united states v. vazquez, 1st cir. (2013)
TRANSCRIPT
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United States Court of AppealsFor the First Circuit
No. 12- 1203UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,
Appel l ee,
v.
KATHY VZQUEZ,
Def endant , Appel l ant .
APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURTFOR THE DI STRI CT OF NEW HAMPSHI RE
[ Hon. St even J . McAul i f f e, U. S. Di st r i ct J udge]
Bef or e
Tor r uel l a, Thompson and Kayat t a,
Ci r cui t J udges.
Al l i son J . Kour y, by appoi nt ment of t he cour t , f or appel l ant .Set h R. Af r ame, Assi st ant Uni t ed St at es At t or ney, wi t h whom
J ohn P. Kacavas, Uni t ed St at es At t or ney, was on br i ef f or appel l ee.
J ul y 18, 2013
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KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Kat hy Vzquez sol d cr ack cocai ne
t o a conf i dent i al i nf or mant . A pol i ce sear ch of her home l at er
t ur ned up powder cocai ne, cash, and dr ug- deal i ng par apher nal i a.
Based on t hi s evi dence, Vzquez was convi ct ed of t hr ee dr ug- r el ated
of f enses and sent enced t o 78 mont hs' i mpr i sonment .
On appeal , Vzquez chal l enges t hr ee di f f er ent st eps i n
t he pr ocess t hat brought her t o a pr i son cel l . Fi r st , she cl ai ms
t hat her consent t o t he FBI ' s war r ant l ess search of her home was
secur ed by a f al se cl ai m t hat a l awf ul , war r ant l ess sear ch of her
home woul d ensue wi t hout her consent , r ender i ng t he evi dence
di scover ed t hr ough t hat sear ch i nadmi ssi bl e at t r i al . Second, she
ar gues t hat t he di st r i ct cour t shoul d have i nst r uct ed t he j ur y on
t he def ense of dur ess. Fi nal l y, she asser t s t hat t he di st r i ct
cour t mi scal cul ated her sent ence under t he Uni t ed St ates Sent enci ng
Gui del i nes by assi gni ng her r esponsi bi l i t y f or t oo much cr ack
cocai ne, as wel l as f or a gun possessed by her co- conspi r at or
bef or e t he begi nni ng of t he char ged conspi r acy.
We f i nd t hat t he di st r i ct cour t er r ed i n f ai l i ng t o
determi ne whether t here were reasonabl e gr ounds t o suppor t t he
cl ai mmade t o Vzquez t hat a l awf ul , war r ant l ess sear ch of her home
woul d ensue wi t hout her consent . Ot her wi se, we r ej ect Vzquez' sargument s on appeal . As expl ai ned more f ul l y bel ow, we t her ef ore
af f i r m Vzquez' s convi ct i on on t wo of t he t hr ee of f enses, vacat e
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t hat t hey onl y had powder cocai ne i n st ock and t hat i t was not good
f or cooki ng i nt o cr ack.
Lat er t hat same day, New Hampshi r e Pr obat i on and Par ol e,
wor ki ng i n coor di nat i on wi t h t he FBI , ar r est ed Sot o on a par ol e
vi ol at i on i n a par ki ng l ot near a gym i n Nashua. Ther eupon, t he
FBI sought and r ecei ved Vzquez' s per mi ss i on t o sear ch her home,
where Sot o had been st ayi ng. The search t ur ned up t wo pl ast i c bags
of powder cocai ne; a number of unused pl ast i c bags; appr oxi matel y
$4, 620 i n cash; a West er n Uni on r ecei pt dated t hr ee days pr i or
i ndi cat i ng t hat Vzquez had sent money t o t he Domi ni can Republ i c;
a di gi t al scal e; t wo ki nds of cut t i ng agent used t o pr epar e cocai ne
f or sal e; and a f i l t er f or cut t i ng cocai ne.
Vzquez was subsequent l y i ndi ct ed on f our separate
count s: ( I ) Conspi r acy t o Di st r i but e Cocai ne and Cocai ne Base
( cr ack) begi nni ng on December 5, 2007, and cont i nui ng t hr ough
J anuar y 16, 2008; ( I I ) Di st r i but i on of Cocai ne Base on December 5,
2007; ( I I I ) Di st r i but i on of Cocai ne Base on December 6, 2007; and
( I V) Possessi on of Cocai ne wi t h I nt ent t o Di st r i but e on J anuar y 16,
2008. See 21 U. S. C. 841( a) ( 1) & 846 ( 2006) . Pr i or t o t r i al ,
Vzquez moved t o suppr ess t he evi dence sei zed i n t he sear ch of her
home, pressi ng t he ar gument t hat her consent had been secured by a
f al se cl ai m of aut hor i t y t o sear ch. Af t er an evi dent i ar y hear i ng,
t he di st r i ct cour t deni ed her mot i on t o suppr ess. Vzquez was
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ul t i mat el y convi ct ed on t he f i r st , t hi r d, and f our t h count s, and
was acqui t t ed on t he second count .
At sent enci ng, t he di st r i ct cour t cal cul at ed Vzquez' s
r ecommended sent ence under t he Uni t ed Stat es Sentenci ng Gui del i nes
by at t r i but i ng t o her appr oxi mat el y 100 gr ams of cr ack cocai ne,
whi ch gave her a base of f ense l evel of 26. See U. S. S. G.
2D1. 1( c) ( 6) . The cour t al so f ound t hat a f i r ear m was possessed i n
connect i on wi t h t he charged conspi r acy and accordi ngl y enhanced
Vzquez' s base of f ense l evel by t wo, r ai si ng i t t o 28. See i d. at
2D1. 1( b) ( 1) . I n combi nat i on wi t h Vzquez' s cr i mi nal hi st or y
category of I , t hese f i ndi ngs yi el ded a recommended sent ence of 78
t o 97 mont hs. The cour t sent enced Vzquez t o a 78- mont h t erm of
i mpr i sonment .
II. Analysis
A. The Search of Vzquez's Home
The Four t h Amendment f or bi ds l aw enf or cement f r om
sear chi ng a suspect ' s home wi t hout a war r ant unl ess t he sear ch
f al l s under "one of t he ' f ew speci f i cal l y est abl i shed and wel l -
del i neat ed except i ons' t o t he war r ant r equi r ement . " Uni t ed St at es
v. For bes, 181 F. 3d 1, 5 ( 1st Ci r . 1999) ( quot i ng Schneckl ot h v.
Bust amont e, 412 U. S. 218, 219 ( 1973) ) . Consent t o t he sear ch i s
one such except i on. See i d.
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For consent t o a sear ch t o be val i d, however , t he
gover nment must prove by a pr eponder ance of t he evi dence t hat t he
consent was uncoer ced. See Uni t ed St ates v. Vanvl i et , 542 F. 3d
259, 264 ( 1st Ci r . 2008) . The pr esence of coer ci on i s a quest i on
of f act based on t he t ot al i t y of t he ci r cumst ances, i ncl udi ng "t he
consent i ng par t y' s knowl edge of t he r i ght t o ref use consent ; t he
consent i ng par t y' s possi bl y vul ner abl e subj ect i ve st at e; and
evi dence of i nher ent l y coer ci ve t act i cs, ei t her i n t he nat ur e of
pol i ce quest i oni ng or i n t he envi r onment i n whi ch t he quest i oni ng
t ook pl ace. " Uni t ed St at es v. Twomey, 884 F. 2d 46, 51 ( 1st Ci r .
1989) ( ci t i ng Schneckl ot h, 412 U. S. at 227, 229, 247) ) .
I mpor t ant l y, cour t s must al so consi der "any evi dence t hat l aw
enf or cement of f i cer s' . . . mi sr epr esent at i on pr ompt ed def endant ' s
acqui escence t o t he sear ch. " Vanvl i et , 542 F. 3d at 264- 65 ( ci t i ng
Moran v. Bur bi ne, 475 U. S. 412, 421 (1986) ) .
As we wi l l expl ai n, t hi s i s a case i n whi ch t he r ecor d i s
cl ear t hat a r epr esent at i on by t he FBI pr ompt ed Vzquez' s
acqui escence t o t he sear ch. Speci f i cal l y, t he FBI obt ai ned
Vzquez' s consent t o search her home by tel l i ng her t hat a
war r ant l ess sear ch of her home woul d be conduct ed wi t hout her
consent . The cent r al quest i ons t hus posed f or t he di st r i ct cour t
wer e whet her t he repr esent at i on was cor r ect and, i f not , whet her
t he consent was i nval i d and t he sear ch unl awf ul . I n answer i ng
t hese r at her di f f i cul t quest i ons, t he di str i ct cour t f ound i t sel f
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unabl e to det er mi ne whet her t he repr esent at i on used t o pr ocur e
Vzquez' s consent was f al se. Never t hel ess, t he cour t r ul ed t hat ,
as l ong as t he FBI agent s act ed i n "subj ect i ve good f ai t h" i n
cl ai mi ng t hat a war r ant l ess search coul d be conduct ed wi t hout
Vzquez' s consent , her consent val i dat ed the sear ch.
