Abstract In his twelfth century alam: karasastra, the Candraloka, JayadevaPıyus.avars.a reverses the sequence of topics found in Mammat:a’s Kavyapr-akasa, an earlier and immensely popular work. With such a structuralrevisionism, Jayadeva asserts the autonomy of his own work and puts forth anambitious critique of earlier approaches to literary analysis. Jayadevainvestigates the technical and aesthetic components of poetry in the first partof the Candraloka, prior to his formal semantic investigations in the latter halfof the text, thus suggesting that aesthetic evaluations of poetry beneficiallyinform scientific investigations of language. Jayadeva’s organization of hischapters on the semantic operations, moreover, intimates that the study ofsuggestive and metaphoric functions of language clarifies our understanding ofdenotation, which is conventionally understood to be the primary and directpath of verbal designation.

Keywords Jayadeva Æ Candraloka Æ Alam: karasastra Æ Sanskrit poetics ÆIndian poetics Æ Poetics Æ Mammat:a Æ Kavyaprakasa Æ Sabdavr. tti Æ Indiansemantics Æ Semantics Æ Indian language theory Æ Language theory Æabhidha Æ Denotation Æ Metaphor Æ laks.an. a Æ upacara

Introduction: in the shadow of the Kavyaprakasa

Jayadeva Pıyus.avars.a1’s Candraloka, a treatise on Sanskrit poetics composed

between the 12th and 14th centuries, is commonly praised as a charming

D. Mellins (&)720 Fort Washington Ave., Apt. 5GNew York, NY 10040, USAe-mail: drm8@columbia.edu

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J Indian Philos (2007) 35:227–251DOI 10.1007/s10781-007-9014-8

Unraveling the Kavyaprakasa: Jayadeva Pıyus.avars.a’sidiosyncratic sequence of topics in the Candraloka

David Mellins

Published online: 4 July 2007� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

pedagogical manual on alam: kara�sastra (Sanskrit poetics), but rarelyacknowledged to be a serious or innovative work. The renowned historian ofSanskrit poetics, S. K. De, writing in the first quarter of the twentieth century,surmises:

Jayadeva’s Candraloka has been a deservedly popular manual, but inspite of its clearness and brevity of exposition and aptness of its illus-trations, it is nothing more than a convenient epitome, its mostremarkable feature being its detailed treatment of poetic figures, whichoccupy nearly half its bulk.2

Narayan. a Sastrı Khiste, the editor of the first Chaukhamba edition of theCandraloka, writes in 1929:

There is no other work, as far as we know, which may be confidentlyplaced in the hands of ardent beginners as a safe guide to the study ofSanskrit Poetics on old traditional lines.3

Given these pronouncements, it is surprising to discover a statement regardingthe Candraloka by the formidable 17th century Mımam: saka (Vedic Herme-neutician) Gagabhat:t:a:

anekaih: klesair yan na paricitam adyapi gahanam:parıhasas tasmin mama bhavati yatnasya, tadapi

yasodakausalyatanayapadabhavahitamanah:prasadah: klesanam: phalati phalam atyutkat:am api.4

Even today, this difficult text is not properly understood despite manyefforts.

Some will thus laugh at my effort here.Still I will place my mind at the feet of Kr. s.n. a and Rama.

Grace accomplishes the most arduous of goals.

One might be tempted to attribute the disparity of these evaluations to thedifferent critical standards of their respective eras. Yet even in pre-colonialperiods, the Candraloka was rarely appreciated for its innovation, and insteadassumed to follow the model of Mammat:a’s Kavyapraka�sa, an alam: kara�sastra

3 Khiste (1929: 2).4 RA (Prologue).

1 An alias that distinguishes the author of the Candraloka from the author of the Gıtagovindabearing the name same. At the conclusion of each chapter, the author of the Candraloka states hisfather’s and mother’s names to be Mahadeva and Sumitra, further distinguishing his personagefrom the more famous devotional poet who identifies his parents as Bhojadeva and Ramadevı(�srıbhojadevaprabhavasya ramadevısuta�srıjayadevakasya / para�saradipriyavargakan: t:he �srıgıtago-vindakavitvam astu // GG, 12.22).2 De (1925: 248–249).

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treatise that had attained near canonical status by the middle of the secondmillennium.5

Structural distinctions

In certain ways this assumption is understandable. Both the Kavyapraka�saand the Candraloka are divided into 10 chapters, which, excluding the first,investigate a more or less distinct category of poetic analysis. The termsdesignating the chapters of both works refer to forms of light—theKavyaprakasa is divided into ten ullasas (flashes) and the Candraloka tenmayukhas (rays). Like the Kavyapraka�sa, the Candraloka is highly sys-tematic in format, detailing all the important topics in alam: kara�sastra, andlike the Kavyapraka�sa, the Candraloka — in a departure from the Dhv-anyaloka and the Locana — investigates both rasa and alam: kara (figuresof speech) as independent sources of charm in poetry.

Still a careful comparison of the structures within the Kavyapraka�sa andthe Candraloka reveals that Mammat:a and Jayadeva have distinctapproaches to the study of poetry and different estimations of its mostessential import. Examining the chart in Fig. 1, we can see that althoughthe two texts cover more or less the same span of topics, the partitioningand sequencing of these subjects are quite different in the two texts. Thefirst chapters of both works are indeed remarkably similar, despite someadditional topics in the Candraloka. Yet the parity stops here. In thesubsequent four chapters, Mammat:a discusses topics related to the �sab-davr: ttis, or semantic operations. In chapter two he defines abhidha(denotation), laks:an: a (metaphorical indication), and vya~njana (literarysuggestion).6 In chapter three, he demonstrates that denoted, indicated

5 Vamanacharya Ramabhatta Jhalakikar, the 20th century authority on Mammat:a, lists 46 com-mentaries and sub-commentaries to the Kavyapraka�sa in the introduction to his own, theBalabodhinı. Gagabhat:t:a, in his comment to Jayadeva’s statements of the purpose of poetry inCandraloka 1.3, states atramr: tapadena prabhusam: mitasuhr: tsam: mitakantasam: mitopade�satraividhye’py ude�sa(read upade�sa)dvayasya �sabdarthpradhanatayasvadavi�sayatvat kantasam: mitopade�sasyarasapradhanatayasvadavi�sayatyad amr: tatulyataya tr: tiyopade�so vyajyate (RA 1.3), clearly super-imposing Mammat:a’s analogy in Kavyapraka�sa 2:

kavyam: yasase ’rthakr. te vyavaharavide sivetaraks.atayesadyah: paranirvr. taye kantasam:mitatayopadesayuje

Gagabhat:ta’s argument is used to support his contention that Jayadeva truly intends poetry tohave the six purposes enumerated by Mammat:a, rather than the three that Jayadeva lists inCandraloka 1.3. While this argument is not without merit, it requires a metaphoricalinterpretation of Jayadeva’s verse.6 A tertiary power of speech, which many Sanskrit rhetoricians (most notably Anandavardhanaand Abhinavagupta) contend is distinct from denotation and metaphorical indication. It wasgranted an exalted literary status on account of its unique capacity to evoke rasa in poetry.

