units and the - marines.mil in the... · not represent the 10 percent of marine corps ... first...

CHAPTER 5

BETWEEN THE WARS

Before the troop reductions and unit dis-bandments occurred overseas at the end ofWorld War II, Montford Point Camp itself hadsome changes after the majority of blackMarines had been dispatched to field duties. InOctober 1944 three of the then seven trainingcompanies of the Recruit Depot Battalion weredisbanded and the Stewards' Branch Battalionwas reduced to company strength. By that timethere were 15,131 blacks in the Corps out of atotal strength of approximately 475,000 menand women. Obviously, the black figure didnot represent the 10 percent of Marine Corpsstrength that was contemplated in 1943, butthe corps was never able to fill its black selectiveservice quotas. In fact, only about 65 percent ofthe men called for induction .rere taken.1

In contrast, however, and encouragingly,1944 saw the first signs that the Marine Corpswould eventually have black officers. Thatsummer the first black Marines were assignedto the Navy's V—12 program, which was de-signed to provide qualified enlisted men with acollege education at selected colleges and uni-versities and ultimately with a commission inthe Navy or Marine Corps Reserve. Only a fewmonths before, in April, Headquarters MarineCorps had made a study that recommendedthat no black Marine officers be procured atthat time, but the study group recognized thatsuch procurement might be ordered by higherauthority, which led to recommendations,among others, that black officers be assigned toMontford Point only and that they not be as-signed to command over white officers or en-listed men.2

This study was overtaken by events and theinevitability of the advent of black officers wasrecognized at Headquarters Marine Corps.Preparations were made to send two black col-lege graduates, Charles F. Anderson, sergeantmajor of Montford Point Camp, and CharlesW. Simmons, former sergeant major of the51st Defense Battalion, to Quantico to the 9th

Platoon Commanders Class.3 To this originalduo, one more college graduate was added,First Sergeant George F. Ellis, Jr., who hadserved overseas with the 26th Marine DepotCompany. A rousing send-off party was held atthe Staff NCO Club at Montford Point on 12March 1945 to speed the officer candidates ontheir way to Quantico.4 The letdown was tre-mendous when all three men failed to makethe grade and receive their commissions; onewas given a medical discharge for a congenitalheart murmur, the other two failed to maintainthe required military and scholastic rating, be-coming a part of the 13 percent of the class thatwas not commissioned.5 The bad news did notsit well with black Marines, and, as the new

First black Marine officer, Frederick C. Branch, ha his secondlieutenants bars pinned on by his wfe on 10 November 1945.(USMC Photo 500043).

47

4

..-,

48 BLACKS IN THE MARINE CORPS

sergeant major at Montford Point, Gilbert"Hashmark" Johnson, put it: "There were anumber of questions asked and quite a bit ofconsternation." 6

The questions were not without foundation,for the three men were among the best edu-cated and militarily successful black Marines.Later in civilian life they became a lawyer (An-derson), a physician (Ellis), and a college pro-fessor and author (Simmons). They were fol-lowed in officers training by three similarlyqualified black candidates who also failed tomake the grade.7

But the inevitable did happen. Five moreblack Marines were assigned to the 16th Pla-toon Commanders Class meeting that summerat Quantico. This class was in training on V-JDay, and the members were given the oppor-tunity to be discharged, to revert to regularenlisted status, or to stay on in abbreviatedtraining and go on inactive duty as soon as theywere commissioned. Of the five blacks one,PFC Frederick C. Branch, born in Hamlet,N.C. and formerly of the 51st Defense Battal-ion, elected to stay in the training course. Ap-propriately, on the Marine Corps birthday, 10November 1945, Second Lieutenant Branchwas commissioned as a reserve officer, the firstblack man to achieve this distinction. Althoughhe immediately went on inactive duty, Branchstayed active in the reserve, commanding ablack volunteer reserve unit in Philadelphia in1949, and returned to active service during theKorean War.

In 1946, three black Marines who had beenenrolled in the V—12 program were commis-sioned as reserve officers on inactive status:Charles C. Johnson of Washington, D.C.; JuddB. Davis of Fuquay Springs, North Carolina;and Herbert L. Brewer of San Antonio, Texas.Lieutenant Johnson resigned to accept a com-mission in the U.S. Public Health Service inNovember 1947; Lieutenant Davis was recalledto active duty during the Korean War but wasfound physically disqualified and was honora-bly discharged for physical reasons in 1952;Lieutenant Brewer served on active duty in theKorean War and in 1973 was a reserve colonelin the Philadelphia area, the highest rankingblack officer in the Marine Corps Reserve.

In a sense, with those first commissions theice had been broken, but the Marine Corps wasstill segregated when the war emergencyended and was to remain so for another fouryears. Montford Point Camp was still homebase to all black Marines and the focal point ofall comings and goings.

Colonel l—Is'rbert L. Brewer, o riglncill\ corn,ni.wlon nil in 1948the highest ranking black officer in the liarine Corp.s Reverse in193. (USMC Photo 4619582).

In all, 19,168 blacks had served in theMarine Corps in World War II and 12,738 ofthese men had served overseas.8 The otherswere part of the training base at MontfordPoint or had done duty at the Marine Barracks,Naval Ammunition Depot, McAlester, Ok-lahoma, in depot units attached to the supplyactivities at Philadelphia and Norfolk, and instewards' detachments at major posts and sta-tions in the United States.

The rapid demobilization of the MarineCorps in late 1945 and 1946 created a time ofconsiderable upheaval at Montford Point, acondition shared at most Marine Corps bases.The emphasis was on getting the men whowere eligible out of service, and the 2d CasualCompany at Montford Point, which processedmost of the men, was handling an average ofwell over a thousand men a month in the firstsix months of 1946, reaching its peaks in Feb-ruary (1,945) and May (1,848). All recruittraining of World War II lineage came to anend after 25 January 1946 when the 62 men inthe last three recruit platoons, the 573d, 574th,and 575th, fired for record at the range atStone Bay. The field sergeant major was Gun-nery Sergeant Haywood D. Collier and the Dis

n

BETWEEN THE WARS 49

of the final platoon, the 575th, were CorporalCharles E. Counts and PFC John A. Peeples,Jr.9

By January 1946, most black veterans hadsome idea of the shape of the postwar MarineCorps insofar as blacks were concerned. Sepa-rate and segregated units would continue,probably an antiaircraft battalion, some depotcompanies, the Stewards' Branch, and a smalldetachment at Montford Point. The prospectdid not seem to have much appeal to the lowerranking black Marines.10 Although a numberof staff NCOs switched to the regular MarineCorps as career men, only a trickle of PFCs,corporals, and sergeants reenlisted. Ap-parently, in the rush for discharge and theresultant disbandment and consolidation oforganized units, there did not appear to bemuch consistent purpose in what was going onat Montford Point. Topping this for manyblacks was the continued segregation in theCorps and the fact that many of them waitingfor discharge at Montford Point found them-selves being used on work details in other partsof Camp Lejeune, cleaning up barracks andgrounds occupied by white Marines. Naturallyenough, this did not Sit well with the youngblacks, who were certain that the reverse situa-tion would not apply.'1

Deliberations at Headquarters Marine Corpsregarding the postwar status of black Marinesin the spring of 1946 were spurred on by NavyDepartment pronouncements of a policy ofnon-discrimination by reason of color or racein the naval service. A Bureau of Naval Per-sonnel circular letter of 27 February an-nounced the abolition of all restrictions in theNavy governing types of assignments in all rat-ings, in all activities, and on all ships. However,there was to be a 10 percent limitation on thenumber of blacks in any ship or activity.'2 AnArmy study group's report on postwar plansfor black soldiers, issued in March, was moretraditional in nature. The group recom-mended the retention of separate black unitsno larger than infantry regiments. Units wereto be of all types, both combat and service, witha ratio one black to 10 whites throughout theArmy.'3

In the Marine Corps, which was contemplat-ing an overall postwar strength of 100,000, theproportion of blacks was to be much lowerthan in the other services. There was a muchdiminished peacetime requirement for thetypes of units in which blacks had served and

apparently little disposition to create new fieldsof opportunity. The initial projection ofstrength was 2,800, the estimated number ofbillets in the postwar establishment that couldbe filled by black Marines under a policy ofmaintaining separate black units and theStewards' Branch. Of this number 414 wouldserve at posts and stations in the U.S., 1,847would be in ground FMF units, and 290 wouldserve in aviation billets. Non-available men(those sick, confined, absent, or in transit) wereestimated at 249.14

The provision for black Marines to be a partof Marine aviation was an innovation, sincenone except stewards had served in air unitsduring World War II. The Director of Avia-tion at Headquarters objected to the proposedassignment, indicating that he had no unitswhich could operate separately and be com-posed entirely of blacks. Initially, he was over-ruled by the Director of the Division of Plansand Policies who rightly pointed out that theexclusion of general duty black Marines fromaviation was discriminatory.'5 Nevertheless,the Director of Aviation won the argument andblacks, except stewards, were deleted from theaviation troop list by a decision of the Com-mandant in early June 1946.16

The memorandum regarding postwaremployment of blacks was approved a few daysearlier, on 28 May 1946. In it was a paragraphthat summed up Headquarters Marine Corps'position on integration:

It appears that the Negro question is a national issuewhich grows more controversial yet is more evaded astime goes by. During the past war the services wereforced to bear the responsibilities of the problem, thesolutions of which were often intended more to ap-pease the Negro press and other interested" agenciesthan to satisfy their own needs. It is true that a solu-tion to the issue was, and is, to entirely eliminate anyracial discriminations within the services, and to re-move such practises as separate Negro units, ceilingson the number of Negroes in the respective services,etc., but it certainly appears that until the matter issettled on the higher level, the services are not re-quired to go further than that which is already cus-to in.'

