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Interdependence X Autonomy Running head: INTERDEPENDENCE X AUTONOMY Working Together versus Working Autonomously: A New Power- Dependence Perspective on the Individual-level of Analysis August 2013 1

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Page 1: University of East Anglia · Web viewConsequently, motivating, inspiring, or rewarding underperforming team members might not work if the structural causes for low performance (i.e.,

Interdependence X Autonomy

Running head: INTERDEPENDENCE X AUTONOMY

Working Together versus Working Autonomously: A New Power-Dependence Perspective

on the Individual-level of Analysis

August 2013

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Abstract

Recent studies have indicated that it is important to investigate the interaction between task

interdependence and task autonomy because this interaction can affect team effectiveness.

However, only a limited number of studies have been conducted and those studies focused solely

on the team level of analysis. Moreover, there has also been a dearth of theoretical development.

Therefore, this study develops and tests an alternative theoretical perspective in an attempt to

understand if, and if so why, this interaction is important at the individual level of analysis.

Based on interdependence theory and power-dependence theory, we expected that highly task-

interdependent individuals who reported high task autonomy would be more powerful and better

performers. In contrast, we expected that similarly high task-interdependent individuals who

reported less task autonomy would be less powerful and would be weaker performers. These

expectations were supported by multi-level and bootstrapping analyses performed on a multi-

source dataset (self-, peer-, manager-ratings) comprised of 182 employees drawn from 37 teams.

Keywords: task interdependence; task autonomy; individual performance; power-

dependence theory; interdependence theory; asymmetry in task dependence

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Working Together versus Working Autonomously: A New Power-Dependence Perspective

on the Individual-level of Analysis

Studies have shown that task interdependence and task autonomy are crucial to employees who

work in teams because they shape the extent to which team members must rely on fellow

coworkers for resources or the extent to which team members feel free to act on their own accord

(e.g., Campion, Medsker, & Higgs, 1993; Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Kiggundu, 1983; Langfred,

2005; Stewart & Barrick, 2000). Team members are considered task interdependent when they

require resources, such as materials, information, and/or advice, from one or more co-workers to

complete their work successfully (e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 1989; Van der Vegt, Emans, & Van

de Vliert, 2005; Wageman, 1995). In addition, team members’ task autonomy can be defined as

the degree to which they have the discretion and freedom to determine how to carry out assigned

tasks (e.g., Langfred, 2000; Molleman, Nauta, & Jehn, 2004; Stewart & Barrick, 2000). Several

recent studies have demonstrated that task interdependence and task autonomy are distinct

constructs and that the interaction between them relates to team effectiveness (Langfred, 2000),

team creativity (Gilson & Shalley, 2004), and team performance (Langfred, 2005).

However, to date only a limited amount of research has been performed and studies have

been restricted solely to the team level of analysis (e.g., Cordery, Morrison, Wright, & Wall,

2010; Langfred, 2000, 2005; Rasmussen & Jeppesen, 2006). Molleman (2009, cf. p. 263) noted

that important questions have therefore remained unanswered, such as, if—and if so, how—the

interaction between task interdependence and task autonomy exerts an influence on the

individual level of analysis, in particular in relation to individual performance. More insight into

this is important for several reasons. For example, if the interaction is not found at the individual

level, interventionists can be more assured that they do not have to balance for each individual in

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the team the extent to which he or she must rely on co-workers for resources and the extent

he/she is autonomous. Interventions could then be more confident that they can just deal with

these job and work design issues on the team level. Yet, if the interaction does exist at the

individual level, interventionists would have evidence that a more detailed look might be worth

their efforts. More importantly, besides knowing if the individual level of analysis matters for

this topic, our study aims to provide more insight into why and how this interaction affects

individual-level employees. The advantages for practitioners and researchers alike of a deeper

theoretical understanding is that it helps to guide interventions and future studies, for instance, by

indicating what other variables would fit to our new theoretical framework and might thus also

be of importance. Investigating this topic is, however, challenging given the current state of

knowledge. Because not only is empirical evidence scarce, but there has also been a limited

amount of theoretical development on this interaction (e.g., Langfred, 2005; Langfred & Moye,

2004). Consequently, although several studies have shown that the interaction between these two

constructs is important, empirical evidence is scarce, studies have only looked at the team level

of analysis, and theoretical development has been limited.

To address all these three gaps simultaneously, this study will develop, and test, an

alternative point of view focused at the individual level of analysis. To develop a firm foundation

for our research, we will draw on established theories, namely interdependence theory (Thibaut

& Kelley, 1959; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) and Emerson’s (1972) power-dependence theory to

argue that individuals’ dependence on others makes them relatively powerless. In contrast,

individuals who have others who depend on them (but who do not depend on those others in

return) are relatively powerful. Although several other views related to power can be found in the

literature (e.g., Raven, 2001), a number of recent reviews of the power literature (e.g., Fiske &

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Berdahl, 2007; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) have reaffirmed that Emerson’s theory on

power and dependence very appropriately describes power differences that occur between team

members (for additional reviews of the power literature, see also Guinote, 2007; Keltner, Van

Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008; Sell et al., 2004). The value of adopting a power-dependence

perspective involves a frequently overlooked, but crucial, point of interdependence theory. This

point is that two aspects determine individual task members’ levels of task interdependence: (1)

the amount of resources received from other team members and (2) the amount of resources

given to others (see also Morgenson & Humphrey, 2006).