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and suggested meanings each have the capacity to suggest subsequentmeanings. In chapter four he describes the varieties of dhvani as deter-mined by different types of vya~njana; and in chapter five he discussesgun: ıbhutavya _ngya, poetry where suggested meaning exists but is subordi-nate to the literal meaning, and proceeds to describes its sub-varieties.Jayadeva, on the other hand, does not discuss the �sabdavr. ttis until thesecond half of the Candraloka. In the first half of the treatise he describestopics related to the technical evaluation of language, topics that were theprinciple concern in treatises from the early period of alam: kara�sastra —dos:a (poetic blemish) in chapter two, laks:an: a (poetic distinction, to bedistinguished from the �sabdavr: tti or semantic power termed laks:an: a) inchapter three, gun: a (poetic virtue) in chapter four, and alam: kara (figuresof speech) in chapter five.7 Mammat:a does not discuss these topics untilthe second half of the Kavyapraka�sa. He discusses dos:a in the seventhchapter, gun: a in the eighth, �sabdalam: kara (acoustic figures of speech) inthe ninth, and arthalam: kara (semantic figures of speech) in the 10th. Hedoes not discuss laks:an: a (poetic distinction) at all in the Kavyapraka�sa.Jayadeva seems to be the only alam: karika to discuss laks:an: a, a distinctionof language elaborated in the Nat:ya�sastra and other dramaturgical worksbut disregarded in other alam: kara treatises.8 Another peculiar distinction isfound in the sixth chapters of these two works. Mammat:a discusses cit-rakavya, a type of poetry that lacks appreciable suggestion and rasa, in the

7 Jayadeva characterizes these features of poetry as follows:

syac ceto vis.ata yena saks.ata raman. ıyatasabde ’rthe ca kr. tonmes.am: dos.am udghos.ayanti tam (CA, 2.1).

When it enters the heart, the charm in poetry is damaged.Manifesting in sound and meaning, the experts call it poetic blemish.

ityadi laks.an. am: bhuri kavyasyahur mahars.ayah:svarn. abhrajis.h:h:n. ubhalatvaprabhr. tıva mahıbhujah: (CA 3.11).

Great sages say that such features are the distinctions (laks:an: a) of poetry,Just like signs such as a brilliant golden forehead are the distinctions of a king.

amı dasa gun. ah: kavye pum: si sauryadayo yathatilakadyam iva strın. am: vidagdhahr. daya _ngamamvyatiriktam ala _nkaram: prakr. ter bhus.an. am: giram (CA, 4.10cd – 11).

These ten are the virtues (gun: a) within poetry just like courage and other qualities are virtueswithin man.The figures of speech (alam: kara) are the ornament of speech and are distinguished from itsnatural state. These are thrilling, like the forehead ornaments of women, to the connoisseur.

8 The Nat:ya�sastra enumerates 36 laks:an: as: bhus:an: a, aks:arasa _nghata, �sobha, udaharan: a, hetu,sam: �saya, dr: s: t: anta, prapti, abhipraya, nidar�san: a, nirukta, siddhi, vi�ses:an: a, gun: atipata, ati�saya, tul-yatarka, padoccaya, dr: s: t:a, upadis: t:a, vicara, viparyaya, bhram: �sa, anunaya, mala, daks: in: ya, garhan: a,arthapatti, prasiddhi, pr: ccha, sarupya, manoratha, le�sa, ks:obha, gun: akırtana, anuktasiddhi, andpriyokti (N�S, 130–70). Some of these — ati�saya, le�sa and hetu — are categorized as alam: karas inearly alam: kara�sastra treatises such as Bhamaha’s Kavyalam: kara.

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sixth chapter of the Kavyapraka�sa. Jayadeva, on the other hand, discussesrasa itself in the sixth chapter of the Candraloka.

Organization of the Kavyaprakasa

To a considerable extent, the organization of topics in the Kavyapraka�sa isover-determined by Mammat:a’s threefold gradation of poetry at the end ofthe first chapter, which states:

Fig. 1 Chapter topics in the Kavyapraka�sa and the Candraloka

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idam uttamam atisayini vya _ngye vacyad dhvanir budhaih: kathitah:atadr. si gun. ıbhutavya _ngyam: vya _ngye tu madhyamamsabdacitram: vacyacitram avya _ngyam: tv avaram: smr. tam9

Poetry is of the superlative grade when the suggested meaning pre-dominates over the literal. Scholars call such poetry dhvani. Poetry of themiddle grade, where the suggested meaning is otherwise (subordinate), iscalled gun: ıbhutavya _ngya. The lowest grade of poetry, which lacksappreciable suggested meaning, is called either acoustic citra or semanticcitra.

Mammat:a discusses the �sabdavr: ttis in the second and third chapters of theKavyapraka�sa because it is essential that his audience gain a preliminaryunderstanding of abhidha (denotation), laks:an: a (metaphorical indication)and vya~njana (literary suggestion) prior to his discussion of the highestgrade of suggestive poetry, dhvani, in the fourth chapter. This discussion ofthe �sabdavr: ttis similarly informs his explanation of the middle gradeof suggestive poetry (gun: ıbhutavya _ngya) in chapter five. However,Mammat:a’s discussion of citrakavya (the lowest grade of Kavya, lacking anysignificant trace of suggested meaning) in the sixth chapter precipitates ashift in the orientation of his discourse. In subsequent chapters, he analyzestechnical properties of speech such as dos:a (blemish), gun: a (poetic virtue)and alam: kara (figures of speech), utilizing categories and methods estab-lished during the pre-dhvani era of Sanskrit poetics. In his auto-comment tothe final verse of the introductory chapter, Mammat:a had stated:

citram iti gun. alam:karayuktam.10

citrakavya is suitable on account of gun: a and alam: kara

indicating that the charm of citrakavya results from the auspicious choice ofwords and skillful applications of figures of speech, rather than suggestive andemotive properties in the meaning.

The sequencing of topics in the Kavyapraka�sa to a certain degree reflectsthe dhvani-centric vision of poetry Mammat:a had inherited from his Kasmiripredecessors, Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Herein, the function ofproperties such as gun: a and alam: kara is oriented and indeed stipulated by themore essential functions of rasa and dhvani. Thus Abhinavagupta states in theDhvanyaloka:

rasabhavaditatparyam asritya vinivesanamalam:kr. tınam: sarvasam alam:karatvasadhanam11

All figures of speech gain their authority from the fact that their figu-ration is established in relation to the rasas, the sentiments and the like.

9 KP (4cd – 5).10 KP (vr. tti to verse 5).11 DhvA (vr. tti to 2.5).

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Similarly, he explains that certain poetic blemishes are faulty in relation tocertain rasas:

srutidus.t:adayo dos.a anitya ye ca darsitah:dhvanyatmany eva sr. _ngare te heya ity udahr. tah:

12

The faults such as indelicacy in sound are shown to be relative.13

These are to be abandoned only in the case of the erotic rasa when this isbrought to life by dhvani.14

In Anandavardhana’s view, figures of speech are literary devices that orna-ment the function of rasa; blemishes are the unfortunate features obstructingthis. Their ‘‘figurativeness’’ or ‘‘faultiness’’ does not independently pertain tothe sound or meaning constituting the body of poetry, but rather their capacityto expedite or damage specific rasas.