While there were increasing signs that thecomplete integration of the services was inevit-able, it was readily apparent that the leaders ofthe Marine Corps were not going to be in theforefront of the integration battle. Their con-cern was more with how they were going toutilize the black Marines they had and howthey were going to recruit enough men to fillthe ranks of black units.


Finding a Place

Recruiting for black Marines was suspendedin the early months of 1946 until there was aclearer idea of how many veterans might be-come regulars and what the postwar troop re-quirements would be. Once the Commandanthad approved the concept of employment ofblack Marines, Montford Point Camp againbecame the black boot camp. A Training Com-pany was formed on 10 June 1946 in succes-sion to the Recruit Training Battalion, whichhad been reduced to nominal strength afterthe last platoon had graduated in January andthen been disbanded in May. Lieutenant Colo-nel John F. Mallard, an artilleryman who hadserved on Guadalcanal with the 1st Marine Di-vision and then with the 4th Marine Divisionthroughout the rest of the war, took commandof the new company.'8 His sergeant major wasGilbert "Hashmark" Johnson, First SergeantEdgar R. Huff became the field sergeantmajor, and Gunnery Sergeant Thomas Brokawwas appointed NCO in charge of recruit train-ing. The three senior blacks all had extensiveexperience in recruit instruction and were de-termined to maintain the standards of disci-pline and drill with the new men which hadprompted the Commanding General, CampLejeune, Major GeneralJohn Marston, to tell ablack USO audience in Jacksonville in Feb-ruary: "Montford Point Marines are the snap-piest Marines on the entire Camp Lejeune.The others can't touch them in military discip-line." 19

As the first volunteer, Private Charles F.Boddie of Nashville, North Carolina, reportedon 14 June, the last vestiges of the original bootcamp area of Montford Point were disappear-ing. The green wooden huts that had been thehome of thousands of World War II blackMarines were torn down. Even Hut No. 1,which had stood at the intersection ofMontford Landing Road and Harlem Drive,the receiving hut where new boots got "theword," disappeared.2° Recruit training wasnow to be located in the Stewards' Branchcamp, which had been built to accomodate athousand men and now held less than ahundred.

To meet the expected influx of 1,400 volun-teers who would be needed to flesh out theblack Marine units, men who had been DIsbefore and some new instructors appeared onthe drill field during the summer. The new

recruits began to arrive in sufficient numbersto form four platoons and Montford Point wasagain ringing to the flashing cadences of theblack DIs. Sergeant Major Johnson was nonetoo happy with some of the men who werearriving, many of them enlisted for stewardduty only which permitted lower mental testrequirements than general duty. He did notthink that they measured up to the men whohad served in World War II. He commented:

the attrition rate among the recruits who cameto Montford Point in 1946 and 1947 was much higherthan the attrition rate of those who came in earlier,1943 and 1944. We would start out with a platoon of48 and if half that number completed boot camp it wasa marvel. The attrition rate was outlandishly high. Weseemed to be getting the scrapings of the barrel. Noneof the old Marines were reenlisting who had beendischarged. And the only individuals left seemed tohave been the 4Fs who were reclassified and we weregetting them.2'

While the new black Marines were undergo-ing the rigors of boot camp, there was a con-certed effort on the part of Headquarters,Marine Corps to find posts and stations wherethey could be employed. While the barracksdetachment at McAlester, Oklahoma remaineda black Marine post, another Marine Barrackson the east coast was wanted. There was morethan a little opposition to every postingsuggested and even McAlester's days werenumbered as a station for the graduates ofMontford Point.

Unfortunately, the barracks at McAlesterwas not an ideal spot for black troops. A letterfrom the commanding officer, LieutenantColonel Clarence J. O'Donnell, of 5 November1946, outlined some of the problems. Thenaval ammunition depot was located 10 milesaway from McAlester which was the only avail-able liberty area for the black Marines. Onceoutside the limits of the depot, the "Jim Crow"laws of Oklahoma were strictly enforcedagainst the blacks, beginning with the bus rideinto town. Once in McAlester, the men werevirtually restricted to the east end of the town,an area of about three blocks. Recreation forthe visiting black Marines was in competitionwith that of the local black population of about2,000.

In addition to the Jim Crow laws, O'Donnellpointed out, the customs of the area broughtconsiderable restriction and limitation. Thecommanding officer felt:

BETWEEN THE WARS 51

• the Marine Corps is not now maintaining thehigh esteem of public opinion or gaining in prestigeby the manner in which its uniform and insignia aresubjected to such laws. The uniform does riot count, itis relegated to the background and made to partici-pate in and suffer the restrictions and limitationsplaced on it by virtue of the wearer being subject tothe Jim Crow laws.22

It was his conclusion that for the good of theMarine Corps, black Marines should not beassigned to McAlester. In an endorsement toO'Donnell's letter, the Commanding Officer,Naval Ammunition Depot suggested that theassignment of black Marines "to areas wherethere is a relatively large colored populationwould result in the availability of far betterrecreation and leave areas for them." 23

The Division of Plans and Policies receivedO'Donnell's letter and, after study, recom-mended to the Commandant that the blackMarines be removed from McAlester and thatthe Marine Barracks, Naval Magazine, PortChicago, California, be substituted as a post.This, combined with a plan for utilizing theMarine Barracks, Naval Ammunition Depot,Earle, New Jersey, would provide a post oneach coast. The proposal was approved byGeneral Vandegrift on 13 December 1946.24The Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet AdmiralChester W. Nimitz, concurred on 6 January1947 provided the Navy's policy of non-racialdiscrimination was complied with.25

Some changes in the strength of blackMarines were approved by the Commandantof 6 January 1947. The overall requirementfor black personnel, which had been cut from2,800 to 2,302, was now further reduced to1,500. Of these, 1,150 were to be general dutyMarines and 350 were to be stewards. This cutwas largely due to the cancellation of require-ments for antiaircraft artillery elements onGuam and Saipan, the modification of plansfor utilization of the 3d AAA Battalion so as toexclude it from the planned operating forces,and a reduction in the authorized enlistedstrength of the Corps by budgetary limitations.

It was decided because of the changed situa-tion to suspend black first enlistments until 1July 1947, at which time the subject would berestudied. The training of black recruits atMontford Point would be discontinued uponthe completion of the training period of therecruits already there. Future recruit trainingwould be conducted at the Recruit Depot, Par-ris Island, South Carolina, by separate black

platoons, and the Stewards Schools would bemoved from Montford Point to Parris Island.Second thoughts, however, brought about therevocation of the last three changes on 31January.26

Plans to assign black Marines to Port Chicagoreceived ajolt when a communication from theCommandant, 12th Naval District, dated 5March 1947, reached Headquarters.27 The gistof the message was that in view of present andpossible future labor disturbances, it was notconsidered desirable to assign a black detach-ment to any activity in the San Francisco Bayarea where labor conditions were in almostconstant turmoil. The situation at Port Chicagohad not improved any by 6 June, when theadmiral's opinion was that "in areas predomin-antly white but with considerable coloredpopulation, with almost constant labor difficul-ties, possible clashes between colored guardsand white pickets invites racial conflict." 28