The majority of previous studies that focused on task interdependence (e.g., Johnson &

Johnson, 1989; Van der Vegt et al., 2005; Wageman, 1995, 2001), as well as the few studies on

the interaction between task interdependence and task autonomy, did not explicitly acknowledge

the two above-noted aspects. Rather, they assumed that similar task-interdependent individuals

have equal power. However, we will argue, based on the above-mentioned two theories, as well

as on other research on power and dependence (e.g., Brass, 1981; Cook & Emerson, 1978;

Giebels, De Dreu, & Van de Vliert, 2000), that this is not necessarily the case. In short, we

theorize that individuals who report both high task interdependence and high task autonomy

indicate that they give more resources to their colleagues than they receive resources from their

colleagues in return. In contrast, we argue that similar high task interdependent individuals who

report less task autonomy will need more resources from co-workers than their co-workers will

require from them. We test this logic by investigating if interdependent individuals who report

less task autonomy are more asymmetrically task dependent, and, thus, less powerful, than

individuals who report more task autonomy. Ultimately, we will extend this theorizing by an

additional step by arguing that, if the above line of reasoning is valid, then highly task

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interdependent and highly task autonomous individuals should also be in better positions to

successfully complete their tasks than their less powerful colleagues who are also highly task

interdependent, but perceive lower task autonomy. Hence, our core expectations are that the

interaction between task interdependence and task autonomy will be related to individuals’

power and performance. Figure 1 depicts all of the expected individual level relationships

between these four variables.

--------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here--------------------------------

Consequently, the main goal of this study is to increase currently limited insights into the

interaction between task interdependence and task autonomy (e.g., Langfred, 2005; Molleman,

2009; Rasmussen & Jeppesen, 2006). We will expand contemporary knowledge on this topic by

developing a new theoretical lens based on interdependence theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) and

power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1972) and by investigating whether this interaction is

related to power differences and individual performance. By studying this, this study will also

contribute to future research related to “power due to asymmetries in task dependence” (De Jong

et al., 2007; Van der Vegt et al., 2010).

Theory and Hypotheses

Definitions and Foundations

Before we develop our theory and hypotheses we will first discuss the definitions and theoretical

foundations for our key variables. In our characterization of task autonomy, we remain close to

the definition provided by Hackman and Oldham (1975) who described task autonomy as the

amount of freedom and independence individuals possess in relation to their abilities to complete

their work assignments. Task autonomy is an important aspect of work teams because it has been

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demonstrated to have a strong relationship with individuals’ well-being (Van Mierlo, Rutte,

Kompier, & Seinen, 2001), team cohesiveness (Man & Lam, 2003), and team performance

(Cohen & Bailey, 1997). According to a recent study conducted by Molleman (2009) “the focus

[of task autonomy research] has always been on task autonomy as perceived by the jobholder

because it is assumed that it is primarily these perceptions that affect psychological phenomena

such as attitudes and behavior” (p. 245). Therefore this study will focus on team members’

individual perceptions of the amounts of task autonomy they possess within their teams.

The second key variable of interest is task interdependence. Prior studies conceptualized

and measured task interdependence at both the team and individual levels of analysis (see, e.g.,

Johnson & Johnson, 1989; Van der Vegt et al., 2005; Wageman, 1995). Studies that adopted

team level approaches focused primarily on the differences between teams with respect to the

extent of average task interdependence that occurred among all team members (e.g., Johnson &

Johnson, 1989; Wageman, 1995). In contrast, studies conducted at the individual level of

analysis focused primarily on the degree to which specific individual team members were task

interdependent with other members of their teams. Based on the goals of this study, we adopted

the latter perspective and define task interdependence “as the degree to which the design of an

individual team member’s tasks and job requires that he or she coordinates activities and

exchanges materials and information with other members of the team for being able to carry out

the job” (Van der Vegt & Van de Vliert, 2005, p. 75).

The perspective on task interdependence described above holds an implicit assumption

that has been applied by most studies focused on interdependence theory, namely that

relationships are symmetrical. Contemporary research has shown that this assumption is not

always valid because differences, or asymmetries, in task dependence occur in real life teams.

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These differences or asymmetries can exert importance effects on work relations (De Jong et al.,

2007), as well as on intra-team processes (Van der Vegt et al., 2010). Based on Emerson’s

(1972) power-dependence theory, we expect that asymmetries in task dependence might be very

important because they may result in situations in which asymmetrically less task-dependent

team members maintain power over asymmetrically more task-dependent co-workers. By

building on this theory of power offered by Emerson (1972), as well as by drawing upon recent

insights (e.g., De Jong et al., 2007; Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Van der Vegt et al., 2010), we

conceptualized that team members’ power relates to imbalances in the resource exchange

relationships between those team members and their peer team members1.

The Interaction between Task Interdependence and Task Autonomy

Before going into detail on the interaction between task interdependence and task autonomy we

will briefly discuss the two main theories from which we will draw, namely interdependence

theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) and power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1972). While they

have some similarities, each of them also provides crucial and unique insights into the topic of

this study. Interdependence theory describes what occurs when team members need each other to

fulfill their tasks. In short, this theory states that when team members have high need of each

other (i.e. are highly task interdependent) they tend to collaborate more, whilst coworkers tend to

work more individually when they do not need others to fulfill their tasks (i.e., are lowly task

interdependent). Yet, as mentioned earlier, research on interdependency theory has often failed

to investigate what happens when one individual needs coworkers more than vice versa (cf. De

Jong et al., 2007). It is here where power-dependency theory (Emerson, 1972), and subsequent

research on power, comes into play as it indicates that such differences in task interdependence

mean that some workers have more power than others and that the powerful have many benefits.

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One of these benefits is that they can choose to withhold support or exit relationships at lower

costs than less powerful team members (e.g., Cook & Emerson, 1978; Giebels, De Dreu, & Van

de Vliert, 2000). Another is that they have more transaction alternatives (e.g., Brass, 1981) and

therefore have more potential partners to exchange resources with.

The application of these two theories to the interaction between task interdependence and

task autonomy (Langfred, 2000, 2005) suggests that individuals who are highly task-

interdependent and highly task-autonomous are likely to be the most powerful members in

teams. Our argument is that a) the high task-interdependence of these individuals indicates that

they exchange many resources within their teams and b) that this reveals, when viewed in

conjunction with their perceptions of high task autonomy, that these individuals need fewer

resources from others than others need from them. Hence, based on power-dependence theory

(Emerson, 1972), interdependence theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), and recent studies on

power-dependence asymmetries (De Jong et al., 2007; Van der Vegt et al., 2010), we expect that

these highly task interdependent and highly task autonomous individuals will be relatively

powerful within their teams.

