u navailab le o r they

m ay prove to be too pow erful for the breach required. In high-intensity urban

conflict, the situation m ay call for large am ounts of bulk explosive, but inm any situations the commander w ants to create a sm aller-size hole than the

M37 o r M183 satch el c ha rg es n ormally p ro du ce . Smaller, y et e ffe ctiv e, sa tc he l

charg es can be im provised . E xperim en tation can determ ine the correct size of

M-l



Clf FM 90-10-1

M -2

these im provised satchels, depending on the types of w alls found in the battlearea.

a . G en era l-p urp ose s atc he l c ha rg es c an b e a ss emb le d u sin g empty machin egun ammunitio n b ando le ers fille d w ith v ario us amounts o f C4 exp lo siv e.

(1) C onnect a short length of detonation cord firm ly to the explosive andle av e it d anglin g. T ap e th e e xp lo siv e s ec ure ly in to th e b ando le er.

(2) H ang the charge on a w all by the bandoleer strap or prop it against thew all u sin g a stic k o r o the r o bject. S atch el ch arg es d eto nate d w li:ile h eld firm lya ga in st th e ta rg et w all at a bo ut sh ou ld er h eig ht p ro du ce th e b est effects.

(3) Prim e the charge, attaching either an electric or nonelectric firing

sy stem to th e sho rt len gth o f d eto natio n co rd le ft d an glin g.

Wh en u sed ag ain st n on re in forc ed co nc rete w alls, a sa tch el ch arg e co ntain in g2 pounds of C 4 norm ally produces a m ousehole; 5 pounds create a hole large

enough for a man to move through; 7 pounds create a large hole through

which two men can move simultaneously; and lO pounds can blow a hole

large enough to drive a vehicle through. The lO-pound charge may also

d estro y th e en tire b uildin g if it is n ot o f stu rd y co nstru ctio n.b . A u se fu l b re ach in g ch arg e impro vised b y lig ht en gin ee r sap pers d urin g

com bat operations in S om alia consisted of a 3-foot length of engineer picket(V -shaped engineer stake) packed with 4 to 8 pounds of C4. The explosivewas primed with detonation cord and taped securely to the picket. W henn eed ed , th e p ic ke t w as p lac ed u prig ht w ith its flat sid e ag ain st th e w all, h eld tothe w all by another stake, and then detonated. This charge could be rapidlyfabricated, w as sturdy, and could be easily and quickly em placed. A ccordingto reports from the field, this device w ould blow a hole about 4 feet w ide and8 feet high in a nonreinforced concrete w all (common in the third w orld). T hech arg e would th row fragmen ts from th e p ick et straigh t ba ck fo r lo ng d ista nc es(from 50 to 100 meters) but was fairly safe to either side. In combat,

infantrym en could stand about 20 m eters from the picket, crouched tightlyagainst the w all w ith their backs turned to the explosive, w ithout undue risk.This allow ed them to follow up on the explosion w ith a rapid assault into thec ompound o r b uild in g b efo re th e o cc up an ts c ou ld re cove r.

M-3 . BREACHING INTERIOR WALLS AND PARTIT IONSInte rio r walls genera lly requ ir e much le ss exp lo sive to c re ate a satis fa cto rybreach than do exte rio r, load-bea ring wa lls . An eas ily fabricated s ilhoue ttecha rge can fur ther reduce the amount of exp losiveneeded to breach p lywood ,sheet rock, o r ligh t p la ste r wa lls . I t can a lsobe used to breach wooden or me ta ld oo rs. T his ch arg e p rodu ces a hole la rg e enough fo r a man to ru n th ro ugh. It

can be em placed quickly and throw s only a sm all am ount of dangerousmate ria l b ac k in to th e first ro om .

a. T ape tw o E -ty pe silh ou ette ta rg ets o r sim ila r stiff card bo ard to gethe r. T omake the charge easier to carry, it can be built to fold in the middle

(F ig ure M-1 ). Round in g th e c orn ers mak es th e c ha rg e e as ie r to h andle .



Clf FM 90-10-1

FOLD ING SILHOUETTE CHARGE

D et cord w raps (placed

on target side of charge

,-...., "" ,I

\,

I,.. , CutheadoffI \

I \

" "" ....SOL ID S ILHOUETTE CHARGE

De t cho rdwraps( pla ce d o ntarget s ide )

C ut o ff c orn er s

-: / Det c or d w ra ps

B race s ti ckpocket(c e n te re d)

Two E -t yp esilhouettestaped toge ther

Brace s ti ckpockets

;"

"\ I Cut h ea d o ff\ I, I\ I

"--~

F ig ure M -l. C on stru ctio n o f s olid a nd fo ldin g

si lhouette charges.

b . P la ce d eto natio n c ord o r fle xib le lin ea r-s ha pe d ch arg e (FLSC) around

the edges of the silhouettes, leaving a 6-inch tail for prim ing. Secure the cord

to the silhouette using sturdy tape. (See Table M -l for the appro

rr ia te number

of w raps of detonation cord or F LSC to breach various barriers. T ape severalsma ll d owels o r o the r mate ria ls a t va rio us p la ces a ro un d th e s ilh oue tte if u sin g

FLSC. T his p ro vid es th e n ec ess ary sta nd -o ff d is ta nce to e nsu re th e max imum

shaped charge effect. (S ee T able M -2 for the required stand-off distance forvanous sizes of F LSC.)

