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Unravellinghraymachus'rguments

in TheRepublic '

P. P. NICHOLSON

I

There has been muchdiscussion ecentlyof the encounter etweenThrasymachus and Socrates in Book I of Plato's Republic.

I am not hereconcernedwith whetherThrasymachus'arguments

and Socrates' replies are valid, interesting and important though that

problem is, but with the fundamental problem of deciding what

exactly Thrasymachus is saying about so 81x%ctov, ustice. Clearly,

this is a necessary preliminary to the raising of any other question

about Thrasymachus' arguments. Such an investigation may also

contribute to our understanding of The Republicas a whole: given

the structure of the dialogue, to know what Plato dissents from can

providevaluableclues to what he assentsto.

In brief, my aim is to supportProfessorKerferd's nterpretationthat

Thrasymachus'doctrine is that justiceis the advantage of another .2

Kerferd's view has not been generally accepted. I shall argue that the

standard view found in most commentaries, that Thrasymachus

thinks justice is the advantage of the ruler(s) , is open to major

objections, and that Kerferd's interpretation is to be preferredbe-

cause it avoids these objections. I shall argue further that some of

the implications of Kerferd's interpretation provide additional

1

I am grateful to John Gould, W. H. Greenleaf, Dale Hall, G. B. Kerferd,Hugh Price, and J. C. Rees for their comments.2 G. B. Kerferd The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic Durham

University Journal n.s. 9 (1947) 19-27.

Since I shall be using the single word advantage throughout, it must be

stressed that Thrasymachus uses two words, speaking of sY -oi xpe'rrovo

kubtupkpove.g. 338 C) but of X6-rptov &Tayokve.g. 343 C). Advantage and

interest are the common translations of E,u,uqppov,lthough good has very

occasionally been used; good is the usual translation of &ya&6v.Now, in both

cases advantage seems to me the word best suited to Thrasymachus' meaning

and to his nuances, ambiguities, and word-plays, despite the risk of making his

position more uniform in appearance than it is. I shall therefore write of theadvantage (vb kt4pipov) of the ruler and of the advantage (&yc&6v) f an-

other .

210





reasons for thinking that it comes nearer the mark than any other.

With Kerferd as guide, Thrasymachus' arguments can be exhibitedas both consistent and coherent, once it is understood that he is

concerned to characterise and not define, that he prefers to do this

by his own method of argument, and that he presents his case in an

unexpected order.

II

According to most commentators in English, Thrasymachus sees

justice as a political relationship between rulers and subjects, andasserts that justice is the advantage of the stronger,i.e., of the ruler(s).3On the face of it, this means that Thrasymachus is only discussing

justice in the political sphere, since rulers' enactments cover a limited

range of the conduct which can be called just or unjust. However far

one stretched his terms like rule (&px&)r law (v6qos),so that

they included not only legislation but also social regulation such as is

attributed to Lycurgus, they still would not encompass all moral

conduct. This interpretation, that Thrasymachus means that justice

is the advantage of the ruler(s), is open to two objections: (1) it seemsnot to fit properly into the development of the argument of The

Republic; and (2) it is not a doctrine which Thrasymachus holds

consistently.

(1) It is, to say the least, odd and surprising to find the discussion

* E.g. R. L. Nettleship Lectures on the Republic of Plato (London 1901) pp. 28-9;E. Barker Greek Political Theory. Plato and his Predecessors (London 1918)

p. 180; P. Shorey What Plato Said (Chicago 1933) p. 210; G. M. A. GrubePlato's Thought (London 1933) pp. 265-6; A. D. Lindsay The Republic of Plato

[Translated] (London 1935) p. xxxi; M. B. Foster Masters of Political Thought.Volume I Plato to Machiavelli (London 1942) p. 47; T. A. Sinclair A History ofGreek Political Thought (London 1951) p. 74; I. M. Crombie An Examinationof Plato's Doctrines. Volume I Plato on Man and Society (London 1962) p. 81;G. F. Hourani Thrasymachus' Definition of Justice in Plato's RepublicPhronesis 7 (1962) 110-20; L. Strauss Plato in Strauss and J. Cropsey (eds)History of Political Philosophy (Chicago 1963) pp. 11-12; R. S. BrumbaughPlato for the Modern Age (New York 1964) pp. 86-7; R. C. Cross and A.D.Woozley Plato's Republic. A Philosophical Commentary (London 1964) pp.

2441; A. Bloom The Republic of Plato. Translated with Notes and an InterpretiveEssay (New York 1968) pp. 326-8; W. K. C. Guthrie A History of Greek Philo-

sophy. Volume III The Fifth Century Enlightenment (Cambridge 1969) pp. 88-90;and K. Dorter Socrates' Refutation of Thrasymachus and Treatment ofVirtue Philosophy & Rhetoric 7 (1974) 25-46, especially section II.

211





of justice narrowed down to politics at this point. Very early on

(330 E ff) justice is spoken of as a general quality relevant to allconduct and not simply to political activity; and the discussion con-tinues in the same vein after the Thrasymachusdebate until Socratesmakes a point of diverting it into the political channel (368D-369 A).It is true that the specificallypolitical aspect is first raisedby Thrasy-machus, yet considering the dialogue'sstructure, it would be strangeif he were concerned exclusively with politics. Since the subject ofThe Republic s justice at large, it is natural to expect Thrasymachus,like Cephalus, Polemarchus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus, to be intro-

duced in order to present a contrasting account of it. Moreover,it can be argued that Thrasymachus is expressing a version of thetraditional values of the ordinary Greek. Adkins has elaborated thiskind of view, and writes for instance, scratch Thrasymachus andyou find King Agamemnon ,and Thrasymachus s merely drawingout what appearto him to bethe logicalconsequencesof Greekvalues .'But as the traditional Greek conception of justice did not confineitself to political obedience,' once more one would not expect Thrasy-machus to limit himself to justice in a political context. In fact, when

he comes to give examples of just and unjust actions (343D-344 B),only some concern one's relations with rulers (e.g. paying taxes),whilst others concern one's relationswith fellow-subjects(e.g. business

dealings).And he sees the crucialissue as being which of the two lives,the just or the unjust man's is superior (e.g. 347 E): meaning by

life a man's total imputableconduct not merelyhis politicalactivity.More will be said about this aspect later. I leave it now forthe secondobjection to the standard interpretation of Thrasymachus.

(2) There is apparently a major inconsistency in Thrasymachus'account of justice. Initially, he says that it is the

advantageof the

stronger, i.e. the ruler(s) (338 C-341A), but later that it is the advan-

tage of another (343 C-344C). But to assert both propositions canlead to contradiction, because only for the weaker is the advantage

' A. W. H. Adkins Merit and Responsibility (Oxford 1960) p. 238, and MoralValues and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece (London 1972) p. 119. Cf.