In contrast, we reason that highly task-interdependent individuals who reported lower

task autonomy will be relatively powerless compared to the above mentioned colleagues who are

also highly task-interdependent but experience more task autonomy. Once again, drawing from

interdependence theory it can be expected that their high task-interdependence indicates that they

exchange many resources within their team. However, drawing on power-dependence theory it

can be argued that their perceptions of low task autonomy reveals that they are rather powerless

because low autonomy indicates that they are more dependent upon their colleagues for

resources to complete their tasks than colleagues are upon them.

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As an illustration, imagine individuals who need to exchange many resources with their

coworkers yet cannot autonomously decide how to use these resources or cannot freely decide

how to schedule their tasks (cf. Morgeson and Humphrey, 2006). We expect that these

individuals are likely to have little power as the resources they need are apparently under the

control of more powerful team members. Similarly, we argue that equally highly task

interdependent individuals who report that they can freely decide on such matters are more likely

to be powerful. Research on autonomy and power supports this notion, as research has indicated

that more autonomous individuals indeed perceive themselves to be more powerful (Seppälä,

Lipponen, Pirttila-Backman, & Lipsanen, 2011). Thus, at the individual level of analysis, we

expect that the interaction between task interdependence and task autonomy relates to which

individuals are powerful within their teams and which not.

Hypothesis 1: The interaction between task interdependence and task autonomy is

positively related to individual team members’ power. Specifically, highly task-

interdependent team members who perceive that they possess high task autonomy will be

more powerful in comparison with equally highly task-interdependent team members who

perceive that they possess lower levels of task autonomy.

Task Interdependence, Task Autonomy, and Individual Performance

The limited number of studies (e.g., Gilson & Shalley, 2004; Langfred, 2000, 2005) that

investigated the interaction between task interdependence and task autonomy focused solely on

the team level of analysis. Therefore, if—and how—individual level processes and outcome are

affected by this interaction remains unexplored (cf. Molleman, 2009). Based on recent studies

focused on power that results from asymmetries in task dependence (De Jong et al., 2007; Van

der Vegt et al., 2010), as well as on literature related to power-dependence theory (e.g., Emerson,

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1972; Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Keltner et al., 2003), we argued above that the interaction of task

interdependence and task autonomy is related to the power of individual team members. Below,

we will argue that, if this is indeed a valid line of reasoning, this interaction should also be

related to individual performance because more powerful team members should be in better

positions to successfully complete their tasks than their less powerful colleagues. Although

teams often aspire to attain team goals, the reality in many teams is that individuals have

conflicting goals (e.g., Locke, Smith, Erez, Chah, & Schaffer, 1994) as they vie for bonuses,

promotions, salary increases and compete for getting more resources or better projects.

Before extrapolating our power-dependence argumentation underlying hypothesis 1 to

individual performance, it should be noted that research on the separate effects of task

interdependence and task autonomy also suggests that these variables should affect individual

performance. For example, the key works of Thompson (1967) and Steiner (1972) indicate that

workers who are less dependent, and thus need few resources from co-workers, have a better

chance of getting a high individual performance as they experience less so called ‘processes

losses’ which can interfere with their work and outputs. Processes losses can be many things,

such as conflicts over resources or goals, communication problems, misunderstandings,

cooperation issues, or unproductive waiting times. Based on these works, it can be expected that

when workers have the autonomy to decide how to work and have the resources to do their work,

such process losses are less likely to distract, or hinder, them from setting a good performance.

Additional support for an effect of our key variables on individual performance can be found in

research which has shown that employees work harder on freely chosen tasks than on assigned

tasks (e.g., Patall, Cooper, & Robinson, 2008). Why this is, is described by self-determination

theory, in which choice is argued to increase one’s sense of autonomy and it is this sense of

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autonomy which enhances one's effort and motivation (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1987; Ryan, Koestner,

& Deci, 1991). Hence, although studies on the interaction of task interdependence and task

autonomy are scarce on the individual level, prior research into the separate effects of these

variables already hints towards an impact on individual performance.

To capture these findings in one clear theoretical framework we will now continue on our

previous theorizing from a power-dependence theory perspective (Emerson, 1972). Doing so,

reveals that there are several theoretical reasons why a positive relationship between team

members’ power and individuals’ performance can be expected, including the fact that more

powerful team members are not easily hindered by other team members because they already

possess the majority of the resources they require to complete their tasks (for reviews of the

power literature see, e.g., Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Guinote, 2007; Keltner et al., 2003, 2008).

Therefore, even if other team members might attempt to influence powerful members in negative

ways, they cannot easily affect them. In addition, these attempts would involve great risks since

powerful team members might choose to punish powerless team members at a later date by

withholding critical resources (e.g., Cook & Emerson, 1978; Giebels et al., 2000). Consequently,

powerful individual can perform better than the powerless as they are less easily affected by

others.

Second, powerful team members can more easily recruit support by offering to provide

materials, means, and/or information they control in exchange for assistance. Thus, the powerful

are in better positions to employ direct influence tactics to persuade reluctant team members to

share their resources. Even if one team member refuses to cooperate, the powerful remain in

good positions to complete their tasks because they have more transaction alternatives that allow

them to exchange resources with other team members (cf. Brass, 1981). Other research supports

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this notion by showing that different types of power can affect job performance by affecting the

bargaining and problem-solving style of individuals (e.g., Rahim, Antonioni, & Psenicka, 2001).

Hence, powerful individuals are likely to perform better than the powerless as they have more

options to influence others.

Third, powerful individuals might require less time to acquire their resources and can

thus spend more time on actual task performance. In other words, powerful members might have

lower ‘process losses’ than powerless members (cf. Steiner, 1972). Process losses not only refer

to the losses individuals encounter when they try to search for the needed resource (e.g, by

asking co-workers), but also refer to many other types of losses as well, such as conflicts,

distractions, or unproductive thoughts and emotions. As an example of such other process losses,

research by Keltner, Gruenfeld and Anderson (2003) argues that ”status, class, or power related

connotations may direct the attention of individuals of low-power groups away from the

substance … thus worsening performance” (p. 272). We argue that since the powerful have less

of these process losses and distractions, they are more able to focus on the tasks at hand and thus

should be better able to perform.