A survey in mid-1947 showed that therewere approximately 2,200 black Marines out ofa total Corps strength of 93,000, or about 700more blacks than the estimated requirements.The survey indicated that those who might beconsidered for discharge (men with overseasservice and with dependents) amounted toabout the same number as the overage. TheCommandant then approved certain dis-charges "for the convenience of the govern-ment" to reduce the number to the require-ments.29 At the same time, the requisitenumber of stewards was not volunteering forservice nor were many men remaining in theStewards' Eranch on the expiration of enlist-ment. There was at least some attempt to "en-courage" excess general duty black Marines toswitch to steward's duty. At Headquarters,Marine Corps the action was viewed as an at-tempt "to solicit additional volunteers." ° AtMontford Point this translated into the wordbeing passed to the senior black NCOs of apending order that they would have to serve asstewards. As one of them recalled: "We wereinstructed that we would either sign a state-ment that we would serve for steward's dutyonly or we would accept a discharge." 31 Thisnews, in the words of "Hashmark" Johnson,was greeted with "absolute consternation," andthe majority of black general duty Marines"were determined to get out if need be ratherthan accept 32 There was vehement opposi-tion to the proposed move, opposition thatreached into influential black circles in


Washington, and the forced transfers or dis-charges never materialized. At Montford Pointnobody signed up for steward's duty, and asone NCO recalled "we just waited to see whatthe hell was going to happen and it fadedaway." n

The proposed reduction in the numbers ofblack Marines brought about a new allocationof personnel. Port Chicago was scheduled toreceive 120 men during the summer of 1947.In view of Navy opposition that had surfacedtowards the assignment of blacks to Earle, NewJersey, a substitution was made of the 92-man2d Guard Company, Marine Barracks, NavalShipyard, Brooklyn, New York, a security de-tachment for the naval installations of Ba-yonne, New Jersey. FMF ground forces were tobe two medium depot companies, one lightdepot company, and one depot platoon, for atotal of 579 men. Training activities atMontford Point, including 180 recruits intraining (60 a month), would take 337.Nonavailables would take 98, for a grand totalof 1,226 general duty Marines. The removalfrom McAlester and the replacement of whitesby blacks in the guard company at Bayonnewere both to take place in July.34 -

On 18 June 1947, the plan for assignment ofblack Marines to Port Chicago was revoked.35On the same day the Commandant ap-proached the Navy about the possibility of as-signing blacks to the Marine Barracks, NavalAmmunition Depot, Hingham, Massachusettsand to the Marine Barracks, Naval Ammuni-tion Depot, Fort Mifflin, Pennsylvania.36 Ac-tion was deferred at the same time on theproposed assignment of black Marines to the2d Guard Company at Bayonne.37

The report from Fort Mifflin indicated thatthe assignment of black Marines was feasible. Itwas suggested that a white first sergeant andfour staff sergeants be retained to furnishsupervision and that the replacement of cer-tain key personnel be an overlapping proce-dure. Still, this was not a large detachment, asthe table of organization provided for just twoofficers and 48 enlisted men.38

Numerous objections were received on theproposal to station black Marines at theHingham ammunition depot. The command-ing officer was greatly concerned with the needfor skilled fire fighters and implied that blackMarines might not have "the suitability oradaptability." He further pointed out that thesurrounding communities were almost corn-

pletely white, affording virtually no recreation,housing, or other welfare facilities. A third ob-jection was that since this was a restricted resi-dential area and a major summer beach resortfor New England, "the assignment of NegroMarines to this command would have very ad-verse effect on the civilian population whichwould be detrimental to the Marine Corps andthe Naval Service."

On 10 July 1947, the Commander, NavalBase, New York, reversed the decision to sendblack Marines to Bayonne, and advocated theirbeing stationed at Earle, as presenting "lessproblems and difficulties than at any otherNaval activity." This post could utilize the ser-vices of up to 175 men.4° A new target date of15 August was suggested for the change fromMcAlester to Earle and Fort Mifflin. TheCommandant approved of this but turned"thumbs down" on the initiation of active in-quiry leading to the possible assignment ofblack troops to the Marine Barracks, NavalOperating Base, Trinidad, British West In-dies.4'

The Marine Corps hardly had time to con-gratulate itself on finally solving its problemwhen a letter came from the Chief of theBureau of Ordnance through the Chief ofNaval Operations asking for the retention ofthe present Marine detachment at Earle andthe cancellation of orders assigning blackMarines to the ammunition depot. The Navysaid that a recent decision to handle am-monium nitrate at Earle had so changed thesituation as to make it unwise to relieve thepresent trained detachment. The situation wasfurther complicated by the introduction ofcontract civilian stevedores and by the plannedmixing of Army MPs (white) with the Marinedetachment which would involve the use of thesame barracks and mess.42

General Vandegrift revoked the plannedtransfer to Earle on 20 August 1947, leavingthe transfer from McAlester to Fort Mifflinunchanged.43 Eight days later, the Division ofPlans and Polices came up with the suggestionthat the Marine Barracks, Naval Supply Depot,Scotia, New York, be made a black post, pro-viding billets for 54 men. It was also planned toprovide 170 additional billets by the assign-ment of black Marines to the Marine Barracks,Naval Ammunition Depot, Lualualei, Oahu,Hawaii.44

The word from Hawaii was favorable, butthe Navy objected to the use of black Marines

BETWEEN THE WARS 53

Master Sergeant Gilbert H. "Hashmark" Johnson, sergeantmajor of Montford Po?nt Camp in 1948, watches Private JohnW. Davic cut a stencilfor a camp order. (USMC Photo 505211).

at Scotia as "weakening of the local public rela-tions image now held by the Navy." Furtherobjections were to the joint billeting of 25Marine Graves Registration Escorts (white);the letter stated that the use of black Marinesfor Marine firing squads for the funerals ofwar dead would be "undesirable" and pointedout that the local black population was quitesmall, making for extremely limited recrea-tional and social opportunities for blacktroops. n

The first transfer was effected on 14 Sep-tember 1947 when a mass change of personnelwas made at McAlester, with 112 black Marinesbeing transferred back to Montford Point. Onthe same day, 50 men were sent fromMontford to replace the white Marines at FortMifflin.

A new set of decisions was reached by theMarine Corps on 19 November 1947 whenGeneral Vandegrift approved: (1) the reopen-ing of black enlistments at the rate of 40 amonth; (2) the processing of these recruits atMontford Point; (3) the assignment of a blackenlisted complement to the barracks at Earle,New Jersey, on or about 1 February 1948; and(4) the assignment a black barracks detachmentto the Naval Ammunition Depot at Lualualeion or about 1 December 1948.46

The Navy Bureau of Ordnance again ob-jected to the assignment of blacks to Earle, but

the Chief of Naval Operations supported theCommandant's decision with a letter conclud-ing: "A preponderance of factors indicates nopractical action other than the effectuation ofthe subject assignment." The transfer toEarle took place on 30 January 1948 when 138black enlisted men reported on board. A masstransfer out of white troops took place on 6February, leaving white officers, headed byMajor Bennett G. Powers, and a cadre of whiteNCOs. These later were later replaced by blackNCOs of comparable rank.

Finally, with decisions reached as to the loca-tions of the guard detachments, an assignmentschedule for 968 general duty black Marineswas drafted. Five small depot units would ac-count for 360 men. The barracks at Earle, FortMifflin, and Lualualei would account for 337men, Montford Point would take 134, with 10in specialist schools, and 30 recruits in training,and 97 men would be non-available. The totalallotted for steward's duty was 420, making thetotal authorized black Marine strength 1,388men.

The Marine Corps had made an honest ef-fort to find posts to which it could assign blacksin segregated units. The cutback in strength ofthe Corps overall actually advanced the causeof integration because it was becoming increas-ingly apparent that the maintenance of sepa-rate training facilities was uneconomical. Thedifficulty of finding acceptable duty stationsfor black units undoubtedly contributedfurther to the ultimate solution to the problem,the end of segregation. The final impetus wasto come from the White House.

Truman and Integration

A push away from segregation in the ArmedForces and towards integration was furnishedby the organization on 23 November 1947 ofthe Committee Against Jim Crow in MilitaryService and Training. The two most promi-nent leaders were A. Philip Randolph, presi-dent of the Brotherhood of Sleeping CarPorters, and Grant Reynolds, formerly a Re-publican city councilman from Harlem. Head-quarters for the new committee was the NewYork union office of the Sleeping Car Porters.The basic principle implied in the organiza-tion's title received strong support from blackcitizens and the black press.48

The climate was right to provide effectivepolitical pressure against segregation because

I ''I'- II4

SiC


President Harry Truman, on the recommen-dation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was ready topropose the imposition of a peacetime draft.On 17 March 1948, he asked Congress to enactsuch legislation. Just five days later, Mr. Ran-dolph led a delegation to the White Housewhere he reportedly told the President thatblacks did not want "to shoulder a gun to fightfor democracy abroad unless they get democ-racy at home."