Tw oE-typesi lho uettes

tapedtoge the r tofol d in half .

M -3



Ho llow -co re doo r 1 wrap 75 grain/foot

Pa rt ic le -f ill ed doo r (1 inch ) 2 wraps 75 g rain/foot

So lid wood door (2 inches ) I 3 wraps 75 g rain/foot

H igh-qua li ty sol id doo r 4 w raps 225 g rain/foot

ot fA : . . . - . 1 . . . _I.......__~ ... .......-- ..,r:. -...-:... ,,--~1 /"' -111" '11 ~. IIYWVVU I WI djJ I;J ~I ill IUVl

1/2-inch plywood 2 wraps 75 grain/foot

3/4-inch plywood 3 wraps 75 grain/ foo t

L ig ht me ta l d oo r NA 225 grain/foot

Med ium s te el d oo r NA 300 grain/ foo t

Heavy s te el d oo r NA 300 grain/foot

T ab le M -l. S ilh ou ette ch arg e e xp lo siv e lo ad s.

Cl, FM 90-10-1

75 g ra in

225 g ra in

0 - 1 /1 6 i nc h

1/8 inch

300 g ra in 1/ 8 inch -3/16 inch

T ab le M -2. Stand off required for flexiblel in ea r- shaped cha rges

c .U s in g h ea vy -d uty ta pe , p la ce th re e o r fo ur strip s o f d ou ble -sid ed co nta cttape on the front of the silhouette from top to bottom . Construct a sturdypocket for a brace stick in the appropriate position on the back of thesilhouette.

d . P ull the covering o ff the d ou ble-sided tap e and place the charge againstthe wall at knee height, bracing it if necessary. Prime, take cover, anddetonate.

M -4. DOO R-BREA CH ING CHARGESSeveral different field-expedient charges can be used to breach interior or

exterio r doo rs. Among these are the general-purpose charg e, the rubb er bandcharge, the flexible linear charge, and the doorknob charge. A ll can be m ade

ahead of tim e and are sim ple, compact, lightw eig ht, and easy to emplace.

M - 4



Clf FM 90-10-1

a . T h e g e n e r a l- p u rp o s e c h a r g e i s t h e m o s t u s e fu l p r e a s s e m b le d c h a r g e fo r

b r e a c h in g a d o o r o r o th e r b a r r ie r . A s i t s n a m e im p l ie s , i t is u s e fu l n o t o n ly f o r

d o o r b r e a c h in g , b u t i t c a n a ls o c u t m i ld ste el c ha in and destroy c ap tu redenemy equ ipmen t.

(1 )S ta rt build ing the genera l-purpose cha rge with a leng th o f detonation

cord about 2 f e e t long . Using ano ther leng th o f detona tion cord , tie two u liknots (Figure M -2) around the 2-foot long cord. The uli knots must have am inim um of six wraps and be loose enough for them to slide along the m ainline. Trim excess cord from the uli knots and secure them with tape, ifnecessary .

(2) Cut a block of C4 explosive to a 2-inch square. Tape one uli knot to

each side of the C4 block, leaving the length of detonation cord free to slideth ro ug h th e k no ts (F ig ure M-3 ).

-~

U II knots should be dressed and both knots should slide easily upand down the length of the cord.

F ig ure M -2 . S lid in g u li k no ts.

SLIDINGUL I

KNOTS

F ig ure M -3 . C omple te d g en eral-p urp ose ch arg e.

M -5



Clf FM 90-10-1

SQUARE KNOT

NONELECTR IC DUALDETONAT ING ASSEMBLY

F ig ure M -4. C harge p lacem ent again st d oorkn ob.

DETAPRIME BOOSTER

----

I II II II II II II I

I II II II II II II II II I

Figure M -5. R ubber band charge w ith D etaprim e booster.

(3) To breach a standard door, placethe top loop of the charge over thedoorknob. Slide the uli knots taped to theC4 so that the charge is tight against theknob. Prime the loose ends of thedetonation cord w ith either an electric or

nonelectric firing system and detonate(Figure M -4). To cut m ild steel chain,

p lac e th e lo op c omple te ly a ro un d th e c ha inlink to form a girdl hitch. Tighten the loop

a ga in st th e lin k b y slid in g th e u li k no ts.b. The rubber b a n d charge is a no th er

easily fabricated, lig htw eign t device thatcan be used to remove the lockingm echanism or doorknob from wooden orlight metal doors, or to break as ta ndard -s iz e p ad lo ck a t th e sha ck le .

(1) C ut a 1Q -in ch piece of deto nation

cord and tie an overhand knot in one end.U sing ano th er p iece of d eton ation cord , tiea uli knot w ith at least eight w raps aroundthe first leng th of cord. A s an altern ative tothe uli knot, pass the detonation cordthroug h th e center of a 20 -g ram Detaprim eboo ster. S lid e th e u li k no t o r th e Deta primebooster tightly up against the overhandknot. Secure it in place w ith either tape ors trin g. Loo

?a strong rubber b and a round

the base 0 the uli Knot tied around thedetona tion co rd , o r a round th e base o f th eboo ste r. T ie a n ove rh and kno t in th e o th erend of the cord to form a pigtail forpriming the charge (Figure M - 5 ) .