On appeal f r om t hat r ul i ng, we r evi ew t he di st r i ct
cour t ' s concl usi ons of l aw de novo and i t s f i ndi ngs of f act f or
cl ear er r or . See Or nel as v. Uni t ed St at es, 517 U. S. 690, 696- 98
( 1996) . I n so doi ng, we f i nd t hat r easonabl eness, r at her t han
subj ect i ve good f ai t h, i s t he cont r ol l i ng l egal st andar d; consent
pr ocur ed by a cl ai m t hat a sear ch wi l l ensue anyhow i s val i d onl y
i f t he cl ai mi s based on a r easonabl e assessment of t he f act s under
t he appl i cabl e l aw. Because t he di st r i ct cour t di d not det er mi ne
whet her t he FBI agent s' r epr esent at i on was cor r ect based on a
r easonabl e assessment of t he f act s, because t he record does not
di ct at e an answer t o t hi s quest i on, and because admi ssi on of t he
r esul t s of t he sear ch at t r i al was not har ml ess as t o Count I V,
r emand i s r equi r ed. Our r easoni ng f ol l ows.
1. Procuring Vzquez's Consent
Once Soto was ar r est ed, t wo FBI agent s dressed i n pl ai n
cl ot hes appr oached Vzquez, i dent i f i ed t hemsel ves, and asked i f she
woul d have a cup of cof f ee wi t h t hem at a near by Dunki n' Donut s.
Nei t her agent di spl ayed f i r ear ms or handcuf f s, t ouched Vzquez, or
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t ol d her t hat she was under ar r est . Vzquez agr eed t o j oi n t hem
for coffee.
I nsi de the Dunki n' Donut s, t he agent s or der ed Vzquez a
cup of cof f ee and al l owed her t o use t he rest r oom unescor t ed whi l e
t hey secur ed a t abl e. Vzquez l at er j oi ned t he agent s at t he
t abl e. She di d not appear upset or unset t l ed. One of t he agent s
asked Vzquez f or her cooper at i on i n t hei r i nvest i gat i on,
expl ai ni ng t hat Sot o had been ar r est ed f or a par ol e vi ol at i on.
As i t became cl ear t hat Vzquez was not wi l l i ng t o
cooper at e wi t h the i nvest i gat i on, t he agent s changed t ack and
at t empt ed t o obt ai n Vzquez' s consent t o a search of her home.
Vzquez asked t he FBI agent s i f t hey had a search war r ant f or her
home. I n r esponse, t hey t ol d her t hat , whi l e t hey di d not have a
warr ant , New Hampshi r e Pr obat i on and Parol e had t he aut hor i t y t o
search her home wi t hout her consent , and was goi ng t o do so. The
agent s based t hat asser t i on on i nf ormat i on communi cated t o t hemby
New Hampshi r e Pr obat i on and Par ol e, whi ch had i nf or med t he FBI
ear l i er i n t he day t hat i t i nt ended t o sear ch Sot o' s r esi dence- -
assumed t o be t he same as Vzquez' s- - af t er hi s ar r est . 1
1The government ' s br i ef cl ai ms t hat t he FBI agent s "mer el y
pr ovi ded t he def endant wi t h t r ut hf ul i nf or mat i on t hat anot her l awenf or cement agency bel i eved that i t had t he r i ght t o sear ch on agr ound ot her t han consent . " Says the government , "Speci al AgentSchnei der made no st at ement suggest i ng hi s own vi ew on t hi saut hor i t y. " Speci al Agent Schnei der , however , t est i f i ed f l at l y t ot he cont r ar y: "I ' m sur e I t ol d her t hat pr obat i on and par ol e hast he aut hor i t y t o conduct a sear ch at t hat r esi dence. " I n a si mi l ar
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The FBI agent s expl ai ned t o Vzquez t hat i f she consented
t o an aut hor i zed sear ch, she coul d hel p t he agent s t o separate her
pr oper t y f r omSot o' s and t her eby di st ance her sel f f r omhi s i l l egal
act i vi t i es. Vzquez expr essed concer n t hat t he sear ch mi ght make
a mess of her house, and asked a f ew ot her quest i ons about t he
pr ocess. Af t er t he of f i cer s expl ai ned t o her how t he sear ch woul d
pr oceed, and then revi ewed wi t h her a wr i t t en consent f orm, she
si gned t he f or m gr ant i ng consent t o sear ch her home.
The ent i r e conver sat i on i n t he Dunki n' Donut s l ast ed
bet ween 15 and 20 mi nut es. Havi ng obt ai ned Vzquez' s consent , t he
FBI agent s dr ove t o her home, where t hey met New Hampshi r e
Pr obat i on and Par ol e of f i cer s. Toget her , t he agent s and of f i cer s
j oi nt l y sear ched t he pr emi ses, di scover i ng t he evi dence descr i bed
above.
Three aspect s of t he di scussi on bet ween t he FBI agent s
and Vzquez ar e especi al l y per t i nent . Fi r st , not hi ng i n t he r ecor d
can be r easonabl y under st ood t o suggest t hat Vzquez woul d have
consent ed t o t he sear ch but f or t he agent s' asser t i on t hat a sear ch
by New Hampshi r e Pr obat i on and Parol e woul d ensue anyway. Havi ng
f i r st r ef used t o cooper at e gener al l y, her i ni t i al r esponse t o t he
agent s' r equest f or consent t o sear ch was t o ask i f t her e was
vei n, t he government suggest s t hat t he agent s merel y al l owed t hata sear ch wi t hout consent was "l i kel y. " As t he di st r i ct cour texpr essl y f ound, however , t he agent s t ol d Vazquez " t hat t he st at ehad t he aut hor i t y to sear ch and i n f act wer e goi ng t o sear ch. "
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al r eady a war r ant ; i . e. , whet her a search was goi ng to happen
ei t her way. She onl y consent ed t o t he sear ch af t er she was assur ed
t hat a sear ch was i nevi t abl y goi ng t o occur , even wi t hout a
war r ant ; i . e. , t her e was no possi bl e upsi de t o r ef usi ng consent .
Second, whi l e t he agent s' conf i dent and pr of essi onal behavi or
l i kel y enhanced t he cr edi bi l i t y of any assurances t hey conveyed,
not hi ng i n t he recor d suggest s t hat what t hey sai d or di d was
ot her wi se coer ci ve or i n any way i nappr opr i at e. Thi r d, t her e i s no
basi s f or r ever si ng as cl ear er r or t he di st r i ct cour t ' s
det er mi nat i on t hat t he agent s honest l y bel i eved t hat New Hampshi r e
Pr obat i on and Par ol e of f i cer s coul d conduct a l awf ul sear ch wi t hout
Vzquez' s consent .
2. New Hampshire Probation and Parole's Authority to Search
Vzquez's Home
On appeal , t he gover nment cor r ect l y observes t hat , i f New
Hampshi r e Pr obat i on and Parol e di d i ndeed have t he r i ght t o conduct
t he search of Vzquez' s home wi t hout her consent , t hen the i ssue of
her consent woul d be moot . That i s so because t he consent secur ed
no ear l i er or br oader sear ch than coul d have been conduct ed
l awf ul l y wer e t he cl ai m of aut hor i t y cor r ect. Bui l di ng on t hi s
obser vat i on, t he government t hen cl ai ms t hat Vzquez never
chal l enged t he i ndependent aut hor i t y of New Hampshi r e Probat i on and
Par ol e t o conduct t he sear ch. Ther ef ore, r easons t he gover nment ,
we can af f i r m t he deni al of t he mot i on t o suppr ess on t hat
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al t er nat i ve gr ound, r ender i ng t he consent i ssue ef f ect i vel y moot .
The f l aw i n t hi s moot ness ar gument i s t hat Vzquez di d
f ai r l y chal l enge t he i ndependent aut hor i t y of New Hampshi r e
Probat i on and Par ol e t o conduct a sear ch of her home. I ndeed, her
ar gument was pr eci sel y t hat because New Hampshi r e Probat i on and
Par ol e di d not have such aut hor i t y, t he agent s shoul d be f ound t o
have empl oyed a f al se cl ai m t o pr ocur e her consent . To suggest
t hat Vzquez somehow ar t i f i ci al l y l i mi t ed t hi s argument i n a manner
t hat l ef t unchal l enged t he aut hor i t y of New Hampshi r e Probat i on and
Par ol e as an i ndependent basi s f or sust ai ni ng t he val i di t y of t he
sear ch i s t o suggest t hat t he par t i es and t he di st r i ct cour t
knowi ngl y engaged i n a poi nt l ess hear i ng.