Emulating Anandavardhana, Mammat:a also correlates his discussion ofgun: a, dos:a and alam: kara to the function of rasa and poetic suggestion. Heacknowledges, however, that such poetic attributes to a limited degreehave an independent literary significance. Regarding dos:a (blemish) hestates:

mukhyarthahatir dos.o rasas ca mukhyas tadasrayad vacyah:ubhayopayoginah: syuh: sabdadyas tena tes.v api sah:

15

Blemish is that which damages the main purport. The purport may be arasa, but it can also be a literal meaning associated with rasa. Blemishcan also exist in the words and phonemes etc., as these are what expeditethe rasas and the literal meaning.

While dos:a (blemish) principally pertains to a rasa, it may secondarilybe analyzed with respect to the literal meaning associated with a rasaor with respect to the words and sentences constituting a rasa or associ-ated literal meaning. Similarly, in regard to alam: kara, Mammat:a pro-nounces:

upakurvanti tam: santam: ye ‘ _ngadvaren. a jatucidharadivad alam:karas te ‘nuprasopamadayah:

16

12 DhvA (2.11).13 anityah: . Literally, ‘‘impermanent.’’ In this context, it conveys that certain faults are damagingonly to specific rasas, and are not destructive in all cases of poetry.14 More literally, ‘‘they are to be abandoned only in the cases of erotic rasa, when this has dhvanias its soul (atma).’’15 KP (49).16 KP (67).

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Sometimes figures of speech such as alliteration and simile serve adominant rasa17 by ornamenting the body of poetry (speech and mean-ing), in the manner of necklaces and other jewelry.

Even in cases when alam: kara assists a dominant rasa, Mammat:a acknowledgesthat alam: karas may still ‘ornament’ the body of poetry as constituted byspeech and meaning. In his auto-comment to this verse, Mammat:a specifiesthat figures of speech do at times function independently from rasa:

yatra tu nasti rasas tatroktivaicitryamatraparyavasayinah: . kvacit tu san-tam api nopakurvanti.18

But where a dominant rasa does not exist, figures of speech bestowbeauty to a poetic expression. Even in some cases where a dominant rasaexists, there can be figures of speech, which do not come to its service.

Such statements clearly depart from the uncompromisingly dhvani-centricideology espoused in the Dhvanyaloka. Mammat:a implies that in superiorgrades of poetry, aesthetic properties such as alam: kara and gun: a do expeditethe function of a predominant rasa, but additionally recognizes the utility ofanalyzing these technical features as components of speech and meaning. Suchan understanding is supported by the organization of his work. Investigatingdos:a, gun: a and alam: kara subsequently to dhvani and gun: ibhutavya _ngya heclearly suggests the primacy and centrality of rasa and dhvani in poetry.However, by isolating the technical investigations of dos:a, gun: a and alam: karain the latter half of the Kavyapraka�sa, after his explication of citrakavya,Mammat:a implies that these investigations serve an independent if secondarypurpose within the analysis of poetry.

Structure of the Candraloka

Jayadeva, in his own distinct sequencing of topics in the Candraloka, rebelsmore forcefully against the hegemony of rasa/dhvani theory, striving toresuscitate a poetic discourse centered on the analysis of alam: kara. Investi-gating gun: a, dos:a and alam: kara in the first half of his treatise, prior to themention of dhvani and rasa, Jayadeva indicates that these constitute

17 Mammat:a’s auto-comment to this sutra clarifies that the pronoun tam refers to mukhyam: rasam:(dominant or primary rasa):

ye vacakavacyalaks.an. a _ngatisayamukhena mukhyam: rasam: sam:bhavinam upakurvanti tekan. t:hadya _nganam utkars.adhanadvaren. a sarırin. o ‘py upakaraka haradaya ivalamkarah: ’’(KP, vr. tti to 67).

Those things, which come to the service of a dominant rasa by bestowing an excellence toits body, i.e. its literal speech and meaning, are figures of speech. They are similar tonecklaces and other ornaments, which become servants to the self by bestowing excellenceto limbs such as the neck.

18 KP (vr. tti to 67).

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independent properties of speech and meaning, rather than subsidiaryproperties of rasa or dhvani. While this prerogative indicates the primarymotivation for the unusual structure of the Candraloka, I would like tosuggest a more theoretically driven purpose to Jayadeva’s topical organi-zation. Before I present my hypothesis, I would like to re-examine thestructure of the Candraloka, applying more general categories, as exhibitedin the chart in Fig. 2. If we exclude the introductory subjects of the firstchapter, we can divide the topics of the Candraloka into three generalclasses: the first constitutes the technical examination of poetry whichincludes dos:a, laks:an: a, gun: a, and alam: kara; the second constitutes thesentimental, psychological and cognitive analysis of poetry which includesrasa, vya~njana and gun: ıbhutavya _ngya; and the third constitutes thesemantic analysis of poetry which shares vya~njana and gun: ıbhutavya _ngyawith the previous class, and additionally includes laks:an: a and abhidha.The chapter topics in the Kavyapraka�sa can be categorized into threemore or less identical classes, which are ordered in exactly the oppositesequence as those in the Candraloka (see Fig. 2): the semantic investiga-tion taking place in chapters 2 and 3, followed by the sentimental andpsychological investigation in chapters 4–6 and the technical examinationin chapters 6–10.

The first question that arises is whether this retro-gradation in sequence ispurely adventitious or whether Jayadeva intentionally structures the Can-draloka in a contrary fashion to the Kavyapraka�sa. I would strongly advocatethe latter view since there is significant evidence suggesting Jayadeva wascritical of Mammat:a and his texts. In verse 1.7 of the Candraloka, Jayadevastates:

a _ngıkaroti yah: kavyam: sabdarthav analam:kr. tıasau na manyate kasmad anus.n. am analam: kr. tı19

If he concedes that poetry can be speech and meaning lacking figures ofspeech, should not that ‘wise’ scholar also believe in a fire without heat.

Fig. 2 Thematic sequences in the Candraloka and the Kavyaprakasa

19 CA (1.8)

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This verse clearly mocks Mammat:a’s definition of poetry in Kavyapraka�sa4ab, which states:

tad ados.au sabdarthau sagun. av analam:kr. tı punah: kvapi.20

Poetry is a complex of speech and meaning that lacks blemish (dos:a),possesses virtue (gun: a), and that sometimes is analam: kr: tı, i.e. devoid ofdistinct figures of speech.

Jayadeva puts forth a more subtle, though perhaps even more deprecating jestin verse 1.2:

ham: ho cinmayacittacandraman. ayah: sam:vardhayadhvam: rasanre re svairin. i nirvicarakavite ma sma prakasıbhavah:

ullasaya vicaravıcinicayalam:karavaram:nidhescandralokam ayam: svayam: vitanute pıyus.avars.ah: kr. tı21

Oh you with moonstone hearts!22 Expand the rasas!but you, unfaithful wench! Undiscerning poesy, do not reveal yourself!

The skillful Pıyus.avars.a creates his own moonlightin order to expand the ocean of alam: kara that has discriminating wisdomas its waves.

Here, I direct the reader’s attention to the cvi formation at the end of padab—ma sma praka�sıbhavah: (‘‘do not reveal yourself’’). Through doubleentendre (�sles:a), this expression may also refer to the Kavyapraka�sa. On itsown, such a lexical congruence might simply be a case of ghunaks:aranyaya, orrandom coincidence, but if we look at the beginning of the pada, we find theword ullasaya, which intimates the designation of the chapters in theKavyapraka�sa—ullasa. Similarly, the very next word is a compound beginningwith the term vicara, which may or may not call to mind Mammat:a’s treatiseon semantics, the �Sabdavyaparavicara. Given the concurrence of these words,there is good reason to believe this verse is yet another jest at Mammat:a, inwhich case Jayadeva, perhaps envious of Mammat:a’s popularity, identifieshim with the svairin: i (loose woman) and requests that he not ‘‘reveal himself’’in the Candraloka (moonlight).23

Semantic analysis in poetics: foundation or consequence?