Bloom, op. cit. p. 336: Thrasymachus gives voice to common opinions whichare usually kept quiet.

' As Barker puts it, 8LxaCXoa7 is an ethical as well as a legal term, and has

the overtones and suggestions of our own word 'righteousness '. The Politicsof Aristotle. Translated with an Introduction Notes and Appendices (Oxford 1946)p. Lxx.

212





of the stronger synonymous with the advantage of another .

For instance, if a tyrant levies a tax to pay for his orgies, is he actingjustly or unjustly, according to Thrasymachus?Justly, if justice is

the ruler's advantage, unjustly if justice is another's advantage.Those commentators who have paid attention to this problem have

reacted in a vanety of ways. Some accept that Thrasymachus is

inconsistent, offering a number of different explanations. Jowett

depicts Thrasymachusas a vain clown and amerechild in argument ,implying that consistency was beyond him.6 Sidgwick does not think

Thrasymachus' arguments are to be taken too seriously, believing he

defines justice as a rhetorician,possessing the cultivated omniscienceto which ancient rhetoricians commonly laid claim, and so able to

knock off a definition of Justice, as of anything else. That 'Justice is

the interest of the stronger' is a plausible cynical paradox which a

cultivated person might naturally and prosperously maintain in a

casual conversation .7 Crossand Woozley conclude that Thrasymachushasadvanced two different criteriaof justice ... without appreciating

that they do not necessarily coincide .8And Maguirecontends that

only some of the argumentsThrasymachus states are his own, others

not consistent with them being falsely attributed to him by Plato.9However, we should not accept any explanation of Thrasymachus'

inconsistency before asking whether his arguments will stand being

treated seriously, and whether they can be taken as a whole and

renderedinternallyconsistent. Accordingly,I shall next considerthreedifferent interpretations (without claiming that they exhaust the

possibilities) each alleging that Thrasymachus' two statements can be

made consistent, and this second objection met.

(i) It might be argued that the advantage of another is simply a

synonymous expression for the advantage of the stronger, i.e. the

ruler(s) , for at 343 C Thrasymachustells Socrates you don't know

that justice and the just are literally the other fellow's good - the ad-vantage of the stronger and the ruler, but a detriment that is all hisown of the subject who obeys and serves... '1' However, it is clear

6 B. Jowett The Dialogues of Plato Translated into English with Analysis andIntroductions (Oxford 1871) vol. II p. 6.7 H. Sidgwick The Philosophy of Kant and OtherLectures (London 1905) p. 370.8 Op.cit. p. 41.

' J. P. Maguire Thrasymachus ... or Plato? Phronesis 16 (1971) 142-63.'I The Loeb translation, by P. Shorey (London 1930). This is the translationused throughout.

213





from the speech taken as a whole (i.e. to 344 C) that Thrasymachus

is not talking only of rulers and ruling but of all men and all socialrelations. His examples of just and unjust acts, as was noted, include

other relations besides those between ruler and subject. Therefore

another cannot be equated with stronger, i.e. ruler(s) , because

Thrasymachus'examples show that another can be a fellow-subject

as well as a ruler.

(ii) If stronger, .e. ruler(s) and another are not synonymous, a

contradictionbetween them can be avoided by taking one as the pri-

mary idea and subordinatingthe other to it. The secondinterpretation

takes as primaryThrasymachus'first account of justice ( advantageof the stronger, i.e. ruler(s) ), and subordinates to it his second

account ( advantage of another ). Barker, for instance, writes:

if justice... consists in whatever is for the ruler'sinterest, it follows

that, for everybody other than the ruler, justice may be further de-

fined, according to a popular definition, as 'another's good'. To be

'just', in the popularsense, is to be a means to the satisfaction of the

ruler: to be 'unjust', in the popularsense, is to act for the satisfaction

of oneself .1'But this is to gain consistency at a heavy price, for it

entails that Thrasymachusapplies his doctrine only to some people,namely, the subjects. Two main difficulties impede our acceptance of

that conclusion.'2

(a) Thrasymachus gives an example, business dealings , in which

what the just man does is to the advantage of someoneother than the

ruler(s) (343D). The example cannot be ignored: yet it is hard to

account for it within this line of interpretation without introducing

some further hypothesis, with difficulties of its own. For instance,

it might be arguedthat although in private transactionswhat is to the

advantageof another is not to the advantage of the ruler(s)directly,

indirectly it is. It wouldnot be necessaryto suggest, with Lee, that like

Marx, Thrasymachusthinks that all morality is somehow determined

11 Op. cit. p. 180. Cf. Cross and Woozley op. cit. pp. 3941.Is One might add, as a further difficulty, that it is an odd doctrine of justice

which applies only to some people, that this is a point which Socrates should

have seized upon, and that since he does not it cannot be what Thrasymachus

means. But we have no grounds for assuming from Socrates' absence ot reaction

that Thrasymachus has not made a point. If we did, it would wreak havocwith much of the interpretation of Thrasymachus and other thinkers treated in

Plato, including that offered in this paper.

214





by the ruler(s)to their advantage 13 it might simply be said that Thra-

symachus believes that the observance of moral rules, however theyhave been determined, always works out to the advantage of the

ruler(s). In this way, every just act is necessarily to the advantage of

the ruler(s),though it may also be to the advantage of someone else.14But the difficulty with this interpretation is to see how the text can

support it. It involves sophisticated and contentious ideas, yet Thra-

symachus provides no special explanation of them such as he giveswith other unusual ideas, for example that of the ruler who makes no

mistakes. On the contrary, what he does say runs counter to this

interpretation, for whereas many moral rules are the same underdifferent constitutions, what Thrasymachus stresses is the diversityof the ruler(s)'enactments underdifferentconstitutions. His emphasisis upon the limited number of rules which vary correspondinglywith

the differentformsof government (338 D, E). Even if we acceptedthatThrasymachus means, although he does not say, that all just actsare sooner or later to the advantage of the ruler(s), the difficultyremains that an act could then be to the advantage both of anothersubject, directly, and of the ruler(s), indirectly; whereas Thrasy-

machus conceives of advantage in terms of private goods which canbe enjoyed only by one person exclusively (343 D-344 B).(b) Even if it is felt that the first obstacle can be overcome, theproblem remains of what justice is for the ruler himself, if Thrasy-machus is only talking about everybody other than the ruler(Barker, above). Barker's interpretation implies that if justice is theruler's advantage, then for the ruler, justice must consist in pursuinghis own advantage. As Kerferd points out, nowhere does Thrasy-machus say, hint or imply that this was his view. 15In fact, Thrasy-machussays the reverse: that the rulerwho pursueshis own advantageis unjust (344 A-C). And this last passage also shows that Thrasy-machus is not thinking solely of what is just for subjects, but for rulerstoo.