Hence, based on power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1972), reviews of the power

literature (e.g., Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Keltner et al., 2003), and recent empirical studies focused

on power that results from asymmetries in task dependence (De Jong et al., 2007; Van der Vegt

et al., 2010), we expect that the interaction between task interdependence and task autonomy is

related to the performance of individual team members. We put forward three key reasons for

this, namely a) powerful individuals already possess the majority of resources required to

complete their own tasks and cannot be easily affected by others (Giebels et al., 2000), b)

powerful individuals possess valuable resources they can exchange with others so they can use

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more influence and problem-solving strategies (Rahim et al., 2001), and c) powerful individuals

have fewer process losses and less distractions (Keltner et al., 2003). As described in the theory

that led to the development of Hypothesis 1, task-interdependent individuals who consider the

task autonomy within their teams to be more limited are likely to be relatively powerless because

they are more dependent on powerful team members to provide resources. Therefore, we propose

the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2: The interaction between task interdependence and task autonomy is

positively related to a team member’s individual performance. Specifically, a highly task-

interdependent team member who reports he/she has high task autonomy is expected to

have higher individual performance levels in comparison to an equally highly task-

interdependent team member who reports he/she has lower task autonomy.

Hypothesis 3: An individual’s power within his/her team mediates the relationship

between the interaction of task interdependence and task autonomy on the one hand and

individual’s performance on the other.

Method

Context, Procedure, and Sample

As part of a larger research project we gathered data from teams who worked in companies

throughout the Netherlands by contacting their managers. These teams worked in a variety of

different organizational settings. The top three sectors where the financial sector (16.7%), the

government sector (12.5%), and the consultancy sector (12.5%). The other teams had various

backgrounds, namely consumer goods, education, ICT, medical, technology, construction, law,

real estate, and travel sectors. We selected these teams because we expected there would be

differences between team members in the degrees of specialization, backgrounds, tenure, and so

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on and that these intra-team differences would allow us to observe power-dependence

asymmetries within these teams. To increase the likelihood that these differences were present,

we focused on teams that included four or more members. This approach resulted in a dataset

that contained 37 teams comprised of 224 individuals. Of that total, 182 individuals (81%)

returned usable questionnaires. The average response rate within teams was 85 percent (SD=20).

The average team size was 6.05 team members (SD = 3.70).

To connect and analyze the self-, peer-, and manager-ratings, we asked supervisors to

provide the names of all team members. After this we sent out the questionnaires. Our

questionnaires contained questions related to respondents’ demographic backgrounds and task

autonomy, as well as relational level items that aimed to assess the extent of power that resulted

from asymmetries in task dependence between the specific respondent and each of his/her fellow

team members. A short introductory text explicitly guaranteed confidentiality and we explicitly

mentioned that only group-level results would be reported back and that individual team

members where thus not recognizable. The manager provided data on the performance of each

team member as they would normally also do for performance evaluations or end of year talks.

On average managers were 41.43 years old (SD=8.47) and had been 59.79 months in their

function (SD=70.21), 24 percent of the managers were women. Managers were not included in

the analyses because our attention was focused on peer-relationships (see Footnote 1). In our

sample, 110 of the 182 respondents were female (60%), the average age was 35.36 years (SD =

9.85), and the average number of years in the organization was 7.42 years (SD = 7.41).

Measures

Task interdependence. This variable was measured using team members’ responses to

three items adapted from past research (Van der Vegt et al., 2003, p. 719; see also Van der Vegt

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& Van de Vliert, 2005). These items were adapted to be consistent with our other measures and

as such we used a 7-point scale (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree) instead of the original 5-

point scale. An example item is: ‘I have to work closely with my colleagues to do my work

properly’. Cronbach’s alpha was .76. An ANOVA revealed that some differences occurred

between the groups (F[36,145] = 1.65, p < .05). The subsequently calculated ICC1 demonstrated

that only 8 percent of the variance occurred at the team level (ICC1 = .08). These results showed

that we needed to include a random intercept in our multi-level analysis to control for possible

differences that might occur between teams (e.g., Krull & MacKinnon, 2001).

Task autonomy. This variable was measured by the use of respondents’ responses to five

7-point items adapted from Molleman et al. (2004) which we obtained by contacting the main

author. The original items were rated on a 5-point scale. An example item is: ‘As a team we are

free to choose our work methods’. Cronbach’s alpha was .72. Although the ANOVA revealed

that some differences occurred between groups (F[36,145] = 1.85, p < .01) the subsequently

calculated ICC1 demonstrated that 10 percent of the variance occurred at the team level (ICC1

= .10) and according to Lebreton and Senter (2008, p. 838) this can be considered as a medium

effect. This reaffirmed the need to use multilevel analyses and include a random intercept to

account for possible group-level effects.

Power. This variable was measured by the use of a peer-rating approach. Consistent with

the conceptualization that power is based on resource dependencies (Emerson, 1972; Fiske &

Berdahl, 2007), we used the same two items reported in De Jong et al. (2007) and Van der Vegt

et al. (2010) to measure the effects of asymmetries in the task dependence of team member (A)

on another team member (B): “How dependent are you on X for materials, means, information,

and so on, so you can complete your work adequately?” and “How dependent is X on you for

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materials, means, information, and so on, so he/she can complete his/her work adequately?” (1 =

not dependent, 7 = completely dependent). X was replaced by the name of a specific fellow team

member for all items.

Given that task interdependence and task autonomy had already been measured by self-

report items, we decided to calculate each team member’s power within a dyad by calculating the

differences that occurred between the two questions answered by each co-worker in order to

diminish concerns related to common source biases (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff,

2003). More specifically, we subtracted the first item mentioned above (i.e., …you on X…) from

the second mentioned item (i.e., …X on you…) in order to arrive at a measure of power in which

higher scores indicate more power for the target individual as viewed by his or her colleague. We

then averaged the dyadic power scores to the individual level by calculating the mean, and thus

followed an additive composition model strategy (Chan, 1998), as consensus is not required on

these items. The resulting individual-level measure reflected the average power of an individual,

with higher scores indicating that colleagues viewed this individual as more powerful. The

procedure we performed was highly similar as the procedure reported in Van der Vegt et al.