Cer t ai nl y, t he di st r i ct cour t di d not vi ew t he aut hor i t y
of New Hampshi r e Pr obat i on and Par ol e as an unchal l enged,
al t er nat i ve basi s f or denyi ng t he mot i on t o suppr ess. Rat her , t he
cour t expr essl y avoi ded deci di ng whether New Hampshi r e Pr obat i on
and Par ol e actual l y had t he aut hor i t y t o search Vzquez' s home or
whet her i t was reasonabl e t o t hi nk t hat t hey di d have such
aut hor i t y. The di st r i ct cour t expl ai ned: "I don' t t hi nk t hat ' s t he
t ur ni ng poi nt . " I nst ead, t he di st r i ct cour t det er mi ned t hat ,
because t he FBI agent s bel i eved t hat a search coul d be conduct ed
anyway, and because t he FBI agent s di d not ot herwi se coer ce
Vzquez' s consent , t he consent val i dated t he search even i f New
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Hampshi r e Pr obat i on and Parol e coul d not have l awf ul l y conduct ed a
sear ch. 2
I t i s, i ndeed, uncl ear whet her New Hampshi r e Pr obat i on
and Par ol e had t he r i ght t o search Vzquez' s home. One suggest ed
basi s f or t he sear ch - - t he ar r est war r ant i ssued f or Sot o due t o
hi s vi ol at i on of hi s par ol e - - coul d not have suf f i ced. The
war r ant gr ant ed "t he l i mi t ed aut hor i t y t o ent er [ t he] dwel l i ng i n
whi ch [ Sot o] l i ve[ d] when t her e [ was] r eason t o bel i eve [ t hat he
was] wi t hi n. " Payt on v. New Yor k, 445 U. S. 573, 602 ( 1980) . Si nce
Sot o had al r eady been ar r est ed at anot her l ocat i on, t he ar r est
war r ant di d not aut hor i ze a subsequent sear ch of hi s home as a
mat t er of l aw. Cf . Uni t ed St at es v. Gr aham, 553 F. 3d 6, 15 ( 1st
Ci r . 2009) ( "Al t hough t he of f i cer s possessed a val i d ar r est
war r ant , t hi s war r ant onl y per mi t t ed t hem t o sei ze Gr aham and di d
not , st andi ng al one, aut hor i ze t he sear ch of t he bedr oom wher e
Gr aham was f ound. " ) .
As a possi bl e al t er nat i ve j ust i f i cat i on f or sear ch
wi t hout consent , t hat l eaves onl y the f act t hat , as a condi t i on t o
hi s par ol e, Sot o had agr eed t hat New Hampshi r e Probat i on and Par ol e
coul d sear ch hi s resi dence at any t i me. Thi s ki nd of pr obat i on
condi t i on can so di mi ni sh a pr obat i oner ' s expect at i on of pr i vacy
2To t he ext ent t hat t he gover nment i s al so ar gui ng t hat i t beal l owed to suppl ement t he recor d on remand, t he di st r i ct cour tr et ai ns di scr et i on i n st r uct ur i ng t he r emand pr oceedi ng.
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t hat i t woul d per mi t pol i ce of f i cer s t o sear ch hi s r esi dence
wi t hout a war r ant based onl y on a r easonabl e suspi ci on of cr i mi nal
conduct , see Uni t ed St ates v. Kni ght s, 534 U. S. 112, 119- 121
( 2001) , whi ch l aw enf orcement cl ear l y had her e. 3 However ,
Vzquez' s case di f f er s f r om Kni ght s i n sever al i mpor t ant ways:
Sot o' s par ol e agr eement used di f f er ent l anguage t han Kni ght s' s, 4
Soto had al r eady been ar r est ed bef ore the search occur r ed, 5 and
Sot o mi ght not have been r esi di ng i n Vzquez' s home.
Because t he di st r i ct cour t di d not r each t he quest i on of
whether New Hampshi r e Pr obat i on and Par ol e real l y di d have t he
aut hor i t y t o sear ch Vzquez' s home, we have no anal ysi s of whether
t he ter ms of Soto' s pr obat i on agr eement woul d per mi t a war r ant l ess
search of hi s home based onl y on r easonabl e suspi ci on, nor whether
such a sear ch woul d be per mi ssi bl e f ol l owi ng hi s ar r est .
I mpor t ant l y, we al so have no f act f i ndi ng on whet her Sot o resi ded
wi t h Vzquez and, i f not , what t he var i ous of f i cer s knew t hat mi ght
have r easonabl y l ed t hemt o bel i eve t hat Sot o resi ded wi t h Vzquez.
3Al t hough some st at es have passed st at ut es gi vi ng l awenf or cement t he power t o sear ch the homes of per sons r el eased onpar ol e wi t hout any cause at al l , see, e. g. , Cal . Penal Code 3067( b) ( 3) ; see al so Samson v. Cal i f or ni a, 547 U. S. 843 ( 2006)( uphol di ng such st atut es agai nst Four t h Amendment chal l enge) , wecannot l ocat e a si mi l ar pr ovi si on under New Hampshi r e l aw, see N. H.
Rev. St at . 504- A: 1- 15; 651- 1A: 1- 25 ( 2013) , and t he gover nmentdoes not poi nt us t o one.
4See, e. g. , Gr aham, 553 F. 3d at 15- 18.
5See, e. g. , Uni t ed St at es v. Tr uj i l l o, 404 F. 3d 1238, 1242- 43( 10t h Ci r . 2005)
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Wi t hout f ur t her f act- f i ndi ng and anal ysi s f r omt he di st r i ct cour t ,
we cannot deci de at t hi s j unct ur e whet her t he parol e condi t i on was
a l awf ul basi s f or New Hampshi r e Probat i on and Par ol e t o search
Vzquez' s home. Theref ore, we must assume f or pur poses of t hi s
appeal t hat New Hampshi r e Probat i on and Par ol e of f i cers di d not
have t he r i ght t o search Vzquez' s home absent her consent .
3. "Subjective Good Faith" Versus "Reasonableness"
Gi ven t he f oregoi ng, t he quest i on posed i s whet her
Vzquez' s consent can j ust i f y t he sear ch i f secur ed by a si ncer e,
but er r oneous r epr esent at i on t hat a sear ch woul d ensue anyhow. The
ot herwi se wel l - devel oped case l aw on consensual searches secur ed by
t he l oomi ng pr omi se of a non- consensual search marks t he boundar i es
of our i nqui r y, but pr ovi des no cl ear answer t o t he speci f i c
quest i on posed her e. The l aw i s cl ear , f or exampl e, t hat consent
t o a sear ch i s i nval i d i f gi ven onl y because of an of f i cer ' s
knowi ngl y f al se assur ance t hat t her e wi l l soon be a l awf ul sear ch
anyway. Bumper v. Nor t h Carol i na, 391 U. S. 543, 548 ( 1968) ;
Uni t ed St at es v. Mi l l er , 589 F. 2d 1117, 1132 ( 1st Ci r . 1978) ; 2
Wayne R. LaFave, et al . , Cr i mi nal Pr ocedur e 3. 10( b) , at 410- 11
( 3d ed. 2007) . Si mi l ar l y, t he l aw i s al most as cl ear t hat consent
t o a sear ch i s not i nval i d mer el y because i t i s secur ed by anof f i cer ' s accur at e assur ance t hat t her e wi l l soon be a l awf ul
sear ch anyway. See Uni t ed St ates v. Marshal l , 348 F. 3d 281, 286
( 1st Ci r . 2003) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Lee, 317 F. 3d 26, 33 ( 1st Ci r .
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2003) ; Twomey, 884 F. 2d at 52 ( f act t hat war r ant woul d have i ssued
r endered i t unnecessar y t o deci de whether and when honest , but
mi st aken, r epr esent at i on i mpl yi ng t hat war r ant coul d be obt ai ned
i nval i dat ed consent ) ; see al so Uni t ed St at es v. Wi l ki nson, 926 F. 2d
22, 25 ( 1st Ci r . 1991) , over r ul ed on ot her gr ounds, Bai l ey v.
Uni t ed St at es, 516 U. S. 137 ( 1995) ( t he of f i cer s accur at el y st at ed
t he l i kel y consequences i f t he suspect r ef used t o consent t o a
sear ch) ; Robbi ns v. MacKenzi e, 364 F. 2d 45, 49- 50 ( 1st Ci r . 1966)
( "Bowi ng t o event s, even i f one i s not happy about t hem, i s not t he
same t hi ng as bei ng coer ced. " ) . I n shor t , t he l aw r ej ect s consent
secur ed by knowi ngl y f al se repr esent at i ons whi l e at t he same t i me
seei ng no r eason t o det er of f i cer s f r om secur i ng conveni ent and
pr ompt consensual access by conveyi ng accur at e i nf ormat i on t o a
r eci pi ent . 6
Thi s case f al l s bet ween t hese boundar i es because, as
not ed, we have nei t her knowi ng f al si t y nor a det er mi nat i on of
accur acy. Whi l e t her e i s no cont r ol l i ng pr ecedent on poi nt , t he
appl i cabl e pr i nci pl es and anal ogous case l aw never t hel ess convi nce
us that t he agent s' subj ect i ve good f ai t h i s not enough. The
Four t h Amendment by i t s expr ess t er ms demands t hat searches be
"r easonabl e, " not mer el y based on good i nt ent i ons. " I f subj ect i ve
6Usi ng t he concept of " coer ci on" t o di st i ngui sh t hese t wosi t uat i ons i s somet hi ng of a mi snomer . I n each case, t he sameamount of pr essure i s br ought t o bear on t he per son' s wi l l . Thedi st i nct i on r esi des mor e i n concept s of knowi ng mi sr epr esent at i on,or " t r i cker y. " See Vanvl i et , 542 F. 3d at 264.