(iii) This is the converse of the last interpretation; it takes as pri-mary Thrasymachus' second account of justice ( advantage of an-other ), and subordinates to it his first account ( advantage of thestronger, i.e. ruler(s) ). This is in effect what Kerferd does, and,

I' H. D. P. Lee Plato. The Republic Translated with an Introduction (Harmonds-

worth 1955) P. 71.This view was put to me by Dale Hall.16 Op. cit. p. 22.

215





with some variations, Sparshott16and Herderson.17 Kerferd argues

that 343 C to 344 C,whereThrasymachussays justice is the advantageof another, is the fullest account of his views on justice and injustice

whichwe have and hashardly receivedthe attention which it merits,

and ... has often been dismissedas hardly worthy of serious study .118

In this passage, Thrasymachus has a single conception of justice

( another's advantage ) and injustice ( one's own advantage ).

Until this passage, he has been talking about what is just for the

subject, namely the advantage of the stronger, the ruler. Yet that is

but one instance of the general doctrine that justice is the advantage

ofanother;

in thiscase, of

the ruler.What then is justice for the ruler?Since justice is the advantage of another, justice for the rulermust be

the subject's advantage. It is because this is so, that Thrasymachus

always prefers injustice to justice, i.e. prefers the promotion of one's

own advantage. Kerferd's interpretation, it seems to me, provides

an account of Thrasymachuswhich is consistent both internally and

in relation to the rest of The Republic,and which avoids both of the

objections to the standard interpretation. In what follows I shall

argue that the best sense can be made of Thrasymachus' arguments

by abandoning the standard interpretation forKerferd's,

thatis,first, by conceiving Thrasymachus to be discussing all just relation-

ships and not simply those between subject and ruler, and second

by making central the idea that justice is the advantage of another,rather than the idea that it is the advantage of the stronger, i.e.

ruler(s).

However, I must make it clear that I only subscribeto that part of

Kerferd's article in which he discusses what Thrasymachus says.

He also discusses what we should take Thrasymachus to mean by

what he says, and here I cannot agree with him. He classifies Thrasy-

machus' doctrine as one of Natural Right ( moralobligation has real

independent existence, and arises from the nature of man ) rather

than of Ethical Nihilism, Legalism, or Psychological Egoism. I

agree that Thrasymachus thinks injustice is supenor to justice as

an aim in life, but I am not sure that he asserts a moralobligation o

1 F. E. Sparshott Socrates and Thrasymachus Monist 50 (1966) 421-59,

especially section V.17 T. Y. Henderson In Defense of Thrasymachus American Philosophical

Quarterly7 (1970) 218-28.Op. cit. p. 22.I Op. cit. p. 19.

216





be unjust, as Kerferdclaims. The issue is complicated by our holding

different conceptions of moralobligation from the Greeks; n partic-ular, it has been suggested that they did not make a clear distinction,

as we do, between morality and prudence.20 But even by Greek

standards, it seems doubtful whether Thrasymachuswas thinking in

terms of morality at all.2' He calls injustice not a virtue but sound,

good ,judgement, zu43ovka.348 C, D). EU'ouALocs usedin Thucydides

of expedient judgements.22Likewise, iuicpgpov nd cyo 6 are words

often connected with prudence,efficiency, success, and the production

of desiredresults; they are, writes Adkins, part of a system of values

based on calculation .23 Nor is it clear whether Plato introducesThrasymachusin order to contrast his own moral theory with a dia-

metrically opposed moral theory or a completely non-moral theory.

However, there is no need for my present purposesto settle whether

Thrasymachus' ideal of injustice is a moral theory or not. Since

Kerferd's classification of Thrasymachus'doctrine in terms of moral

theories is quite distinct from his interpretationof what Thrasymachus

says, one could reject the first whilst accepting the second. I consider

Kerferd's nterpretationof what Thrasymachussays to be an important

contribution to our understanding of both Thrasymachus and TheRepublic.Only Houranihas confronted Kerferddirectly and dissented

from his interpretation: I shall not discuss Hourani, because I regard

Kerferd's reply as conclusive.24Instead, I aim to show how, with

Kerferd's interpretation in our hands as the vital clue, it is possible

to unravel Thrasymachus' arguments, and reach a better under-

standing of the whole courseof his debate with Socrates.

'? E.g. E. F. Carritt An Ambiguity of the Word 'Good ' Proceedings o/ theBritish Academy 23 (1937) 51-80, H. A. Prichard Duty and Interest (Oxford 1929)

and Moral Obligation (Oxford 1949) chs 1, 3, and 5, and Adkins Merit and

Responsibility especially ch. xi. Cf. R. G. CollingwoodAn Autobiography (Oxford

1939) pp. 634, and chs IV, V, and VII passim.

21Cf. Maguire op. cit. pp. 158-9, who is sure Thrasymachus does not assert a

moral obligation.si E.g. Peloponnesian War iii 40 and 42-8. It is used in this way by Kleon and

Diodotus.2 Merit and Responsibility p. 223.

24Hourani loc. cit.; Kerferd Thrasymachus and Justice: a Reply Phronesis 9

(1964) 12-16. One of Kerferd's points, that Thrasymachus is not a legalist,is further supported by D. J. Hadgopoulos Thrasymachus and Legalism

Phronesis 18 (1973) 204-8.

217





III

A corollary of Kerferd's interpretation is that Thrasymachus haspresentedhis case backwards.For he begins with the particularappli-

cation to political inferiors of a general doctrine which he presents

later. Did the real Thrasymachusadopt this procedure?If so, why?

Or is this another instance of Plato's manipulation of Thrasy-

machus?26If so, why? These are awkward questions, but they must

be raised. I shall arguethat we can come partially to terms with them

if we pay attention to the dramatic setting. This entails examining

the first steps in the debate (336 B-338), which are usually ignored.26

Indeed, I suggest that whetheror not my particularuse of this passageis acceptable, this section of the debate is of great importanceand has

been neglected. Plato is a philosopherwho thinks he has tamed art

and put it to work as philosophy'shandmaiden,and consequently it is

always necessary to consider whether a dramatic nterludeorby-play

may not be the means of making a philosophically relevant point.

There is of course the dangerof readingtoo much into Plato: but this

is less of a dangerthan not consideringall possiblereadings.