When the public portions of the hearings onthe draft bill were reached, Mr. Randolph chal-lenged the Senate Armed Services Committeewith his statement: "Today I would like tomake it clear to this committee and throughyou to Congress and the American people thatpassage now of a Jim Crow draft may onlyresult in mass civil disobedience." 50 Althoughit was approved by many blacks, the Randolphdeclaration did not go unchallenged. AtMontford Point, now-titled Master Sergeant"Hashmark" Johnson wrote a long letter toPresident Truman on 31 March taking excep-tion to Mr. Randolph's extreme position, call-ing it "biased and dangerous." He assured thePresident "that whatever crisis comes, foreignor domestic, the American Negro will be inthere pitching for all he is worth, alongsideother fellow Americans." His letter, forwardedthrough channels, reached the President whoreplied that he had read it "with a great deal ofinterest." '

Sergeant Johnson had not been demoted.His new rank was the result of a sweepingchange of designations. On 1 December 1946,the Marine Corps had done away with the mu!-tiplicity of enlisted rank titles that had grownup during the war and the years before andsettled on one title for each of the seven en-listed pay grades: Master Sergeant; TechnicalSergeant; Staff Sergeant; Sergeant; Corporal;Private First Class; and Private. Sergeant MajorJohnson, for example, became a mastersergeant but still retained the appointment ofsergeant major.

When the new peacetime draft act wassigned into law on 24 June 1948, PresidentTruman was not long in following it with ananti-discrimination order. After the Demo-cratic National Convention in July which fea-tured a dramatic walkout of southern delegatesfollowing a losing battle over a liberal civilrights plank, the President promulgatedExecutive Order 9981 on 26 July 1948 whichbanned color bias in the Armed Services. A

seven man board to be named later, and titled"President's Committee on Equality Of Treat-ment and Opportunity in the Armed Services,"was to investigate rules and practises to see ifchanges should be made. Mr. Truman assuredreporters on 29 July that racial segregationwould eventually be abolished in all services.52

The President announced the membershipof his committee on 18 September 1948. Bestknown as the "Fahy Committee" after itschairman, former U.S. Solicitor GeneralCharles H. Fahy, it included A. J. Donahue,Dwight R. G. Palmer, Charles Luckman, WI!-ham E. Stevenson, Lester Granger, and JohnA. Sengstacke as members.53 The committeeconducted its inquiries with a spirit of under-standing and cooperation with the Armed Ser-vices, but still it prodded and prompted moreeffective compliance with existing regulationswhich if conscientiously carried out would haveended segregation in time. A particular targetwas all-black units and the philosophy that keptthem in being. When the committee made itsreport to the President in 1950 just prior to theoutbreak of the Korean War, Time magazinecommented on its findings:

The committee did not argue the moral or sociolog-ical aspects of the case. It based its arguments onefficiency. There were bright Negroes and there weredumb ones, just like white men. To refuse ajob to anintelligent or skilled Negro was simply a waste ofmanpower. Concentration of unskilled Negroes insegregted units just multiplied their inefficiency.54

Some officers at Marine Corps Headquar-ters felt rather strongly that it was not theMarine Corps place to lead the fight againstsegregation. On 17 March 1949, the Comman-dant, General Clifton D. Cates, objected to aproposed directive of the Armed Forces Per-sonnel Policy Board, another civilian reviewpanel, which advocated a policy of equality oftreatment and opportunity for all persons inthe Armed Forces without regard to race,color, religion, or national origin.

General Cates first indicated that he thoughtthe board had exceeded its authority in de-veloping the draft directive. It was his feelingthat the National Military Establishment couldnot "be an agency for experimentation in civilliberty without detriment to its ability to main-tain the efficiency and high state of readinessso essential to national defense." The Com-mandant supported the principle that "alloca-tion of personnel on a qualitative and quantita-tive basis to meet the needs of the Armed

BETWEEN THE WARS 55

Forces should be made without regard to race,color, religion or national origin," but pro-tested vigorously that:

The problem of segregation is not the responsibilityof the Armed Forces but is a problem of the nation.Changing national policy in this respect through theArmed Forces is a dangerous path to pursue in asmuch as it affects the ability of the National MilitaryEstablishment to fulfill its mission . . . Should thetime arise that non-segregation, and this term appliesto white as well as negro, is accepted as a custom of thenation, this policy can be adopted without detrimentby the National Military Establishment." i

Like General Holcomb's remarks in 1942 be-fore blacks entered the Marine Corps, GeneralCates' opinions had little effect upon thecourse of change. On 20 April 1949, Secretaryof Defense Louis Johnson ordered the ArmedServices to end racial discrimination in linewith President Truman's Executive Order9981. The Secretary's directive provided that"all individuals, regardless of race, will be ac-corded equal opportunity for appointment,advancement, professional improvement,promotion." Segregated units could continuebut on a permissive rather than a mandatorybasis.56

Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthewsissued ALNAV 49—447 on 23 June 1949 whichwas a landmark declaration of racial policy inthe Navy and the Marine Corps, dealing as itdid with racial segregation as well as discrimi-nation. The pertinent portions read:

2. It is the policy of the Navy Department thatthere shall be equality of treatment and opportunityfor all persons in the Navy and Marine Corps withoutregard to race, color, religion, or national origin.

3. In their attitude and day-to-day conduct of af-fairs, officers and enlisted personnel of the Navy andMarine Corps shall adhere rigidly and impartially tothe Navy Regulations, in which no distinction is madebetween individuals wearing the uniform of these ser-vices.

4. All personnel will be enlisted or appointed,trained, advanced or promoted, assigned duty, andadministered in all respects without regard to race,color, religion, or national origin.

5. In the utilization of housing, messing, berthing,and other facilities, no special or unusual provisionswill be made for the accomodation of any minorityrace.57

A few months later, on 18 November 1949,the Marine Corps issued a memorandum ofguidance to commanders establishing policyregarding black Marines. It revoked all previ-ous policy statements including those prohibit-ing mixed units. However, all black units of

platoon strength or larger, both regular andreserve, were to be continued. Commanders oforganized reserve units could accept or rejectmen for their unit, but not on the basis of race,color, religion, or national origin. Most impor-tant (and this appears to be the official begin-ning of integration in the Marine Corps), itstated: "Individual negro Marines will be as-signed in accordance with MOS [Military Oc-cupational Specialty] to vacancies in any unitwhere their services can be effectivelyutilized." 58

The memorandum actually postdated theend of Montford Point as a segregated facilityand the dispersal of its men to both mixed andblack units. In practice, the process of desegre-gation had begun in the Marine Corps on agradual, local, and ad hoc basis well before theofficial word filtered down.

The End In Sight

Athletic teams, in the Marine Corps as incivilian life, were one of the first means ofintegration in the postwar period. At CampLejeune black all stars from the MontfordPoint teams which played in camp intra-unitcompetition were selected to play on campteams which engaged in inter-service play. Inthe 1947—1948 season, the Montford Pointbasketball team won the intra-unit competitionand some of its star members became part ofthe team that represented Camp Lejeune. Inother sports, the athletic abilities of some blackMarines won them a place on other campteams, particularly in track, football, and box-ing. Boxing had been an integrated sport over-seas during the war and it continued to be oneafter the fighting ended; it was foolish to denymen a place on the team on the basis of racewhen Montford Point harbored men likeSergeant Charles W. Riggs, formerly of the35th Marine Depot Company, who had beenthe All Service Heavyweight Champion ofPacific Ocean Areas, Forward, on Guam.59

Although black Marines continued to bequartered on a segregated basis, increasingnumbers of blacks began to work side by sidewith whites on the basis of common militaryoccupational specialities. Letter of Instruction421 of 20 March 1943, which had directed thatno black Marines would be placed in positionswhere they would command whites, was re-cinded on 14 February 1946.60 As the naturalcourse of events evolved, situations arose


where black NCOs of necessity were placed inthe position where they were responsible forgiving orders to white Marines junior to them.Such events were not commonplace but theydid occur, and it was prejudicial to discipline toallow any exception to the general rules ofmilitary precedence and order.

The number of black Marines was so rela-tively small that it became uneconomical in theaustere postwar period to continue separatetraining facilities for specialists at MontfordPoint. Stewards, cooks, bakers, and eventuallyall specialists were trained at Camp Lejeuneschools, in mixed classes for the most part. Thenecessary recruit influx to maintain thenumber of blacks authorized on active dutywas small and recruit training was switched toParris Island in the spring of 1949 as a meas-re of efficiency and economy. At first therewere separate black platoons under black DIs,but by fall the decision was made to effectcomplete integration.