(2) A ttach the charge to the doorknob

(or locking mechanism) by pulling theloose end of the rubber band arouna theknob. The charge should be placedbetw een the knob and the door fram e. Thisplaces the explosive over the bolt thatsecures th e do or to the fram e.

c. One o f th e simple st field -ex pe dien t

charg es for breach in g wooden doo rs is th eflex ib le lin ea r c ha rg e. It can be made inalm ost any length and then cut to the rightsize quickly just before it is used. It can berolled up and easily carried until n eeded. It

is e ffe ctiv e a ga in st h ollow-c ore, p artic le-

M -6



filled, and solid w ood doors. When detonated, the flexible linear charge cuts

through the door near the hinges (Figure M -6).(1) Layout a length of double-sided contact tape with the top-side

adhesive exposed. Place the necessary num ber of strands of detonation corddow n the center of the double-sided tape, pressing them firm ly in place. Forhollow -core doors, use a single strand. For particle-filled doors, use two

strands, and for solid w ood doors use three. If the type doors encountered isunknow n, use three strands. O ne of the strands m ust be cut about a foot longerthan the others and should extend past the end of the double-sided tape. T hisform s a pigtail w here the firing system is attached once the charge is in place.

(2) C o ver the strands of detonation cord and all the exposed portions of the

double-sided tape w ith either sturdy single-sided tape or another length ofd ouble -sid ed ta pe . Roll th e c ha rg e, sta rtin g a t th e p ig ta il, w ith th e double -sid edtape surface that is to be placed against the door on the inside.

(3 )A t th e b reach site , place th e ch arg e straig ht u p an d d own tig htly a ga in stthe door. If the charge is too long, angle it to best fit the door. If it is too short,place it so that it covers at least half of the door's height. Prim e and fire thec ha rg e from th e bottom .

FLEXIBLEfrn

LINEAR -- Hl1CHARGE ~

...

Clf FM 90-10-1

L INEAR CHARGE

DOUBLECONTACTTAPE :~~

SUFFICIENT

WRAPS OF

DETONATING

CORD~

P IG TA IL FO R

PRIMING

,,--

F igu re M -6. P lacem ent of the flexible linear charge.

rl

0

'--1

M-7



Clf FM 90-10-1

d . A d o o rk n o b c h a r g e is easy to m ake and is highly effective againstwooden or light m etal aoors. Charges for use against wooden doors can bem ade w ith detonation cord. If the charge is to breach a light m etal door, eitherd eto na tio n co rd (3 le ng th s) o r 2 25 g rain /fo ot FLSC shou ld b e u sed .

(1) Cut the appropriate am ount of detonation cord for the charge. U se a

3D -inch length for a nollow -core door. For a particle-filled door, use one

3D -inch length and one IS -inch length. For a solid-core w ooden door or a lig htmetal d oo r, u se o ne 3D-in ch len gth an d two IS -in ch le ng th s.

(2 )Cut th e ch arg e h old er from a p iece o f stiff c ard bo ard .(3) Tape the detonation cord in the sha

re of a large "C" along the edge of

the charge holder. Leave a 12-inch pigtai for prim ing (Figure M -7). Placed ou ble-sid ed tap e o n th e b ac k o f th e ch arg e h old er.

(4) If using FLSC , cut a length 21 inches long. C ut a 2D -gram D etaprim e

booster in half. Tape the FLSC to the charge holder, leaving a 3-inch tail forprim ing. Bend the tail upward. Slide a 12-inch length of detonation cordthrough the D etaprim e booster and tie an overhand knot on each end. T ape thebooster and detonation cord combination to the tail end of the FLSC.

(5) H ang the charge on the door knob or locking m echanism . Secure it in

place w ith the double-sided tape. The detonation cord m ust be held firm lyaga in st th e doo r's s urfa ce .

3-STRANDSDET CORD

HOLE F OR DOORKNOB

-OR-

- FLSC

DET CO RD

TAIL

1 /2 OF20 GRAMBOOSTER

FLSC BENTUP

Figure M -7. D oorknob charge.

M -8



* A P P E N D I X N

INFANTRY AND ARMOR SMALL-UNIT ACTIONS

DURING MOUT

T h e f i r s t a n d m o s t f u n d a m en ta l le s s o n le a r n e d f r o m re c e n t u s a n d

a l l ie d o p e r a t io n s in b u i l t - u p a r e a s is t h e v a lu e o f th e fu l l y in t e g r a te d

c o m b in e d a rm s te a m . T h e r e is n o d e n y in g th e v a lu e o f l ig h t in f a n t r y

f o r c e s d u r in g M O U T H o w e v e r , c o m b a t o r O O T W in u r b a n a r e a sn e v e r s h o u ld b e c o n s id e r e d a p u r e in f a n t r y t a s k . U r b a n c o m b a t b y

u n i t s c o m p o s e d e n t i r e ly o f in f a n t r y m e n is a h is t o r i c a l a n o m a ly . A c r o s s

th e s p e c t r u m o f c o m ba t a c t io n in u r b a n a r e a s , p o w e r f u l c o m b in e d