But first, a distinction must be drawn. Thrasymachus s joiningin a

discussionon whatis justice . Thereare, broadlyspeaking,two waysof dealing with such a question: (1) by delimitation - showing

which peopleand acts arecounted just; and (2)by characterisation

giving some characteristicor essential feature common to some or all

of the uses of the word. These are logically distinct, and it is possible

to be able do one and not the other. Now, in The Republiceveryone,

including Thrasymachus, seems to be agreed upon whichpeople and

acts are just, for they all hold that certain acts, which are both illegal

and normally called unjust, are what a just man does not do (331A,

333 C, 343 D-344 B, and 360 B, C). Examples would be dishonesty,tax evasion, corrupt practices, sacrilege, murder and adultery. It is

significant that when Socrates later illustrates the commonplaceand

vulgar conception of justice (442E-443 B), he repeats the others'

examples but also greatly expands the category of just conduct which

is not covered by the law, adding the examples of loyalty to friends

21The word manipulation is E. L. Harrison's: see Plato's Manipulation of

Thrasymachus Phoenix 21 (1967) 27-39. It is approved by Maguire op. cit.

p. 142 n. 3.IThough not by T. G. Tucker The Proem to the Ideal Commonwealthof Plato

(London 1900) pp. xxxviii-xlv, or Cross and Woozley op. cit. pp. 23-6.

218





and keeping promises. None of the other participants can object to this

extension, since it follows their own principle that to be just is -toobey social rules. Whether these are also legal rules or not is surely

secondary, and so Socrates is right to add these further examples.

We may note in passing that if we assume, as seems legitimate, that

Thrasymachus too would accept Socrates' list of just actions, then his

doctrine cannot possibly be reducedto justiceis the advantage of the

ruler since some of Socrates' additional examples have nothing at all

to do with the ruler.Be that as it may, clearly in their debate Thrasy-

machus and Socrates agree on which acts are to count as just.27

The disagreement between them concerns the characterisation ofjustice, in particular, whether the just man's acts are advantageous

to him. Once again, although they differ in their answers, the partic-

ipants all agree that this question is central. Cephalus has said that

the chief service of wealth is that it enables him to act justly, and

Glaucon and Adeimantus require Socratesto show that justice pays .

What we must expect Thrasymachus to do, therefore, is to give us

such an account of the characteristicsof justice as will enable us to see

whether it pays to be just.28

Now to turn to the text itself. Thrasymachus'first wordsare mainlyabout the methodof argument hat has been adopted until then (336

C, D). First be condemns Socrates, and the others, not only for talking

nonsense, but also for using the question and answer method: why

do you Simple Simons truckle and give way to one another? He next

demands that Socrates give his own answer, and finally tries to pre-

scribe the kind of answeradmissible: anddon't you be telling me that

[justice] is that which ought to be, or the beneficial or the profitable

or the gainful or the advantageous, but express clearly and precisely

whatever you say . What exactly is Thrasymachus telling Socrates to

do: and what therefore is he implying he will himself do instead?

It has been variously suggested that Thrasymachus is trying to rule

out stale and barren platitudes ,29 synonyms ,30and slogans...

27 The same view is taken by D. Sachs A Fallacy in Plato's Republic Philo-

sophical Review 72 (1963) pp. 142-3, (reprinted in A. Sesonske [ed.] Plato's

Republic : Interpretation and Criticism [Belmont 1966] and in G. Vlastos

[ed.] Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays [New York 1971] vol. II), and byHenderson op. cit. p. 219.28 A similar conclusion is reached by Sparshott op. cit. pp. 422-3.

29 J. Adam The Republic of Plato. Edited with Critical Notes, Commentary andAppendices (Cambridge 1902) vol. I. p. 24.30 Shorev in his translation. p. 39.

219





never less ambiguousthan the terms they replace. '3' his is part of it,

but I think there is a further point. These suggestions all presupposethat Thrasymachus s looking for a different answer,whereaswhat he

seeks is a different method of answering.What we have here is a dis-

pute about the method of argument to be employed.32Thrasymachus

objects to Socrates' elenctic method because, not understanding its

purpose,he regards t as merely a device by which Socratesgets out of

giving his own account of justice. So he sees Socrates' evasiveness as

the consequenceof his methodof discussion.

The alternative method of discussionwhich Thrasymachusthinks is

more satisfactory is that of pcxpoXovLx,here one speaks at length,develops an argument without interruption, and deals properly with

an issue. A rhetorician,he is himself at his best in giving set speeches

of some length, whilst on the other hand, as the sequel reveals, not

very skilled at the cut and thrust of the Socratic question and answer.

Indeed, the Sophists of Thrasymachus' generation, as suited their

profession, preferred long set speeches, and Plato describes clashes

over the two methods between Protagorasand Socrates and between

Polus and Socrates.33Sidgwick emphasises the proficiency of Prota-

goras, Polus, Hippias, Gorgiasand Thrasymachusat j&xpoXoyta,ndtheir ineptitude at Socratic discourse, noting that Thrasymachus

is the least inept; and indeed claims that Socrates originated the

method of questionand answer,was at that time its only practitioner,

and naturally could beat everyone else at it.34So it is not surprising

to find Thrasymachusin The Republictrying to switch the course of

the discussioninto the channelhe prefers,forbiddingSocrates to come

up WItha bare formulawhich is unclearandimprecise,anddemanding

a full account,i.e. a ,uocxpoAoyEo,or this opensthe way to Thrasymachus

31Sparshott op. cit. p. 456. Cf. Cross and Woozley op. cit. pp. 24-5.32 It might be objected that Thrasymachus is concerned with the content of the

argument as well as its form, since he tries to rule out several possible answers

(336 D). But that here too he is primarily making a point about method becomes

clear when we consider that he himself uses openly (339 A) one of the terms he

forbade Socrates (vu[q)pov), the difference being that Thrasymachus specifies

that justice is the advantage of another and that he embeds this in a whole

theory about justice and injustice. That is to say, the different method by

which Thrasymachus describes justice in terms of advantage makes his account

radically different in content too. Questions of content, then, are secondary

to those of method.3 Protagoras 328 D-329 B and 333 E-338 E; Gorgias 461 D-462 B.

a' Op. cit. pp. 333 and 338 ff.

220





giving his own iocxpoXoyocl.hat is surprising,is that he does not im-

mediately launchinto his Focxpo?oyEo,n which we find later that he is athis clearest and most forceful,but instead expresses his view partially

and very briefly, and, moreover, at once allows Socrates to cross-

questionhim about it. What has happened?Is Thrasymachusso angry

that he has lost his head, and thrown away all his advantages? On

the contrary, his action is not impetuous but deliberate: he does not

plunge in, but pauses to arrange his fee, and to repeat his complaints.