The Commanding General, Marine CorpsRecruit Depot, Parris Island, during thisperiod was Major General Alfred H. Noble,who recalled in an oral history interview:

Also while I was there we integrated for the firsttime the black people into the Marine Corps recruitplatoons right with the white trainees. This was doneas soon as they arrived at Parris Island. I believe I saidsome time ago that before that time we would wait forthe number of colored troops to build up to theproper size of a recruit platoon and then they trainedas a separate unit. While I was there the NCO clubsalso were opened up to the colored non-commissionedofficers. This innovation not only produced no un-favorable reaction among the Marines, but it also hadno unfavorable reaction among the civilian citizens ofSouth Carolina in the vicinity. Of course, I consultedthe civilian leaders first and told them what I wasgoing to do and got their advice and promises of helpto try and stop any adverse criticism of it. It seemedlike integration was due to take place sooner or lateranyway in this country, certainly in the Armed Forces,and I thought that it should take place in the ArmedForces first.6'

General Noble's remarks indicate that- theopposition to integration in the Marine Corpswas by no means universal at the highest levels.Many Marines, white and black, shared hisviews that the Armed Forces were in a uniqueposition to promote desegregation. But therewere plenty of white Marines of all ranks whopreferred the racial status quo and the treat-ment by some of these men of the first blackregular officer was described by him as "un-sympathetic." 62

John E. Rudder, born in Paducah, Ken-tucky, served in the 51st Defense Battalionafter his enlistment in June 1943 and wasselected for the V—12 program, attending Pur-due University. After his discharge in 1946, hecontinued at Purdue as a regular NROTC(Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps) mid-shipman destined for a regular commission. InJune 1948, he was appointed a second lieuten-ant, USMC, and in September started the BasicSchool course for new officers. Upon recon-sideration of his circumstances, LieutenantRudder decided to resign his commission, stat-ing to a black reporter that his reason "could bedescribed as religious scruples." 63 He washonorably discharged on 1 April 1949.

At the same time Rudder was appointed,June 1948, William K. Jenkins from Elizebeth,New Jersey, a contract NROTC graduate fromIllinois Polytechnic Institute and a Navy vet-eran of World War II, was commissioned areserve second lieutenant and assigned to inac-tive duty. Lieutenant Jenkins, in 1973 a reservelieutenant colonel, was called to active duty inthe Korean War, where he became the firstblack officer to lead Marines in combat as botha weapons and a rifle platoon commander withCompany B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.

Another segregation barrier was broken in1949 when the first black women enlisted inthe Marine Corps. During World War II, thelack of separate housing facilities, plus the factthat white Women Reserves early filled the au-thorized complement for women acted againstblacks being enlisted. On the passage of theWomen's Armed Services Integration Act of12 June 1948, women became a part of theregular Marine Corps for the first time.64 InNovember, the first officers and enlistedwomen, all veterans of World War II service,were sworn in as regulars and provisions weremade for limited recruiting. On 8 March 1949,Mr. A. Philip Randolph, acting for the Com-mittee Against Jim Crow, directed a questionto the Commandant: "We should like to ascer-tain if Negro women were eligible to join theMarines and if so whether on a basis of non-segregation." 65 General Cates' reply two dayslater said: "If qualified for enlistment, negrowomen will be accepted on the same basis asother applicants." 66

Six months later on 8 September 1949 thefirst black woman Marine, Annie E. Graham,enlisted at Detroit, Michigan, and on the fol-lowing day Ann E. Lamb joined at New York

BETWEEN THE WARS 57

Warrant Officer Annie L. Grimes, the third black woman to enlist in the Marine Corps in 1950, is shown in 1968 with Colonel BarbaraJ. Bishop, Director of Women Marines. (US MC Photo A 416512).

City. The two women reported to Parris Islandon 10 September and went through boot camptogether with Platoon 5—A of the 3d RecruitTraining Battalion. Both subsequently re-ported for duty at Headquarters MarineCorps. The third black woman to join, AnnieL. Grimes of Chicago, who was destined tobecome a chief warrant officer later in hercareer, joined and went to boot camp in Feb-ruary 1950. From the beginning, the recep-tion, training, and housing of black womenMarines was completely integrated.

The treatment accorded black women wasundoubtedly a reflection of what was happen-ing elsewhere in the Corps. Not all black gen-eral duty Marines in 1949 were being assignedto segregated units, scattered individualsbegan to show up on the rolls of previouslyall-white commands in accordance with theirMOSs. But the real turning point away fromsegregated units awaited the closing of

Montford Point Camp as a black trainingcenter and barracks area.

The strength of the troops in the camp re-mained about the same during 1949, roughlysix officers and 300 enlisted men. Major FrankW. Ferguson, by then the camp commander,also doubled in brass as the supply officer.Ferguson, a former quartermaster clerk whohad fought and been captured at Corregidor,had served at Montford Point since March1946 and was destined to preside over the dis-solution of the segregated facility.67 On 9 Sep-tember 1949, Headquarters Company,Montford Point Camp was deactivated and theremaining 242 officers and men on the rollswere transferred, for the most part to otherCamp Lejeune units.

The deactivation marked the end of an erafor black Marines; it came just a little overseven years after the first boots had reportedfor training. To some black Marines it meant


the end of an ordered and familiar existencewhere they were sure of coming "home" toMontfoi'd Point periodically. One veteran,Edgar R. Huff, then a master sergeant, ex-pressed this view when he commented on theeffect of the official advent of integration, re-calling:

that was a sad day, it was a black day, a blackmark as far as I'm concerned. Myself, and to myknowledge the majority of black Marines . . . wewanted to stay together, we had our own camp, wehad our own resources, and we were taken care of,holding our own we called it at that time, and didn'tcare to go anyplace. I was sorry to see it happen.68

From a somewhat different point of view,"Hashmark" Johnson, who at the timeMontford Point closed down was sergeantmajor of the barracks at Earle, New Jersey,

commented on the attitude of the blackMarines towards integration:

Some of them saw it as a gradual phasing out of theNegro Marine and others saw it as an opportunity toshow they were equal in proficiency and all otherqualifications to their white counterparts. Some wel-comed the opportunity and others were just a bitscared of it.69

Scared, pleased, unhappy, or indifferent,black Marines had at last achieved a goal thatmany people both inside and outside theMarine Corps had worked for. There were stillall-black units in the Corps, but there wereintegrated units as well, and the trend was ir-reversibly towards a completely integratedMarine Corps. The outbreak of the KoreanWar measurably accelerated the desegregationprocess.

CHAPTER 6

A DECADE OF INTEGRATION

On 30 June 1950, immediately following theoutbreak of the Korean War, there were 1,502black Marines on active duty, 1,075 on generalduty assignments and 427 serving as stew-ards.1 In overall strength the Marine Corpsstood at 74,279, its post-World War II low.2Three years later, as the war was drawing to aclose, 14,731 black Marines were on activeduty, only 538 of whom were stewards. Theoverall strength of the Marine Corps was249,219, its peak for the Korean War.3 Thegrowth in the number of black Marines fromtwo percent of the Corp's strength to six per-cent accurately reflected the end of segrega-tion. Certainly the manpower demands of thewar hastened the change, but the combat per-formance of black Marines in integrated unitsdid nothing to lessen the pace.

In July 1950, a thin sprinkling of blacks wentOut to Korea with the first units to see combatin the Pusan Perimeter, the 1st ProvisionalMarine Brigade, which included the 5thMarines and Marine Aircraft Group 33. Stillmore men followed in August and Septemberwhen the 1st Marine Division and the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing deployed to take part inthe amphibious assault at Inchon and the cap-ture of Seoul. Men from barracks detach-ments, including those at Earle, Ft. Mifflin,and Lualualei, from 2d Marine Division units,and from virtually every post and station in theMarine Corps were used to bring the deployedunits up to war strength. Typically, the 6thMarines of the 2d Division, augmented by re-called reservists and men from the supportingestablishment, was used as a nucleus to formthe 7th Marines of the 1st Division. The regi-mental commander, Colonel Homer A. Litz-enberg, Jr., recalled, after his men had foughttheir way out of the Chosin Reservoir trap, that"one of the miscellaneous units he received"when he activated the 7th Marines "was a54-man Negro servjce unit which was inte-grated throughout the command." He com-mented to the press:

Never Once did any color problem botherus . . . It just wasn't any problem. We had oneNegro sergeant in command of an all-white squad andthere was another—with a graves registration unit—who was one of the finest Marines I've ever seen.4

These remarks coming from one of theCorps distinguished combat leaders, a highlydecorated former enlisted man with nearly 30years of active service,5 were echoed by thedivision commander, then Major GeneralOliver P. Smith. In an oral history memoir ofhis career, the general was asked if his divisionwas integrated. He replied:

Oh yes, I had a thousand Negroes, and we had noracial troubles. The men did whatever they were qual-ified to do. There were communicators, there werecooks, there were truck drivers, there were plaininfantry_they did everything, and they did a goodjob because they were integrated, and they were withgood people . . . Two of these Negroes got the NavyCross. There was no fooling; they were real citations,and there were plenty of Silvers Stars and BronzeStars, and what have you. And I had no complaint ontheir performance of duty.6

The mention of the Navy Cross awards high-lights a peculiar problem that arises when thestory of black Marines in the Korean War isresearched. Short of the lengthy task of match-ing up the individual record books of everyrecipient of a medal with his citation, there isno way of determining which of these men wasblack. Records pertaining to black Marines,aside from strength and deployment statistics,are virtually nonexistent. With the end ofsegregation, black Marines merged into themainstream of Marine Corps experience.

