University of Helsinki, Department of Social Sciences, 16 May 2012.

The ‘Second Demographic Transition’: What does it mean? How far will it go?

David Coleman

University of Oxford

In the beginning. the standard story: characteristics

of the ‘Western European demographic regime’ (according to Malthus, Wrigley and Schofield, Laslett, Hajnal et al.)

1. Relatively slow, intermittent population growth. 2. Moderate mortality levels. Mostly epidemic, not starvation or

war. e0 35 – 40 years.3.Moderate fertility – ‘low pressure’ regime. TFR 4 – 6.

Parity-specific family planning rare. Illegitimacy usually low – 5% of births or fewer.

4. Central role of late and variable marriage in a feedback system with the economy and population. Cohabitation and divorce unusual.

5. Household mostly based on nuclear family plus non-relatives (husbandry service, lodgers).

6. Possibly a promoting factor in market economy, capitalism, need for formal welfare systems.

England – mean age at first marriage 1600 – 1849.

England - average age at first marriage 1600 - 1849percent

marriage mean age never- marriagecohort men women married cohort

6.3 1556-711600-1649 28.0 26.0 24.1 1601-061650-1699 27.8 26.5 27.0 1651-561700-1749 27.5 26.2 11.2 1704-061750-1799 26.4 24.9 4.9 1751-561800-1849 25.3 23.4 9.6 1801-06

mean of 12 reconsitution studies, and back projections.Wrigley and Schofield 1981 t 7.26, 7.28.

Marriage patterns - East West Contrastspercent never-married at selected ages

men womencountry 20-24 45-49 20-24 45-49

Belgium 1900 85 16 71 17Sweden 1900 92 13 80 19

Bulgaria 1900 58 3 24 1Serbia 1900 50 3 16 1

Turkey 1935 49 3 18 3Japan 1920 71 2 31 2

India 1931 35 4 5 1

Source: Glass 1976.

Index of proportions married (Im), 1900, showing Hajnal’s line.Red= marriage late or avoided, blue = earlier, prevalent marriage

Source: Coale and Watkins 1996.

The end of the old marriage regime in Western Europe after the 1960s

Later or marginalised marriage.

Divorce terminates up to one marriage in two.

Cohabitation becomes ‘normal’.

Up to 60% children born outside marriage.

Childbearing postponed, family size falls.

These are the empirical indicators of the ‘Second Demographic Transition’ (Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa)

The end of the ancien regime in marriage: mean age at first marriage in England and Wales 1889 - 2001

Mean age at marriage, bachelors and spinsters, England and Wales 1889 - 2001. Source: ONS Series FM2

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

1889

1893

1897

1901

1905

1909

1913

1917

1921

1925

1929

1933

1937

1941

1945

1949

1953

1957

1961

1965

1969

1973

1977

1981

1985

1989

1993

1997

2001

bachelors spinsters

Trend in mean age at first marriage (females), The English-speaking countries 1945 - 2010

Trend in mean age at first marriage, females, 1945 - 2010. English-Speaking countries

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

1945

1948

1951

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1966

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1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

England and Wales

Canada

New Zealand

Australia

USA

Parallel developments throughout Europe.

Mean Age at First Marriage (females), groups of European countries 1960 - 2008. Source: Council of Europe, UNECE

21

23

25

27

29

31

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

Scandinavia mean

Southern Europe mean

NW Europe mean

CEE mean

FSU mean

former Yugoslavia mean (ex Bosnia)

Percent ever-married - decline from 1935 to 1960 birth cohorts, selected countries. Source:

Eurostat.

Proportions of women ever-married by 2002, selected European countries, Source: Eurostat.

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Sw

eden

Sw

itze

rlan

d

Fin

land

Aus

tria

Den

mar

k

Fra

nce

Nor

way

Bel

gium

Net

herl

ands

E&

W

Ital

y

1935 birth cohort

1960 birth cohort

High levels of cohabitation instead. Source: Kiernan 2004 table 2.