a rm s te a m s p r o d u c e th e b e s t r e s u l t s . T h e a c tu a l c o m p o s i t io n o f t h e s e

te a m s m u s t b e d e te rm in e d b a s e d o n a c a r e fu l a n a ly s is b y c o m m an d e r s

a t a l l le v e ls . L ig h t in fa n t r y u n i t s o p e r a t in g a lo n e s u f f e r f r o m c r i t ic a l

s h o r t c o m in g s th a t c a n b e c o m p e n s a te d fo r o n ly b y a p p r o p r ia t e t a s k

o r g a n iz a t io n w i t h m e c h a n iz e d in f a n t r y , a rm o r , a n d e n g in e e r s . T h e s ete a m s m u s t b e s u p p o r t e d b y c lo s e ly in t e g r a te d a v ia t io n , f i r e s u p p o r t ,

c o m m u n ic a tio n , a n d lo g is t ic a l e le m e n ts .

N - l . S T R E N G T H S , W E A K N E S S E S , A N D E M P L O Y M E N T

C O N S ID E A T IO N S F O R S M A L L C O M B IN E D A R M S T E A M S

Because of the decentralized, fragmented nature of both OOTW and

conventional battles in urban areas, dism ounted infantrym en w ill alw ays

re pre se nt th e bu lk o f an y su cce ssfu l fo rce. A t th e sm all-u nit tactical le vel, lig ht

in fa ntry fo rc es h av e d is ad vanta ge s th at c an b e c ompen sa te d fo r b y mech an iz ed

infantry or armor units. Conversely, tanks and mechanized forces face

problems in the confines of urban areas that place them at a severe

d is ad vanta ge when ope ra tin g a lo ne . On ly to ge th er c an th es e fo rc es a cc omp lish

th eir m issio n w ith m in im al c asu alties w hile av oid in g u nn ece ssary co lla teral

damage.

a. L ight infantry forces lack heavy supporting firepow er, protection, andlong-range mobility. A rmored forces, on the other hand, can deliverd ev asta tin g fires, are fu lly p ro te cted a ga in st a ntip erso nn el m in es, fragmen ts,a nd sm all arm s, an d ha ve ex ce llen t mob ility alo ng u nb lo ck ed ro utes.

b. C rewmen in arm ored vehicles have poor all-round vision through theirvision blocks; they are easily blinded by sm oke or dust. T anks cannot elevateor depress their w eapons enough to engage targets very close to the vehicle or

those high up in tall buildings. D ismounted infantrymen have excellentall-round vision and can engage targets w ith sm all arm s fire under alm ost allconditions.

c. Infantry sm all-arm s fire within a building can elim inate resistancew itho ut serio usly d am ag in g th e stru ctu re. H ea vy fires from armore d v ehicle s

c au se unwan te d c olla te ra l d amag e o r c an d esta biliz e b as ic s tru ctu re s.

N-l



C lf FM 90-10-1

d. If isolated or unsupported by dism ounted infantry, arm ored vehicles(w ith the possible exception of the heavily protected m ain battle tank) are

vulnerable to enem y hunter/killer team s firing light and m edium antiarm orweap on s. A rmo red v eh ic le g un ne rs c an no t e asily id en tify e nemy ta rg ets u nlessthe commander exposes him self to fire by opening his hatch, or dism ountedin fan trymen d ire ct th e g un ner o nto th e targ et.

e. A rm ored vehicles are noisy. Therefore, there is little chance of themarriving in an area u ndetected. D ismou nted in fantrym en can move stealth ilyinto po sitio n w itho ut alerting the en emy. A rmored vehicles can b e blocked byim provised barricades, narrow streets and alleyw ays, or large am ounts ofru bD le. D ismounted in fantrym en can move over o r aro und most u rban terrain ,re ga rd less o f th e amoun t o f d amag e to b uild in gs.

f. A lthough they have lim ited fields of view at the typically short rangesn orm ally encoun tered d uring MOUT , the th erm al sights o n armored vehiclescan detect enem y activity through darkness and sm oke, conditions that lim ite ven th e bes t- equipped d ismounted in fantry .

g. In som e OOTW situations, arm ored vehicles project a psychologicalpresen ce, an au ra of invu lnerability , that aids the frien dly forces in deterring

violence. M ounted patrols by arm ored vehicles can m onitor large areas of acity w hile m aking their presence know n to the entire populace, both friendlyand unfr iendly .

h. During cordon and search operations, armored vehicles can movemounte d in fa ntrymen rap id ly to p oin ts where , to ge th er, th ey c an d om in ate a ndiso late th e co rd on ed are a. W ith th eir lo ng -ran ge sig hts an d wea po ns, armore dvehicles can dom inate large expanses of open area and thus free dism ountedin fan try to c ord on c lo ser te rra in an d v isu al d ead sp ace .

i. T he m obile protected firepow er of arm ored vehicles can be used to addsecurity to resupp ly con voy s and to extract w oun ded p erso nnel u nder fire. T he

armored vehicle's smoke-generation capability can aid this and othersma ll- un it a ctions .