(2010, p. 352) with two key exceptions, namely a) we focused on peer ratings to circumvent

issues related to mono-source biases and b) we did not aggregate our individual level measures

to the team level given that our theory resides at the individual level2. An ANOVA revealed that

no significant differences occurred between teams (F[36,145] = 1.20, n.s.).

Individual performance. Each manager who normally rated each employee’s

performance (e.g., during performance evaluations or end of year talks) provided information on

each team member by proving responses to three questions from Wayne, Shore, and Liden

(1997, p. 98). We used a 7-point scale instead of the original 5-point scale to be consistent with

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the other measures. As we asked the manager to rate all of his followers we shortened the

original scale to include only the three items which had the highest factor loading. Cronbach’s

alpha was .86. An ANOVA revealed that no significant differences occurred between teams

(F[36,145] = 1.44, n.s.).

Control variables. To account for the possible confounding effects of team size, we

controlled for this variable in our analyses. Additionally, since employees with more experience

in life or more experience in the organization might be better able to perform well, we controlled

for the age of each team member as well as for the time each team member had worked in the

organization. These variables were also added to control for colleagues’ and managers’

possession of possible stereotypes and biases related to these variables that might affect

individual team members’ power (e.g., Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Guinote, 2007; Keltner et al.,

2003; Keltner et al., 2008; Raven, 2001).

Discriminant and Convergent Validity

We performed a confirmatory factor analysis to assess the discriminant and convergent validity

of our scales. We computed parameter estimates by the use of the maximum likelihood method

provided in the AMOS 18 computer package. First, we tested a model in which the three task

interdependence items, the five task autonomy items, the three individual performance items, and

the aggregated power measure were loaded onto four corresponding latent constructs. For the

power measure, we followed Richardson and Van den Berg (2005) and assumed a conservative

reliability of .70. The overall fit of the four-factor model to the data was satisfactory (χ2[49, 182]

=73.94, p<.05, SRMSR=.06, GFI=.94, CFI=.96).

To further evaluate the discriminant validity of our scales, we computed an alternative

three-factor model in which the eight self-perception items related to task interdependence and

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task autonomy were loaded on one dimension and the three supervisor-rated individual

performance items were loaded on another dimension. The peer-rated power measure was loaded

on its own dimension. The fit of this three-factor model (∆χ2[4]=171.10, p< .001, SRMSR =.13,

GFI=.82, CFI=.72) was significantly worse than the fit of the four-factor model. Additionally,

we calculated a one-factor model in which all twelve items were loaded onto one latent

construct. The fit of the one-factor model (∆χ2[6]=501.20, p< .001, SRMSR=.21, GFI=.63,

CFI=.24) was also significantly worse than the fit of the four-factor model. Therefore, we

concluded that our hypothesized four-factor measurement model was the most appropriate for

the situation under consideration. Hence, task interdependence, task autonomy, asymmetries in

task dependence, and individual performance were both theoretically and empirically distinct

from one another.

Statistical Analyses

Our model focused on the individual level of analysis. However, because we investigated our

model by studying real life teams, we were required to consider the nested structure of the data

because team members were nested within work teams. If we had neglected this, we might have

developed erroneous conclusions as interfering group effects might have been overlooked (e.g.,

Hox, 2007). Our mediation model was a “1-1-1”-model. As Krull and MacKinnon (2001)

observed, when “all three variables [are] measured at the same level, it is only the clustered

nature of the data that requires multilevel modeling” (p. 253). Therefore, we conducted

multilevel analyses by using the MIXED MODEL procedures in SPSS 20. We included a

random intercept and used fixed terms for all other variables (see p. 701 of Zhang, Zyphur, &

Preacher (2009) for the multilevel equations for 1-1-1 models). We began with model-0 which

did not include any predictor variables to establish a baseline condition. Next, we recalculated by

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including the control variables and then we added the main effects. Subsequently, we added the

two-way interaction. The mediation term was added in the fourth model. We tested for a

decrease in log-likelihood between each of the models by performing a chi-square difference

test. In line with the recommendations of Aiken and West (1991), all independent variables were

first standardized and the interaction term was calculated from the products of the standardized

variables. We used the bootstrapping techniques of Preacher and Hayes (2008) by utilizing their

SPSS macro’s to test for the indirect effect hypothesized in hypothesis 3.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

The means, standard deviations, and Pearson zero-order correlations between variables are

presented in Table 1. The table shows that individual performance was positively and

significantly related to power (r=.17, p<.05). This result indicates that, in line with our

theorizing, team members who possessed more power also tended to demonstrate better

performance.

-------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here-------------------------------

Hypotheses Tests

Hypothesis 1 predicted an interaction effect between task autonomy and task interdependence on

a team member’s power. As shown in Table 2, the first model, which included the control

variables, did not have significantly more predictive power (∆χ2[3]=3.272, n.s.) than model 0 that

solely contained the random intercept. The second model also did not have more predictive

power than the first model (∆χ2[2]=2.185, n.s.). However, as expected, the interaction between

task interdependence and task autonomy added in Model 3 did significantly improve the model

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(∆χ2=4.100, df =1, p<.05). The interaction coefficient (γ=.128, p<.05) had the expected positive

sign.

-------------------------------Insert Table 2 about here-------------------------------

Figure 2 illustrates the significant two-way interaction between task interdependence and

task autonomy for power. To create the figure, we followed procedures suggested by Aiken and

West (1991). We plotted the low conditions at -1 SD and the high conditions at +1 SD. As

expected, when task interdependence was high, higher levels of task autonomy were related to

higher levels of power (simple slope: γ=.200, se=.082, p<.05). No significant relationship was

detected between task autonomy and power when task interdependence was low (γ=-.053,

se=.097, n.s.). Hence, team members who reported high levels of task interdependence and low

levels of task autonomy were considered relatively powerless by their peers. In contrast, team

members who reported high levels of task interdependence, and who reported high levels of task

autonomy were considered relatively powerful by their peers. These results fully support

Hypothesis 1.