He does have a pocxpoXoyEa.i.e. 343-344C),but he apparently wants to

make a stir by presenting its essential point (justice is the advantage

of another, so it is better to act unjustly) in its most striking applica-tion, the conduct of the ruler.35We may suppose that he feels free to

abandon his normal methodof presentationtemporarilybecause he is

confident that he can handle Socrates' questions. Socrates tied Pole-

marchus into knots, reducing him to saying that he no longer knew

what he meant (334 B), and twisted his words to suit himself; but

then, from Thrasymachus' point of view, Polemarchus suffered two

grave disadvantages: he did not know what he was talking about, and

he was preparedto defer to Socrates. Whereas Thrasymachus thinks

that he knows the essential characterof justice, and that he is able to

prevent Socrates confusingor trickinghim - heis not a SimpleSimon

(341 A-C).36He succeeds in keeping his end up remarkably well, but

seems to feel that Socrates is steering the course of the discussion too

much in his own direction and away from Thrasymachus' thesis (i.e.

in the discussions 341 C-342 E), and this is why he shows reluctancein

answering, and at last breaks up the discussion (343 A), abuses

Socrates, and opens his t=xpo?oyEa..hat completed, he is about to

depart, since he does not think there is anything else he can do to

convince Socrates (345 B). He cannot be said to participate properly

when Socrates questions him after this: perhapshe sees that they can

never agree. When Socrates later justifies his use of question and

answer instead of the set speech which might have been expected as

a counter to Thrasymachus', t is noticeable that the point is settled by

Socrates and Glaucon without reference to Thrasymachus himself

(348 A, B). In the dialogue that follows, Thrasymachus is made to

*6 There is a measure of agreement that Thrasymachus is out to impress:

Kerferd The Doctrine of Thrasymachus p. 26, Hourani op. cit. p. 112.

I6 We note here that Thrasymachus uses the same word, -6s?uz, for the simpli-city of those who accept and succumb to Socrates' elenchus (336 C) and for the

simplicity of the just man (348 C). He implies that he has seen through both.

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feel that he cannot handle Socrates'questionssowellas he had thought:

he is trapped, knows it, and blushes (350 D). At this point Thrasy-machusnot unnaturallywantsto revertto puxpaoytocbut says heknows

he will not be allowedto (350 D, E): after all, it was Glaucon,who had

taken the lead in arrangingThrasymachus'payment (337D), who had

just agreed with Socrates that paxpoXoyxabe dropped (348 B). De-

prived of his chosen weapon of argument, Thrasymachus in effect

ceases to oppose Socrates (e.g. 351 C, 351 D) but agrees to all he says,

making clear that he is simply allowing Socrates to elucidate his ideas

and is not committing himself to holding them (351A-354A). In

other words, because the conditions of debate set by the audienceare

not those which Thrasymachussought, he feels unable to continue;

but he remainsunconvincedby Socrates'arguments.Thrasymachus s

shown to us as a man who is rathertruculent,37a little vain, and over-

confident. No doubt such qualities were important in his profession.

Yet he is also shown to have considerableself-control and integrity,for he extricates himself rather well from a situation whereeverything

is weighted against him. He is not portrayed as either a foolish or an

unsympathetic character, though perhaps a little reckless. So it is

plain to all that in his encounter with Socrates, his argument suffers

no real defeat. He has made a strategic withdrawal,not a retreat.

Howeverwe account for the orderin which Thrasymachuspresents

his argument, it remains that he expresses a clear preference for

FompoMoyEas the method of argument. If we take that preference

seriously, then we shall hesitate to leap in as soon as Thrasymachus

begins to speak and say that he means by justice the advantage of

the ruler .Rather, we shall refrainfrom trying to interpret his argu-

ment until he has finished giving it, and then we shall see that he

means justice is the advantage of another .This enables him to give a

characterisation of justice relevant to the discussionhe has joined.

IV

I have argued that it is no objection to Kerferd'sinterpretationthat

Thrasymachus means justice is the advantage of another, to argue

that this is not what Thrasymachusbegins by saying, for a plausible

explanation can be provided to show that Thrasymachus presented

7 ... is pugnacity and sharp tongue are almost the only other things inde-

pendently recorded of him. Guthrie op. cit. p. 297.

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his case in reverse. Next, I shall say something about the connection

between the earlier and later parts of Thrasymachus' account ofjustice, stating my understanding of his main thesis and showinghow the opening formula follows from it. This may help to explainwhy Thrasymachusplaces so much emphasison that formula.

According to Thrasymachus' 1iocxpoXoy(c343 B-344 C), men are in

competition for scarce resources (all his examples concern money inone way or another). There are times when one is in a position of trustand could take advantage of another person to one's own profit, e.g.in a business partnership, or when holding public office. The rules

that make up justice forbidone to do that. But if you do not do whatis to your advantage, your inaction must be to someone else's ad-vantage; your loss is his gain. Thereforejustice is another'sadvantageand your own detriment, and injustice, being the contrary, is yourown advantage and another's detriment. The rules of justice thusfavour those who break them. Consequently, the unjust man has theadvantage over the just, for the latter does the work but the formertakes the profit. The simple-mindedjust man's efforts make happynot himself (as he thinks) but the unjust man. The unjust man is thusin control of (&px&)he just man. He is

using the just man, who isunaware of it. (Thrasymachus seems to imply that men are just onlyunwittingly: anyone who canconsider he choice will see the advantagesof being unjust.) Here the question of strength arises. If we considernot, say, a random or occasional thief, but a professionalcriminal orpersistently dishonest shop-keeper, we see that they are living offtheir just fellows through a policy of injustice. This latter seems to bethe kind of situation of which Thrasymachus says that injusticeon a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and more masterfulthing than justice (344 C). The consistently unjust man comes offbetter than the consistently just man: and he is therefore called

stronger ,referringto both his strength of mind (i.e. his knowledge)and the strength of his consequent position (i.e. the advantages hegains). Physical strength does not come into it (338 D). Every ruler ,i.e. man in control, whether or not in a political context, is stronger :presumably because control implies knowledge. But we should notethat stronger is not a synonym for another . Justice is alwaysthe advantage of another, but it is only the advantage of the strongerwhen someone has the strength to refuse to be just and seek his own

advantage instead. Thrasymachus is justified in speaking loosely(though it does seem to be a bad habit of his, e.g. 340 C-E) as if the

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two were synonymous because in this speech he has limited himself

to cases where there areonly two parties,one just and the other unjust,and here for the just man the advantage of another is always the

advantage of the stronger. Though even in these cases, justice for the

unjust man is not the advantage of the stronger but only of another,

i.e. the just man, the weaker. So advantage of another is the uni-

versal characteristicof justice. It is the advantage of the stronger

only in those cases where the stronger takes advantage. In short,

Thrasymachushas two propositions: (1) to be just is always to another

person's advantage and your disadvantage, whilst to be unjust is

always the opposite; and (2) if you pursue your own advantage on asufficiently large scale you will be strong and happy. The final step in

Thrasymachus'argumentadds a third propositionwhich at first glance

is not closely connected. In orderto see how much more advantageous

it is to be unjust than just, Socratesis invited to considerthe extreme

case of the man who does the greatest wrong and is the most happy

- the tyrant. Thrasymachus' examples make clear that by a tyrant

he means not a usurperbut a despot, someone using his position and

power to take everything he wants, committing completeand entire

injustice (344 C). This gives another proposition: (3)to

ruleis to

seek one's own advantage, i.e. to act unjustly, so that the tyrant is the

perfectruler.