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good f ai t h al one wer e t he t est , t he pr ot ect i ons of t he Four t h
Amendment woul d evapor at e, and the peopl e woul d be secur e i n thei r
per sons, houses, paper s, and ef f ect s, onl y i n t he di scr et i on of
t he pol i ce. " Beck v. Ohi o, 379 U. S. 89, 97 ( 1964) . Law
enf or cement of f i cer s f ace var i ed and ambi guous si t uat i ons i n t he
cour se of mai nt ai ni ng the or der necessary t o make ci vi l soci et y
possi bl e. They ar e ent i t l ed t o er r i n assessi ng t he f act s, but
" t he mi st akes must be t hose of r easonabl e men, act i ng on f act s
l eadi ng sensi bl y t o t hei r concl usi ons . . . . " Br i negar v. Uni t ed
St ates, 338 U. S. 160, 176 ( 1949) .
The gover nment ' s posi t i on, t hat t he subj ect i ve good f ai t h
of i t s of f i cer s i s enough t o sust ai n t he val i di t y of consent as an
i ndependent j ust i f i cat i on f or a sear ch, over l ooks t he compel l i ng
potency of a repr esent at i on t hat a search i s i mmi nent even wi t hout
consent . When l aw enf orcement of f i cer s seek consent t o sear ch a
per son' s home wi t hout maki ng such a repr esent at i on, t he per son
gi vi ng t he consent can r easonabl y bel i eve t hat she has a choi ce.
Such consent , unl ess other wi se coer ced, st ands on i t s own as an
i ndependent basi s f or sust ai ni ng t he val i di t y of t he sear ch. See
Schneckl ot h v. Bust amont e, 412 U. S. 218, 228 ( 1973) . Conver sel y,
" ' [ w] hen a l aw enf or cement of f i cer cl ai ms aut hor i t y to sear ch a
home under a war r ant , he announces i n ef f ect t hat t he occupant has
no r i ght t o r esi st t he sear ch. ' " I d. at 234 ( quot i ng Bumper , 391
U. S. at 550) . Consent pr i ed l oose by such a cl ai m of aut hor i t y i s
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mer el y acqui escence. As such, i t ser ves poor l y as an i ndependent
basi s f or sust ai ni ng t he val i di t y of t he sear ch. Rat her , i t s f or ce
i s l ar gel y der i vat i ve, nei t her addi ng t o nor subt r act i ng f r om t he
r easonabl eness of t he r epr esent at i on of i nevi t abi l i t y used t o
secur e t he consent . Accor di ngl y, i f we wer e t o al l ow consent t o
val i date a sear ch secur ed by an aut hor i t at i ve pr onouncement of
i nevi t abi l i t y wher e t he of f i cer s act onl y i n subj ect i ve good f ai t h,
and not r easonabl y, we woul d l argel y el i mi nate any r equi r ement t hat
r eason necessar i l y pl ay a r ol e i n secur i ng t he sear ch.
I l l i noi s v. Rodr guez, 497 U. S. 177 ( 1990) , suppor t s our
concl usi on that r easonabl eness, not mer el y subj ect i ve good f ai t h,
i s t he st andard t hat t he government must meet . I n Rodr guez, t he
pol i ce conduct ed a war r ant l ess sear ch based on t he consent of a
per son who appear ed t o have, but di d not i n f act have, aut hor i t y
over t he pr emi ses. See i d. at 179- 82. The def endant ar gued t hat
wi t hout val i d consent f r om an aut hor i zed par t y, t he sear ch was
unl awf ul . See i d. at 180. The Supr eme Cour t r ej ect ed t hat
argument , hol di ng t hat no Four t h Amendment vi ol at i on occur s when
t he pol i ce r easonabl y, t hough er r oneousl y, bel i eve t hat t he per son
who has consent ed to t hei r ent r y has aut hor i t y over t he pr emi ses.
See i d. at 185- 86.
For pr esent pur poses, t he i mpor t ant poi nt i s t hat i n
r ej ect i ng t he ar gument t hat t he pol i ce must be cor r ect on t he
f act s, t he Cour t al so made cl ear t hat an honest bel i ef i n t he
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val i di t y of t he consent was i nsuf f i ci ent : "As wi t h ot her f act ual
det er mi nat i ons bear i ng upon sear ch and sei zure, det er mi nat i on of
consent t o ent er must ' be j udged agai nst an obj ect i ve st andar d . .
. . ' " I d. at 188 ( quot i ng Ter r y v. Ohi o, 392 U. S. 1, 21- 22
( 1968) ) . The Cour t emphasi zed t hat "what i s general l y demanded of
t he many f act ual determi nat i ons t hat must r egul ar l y be made by
agent s of t he gover nment . . . i s not t hat t hey al ways be cor r ect ,
but t hat t hey al ways be r easonabl e. " I d. at 185- 86; cf . Hi l l v.
Cal i f or ni a, 401 U. S. 797, 803- 04 ( 1971) ( "The upshot was t hat t he
of f i cer s i n good f ai t h bel i eved Mi l l er was Hi l l and ar r est ed hi m.
They wer e qui t e wr ong, as i t t ur ned out , and subj ect i ve good- f ai t h
bel i ef woul d not i n i t sel f j ust i f y ei t her t he ar r est or t he
subsequent sear ch. " ) .
I n Rodr guez, t he j ust i f i cat i on f or t he sear ch was
consent gi ven by a per son who l aw enf or cement bel i eved was
aut hor i zed t o do so. Her e, t he j ust i f i cat i on was consent secur ed
by l aw enf orcement ' s announced bel i ef t hat a nonconsensual search
woul d ensue anyway. We see no r eason why r easonabl eness need not
char act er i ze t he of f i cer s' bel i ef s i n bot h ci r cumst ances.
Ot her wi se, unr easonabl e but honest of f i cer s coul d par l ay unl awf ul
gr ounds f or conduct i ng sear ches i nt o l awf ul sear ches mer el y by
usi ng t he pr ospect of t he unl awf ul sear ch as a means of secur i ng
acqui escence.
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Our hol di ng i s compat i bl e wi t h t he f ew deci si ons we have
f ound t hat have addr essed sl i ght var i ant s of t he i ssue bef or e us.
Three cases have hel d t hat a l aw enf or cement of f i cer ' s honest but
mi st aken cl ai m of l awf ul aut hor i t y t o sear ch i nval i dat ed t he
def endant ' s consent and r equi r ed excl usi on of t he r esul t i ng
evi dence. I n al l t hr ee cases, t he pol i ce l acked an obj ect i vel y
r easonabl e f act ual basi s f or t hei r asser t i ons- - t hei r cl ai ms of
l awf ul aut hor i t y wer e wr ong even on t he f act s as t he pol i ce
underst ood t hem. See Uni t ed St at es v. Mol t , 589 F. 2d 1247, 1251- 52
( 3d Ci r . 1978) ( consent vi t i ated when cust oms agent s i nnocent l y but
i ncor r ect l y asser t ed t he l egal aut hor i t y to conduct a war r ant l ess
sear ch of a busi ness' s r ecor ds) ; Cooper v. St at e, 587 S. E. 2d 605,
612- 13 ( Ga. 2003) ( consent vi t i at ed when pol i ce of f i cer
uni nt ent i onal l y mi sr epr esent ed t o t he def endant t hat he was
r equi r ed t o submi t t o a war r ant l ess bl ood t est ) ; Lobani a v. St at e,
959 S. W. 2d 72, 73- 74 ( Ar k. Ct . App. 1998) ( consent vi t i ated when
pol i ce t r ansl at or i nnocent l y but i ncor r ect l y mi st r ansl at ed an
of f i cer ' s r equest t o sear ch as an of f i cer ' s cl ai m of aut hor i t y t o
sear ch) . One case of whi ch we ar e awar e hel d t hat an honest but
mi st aken cl ai m of l awf ul aut hor i t y t o sear ch di d not vi t i at e t he
def endant ' s consent . I n t hat case, t he pol i ce had an obj ect i vel y
r easonabl e basi s f or t hei r cl ai m; i t j ust t ur ned out t hat t hey wer e
mi st aken about t he under l yi ng f act s. See Uni t ed St at es v. Ri char d,
994 F. 2d 244, 252 ( 5t h Ci r . 1993) ( consent val i d when pol i ce
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of f i cer s honest l y but i naccur at el y i nf or med t he subj ect of t he
sear ch t hat her boyf r i end had al r eady agr eed t o al l ow t hem t o
sear ch her mot el r oom) .