--------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here--------------------------------

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the interaction effect between task autonomy and task

interdependence would affect the individual performance of team members. As shown in Table

3, the first model did not have significantly more predictive power (∆χ2[3]=4.706, n.s.) than

model 0 and model 2 did not significantly improve on model 1 (∆χ2=[2]=3.091, n.s.). However,

as was hypothesized, adding the interaction between task interdependence and task autonomy in

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model 3 did significantly improve the model (∆χ2[1]=5.793, p<.05). The interaction coefficient

(γ=.166, p<.05) had the expected positive sign.

-------------------------------Insert Table 3 about here-------------------------------

Figure 3 illustrates the significant two-way interaction between task interdependence and

task autonomy for individual performance. As expected, when task interdependence was high,

higher levels of task autonomy were related to higher levels of individual performance (γ=.189,

se=.089, p<.05). No significant relationship was detected between task autonomy and

performance when task interdependence was low (γ=-.139, se=.105, n.s.). Hence, Hypothesis 2

was fully supported.

--------------------------------Insert Figure 3 about here--------------------------------

Hypothesis 3 predicted that power would mediate between the interaction of task

interdependence and task autonomy on the one hand and individual performance on the other. As

shown in Table 3 (Model 4), the addition of the mediation term significantly improved the model

(∆χ2[1]=5.239, p<.05). The coefficient for power was in the expected positive direction and was

significant (γ=.159, p<.05). The interaction coefficient dropped (from γ=.166, p<.05 to γ=.139,

p<.05). Given that both of these coefficients were positive and significant our mediation can be

classified as a ‘complementary mediation’ (Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). To test if mediation

indeed occurred we used the bootstrapping procedures of Preacher and Hayes (2008). The results

showed that the bootstrapped estimate for the indirect effect was .0234 and that the values of the

95% BC confidence interval (CI) were positive and did not include zero (lower 95%

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BCCI=.0038; higher 95% BCCI=.0686). Thus, we concluded that our third hypothesis was,

indeed, supported by the data3.

Discussion

In this study, we focused on a rarely researched interaction that exerts an important impact on

employees who work in teams: the interaction between task interdependence and task autonomy

(e.g., Campion et al., 1993; Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Kiggundu, 1983; Langfred, 2005; Stewart &

Barrick, 2000). Although a few prior studies demonstrated that this interaction is important at the

team level (e.g., Gilson & Shalley, 2004; Langfred, 2000, 2005), we decided to perform a more

detailed investigation of this interaction at the individual level of analysis. The primary reason

why we chose to perform this investigation was because previously scholars had observed that

scientific progress on this topic had been hindered by a lack of theoretical development (e.g.,

Langfred, 2005; Langfred & Moye, 2004). We based our new perspective on recent

developments in power-dependence theory and interdependence theory. Thus, we attempted to

provide more than a simple response to scholars’ calls for more research on this topic (e.g.,

Langfred, 2005; Molleman, 2009; Rasmussen & Jeppesen, 2006) by also providing an alternative

theoretical perspective that can be used to gain a better understanding of this interaction at a new

level of analysis.

Our alternative perspective is based on power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1972),

interdependence theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), recent reviews of the power literature (e.g.,

Fiske & Berdahl, 2007), and recent studies on power that focused on asymmetries in task

dependence (De Jong et al., 2007; Van der Vegt et al., 2010). Based on these theories and

studies, we hypothesized, and subsequently demonstrated, that team members who report they

are highly task-interdependent and highly task autonomous are considered relatively powerful by

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their peers. They are also considered to be high performers by their supervisors. Additionally,

our results demonstrated that team members who report high task-interdependence, but who

perceive little task autonomy, are considered relatively powerless by their peers, as well as lower

performers by their supervisors. Furthermore, our theorizing was supported by the fact that we

found support for a mediating effect of power between the interaction between task

interdependence and task autonomy on the one hand and individual performance on the other.

Consequently, the results indicated that the power-dependence perspective (Emerson, 1972) can

be used to understand the interaction between task interdependence and task autonomy and its

relationship with individual power and performance.

In the next section, we will discuss the theoretical implications of this study. Then, we

will reflect on the main strengths and limitations of this study and discuss possible implications

for future research. Finally, we will present our practical recommendations.

Theoretical Implications

In our opinion, this study makes at least two main theoretical contributions to (1) the limited

amount of literature which focused on the interaction between task interdependence and task

autonomy (e.g., Molleman, 2009; Langfred, 2005); and (2) the power-dependence perspective on

power (Emerson, 1972; Fiske & Berdhal, 2007; Keltner et al., 2003) and the related up-and-

coming area that focuses on “power due to asymmetries in task dependence” research (e.g., De

Jong et al., 2007; Van der Vegt et al., 2010).

As our first main contribution, we increased the currently limited theoretical insight into a

particular interaction that can profoundly influence team members (e.g., Langfred, 2005;

Rasmussen & Jeppesen, 2006). While scholars had previously noticed that the study of Langfred

(2005) demanded more theoretical insights, researchers had, until now, only investigated the

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team level of analysis (e.g., Cordery et al., 2010). By adopting a power-dependence perspective

on the individual level of analysis, we provided an alternative viewpoint, on a new level of

analysis, that can be used to understand the interaction between task interdependence and task

autonomy. Our study also response to the call of Grant and Parker (2009) to investigate in more

depth the relational perspectives on job and task design. Our results do so by demonstrating that

the interaction between task interdependence and task autonomy can be understood at the

individual level by observing individuals’ power within their teams, based on the differences in

their relational task dependencies with co-workers. Hence, we contribute to scholarly

understanding of job and task design by bringing to this field the core reasoning that underlies

power-dependence theory (e.g., Emerson, 1972; Fiske & Berdahl, 2007), interdependence theory

(Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), and the reasoning from recent studies on power and asymmetries in

task dependence (e.g., De Jong et al., 2007; Van der Vegt et al., 2010).