N -2. IN FANTRY-TANK /B FV COMBINED ARMS TEAM

An effective use of arm ored com bat vehicles in m ost tactical situations is en

m ass. A rm ored units operating in platoon, com pany, and battalion strength

com bine m obility, protection, and firepow er to seize the initiative from the

enem y and greatly aid friendly success. H ow ever, com bat in som e urban and

built-up areas is so decentralized, and avenues of approach for vehicles so

channelized, that m assed arm ored vehicles cannot be easily em ployed. T he

heavy firepow er, m obility, and arm or protection of the tank or BFV is still

needed; how ever, this situation calls for few er arm ored vehicles em ployed

o ve r b ro ad er area s. T he d ec isio n to d isp erse ra th er th an mass a rmo red v eh iclesshould be m ade only after a careful consideration of the command's presentMETT -T situ atio n a nd an ticip ated o pera tio ns in th e n ea r fu tu re . D ec en tra liz ed

armor support greatly increases a small infantry unit's combat power.

However , s uch d is pe rs ed veh ic le s c anno t b e e as ily and quickly re concen tra te d.

Their sudden removal from throughout the com bat area will necessitate a

N-2



C lf FM 90-10-1

tactical pause for reorganization and a change of tactical tempo, w hich could

d isru pt th e o ng oin g combat o pera tio n at a c ritical tim e.

a. Traditionally, arm ored vehicles participating as part of a sm all-unitcombined arms team have been tanKs working with small groups ofdism ounted infantrym en. H owever, the advent of the BFV (especially theheavily p ro te cte d varia nts ) h as meant th at s uc ce ssfu l in fantry /ta nl< -type te ams

can be created around a few BFVs and some dism ounted infantry. The BFVlacks the tank's m ain gun, but it has a pow erful weapons com bination in theTOW/25 -mm/ coax sys tem . Un le ss sp ec ific ally noted, th e fo llow ing d iscuss ionof infantry/tank team s also includes infantry/B FV and infantry/Sheridanteams. W hen the Armored Gun System (AGS) is fielded, it w ill replace theSheridan arm ored vehicle in this role. D esigned from the beginning to w orkc lo sely w ith lig ht in fan try , th e AGS w ill b e an effec tiv e a nd p owerfu l a dd itio nto th e small-u nit c ombin ed a rm s team .

b. The most common task organization of dispersed armor is to attach atank platoon to an infantry company, w ith the platoon further subattached onthe basis of a tw o-tank section to each of the lead rifle platoons. Individualtanks can be employed, but tw o-vehicle sections are preferred. A rifle squad isn ormally d esig na ted to work w ith ea ch o f th e p la to on 's attac hed ta nk s.

c. Infantry/tank team s work together to bring the m aximum combat pow erto bear on the enem y. The dism ounted infantry provides the eyes and ears ofthe team . T he infantry locates and identifies targets for the tank to engage. Itm aneuvers along covered and concealed routes to assault enem y elem entsfixed and suppressed by tank fire. It provides protection for the tank againstattack by enem y dism ounted infantry. M eanw hile, the tank provides heavy,con tinuous supporti ng f ir es aga inst enemy s trongpoints .

d. The dism ounted infantry norm ally leads m ovem ent through built-upa reas. T he tan ks fo llow and p ro vid e clo se o ve rwatch . If th e in fan try d isco versan enemy position or encounters resistance, the tank immediately responds

w ith supporting fire to fix the enem y in place or suppress him and allow thein fan try to d ev elo p th e situ atio n. A fter su ffic ien t tim e to d ev elo p th e situ atio nor conduct short-range reconnaissance, the infantry squad leader directs thetank to m ove, if necessary, and identifies specific targets for the tank toengage.

e. C oordination betw een the tank commander and the squad leader must beclose and continuous. The tank commander or driver m ay need to dism ountand m ove, accom panied by the squad leader, to a position w here the route orta rg et can b e b etter seen . S ig nals fo r in itiatin g, sh iftin g, o r liftin g fire s must b eunderstood by all. O ne of the greatest barriers to coordination and commandand control in urban com bat is the intense noise. V erbal commands should beb ack ed u p by simple , n on verb al sig na ls.

f. The tank's on-board sm oke generation system and its sm oke grenadeprojectors m ay be u sed both to protect the tank from enemy fire and to provideconcealm ent for the infantry forces as they either m ove across open areas or

reco ve r wound ed . The u se o f smok e must-b e carefu lly c oo rd in ated . A lth ou ghthe tanks' sights can see through most smoke, dism ounted infantrym en are at a

significant disadvantage when enveloped in dense smoke clouds. T he smoke

N-3



Clf FM 90-10-1

grenade launchers on the tank provide excellent, rapidly developed localsmok e clo ud s, b ut th e g ren ad es p rod uce b urn ing fragmen ts tha t are n azard ou sto in fan tryme n n ea r th e tan k an d th at can ig nite aan gero us fires in u rb an areas.

g . Tanks and BFVsar e valuab le t oo ls f or a ss is ti ng the a ss au lting for ce s isol ateth e obje ctiv e a re a a nd se iz e a fo oth old . A s th e d ismoun te d in fa ntry th en move s toc lear the posi tion and expand the foo tho ld , the tanks are lef tbeh ind . Impossible, the

tanks should m ove to positions w here their fires can be used to prevent enem yrein fo rc ement and engage enemy for ce sw i thdr aw ing f rom the pos it ion. However ,

at this tim e the tank crew must be very alert. B ecause of the nonlinear nature ofu rb an ba ttle s, en emy fo rces m ay mov e to th e rear o r flan ks of the n ow -iso latedtanks and destroy them . If a sm all elem ent of dism ounted infantry cannot bespared to rem ain w ith the tanks, both vehicles in the section should m ove topos itio ns o f c ov er a nd mu tu al s uppo rt. L oade rs a nd v eh ic le c ommande rs s houldm an their external m achine guns and be alert, especially for enem y infantryapp roaching f rom above , th e r ea r, o r f rom the f lank s.

