update on conflict and diplomacy - institute for palestine ... · abbas to the saudi capital just 2...

COMPILED BY PAUL KAROLYI

This update is a summary of bilateral, multilateral, regional, and international events affectingthe Palestinians and Israel. More than 100 print, wire, television, and online sources providing U.S.,Israeli, Arab, and international independent and government coverage of unfolding events aresurveyed to compile the quarterly Update. The most relevant sources are cited in JPS’sChronology section, which tracks events day by day. JPS Chronologies are archived on the JPSwebsite at www.palestine-studies.org.

Highlights of the Quarter: Regional events figure heavily in developments this quarter as the SaudiArabian crown prince steps out of the shadows of secret meetings with Israeli and U.S. officials;Lebanese PM Saad Hariri announces his resignation under mysterious circumstances in Riyadh;and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman summons Palestinian Authority (PA) pres. MahmoudAbbas to the Saudi capital just 2 days later. These actions come soon after reps. from Hamas andFatah sign a new reconciliation agreement in Cairo, prompting Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahuto threaten to upend U.S. pres. Donald Trump’s peace initiative. Netanyahu and his right-wingcoalition continue to quarrel internally over settlement growth and annexation. They alsocontinue their crackdown on the Israeli opposition, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and supporters ofthe Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. Earlier in the quarter, Trump asks thePalestinians to delay unilateral moves at international forums while he puts together a plan forrestarting Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations.

THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELICONFLICTU.S. pres. Donald Trump continued work

on a peace initiative this quarter, without anyresolution to lingering uncertainties on keyissues (e.g., whether the U.S. should move itsembassy in Israel to Jerusalem; see JPS 46 [4]and 47 [1]). He and his negotiating team metwith Israeli and Palestinian officials, as well as

other country and organizational leaders,but they failed to produce anything concrete.Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law andhis senior advisor, along with Dep. NationalSecurity Advisor Dina Powell and SpecialRepresentative for International NegotiationsJason Greenblatt, made an unannounced visit toSaudi Arabia on 10/25–28. The White House

declined to disclose with whom Kushner met

Journal of Palestine StudiesVol. XLVII, No. 2 (Winter 2018), p. 104, ISSN: 0377-919X; electronic ISSN: 1533-8614. © 2018 by the Institute for PalestineStudies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of CaliforniaPress’s Reprints and Permissions web page, http://www.ucpress.edu/journals.php?p=reprints. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2018.47.2.104.

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Update on Conflict and Diplomacy16 AUGUST–15 NOVEMBER 2017

but media reports indicate he held talks withPrince Mohammad, who had recently hadseveral Saudi ministers and 11 princes arrested,presumably to consolidate his power, though heclaimed to be fighting corruption. Shortlyafterward, Lebanon’s PM Hariri visited thekingdom and announced his resignation. Twodays later, Prince Mohammad summoned PApres. Abbas (see “Regional Affairs” below) inwhat some analysts viewed as efforts to derailthe Hamas-Fatah unity deal and to furthermarginalize Iran.After Palestinian support for Trump’s efforts

began to waver last quarter (see JPS 47 [1]),the Palestinians shifted their focus almostentirely to internal and regional issues (see“Intra-Palestinian Dynamics” and “RegionalAffairs” below). Meanwhile, the Israeli govt.dealt with internal issues of its own, includingan increasingly acrimonious debate over: abill that would grant Israeli sovereignty tosettlements ringing East Jerusalem, effectivelyannexing them into Israel, and settlementgrowth, which put Netanyahu at odds with theultranationalists in his own ruling coalition.

THE TRUMP INITIATIVE

As the quarter opened, the Trump peaceinitiative was all but stalled. Trump maintainedhe was still eager to make “the ultimate deal,” ashe referred to the prospect of a comprehensivepeace agreement between Israel and thePalestinians, but he rarely brought the subjectup of his own accord. Instead, he focused onconfronting North Korea over its nuclearprogram and overhauling the U.S. health-careand tax systems. The Israelis, led by Netanyahu,still supported Trump’s efforts, but were moreconcerned with countering the alleged Iranianthreat as well as with their own internal issues.The Palestinians were the least enthusiastic ofall parties. After the U.S. Middle East

negotiating team consistently defended Israel’sinstallation of cameras and checkpoints underthe guise of security at Haram al-Sharif in7/2017 (see JPS 47 [1]), it was clear that theTrump admin. was going to have to rebuildrelationships in Ramallah before movingforward on peace talks.Their first opportunity to do so was set for