We are now approaching, n its correctorder, the point from which

Thrasymachusbegan. From the point of view of the tyrant's subjects,

justice is the advantage of the ruler, i.e. the tyrant. And, more gen-

erally, justice for the subject is the advantage of the rulers. However,

there is still one matter to clarify. Thrasymachusbegins by talking

of rulers in a very general way (338 D-339 A). However, before long

he has elevated the discussion from the case of actual rulers,who are

trying to be unjust but do not completely succeed, to the case of the

perfect ruler who always succeeds in his injustice (339A-341 A);

and thereafter, I think, he is talking only about the perfect ruler, i.e.

the tyrant. Many commentators think that there is something wrong

with Thrasymachus'adoption of the position that the ruler in so far

forth as ruler does not err (341 A). It has been said that Thrasy-

machus blunders here by abandoning a realistic empiricism for an

idealismwhichmakeshim an easy victim for Socrates,38hat he should

SE.g. Adam op. cit. vol. I p. 33, Shorey What Plato Said pp. 211-12, H. W. B.Joseph Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy (Oxford 1935) p. 18, Lee

oP. cit. p. 63, and Harrison op. cit. p. 31.

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have slipped through the loop-hole which Cleitophon had provided

(340 B),189and that Plato is again falsely attributing a position to him.'0None of this is acceptable to those who deny that the advantage of

the ruler(s) is Thrasymachus' main view of justice.41And they areright to reject the traditional interpretation of his response to Clei-

tophon's interjection. It can be argued that Thrasymachus' is not an

empirical thesis, that he is not refuted by Socrates, that Cleitophon's

formula is quite different from and indeed in several ways opposed to

Thrasymachus',and that, given the context of his tLaxpoXoyEa,here is

no reason to think that he is saying anything other than what he wants

to. Above all, there is no need to assume that Thrasymachus istrapped or manipulated into a false move. On the contrary, the

perfect ruler is a crucial and logical deliberate step in the unfolding

of his ideas. By taking it, Thrasymachushas raised the whole argument

to a higherlevel.

Having reached the culmination of Thrasymachus' view in his

V=uxpoXoyEa.,nd having considered his progresstowards it, let us turn

back to his originalstatement. Some of those who interprethis positionas being that justice is the advantage of the ruler,and especially those

who see him as a Legalist ( justice is obedience to the law ), are aptin my view to miss part of what he is saying here. Maguire or instance

interprets Thrasymachus'position very narrowly: (a) only the subject

can be either just or unjust; and (b) in relation to some laws only,viz. those ensuring the stability of the particular regime in power;from which he concludes that Thrasymachus is not, at the outset,

talking about moral rules at all, but only about political arrange-

ments .'3 If this were so, then there would indeed be a disjunction

between Thrasymachus' two discussions of justice. However, if we

read thetaxpoXoyEa

first, and then considerThrasymachus' openingremarks about rulers as an application of its doctrine, we see that his

initial views are not Legalist. It is true that at first he explains him-

self by speaking of the rulers maldingv6suOL338 E), but rulers do far

ag E.g. Joseph op. cit. p. 17, Sinclair op. cit. p. 75, Cross and Woozley op. cit.

p. 46, Bloom op. cit. p. 329, Guthrie op. cit. pp. 95-6, and Maguire hc. cit. p. 145.'I Hourani loc. cit. p. 115, Harrison loc. cit. pp. 30-2, and Maguire loc. cit. p. 146.41See Kerferd The Doctrine of Thrasymachus pp. 20-1, Sparshott hc. cit.

section III, and Henderson loc. cit. pp. 2234.42

There is not the space to develop these points here.43 Loc. cit. pp. 146-7. Cf. Sparshott's opinion that the law which Thrasymachusequates with the ruler's advantage is only consitutional law, loc. cit. pp. 426-7.

225





more besides, and it is clear from the p.axpoXoyEtxhat we are to con-

sider all their acts and not simply their v6pLQ. I suggest that Thrasy-machus has in mind not only what we call constitutional law, but as

elsewhere, anything to do with money. Taxation is the obvious

example of a situation which provides opportunitiesfor just or unjust

action by both rulers and subjects.44A democracylike Athens raised

money for some public purposes by imposing trierarchieson the rich.

Thrasymachuswould see this as something where justice (paying up

honestly) was to the advantage of the democrats and to the dis-

advantage of the nrch,so that justice is the advantage of the rulers .

In an oligarchy money was more likely to be raised regressivelythanprogressively,e.g. by a poll tax, which is to the advantage of the rich

since they pay a smallerproportionof their wealth, and again Thrasy-

machus would say that justice was to the advantage of the rulers.

Finally, a tyrant levies taxes without paying any, so clearly justice is

to his advantage. At the same time, justice for the rulerswould be to

use the money raised from taxes to the advantage of the taxpayers,

and injustice would be to use it directly or indirectly for their own

advantage, e.g. for their own pleasure or to pay men to defend their

regime. (Of course, Thrasymachus is not committed to saying thatrulers never do what is for the advantage of their subjects. His thesis

is that whatever rulers who know their own advantage do, they do

for their advantage. This could include acts which do benefit the

subjects in the short term, in the same way that the profit-seeking

shepherddoes care for his sheep. That is, when these rulers do benefit

their subjects, when they keeplaw and order,defend the polis, promote

trade, and so on, they do it for their own advantage, and in fact it is

ultimately for their own advantage and not their subjects'. Healthy

sheep give the best fleeces and best meat, and likewise orderly,

prosperous and contented subjects are less troublesome and more

profitableto the rulerswho fleece hem. It may look as if the subjects

benefit, but at the last count every advantage finds its way into

the ruler's coffers.) So I think we must assume that Thrasymachusis

concerned with what is just in relation to all the rulers' actions, not

simply their legislative acts in any strict (and modern) sense. After

all, this is clearly the case with the tyrant in the FaxpoAoyEx344A).