Second, our research contributes to power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1972) and

interdependence theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) because it uses a measure that is directly

related to the core of each of these theories: Power resulting from asymmetries in task

dependence (e.g., Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Keltner et al., 2003). By showing an effect on

individual performance, our results extend the results of prior studies by testing their key, but

often implicit, assumption that power that results from asymmetries in task dependence are

indeed beneficial to the powerful (e.g., De Jong et al., 2007). Additionally, no study to date has

investigated where these asymmetries in task dependence come from. Prior studies solely

examined consequences that included interpersonal processes and team processes and outcomes

(e.g., Van der Vegt et al., 2010). The results of our study indicated that asymmetries in task

dependence (as rated by peers) can be related to each team member’s specific position within

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their teams (i.e., a team member’s perception of his or her task interdependence and task

autonomy). Thus, our study not only contributes to research focused on the interaction between

task interdependence and task autonomy, it also contributes to the emerging area of research that

focuses on power that results from asymmetries in task dependence, because it demonstrates that

power resulting from asymmetries in task dependence (1) has effects on the individual level, (2)

has task interdependence and task autonomy as key antecedents, and (3) has a positive

relationship with individual performance.

Strengths and Limitations

Similar to any scientific study, the present research has some strengths and limitations. A first

potential limitation might involve the study’s use of single items in its assessment of the dyadic-

level differences in power. However, our items were drawn from existing scales used in previous

research whose value has been demonstrated (e.g., De Jong et al., 2007; Van der Vegt et al.,

2010). Moreover, we constructed individual level measures from several dyadic level items. This

procedure was directly derived from power-dependence theory of Emerson (1972),

interdependence theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), and the recent characterization of power

provided by Fiske and Berdahl (2007). Consequently, the method used in this study, which

measures power resulting from asymmetries in task dependence, directly assesses the resource-

based power differences as described by power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1972).

Another potential limitation might involve the use of cross-sectional data, because this

prevented us from determining the causality in our model. Therefore, the possibility remains that

power actually determines the interaction between task interdependence and task autonomy.

Hence, even though our results fall in line with our theorizing, future studies should test causality

by taking measurements at more than one point in time or by conducting laboratory experiments.

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Moreover, future studies should also study in more detail the broader context of our new

perspective, for example by investigating boundary conditions or cross-level relationships (cf.

Diez-Roux, 1998). We think that one of the key contributions of this study lies in the fact that

these future studies can now actually draw from our theorizing about the importance of the

power-dependence perspective and are now in a better position to develop scholarly

understanding of this interaction.

Although our research design did not allow us to test causality, it did allow us to perform

rigorous tests on our hypotheses because we used three different sources of data and we used

dyadic- and individual-level measures. Scholars in the field have demanded that researchers

employ multi-source and multi-method datasets in their research (e.g., Molleman, 2009, p. 262)

because the employment of these datasets can greatly diminish alternative explanations for

findings, such as common source and common method biases (e.g., Podsakoff et al., 2003).

Given that we investigated a diversity of teams, ranging from the financial sector to the

government sector, our results appear to be generalizable to various sectors and industries.

However, only further research can determine if this is indeed so.

Implications for Future Research

Future studies could conduct in-depth investigations of the interaction between task

interdependence and task autonomy. As shown in Figure 2, differences in task autonomy are not

associated with differences in power in situations of low task-interdependence. It is possible that

low task-interdependence facilitates high individual performance because team members then

have access to all resources required to complete their tasks. If low task- interdependence is

coupled with high autonomy, tasks are likely to require only limited interactions with other team

members. Moreover, individuals should then be more likely to clearly understand what must be

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done to complete their tasks. As such, these situations can be expected to have low levels of role

ambiguity (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 1964) or high goal and process clarity

(e.g., Sawyer, 1992). Because these would be relatively simple and clearly defined tasks, team

members can easily complete them. Although the simple slope is not significant, our results

provide some support to the arguments stated above because they indicate that low task-

interdependence is associated with high individual performance when task autonomy is low (see

Figure 3). Hence, our theory and results indicate possible ways to further improve our

understanding of this interaction and indicate that theories and research related to role ambiguity

(e.g., Kahn et al., 1964) or goal and process clarity (e.g., Sawyer, 1992) might be useful.

Alternatively, future research could also explore other mechanisms which might drive this effect

as we found that power is a significant, yet complementary, mediator (Zhao et al., 2010).

Variables which are related to process losses (e.g., Steiner, 1972; Thompson, 1967), such as

lowered trust (Langfred, 2005), increased communication needs (Puranam, Raveendran, &

Knudsen, 2012), or heightened interpersonal conflict (Jehn, 1995) might be able to shed more

light on this interaction. Thus, future research could validate our results that the power-

dependence perspective can explain the interaction between task autonomy and task

interdependence and separately, or simultaneously, investigate new mechanisms such as

described above.

In addition, future research might explore power that results from asymmetries in the

power-dependence perspective in more depth by combining our results with results drawn from

other recent field studies (e.g., De Jong et al., 2007; Van der Vegt et al., 2010) and/or from

broader literature focused on power. For instance, one avenue for these types of future endeavors

can be derived from Fiske and Berdahl’s (2007, p. 687) observation that power = person ×

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position × situation. In our study, we primarily focused on the position aspect (i.e., the

interaction between task interdependence and the task autonomy). However, Van der Vegt et al.