8/24, when Kushner was scheduled to visitIsrael and the occupied Palestinian territories(oPt). In the lead-up to Kushner’s trip, somePA officials aired their skepticism publicly.Abbas reportedly told a delegation from theIsraeli leftist party Meretz that he couldn’tunderstand the Trump admin.’s conduct (8/20).“I have met with Trump envoys about 20 timessince the beginning of his term as pres. of theU.S. [in 1/2017],” he said. “Every time, theyrepeatedly stressed to me how much theybelieve and are committed to a 2-state solutionand a halt to construction in the settlements.I have pleaded with them to say the samething to Netanyahu, but they refrained. Theysaid they would consider it but then they didn’tget back to me.” PLO Executive Comm. mbr.Ahmad Majdalani then clarified (8/22) thatthe Palestinians brought up those 2 key issuesduring a meeting in 6/2017 (see JPS 47 [1]).“Since then we haven’t heard from them,” hesaid. “We hope they bring clear answers thistime. If not, then the peace process cannot beresumed because we cannot negotiate fromscratch.”The day before Kushner arrived in Israel, a

U.S. State Dept. spokesperson responded (8/23)to the Palestinians’ complaints. “We are notgoing to state what the outcome has to be,”she said, addressing the open question ofTrump’s support for a 2-state solution. “It hasto be workable to both sides. And I think, really,that’s the best view as to not really bias oneside over the other, to make sure that they can

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work through it.” Kushner was apparentlymore reassuring in his meeting with Abbas on8/24. “We know that this [U.S.] delegation isworking for peace, and we are working with it,”Abbas said (8/24). “We know that things aredifficult and complicated, but there is nothingimpossible with good efforts.” The meetingwas “productive,” according to a PA statement(8/24). “Both sides agreed to continue withthe U.S.-led conversations as the best way toreach a comprehensive peace deal.”The Kushner meeting established the

dynamic that prevailed through the end ofthe quarter. Amid a spate of rumors andunconfirmed reports, Israel Hayom reported(8/27) that Kushner pledged the Trumpadmin. would present its peace plan,including positions on all final status issues,within 3–4 mos. in exchange for thePalestinians indefinitely postponing theirpursuit of statehood recognition in theinternational arena. Abbas, whose deputieswere threatening to resume that very strategy,reportedly agreed contingent upon Trumppersonally backing Kushner’s pledge.According to an unnamed Palestinian official,Kushner and Abbas sealed the deal byagreeing to arrange a meeting between the2 presidents on the sidelines of the UnitedNations General Assembly (UNGA) inNew York on 9/2017.With the Palestinians mollified, the Trump

admin. turned back its attention to the Israelis.By the end of 8/2017, U.S. and Israeli officialsresumed talks on Trump’s pledge to move theU.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv toJerusalem (Times of Israel, 8/28; see JPS 46 [4]and 47 [1] for background on Trump’sshifting position on the embassy move).According to a U.S. source, both sides broughtup the issue during Kushner’s meeting withNetanyahu on 8/24. Israeli officials confirmed

that the subject did come up, but made nocomments on the nature of the discussion.Ahead of the UNGA, Trump and his aides

lowered expectations for their peace initiativeand directed the focus to the implementationof the 7/14/2015 Iran nuclear deal (see “Iran”below). “Achieving peace between the Israelisand the Palestinians remains one of thepresident’s highest priorities, but the UNmeetings will primarily focus on other issuesand serve as check-in opportunities,” a seniorU.S. official said (9/16). The Palestinians,apparently content with the promised timeframe and occupied with their own nationalreconciliation process (see “Intra-PalestinianDynamics” below), refrained from calling forclarity from the Trump admin. on settlementsand the 2-state solution. Netanyahu, for hispart, was eager to redirect the discussion as well.In New York, Trump met first with

