unquestionable corruption submitted to court of appeals of the first circuit case 11-2292 docketing...

8/3/2019 Unquestionable Corruption submitted to Court of Appeals of the First Circuit Case 11-2292 Docketing Statement

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Case: 11-2292 Document: 00116288179 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/08/2011 Entry ID: 559409


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Please note that the docket text to Dkt. # 102 dated 10/12/2011 states US District Court Clerkto deliver official record to Court of Appeals by 11/1/2011. An abbreviated electronic record

was delivered on 11/2/2011. A call was place to Jeanette Ramos at 5:07 PM on November 2,

2011 requesting that the entire electronic record be delivered to the Court of Appeals as per

Local Rule 11.0 Transmission of the Record ( b) In pro se cases, the entire record will betransmitted to the circuit clerk; the request to Ms. Ramos was made again at 9:30 AM on

11/04/2011 along with a request that the entire docket activity report be transmitted to the

Court of Appeals as the docket text report transmitted on 11/02/2011 is inadequate for use in fully presenting this Plaintiffs position.

B. Finality of Order or Judgment

2. a & b continued

CONTINUATION OF EXPLAINATION:

This action in the US District Court of Massachusetts is not under the provisions of 28 U. S. C.636 (c). Magistrate Judge Sorokin is not the trial judge and Magistrate Judge Sorokin was notthe ordering judge as incorrectly noted on the docket in this court for Case No. 11-1668 In re:McGarry. The law is clear regarding consent to the Magistrates jurisdiction. Without a signedconsent to jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge, the Magistrate Judge has no authority to writeorders regarding contempt under 636(e) and the Magistrate Judge has no authority to write orderson referred matters under 636 (b). Dkt. #61 had ORDERS undersigned by the MagistrateJudge that DENIED and also excused the Defendants from responding to Plaintiffs ContemptMotion (Dkt. #58). Plaintiffs Motion for Contempt (Dkt. #58) filed by this Plaintiff on January30, 2011was written regarding contemptuous behavior by the pro se staff attorney and defensecounsel who were noted to be in more than obvious collusion while the case was assigned to theUS District Judge; the order of reference to the Magistrate Judge was not entered on the Docketuntil January 31, 2011. Even if there had been a valid US District Judge order referring the caseto the Magistrate for pre trial proceedings and a valid order from the US District Judge referring

the contempt motion (Dkt. #58) to the Magistrate in compliance with Magistrate Rules for TheDistrict of Massachusetts Rule 8, the Magistrate Judge had no authority beyond a report andrecommendation to the US District Judge.

A magistrate judge may exercise both civil and criminal contempt authority in certaincircumstances. See 28 U.S.C. 636(e). These include summary criminal contempt authority formisbehavior in the magistrate judges presence so as to obstruct the administration of justice,

and criminal and civil contempt authority in misdemeanor cases and civil consent cases. See 28



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U.S.C. 636(e)(2), (3), (4). In other circumstances, the Federal Magistrates Act provides for a

procedure whereby the magistrate judge certifies facts pertaining to contempt to a district judge.See 28 U.S.C. 636(e)(6); see also Hunter TBA, Inc. v. Triple V Sales, 250 F.R.D. 116, 117-18(E.D.N.Y. 2008).

The Magistrate Judge denied this Plaintiff her right to bring her contempt motion and the voidorders of Dkt. #61 to the attention of a US District Judge; there was no final decision or ordersby the US District Judge regarding Plaintiffs Contempt Motion (Dkt.. #58) and the Magistrate

Judge denying this Plaintiffs requested review of his orders in a case where he had no consent tojurisdiction or valid order to act on any matter by a US District Judge is a clear andunquestionable usurpation.

The orders of Dkt. #61 are void; there is no legal order that restricted this Plaintiff from filingwith the US District Court. All subsequent orders to the aforementioned, more than obvious,void order are also void. The Magistrate Judge by denying this Plaintiffs motions and refusing

to recuse himself while actively blocking this Plaintiff from Article III oversight was essentiallyholding this Plaintiffs action hostage on his docket as fictitious memorandum that withoutwarrant continually intimidated and threatened this Plaintiff with sanctions and complaintdismissal and bizarre and unjust orders that denied any form of due process. The unauthorizeddefense counsel were allowed to continue with their fictitious memorandum as they workedtoward their goal of complaint dismissal.

The Magistrate had no authority to write a Report and Recommendation (Dkt. #80) under theprovision of 28 U. S. C. 236 (e) because holding a case hostage while violating legislativeauthority and constitutional rights when there was no legitimate reference of the case to theMagistrate Judge from a US District Judge to begin with leaves him without jurisdiction over thematter and this Plaintiff. The Magistrate Judge usurped this action from the time he was madeaware that Dkt. #61existed knowing full well he never approved of the filing as he sat on thebench and made a blatant false statement by stating he did during a scheduling conference that hehad no authority to convene. Let this Plaintiff not leave absent the fact that the unauthorizedattorneys filing of the Contempt Motion (Dkt. #71) by local rule and Massachusetts law cannotand should not be a filing recognized by the court; so in actuality there was no motion thatrequired a report and recommendation to the US District Judge.

Further, the US District Judge had no idea the contempt motion (Dkt. #71) existed which isdemonstrated by the fact that nowhere on the docket was the Contempt Motion (Dkt. #71)referenced to the Magistrate by order of the US District Judge as per Magistrate Rules for TheDistrict of Massachusetts[Rule 8 states that the manner of referral to the magistrate judge ofspecific matters in a case shall be in accordance with the provisions of Rule 8(b); [8(b) Mannerof Referral(4) All other civil matters may be referred to the magistrate judges only by order of adistrict judge. The order must specify the matters to be considered and the action to be taken bythe magistrate judge.]

This Plaintiff requested case management by an Article III Judge in Dkt. #48, # 51, #58, #64attachment 1and Dkt. #78. In Plaintiffs Motion IMMEDIATE REASSIGNMENT TO A



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DIFFERENTUS District Judge and Magistrate Judge (Dkt. # 69) this Plaintiff requestedreassignment to an Honorable Judge and protection from further conspiracy; Magistrate JudgeSorokin denied the motion with docket text and terminated the motion from the docket. Themotion was never seen by the US District Judge.

See the docket at Dates 3/2/2011 and 3/3/2011 where motions for judicial reassignment andvacate void orders are denied by the Magistrate Judge with electronic orders and then themotions immediately terminated from the docket (Deadline/ hearing docket Dkt. #33 attachments7 & 8); the Magistrate again had no authority beyond a report and recommendation to the USDistrict Judge regarding the vacate void orders motion and this, again, is unquestionableusurpation. Not only did the Magistrate refuse to disqualify himself after clear and unarguableviolation of this in forma pauperis disabled Plaintiffs constitutional rights to due process andArticle III oversight he blocked the filings from the US District Judge.