Throughout much of the Korean War andthe decade that followed, the trace of blackMarines is extremely hard to follow. There areno pertinent unit records for there were noblack units. Moreover, there was a consciouspolicy of cutting down on the number andvariety of reports which included race as a re-porting element. In June of 1953, there were30 such records required by various Depart-

59

BLACKS IN THE MARINE CORPS60

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ment of Defense agencies; 17 of these wereeliminated. By April 1954 the number ofrecords with a racial reporting element wasdown to 10. Many of these few were requiredonly to ensure that personnel assignmentswere equitably made.7 In large part, therefore,the narrative thread of the story of blackMarines in the 1950s has been extracted fromthe experiences and reminiscences of a fewrepresentative officers and men whose careersspanned these years. Fortunately, they wereperceptive observers as well as being intimatelya part of the process of change.

Combat In Korea

Among the various scattered records ofblack Marines there is an occasional humaninterest story that highlights the advent of in-tegration. On 5 December 1949, a black WorldWar II veteran, former Corporal WalterChandler, wrote to Headquarters MarineCorps from his home in Addyston, Ohio ask-ing if the Marine Corps' recruiting advertise-ments broadcast over the radio were meant forwhites only or for any Americans able and wil-ling to serve. If blacks were being accepted, hewanted to recommend a young man by thename of Donald Woody as a potential Marine.In reply, Headquarters asked Mr. Woody tocontact the local recruiter in Cincinnati, Ohio;if found qualified he would be welcome.8 Thesequel is found in the casualty files of Head-quarters where it is noted the Corporal DonaldWoody served with Company I, 3d Battalion,7th Marines in Korea and was wounded twicein combat.9

Thousands of black Marines matched Cor-poral Woody's experience in fighting side;by-side with white Marines as part of the sameunit. They were needed and they were ac-cepted for what they were. As one young whitelieutenant, Herbert M. Hart, wrote to his col-lege newpaper in late 1952 regarding his bat-talion:

It doesn't make any difference if you are white, red,black, green, or turquoise to the men over here. Norecord is kept by color. When we receive a draft ofmen they are assigned by name and experience on-ly . . . There's no way we can find out a man's coloruntil we see him and by that time he's already in afoxhole, an integral part of his team.'°

As one of Hart's men commented: "Afteryou've been here a while, you'll see that colordoesn't make any difference. It's the guts that

Having fired hu 5 7in in recoi/le.ss r!fle (it C/i iiie.ie Coin man 1stposmtwns, a black Marine gunner headc for ozer mu fare ofInca mning enemy fire. (USMC Photo .4173312).

count." And as the lieutenant observed, "colordoesn't seem to be any register of guts." 11

Certainly he had ample evidence of this inhis own unit. PFC (later Corporal) A C Clark, ashort-statured black automatic riflemen fromMinden, Louisiana serving with Company H,3d Battalion, 5th Marines, won a Silver Star on13 December 1952 for aggressively coveringthe evacuation of two wounded Marines of hiscombat patrol, silencing an enemy machinegun, killing three enemy soldiers, and helpingto evacuate other American casualties althoughwounded twice himself.12 Since PFC Clarkpreviously had been awarded a Bronze Star forrescuing his wounded platoon leader onanother combat patrol in August, he "served"as one of his citations states "to inspire all whoobserved him." 13

There were other black Marines like Clark,recognized combat heroes, and there were leg-ions of those who did their jobs in an unspec-tacular, steady, and efficient manner. The con-tinual flow of replacements soon brought someof the senior black line NCOs to Korea, menwho had been leaders in segregated units and

A DECADE OF INTEGRATION 61


who now took their place in previously all-white units. Master Sergeant Edgar R. Huff,who had been the guard chief of the MarineBarracks at Earle, ended up as gunnerysergeant of Weapons Company, 2d Battalion,1st Marines. Moving into the infantry replace-ment training cycle at Camp Pendleton in June1951, he was platoon commander of a "Zebra"platoon, composed entirely of white staffNCOs, and noted that he "certainly couldn'thave been treated any better than I was" in hisfirst experience in an integrated outfit.'4 Whenhe arrived at his battalion's lines on the eastcentral front in Korea, he found himself theonly black man in his company and an object ofsome awe and speculation as he stood about sixfoot, five inches tall and was built along thelines of a professional football lineman. In hiswords:

I decided the first thing for me to do was to call mycompany together and let them see this monster thatthey had been hearing about [I told them] that Iwas the company gunnery sergeant, and 1 wantedthem to know that under all circumstances I was thecompany gunnery sergeant, not the figurehead, butthe company gunnery sergeant, and they understoodthat IS

Huff's experience of being the only blackMarine in a company-sized unit was not un-common in 1950 and 1951, but it became farless so as the war continued. Over 10,000blacks joined the Corps between June 1951and July 1952 and many of these men reachedKorea to serve in combat.'6 Scattered through-out the 1st Division and 1st Wing, they filledthe billets for which their training and experi-ence fitted them, and they earned the respectof their fellow Marines in direct ratio to howwell they did their job. When a veteran NCOlike Master Sergeant Gilbert "Hashmark"Johnson arrived in Korea, he was given a pro-gression of responsible jobs which fitted hisbackground: personnel chief of the 1st ShoreParty Battalion; first sergeant of the battalion'sCompany A; personnel sergeant major of theforward echelon of the 2d Battalion, 1stMarines; and administrative advisor at theHeadquarters of the Korean Marine Corps.Asked ifhe had experienced any problems as asenior black NCO serving in predominantlywhite units, Johnson characteristically said: "Ididn't encounter any difficulty. I accepted eachindividual for what he was and apparently theyaccepted me for what I was." 17

Led a black Marine, a light machine gun squad of CompanD, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines moves up to reinforce the front linesin July 1953. (USMC Photo A173715).

Black Leaders

While there were thousands of black enlistedmen who served in Korea, there was only ahandful of black officers. Lieutenant WilliamK. Jenkins, the first black officer to leadMarines in combat, served as platoon leaderwith Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines in1951—1952. A few other ground officersreached Korea during the fighting and onepilot, Second Lieutenant Frank E. Petersen,Jr.

The first black officer to be commissioned inthe Marine Corps from the Naval AviationCadet Program, Petersen was only the fourthof his race to receive the naval aviator designa-tion. In choosing an aviation career, he wasparticularly inspired by the example of EnsignJesse L. Brown, the first black naval aviator,who was killed while flying close support forthe Marines breaking out from the ChosinReservoir on 4 December 1950. Petersen, fromTopeka, Kansas, enlisted in the Navy after ayear of college and then entered the cadetprogram. Determined to be the first blackMarine pilot, he received both his wings andhis commission at Pensacola on 1 October1952. After advanced flight training in theStates, he reported to Marine Attack Squadron212 in Korea in April 1953. Flying the attackversion Corsair, Petersen completed 64 combat

, .•4 —

:.


missions before the fighting ended, earning aDistinguished Flying Cross and six Air Medals.In 1973 he was the senior black regular officerin the Marine Corps as a lieutenant colonel.'8

Most of the black officers who were commis-sioned during the war were reserves who werereleased to inactive duty after completing anormal tour, but a few like Petersen stayed onto become regulars. Kenneth H. Berthoud, Jr.from New York City, the second officer to re-ceive a regular commission, was a graduate ofLong Island University with a major in biology.A naval reserve hospital corpsman while at-tending school, he entered the Marine Corpsas a candidate for a commission and was desig-nated a second lieutenant in the reserve on 13December 1952 and a regular officer on 13July 1953. Posted overseas to serve as a tankofficer in the 3d Marine Division in Japan, healso served with the 1st Tank Battalion on oc-cupation duty in Korea. Subsequently becom-ing a supply officer, he served in many respon-sible assignments in the logistics field and in1973 was a lieutenant colonel assigned toHeadquarters Marine Corps in the Installa-tions and Logistics Department.19