The concl usi on t hat consent i s i nval i d i f pr ocur ed by an
of f i cer ' s unr easonabl e cl ai mt hat a l awf ul sear ch wi l l ensue anyway
i mposes no unusual bur den on l aw enf orcement of f i ci al s. I n many
wal ks of l i f e, agr eement s gi ven i n j ust i f i ed r el i ance on f al se
r epr esent at i ons are voi dabl e. See Rest atement (Second) of
Cont r act s 164( 1) ( 1981) . ( I ndeed, i n an or di nar y cont r act case,
even r easonabl eness i n maki ng t he r epr esent at i on mi ght not save t he
deal . I d. ) Law enf or cement of f i ci al s, mor eover , ar e knowl edgeabl e
i n assessi ng whet her t he f act s render a sear ch l awf ul . I n t hi s
cont ext , i t i s no gr eat demand to expect t hat t hey know t he l aw and
t hemsel ves be r easonabl e i n assessi ng the f act s when they pr ocur e
consent t o sear ch a per son' s home by assur i ng t he per son t hat a
l awf ul sear ch wi l l ensue anyway.
I n sum, by f ai l i ng to det er mi ne whet her t he cl ai med
aut hor i t y t o search was based on a reasonabl e assessment of t he
f act s, t he di st r i ct cour t may have er r ed i n i t s ul t i mat e deci si on
denyi ng t he mot i on t o suppr ess.
4. Harmless Error Analysis
Even i f admi ssi on of t he r esul t s of t he sear ch may have
been er r or , we need not vacat e and r emand i f , beyond a reasonabl e
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doubt , t he admi ss i on of t he evi dence coul d not have i mpacted t he
r esul t bel ow. Neder v. Uni t ed St at es, 527 U. S. 1, 7 ( 1999) ; Fed.
R. Cr i m. P. 52( a) ; see al so Uni t ed St at es v. Cr ooker , 688 F. 3d 1,
9 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) ; Uni t ed St at es v. J i mnez, 419 F. 3d 34, 41- 42
( 1st Ci r . 2005) .
When we appl y t he harml ess er r or anal ysi s, we pl ace t he
bur den on t he gover nment t o show " t hat t he supposed er r or di d not
af f ect t he out come of t r i al . " J i mnez, 419 F. 3d at 42. We conduct
"a panor ami c, case- speci f i c i nqui r y consi der i ng, among ot her
t hi ngs, t he cent r al i t y of t he t ai nt ed mat er i al , i t s uni queness, i t s
pr ej udi ci al i mpact , t he uses t o whi ch i t was put dur i ng t he t r i al ,
t he r el at i ve st r engt hs of t he par t i es' cases, and any t el l t al es
t hat f ur ni sh cl ues t o t he l i kel i hood t hat t he er r or af f ect ed t he
f act f i nder ' s r esol ut i on of a mat er i al i ssue. " Uni t ed St at es v.
Cast el l i ni , 392 F. 3d 35, 52 ( 1st Ci r . 2004) ( quot i ng Uni t ed St at es
v. Sepul veda, 15 F. 3d 1161, 1182 ( 1st Ci r . 1993) ) ( i nt er nal
quotat i on marks omi t t ed) .
We begi n wi t h Count I , Conspi r acy to Di st r i but e Cocai ne
and Cocai ne Base ( cr ack) begi nni ng on December 5, 2007 and
cont i nui ng t hr ough J anuar y 16, 2008. See 21 U. S. C. 841( a) ( 1) &
846. The evi dence di scover ed i nsi de Vzquez' s home, wher e Sot o was
at l east t empor ar i l y st ayi ng, was hi ghl y i ncr i mi nat i ng, but i t was
al so mer el y cumul at i ve of t he subst ant i al addi t i onal evi dence
of f er ed at t r i al i ndi cat i ng t hat Vzquez and Sot o had been wor ki ng
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t oget her t o sel l cr ack cocai ne dur i ng t he per i od i n quest i on.
Asi de f r om t he mat er i al s f ound i nsi de Vzquez' s home, t he
gover nment al so present ed evi dence t hat Sot o and Vzquez t oget her
sol d cr ack cocai ne t o the conf i dent i al i nf or mant at t hei r home on
December 6; t hat t hey pl anned t o sel l her cr ack cocai ne once more
at Vzquez' s home on J anuary 16; and t hat t hey engaged i n mul t i pl e
r ecor ded conver sat i ons dur i ng whi ch t hey bot h di scussed t hei r j oi nt
dr ug- deal i ng vent ur e i n gr eat det ai l . 7 Based on t hi s evi dence, we
ar e convi nced t hat t he j ur y woul d st i l l have convi ct ed Vzquez on
t he f i r st count even i f t he evi dence f r om t he sear ch of her home
had been suppr essed.
As t o Count I I I , 8 Di st r i but i on of Cocai ne Base on
December 6, 2007, see 21 U. S. C. 841( a) ( 1) , t he evi dence f ound i n
Vzquez' s home was super f l uous. The government present ed bot h
wi t ness t est i mony and r ecor ded conver sat i ons i ndi cat i ng t hat
Vzquez sol d 14 gr ams of cr ack cocai ne t o t he conf i dent i al
i nf ormant on December 6. Not hi ng f r omt he search of Vzquez' s home
was needed to suppor t t hi s convi ct i on.
7The gover nment al so pr esent ed evi dence t hat t he t wo sol d
cr ack t o the i nf ormant on December 5, but t he j ur y acqui t t edVzquez on t he char ge r el at ed t o t hat t r ansact i on. I n any event ,t he evi dence of t he December 5 sal e i s mer el y cumul at i ve, si ncet her e was subst ant i al addi t i onal evi dence that Vzquez and Sot ower e conspi r i ng t oget her t o di st r i but e cr ack cocai ne.
8As not ed above, t he j ur y acqui t t ed Vzquez on Count I I .
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Fi nal l y, i n r egar d t o Count I V, Possessi on of Cocai ne
wi t h I nt ent t o Di st r i but e on J anuar y 16, 2008, see 21 U. S. C.
841( a) ( 1) , t he pr osecut i on' s case was based al most ent i r el y on t he
cocai ne t hat t he FBI agent s had sei zed f r om i nsi de Vzquez' s home.
The onl y ot her evi dence suppor t i ng Count I V was t he conf i dent i al
i nf or mant ' s t est i mony at t r i al t hat Vzquez had ment i oned t o her on
J anuar y 16 t hat she and Sot o had some powder cocai ne i n t hei r
possessi on. We are not convi nced "beyond a r easonabl e doubt " t hat
t he j ur y woul d st i l l have convi ct ed Vzquez on Count I V based
sol el y on t hi s st r ay and unsubst ant i at ed r emar k. Neder , 527 U. S.
at 7 ( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) . Accor di ngl y, a r emand
wi l l be necessary.
5. Guidance on Remand
Gi ven t he r el at i ve novel t y of t he i ssues as f r amed i n a
case i nvol vi ng a j oi nt l aw enf or cement exer ci se and t he asser t i on
of an i ndependent and a der i vat i ve gr ound f or t he war r ant l ess
sear ch, we addr ess t hr ee addi t i onal quest i ons t hat necessar i l y wi l l
ar i se bel ow as a f or eseeabl e pr oduct of our hol di ng.
Fi r st , t o what det er mi nat i on does t he assessment of
r easonabl eness appl y: t he det er mi nat i on of t he f act s, or t he
det er mi nat i on of what t he l aw i s, based on t hose f act s? As at
l east t wo ot her si st er ci r cui t s have not ed, Rodr guez per mi t s
war r ant l ess searches based onl y on a r easonabl e mi st ake of f act ,
not on a mi st ake of l aw. See Uni t ed St at es v. Sal i nas- Cano, 959
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F. 2d 861, 865- 66 ( 10t h Ci r . 1992) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Whi t f i el d, 939
F. 2d 1071, 1073- 75 ( D. C. Ci r . 1991) ; see al so Uni t ed St ates v.
Har r i son, 689 F. 3d 301, 309- 10 ( 3d Ci r . 2012) . I n ot her wor ds,
Rodr guez " appl i es t o si t uat i ons i n whi ch an of f i cer woul d have had
val i d consent t o sear ch i f t he f act s wer e as he r easonabl y bel i eved
t hem t o be. " Whi t f i el d, 939 F. 2d at 1074. Rodr guez does not
per mi t an of f i cer t o sear ch i f hi s mi st ake i s about t he l aw - - f or
i nst ance, i f he mi st akenl y bel i eves t hat t he Four t h Amendment
aut hor i zes a sear ch when i n f act i t does not , even based on t he
f act s as he underst ands t hem.
Second, who must have been r easonabl e i n assessi ng t he
f act s, t he FBI agent s who t ol d Vzquez t hat New Hampshi r e Probat i on
and Par ol e coul d and woul d sear ch, or t he st at e of f i cer s who so
t ol d t he FBI ? On t he one hand, agent s worki ng i n a t eamshoul d be
abl e t o r el y on f aci al l y pl ausi bl e st at ement s made by t hei r
col l eagues wi t hout havi ng t o conduct due di l i gence on t hei r own.