The bizarre orders of Dkt. #57 are also transparently invalid because no honest US District Judgewould prohibit a pro se Plaintiff from making reference to docketing information which is a clear

violation ofthe US Constitutions First Amendment right; further, no honest US District Judgewould have the same person from whom a pro se Plaintiff was seeking relief thru an injunctivemotion draft the memorandum and orders to the said motion; partiality in any decision would bewithout question. The fact that this Plaintiff requested a hearing with a US District Judge in Dkt.#48 that was denied by the pro se staff attorney and that this Plaintiff requested a hearing againin Dkt. #78, #81 and #88 in regards to the bogus contempt the Defendants were unlawfullyseeking where this Plaintiffs hearing requests were never even addressed in any document fromthe US District Court is without question a denial of due process and clearly a denial of actuallegitimate access to the court; more than apparent the usurpers were blocking this Plaintiff froma hearing in front of a US District Judge knowing the usurpation would be revealed amongmultiple other improprieties that had occurred throughout the now15 months old case that hashad zero legitimate court process.

A decree which has been erroneously rendered must nonetheless be obeyed until overturned, and violators thereofmay be punished for criminal contempt. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 293(1947); United States v. J. Myer Schine, 260 F.2d 552, 557 (2nd Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 934 (1959). Apossible exception exists where the order is "transparently" unlawful. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307,315 (1967).

No. 86-1336 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT820 F.2d 1342; 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 36502; 91 A.L.R. Fed. 245; 13 Media L. Rep.1945December 31, 1986Because the order was transparently invalid, the appellants should have been allowed to challenge itsconstitutionality at the contempt proceedings. A fortiori, the order cannot serve as the basis for a contempt citation.

The order of the district court finding the Providence Journal Company and its executive editor, Charles M. Hauser,in criminal contempt is therefore reversed.When, as here, the court order is a transparently invalid prior restraint on pure speech, the delay and expense of anappeal is unnecessary.The dilemma is particularly acute where First Amendment interests are at stake, for even a temporary restraint onexpression may constitute irreparable injury. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 49 L. Ed. 2d683, Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182, 89 S. Ct. 347, 21 L. Ed. 2d 325(1968)." In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 184 n.15;; see also Goldblum, 584 F.2d at 907. ("A broadcaster or publishershould not, in circumstances such as those in this case, be required to make a sudden appearance in court and then totake urgent measures to secure appellate relief, all the while weighing the delicate question of whether or not refusal



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to comply with an apparently invalid order constitutes a contempt."); Goodale, 29 Stan. L. Rev. at 509 (Walker doesnot require a party subject to a transparently invalid prior restraint to seek appellate review.). [**37] Nebraska PressAssoc., 427 U.S. at 558.

Rule 60(b)(4) permits a court to grant relief from a "void" judgment. "Void" means the court lacked the power toenter the judgment, usually when it lacked jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter. A judgment can also be

void if the court violated "due .process of law" or engaged in" a plain usurpation of power. " Matter of Whitney-Forbes, 770 F.2d 692,696-97 (7th Cir. 1985); V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220,224-25 (loth Cir. 1979);United States v. Holtzman, 762 F.2d 720,724 (9th Cir. 1985) (a plain misinterpretation of statutorily delegatedpower is "blatant usurpation)

The order for dismissal (Dkt. # 86) was a scanned document to mask the properties of the PDFwhich if not masked would show the documents origin was not from the computer of theHonorable Judge OToole. (Dkt. # 86) was entered into the ECF System by Judge OToolesDocket clerk but it was scanned on the Computer used by Magistrates Judge Sorokins JudicialAssistant. See affidavit at Dkt. #100 attachment 1.

The document that dismissed this action with prejudice was not scanned on the computer used by

either Judge OTooles Deputy or Docket Clerk. The document had no hand signature. Thedismissal was continued usurpation. This Plaintiff knows the PDF properties of scanned PDFscreated on Judge OTooles and Magistrate Sorokins clerk staffs computers;

11-cv-10563 entered 8/05/2011 by Judge OTooles Docket Clerk and scanned on Judge OTooles Docket Clerkscomputer --signed by Judge OToole

10-cv-10443 entered by Judge OTooles Deputy Clerk on 9/22/11 and scanned on Judge OTooles Deputy Clerkscomputer signed by both the Deputy Clerk and Judge O'Toole

The only legitimate reason any scanned Document should be coming from the US District Courtof Massachusetts would be that the document has the hand signature of a Judge or Clerk.

01-cv-12257 order entered 9 19 2011 is an adopted R & R scanned but hand signed by Judge Young09-cv-10237 order entered 1 05 2011 is an adopted R & R scanned but hand signed by Judge Tauro10-cv-10699 order entered 9 28 2011 is an adopted R & R scanned but hand signed by Judge Tauro10-cv-11009 order entered 9 28 2011 is an adopted R & R scanned but hand signed by Judge Gorton11-cv-10092 order entered 9 20 2011 is an adopted R & R scanned but hand signed by Judge Gorton10-cv-12143 order entered 9 27 2011 is an adopted R & R scanned but hand signed by Judge Gorton08-cv-10051 order entered 9 27 2011 is an adopted R & R scanned but hand signed by Chief Judge Wolf

This case No. 10 CA 11343 GAO in the US District Court of Massachusetts is in whole pretenselitigation. This action was brought after receiving a Notice to Suit Rights from the EEOC

where a sham investigation also took place (see Dkt. #29 paragraph 186 or the excerpt of this

paragraph from Dkt. #29 at Dkt. 51 attachment 6 and the following supporting exhibits).Dkt.Attachment No.15-29 newly purchased home six days before position statement hand delivered to EEOC by attorney15-30 actual residence17- 1 actual residence with 12/09 mortgage taken15-33 Document re: retaliation submitted to EEOC 7/20/2009 no response from EEOC for eight months15-34 EEOC Charge amended 3/5/2010->retaliation -> no response from the Defendants/ charge not in FOIA file15- 35 EEOC Bogus Determination Letter signed by investigator not the Director as per legislative authority15-36 letter to NY requesting FOIA File by EEOC Director with EEOC charge number recorded incorrectly



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15-38 letter requesting section 83 from EEOC ignored / frustrated into asking for the FOIA file15-44 EEOC July news letter excerpts that describe legitimate processing of charges and section 83 process50-2 EEOC Charge-the EEOC Completely ignored the hostility described in this charge

This Plaintiff alleges that the US District Courts general court order 09-4 May 1, 2009 [{Inorder to facilitate the appointment of pro bono counsel for indigent pro se parties in civil cases

when such appointment has been authorized by a judicial officer, the Judges of the United StatesDistrict Court for the District of Massachusetts have approved the Plan for the Appointment of