Another black officer, Hurdle L. Maxwell,enlisted in the Marine Corps during the Ko-rean War after three years at indiana StateTeachers College and was commissioned a re-serve second lieutenant in March 1953 and aregular officer in September after completingThe Basic School at Quantico. Like KennethBerthoud, he served originally as a tank officerwith the 3d and 1st Tank Battalions in Japanand Korea; he later held other staff and com-mand assignments in FMF and supporting es-tablishment units. In January 1969, threemonths after his promotion to lieutenantcolonel, he reported to the 2d Marine Divisionto become the first black officer to commandan infantry battalion, the 1st Battalion, 6thMarines. Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell retiredin 1971 after serving on active duty for over 20years. 20

These few men, and others who slowly fol-lowed them into the Marine Corps to serve aspilots and ground officers in the 1950s, had tohave, of necessity, a special quality of personalintegrity and professional pride. They couldnever be inconspicuous wherever they served;they were, in a real sense, marked men. Theyrepresented black Marines as a group andwhatever they did, however well they per-formed their jobs, was to many men the

First black Marine pilot, Second Lieutenant Frank E. Petersen,Jr., climbs into his Corsair shortly after arriving in Korea zn April1953. (USMC Photo A347177).

measure of what could be expected from blackMarines in leadership positions. Never untilthe Vietnam era more than a small fraction ofone percent of active duty officers, the blackofficers were well aware of their role and theirresponsibilities. There were few situationswhere they could afford to relax and nonewhere they could afford to be average officers.

While all black officers in the 1950s wererelatively junior in rank, there were a numberof blacks in the top enlisted pay grade, mastersergeant, men who had comparable time in theCorps with their white contemporaries. As theyhad in integrated units in combat in Korea,these black NCOs began to fill more and moreleadership positions in peacetime units. One ofthese men was Edgar R. Huff, who was toestablish an unbeatable string of firsts for blackMarines, each one noted with pride by his fel-low blacks who thereafter followed him intocomparable positions.

In September 1952, shortly after he re-turned from Korea, Huff became the gunnerysergeant and then the first sergeant ofWeapons Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Marinesat Camp Lejeune. In February 1954, he be-came the battalion sergeant major, the first


black to hold such a position in an infantrybattalion. In April 1955, he reported to theMarine Barracks, Port Lyautey, Morocco toserve as guard chief. At the end of the year hebecame the barracks sergeant major with therank of sergeant major.

The Marine Corps had determined in 1955to reinstitute the actual ranks of first sergeantand sergeant major within the top pay grade.Selection boards sat at Headquarters MarineCorps to pick the men who would hold bothranks from the master sergeants with combatand combat support occupational specialties.Huff was the only black Marine among thoseselected to both first sergeant and sergeantmajor. On 31 December 1955, he became asergeant major, a rank he was to hold on activeduty for almost 17 years until he was the seniorsergeant major in point of service in theMarine Corps. As a revealing side light toHuffs promotion, the white master sergeantwho had been sergeant major at Port Lyauteyand who had not been selected for the higherrank indicated that he would rather retire thanserve under a black man. The commandingofficer of the barracks immediately contactedHeadquarters Marine Corps, which adjudgedthe master sergeant's usefulness to the MarineCorps had ended and retired him as soon as hecould be returned to the United States.21 Boththe promotion and the retirement were a farcry from the days of segregation.

Huff went on in later assignments in the1950s and early 1960s to become regimentalsergeant major of the 2d Force Service Regi-ment at Camp Lejeune (1957—59), commandsergeant major of Landing Force TrainingCommand, Atlantic in Norfolk (1959—60), andregimental sergeant major of 3d Force ServiceRegiment on Okinawa (1961—62). His path toadvancement was not always smooth and thecooperation received from some white officersand NCOs was not always exemplary for thefirst black sergeant major in every post he oc-cupied. He was to recall later regarding hisinitial service in the 2d Force Service Regimentthat "I did everything, bit my tongue till itscarred the bottom of my stomach, to get alongwith these people and also maintain the dignityof the position I held . . . And it was verydifficult for me to do this." 22 But he had thewhole-hearted support of his commanding of-ficer, Colonel Harlan C. Cooper, a NavalAcademy graduate (Class of 1931) who hadcommanded the 1st Base Depot and the 16th

Field Depot during World War JJ23 Cooper•soon made it evident to all concerned thatSergeant Major Huff was the regimentalsergeant major and spoke with the colOnel'sauthority in all matters concerning the enlistedmen of the regiment.

There were many white commanding offi-cers and senior NCOs like Colonel Cooper,men who were determined to make integrationwork. It was the official Marine Corps policy,often expressed in some variation of the catchphrase "every Marine is a green Marine." If, inretrospect, this attitude seems an oversimplifi-cation of a very complex problem, it was apervading philosophy at the time. Althoughsome white Marines harbored personal reser-vations and prejudices about integration, andothers indulged in foot-dragging and showedthinly-masked hostility toward the effort, themain thrust of most Marines was toward theofficial goal.

In a sense, while Sergeant Major Huff ledthe way in many responsible senior enlistedassignments, his experiences were shared byother regular black line NCOs. They too hadtheir chances to fill important billets that re-quired judgement, maturity, and leadership.During most of the years following the Koreanwar, the number of black Marines stayedaround 12—13,000 men and women while theenlisted strength of the Corps overall fluc-tuated from 205,275 (1954) to a low of 154,242(1960).24 Although the number of blacks re-mained below 10 percent, the ratio was sub-stantially higher than it had been in the pre-Korea years. Many of these Marines hadserved since World War II and risen to the toppay grades. They were routinely assigned tothe positions to which their rank and seniorityentitled them. It became common for bothblack and white Marines to have blacks as theirsenior NCOs. The measure of a Marine wasslowly but surely becoming how well he did hisjob, not what color his skin was.

Changing Times

Within the Marine Corps, the last vestige ofmilitary segregation at the end of the KoreanWar lay in the Stewards' Branch. The blackMarines assigned to stewards' duty were stillrecruited under Steward Duty Only enlistmentcontracts or were augmented by volunteersfrom general duty blacks. There was a strongfeeling among many of the stewards that this


volunteering was rigged and that men wereassigned, presumably whenever the needarose, by manipulating their general classifica-tion test scores. Investigation showed there wasat least some support for the truth of thisrumor in local instances.25 For many youngblacks, there was a stigma attached to being anofficers' steward; some obviously felt their po-sition was subject to ridicule, particularly byother blacks. They did not like the thought ofbeing irrevocably confined to one specialty, aspecialty that was itself limited to blacks.

Two senior black steward NCOs, TechnicalSergeants James E. Johnson and LeoMcDowell, had both made a number of sugges-

dons to higher headquarters during the early50s regarding the improvement of the qualityof mess service and the quality of service lifefor stewards. In the spring of 1953, the Quar-termaster General of the Marine Corps, MajorGeneral W. P. T. Hill, called the two men toHeadquarters Marine Corps to listen to whatthey had to say. He gave them a chance to acton their recommendations and appointedthem members of a Steward Inspection andDemonstration Team, later joined by whiteWarrant Officer Perry S. Brenton, whichbegan to tour east and west coast officers'messes after developing a syllabus at CampLejeune. Aside from teaching advanced

Vice Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, the Honorable James E. Johnson, a retired Marine chief warrant officer (middle), sitswith General Lewis W. Walt, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Mr. Richard L. Dalton, President of the Mootford PointMarine Association, at a parade in Mr. Johnson's honor at the Marine Barracks, Washington in 1969. (USMC Photo .1419277).

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I

V.


techniques of mess cooking, service, and man-agement, the two blacks inquired deeply intothe living conditions and motivations of themen with whom they talked. They found thatmany stewards were dissatisfied with what theyconsidered overly-long working hours, limitedchances for advancement and in-service educa-tion, and, particularly, with the image of theStewards' Branch as a place where they were"condemned" to serve as long as they wereMarines.

Both Johnson and McDowell emphasizedthe positive side of stewards' duty, the chanceof learning a trade that was a salable commod-ity in civilian life. They pointed out that ste-wards often had the opportunity to improve ontheir service pay. As Johnson noted:

those young men who were stewards were ableto make extra money because they had the skills. Theywere good bartenders and they always made extramoney. They were good waiters and they could go toany restaurant and the)' made money. They weregood caterers; they made extra money when theywent out.26

Setting an example of their own, both NCOswere heavily involved in off-duty educationalcourses and encouraged the black stewards todo the same after making sure through theirefforts that adequate time was available to themen for this purpose.