(2010) focused more on the situation (i.e., the amount and type of feedback provided to the

team). Yet, no study to date has investigated if, and how, personality can shape perception or use

of power that result from asymmetries in task dependence. Researchers who hope to explore this

topic in more depth might choose to focus on the influence of personality differences, such as

self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1997) or goal orientation (Elliott & Dweck, 1988). We think that

these personality differences might serve as interesting moderators because they might shape

how individuals perceive their positions and power within teams and/or how individuals might

actually be tempted to use these advantages. There is some support for this notion as studies have

shown that personality can be related to individuals’ preferred influence strategies (e.g.,

Koslowsky & Schwarzwald, 2001). Thus, future studies might investigate whether individual-

level power that results from asymmetries in task dependence can be influenced by situational

factors (e.g., types and amounts of feedback, low levels of role ambiguity, or high levels of goal

clarity). Yet, we believe that an even more novel approach would be to investigate the

moderating effects of personality differences.

Practical Implications

The practical implications of the present study derive from our findings that task

interdependence, task autonomy, and power are related to individual team members’

performance. Our results indicate that interventions that attempt to increase team members’

performance must consider structural and relational mechanisms that might prevent team

members from achieving high performance (cf. Grant and Parker, 2009). Thus, managers who

want to ensure that all team members have equal chances to perform well might consider that

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team members who must give more resources will be in better positions than team members who

must receive resources from their colleagues. Consequently, motivating, inspiring, or rewarding

underperforming team members might not work if the structural causes for low performance

(i.e., those team members’ asymmetrical task dependence on other team members) have not been

removed or at least addressed. It is important to consider this factor during team design, as well

as during normal team operations, because prior research has demonstrated that individuals tend

to strive to obtain superior power over their peers (Van Dijke & Poppe, 2007). Therefore,

managers should be aware that some individuals might attempt to change the asymmetries in task

dependence within their teams and make the conditions more favorable for themselves, possibly,

at the expense of others.

Moreover, our results indicate that resolutions of these structural causes by simply matching

amounts of task autonomy with equal amounts of task interdependence might be less appropriate

than prior studies have sometimes suggested (e.g., Molleman, 2009, p. 264). The logic

underlying the power -dependence perspective (e.g., Emerson, 1972) clarifies that attempts to

redesign tasks to increase some team members’ power (e.g., decreasing their asymmetrical task

dependence) could, simultaneously, decrease other team members’ power (e.g., increase their

asymmetrical task dependence). Consequently, if not well thought through, interventions might

simply result in exchanges of certain team members’ low performance for other team members’

low performance. Although additional research is required to examine this issue, we currently

suggest that practitioners balance their interventions when they address task interdependence and

task autonomy by considering the asymmetries in power and task dependence that might occur

between team members.

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Footnotes

1) Leaders often maintain direct and/or indirect control over resources and outcomes of

subordinates. Thus, leader-follower relationships can differ significantly from peer

relationships, for example due to formal reward power (e.g., Raven, 2001). Therefore,

similar to recent studies, we excluded leader-follower relationships and focused on

relationships between peer team members (De Jong et al., 2007; Van der Vegt et al., 2010).

2) According to Van der Vegt et al. (2010, pp. 359–360), measures of power due to

asymmetries in task dependence “are related to but conceptually and mathematically distinct

from measures of power centralization”. Akin to Van der Vegt et al. our main theoretical

interest was focused on imbalance, rather than stratification. Therefore, we used the measure

of power imbalance.

3) To examine if our findings are robust we also re-ran our analyses by only including teams

which had 5 or more team members. The results were highly similar to those reported in the

main text. Simple slopes for power were positive and significant when task interdependence

was high (γ=.286, se=.100, p<.01) and non-significant when task interdependence was low

(γ=-.055, se=.145, n.s.). For individual performance the simple slopes were also positive and

significant when task interdependence was high (γ=.217, se=.103, p<.05) and non-

significant when task interdependence was low (γ=-.167, se=.150, n.s.). As these additional

analyses demonstrate our findings are robust.

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Table 1

Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Zero-Order Correlations among Study Variables at the Individual Level (n = 182).

Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 61 Team size 7.48 4.902 Age 35.36 9.85 -.043 Years in organization 7.42 7.41 .07 .58 ***4 Task interdependence 5.35 1.24 -.12 .02 -.025 Task autonomy 4.70 1.01 -.05 .09 .09 .096 Power .07 .87 -.02 .09 .13 -.01 .127 Individual performance 5.16 .96 -.03 -.09 -.16 * -.11 .03 .17 *

* p < .05*** p < .001

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Table 2

Results of Multi-level Analyses of Power.

Model 0 Model 1 Model 2Model Variable γ SE γ SE γ SE0 Intercept ß0ij .073 .065 .073 .065 .072 .0641 Controls Team size -.024 .070 -.022 .068

Age .011 .079 .008 .078Years in organization .111 .080 .103 .080

2 Main Task interdependence (TI) -.015 .065Task autonomy (TA) .095 .064

3 Interaction TI * PTA

Variance, team level .757 (.079) .740 (.094) .735 (.077)Variance, individual level .000 (.000) .004 (.055) .000 (.000)Total variance .757 .744 .735χ2 465.934 462.662 460.477∆χ2 - 3.272 2.185

* p < .05Note: n = 182 at the individual level and n = 37 at the team level. 

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Table 3

Results of Multi-level Analyses of Individual Performance.

43

Model 0Model Variable γ SE0 Intercept ß0ij 5.155 *** .0771 Controls Team size

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Figure Legends

Figure 1. Research Model of How the Interaction Between Task Autonomy and Task

Interdependence Relates to Power and Individual Performance at the Individual Level of

Analysis.

Figure 2. The Interaction Between Task Autonomy and Task Interdependence and Its

Relationship to Power.

Figure 3. The Interaction between Task Autonomy and Task Interdependence and its

Relationship to Individual Performance.

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Figure 1. (Sources of Measurement appear in Italics)

XTask

interdependence(rated by self)

Power within the team(rated by peers)

Individual performance

(rated by manager)

Task autonomy

(rated by self)

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Low High

-0.4

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

Task interde-pendence high

Task interde-pendence low

Task autonomy

Pow

er

Figure 2.

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Low High4.5

4.6

4.7

4.8

4.9

5.0

5.1

5.2

5.3

5.4

5.5

Task interde-pendence high

Task interde-pendence low

Task autonomy

Indi

vidu

al p

erfo

rman

ce

Figure 3.

47