Partnership status, men and women aged 25 - 34 years, EU countries 2000-2001. Percent, ranked from left by order of percent ever-cohabited.

Source: Kiernan 2004 table 2.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Sw

eden

Den

mar

k

Fra

nce

Fin

land

Eas

t Ger

man

y

Aus

tria

Gre

at B

rita

in

Net

herl

ands

Lux

embu

rg

Irel

and

Wes

t Ger

man

y

Bel

gium

Spa

in

Gre

ece

Ital

y

Por

tuga

l

Ever married

Unmarried, ever-cohabited

Total First Marriage Rate – a simple synthetic cohort measure of proportions ever-marrying at current

rates.Simple total first marriage rate calculation,

England and Wales 2009females female age-specific

first population first marriage rateage marriages (all marital statuses) per 1000

female population

15-19 3,085 1680500 0.001820-24 32,753 1855700 0.017625-29 66,954 1844800 0.036330-34 41,504 1718100 0.024235-39 18,208 1882100 0.009740-44 7,264 2069800 0.003545-49 3,010 2041700 0.001550-54 1,239 1770000 0.000755-59 504 1605100 0.0003

sum to 60 0.0956*5 0.4780

Implication: at 2009 rates, 48% of women will marry at least once by age 60; 52% will not marry.

‘Gross nuptuality’ – a life-table measure of proportions ever-married implied by current patterns.

Simple marriage table, England and Wales 2009 ('Gross Nuptiality')The 'death rate' mx is the age-specific first marriage rate per 1000 spinsters.

The radix of the table is 10,000 unmarried women age 15 (not 16, for convenience)By age 60, 3890 / 10000 remain unmarried , or 39%, with 61% ever-married.

percent

age mx mx/10000 qx lx ever-married

15 2.2 0.0022 0.0109 10000 020 19.1 0.0191 0.0911 9891 1.125 51.4 0.0514 0.2277 8989 10.130 51.2 0.0512 0.2270 6942 30.635 29.5 0.0295 0.1374 5366 46.340 15.8 0.0158 0.0760 4629 53.745 10.0 0.0100 0.0488 4277 57.250 7.0 0.0070 0.0344 4069 59.355 2.0 0.0020 0.0100 3929 60.760 2.0 0.0020 0.0100 3890 61.1

Trends in Total First Marriage Rate, groups of European countries 1960 - 2002. Source: Council of Europe and

Eurostat. Total First Marriage Rate, groups of European countries 1960 - 2002.

Source: Council of Europe

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

1.1

1.2

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

Scandinavia mean

Southern Europe mean

NW Europe mean

CEE mean

FSU mean

former Yugoslavia mean (ex Bosnia)

Not as low as it seems? Period measures of total first marriage rate, Austria, Germany and Switzerland, 1970 – 2000, observed and corrected

for postponement etc (left to right), according to Bongaarts and Feeney (BF), Kohler and Philipov (2001, KP) Kohler and Ortega (2002, KO). Source:

Winkler-Dworak and Engelhardt 2004

Trends in Total Divorce Rate, groups of developed countries. Source; Council of Europe, Eurostat.

Total Divorce Rate trends, groups of European countries 1960 - 2003

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

Scandinavia

Former Soviet Union

Western Europe

Central and Eastern Europe

Balkans (FR Yugoslavia only)

Southern Europe

Total Divorce Rate, selected countries 1960 – 2003.

TDR trends, selected countries, 1960 - 2003. Source: Council of Europe

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

FinlandEstoniaDenmarkNorwayFranceRomaniaFR Yugoslavia

Total Divorce Rate 1948 – 2011, selected countries. Source: national statistical offices.

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

1945

1948

1951

1954

1957

1960

1963

1966

1969

1972

1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

2011

Czech Republic

Austria

Switzerland

Norway

Total Divorce Rate Finland 1970 - 2008

Trends in births outside marriage, groups of

developed countries. Sources: Council of Europe, Eurostat, National statistical yearbooks

Births outside marriage per 1000 live births, European regions and Anglosphere 1955 - 2010. Source: Council of Europe, Eurostat, national demographic yearbooks.