One of the more unusual and striking features of Jayadeva’s organization isthe placement of his discussion on sabdavr: tti (semantic operations) in the final

20 KP (4).21 CA (1.2)22 cinmayacittacandraman: ayah: . A bahuvrıhi compound that might be literally translated ‘‘you whopossess moonstones that are hearts of pure consciousness.’’23 A common trope in Sanskrit poetry involves a female lover having to cancel a rendezvous onaccount of the full moon, which would likely reveal her surreptitious journey.

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four chapters of the Candraloka. Here, Jayadeva’s strategy is contra-posed tothat of Mammat:a, who discusses the sabdavr: ttis in the second chapter of theKavyapraka�sa, in order to more clearly articulate his subsequent explanationsof dhvani, gun: ıbhutavya _ngya and citrakavya. In point of fact, Mammat:a’sorganization provides the model for most of the alam: kara�sastra treatisescomposed during the second millennium. Hence we find the �sabdavr: ttis dis-cussed in the 8th of the 36 chapters in Bhoja’s 11th century �Sr: _ngarapraka�sa, inthe first of the eight chapters of Hemacandra’s 12th century Kavyanu�sasana,in the second of the eight chapters in Vidyadhara’s 14th century Ekavalı andin the second of the 10 chapters in Kaviraja Visvanatha’s Sahityadarpan: a.

While one might be inclined to dismiss Jayadeva’s discussion of the sabdavr: ttisat the end of his treatises as an arbitrary decision or at best a vain and haphazardinnovation, we should consider his expressed ambition to integrate aesthetic andlogical methodologies within the Candraloka. As he states in verse 1.3:

yuktyasvadyalasadrasaikavasatih: sahityasarasvata-ks.ırambhodhir agadhatam upadadhat sevyah: samasrıyatam24

The milk ocean of poetics is the single locus of reasoning and aestheticsavor (rasa). As its depth is unfathomable, it should be approached withgreat care.

While it is common enough for alam: karikas to apply logical methodologies intheir analysis of poetry, traditionally logicians saw little utility in applyingpoetic methodologies within logical analysis. Jayantabhat:t:a, the ninth centuryKasmiri Naiyayika, writes in the Nyayama~njarı:

athava nedr. sı carca kavibhih: saha sobhatevidvam: so ’pi vimuhyanti vakyarthagahane ’dhvani25

Furthermore, discussions of this sort with poets lead to little benefit.Even authoritative scholars become perplexed on the mysterious path ofsemantics.

Jayadeva, envisioning an aesthetically informed reasoning, turns such ajudgment on its head. In Candraloka 6.27, he castigates scholars who wouldexclude aesthetics in their pursuit of logic

a _ngabha _ngollasallıla tarun. ı smaratoran. amtarkakarkasapurn. oktipraptotkat:adhiyam: vr. tha26

This young woman whose beauty shines in her undulating limbs is thegateway to love.

24 CA (1.3).25 NyM (1st ahnika, refutation of dhvani) 1:78.26 CA (6.27).

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She is useless, however, to those whose minds have calcified fromstudying too much logic.

In Candraloka 1.2, Jayadeva identifies poetics as vicaravıcinicayalam: karava-ram: nidhi — the ocean of alam: kara that has vicara as its waves. Understandingvicara to be �sabdavyaparavicara, poetics in the Candraloka becomes ‘‘anocean of figures of speech that produces waves of semantic investigation.’’According to such a model, the technical and aesthetic investigation thatJayadeva conducts in the first two thirds of the Candraloka becomes the idealfoundation for the semantic investigation in the final third of the work. That is,the investigation of how language functions in poetry informs the under-standing of how words operate in their most fundamental sense. Poeticprinciples, rather than being secondary and artificial features of language, areintegral to the function of all language.

Jayadeva’s retrograde presentation of the �sabdavr. ttis

Along these lines, there is a final peculiarity in the structure of the Candraloka thatremains to be discussed — the anomalous sequence within Jayadeva’s discussion ofthe three�sabdavr: ttis (denotation, metaphorical indication, and literary suggestion).As is the case in the Kavyapraka�sa, in practically all alam: kara�sastras sympathetic torasadhvani theory, the analysis of �sabdavr: tti is seen to examine abhidha (denota-tion) first, laks:an: a (metaphorical indication) second and then only vya~njana (sug-gestion), in contradistinction with the two more primary semantic operations. InDhvanyaloka 1.9, Anandavardhana justifies this typical sequence:

alokarthı yatha dıpasikhayam: yatnavan janah:tadupayataya tadvad arthe vacye tadadr. tah:

27

Just as a person desiring light will endeavor to ignite the wick of a lamp,this being a means to his goal, one who is devoted to dhvani (literarysuggestion) will first direct his attention to the literal meaning.

According to Anandavardhana’s analogy, even if a rhetorician is moreenamored of suggested meaning he should first investigate the literal meaning,which is prerequisite for the manifestation of the suggested sense. Once again,we should consider whether Jayadeva’s contrary sequence is arbitrary orpurposeful. According to Jayadeva’s commentator, Gagabhat:t:a, Jayadeva’ssequence is simply a matter of causal retrogression:

laks.an. am: nirupya taddhetubhutam: saktim: nirupayati28

Having explained indication, he proceeds to explain its source: denota-tion.29

27 DhvA (1.9).28 RA (10.1).29 Gagabhat:t:a uses abhidha (denotation) and �sakti synonymously in his commentary to thischapter.

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In Gagabhat:t:a’s view, Jayadeva discusses abhidha and laks:ana after vya~njanabecause these are causes for its manifestation. In the same way, Jayadevadiscusses abhidha after laks:an: a, because denotation is the precipitating causeof metaphorical indication.30 There may still be, however, a deeper purposefor this organization.

The role of Vyanjana (suggestion) in Laks.an. a (indication)

According to Kunjunni Raja, the recently deceased authority on Indiansemantics, Mımam: sakas and logicians of the earlier period (Pracinanaiyayikas)typically state two conditions for indication. The first of these is a precipitatingcondition, alternately described as mukhyarthabadha (a contradiction in theprimary meaning) or anvayanupapattih: (an unsuitability with respect to syn-tactical unity); the second condition is something of an instrumental conditionknown as a sam: bandha, a relational property that orients the presumption ofthe intended secondary meaning with respect to the unsatisfactory literalmeaning. In the stock example ga _ngayam: ghos:ah: (a hamlet on the Ganges), theprecipitating condition is the illogicality of the meaning ‘‘on the Ganges’’ — thefact that such a hamlet would sink. The instrumental condition is the relation ofproximity that allows one to presume the secondary meaning ‘‘on the bank.’’Abhinavagupta and the alam: karikas who are his successors attribute a thirdcondition to laks:an: a, namely a prayojana (purpose) — sometimes referred to asa vya~njana (suggestion). In most literary metaphors, an author uses an indirectexpression for a specific reason rather than simply expressing the purport of thissecondary sense as a literal meaning. An author would say ga _ngayam: ghos:ah: (ahamlet on the Ganges) rather than ga _ngatire ghos:ah: (a hamlet on the bank ofthe Ganges) because the former expression presents a more intimate sugges-tion of coolness and purity than the latter, as well as a greater range of poly-valent associations. Since alam: karikas hold vya~njana to be an essentialcondition of literary indication, a full understanding of laks:an: a would thenrequire a proper understanding of vya~njana. This may, at one level, explain whyJayadeva discusses vya~njana prior to laks:an: a.