Johnson, a most unusual man with a tre-mendous reservoir of talents, was also to .showthat it was really possible to advance as a resultof doing a steward's job in a superior fashion.He was appointed a warrant officer in 1960 inthe food administration field. He went on tohold supply and administrative billets, continu-ing all the while to increase his educationalbackground. Shortly after he retired as a chiefwarrant officer in July 1965, he received hisbachelor of arts degree, later to be joined by adegree of master of arts; he then went on towork for both juris doctor and doctor ofphilosophy degrees. In civilian life, he becamein turn a very successful insurance salesman,the California State Commissioner of VeteransAffairs, the Vice Chairman of the Federal CivilService Commission, and the Assistant Secre-tary of the Navy for Manpower and ReserveAffairs. All this was accomplished in the spaceof eight years by a man who had entered asegregated Marine Corps in 1944 as a privatewith a record book stamped "Colored" and anenlistment contract "Steward Duty Only."

Among the recommendations forwarded to

General Hill by the Brenton-Johnson-McDowell team was one that emerged in afavorable climate in 1954—to eliminate Ste-ward Duty Only enlistments. The Secretary ofthe Navy did this for both the Navy and theMarine Corps on 1 March 1954.27 The teamalso felt strongly that men who wanted to getout of the Stewards' Branch into other fields inthe Marine Corps should have the opportunityto do so. When this came to pass, despite direpredictions of a wholesale exodus of black ste-wards, only 5-10 percent of the men opted fortransfer. The ultimate step was to integrate thesteward service field and this began to happenwhile Major General Joseph C. Burger com-manded Camp Lejeune in 1956_57.28 As whitestewards increased in number the very humanreaction of some black stewards was to try tohang on to choice jobs that they had. For nowthese positions were viewed in a different light.As then Warrant Officer Johnson later ob-served about the black stewards:

they felt they were being discriminated againstbecause they were all black. That was the real hang-up, you see. But the moment they opened it [stewards'duty], they said, "0. K., line. It's all right." Becausetheir feeling was that if it was so good, why don't youhave some of the whites in it.29

The gradual change in the image of stew-ards' duty and the attitude toward it by bothblack and white Marines was in a way a reflec-tion of the immense social revolution that hadits start in the 1950s. Like the integration of theStewards' Branch, the racial integration ofmany other aspects of American life cameabout both as the result of evolutiorial changeand governmental intervention. Within theMarine Corps, there was no question that offi-cial policy called for the end of segregation, butthe off-duty actions and attitudes of manywhite Marines belied this. These men were theproducts of home backgrounds where legal ordefacto segregation was a way of life and theyeither approved of or went along with localcustoms and laws which demanded segregationin schools, housing, public places, and trans-portation facilities.

An inequitable situation existed in whichblack and white Marines served side by side inthe ranks, but their children were separated inschools both on post and off. Off-base housingwas often segregated and military quartersareas tended to be segregated too, movietheaters, even some on base, had separate ra-cial seating areas, and commercial buses serv-


ing military posts in the South required blacksto sit in the rear. A black officer or enlistedman in Jacksonville, North Carolina, for in-stance, could be and was barred from normalcivilian activities which were open to any oftheir white counterparts. This was an un-healthy situation, one which would take manyyears to change, but such change was indeedcoming.

In a monumental decision that had far-ranging repercussions, the Supreme Courtruled on 17 May 1954 that racial segregation inpublic schools was unconstitutional. The deci-sion noted that: "Separate educational facilitiesare inherently unequal." 30 Even before thisruling was published, the Secretary of Defense,Charles E. Wilson, had ordered the ArmedForces to end school desegregation on militaryposts by 1 September 1955.' If necessary, theFederal Government would operate theschools if local school districts did not complywith the order.

Subsequent rulings by the Supreme Court incases which challenged. the "separate butequal" doctrine, which had the force of law inthe South and of custom in many other areasof the country, barred segregation in publicrecreational facilities (1955) and on board pub-lic transport vehicles (1956).32 Civil rights billswere passed by the Congress in 1957 and 1960which were intended to ensure blacks a right tovote and to set up enforcement means thatwould guarantee unfettered elections.33

There was vehement and all too often vio-lent opposition to the end of legal segregationin many parts of the country. No amount oflegislation or court rulings or governmentedicts could change long-held racial biasesovernight. The pace of integration was oftenhalting in the decade following the KoreanWar as legal challenges and illegal subterfugeswere combined by white leaders to slow pro-ceedings. Many American blacks, tired of"second-class citizen" status, were understand-ably impatient to experience the substance ofmeaningful integration. Black leaders couldsuddenly count on newly awakened racialawareness and solidarity, and at times mili-tancy, to back their demands for civil rightsprogress. The rising generation of young blackmen and women was determined to live in anenvironment more to their own choosing thanhad been the lot of their parents.

This new consciousness of black individualand collective rights and worth would lead tomany challenges to established customs, at-titudes, and opinions. Where segregation hadbeen abolished in fact as well as in law, as in theArmed Forces, blacks would now question theintent and will of whites to eliminate covertdiscrimination. The Marine Corps in the dec-ade of the 60s and the Vietnam War years wasto be troubled deeply by racial incidents, someof them violent clashes, while it sought ways topromote better understanding between whiteand black Marines.

CHAPTER 7

THE VIETNAM ERA

An introduction to a changing philosophyamong a vocal segment of blacks in Americawas furnished by Elijah Muhammed in aspeech to an estimated 4,000 Black Muslims inNew York on 31 July 1960. He called for thecreation of an exclusively American black stateeither in the United States or in Africa andurged his followers to tell whites, "If we aregoing to live together, there must be a state foryou, a state for us." 1 His separatist sentimentswere by no means confined to his own religioussect; they found support among other charis-matic black leaders pursuing their own coursesof action. The cry for black separation, how-ever, was but one small manifestation of anoverall heightened black consciousness. Thiswas everywhere apparent in demands for in-struction in black history and culture in thepublic schools, in cultivation of certain aspectsof African life in dress, music, and hair styling,and in a recognition of the values of a separateblack life style best expressed in the phrase"black is beautiful." One must be careful, how-ever, not "to equate the long overdue recogni-tion by the Negro of his African beginningswith a repudiation of his American loyalties." 2

The influence of this new awareness of indi-vidual and racial worth on the urban youthwho furnished most black Marine Corps re-cruits was profound. If, as was frequently thecase, their educational preparation for servicelife was deficient and their classification scoresconsequently low, their assignment to soft skilltasks was viewed as evidence of racial discrimi-nation, not lack of qualification. The standardsthey were asked to meet were standards theysaw as biased in favor of whites. Many of theseyoung men, who in previous decades mighthave striven to change their life patterns, toemulate more successful whites and blacks,now felt no compulsion to meet such stan-dards.

Integration, to the extent it meant equal op-portunity and treatment was accepted, but in-tegration in a social context was viewed in a

different light by many young blacks. Theirown life styles and values had more signifi-cance to them than those of others. These menwere not ready to fit themselves into a behaviormold not of their own choosing. In a militaryenvironment, where there was a long-acceptedpattern of what was correct conduct both onduty and off, a militant black would prove him-self to be disruptive and highly visible. Hecould, and often did, obscure the fact that "thevast majority of black Marines that served inthe Corps during the 60s and 70s were notmilitant and did not attack 'whitey'."

The militants' attitude ran counter to thatwhich had governed the service life of many ofthe veteran black Marine NCOs, men who hadearned a respected place in the Corps based onindividual achievement and performance.These men had experienced segregation at itsdemeaning worst, they had seen integrationimplemented as official policy, and they couldsee progress against discrimination. Imperfectthough their situation might still be, these vet-eran black Marines had become a part of theMarine Corps "family." The outbreaks of racialtension and violence which were to mar the 60sdecade in the Marine Corps would find thesemen ranged on the side of authority. In thisrespect, the veteran black Marines were in themainstream of Marine Corps life, the militantyounger blacks at times appeared to standapart from it; neither group fully appreciatedthe others' background and attitudes. And yetthey had a common cause, a need for fullequality. One of the most striking aspects ofthis need, as seen by a perceptive young blackofficer:

was the recognition among the Negro com-munity that before equality could be achieved, theNegro would have to change his image; both in hismind and in the mind of the white community. Thisimage changing process was manifested in many ways;in patient example, in significant achievement, and inangry demands and rebellion.4

If mutual understanding between black men

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