N -4



ADA

AGS

ANGLICO

AP

APC

APDS-T

APFSDS

AT

ATGMs

ATTN

AXP

BDAR

BDU

BFV

BMNT

BMPs

BTRs

CA

CAS

CEV

CFV

C1

CN

COLT

CP

CS

CSS

DADEA

DPRE

DS

ECM

* G L O S S A R Y

a ir de fense art il le ry

A rmore d Gun S ystem

a ir n av al g un fire lia is on c ompany

armor-piercing, antipersonnel

a rmo re d p erso nn el e arn er

a rmor -p ie rc ing d isca rd ing sabo t- trace r

a rmor -p ie rc ing , f in -s tab il ized, d isca rd ing sabo t

antitank

antit ank guided mis sile s

attention

ambu lance exchange point

b attle d amage a ss es sment a nd re pa ir

b atte ry d is pla y unit; b attle d re ss u nifo rm

Bradley f ighti ng veh ic le

beg inning morn ing nau ti ca l tw il ight

Threat f igh ting vehicles

Threat f igh ting vehicles

civil affairs

c lo se a ir suppo rt

combat eng inee r veh ic le

combat f ight ing veh ic le

conf igura tion i tem; command information ; coun te rintel ligence

chloroacetothenone

combat o bs erv atio n a nd la sin g te am

command post

combat suppo rt , chemical smoke, Ochlo robenzyli dene ma lononi tr il e

combat s ervic e suppo rt

D ep artm en t o f th e A rmyDrug Enfo rc ement Agency

d is pla ce d p erso ns , re fu ge e, a nd eva cu ee

direct support

e lectronic countermeasures

Glossary 1



C l, FM 90-10-1

EOD

EPW

FA

FAC

FAE

FASCAM

FAST

FBI

FCL

FEBA

FIST

FLIR

FLSC

FM

FO

FPF

FPL

FRAGO

FSB

FSE

FSO

G3G5

GS

GPS

GSR

GRREG

HC

HE

HEAT

HEAT-MY

HEI-T

HMMWV

lAW

explos ive o rdnance d isposal

en emy p riso ne r of war

f ie ld arti llery

fo rwa rd a ir con tro lle r

f ue l a ir e xp lo sives

family o f s ca tte ra ble m in es

F re igh t A utoma ted S ystem for T raffic Mana gement forward a re a

suppor t team

Federa l Bureau o f Invest iga tion

f inal coo rd ination line

forward ed ge o f b attle area

fire s uppo rt te am

forward- looking in frared

fle xib le linea r shaped cha rge

f ie ld manua l; f requency modula tion

fo rwa rd observe r

final p ro tect ive fir e

final p ro tective line

f ragmenta ry o rder

final s taging base

fire suppo rt e lemen t

fire suppo rt o fficer

A ss is ta nt Chie f o f S ta ff, G3 (Operations and P lans )A ssis tan t Chief o f S taff, G 5 (C ivil A ffa irs)