The figurative basis of abhidha (denotation)

We still, however, need to consider why Jayadeva discusses abhidha(denotation) as his final topic. In recent decades, a number of prominentscholars in the disciplines of linguistics, cognitive psychology and compara-tive literature—most notably George Lakoff, Mark Johnson and MarkTurner—have argued that what we typically consider to be the literalmeanings of words are in reality constituted by an elaborate chain of met-aphorical associations. According to these theories, the conceptual processesthat shape and motivate language are fundamentally metaphoric in nature,

30 To the extent that denotation is necessary to reveal a contradictory literal meaning motivatingthe secondary sense, denotation is understood to be a cause of metaphorical indication.

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and hence metaphorical speech temporally and functionally precedes literalspeech. This is to say that the most basic and natural expression of humanlanguage is metaphoric rather than literal, and that literal designation,somewhat ironically, is a secondary and dependent function of language.While this theory might seem far removed from the linguistic suppositions ofearly second millennium South Asia, I should like to point out that suchspeculations are not limited to the modern era. The Roman rhetoricianQuintilian writes in the first century C.E:

Quare illo intellectu priore et communi nihil non figuratum est.31

Therefore in the first and common sense of the word everything isexpressed by figures.

Almost 2000 years prior to Lakoff and Johnson, Quintilian determines thatthe most primary function of language is figurative.

As it turns out, ancient Indian scholars were equally aware that metaphorpervades the most common and basic of speech processes. In the second adhyayaof the Nyayasutra, Gautama defends the Nyaya position that the denotativemeaning of a word is a combination of the generic property (jati), the shape(akr: ti) and the individual entity (vyakti) against the challenge (purvapaks:a) ofhypothetical realists who would claim that the denotative meaning is preciselythe individual entity.32 The purvapaks:a argues that because words most com-monly signify individual entities, these must be regarded as the true denotativemeanings.33 Gautama counters this claim, pointing to the fact that words arecommonly used to signify meanings they do not actually denote:

31 Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian / with an English Translation, trans H. E. Butler(Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library, 1921) book 3, 353–355.32 NyS (2.2.62).33 vyaktyakr: tijatisamnidhav upacarad sam: �sayah: // ya�sabdasamuhatyagaparigrahasam: khyavr: ddh-yapacayavarn: asamasanubandhanam: vyaktav upacarad vyaktih: // NyS (2.2.60–61). ‘‘There isuncertainty [regarding your contention] because words would signify the individual, the shape andthe generic property which are inextricably connected. The meaning of a word is the individualentity because the relative pronoun, clusters, abandoning, acquiring, enumeration, growth, dimi-nution, color, verbal compounding, and succession apply to the individual.’’ For some two and ahalf millennia, Indian philosophers have deliberated what constitutes the denotative meaning ofwords. The primary contenders, according to most authorities, are (1) the universal or genericproperty (jati), (2) the individual entity (vyakti), (3) the shape (akrti). The dilemma, which can beinferred from the seemingly contradictory implications of Pan. ini’s sutras 1.2.58 and 1.2.64 (seeScharf 1996), was first ‘‘systematically’’ articulated in the second century BCE by the grammarianPatanjali (Scharf 1966, 2), who postulated the denoted meaning of words to be a combination ofthe class characteristic (akr: ti in Patanjali’s terminology) and the individual entity (dravya — inPatanjali’s terminology). Early Mımam: sakas assumed the most formally orthodox view that thedenotative meaning is the universal or class property (jati) alone, while Gautama and early Nyayaproponents adopted the most pragmatic position that the denotative meaning is a combination ofthe universal or class property (jati), the individual entity (vyakti), and the shape (akrti). Laterlogicians such as Jayantabhat:t:a contended that the denotative meaning of the word is the indi-vidual entity qualified by the generic property (Raja 1963; Scharf 1996; Ganeri 1996; Deshpande1992). One would do well to consult Raja (1963) for a lucid introduction to this debate, and turn toDeshpande (1992) and Sharf (1996) for more comprehensive treatments of this topic. Tiwari(1994) presents an excellent account of early Nyaya approaches to semantic theory.

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sahacaran. asthanatadarthyavr. ttamanadharan. asamıpyayogasadhanadhi-patyebhyo brahman. amancakat:arajasaktucandanaga _ngasat:akannapu-rus.es.v atadbhave ’pi tadupacarah:

In [the examples involving] 1) a Brahman, 2) a cot, 3) a mat, 4) a king,5) barley, 6) sandalwood, 7) the Ganges river, 8) a cloth, 9) food, and10) a man, there is semantic application34 of a word even though theprimary referent is not present35 because of 1) co-presence, 2) place-ment, 3) a purpose, 4) a behavior, 5) measure, 6) containment, 7) prox-imity, 8) connection, 9) means, and 10) sovereignty.

Vatsyayana’s commentary to the sutra elucidates the embedded illustrations:

atadbhave ’pi tadupacara ity atacchabdasya tena sabdenabhidhanam itisahacaran. ad – yas.t:ikam: bhojayeti yas.t:ikasahacarito brahman. o ’bhid-hıyata iti. sthanad – mancah: krosantıti mancasthah: purus.a abhidhıyante.tadarthyat – kat:arthes.u vıran. es.u vyuhyamanes.u kat:am: karotıti bhavati.vr. ttad – yamo raja kubero rajeti tadvad vartata iti. manad – ad:hakenamitah: saktavah: ad:hakasaktava iti. dharan. at – tulayam: dhr. tam: candanam:tulacandanam iti. samıpyad – ga _ngayam: gavas carantıti deso ’bhidhıyatesannikr. s.t:ah: . yogat – kr. s.n. ena ragen. a yuktah: sat:akah: kr. s.n. a iti abhidhıyate.sadhanad – annam: pran. a iti. adhipatyad – ayam: purus.ah: kulam ayam:gotram iti. tatrayam: sahacaran. ad yogad va jatisabdo vyaktau prayujyataiti.36

The statement ‘‘there is semantic application of a word even though theactual referent is not there’’ means ‘‘by the word, there is denotation ofanother word.’’ Because of co-presence, the expression ‘‘feed the staff’’means ‘‘feed the Brahman;’’ because of position, the expression ‘‘the cotsare crying’’ means ‘‘the people lying in the cots are crying;’’ because ofpurpose, ‘‘he is weaving a mat’’ means ‘‘straw is woven for the sake of amat;’’ because of behavior, ‘‘King Yama37’’ means ‘‘King Kubera,38’’ i.e.,‘‘he acts in the same way;’’ because of measure, ‘‘a barley ad: haka39’’means ‘‘an amount of pounded barley that measures one ad: haka;’’because of containment, ‘‘balanced sandalwood’’ means ‘‘the sandalwood

34 upacara. While in a previous context (NyS 2.2.60), Vatsyayana had glossed the word upacarawith the synonym prayoga (‘‘use,’’ ‘‘application’’), in the current context the association with theexpression atadbhave (‘‘the absence of that [referent]’’) clarifies that upacara signifies secondaryor metaphorical usage (see Tiwari, 157). Many thanks to Walter Slaje, Bogdan Diaconescu,Madhav Deshpande and Gary Tubb for their advice and assistance in interpreting this sutra.35 One might alternatively translate atadbhave ‘pi tadupacara to mean ‘‘there is application to ameaning even though this is something other [than the referent of the word]’’36 NyBh (2.2.62).37 The god of death.38 The god of wealth.39 A measure of weight approximating 7 lbs. 11 oz. (Apte, The Practical Sanskrit-English Dic-tionary {Kyoto: Rinsen Book Company, 2003} 321).