0

100

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400

500

600

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1957

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2003

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2009

Scandinavia 4

English-speaking world outside Europe

Western Europe

Eastern Europe and FSU

Southern Europe

The ‘Second Demographic Transition (SDT)’ theory (van de Kaa, Lesthaeghe 1986)

Explains high levels of cohabitation, extramarital births, retreat from marriage, divorce, ‘lowest- low’ fertility since 1960s.

Driven by spread of new attitudes and values of tolerant, individualistic nature (‘post-materialism’).

‘Inevitable consequence of realisation of higher-order human needs in prosperous, educated, secular, secure welfare societies’ (Maslow, Ingelhart).

Will therefore become a universal attribute of developed societies.

Part of the coherent SDT ‘package’: births outside marriage and the total divorce rate, selected European countries around 2000.

Births outside marriage and Total Divorce Rate, selected European countries 2000. Source: Council of Europe 2002

United Kingdom

Switzerland

Sweden

Spain

Portugal

Norway

Netherlands

Luxembourg

Italy

HungaryGermany

France

Finland

DenmarkBelgiumAustria

y = 0.0052x + 0.1783

R2 = 0.3167

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60Births outside marriage per 100 live births

Tot

al D

ivor

ce R

ate

A hierarchy of human needs. (based on Abraham Maslow, ‘Motivation and Personality’, 1954).

Measuring ‘post-materialism’. Inglehart’s ‘post-materialist’ questionnaire.

Bold = short questionnaire. Blue = ‘materialist’ responses; Green = ‘postmaterialist’ responses

Robert Inglehart (1977) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics.

A Maintain order in the nation. B Give people more say in the decisions of the government. C Fight rising prices. D Protect freedom of speech. E Maintain a high rate of economic growth. F Make sure that this country has strong defence forces. G Give people more say in how things are decided at work and in their community. H Try to make our cities and countryside more beautiful. I Maintain a stable economy. J Fight against crime. K Move towards a friendlier, less impersonal society. L Move towards a society where ideas count more than money.

‘post materialist’ attitudes and valuesReligiosity and living arrangements respondents 20-29 in

Belgium, France, West Germany and Netherlands 1990Men WomenSingle Cohab Married Single Cohab Marriedwith with

Beliefs (odds ratio) parents parentsBelieves in God 1.0 0.52 1.86 1.0 0.39 1.54Believes in Sin 1.0 0.47 1.48 1.0 0.69 1.35Prays outside church 1.0 0.60 1.07 1.0 0.59 1.85Believes in reincarnation 1.0 3.29 1.03 1.0 0.72 0.35

Thinks never justified (%)Both sexesTaking drugs 70 62 85Cheating taxman 31 22 41Avoiding fares 34 30 48Fighting with police 29 29 44

Littering 59 62 65Lying 13 18 20Drink-driving 56 67 65

Source: Lesthaeghe and Moors 1996

Association between an index of SDT values (SDT2) and an index of family behaviour (SDT1) (not total

fertility). Source: Sobotka 2008, Figure 4.

Other approaches. Heath, Evans and Martin 1993.Libertarian scale. responses to:

‘Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values’.‘Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards’.‘People in Britain should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives’.‘Homosexual relations are always wrong’.‘People should be allowed to organize public meetings to protest against the government’.‘Even political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should not be banned’.

Socialist/laissez-fair scale. responses to:‘There is one law for the rich and one for the poor’.‘There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees' working conditions and wages’.‘It is government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one’.‘Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic problems’.‘Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership’.

Some problems with the SDT concept

Wrong in respect of fertility.

No so much ‘Second’ but ‘secondary’?

Not really ‘Demographic’?

Not (yet) a ‘Transition’

Imperialistic. Other explanations preferable for demographic change in Central and Eastern Europe, East Asia.

Birth rates can go up as well as down, and the end of ‘lowest-low’ fertility.