Counsel for Indigent Parties in Certain Civil Cases in the form attached hereto.} {The objective

of this Plan for the Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Parties in Certain Civil Cases (Plan) is

to facilitate the appointment of pro bono counsel for indigent pro se parties in civil cases when

such appointment has been authorized by a judicial officer. This Plan does not apply to the

appointment of counsel for pro se plaintiffs who assert employment-related claims againstcurrent or former employers}] is in violation of legislative authority and promotes, as allegedin the instant case, retaliation as a defensive tactic which promoted this Plaintiffs indigent status.Highly unethical high priced civil defense attorneys in collusion with court staff have beenrunning planned pretense litigation where this unrepresented disabled Pro Se Plaintiff has been

forced to do an insurmountable amount of legal work in an action she was set up to loose fromthe start. The docket, now with 101 entries, would not have required even one filing by thisPlaintiff past the initial complaint where the bogus ANSWER submitted by unauthorizedDefense Attorneys who intentionally did not file a Notice of Appearance would have raised theeyebrows of any honest judge.

Title 28 1915. Proceedings in forma pauperis (e)(1) The court may request an attorney torepresent any person unable to afford counsel.

Even Disability Law Center here in Massachusetts stated they could not assist disabled litigantsin employment related litigation yet Disability Pro Bono entities in other states list available

assistance in employment discrimination matters on their web sites. This Plaintiff has researchedmultiple pro bono programs and sees, thus far, no other Pro Bono Program that excludesPlaintiffs in employment related litigation in other US District Courts. The US District Court ofMassachusetts Pro Bono Plan FAQs PDF added to a Pro Bono page on their web site reads,However, it is not rare for the Court to seek pro bono counsel for non-prisoner litigants in a

variety of cases, including housing and employment discrimination actions. The FAQ PDF wasfirst created on 4/27/11 and modified on 5/5/2011; the aforementioned allegations were firstraised by this Plaintiffs in documentation to the court January 19, 2011(Dkt. #51 and #52) and atthat time lingering motions where the word emergency appeared on the docket no less than tentimes turned to abusive court process with more than obvious extra measures taken to ensure thisPlaintiff remained blocked from a US District Judge as purposeful violation of legislative

authority and court established procedure occurred with even more bogus documentation comingfrom, both, the court and the unauthorized defense attorneys. The only Pro Bono assistanceapproved in employment cases noted by this Plaintiff has been short term for ADR only.

CORRECTION Dkt. #51 paragraph 2 at line 3 should read [believe that the decision was not thatof a U S District Judge.]



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The aforementioned is an open avenue to corruption for unethical civil defense attorneys whohandle employment cases for corporations such as in the instant case where these Jackson LewisAttorneys have clearly been handed a free reign by the US District Court staff to violate multiplemodel rules of professional conduct while in more than obvious collusion as they cover eachother with bogus documentation while ignoring fact, law, rule, constitutional rights and criminal

federal law. The unauthorized Defense Attorneys and staff involved in this usurpation deny theaforementioned allegation through their bogus documentation but the actual court record,material evidence and the law support this Plaintiffs allegations.

Dkt. # 64 is a Notice of Intent to file Mandamus with exhibit 1 the language of a Mandamus. Thelanguage of the Mandamus describes the method used to effectuate a pretense litigation whichincluded placing on the docket Notice for Social Security and Immigration Cases (this willshow on the docket activity report 8/10/2010 first entry) which by local rule are exempt fromscheduling conferences; the category sheet that this Plaintiff filed with her complaint was neverentered on the docket. The pro se staff attorney intentionally did not comply with the courtsGeneral Order (09-3)authorizing the assignment of civil cases to the Magistrate Judges so that

she could control the case from the US District Judge's docket. PROCEDURES AND OTHERINFORMATION FOR COMPLETING THE FORM FOR CONSENT OR REFUSAL OFMAGISTRATE JUDGE JURISDICTION were never sent to this Plaintiff as per the courtgeneral order. Dkt. #64 and attachment 1 were served by a process server back in January of2011who was instructed to put the documents in Judge O'Toole's hand but instead the documentswere accepted by Judge O'Toole's assistant on his behalf (receipt verifying process served Dkt.#69 attachment 1); no response from Judge O'Toole came forth and usurpation of this casecontinued.

In spite ofthis Plaintiffs strong objection, the reference to the Magistrate was forced (see dockettext at #58) as well as this Plaintiffs Request for Reliefin Dkt. # 51(1) This entire action to

be put immediately before Judge OTooleDkt. #57 with the order referencing the case to

the Magistrate included the pro se staff attorneys ruling on Dkt. #51. Both Dkt. # 51 & #52

were captioned REQUEST IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY RELIEF FROM JUDGEOTOOLE.

See this Plaintiffs affidavit attachment 1 to Dkt. #97, affidavit attachment 1 to Dkt. # 100, andattachment 1 to Dkt. #64 the language of this mandamus was also referenced in theExtraordinary Writ filed with this court June 10, 2011. The January Mandamus never received aresponse and the Extraordinary Writ filed with this court in June was DENIED without an

opinion ten days after filed. Usurpation falls under the crimes victims act.

TITLE 18 PART II CHAPTER 237 3771 3771. Crime victims rights(d)(3) Motion for relief and writ of mandamus The rights described in subsection (a) shall beasserted in the district court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if noprosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred. Thedistrict court shall take up and decide any motion asserting a victims right forthwith. If the

district court denies the relief sought, the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ ofmandamus. The court of appeals may issue the writ on the order of a single judge pursuant tocircuit rule or the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court of appeals shall take up and



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decide such application forthwith within 72 hours after the petition has been filed. In no eventshall proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of more than five days for purposes ofenforcing this chapter. If the court of appeals denies the relief sought, the reasons for the denialshall be clearly stated on the record in a written opinion.

This Plaintiff noted on September 21, 2011 that on June 28, 2011 Brian Childs, of Jackson Lewismade a Notice of Appearance in the already decided case; this Plaintiff also noted June 13, 2011docket text that was not present on the docket, June 20, 2011, the day JUDGMENT wasentered. Guy P Tully made his notice of appearance on June 15, 2011 which was without anydelay placed on the docket; apparently he assumed another successful fraud at the five day mark.Brian Childs Notice of appearance on June 28, 2011 was also docketed without any delay. ThisPlaintiff noted when going through the ECF training modules the notice to officers of this courtthat explained Notice of Appearance can take a few days to enter on the docket. Brian Childsmade another appearance in this court on June 16, 2011 yet that appearance was not docketeduntil June 21, 2011. See case no. 11-1693.