On t he ot her hand, i t woul d cr eat e per ver se i ncent i ves i f
unr easonabl e j udgment s by one of f i cer di r ect l y i nvol ved i n t he
ar r est and sear ch coul d be l aundered by t r ansmi ssi on t hr ough
anot her of f i cer as i pse di xi t . The answer t hat best bal ances t he
consi der at i ons i n t hi s par t i cul ar case i s t hat t he FBI agent s wer e
ent i t l ed t o suppl ement t hei r own knowl edge of t he f act s by rel yi ng
on t he j udgment s of t he st at e of f i cer s concer ni ng t he f act s,
pr ovi ded t hat t hose j udgment s were t hemsel ves r easonabl e. Cf .
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Uni t ed St ates v. Hensl ey, 469 U. S. 221, 231 ( 1985) ( " [ W] hen
evi dence i s uncover ed dur i ng a sear ch i nci dent t o an ar r est i n
r el i ance on a f l yer or bul l et i n, i t s admi ssi bi l i t y t ur ns on whet her
t he of f i cer s who i ssued t he f l yer possessed pr obabl e cause t o make
t he ar r est . " ) . See gener al l y Uni t ed St at es v. Rami r ez, 473 F. 3d
1026, 1032- 37 ( 9t h Ci r . 2007) ( descr i bi ng "col l ect i ve knowl edge"
doct r i ne) .
Thi r d, and perhaps i r oni cal l y i n vi ew of t he manner i n
whi ch t he i ssues wer e pr i or i t i zed bel ow, our r ul i ng r ender s
Vzquez' s consent i r r el evant i n t hi s par t i cul ar case because the
t hreat ened sear ch by New Hampshi r e Pr obat i on and Par ol e used t o
secur e consent was act ual l y conduct ed si mul t aneousl y and co-
extensi vel y wi t h t he consent ed sear ch. I f t hat sear ch by New
Hampshi r e Pr obat i on and Parol e was val i d, t hen as t he government
argued bel ow, t her e i s no need t o r el y on Vzquez' s consent .
Conver sel y, i f t hat sear ch was unl awf ul on i t s own t er ms, i t woul d
onl y be because t he f act s as r easonabl y per cei ved by t he of f i cer s
di d not as a mat t er of l aw j ust i f y t he war r ant l ess sear ch. The
consent her e i s t hus t r ul y der i vat i ve, and dr ops out of t he
equat i on al t oget her i n det er mi ni ng t he l awf ul ness of t hi s
par t i cul ar sear ch.
On r emand, t he di st r i ct cour t wi l l t her ef or e need t o
deci de whet her t he f act s as r easonabl y under st ood by t he of f i cer s
and agent s at t he scene gave t hemt he aut hor i t y t o search Vzquez' s
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r esi dence wi t hout Vzquez' s consent . I f so, t he sear ch was l awf ul .
I f not , t he consent woul d not have val i dat ed t he sear ch because i t
woul d have been secur ed as a r esul t of ei t her an unr easonabl e
assessment of t he f act s or a mi sappr ehensi on of t he l aw.
B. The Requested Jury Instruction on Duress
Vzquez' s second cl ai m of er r or chal l enges t he di st r i ct
cour t ' s r ef usal t o i nst r uct t he j ur y on t he def ense of dur ess.
Dur ess i s a common l aw def ense t hat excuses cr i mi nal conduct i f t he
def endant vi ol ated t he l aw onl y because she was unl awf ul l y
t hr eat ened by anot her per son wi t h deat h or ser i ous bodi l y i nj ur y.
See Uni t ed St at es v. Bai l ey, 444 U. S. 394, 409- 10 ( 1980) .
At t he cl ose of t r i al , Vzquez asked t he di st r i ct cour t
t o i ncl ude a dur ess def ense i n i t s char ge t o t he j ur y. She
emphasi zed t hat Sot o was a member of t he "et as, " a pr i son gang
t hat or i gi nat ed i n Puer t o Ri co but had si nce acqui r ed t housands ofmembers acr oss t he Uni t ed St at es, i ncl udi ng i n New Hampshi r e, and
whi ch has been i nvol ved i n dr ug t r af f i cki ng, gun vi ol ence, and
wi t ness i nt i mi dat i on. She al so not ed t hat Sot o had access t o a
gun, and t hat she was par t i cul ar l y f ear f ul of f i r ear ms because she
had wi t nessed her f at her shoot her mot her when she was a chi l d.
Vzquez r ecount ed t hat Sot o had t ol d her about t he eta
gang' s r ul es and t hat hi s gang- member f r i ends had shar ed st or i es
"of what t hey do t o peopl e [ who] . . . sni t ch. " Al t hough Sot o
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never t hr eat ened her , and she di d not bel i eve t hat he woul d have
hur t her hi msel f , Vzquez f el t t hat she had been i mpl i ci t l y
t hr eat ened t hat ot her eta gang members mi ght harm her or her
chi l dr en i f she at t empt ed t o go t o t he pol i ce. Al l egedl y, she onl y
par t i ci pat ed i n t he scheme i n or der t o pr ot ect her sel f and her
chi l dr en.
The di st r i ct cour t was unmoved. I t decl i ned Vzquez' s
r equest f or a dur ess i nst r uct i on, ci t i ng a l ack of evi dence i n t he
r ecor d t o suppor t t hat t heor y of def ense. Vzquez t i mel y pr eserved
her posi t i on by obj ect i ng t o t he omi ssi on of t he i nst r uct i on bef or e
t he j ur y r et i r ed.
On appeal , we r evi ew de novo whether t he def endant made
a t hr eshol d showi ng that t he recor d evi dence, const r ued i n her
f avor , suppor t ed her r equest ed i nst r uct i on. Uni t ed St at es v.
Bai r d, 712 F. 3d 623, 627 ( 1st Ci r . 2013) . 9 I n thi s case, i t i s
cl ear t hat Vzquez has not made such a showi ng.
Fi r st , t he t hr eat she ci t es was har dl y i mmedi at e, or even
i mmi nent . Rather , i t was no more t han a "vague t hr eat of f ut ur e
9I f t he evi dence does suppor t t he request ed i nst r uct i on, wet hen move t o a t hr ee- par t t est , al so conduct ed de novo, whi chdet er mi nes whet her t he di st r i ct cour t ' s r ef usal t o gi ve t he
i nst r uct i on const i t ut ed r ever si bl e er r or . Accor di ng t o t hat t hr ee-par t t est , we vacat e t he def endant ' s convi ct i on i f her r equest edi nst r uct i on was: "( 1) subst ant i vel y cor r ect as a mat t er of l aw, ( 2)not subst ant i al l y cover ed by t he char ge as r ender ed, and ( 3)i nt egr al t o an i mpor t ant poi nt i n t he case so t hat t he omi ssi on oft he i nst r uct i on ser i ousl y i mpai r ed t he def endant ' s abi l i t y t opr esent [ her ] def ense. " Bai r d, 712 F. 3d at 627.
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har m, " whi ch i s i nsuf f i ci ent t o suppor t a dur ess i nst r uct i on.
Uni t ed St at es v. Ar t hur s, 73 F. 3d 444, 450 ( 1st Ci r . 1996) ; see
al so Uni t ed St at es v. Bel l o, 194 F. 3d 18, 27 ( 1st Ci r . 1999) .
Mor eover , t he i nf er r ed t hr eat agai nst "sni t ches" can be
di sr egar ded. I n a case of dur ess, t he r el evant t hr eat i s t hat
whi ch "caused t he act or t o engage i n conduct vi ol at i ng t he l i t er al
t er ms of t he cr i mi nal l aw. " Bai l ey, 444 U. S. at 409. Vzquez i s
char ged wi t h vi ol at i ng t he l aws cr i mi nal i zi ng t he sal e of cocai ne,
not wi t h f ai l i ng t o r epor t t hose cr i mes.
Second, even i f we were t o accept t he not i on t hat Vzquez
mi ght have const r ued an i nf er r ed t hr eat agai nst " sni t chi ng" t o be
t he equi val ent of a thr eat of har m f or not act i vel y commi t t i ng t he
cr i me, such a subj ect i ve bel i ef woul d not const i t ut e a "wel l -
gr ounded" f ear . Bel l o, 194 F. 3d at 27. She needed t o pr oduce
evi dence of t hr eats t hat woul d have caused "a def endant of ordi nary
f i r mness and j udgment " t o bel i eve t hat she woul d be i n i mmedi at e
danger shoul d she not commi t t he cr i mi nal act s. Uni t ed St ates v.
Cast r o- Gmez, 360 F. 3d 216, 219 ( 1st Ci r . 2004) . The same
pr i nci pl e negat es Vzquez' s cl ai m t hat t he i mpl i ci t t hr eat had a
more power f ul ef f ect on her due to her past t r aumat i c exper i ences
wi t h f i r ear ms- - our obj ect i ve anal ysi s does not per mi t consi der at i on
of speci al f act or s uni que t o thi s par t i cul ar def endant .