Total Fertility trends, industrial higher-fertility countries 1945-2010 Source: Council of Europe, Eurostat and national statistical yearbooks

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

1945

1948

1951

1954

1957

1960

1963

1966

1969

1972

1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

Denmark

France

NZ

USA

Norway

United Kingdom

An incoherent concept? International comparisons show that national populations most enthusiastic for ‘SDT’ behaviour have the highest, not the lowest

fertility.TFR and extramarital births per thousand live births 2009

USA

UK

Taiwan

Switzerland

Sweden

Spain

Slovenia

Slovakia

SerbiaRussiaRomania

Portugal

Poland

Norway

New Zealand

Netherlands

Montenegro

Moldova

Malta

Luxemburg

Lithuania

Latvia

Korea J apan

Italy

Ireland

Iceland

Hungary

Greece

Germany

Georgia

France

Finland

Estonia

Denmark

Czech Republic

CyprusCroatia

Canada

Bulgaria

Belgium

Belarus

Austria

Australia

y = 346.96x - 223.1

R2 = 0.3713

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3

Total fertility

Pro

por

tion

of

bir

ths

outs

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mar

riag

e p

er 1

000

The Empty Quarter

Persistent variety - Crude Divorce Rate 2003 . red = high, blue = low.

Council of Europe, recent demographic developments in Europe 2003 map 6

Works better at sub-national level? Spatial distribution of the SDT factor for US counties

(blue= higher STD factor) Lesthaeghe, Neidert and Surkyn 2006

Not ‘Second’ but ‘Secondary’?

A major change in behaviour. But some aspects not without precedent (Cliquet 1991).

Other ‘transitions’ important (e.g 16th C. West European Marriage Pattern)

In some respects a consequence of ‘First Demographic Transition’ or a continuation of it.

Not ‘Demographic’ – does not address the central issues?

Demography deals centrally with birth and death, migration and population

‘SDT’ concept more concerned with sex, changing morals and living arrangements – a sociological transition

Prediction of very low fertility contradicted by international comparative data

Does not address mortality or population growth, decline or ageing.

Has nothing directly to say about migration.

Not a ‘Transition’?

A ‘transition’ is permanent, universal, irreversible?Otherwise a limited set of behaviour.Some take it, some leave it: result is diversity, not uniformity

(so far).Nowhere yet universal, unlike First DT.Will other cultures (e.g.) Muslims adopt it?Some elements traditional in non-European societies (simple

societies, South America)?However, some aspects of SDT behaviour now emerging

more widely (Northern Italy, Japan).

Not reversible?

Total First Marriage Rate, selected countries 1960-2002

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

1.1

1.2

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

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1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

Denmark

Germany

France

Iceland

Spain

UK

Finland

‘Sustainable?

Fiscal burdens e.g. divorce adds 15% to UK benefit bill (£15 bn); creates 3 for 2 new households.

Can an economy afford SDT and population ageing? The latter is unavoidable.

Psychosocial externalities. In UK and US at least, some evidence that ‘new living arrangements’ damage childrens’ (social) health and prospects.

Controversial UK social policy (after 2010) aimed at reversing elements of SDT?

Economic recession may be a test.

Underlying theory

SDT good as empirical description of behaviour

Inglehart ‘post-materialism’ an uncertain theoretical foundation : really different from ‘conservativism / liberalism’? Weak test / retest and predictive power?

Plurality of explanations needed for diverse situations (CEE).

Ultimately an Economic model?

Central and Eastern Europe demographic behaviour –a diversity of explanation needed.

Is female education and workforce participation part of the SDT?

Post – communist demographic modernisation after abrupt end to state socialist demographic regime (e.g. early, universal childbearing) ; more crisis than emancipation?

Social dislocation and anomie – predominance of SDT behaviour among poorest, including rural populations

‘Hajnal’s line’ persists into the 21st century – low mean age at first marriage in Eastern Europe around 2002 as a relic of the state socialist

demographic regime . Source: Council of Europe 2003

Trends in rate of union formation (cohabitation and direct marriage, competing risks) 1960 – 2004 in

Russia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Source Hoem et al 2008.