June 13, 2011 docket text:[CASE submitted. Panel: Sandra L. Lynch, Chief Appellate Judge; Kermit V. Lipez, Appellate Judge; Jeffrey R.Howard, Appellate Judge. [11-1668] (SBT)]

There was no panel assignment when this Writ was denied on June 20, 2011;in fact the block onthe upper part of the docket designated for Panel Assignment information appears as follows onthe three dockets this Plaintiff downloaded from pacer which are dated June 10th, June 20th andSeptember 22nd [Panel Assignment: not available]. The attorneys appearance was made on

June 28th to effectuate entry into the case with an appearance of legitimate purpose and thedocket text note dated June 13th was entered at that time. The Extraordinary Writ filed by thisPlaintiff in this court never went before any Circuit Judge. This Plaintiff paid the $450.00 filingfee.

PLEASE SEE THE EMERGENCY MOTION

SUBMITTED WITH THIS DOCKETING STATEMENT

This Plaintiff submitted her June 2010 hospital discharge papers to the US District Court withher Complaint and motion for appointment of an attorney that clearly indicated deficits includingordered medication that would make self representation a significant challenge; there is norecord of any sealed document to the court of appeals from the US District Court and the hospitaldischarge paper is nowhere on the US District Courts docket. In spite of a well pled 41 pageComplaint, supported by 47 exhibits that indicated clear and unquestionable violation of theADA laws and a clear indigent status related to the alleged retaliation that was compounded by

relocation expenses where relocation would not have occurred absent the allegations of thecomplaint, Pro Bono assistance was DENIED (see Dkt. #9). Clearly the orders further qualifierThe Motion for Appointment of Counsel is denied without prejudice to renewal after thedefendants have replied to the complaint by the course of this action was just for show.

DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 1991). In order to qualify for appointment of counsel, a party mustbe indigent and exceptional circumstances must exist such that denial of counsel will result in fundamentalunfairness impinging on the party's due process rights. Id. The Court must examine the total situation, focusing on



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the merits of the case, the complexity of the legal issues, and the litigant's ability to represent him or herself. Id. at24.

In short, Defendants refused to interview this Plaintiff who was a qualified individual for a fulltime open position, denied this Plaintiff opportunity to perform on the clock the duties describedwhen hired for a16 hour position which this Plaintiff accepted only because Defendant Webster

enticed the offer stating that that the special project would lead to full time work. This Plaintiffwas subjected to a hostile work environment as she was led to believe that the position sheaccepted still existed but was never given an opportunity to do the work while working on theclock; the denial of opportunity to compete for the open full time position ended up being thefinal straw that led to constructive discharge.

During orientation this Plaintiff was instructed to sign a blank piece of paper and was told by thenurse conducting the orientation that this Plaintiff would be meeting with Defendant Mikita afterorientation to plan and write the job description for which she was hired; Defendant Mikita thenrefused to meet and write the job description. Retaliation related to this Plaintiffs expressedobjection to discrimination based on disability was prevalent during employment, post

employment and escalated to the max after the EEOC charge was filed. The position sought wasstill vacant on this Plaintiffs last day of work.

Defendants submitted a false record to the EEOC in March of 2010 and falsely claimed a nonpracticing nurse who worked in their human resource department is whom they had hired intothe full time open position. The nurse who was actually hired to fill the position terminated withthe employer at the time the EEOC investigation became active in March of 2010. Dkt. #76attachment 1 is a PDF that was posted on line by ELDER SERVICES OF CAPE COD ANDTHE ISLANDS, INC. names Dawn Manning as the ADON and interim DON (information thatwas provided to Elder Services by the EmployerManning is listed twice in this documentbecause the Employer had not updated the organization at the time of publication) not Diana

Lawson as the record submitted to the EEOC by the Defendants falsely claimed.

Paragraph 187 of the Complaint (Dkt. #1) states, Defendants submitted the employee record ofa non-practicing nurse that worked in their human resource office as the applicant they chose tofill the Assistant Director position; Diana Lawson worked at Pleasant Bay in the office whenPlaintiff was employed there and relayed to Plaintiff that she had no desire to practice nursing.The Defendants Answer (Dkt. #21) to paragraph 187 states, Admit that Defendant PleasantBay submitted to the EEOC the employee record of the person they hired to fill the AssistantDirector of Nursing position, but deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as tothe truth of the remaining allegations in paragraph 187. [see Dkt. #15 attachments 39 & 40]

Paragraph 188 of the Complaint (Dkt. #1) states, Plaintiffs experience and qualifications werenot inferior to the experience and qualifications of the actual chosen applicant or Diana Lawson;the actual ADON chosen was Dawn Manning and she terminated with Pleasant Bay when theEEOC charge investigation became active in March 2010. Defendants specifically stated in theirposition statement to the EEOC that they were not considering any of the Registered Nursesworking at their facility for the ADON position (page 4 lines 1-3). The Defendants Answer(Dkt. #21) to paragraph 188 states, Deny the allegations in paragraph 188.



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(page 4 lines 1-3) of the Defendants position statement to the EEOC---"Complainant was one ofabout 40 nurses--15 to 20 of whom were registered nurses--and Webster and Mikita were notconsidering any of them for the position either."

See Dkt. #15 attachments 45, 46, & 47 for the full text of the fraudulent position statement and

Dkt. #15 attachment 26page 3 where Diana Lawsons name is submitted as the hired candidatein Defendants response to the EEOCs request for information (RIF).

See Dkt. #15 attachment 3 Plaintiffs references, attachment 6 cover letter/ resume, attachment11 facility policy regarding job descriptions (also mandatory per 105CMR 150.002), attachment13 off the clock work update & expressed interest in position to Webster, Dkt. #50 attachment#2 for the official facility employment application that was withheld when the position statementwas submitted to the EEOC Dkt. #50 attachment 3 for Plaintiffs generic employmentapplication Defendants used as attachment 1 to their EEOC position statement which offeredzero support to their position where Defendants falsely claim that this Plaintiff only wanted parttime work and was not qualified for the position.

Paragraph 189 of the Complaint (Dkt. #1) states, Dawn Manning as the Assistant Director ofNursing [ADON] became the Acting Director of Nursing [DON] after Mikita terminated inNovember of 2009. Her experience is described in a news article July 1, 2010. [see Dkt. #15attachments 41 & 43] The Defendants Answer (Dkt. #21) to paragraph 189 states, Admit theallegation that Dawn Manning became the acting Director of Nursing Services in November2009, but deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of theremaining allegations in paragraph 189.