genera l suppor t

g loba l pos itioning sys tem

ground surve illance radar

graves registration

hydrogen chlo ride

h igh exp losive

h igh-exp los ive anti tank

h igh -exp losive an titank, mu lt ipu rpose

h igh -explos ive incend ia ry -t racer

h igh-mobilit y, mu ltipurpose, whee led veh ic le

in acco rdance with

G lossary 2



Clf FM 90-10-1

ICM

ID

IPB

ITOW

ITV

J5

LAW

LCMS

LD

LIC

LOGPAC

LOS

LTC

improved capab ili tie s miss il e

identification

intel ligence preparat ion of the batt le field

impro ved TOW

improved TOW veh ic le

P lans and Po licy Direc to ra te

l ight ant it ank weapon

laser countermeasure system

l ine of departure

low-in tensi ty conf lict

logistics package

lin e o f sight

l ieu tenant colonel

MBA main battle area

MCOO modified, com bined obstacle overlay

MDP m eteorological datum plane, m ain defensive position

MEDEVAC medical evacuation

METT -T m ission , e nemy, terrain, troo ps, and tim e av ailable

MOPP m ission-orientedprotective posture

MODT m ilitary operations on urbanized terrain

MP military police

MRB motorized r ifle battalion

MRR motorized r ifle regiment

MSR main supply route

NATO

NBC

NCA

NCO

NEO

NOENVD

NVG

OOTW

OP

North Atlanti c Treaty Organizati on

nuclear, b io logica l, chemical

na tional command authori ty

noncommissioned off icer

noncombatant evacuation operat ions

nap-of-the-earthn ight v ision dev ic e

n ight v is ion gogg le s

ope ra tions o th er th an war

observation post

Glossary 3



C 1. FM 90-10-1

OPCON

OPLAN

OPORD

OPSEC

PA

PAC

PDDA

PE

PEWS

POL

PSYOP

PW

RCLR

R E M s

ROE

RP

RPG

S1

S2

S3

S4

S5

SALT

SAW

SEAD

SEAL

SF

SIDPERS

SMAW

SOFSOP

STB

SWAT

operat ional cont ro l

operat ion plan

ope ra tion o rder

operat ional security

public affai rs

Pe rsonnel and Admin is tr ation Center ; p la stic ammunit ion con ta iner

power-dr iven decon taminating apparatus

p robable e rror

p la toon early warn ing sys tem

petrol eum, o ils , and lub rican ts

psychological operat ions

p riso ner o f war

recoilless r if leremote sensors

rule s o f engagement

r ef er ence point, r ed phosphorus

Thre at a ntia rmo r weapon

Adju tan t (US A rmy)

intel ligence off icer

Opera tio ns an d T rain in g O ffice r (US A rmy)

Supply O ffice r (US A rmy)

C iv il A ffa irs O ffic er (US A rmy)

suppo rting a rms lia is on te am

squad automatic weapon

su pp ressio n o f e nemy air d efen ses

sea-air-Iand team

specia l forces

S tandard Ins ta lla tion /Div is ion Per sonnel System

shoulder -launched , mult ipurpose , a ssau lt weapon

speci al ope ra ti ons forces tand ing ope ra ti ng p rocedure

supertopica l b leach

Specia l Weapon s and Tac tic s (c iv ilia n polic e)

TAACOM Theater A rm y A rea C ommand

Glossary 4



C lf FM 90-10-1

TF

II

TM

TNT

TOCTOW

TP-T

TRADOC

TTP

UAV

UCMJ

US

USAF

USMC

USN

VT

WP

ta sk force

technica l inspection; technica l intel ligence

te chnic al manual, te am (g raph ic s only )

trinitrotoluene

tac tica l opera tions centertube -la unched , optic ally tra ck ed , w ir e-guid ed mis sile

target pract ice-tracer

T ra in ing and Doctrin e Command

tac tics , technics , and procedures

unmanned aeria l v eh ic le

Unifo rm Cod e o f M ilita ry Ju stic e

Un it ed S ta te s

Unite d S tate s A ir F orc e

Un ite d S ta te s Ma rin e Co rp s

Un ite d S ta te s Navy

var iabl e time

whi te phosphorous

Glossary 5

1 :1 u .s . G O V ER N M EN T PRINTING O F F I C E : 1995 - 6 28 - 0 27 / 4 00 61



Documents Needed

T hese docum ents m ust be available to the intended users of this publication.

FIE LD MANUALS (FMS)7-7 The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and

Squad (APC). 15 M arch 1985.

The M echanized Infantry Platoon and Squad(B rad ley ). 1 8 F eb ru ary 1 98 6.

T he Infantry P latoon and Squad (Infantry,A irborne, A ir A ssault, R anger). 22 A pril 1992.

The Infantry R ifle C om pany. 14 D ecem ber 1990.

T he In fan try B atta lio n (In fan try , A irb orn eand A ir A ssault). 06 A pril 1992.

In fan try , A irbo rn e an d A ir A ssa ult B rig ad eO peratIons. 24 A pril 1981.

Intelligence Preparation of the B attlefield. 23 M ay 1989.T ank and M echanized Infantry C om panyTeam . 22 Novem ber 1988.

T he T ank and M echanized Infantry B attalionT ask Force. 27 Septem ber 1988.

A rm ored and M echanized Infantry B rigade. 11 M ay 1988.

O perations. 05 M ay 1986.

Staff O rganization and O perations. 25 M ay 1984.

O perational Term s and Sym bols. 21 O ctober 1985.

Read ings RecommendedT hese read in gs co ntain re lev an t su pp lem ental in form atio n.

ARMY REGULATIONS385-62 Regulations for Firing Guided M issiles and

H eavy R ockets for T raining, T arget P racticeand Com bat. 05 January 1977.

Polic ie s a nd P ro ce du re s fo r F irin y; Ammun itio nfo r T ra in in g, T arg et P ra ctic e a nd -Combat.15 O ctober 1983.

A rm y C asualty and M em orial A ffairs andL ine of D uty Investigations. 18 S eptem ber 1986.

FIELD MANUALS (FM S)D octrinal Principles for A rm y A viation inC om bat O peratIons. 28 February 1989.

T actics, T echniques, and P rocedures for theA ttack H elicopter B attalion. 21 F ebruary 1991.

7-7J

7-8

7-10

7-20

7-30

34-13071-1

71-2

71-3

100-5

101-5

101-5-1

385-63

600-8-1

1-112

REFERENCES

References 1



FM 90 -1 0-1

3-3

3-4

3-5

3-6

3-9

3-11

3-100

5-33

5-101

5-102

5-103

5-105

5-250

6-20

6-20-40

6-20-50

7-90

7-91

10-63-1

11-50

17-95

17-98

19-1

19-15

19-30

19-40

20-32

21-10

NBC C ontam ination A voidance. 30 Septem ber 1986.

N BC Protection. 29 M ay 1992.

NBC D econtam ination. 23 July 1992.