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contained in the balance;’’ because of proximity ‘‘the cows roam on theGanges’’ means ‘‘a location proximate [to the Ganges];’’ because ofconnection, ‘‘the cloth is black’’ means ‘‘the cloth that possesses the colorblack;’’ because of means [there is the expression] ‘‘life is food’’; becauseof sovereignty, ‘‘he is the family’’ means ‘‘he is the head of the family.’’ Inthe present consideration, because of co-presence or connection, theword for a universal is applied in the sense of the individual entity.’’

It should be acknowledged that this sutra as well as Vatsyayana’s commentaryrepresents a provisional and preliminary argument within Gautama’s greaterdeliberation on the meaning of a word (padartha), and hence does not presentGautama’s conclusive view; here a hypothetical proponent of the view that aword denotes the generic property (jati) clarifies his rebuttal of a hypotheticalproponent of the view that a word denotes the individual entity (vyakti).Nevertheless, Gautama’s sutra provides evidence of an ancient Indian viewcontending that metaphorical indication (laks:an: a or upacara) is responsiblefor one of the most fundamental linguistic processes: the use of words toidentify individual entities.

While all the illustrative expressions in the commentarial passage citedabove present some degree of metaphorical attribution, the third exam-ple—kat:am: karoti (he makes a mat)—is a seemingly direct grammaticalconstruction, which most people, if questioned, would deem to be a literalexpression. In fact, the grammarian Pan. ini’s (fifth century BCE) explanationof the function of the verbal object (karma)—kartur ıpsitatamam: karma40

(karma is the thing most desired by the agent [with respect to theaction]41)—justifies the syntactical logic in this expression,42 thus avoidingthe need for application (upacara) to a secondary meaning. According tothe Nyaya view, however, the action is not performed on the direct object(the mat), which corresponds to the finished product, but rather on the rawmaterial (straw) for the purpose of a mat. On the basis of this discrepancy,Gautama advocates the transference of a secondary meaning, whichVatsyayana determines to be kat: arthes:u vıran: es:u vyuhyamanes:u (straw iswoven for the sake of a mat). A similar evaluation can be made ofVatsyayana’s eighth example: �sat:akah: kr: s:n: ah: (a black cloth). While theword kr: s:n: ah: (the color black) might appear to be an adjective qualifyingthe noun �sat:akah: (cloth), according to the Vai�ses: ika categories adopted byearly logicians, these correspond to separate strata in the ontologicalhierarchy. Kr: s:n: a, being a quality (gun: a), cannot be literally equated with asubstance (dravya) such as �sat:aka, and therefore a relation of inherence ismetaphorically indicated. In this way, the expression �sat:akah: kr: s:n: ah: isunderstood to have the meaning ‘‘a cloth conjoined with the color black’’

40 Pan: (1.4.49).41 The Ka�sikavr: tti supplies here the ellipsis kriyaya (with respect to the action): kartuh: kriyaya yadaptum is: t:atamam: tat karakam: karmasa~nj~nam: bhavati (KV, 1.4.49). (The nominal relation known askarma is that which the agent most desires to attain with respect to the action).42 In the sentence kat:am: karoti (he makes a mat), kat:am: (mat) is the most desired object.

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(kr: s:n: ena yuktah: ). It is the very pervasiveness of such metaphors in ordinaryspeech that lends support to the argument that the use of words to identifyindividual entities is due to a metaphorical indication (upacara) based onthe denotation of the generic property.

Jayadeva’s definition of denotation

At this point, it will be useful to consider Jayadeva’s explanation of abhidha orliteral designation:

dharmam: kancit puraskr. tya prayah: sabdah: pravartateyatha[read yaya]43rtham: spas.t:am acas.t:e sabdas tam abhidham: viduh:jatya gun. ena kriyaya vastuyogena sam: jnayanirdesena ca manyante s.ad:vidham abhidham: budhah:

44

Generally a word will signify a meaning by bringing a specific property tothe forefront.45

Scholars regard denotation to be the [semantic operation] by whichwords clearly express meanings.

They understand denotation to have six types: denotation by way of1) a universal, 2) a quality, 3) an action, 4) a connection to a thing, 5) aname, and 6) a self reference.46

43 Pradyotanabhat:t:a, the earliest known commentator to the Candraloka, comments : tatra yayavr: ttya �sabdah: spas: t:am: saks: ad acas: t:e sabhidha (here the operation by which a word directly signifiesis abhidha). Two subsequent commentators, Gagabhat:t:a and Vaidyanatha Payagun. d:a cite Pra-dyotana’s explanation in their comments to the same verse. It seems likely, given the similaritybetween the letters y and th in devanagari script, that manuscripts may have interpolated thereading yathartham: in the place of yayartham: . All three commentators explain that yaya refers tovr: ttya (‘‘by [this] semantic operation’’). According to this reading, yaya (by which) becomes asuitable relative pronoun to the correlative pronoun tam (that). While it might be tempting toaccept the reading yathartham, translating this to mean ‘‘a suitable meaning,’’ this would result inthe loss of a corresponding relative pronoun for the correlative pronoun (tam).44 CA (10.1–2).45 puraskr: tya. Less figuratively, ‘‘having utilized.’’46 While the word nirde�sa literally means ‘‘specification,’’ Jayadeva explains the denotation of thistype of word in the following way:

na yogader ayatanam: na sa _nketaniketanamvr. ttya nirdesasabdo ’yam: mukhyaya svabhidheyaya (CA, 10.4).

Being neither the locus of en etymology nor the site of a verbal convention,The [nirde�sa] word signifies by way of the primary semantic operation, which [in this case]targets the form of the word itself.

For this reason, I have translated nirde�sa as ‘‘self-reference. The reader will notice that in thisverse, Jayadeva appends two additional types of denotation, vastuyogena (connection to a thing)and nirde�sa (self reference), to the four enumerated by Patanjalı in the Mahabhas:ya: jati, gun: a,kriya and yadr: ccha. Jayadeva also uses the synonym sam: j~na in the place of yadrccha.

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Jayadeva’s definition of denotation differs ever so subtly from that of Mammat:a,which describes the semantic operation in more conservative terminology:47

saks.at sam:ketitam: yo ’rtham abhidhatte sa vacakah:sam:ketitas caturbhedo jatyadir jatir eva vasa mukhyo ’rthas tatra mukhyo vyaparo ’syabhidhocyate48

A denotative expresser (vacaka) signifies a meaning directly establishedby convention. A conventionally established meaning may have fourvarieties – universals, etc. (qualities, actions and adventitious names) –but in another way of thinking it is simply a universal (jati). This is theprimary meaning, and the primary semantic operation signifying this iscalled denotation (abhidha).