Dkt. #77 which strikes just about the entire discovery plan submitted by this Plaintiff is a clearindicator that the players in this pretense litigation had no intent of allowing this Plaintiff herright to due process and prosecution of the retaliation portion of her complaint. By SupremeCourt law these defendants have no affirmative defense see Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270 ("[n]oaffirmative defense is available . . . when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangibleemployment action . . ."); Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293 (same) yet these Defendants,unauthorized attorneys, and rogue court staff have obstructed justice and put this disabled litigantthrough, now,15 months of pretense litigation in violation of multiple constitutional rights andcriminal federal law. Continued retaliation and hostility by these Defendants is more than clear.

These unauthorized defense counsel have the nerve to state in their documentation to the USDistrict Court that this Plaintiff has abused court process when they are the abusers of courtprocess; they devised a planned conspiracy to violate the constitutional rights of a disabled informa pauperis pro se litigant with a false appearance in order to effectuate pretense litigation incollusion with court staff. The primary goal was to obstruct justice, no matter the means, andachieve complaint dismissal as soon as possible because their clients only chance at prevailingwould be if the case never passed before the eyes of an honest judge.

The chilling fact that the players in this highly illegal scheme included taxed paid public servantswho appear to be absent fear of consequence as each act of their planned intentional conspiracyby the design of fraud that was exposed by this Plaintiff in her filings to the court was simply



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followed up with more fraud. Multiple communication attempts to an honest authority to halt thisusurpation and set this case back on a legal tract were sent via the ECF System, the Courts

general email, the US Mail, and by process server and all attempts are presumed by this Plaintiffto be blocked from any honest authority as no relief followed. Plaintiff then emailed the Clerk ofthe Court and requested a response; again, no response and no relief. Three attempts at email to

the Clerk of the Court and a response finally came forth in the form of a Certified Letter from theUS Marshal presumed to be at the direction of the Clerk of the Court warning this Plaintiff that ifshe emailed any clerk in the court again she would be facing criminal federal and stateharassment charges. Plaintiff would be most appreciative if this court of appeals would prove toher that she does still, in fact, live in the United States of America because at the moment all offor which America stands is appearing to this Plaintiff as only an illusion supported by rhetoric.

This Plaintiff lives in disabled housing and did not have a phone at the time; her communicationwas through Skype or email. See Dkt. #88 attachment 17 and Dkt. #93 attachment 1 See Dkt.#54 See Dkt. #58 attachments 7, 8, & 9 See Dkt. #59 See Dkt. #60 See Dkt. #64 andattachments 1, 4 & 6 See Dkt. #92 (same as Dkt. #85contempt motion addressed to Chief

Judge Wolf)

This Plaintiff also believes that Chief Judge Wolf and Judge OToole never received their copyof this Plaintiffs Extraordinary Writ that was served to them by certified mail. Considering thevolume of people the court serves, it is peculiar that the clerk who signed the return receiptsresponded, Laura McGarry from Washington as soon as this Plaintiff stated her name afterplacing a call to the court; this Clerk informed this Plaintiff that after accepting certified mailaddressed to the Judges he brings the mail to the clerk staff. This Plaintiff then spoke with ChiefJudge Wolfs Deputy Clerkwho expressed no knowledge of the Writ. We discussed a documentbeing served to the Judge and strangely enough the Motion (Dkt. #85) intended for Chief JudgeWolf that was brought to the court by a process server back in March made a sudden appearanceon the docket; this Plaintiff had assumed she was taken by a dishonest process server since shenever received validation from the process server that the motion went directly into Chief JudgeWolfs hand as requested but apparently the process server served the motion to the clerk staff.This contempt motion was then put on the docket by the Judge OTooles docket clerk absent thenotation that the motion was referred to Judge OToole by Chief Judge Wolf. It was denied in thescanned document that dismissed this action. Again deficient docketing occurred and neithercontempt motions by this Plaintiff (Dkt. #58 or #85) received any due process.

The faux defense has been nothing but misrepresentation, false statements and blatant fraud uponthe courtthe record supports the former. Perhaps someone from this court of appeals shouldask Judge Sterns how he feels about unauthorized attorneys citing an authority that wasestablished in his court as support for their position by placing the authority in a footnote,misspelling the partys name, changing the Lexis number and leaving absent the adverse

component of the authority and then scanning the documents before entry into the ECF Systemto cover the ruse since no hyperlink could be established because the unauthorized DefenseCounsel maintain in Dkt. # 47 [Here, Defendants have submitted all papers in good faith, andthe representations in those papers are all legally sound and factually accurate.] DefendantsOpposition (Dkt. # 36) to Plaintiffs Motion (Dkt. #28) to Strike Affirmative Defenses footnote 1follows:



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Continuing her by-now all-too-well-documented habit of treating this cases docket like a personal e-mailcorrespondentand perfectly illustrating the harm created by the moving targets she never ceases to manipulatePlaintiff has purported to amend her Motion to Strike, even as undersigned counsel has beenpreparing Defendantsopposition to that motion. See Docket No. 33 (Plaintiffs Motion Addendum). If the Court is inclined to consider

Plaintiffs Motion Addendum at all, the filing should not keep the Motion to Strike from being denied. First, the

Motion Addendum advances an utterly implausible position, i.e., that Plaintiff [lacks] fair notice of the affirmativedefenses in question. See Motion Addendum at 2. One need only consider Plaintiffs granularly detailed, point-by-point factual refutation of Defendants affirmative defenses to realize just how indefensible Plaintiffs contention is.Moreover, Defendants owed Plaintiff Rule 8(c)-notice, not Rule 8(a)-notice. See Kaufman v. Prudential Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 2009 US Dist. LEXIS 68880, *2 (D. Mass. 2009). Where Rule 8(a) applies to claims for relief andrequires a plaintiff to provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,

Rule 8(c) governs affirmative defenses and requires only that a defendant affirmatively state any avoidance oraffirmative defense. Contrast Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (interpreting Rule 8(a));

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (interpreting Rule 8(a)). Defendants affirmat ive defenseshave done at least as much as Rule 8(c) requires of them.Although Plaintiffs Motion Addendum is nothing more than yet another attempted volley that misses its mark, it

does point up the dire need for a net in this match.

Unauthorized Defense Attorneys Misspelled Party and Changed Lexis NumberKaufman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 2009 US Dist. LEXIS 68880, *2 (D. Mass. 2009).Where Rule 8(a) applies to claims for relief and requires a plaintiff to provide a short and plain statemen t of theclaim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, Rule 8(c) governs affirmative defenses and requires only that a

defendant affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.

REALITYKaufmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68800 at *2 (D. Mass. 2009)

Kaufmann v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, No. 09-10239-RGS, 2009 WL 2449872 (D.Mass. Aug. 6, 2009).