Fi nal l y, t her e was no evi dence t o suggest t hat Vzquez
l acked t he oppor t uni t y t o escape or f r ust r at e any t hr eat agai nst
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her . See Bel l o, 194 F. 3d at 27. Vzquez t est i f i ed t hat Sot o "was
al ways around" at home and t hat t he et as had a pr esence "al l over
t he pl ace, " maki ng i t ext r emel y di f f i cul t f or her t o t ur n Sot o over
t o t he aut hor i t i es. But even gr ant i ng t he i mpr obabl e not i on t hat
bet ween December 5 and J anuar y 16, Vzquez di d not have j ust a f ew
mi nut es i n pr i vat e when she coul d have cont acted t he pol i ce, t her e
i s not hi ng t o suggest t hat she coul d not have si mpl y ter mi nated her
r omant i c and pr of essi onal r el at i onshi ps wi t h Sot o i n or der t o
ext r i cat e her sel f f r omt he dr ug- deal i ng busi ness. Cf . Bai l ey, 444
U. S. at 410 ( no dur ess def ense i s avai l abl e " i f t her e was a
r easonabl e, l egal al t er nat i ve t o vi ol at i ng t he l aw") .
For t hese r easons, t he evi dence at t r i al , const r ued i n
Vzquez' s f avor , coul d not have suppor t ed a f i ndi ng of dur ess.
Accor di ngl y, t he di st r i ct cour t di d not er r i n r ef usi ng t o i nst r uct
t he j ur y on t he el ement s of t he def ense.
C. The Calculation of Vzquez's Guidelines Sentence
Fi nal l y, Vzquez cl ai ms t hat t he di st r i ct cour t
mi scal cul ated her sent ence under t he Uni t ed St ates Sent enci ng
Gui del i nes. 10
10At a sent enci ng hear i ng, t he cour t may use evi dence sei zed
i n vi ol at i on of a def endant ' s Four t h Amendment r i ght s so l ong ast he pol i ce di d not i nt ent i onal l y vi ol at e t he Four t h Amendment i nor der t o i ncr ease t he def endant ' s sent ence. See Uni t ed St at es v.Lar i os, 593 F. 3d 82, 87 ( 1st Ci r . 2010) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Acost a,303 F. 3d 78, 86 ( 1st Ci r . 2002) . Even i f t he di st r i ct cour tdetermi nes on r emand that Vzquez' s consent t o t he sear ch of herhome was i nval i d and so suppr esses t he evi dence obt ai ned t herei n,
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The st andar d pr act i ce when i mposi ng a sentence i s f or a
di st r i ct cour t t o use t he Sent enci ng Gui del i nes t o cal cul at e a
r ecommended sent enci ng r ange f or t he def endant , and then to
consi der whet her a gui del i ne sent ence i s appr opr i at e i n l i ght of
t he f act or s enumer at ed i n 18 U. S. C. 3553( a) . Uni t ed St at es v.
Zapata, 589 F. 3d 475, 486 ( 1st Ci r . 2009) . The cour t may t hen
choose t o var y f r om t he Gui del i nes sent ence i f j ust i f i ed by t he
par t i cul ar ci r cumst ances of t he case. See Gal l v. Uni t ed St at es,
552 U. S. 38, 46 ( 2007) . Al t hough def endant s may appeal bot h t he
pr ocedur e used t o cal cul at e t hei r Gui del i nes sent enci ng r ange and
t he over al l subst ant i ve r easonabl eness of t he sent ence t hey
r ecei ve, see Zapata, 589 F. 3d at 486, Vzquez chal l enges onl y the
cal cul at i on. On appeal , we r evi ew de novo t he sent enci ng cour t ' s
i nt er pr et at i on of t he Sent enci ng Gui del i nes and r evi ew f or cl ear
er r or t he cour t ' s f i ndi ngs of f act . Uni t ed St at es v. Woodwar d, 277
F. 3d 87, 91 ( 1st Ci r . 2002) .
Vzquez speci f i cal l y chal l enges t wo of t he var i abl es i n
her sent enci ng equat i on. Fi r st , she obj ect s t o t he cour t ' s
at t r i but i on t o her of appr oxi mat el y 100 gr ams of cr ack cocai ne ( 86
gr ams more t han t he 14 gr ams she was convi ct ed of sel l i ng t o t he
t hat deci si on wi l l not i mpact t he f act s consi der ed by t he di st r i ctcour t i n cal cul at i ng Vzquez' s sent ence. Because t he sent enci ngcal cul at i on i ssues wi l l ar i se ei t her way, we can deci de t hosequest i ons on t hi s appeal , despi t e t he f act t hat we ar e vacat i ng oneof Vzquez' s t hr ee count s of convi ct i on and r emandi ng t he case f orf ur t her pr oceedi ngs.
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pol i ce i nf or mant ) . 11 Second, she di sput es the cour t ' s f i ndi ng t hat
a gun was possessed i n connect i on wi t h t he charged conspi r acy
( r esul t i ng i n an upwar d adj ust ment of her of f ense l evel ) . Because
t hese f i ndi ngs wer e made f or pur poses of sent enci ng, t he
pr osecut i on had t he bur den t o pr ove t hemby a pr eponderance of t he
evi dence. See Uni t ed St ates v. Laboy, 351 F. 3d 578, 582 ( 1st Ci r .
2003) ( dr ug quant i t y) ; Uni t ed St ates v. Hoey, 508 F. 3d 687, 691
( 1st Ci r . 2007) ( f act s cent r al t o upwar d adj ust ment s i n of f ense
l evel s) . We t ake each of Vzquez' s obj ect i ons i n t ur n.
1. The Amount of Crack Cocaine
Vzquez al l eges t hat t her e was i nsuf f i ci ent evi dence t hat
t he 100 gr ams of dr ugs exi st ed, and even i f t hey di d, t hat t hey
t ook t he f or mof cr ack cocai ne r at her t han powder cocai ne ( whi ch i s
puni shed l ess sever el y under t he Gui del i nes) . The r ecor d, however ,
ampl y suppor t ed t he di st r i ct cour t ' s cal cul at i on. As to t he nat ur e
of t he pr oduct , Vzquez' s conver sat i ons wi t h t he conf i dent i al
i nf ormant made cl ear t hat she and Sot o were i n t he busi ness of
sel l i ng cr ack cocai ne, not powder . Vzquez was, af t er al l ,
convi ct ed of sel l i ng cr ack. Nor does t he f act t hat powder cocai ne
was f ound i n the sear ch di ct at e a cont r ar y concl usi on, si nce powder
11I t i s not ent i rel y cl ear f rom t he t ranscr i pt of t hesent enci ng hear i ng whet her t he di st r i ct cour t at t r i but ed t o Vzquez92, 96, 98, or 100 gr ams of cr ack cocai ne. However , al l f ourquant i t i es woul d yi el d t he same base of f ense l evel of 26, whi chcover s t he r ange of 28 t o 112 gr ams. See U. S. S. G. 2D1. 1( c) .
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cocai ne i s t he pr i nci pal i ngr edi ent used t o cook cr ack cocai ne.
See Ki mbr ough v. Uni t ed St ates, 552 U. S. 85, 94 ( 2007) . As f or t he
quant i t y, Vzquez her sel f r ef er r ed t o havi ng r un out of "100
gr ams, " and needi ng t o t r avel t o New Yor k to get more. The cash
f ound, mi nus t he pr oceeds f r om t he sal e of a car , equal ed t he
est i mated sal es pr oceeds of appr oxi matel y 100 gr ams of cr ack.
Smal l - t i me dr ug deal er s r ar el y "aut hor [ ] . . . f or mal
busi ness pl an[ s] or keep[ ] met i cul ousl y det ai l ed i nvent or y
r ecor ds. " Uni t ed St at es v. Skl ar , 920 F. 2d 107, 111 ( 1st Ci r .
1990) . Ther ef ore, " i n a case wher e cash i s sei zed and wher e ei t her
no dr ug i s sei zed or t he amount sei zed does not r ef l ect t he scal e
of t he of f ense, t he sent enci ng cour t may est i mat e t he quant i t y of
dr ugs wi t h whi ch Def endant was i nvol ved by conver t i ng cash t o i t s
dr ug equi val ent . " Uni t ed St at es v. Ri os, 22 F. 3d 1024, 1028 ( 10t h
Ci r . 1994) . Thi s met hod i s commonpl ace i n our ci r cui t and i n
ot her s. See, e. g. , Uni t ed St at es v. Chandl er , 534 F. 3d 45, 50- 51
( 1st Ci r . 2008) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Sepul veda, 102 F. 3d 1313, 1318
( 1st Ci r . 1996) ; Uni t ed St at es v. J ackson, 3 F. 3d 506, 510- 11 ( 1st
Ci r . 1993) ; see al so Uni t ed St at es v. Tokar s, 95 F. 3d 1520, 1541- 42
( 11t h Ci r . 1996) ( col l ect i ng cases) .