We have now completed the outline of Thrasymachus' views.

4Thrasymachus could also instance the distribution of benefits such as grain,

land, or citizenship.

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These do not conflict but, as Kerferdclaims, form a consistent whole.

Though Thrasymachus' doctnrneis formulated in different ways indifferent contexts: (1) if we consider just acts as a single class, thentheir common characteristic is that they are the advantage of an-other ; (2) if we consider the sub-class where the just man's act isto the advantage of the consistently unjust man, justice is the ad-vantage of the stronger ; and (3) if we consider the sub-class of (2)where the just man's act is to the advantage of the stronger who ishis ruler(s), justice is the advantage of the ruler(s) . This perhapsbrings out the crucial importance of getting Thrasymachus'argument

in its right order. As it has now been set out, it is possible to movefrom (1) to (3), but one cannot move from (3) to (1), which is whatwe have to try to do if the text is taken in the order in which it stands.If we take (1) as nothing but an expansion of (3),4f we encounterdifficulties which never arise if we take (3) for what it is, an instanceof (1). Again, if we start from (3), we may find it inconsistent with (1);thus Maguire,nrghtlythinking that between (3) and (1) the meaningsof the key termschange, tries to save Thrasymachus rominconsistencyby arguingthat the incompatible (1) is not his but Plato's. 6Whereas

the principle I have followed is that Thrasymachus is not beinghounded from one position to another, without thinking out theimplications of each, but that before he speaks he already has aconsistent doctrine which, for reasons at which we can only guess,he chooses to revealpiecemeal.

Why then does Thrasymachusplace so much emphasis on the pro-position that justice is the advantage of the ruler?We have mentionedthe suppositionthat he wants to present a striking paradox. But theremay be more to it, surely?Sparshott thinks that thesphere of govern-mental arrangements is indeed that in which justice becomes mostproblematic and questions of justice most pressing: if it is Thrasy-machus' chief interest, it is also Plato's (as the rest of the Republicshows) and Aristotle's and ours ... What Thrasymachus at first

provides can only be, at best, a special case of a general theory. Noone challenges him in these terms because the special case that hechoosesis the most conspicuous and the one most usually debated... 'I should go furtherstill: Thrasymachusbegins with the case of justicebetween subject and ruler because, besides suiting the course of the

4 Hourani oc. cit. p. 117.' Loc. cit. pp. 148-53 and 155-63.47Loc. cit. p. 427.

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discussion, it expresses the core of his doctnrnethat justice is the

advantage of another, and includes its key exemplification, the ex-

treme case of the tyrant. We have noted that his third proposition

is that to rule is to seek one's own interest. He insists on this (340 C-

341 A). Yet to postulate a necessary connection between ruling and

acting unjustly seemsif anything even more implausiblethan Socrates'

assertion of a necessary connection between ruling and acting justly.

Moreover,this proposition might seem to be superfluous to Thrasy-

machus' account; why cannot he simplysay that rulerswillbe happiest

if they act unjustly and seek their own advantage, and ignore the

questionwhethera true ruler would be just orunjust?

The answerlies in the connectionwhich Thrasymachussees between

knowledge, strength, ruling, and injustice. The unjust man is aware

that injustice is to his advantage, and he knows how to use the just

man to his own ends. The unjust man, being thus the ruler of the

just man, is stronger than him in terms both of this knowledge

and his control. But a government is a clear case of men who are in

control, being able in the last resort to coerce their subjects by some

means, so if strength goes with injustice in one instance, it must do in

the other. Otherwise, Thrasymachus' theory will be destroyed by a

powerfulcounter-example.Further,on his premises,it is inconceivable

that the cleverest and most unjust man, the tyrant, should not be the

perfect ruler. For to succeed at injustice requires a great deal of

knowledge: you have to know what is to your advantage and how to

get it. So the tyrant must know all about ruling, or he would not

succeed in his injustice. If Socrates were right, and to rule were to

govern for the advantage of the subjects, there could be no such thing

as an unjust rulerand in exactly the same way, accordingto Thrasy-

machus there cannot be a just ruler,only a simpleton in a position of

powerwhich he does not know how to use - he is not a ruler because

he is just. Thrasymachusmust assert that the essence of ruling is to

be unjust, and Socrates that it is to be just, given the generalview of

justice of each. There is a further connectionbetween ruling and in-

justice for Thrasymachus. He realises, as his examples show, that

laws are one way in which the ordinaryrules of justice are formulated.

Possibly he believes, like Plato and Aristotle, that the rulers' awsare

in the long run the main determinersof the moral climate. Certainly,

Thrasymachus and Socrates agree that laws tell us at least in part

which acts are just, that the rulersare strong and the subjects weak,and that it is just to rule for the advantage of the subjects (344A,

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342 E). But if Thrasymachussays justice is the advantage of another,

and that the strong act unjustly, and that rulersare strong, it followsthat he must say that ruling is acting unjustly. Socrates is likewise

committed to the opposite.

The particular cases where justice is the advantage of the ruler

are therefore not simply the most striking and most interesting, they

also reveal the heart of Thrasyrnachus'general doctrine, and this is

perhapswhy he begins with them before he has stated the framework

in which they lie embedded. Thrasymachus'account of justice is not

only consistent, it is coherenttoo.

V

I now hope to show that Kerferd's interpretation of Thrasymachus,

as well as revealing a consistent and coherent doctrine, fits in with

the rest of the dialogue. The first way to test this hypothesis is to ask

whetherthe details of the debate between Socrates and Thrasymachus,

and in particular Socrates' questions and positions, accord better

with the standard interpretation or with Kerferd's.However, I have

not the space for this task. I suggest only that Socrates' discussion

moves from justice is the advantage of the ruler to justice is the

advantage of another to injusticeis preferableto justice , that this

is a development from the least to the most important question, and

that thus Kerferd'sinterpretationis the more plausible. Furthermore,

it is in his discussionof Thrasymachus'characterisationof justice as a

disadvantage to be avoided, that Socrates first introduces some of

the central ideas of the rest of the book - limit (349 B-350 C),harmony

(351 C-352A), and function (352E-354 A), which again indicates

that Socrates takes Thrasymachusto have a thesis about justice as a

generalmoralconcept and not a narrowly political one.