In a certain respect, Mammat:a and Jayadeva have the same principal con-cerns: (1) establishing the directness or primacy of the denotative operationsand (2) explaining how a single word (e.g. gauh: or ‘‘cow’’) can efficaciouslyidentify countless individual entities (anantavyaktayah: ) belonging to theproper conceptual class. If a word is indeed understood to signify the indi-vidual entity (vyakti), then it would necessarily signify a single entity eachtime the word is used, or it would need to signify each and every entity at alltimes. If the word signifies a single entity, however, then each time a wordsignifies a different entity, the meaning of the word will change and denota-tion will succumb to the pitfall of variability (vyabhicara). If, on the otherhand, the word signifies all the entities within a class, then the meaning of theword will acquire the pitfall of infinitude (anantya) to accommodate theinfinity of individual entities, and hence an ordinary person will never be ableto comprehend the meaning of a word. In resolving this semantic dilemma,the two alam: karikas resort to different strategies.

Mammat:a defines denotation as the operation revealing a single meaninginvariably joined (sam: ketita) to the word by force of verbal convention. Thesedenoted meanings take the forms of four properties: generic properties,qualities, actions and names. As he succinctly explains in his auto-comment tothe aforementioned verses:

yady apy arthakriyakaritaya pravr. ttinivr. ttiyogya vyaktir eva, tathapyanantyad vyabhicarac ca tatra sam:ketah: kartum: na yujyata iti, gauh:

47 The preceding one and a half verses state:

syad vacako laks.an. ikah: sabdo ’tra vyanjakas tridhavacyadayas tadarthah: syus tatparyartho ’pi kes.ucitsarves.am: prayaso ’rthanam: vyanjakatvam apıs.yate

Since words are threefold—denotative, metaphoric and suggestive— The meaning of wordsare denotated, metaphorically indicated and suggested, even if in some cases they aredetermined by the intended import of a sentence. In general, all of these meanings becomesuggestors.

48 KP (7cd –8).

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suklas calo d: ittha ityadınam: vis.ayavibhago na prapnotıti ca tadupadhaveva sam:ketah:

49

It is not proper to establish a verbal convention with respect to theindividual entity, even though this alone is the suitable [object] ofengagement and disengagement on account of objective efficacy(arthakriya), because [this would lead to the unwarranted consequences]of infinitude and variability. Thus words such as ‘‘cow,’’ ‘‘white,’’‘‘moving,’’ and the name ‘‘D: ittha’’ do not have multiple referents andthe verbal convention [is to be established] only with the distinctiveproperty (upadhi).

In equating the denoted meaning exclusively with a distinguishing property(upadhi), Mammat:a emphatically excludes the individual entity (vyakti) fromthe range of denotation proper. According to Jayadeva’s definition, however,a word does not unequivocally denote the distinguishing property (dharma),but rather utilizes this property (puraskr: tya — literally ‘‘having brought to theforefront’’) to expedite the denotative operation.50 In stipulating that deno-tation ‘‘brings a property to the forefront (puraskr: tya),’’ Jayadeva implies thata substrate remains in the background. As the commentator Pradyotanabhat:t:a(16th century) explains:

na kevalavyaktau sa _nketagrahah: sakyah: [read sakyo] vyaktimatrasyati-prasaktatvat vyaktau vises.asya vises.akam: dharmam: vinanupapatteh: . apicaıkavyaktau sa _nkete vyaktyantarapratıtir na syat.51

It is not proper to understand a verbal convention solely in relation tothe mere entity, because this would lead to undesirable consequence.52 Itis impossible to distinguish the mere entity in the absence of a distin-guishing property. Moreover, if the verbal convention were to pertain toa single individual entity, this would not allow for the comprehension ofother individual entities [in the same class].

49 KP (7ab, vr. tti).50 In this respect, Mammat:a’s and Jayadeva’s definitions demonstrate separate philosophicalinclinations. In defining the denoted meaning to be a meaning established by convention,Mammat:a more or less equates abhidha (denotation) — otherwise known as �sakti (inherentdesignative capacity) — with sam: keta (semantic convention), thus demonstrating his sympathywith traditional Mımam: saka presentations of semantic theory. In contrast, Jayadeva appears toconcur with the Naiyayika position that �sakti or abhidha amounts to the relationship between adistinguishing property and the thing designated.51 �SA (10.1)52 vyaktimatrasyatiprasaktatvat. Literally, ‘‘because the mere entity is stretched unwarrantedly.’’In the current context, the qualification atiprasakta has the sense ‘‘leading to unwarranted con-sequences’’ (prasa _nga). In a manner of speaking, even the etymological meaning here is suitable inthat the ‘‘mere entity’’ is ‘‘stretched unwarrantedly’’ in the role of a verbal convention, becausesuch a convention does not enable the signification of the multiplicity of individual entities withina given species.

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In Pradyotana’s opinion, Jayadeva’s definition denies the possibility that thepure individual entity can be the denotative meaning, since this can never bethe object of a single invariable and efficacious verbal convention. However,in stating na kevalavyaktau sa _nketagrahah: �sakyah: (‘‘it is not possible tounderstand the verbal convention with respect to the mere entity’’) ratherthan na vyaktau sa _nketagrahah: �sakyah: (‘‘it is not possible to understand theverbal convention with respect to the entity’’), Pradyotana implies Jayad-eva’s consent that a word may in part signify the individual entity, since thisbecomes the substrate for a distinguishing property. In Pradyotana’s view,Jayadeva’s definition allows that a word, utilizing a distinguishing property,produces an understanding of an individual entity in the process of deno-tation itself.

Jayadeva’s explanation is unique among definitions of abhidha in that itconsciously avoids specifying the denoted meaning of the word (abhid-heyartha). Instead, it draws attention to the different types of properties(dharma), which serve as the instrumental means of denotation (pravr: ttini-mitta). By their nature, these properties are understood to inhere in sub-strates (dharmin), which are no other than the individual entities implicatedin most verbal expression. In a certain way, Jayadeva’s explanation is non-committal since it does not stipulate whether (1) a word denotes only theproperty and the listener must cognize the individual entity by way of thesecondary power of speech (laks:an: a) and a separate cognitive function suchas inference (anumana) or presumption (arthapatti), in which case denota-tion does not produce objective efficacy in the absence of metaphoricalindication, or (2) denotation itself produces the cognition of the individualentity as qualified by a property (dharmavi�sis: t:avyakti). If we accept thislatter view, then there might be the objection that a word cannot simulta-neously denotes two things, a property and a particular, required to convey arelationship. This objection is countered by the understanding that, apartfrom abstract contemplation, there can never be a determinate perception ofa general property in the absence of a particular entity constituting itssubstrate, just as there can never be a determinate perception of a particularentity in the absence of an inhering property. A determinate perception,which provides the basis for verbal signification (pravr: ttinimitta), is based onthis indissoluble relationship. The denotative meaning of a word, whichmirrors such a determinate perception, inherits this relational character aswell, and in this subtle way functions through the trope of inherence(a substrate possessing a property).