More br oadl y, Vzquez cl ai ms t hat she shoul d not be hel d
r esponsi bl e f or unchar ged dr ug sal es and obj ect s t o t he at t r i but i on
t o her of any dr ugs beyond t he 14 grams of cr ack she was convi ct ed
of sel l i ng. Whi l e per haps sur pr i si ng t o a l ay per son, sent enci ng
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cour t s r out i nel y take i nt o account as " r el evant conduct " dr ug deal s
al l egedl y execut ed by def endant s dur i ng t he same appr oxi mat e t i me
per i ods as t hei r char ged t r ansact i ons even though no j ur y has f ound
t he al l eged deal s t o have occur r ed. 12 The Sent enci ng Gui del i nes
endor se t hat appr oach: "[ I ] n a dr ug di st r i but i on case, quant i t i es
and t ypes of dr ugs not speci f i ed i n t he count of convi ct i on ar e t o
be i ncl uded i n det er mi ni ng t he of f ense l evel i f t hey wer e par t of
t he same cour se of conduct or par t of a common scheme or pl an as
t he count of convi ct i on. " U. S. S. G. 1B1. 3, cmt . backgr ound; see
al so Uni t ed St at es v. Chuong Van Duong, 665 F. 3d 364, 368 ( 1st Ci r .
2012) ( "Comment ar y t o t he gui del i nes i s gener al l y aut hor i t at i ve. " ) .
Al t hough "[ n] ot ever y dr ug t r ansact i on under t aken by
ever y dr ug t r af f i cker i s necessar i l y l i nked i n a meani ngf ul sense, "
t he sent enci ng cour t i n t hi s case was per mi t t ed t o at t r i but e
unchar ged dr ug quant i t i es t o Vzquez so l ong as i t f ound, by a
pr eponder ance of t he evi dence, "a suf f i ci ent l i nk bet ween t he act s
char ged and t hose i ncl uded f or sent enci ng pur poses. " Uni t ed St at es
v. Sant os Bat i st a, 239 F. 3d 16, 21 ( 1st Ci r . 2001) ( quot i ng Uni t ed
St at es v. Skl ar , 920 F. 2d 107, 111 ( 1st Ci r . 1990) ) . Vzquez was
convi ct ed bot h of conspi r i ng t o di st r i but e cr ack cocai ne bet ween
12See, e. g. , Uni t ed St ates v. Mrquez, 699 F. 3d 556, 558, 560-61 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Bar bour , 393 F. 3d 82, 92 ( 1stCi r . 2004) ; Laboy, 351 F. 3d at 581; Uni t ed St at es v. Sant osBat i st a, 239 F. 3d 16, 21- 27 ( 1st Ci r . 2001) ; Uni t ed St at es v.Tabares, 951 F. 2d 405, 410 ( 1st Ci r . 1991) ; see al so U. S. S. G. 1B1. 3( a) ( 2) ; i d. at 3D1. 2( d) .
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December 5 and J anuar y 16 and of act ual l y di st r i but i ng crack
cocai ne t o t he i nf ormant on December 6, and so i t was r easonabl e
f or t he sent enci ng cour t t o consi der as wel l her cont emporaneous
sal es of t hat same dr ug t o ot her buyer s. Cf . Uni t ed St at es v.
Ei som, 585 F. 3d 552, 557 ( 1st Ci r . 2009) ( l i st i ng f act or s t o be
consi der ed when deci di ng whet her t o i ncl ude uncharged dr ug sal es i n
a Gui del i nes sent ence cal cul at i on as " t he nat ur e of t he of f enses,
t hei r t i mi ng, t hei r commonal i t i es, and t he exi st ence or non-
exi st ence of over ar chi ng pat t er ns") .
For al l of t hese r easons, t he cour t di d not cl ear l y er r
by at t r i but i ng 100 gr ams of cr ack cocai ne t o Vzquez when i t
cal cul at ed her Gui del i nes sent ence.
2. Soto's Gun
Vzquez al so chal l enges t he di st r i ct cour t ' s f i ndi ng t hat
a gun was possessed i n connect i on wi t h t he charged conspi r acy,i ncr easi ng her base of f ense l evel by t wo ( r ai si ng i t t o 28) . See
U. S. S. G. 2D1. 1( b) . Vzquez st r esses t hat t he gun i n quest i on
bel onged t o Soto, not t o her , and t hat Soto onl y had possessi on of
t he weapon i n Oct ober 2007- - t wo mont hs bef or e t he char ged
conspi r acy had even begun.
As t o who owned t he gun, t he Sentenci ng Gui del i nes
pl ai nl y st at e t hat i n cases of "j oi nt l y under t aken cri mi nal
act i vi t y, " a def endant may be hel d r esponsi bl e f or "al l r easonabl y
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f or eseeabl e act s and omi ssi ons of ot her s i n f ur t her ance of t he
j oi nt l y under t aken cr i mi nal act i vi t y. " U. S. S. G. 1B1. 3( a) ( 1) ( B) .
Vzquez does not di spute t hat she knew Sot o possessed a gun.
I ndeed, she t est i f i ed at t r i al t hat a gun was "accessi bl e" t o Sot o,
and t hat she had asked hi m not t o keep t he weapon i n her house.
The f act t hat Vzquez never handl ed t he gun hersel f does not
r el i eve her of r esponsi bi l i t y f or i t s f or eseeabl e possessi on by a
co- conspi r at or i n connect i on wi t h t hei r dr ug deal i ng vent ur e.
As t o chr onol ogy, t he Gui del i nes al so make cl ear t hat t he
acts and omi ssi ons f or whi ch Vzquez was account abl e i ncl uded al l
t hose t hat wer e "par t of t he same cour se of conduct or common
scheme or pl an as t he of f ense of convi ct i on. " See i d.
1B1. 3( a) ( 2) ; see al so i d. 3D1. 2( d) ; i d. 2D1. 1. That phr ase has
been i nt er pr et ed t o be "br oader t han, r at her t han cot er mi nous wi t h,
t he def i ni t i on of a ' conspi r acy' as t hat t er mof ar t i s used i n t he
over al l cr i mi nal l aw. " Davi d v. Uni t ed St at es, 134 F. 3d 470, 476
( 1st Ci r . 1998) . Accor di ngl y, "conduct can st i l l be r el evant ,
t hough i t may be out si de the t i me f r ame of t he charged conspi r acy. "
Barbour , 393 F. 3d at 92.
I n Vzquez' s case, t he government pr esent ed evi dence t hat
she and Soto wer e engaged i n t he di st r i but i on of cr ack cocai ne at
l east as f ar back as Oct ober 2007, t he same mont h that Sot o
possessed t he gun. Fur t her more, even dur i ng t he per i od of t he
conspi r acy f or whi ch Vzquez was convi ct ed, she was pr esent dur i ng
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a conver sat i on concer ni ng Sot o' s pr ef er ences r egar di ng t he gun' s
di sposi t i on and possi bl e r et ur n t o hi m. The sent enci ng cour t
i ndi cat ed t hat i t was wel l aware of t he danger posed by a
boundar yl ess i nt er pr et at i on of t he " r el evant conduct " Gui del i ne,
and yet i t st i l l det er mi ned t hat Sot o' s gun possessi on was par t of
t he same cour se of conduct as Vzquez' s December t hrough J anuar y
cr ack cocai ne conspi r acy. The cour t di d not cl ear l y er r by
r eachi ng t hat concl usi on. See i d.
Ther ef or e, we f i nd no er r or i n t he di st r i ct cour t ' s
cal cul at i on of Vzquez' s Gui del i nes sent ence.
III. Conclusion
Fi r st , we concl ude t hat t he di st r i ct cour t er r ed by
denyi ng Vzquez' s mot i on t o suppr ess wi t hout det er mi ni ng whet her i t
was r easonabl e f or l aw enf orcement t o bel i eve t hat New Hampshi r e
Pr obat i on and Par ol e had t he aut hor i t y t o sear ch wi t hout herconsent . On r emand, t he di st r i ct cour t wi l l need t o det er mi ne
whet her t he f act s as r easonabl y under st ood by t he of f i cer s and
agent s at t he scene gave t hem t he aut hor i t y t o sear ch Vzquez' s
home wi t hout consent . I f so, t he convi ct i on on Count I V wi l l st and
and Vzquez need not be r esent enced. Ot herwi se, t he convi ct i on on
t hat count must be reversed, and Vzquez r esent enced.
Second, we concl ude t hat t he di st r i ct cour t commi t t ed no
er r or by denyi ng Vzquez' s r equest f or a dur ess i nst r uct i on.
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37/37
Fi nal l y, we concl ude t hat t he di st r i ct cour t cor r ectl y
cal cul at ed Vzquez' s r ecommended sent ence under t he Sentenci ng
Gui del i nes, al t hough t he di st r i ct cour t wi l l need t o r esent ence
Vzquez i f , on r emand, i t r ever ses t he convi ct i on on Count I V.
Accor di ngl y, we af f i r m Vzquez' s f i r st t wo count s of
convi ct i on and vacat e her t hi r d count of convi ct i on. We r emand t he
case f or f ur t her pr oceedi ngs consi st ent wi t h t hi s opi ni on.
So or der ed.