Field B ehavior of N BC A gents (Including Sm okeand Incendiaries). 3 N ovem ber 1986.

Po ten tial Mi li ta ry Chemical /B iolog ica lA gents and Com pounds. 12 Decem ber 1990.

Flam e Field Expedients. 19 Septem ber 1990.

NBC D efense, C hem ical Warfare, Smoke,and Flam e O perations. 23 M ay 1991.

T errain Analysis. 1 1 J uly 1 99 0.

Mob ility . 2 3 Jan uary 1 98 5.

C oun termob ility . 1 4 March 1 98 5.

Surv iv ab ility . 1 0 J un e 1985.

T opographic O perations. 09 Septem ber 1987.

E xplosives and D em olitions. 15 June 1992.

Fire Support in the AirLand Battle. 17 M ay 1988.

T actics, T echniques, and Procedures forF ire S up port fo r B rig ad e Operatio ns(H eavy). 05 January 1990.

T actics, T echniques, and P rocedures forF ire S up port fo r B rig ad e Operatio ns(L ig ht). 05 Jan uary 1 99 0.

Tactical Employm ent of M ortars. 09 O ctober 1992.

T ac tic al Emplo 'y -men t o f An tia rmo r P la to on s,

C om panies, ana B attalions. 30 Septem ber 1987.

G raves R egistration H andbook. 17 July 1986.

C om bat C ommunications W ithin theD ivision (H eavy & L ight). 04 A pril 1991.

C avalry O perations. 19 S eptem ber 1991.

S cout Platoon. 07 O ctober 1987.

M ilitary P olice Support for the A ir L and B attle.23 M ay 1988.

C iv il D istu rb an ce s. 2 5 Nov ember 1 98 5.

P hy sical S ecu rity . 0 1 March 1 97 9.

E nemy P riso ners of Wa r, C iv ilian In tern ees,and D etained Persons. 27 February 1976.

M ine/C ounterm ine O perations. 09 D ecem ber 1985.

Field H ygiene and Sanitation. 22 N ovem ber 1988.

References 2



FM 90 -1 0-1

21-11

21-60

21-75

23-1

23-9

23-30

24-1

27-10

32-1

33-1

34-1

34-3

41-10

44-3

44-8

44-16

63-1

63-2

71-10071-101

90-2

100-2-1

100-2-2

100-2-3

100-10

100-20

100-26

101-10-1/1

First A id for Soldiers. 27 O ctober 1988.

V isual S ignals. 30 S eptem ber 1987.

C om bat Skills of the Soldier. 03 A ugust 1984.

B radley F ighting V ehicle G unnery. 01 M arch 1991.

M 16A 1 R ifle and M 16A 2 R ifle M arksm anship. 03 July 1989.

G renades and Pyrotechnic S ignals. 27 D ecem ber 1988.

Signal Support in the A irLand Battle. 15 O ctober 1990.

The Law of Land W arfare. 18 July 1956.

S ig na l In te llig en ce (S IG INT )(U )

P sy ch olo gical O peratio ns. 3 1 Ju ly 1 98 7.

Intelligence and E lectronic Warfare O perations. 02 July 1987.

Intellig en ce Analy sis. 1 5 March 1 99 0.

C ivil A ffairs O perations. 17 D ecem ber 1985.

A ir Defe nse A rtille ry Employmen t:

C hap arral/V ulcan /S lin ger. 1 5 Ju ne 1 98 4.

Small U nit S elf-D efen se Aga in st A ir A ttack .30 D ecem ber 1981.

C hap arral/V u lc an / S tin ge r P lato on CombatO perations. 20 M ay 1987.

C om bat S ervice Support O perations, S eparateB rigade. 30 S eptem ber 1983.

D iv is io n SURRortCommand , A rmo re d,In fan try , a na Mech an iz ed In fan try D iv ision s.20 M ay 1991.

D ivision O perations. 16 June 1990.In fan try , A irb orn e, a nd A ir A ssau lt D iv isio nO peratIons. 26 M arch 1980.

B attlefield D eception. 03 O ctober 1988.

Soviet A rm y O perations and Tactics. 16 July 1984.

Soviet A rm y Specialized W arfare and R ear A reaSupport. 16 Jury 1984.

The Soviet A rm y Troops O rganization andE quipm ent. 06 June 1991.

C om bat Service Support. 18 February 1988.

M ilitary Ope ratio ns in L ow In te nsity C on flict.05 D ecem oer 1990.

The A ir-G round O perations System . 30 M arch 1973.

S ta ff O ffic ers F ie ld Manu al - O rg~n iz atio na l,Technical, and L ogistical D ata (V olum e 1). 07 O ctober 1987.

Referen ces 3



FM 90-10 -1

101-10-1/2 S t a f f Officers Field Manual - Organizat ional ,Tech nical, an d Log istical D ata P la nn in g F ac to rs(V olum e 2).07 O ctober 1987.

700-80 Logistics. 15 August 1985.

TRA IN ING C IRCULARS (TCS)

T actical W ire and C able Techniques. 03 O ctober 1988.

S ig nal In tellig en ce (S IG INT). 1 1 April 1 98 9.

M ilitary Mountain eerin g. 2 6 April 1 98 9.

34-40-6

90-6-1