The analogy to Jayantabhat:t:a’s doctrine: denoted meaning as tadvan

If we are to interpret Jayadeva’s explanation in the former way, thenJayadeva’s definition, like that of Mammat:a, reiterates the traditionalMımam: sa view that the word designates only the generic property. If, inaccordance with the latter interpretation, Jayadeva’s explanation stipulates

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that a word designates the individual entity as qualified by the genericproperty (jativi�sis: t:avyakti), than his explanation resonates most closely withthat of the ninth century logician, Jayantabhat:t:a, who states:

anyes.u tu prayoges.u gam: dehıtyevamadis.utadvato ’rthakriyayogat tasyaıvahuh: padarthatam53

But because of the objective efficacy of other usages such as ‘‘bring thecow,’’Scholars say that the meaning of the word is just ‘‘that possessing this(the generic property).’’54

With such a doctrine, Jayanta reconfigures Gautama’s doctrine so as accountfor the relationship of the generic property and individual entity. WhereJayadeva’s explanation of denotation intimates that the denotation of a wordaims at something beyond a delimiting property, namely the individual entitypossessing this property, Jayanta’s doctrine of tadvan emphatically specifiessuch a relationship. Still, defining the denotative meaning of a word to be‘‘that possessing the generic property’’ does not completely eliminate the needfor attribution in denotation. Even if one assumes that the meaning of theword is something possessing a specified property, a listener will still need toattribute the possession to the particular entity intended by the speaker.

The synedochic structure of Jayadeva’s explanation of denotation

However we chose to interpret Jayadeva’s model of denotation, this presentsthe verbal signification of the individual entity as a type of synecdoche,whereby a property or attribute is used to signify its locus. Hereby, denotationutilizes a property — a generic property (jati), a quality (gun: a), an action(kriya), a relationship to a thing (vastuyoga), a name (sam: j~na), or a self-reference (nirde�sa) — to identify the entity possessing this property. Thereader may consult Figs. 3 and 4, which schematize the quasi-figurative natureof two types of denotation presented by Jayadeva.

When examined closely, Jayadeva’s model of denotation embodiesfeatures remarkably similar to the three causal properties found in meta-phorical indication (laks:an: a): (1) a direct sense that is somehow unsatis-factory (mukhyarthabadha or anvayanupapatti), (2) a relationship betweenthe ultimately targeted meaning and the unsatisfactory direct meaning(sambandha), and (3) a purpose for the indirect expression (prayojana). Byway of Jayadeva’s explanation, when a speaker uses a word to designate aparticular entity, the word specifies a qualifying property, which allows the

53 Jayantabhat:t:a (2:37). This passage is cited in Ganeri (1996). I am indebted to this article for bothits explanations and its provision of a number of valuable sources.54 Jayanta later clarifies the term tadvan:

kim: tu samanya�srayah: ka�scid anullikhita�sabaleyadivi�ses:as tadvan ity ucyate (NyM, 2:38).

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listener to identify the proper type of particular entity, but which does notultimately satisfy the speaker’s intention. A parched traveler asking for‘‘some water,’’ cannot not quench his thirst with the generic property‘water-ness,’ even if this is said to expedite his communication. Hisintention is to receive a measure of a specific type of liquid substance, i.e.,water. The relationship between the immediately specified quality (‘water-ness’) and the water itself is one of inherence (samavaya). The purpose forthis indirection is that it allows for the objective efficacy (arthakriya) of asingle word in multiple contexts. Such an indirect pathway insures that thespeaker can use the same word, ‘‘water,’’ to successfully communicate thesame type of substance, water, in any given instance or circumstance. It isfunctionally impossible to directly signify the individual entity alonebecause this would require a unique word for each and every individualentity. In order to avoid this predicament, denotation depends upon asubtle form of semantic indirection. What distinguishes most cases ofmetaphorical indication from the attribution I have just described is typeof purpose. The semantic indirection within metaphor allows a speaker orwriter to suggest a quality or feeling that would not be conveyed throughdirect expression, such as the coolness and holiness suggested by theexpression ‘‘a hamlet on the river Ganges.’’ The subtle indirection withindenotation, in contrast, simply provides the single word the capacity tocommunicate particular entities in multiple contexts.

Fig. 3 Denotation by way of a Generic Property (jati)

Fig. 4 Denotation by Way of a Connection to a Thing (vastuyoga)

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The representative nature of speech prevents denotation from everattaining the status of perfectly direct signification. The word fire does notburn our tongues; the word water will not quench our thirsts. Semanticdirectness is further compromised by the fact that a single word must havethe capacity to identify countless individual entities. In their effort toestablish the directness of verbal designation in statements involvingobjective efficacy, e.g., ‘‘bring the cow,’’ Indian language theorists postu-lated a relationship between a word and a general property, which is to bethen attributed to the appropriate particular entities. No school of thoughtperfectly succeeded in explaining non-variable verbal denotation fullyapart from this attribution. In truth, denotation is direct only to the extentthat it is the most direct of the semantic operations. Jayadeva’s explana-tion that ‘‘generally a word signifies by bringing some property to theforefront’’ acknowledges this attributive nature more openly than do otherclassical Indian models. In the face of this limitation, he allows his analysisof figures of speech (alam: kara) and metaphorical indication (laks:an: a) toinform and contextualize his explanation of denotation. In reversing theconventional sequence within his own discussion of the �sabdavr: ttis,Jayadeva emphasizes that investigations into the separate semantic oper-ations — denotation, indication and suggestion — mutually reinforce oneanother, that by cultivating an understanding of the indirect functions ofspeech, one gains greater insight into the direct semantic capacity. Inas-much as it is impossible to understand indication and literary suggestion inthe absence of a rudimentary comprehension of literal designation, theelusive nature of literal designation, disputed for over two millennia inIndia, may most effectively be understood in opposition to its more indi-rect semantic counterparts.

Concluding remarks

To summarize the main points of the paper: Jayadeva’s idiosyncraticsequence of topics in the Candraloka has a threefold purpose. First, thisorganization differentiates his treatise from the Kavyapraka�sa, an act ofdefiance that literally unravels the structure of Mammat:a’s text. Second, thisorganization intimates that aesthetic explorations into language inform sci-entific investigation into the same. Lastly and somewhat paradoxically, hisorganization suggests that the investigation of more indirect functions oflanguage (verbal suggestion and metaphorical indication) clarifies ourunderstanding of the most primary semantic operation (denotation).Through this unusual structure, Jayadeva presents evidence for a positionthat becomes more forcefully articulated by Jagannatha Pan. d: itaraja in theRasaga _ngadhara: that Alam: karikas (literary rhetoricians), as the true con-noisseurs of figurative and suggestive language, are sovereign epistemologi-cal authorities, unbeholden to other philosophical traditions. Here, I

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conclude with a verse from Jayadeva Pıyus.avars.a’s drama the Prasan-naraghava:

yes.am: komalakavyakausalakalalılavatı bharatıtes.am: karkasatarkavakravacanodgare ’pi kim: hıyate

yaih: kantakucaman. d:ale kararuhah: sanandam aropitastaih: kim: mattakarındrakumbhasikhare naropan. ıyah: sarah:

55

Those whose speech possesses skill, technique and beauty suitable fortender poetry,What would they suffer, even in the articulation of complex circuitouslogical statements?56

Those whose fingernails have blissfully pierced the breasts of beautifulwomen…Why shouldn’t their arrows pierce the fleshy temples of rutting ele-phants?

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