Id. (holding that the defendant must amend its affirmative defenses, other than those listed inRule 8(c)(1), to include a semblance of factual content).Remarking "that sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander" the court stated that it was inclinedto hold that both plaintiffs and defendants have the same notice obligation under Rule 8. Thecourt also observed, however, that due to the commonly recognized usage of the affirmativedefenses listed in Rule 8(c)(1), these defenses intrinsically provide sufficient notice to satisfy theplausibility standard.

The Defendants had not one 8(c)(1) affirmative defense that would stand. See Plaintiffs Motionto Strike Defendants Affirmative Defenses (Dkt. # 28), Plaintiffs Response to Defendants

Answer Dkt. # 29, Motion Addendums Dkt. #32 & #33.

All submissions by Defense Counsel on November 5, 2010 were scanned prior to entry into theECF System; (Dkt. #52) describes the unauthorized attorneys planned ruse to mask theirsubmission of frivolous filings by scanning documents prior to ECF System entry and how whenthe same was exposed by this Plaintiff they switched the files with word processed PDFs. SeeDkt. #52 attachment 3 which shows the timeline of creating the word processed PDFs compared

to entry into the ECF System; the one scanned PDF that remained a scanned PDF after theyswitch the other scanned files with word processed files was the bogus attachment 1 to document



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36 which was document 35 scanned and stamped with the word copythat scanned PDF wascreated at 2:54:26 and they began entering all scanned documents into the ECF System at2:58:23. There were absolutely no hyperlinks or ability to search, copy or paste the documentsthese unauthorized attorneys filed in the ECF System on November 5, 2010.

Defense filings on November 5, 2010 used erroneous authorities and argued the wording of theFRCP to suit their need of the moment. They insisted that rule 15 stated as a matter of coursewithin 21 days after filing where the rule states after serving in order to strike this Plaintiffscomplaint amendment where minor corrections to the complaint had been mailed to the courtbecause this Plaintiffs decline in health that required hospitalization followed by a sudden moveacross the country had her functioning at far less than optimal; the Docket Clerk entered thesecorrections into the ECF System as Complaint Amendments. All corrections were before anyservice ofprocess to any Defendant yet this Plaintiffs Complaint amendment was Denied duringthe usurpation rampage by the pro se staff attorney as she wiped out this Plaintiffs prosecutionwith Dkt. #53 and manipulated the filing date from January 20th to January 19th. This Plaintiffswell supported motions (Disqualify Defense Counsel Dkt. #27 & Strike All of Defendants

Affirmative Defenses #28), Rule 15 compliant complaint amendment (Dkt. #30), US AppealsCourt authority and Rule 9 supported response (Dkt. #29) to Defendants ANSWER (Dkt. #21)[the Defendants answer was essentially non responsive as it was full of denials, not enoughinformation and false statement that ignored 47 exhibits and further pleading with particularitywas duly warranted], and Plaintiffs oppositions Dkt. #41 & #42 to unsupported frivolousdefense motions were ignored, denied or stricken by the pro se staff attorney with Dkt. #53. Theauthorities they used for Dkt #37 & #39 fully explained FRCP 15 before and after the 2009amendment. They argued USCA authority in a foot note to ensure Plaintiff response to theirbogus answer would be stricken; as soon as this Plaintiff emailed them the authority she wouldbe using to support her Dkt #29 they halted the 7.1(A)(2) conference and filed their frivolousmotion to strike.

Unauthorized Defense Attorneys Dkt #37 & #38 footnote 1

1 Plaintiff has attempted to avoid the effect of Rule 7(a)(7), after having been alerted to it by the parties Rule

7.1(A)(2) conference, through her Motion Addendum Coordinating Documents. See Docket No. 32. This motion

addendum is of no momentit offers no legal basis whatever to support the Responseand should by no means

affect the striking of Plaintiffs Response.

REALITY Plaintiffs Motion addendum Dkt. #32 that supported Dkt. #27 & #28 as well as thecomplaint amendment Dkt. #30

BAUER MECHANICAL INC v. JOINT562 F.3d 784; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 6072

[The Federal Rules themselves instruct us to construe and administer their provisions to do substantial justice andto secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.] Fed.R.Civ.P. 1, 8(e). Rules 7(a) and(b) do not limit the methods by which a pleading may be filed. See, e.g., Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567,1576 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming district court ruling recognizing an answer and response attached to a motion forleave to file defensive pleadings); In re World Access, Inc., 301 B.R. 217, 220 n. 1 (N.D.Ill.2003) (recognizing anamended complaint attached to a motion for leave to file an amended complaint instanter); Andersen v.

Roszkowski, 681 F.Supp. 1284, 1287-88 (N.D.Ill.1988) (same).

FRCP Rule 9. Pleading Special Matters



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(b) Fraud or Mistake; Conditions of Mind. In alleging fraud or mistake, a party muststate with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent,knowledge, and other conditions of a persons mind may be alleged generally.

In a just Court a Plaintiffs exposure ofDefense Counsels unauthorized appearance followed bymultiple misrepresentations, false statements and blatant fraud where the allegations of the

Complaint are more than adequately supported by existing law and supporting evidencecompared to a more than obvious bogus Answer, the determination would be a nonexistentdefense followed by Judgment for the Plaintiff and sanctions against the attorneys andDefendants.

No legitimate rulings have come from the US District Court and the Honorable Judge

OToole did not dismiss this action with prejudice nor did he deny this Plaintiffs postdismissal reconsideration and other motions. The Magistrate, pro se staff attorney, attorneyjudicial assistant to the Magistrate, Docket and Deputy Clerk to Judge OToole and unauthorizeddefense counsel do not have the authority to decide this case and no final decisions in any matterrelated to this action have come from a US District Judge.

Dkt. No. 9, 20, 53, & 57 are missing from the written opinions report (Dkt. #88 attachment 31)and their absence indicates that the court considers them void as well; these documents areundersigned by US District Judge but were drafted and filed by the pro se staff attorney with noUS District Judge oversight.

Orders on January 28, 2011 Dkt. #57 included prohibiting this Plaintiff from making reference todocketing information because the Plaintiff had noted in her third motion to disqualify defensecounsel for fraud upon the court (Dkt. # 52) a random entry into the case docket where text wasentered by the Docket Clerk on 12/3/2011 at Dkt. # 29 & #34 stating a modification that wasneither taken nor needed to effectuate the appearance of legitimate docket entry; this Plaintiff

alleges that the bogus scanned documents that had been filed on 11/5/2011 by the unauthorizeddefense counsel were switched at that time with word processed files. The aforementionedoccurred four days after this Plaintiff filed for sanctions (see Dkt. #46).