Rapid ‘modernisation’ of marriage in Central and Eastern Europe post-1989

.Total First Marriage Rate, selected countries 1960-2002

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

1.1

1.2

1960

1962

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1966

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1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

Denmark

France

Iceland

UK

Finland

Bulgaria

Czech Republic f

Mean age at first marriage 1960 – 2010. Selected countries in Western and Central and Eastern Europe.

Mean Age at First Marriage (females), selected countries 1960-2010. Sources: Council of Europe, UNECE.

21

23

25

27

29

31

33

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

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1998

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2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Denmark f

Finland f

Germany f

France f

Czech Republic

Bulgaria

Hungary

Romania

Former Soviet Union, 1956 – 2010, births outside marriage per 1000 live births.

Live births outside marriage, per thousand llive births, former Soviet Union 1955 - 2010

Source: Council of Europe and national statistical yearbooks. Excludes Moldova.

0

100

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700

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pe

r th

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san

d li

ve b

irth

s

Estonia Georgia Latvia

Russia Lithuania Belarus

Ukraine Armenia Azerbaijan

Is Central and Eastern Europe really ‘post-materialist’?

Births outside marriage per 1000, 1970-2001, CEE

0

100

200

300

400

500

60019

70

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

Belarus Bulgaria Czech Republic

DDR Estonia 3*Real GDP/NMP in Eastern Europe

3*Real GDP/NMP Baltic States 3Real GDP/NMP CIS

Is some SDT behaviour driven by poverty, not prosperity? some examples

‘UK upper-middle class pioneers in cohabitation’. British Household Panel Survey 1950-62 cohort : ‘More cohabitation with higher father’s social status. Class distinction disappears with 1963-76 cohort, cohabitation normative’. (Ermisch and Francesconi , 2007)

USA: ‘Transitions to marriage especially unlikely among poor women. Cohabitation among poor women a long-term substitute for marriage’. Poor family background, women’s economic resources salient in transitions. (Lichter et al. 2006, Demography)

Sweden: ‘Women of lower socio-economic background more likely to cohabit and have births outside marriage’. (Hoem 1986, EJP)

Russia: ‘Least-educated women have highest birth rates within cohabitation, lower probability of legitimating a nonmarital conception. Nonmarital childbearing in Russia more like pattern of disadvantage in United States than ‘second demographic transition’. (Perelli-Harris 2011,Demography).

USA: ‘Transitions to cohabitation more rapid among working class for practical reasons - financial necessity, convenience, housing need. Middle-class cohabitors more likely to become engaged than working-class cohabitors’. (Sassler 2011, Family Relations)

Association of SDT behaviour with poverty

USA: Most working and lower-middle class cohabitors mentioned lack of economic resources as delaying marriage: insufficient money “to pay the bills,” desire to own a home upon marriage, be debt-free, have a “real” wedding. Stress over money source of conflict for some couples. (Smock, Manning, and Porter 2005).

Edin (2000) low-income mothers women chose cohabitation or single-parenthood due to their partner’s fragile income. “pay and stay rule. USA (Smock et al 2008 Michigan Population Studies Center)

women from more affluent backgrounds more likely to cohabit, but less likely to have a child in cohabitation, middleclass women remain single longer.

First birth within a cohabiting union in Britain more likely when the man unemployed. Women with fathers in unskilled or semi-skilled manual jobs much more likely to become mothers in cohabiting unions.

Cohabiting couples with children are generally more likely to have low socio-economic status compared to childless cohabitants, UK, Morgan 2000 p. 16

‘cohabiting couples with children two or three times as likely to be in the semi-skilled and unskilled groups’ (UK, Kiernan and Estaugh, 1993, p. 16).

Births outside marriage by social class of father, England and Wales 1976 – 2000 (percent).