The second way to test the hypothesis is to ask how Thrasymachus'

doctrine has been understood by Glaucon and Adeimantus. Plato

representsGlauconfrom the first (357 A, B) as taking Thrasymachus'

main point to have been that all injustice is preferable to justice,

that is, Glaucon does not limit the discussion to rulers. Adeimantus

formulates Thrasymachus'doctrine in his own words as the opinion

that justice is the other man's good, the advantage of the stronger,

and that injustice is advantageous and profitable to oneself but

disadvantageous to the inferior (367 C). Clearly, Adeimantus takesthe doctrine to be that justice is the advantage of another, though he

229





speaks loosely and equates another with stronger ,which we saw

is strictly speakingincorrect,but there isnoindicationthat he meansbystronger merely ruler (in the political sense). Neither Glauconnor Adeimantus simply repeats Thrasymachus' attack on justice,

they renewit, expandingsome points and addingothers. For instance,Glaucon adds an account of the origin of justice (358 E-359 B), andexpands Thrasymachus' point (344 C) that men revile injustice onlybecause they are afraid of being unjust, arguing that men are justunwillingly because they cannot be unjust (359 B-360 D). 8 As an-other instance, Adeimantus adds a whole new dimension concerning

the teaching of attitudes towards justice (362 E-367 E). My point isthat though Glauconand Adeimantus do not claim to be urging whatThrasymachus would have said, they do claim it is what he couldhave said (e.g. 367 A). They think their argumentsare consistent withhis. And what their arguments fit, is Thrasymachus'statement thatjustice is the advantage of another.

The third way to test the hypothesis is to ask with which of Thrasy-

machus' doctrines does the remainderof the book deal. And again,the answer is that TheRepublicdeals with the doctrine that justice isthe advantage of another, including the idea that

justicefor

subjectsis the advantage of the ruler,and not the latter solely or even mainly.No one is satisfied with Socrates' replies to Thrasymachus,not even

Socrates (354A-C). Thrasymachus himself, as we saw, simply falls

silent, obviously unconvinced. Glaucon and Adeimantus demand afurther defence of justice. When Socrates sets out to reply to their

demandsin the remainderof TheRepublic,he is also makinghis replyto Thrasymachus, and making it by a method that Thrasymachuscannot ignore, that of [LoxpoXoyto.lato, unlike Socrates, seems toagree with Thrasymachus over method. He knows that he cannot

prove Thrasymachuswrong - Sachs' mistake is to suppose that iswhat Plato wants to do - and that to rebut his characterisationof

justice he must resort to Thrasymachus'methods and producea rival

48 Sparshott, loc. cit. p. 431, claims that Glaucon and Adeimantus plainly misin-

terpret Thrasymachus on the issue of the conventionality of justice, for they takehim to hold that the just man would be unjust if he dared (360 C), whereasin fact he had attributed justice to 'an honest simplicity ' in 348 C. If Sparshottis right about Glaucon, then there is an inconsistency in Thrasymachus himself,

since he plainly states that some are not unjust only from fear of the conse-

quences (344 C). But there is no misunderstanding by Glaucon, and no in-consistency in Thrasymachus, if we take Thrasymachus to mean that some men

act justly out of folly (as at 348 C) and others out of fear (as at 344 C).

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and more appealing characterisation. In their debate, Socrates and

Thrasymachusin effect swap definitions of the key terms (art, ruling,wise, strong, happy, advantage, etc). Neither can be confuted provided

that his own set of definitions is adhered to. As a quick illustration

of this, consider art ('ixvy). Thrasymachusclaims that the essence

of rulingis to take advantage of the subjects, Socrates that its essence

is to look to the advantage of the subjects. They agree that ruling is

an art, but each is defining both the art of ruling and art in his

own way; and the ordinary usage of art is sufficiently vague to lend

itself to both definitions, and to others too.49 Socrates could have

repeated the move he makes in the Gorgias (462 ff.) and dismissed aspseudo-arts those which do not fit his definition; but the difficulty

would have remained, namely, why accept his definition and not that

of Thrasymachus?The existence of the rest of TheRepublic s Plato's

tacit admission that more is required.Only when the idea of the Form

of the Good is broached do we finally understand why Plato sees a

necessary connection between arts and justice, via his conception of

Knowledge.

The importanceof the debate with Thrasymachus s that it sets many

themes for the book as a whole (of coursestill

others are set by Glauconand Adeimantus). Socrates and Thrasymachus agree that ruling is

an art, that an art involves knowledge, that the just ruler governs

for the advantage of his subjects, that rulers are stronger, and that

there must be a comparisonmade between the lives of the perfectly

just man and the perfectly unjust man to see which is happier.

Thrasymachus, in fact, has set up an ideal which is the mirror mage

of Plato's (a procedurepursuedin the Gorgiasthrough the opposition

between Socrates and Callicles).That is to say, their ideals are often

the same yet turned back to front at the vital point. For instance,

for both, ruling is an art, but for one it is the art of being unjust, for

the other, of being just. Again, they agree that the man with knowledge

will act on it, but for one this means never being just wittingly, and

for the other, never being unjust wittingly. Overall, Thrasyrnachus'

tyrant is the mirrorimage of Socrates' PhilosopherRuler. And if this

is so, since Plato is concernedwith justice in a general sense and not

4 Varying examples of arts , to show how some fit Socrates' case but not

Thrasymachus', and others the converse, are cited by Tucker op. cit. pp. 1-li,

Joseph op. cit. pp. 224, Cross and Woozley op. cit. p. 50, Sparshott loc. cit.section IV, and Henderson loc. cit. pp. 226-7. Cf. L. Wittgenstein on game ,

Philosophical Investigations (Oxford 1953) I 66.

231





a specifically political sense, so too must Thrasymachusbe, as Kerferd

claims.

VI

The burden of the last section was that there is nothing elsewhereinThe Republic which leads us to abandon the line of interpretation of

Thrasymachus'argumentswhich, following Kerferd, has been offeredhere. Neither, I would argue,doesTheLaws714B-D, nor what is known

independently of the real Thrasymachus,require any modificationof

the interpretation.

This is not to say that this interpretationeliminatesevery problem.

Indeed, as it has been developed here, it may be felt to leave us with

at least three new and difficult questions unanswered: (a) if Thrasy-

machus' fundamental premise is that justice is the advantage of an-

other, why does he not spell it out at greater length; (b) why does he

presenthis case backwards,making it hard to follow; and (c) why does

he speak of 4uzqkpov the advantage ) of the stronger but of &yOCv

( the advantage ) of another, instead of using one word. These

difficulties,and their importance,must not be overlooked.On the other

hand, the interpretation offered has the merit of making a coherent

whole of all Thrasymachus'arguments and examples. On balance, I

suggest that his argumentsare in such disarraythat no interpretation

can be establishedbeyond all doubt, but that whilst the present inter-

pretationrests in part upon conjecture,and leaves some matters in the

air, it is yet the most plausiblereadingof the text.

UniversityCoUege fSwansea

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unravelling thrasymachus' arguments nicholson

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