The pro se staff attorney ruled regarding Plaintiffs Contempt Motion (Dkt. #58) of which shewas part subject with orders (Dkt. #61) that restricted this Plaintiffs filing with the court andsigned the Magistrate Judges name. Magistrate Judge Sorokin at a bogus February 14, 2011scheduling conference stated he had authorized these orders and continued a restriction on thisPlaintiffs filing with the court. This Plaintiffs son was present in the court room for thescheduling conference that occurred on February 14, 2011; this Plaintiff attended the conferenceby phone from Washington State. This Plaintiffs son witnessed the Magistrate violate this

Plaintiffs constitutional right to Article III oversight when the Magistrate Judge denied thisPlaintiffs direct verbal request for permission to file so that she could appeal his orders to theUS District Judge and he, also, denied her request for permission to file so she could requestreconsideration of the bogus orders by the pro se staff attorney that were undersigned by the USDistrict Judge (Dkt. #20, #53 & #57).

The pro se staff attorney entered an antagonistic memorandum and order (Dkt. #53) that wipedout the prosecution of this Plaintiffs action on January 20, 2011 and she manipulated the filing



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date back to January 19, 2011. Dkt. #53 was drafted and entered after the pro se staff attorneywas aware of Dkt. #51 and she was not aware of Dkt. #51 until January 20, 2011 because thisPlaintiff did not file Dkt. #51 which requested that the pro se staff attorney be enjoined from dutyon the case until 17:37 on January 19

th. There was absolutely no law, rule or fact in this

unauthorized ruling by the pro se staff attorney. An example of the usurpation and purpose for

the docket manipulation follows with an excerpt from Dkt. # 57 which is page 25 paragraph 2 ofthe 51 page abbreviated electronic record:

On January 19, 2011, this Court issued a Memorandum and Order (Docket No. 53) that,

among other things, denied Plaintiff's two motions to disqualify defense counsel. As aptly

noted in Defendants opposition to Plaintiff's third attempt to disqualify Jackson Lewis' asdefense counsel, such request is essentially mooted by this Courts order denying Plaintiffs

first two attempts to disqualify counsel. See 1/19/11 Order, Docket No. 43.

The dismissal with prejudice (Dkt. # 86) is an adoption of the Magistrates procedurally deficient

Report and Recommendation (Dkt. #80) where this Plaintiff had requested that any R & R be by

any judge other than Judge Sorokin (see Dkt. #78 & #81) who was actively violating thisPlaintiffs constitutional rights; (Dkt. # 86) which is beyond bogus by the language alone is a

scanned document. The document was scanned with the purpose of masking the properties of the

document because it is not an opinion and order by Judge O'Toole; the staff of the US District

Court are well aware that this Plaintiff is able to determine the origin of documents entered by

the court, i.e. staff computer v. judicial officer computer, by looking at the PDF properties (see

affidavit Dkt. # 100 attachment 1, Dkt. #58 attachment 2, Dkt. #70 attachment 1). Judge

OTooles Deputy Clerk was made fully aware that this Plaintiff knew the exact computer that

scanned Dkt. #86 and that her objection to the R & R that the Magistrate had no authority to

write never saw a US District Judge. The clerks then began scanning several legitimate

appearing opinions by Judge OToole on the computer that scanned the dismissal of this

Plaintiffs action and this Plaintiff has all those files but used the most peculiar scanned

document for her affidavit. The affidavit attachment 1 to Dkt. #100 describes an attempt to

produce a scanned legitimate appearing document that would have the same properties as Dkt.

#86. As a note of interest, the scanned opinion set with publisher information regarding the

criminal case discussed in the affidavit of Dkt. #100 was entered on the all recent opinions web

page; the last page of the opinion is page 33 which is directly followed by page 41citing the

publisher information. The case had been essentially stagnant with no court entries since May of

2010.

Dkt. # 101 that denied reconsideration of the complaint dismissal and all post dismissal motions

ignored Plaintiffs requests for Judicial Notice. Plaintiffs submitted Affidavits were ignored.

Plaintiffs request that the decision be hand signed by a US District Judge was ignored.

Plaintiffs multiple requests for a hearing were ignored. Usurpation continued after this Plaintiff

filed her documented proof that her Objection (Dkt. #81) to the bogus R & R (Dkt. #80) never

went before the US District Judge. Dkt. #100 with an affidavit at attachment 1was filed on

September 8, 2011 and Plaintiffs request for reconsideration and other post dismissal motions



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were denied under continued usurpation on September 13, 2011(the filing date was manipulated

and recorded as 9/12/2011); apparently the exposure of the continued usurpation that was proven

in this Plaintiffs affidavit was determined to require prompt action by the usurpers of this action.

The PDF properties of Dkt. #101 are the same properties of the computer the pro se staff attorney

who usurped this action is now using to file documents in the US District Court; she now leaves

her name out of the properties but still enters the documents with (PSSA, 4). The undersigned

signature of Dkt. #101 and the PDF entered by PSSA4 have the same signature variant from

Judge OTooles signature which is absent his usual indentation.

C.A. No. 10-11019-GAOentered 9/21/2011 by PSSA 4- file date is manipulated just as it was on Dkt. #101

1:11-cv-11510-LTS- entered 9/21/2011 by PSSA 4

It appears court staff have take some extra insurance in making this Plaintiffs scanned dismissal

appear legitimate even after Dkt. #101. This Plaintiffs reconsideration and post dismissal

motions that were denied under continued usurpation (Dkt. #101) were entered into the ECF

System by Judge OTooles Deputy Clerk on (9/13/2011); all other docket entries in the case

had been by PSSA 4 or Judge OTooles Docket Clerk except while on the Magistrates docket

where the Magistrates Judicial Assistant or Docket Clerk made court entries. On 9/15/2011

another case that had been stagnant since 12/10 was decided with a judicial panel. The decision

was signed by three US District Court Judges so it required scanning. Judge OTooles Docket

Clerk entered the scanned PDF from his computer but the scanned PDF was not created from his

computer; all other court orders in this case under the judicial panel have been entered by Judge

Zobels clerk. The document was scanned on the computer that scanned this Plaintiffs dismissal.

The staff now had a scanned PDF memorandum and order signed by three US District Judges

with the same properties as the PDF file with this Plaintiff case dismissal. The aforementionedcase was the quietly decided case finding that an Assistant US Attorney had not violated any

rules of misconduct. Case 1:09-mc-10206-RWZ -WGYGAO decided, scanned and entered on

9/15/2011. This decision also made the all recent opinions web page.