Source: Maher and Macfarlane 2004, table 2 (from ONS)

Live births outside marriage, percent, by social class of father, England and Wales 1976 - 200

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Social Class 5

Social Class 4

Social Class 3 (Manual)

Social Class 3 (Non-manual)

Social Class 2

Social Class 1

Births outside marriage, percent, England and Wales 2010 according to fathers’ socio-economic category.

Source: ONS. Note: births registered by mother only not included.

Percent of births outside marriage by socio-economic category, England and Wales 2010. Source: ONS

22.319.6

32.5

38.6

45.4

53.3 53.7

61.8

0

10

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40

50

60

70

1.1 1.2 2 3 4 5 6 7

Per

cen

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bir

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outs

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e

1.1 Large employers and higher managerial1.2 Higher professional2 Lower managerial and professional3 Intermediate4 Small employers and own-account workers5 Lower supervisory and technical6 Semi-routine7 Routine

Another badly-fitting example– trends in marriage and reproduction in East Asia.

Mean age at first marriage, females, in East Asia 1947 – 2010Mean age at first marriage, females, East Asian countries 1945 - 2011

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

1945

1948

1951

1954

1957

1960

1963

1966

1969

1972

1975

1978

1981

1984

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

2011

Korea

Singapore

Taiwan

Japan

Divorces per 100 marriages, calendar years 1930 – 2010, Japan and Korea.

marriage divorces divorces/ 100 marriages

marriage divorces divorces/ 100 marriages

1930 506674 51259 10 180833 8894 51940 666575 48556 7 158271 8151 51950 715081 83689 12 85043 3223 41960 866115 69410 8 186187 7016 41970 1029405 95937 9 295137 11615 41980 774706 141689 18 403031 23662 61990 722138 157608 22 399312 45694 112000 798138 285911 36 334303 119982 362010 730971 257475 35 326100 126900 39

Note: Korea '1940' data are for 1938, '1950' data are for 1949. Japan - '2010' data are 2006

Sources: Population Statistics of Japan 2008, tables 6.1, 6.2, Kim 2004 Table 6.1, Statistics Korea

Marriage and divorce trends Korea and Japan 1930 - 2010

Japan Korea

Proportions of women never-married at ages 30-34, selected East Asian countries and Bangkok, Source: Jones 2003

Table 1; 2012, table 3, Hong Kong census 2011, Population Statistics of Japan 2008 table 6.22. Notes: Blank = no data. Hong Kong '2000' data are for 1996, '2010' data for 2011. Japan '2020' data are 2005. Taiwan - years end in '-1', '2010' data

are 2004.Taiwan-Fuchien demographic fact book

30-34 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010Pen. Malaysia (Chinese) 4 10 13 16 18Taiwan 2 7 8 13 22 27Japan 9 7 9 14 27 32Korea 1 1 3 5 11

Singapore (Chinese) 5 11 18 22 22 30Hong Kong 6 6 11 25 27 38Bangkok 12 17 25 29 33

Proportions of women never-married by ages 30-34 , East Asian countries.

Very low levels of birth outside marriage in East Asia – but increasing.

Births outside marriage per 1000 live births, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan 1947 - 2010. Sources: national statistical offices.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

1947

1950

1953

1956

1959

1962

1965

1968

1971

1974

1977

1980

1983

1986

1989

1992

1995

1998

2001

2004

2007

2010

Hong Kong

Taiwan

Japan

South Korea

ConclusionsRevolution in sexual behaviour, living arrangements, setting

for childbearing, family building postponement postponement and associated values and attitudes.

This ‘SDT’ behaviour incomplete and limited so far – result is new diversity, not yet a new regime, nor universal.

SDT theory creative, valuable, testable, influential. Facts contradict its predictions on reproduction at national

level.‘Poverty led’ aspects not compatible with theoretical model

of ‘post-materialism’.Negative feedbacks (costs) may limit its scope, especially in

times of economic distress.‘P-M’ is only one of several possible models for empirically

similar behaviour in CEE and East Asia.