Prior to September 13, Plaintiffs emergency motions had lingered for more than two months in

spite of the fact that this Plaintiff had been informing the court that her son was hospitalized here

in Massachusetts and that she needed a prompt decision so she could take him back to

Washington State to ensure his healthcare need were met; this Plaintiff had planned to return to

Washington State directly after the hearing she requested from this court was granted but her

Extraordinary Writ was DENIED on June 20

th

and during this same time period this Plaintiffsson became acutely ill and he was hospitalized for nearly a month. The staff of the US District

Court knew that this Plaintiff was in Massachusetts because of the death of her father and that

the usurpation of this action that had obstructed and delayed justice prevented this Plaintiff from

reciprocating support to her father during his time of need; this Plaintiffs father generously

provided support during this Plaintiffs time of need which left her father with insufficient funds

to meet his own needs and he ended up in a more than incompetent care setting that promoted his



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early death and yet they planned to continue obstruction justice. This Plaintiff has noted

emergency motions answered by Judge OToole in as short of time as two days.

11-cv-11099 emergency motion requested 8/15/2011oders by Judge OToole and entered 8/17/2011

This Plaintiff has filed one law suit in her entire life and it is well supported by established law

and evidence. The players of this pretense litigation appear to be only interested in their own self

preservation and retaining their falsely perceived power that by law they do not possess. The

usurpers of this action labeled this Plaintiff a vexatious litigant and barred her from any future

filings with the court and certified that any appeal of this action would be frivolous so in forma

pauperis filing with the court of appeals was out of the question no matter any procedure

required to challenge this type of order because this Plaintiff is well aware that any challenge

would also fall to usurpation. Again, this Plaintiff spent her grocery money to file this appeal just

as she had in order to file her Extraordinary Writ that never saw a judge and just as she had in

order to initiate service of process (twice) that never saw a judge; this Plaintiffs only income is

SSDI. This Plaintiffs latest filings to the court indicated that she was in Massachusetts with onlyher laptop and had no means to print or scan; Dkt. #101also terminated this Plaintiffs ECF

System filing privileges noting that any appeal would have to be by mail.

D. Are any related cases or cases raising related issues pending in this court, any district

court of this circuit, or the Supreme Court? Yes Case No. 11-1668 In re: McGarry

Relief request: this honorable and just court must immediately vacate the June 20, 2011

JUDGMENT regarding Case No. 11-1668 an Extraordinary Writ. This Plaintiff is requesting

that the Writ and this docketing statement go immediately before a Circuit Judge. This Plaintiff

is requesting that this court of appeals order the US District Court to vacate all the void orders of

Civil Action NO. 10 CA 11343 GAO passed the case initiating orders of Dkt. #9 and order that

Civil Action NO. 10 CA 11343 GAO be immediately placed before an Honorable Judge of the

US District Court to process the default judgment as per this Plaintiffs request in Dkt. #88 and

Dkt.#97 as per FRCP 60. See Motion filed with this court on this date November 8, 2011.

F. List each adverse party to the appeal. If no attorney, give address and telephone numberof the adverse party. Attach additional page if necessary.

4. Adverse party Geriatric Facilities of Cape Cod, Inc.Attorney No attorney filed a notice of appearance in the US District Court or has indicated

in any filing with the US District Court that this corporation is represented by and

through an attorney.Address 383 South Orleans Rd Brewster, MA 02631Telephone 508-240-3500

The defense counsel have made a false appearance in this action with the purpose of carrying

pretense litigation; no documentation to the court indicates that they represent the Defendants.

The attorneys purposefully did not file a notice of appearance in regards to this action in the US



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District Court to effectuate the aforementioned. See Dkt. #97 the affidavit attachment 1 of Dkt.

#97 and all other attachments associated with Dkt. #97.

Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts

RULE 83.5.2 APPEARANCES

(a) Generally. The filing of the complaint shall constitute an appearance by the attorney whosigns it. All other appearances in a case shall be made by filing a notice of appearancecontaining the docket number of the case, name, address and telephone number of the personentering an appearance, in compliance with Rule 5.1(a)(1).

(d) Firms and Corporations. The court will not recognize the appearance of a firm orprofessional corporation unless it is accompanied by the appearance of at least one (1) attorney.In the event that a party is represented by more than one (1) attorney, whether or not from thesame firm, the clerk shall not be required to send notice of orders, judgments, trial settings, etc.,to more than one (1) attorney for any party, unless the attorneys represent different interests andthis fact is noted on the record.

Case 1:11-cv-10807-RGS 10/07 2011 Judge Richard G. Stearns: Electronic OrderThe law in Massachusetts is clear. Corporations must appear and be represented in court, if at all,by attorneys. Driscoll v. T.R. White Co., Inc., 441 Mass. 1009, 1010 (2004), quoting VarneyEnters, Inc. v. WMF, Inc., 402 Mass. 79, 82 (1998).

BRANDSTEIN et al.v.WHITE LAMPS, Inc., et al.20 F.Supp. 369 (1937)

In Osborn et al. v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738, at pages 829, 830, 6 L.Ed.

204, where the court had before it, among other matters, the question of whether the record of thecase should disclose that the defendant bank authorized the institution or prosecution of the suit,Chief Justice Marshall, in the course of his opinion, stated:

"It is admitted that a corporation can only appear by attorney, and it is also admitted that theattorney must receive the authority of the corporation to enable him to represent it. * * * Acorporation, it is true, can appear only by attorney, while a natural person may appear forhimself."

While a corporation is a legal entity, it is also an artificial one, existing only in the contemplationof the law; it can do no act, except through its agents. Since a corporation can appear only

through its agents, they must be acceptable to the court; attorneys at law, who have beenadmitted to practice, are officers of the court and subject to its control. See Nightingale v.Oregon Cent. Ry. Co., 18 Fed. Cas. p. 239, No. 10,264.

"Were it possible for corporations to prosecute or defend actions in person, through their

own officers, men unfit by character and training, men, whose credo is that the end justifies

the means, disbarred *371 lawyers or lawyers of other jurisdictions would soon createopportunities for themselves as officers of certain classes of corporations and then freely



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appear in our courts as a matter of pure business not subject to the ethics of our professionor the supervision of our bar associations and the discipline of our courts."

The foregoing clearly represents what has happened in this more than unfortunate and shamefulsituation.

Certificate

The undersigned declares under penalty of perjury that, to the best of her knowledge and belief,

that the statements in the above Docketing Statement are true.

Westfield, Massachusetts on this 8th

day of November 2011.

s/ Laura J. McGarry, Pro Se

Respectfully submitted to the COURT,s/ Laura J. McGarry, Pro SeLaura J. McGarry, Pro Se

1717 Sheridan RoadApt. A- 50Bremerton, WA [email protected]

November 8, 2011

Certificate of Service

I, Laura J. McGarry, hereby certify that on November 8, 2011 I electronically filed the foregoingdocument with the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit by using the CM/ECF

system. I certify that the following counsel of record with the United States Court of Appeals areregistered as ECF Filers and that they will be served by the CM/ECF system: Guy Paul Tully &Brian M. Childs of Jackson Lewis, LLP.

mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]