Netanyahu on 9/18. “Most people would saythere is no chance whatsoever” to reach apeace agreement, Trump said, at a joint pressconference. “I actually think that with theability of Bibi, and frankly with the other side,I really think we have a chance.” After themeeting, the White House released (9/18) astatement saying that the pair discussed their“continuing efforts to achieve an enduringIsraeli-Palestinian peace agreement, theoptimism in the region about peace, andexpanding economic opportunities toimprove conditions for peace.” No furtherdetails were disclosed.Trump’s meeting with Abbas was potentially

more critical, since Abbas was reportedlyhoping for the U.S. president’s personalcommitment to the pledge Kushner had madeon 8/24. A PA spokesperson said (9/18) thatAbbas planned to reassess his dedication tothe U.S. initiative after the meeting. On 9/20,hours after Abbas addressed the UNGA



reaffirming his support for a 2-state solutionand reasserting the Palestinians’ right to pursuejustice through international arenas such asthe International Criminal Court, he met withTrump. The U.S. pres. told (9/20) Abbas thatthis was their “best shot ever” to make the“toughest deal of all” and reportedly repeatedKushner’s request for more time. Accordingto senior PA officials, Abbas acquiesced(Haaretz, 9/24).In the aftermath of the UNGA, the

Palestinians, U.S., and Israelis all displayedsome optimism in their public commentsand actions. The Trump admin. was presumedto be working on its plan; Netanyahu tookapparent steps to limit settlement growth,despite pressure from his ultranationalistcoalition partners (see “Settlement Growth inthe Trump Era” below); and the Palestiniansproceeded to reach a major nationalreconciliation agreement (10/12), in hope ofpresenting a unified front ahead of peace talks.At the same time, there was one indication

that Trump was starting to feel the same kind offrustration with Netanyahu that his predecessor,Barack Obama, experienced. According to aWestern diplomat on 10/4, Trump had told(9/19) UN secy.-gen. António Guterres thatboth Netanyahu and Abbas were “problematic,”but that between the two, “Netanyahu is thebigger problem.” A senior White House officiallater challenged (10/4) that narrative, saying,“The pres. said that he feels both sides want tomake peace and he remains optimistic about anenduring peace deal. We are focusing on ourproductive conversations and not on the noisecreated by spoilers.”Although there were some early signs that the

Palestinian reconciliation agreement of 10/12would be a game changer, the Israeli securitycabinet quickly imposed strict conditions onHamas before Israel would agree to work with

the consensus govt. (10/17). According to astatement from Netanyahu’s office, theconditions included Hamas recognizing Israel,ceasing all so-called terrorist activity, disarmingand dismantling its military infrastructure intheWest Bank, severing ties with Iran, returningto Israel the remains of the 2 Israel DefenseForces (IDF) soldiers and the Israeli civiliansbeing held in Gaza (see “Prisoner Swap” below),and giving up security control of Gaza to the PA.A senior Israeli official said (10/17) that thecabinet had also authorized Netanyahu toimpose punitive sanctions on the PA, includingdeductions from the tax revenues Israel collectson the Palestinians’ behalf and transfers to thePA on a monthly basis. “Any other cabinetdecision would have given legitimacy to theterror organization Hamas, which strives todestroy Israel,” Education Minister NaftaliBennett said (10/17). Later that same day, aPA spokesperson said that the Israeli govt.would not be allowed to stand in the way ofreconciliation, indicating that Abbas wouldprioritize reconciliation with Hamas given thechoice between that and the possibility ofanother round of talks with Israel. Anothersenior Palestinian official accused the Israelicabinet of falsely assuming that Hamas wouldjoin the PA, and putting forth a “new excuse”to back out of the process.Two days later, Greenblatt offered (10/19)

the first official U.S. response to thereconciliation deal. “All parties agree that it isessential that the PA be able to assume full,genuine, and unhindered civil and securityresponsibilities in Gaza and that we worktogether to improve the humanitarian situationfor Palestinians living there,” he said in astatement. “The U.S. reiterates the importanceof adherence to the Quartet principles: anyPalestinian govt. must unambiguously andexplicitly commit to nonviolence, recognize


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the State of Israel, accept previous agreementsand obligations between the parties—includingto disarm terrorists—and commit to peacefulnegotiations. If Hamas is to play any role in aPalestinian govt., it must accept these basicrequirements.” Another senior Trump admin.official offered some context on Greenblatt’sstatement on 10/22, saying that the U.S. expectedHamas to disarm, but didn’t necessarily expectit to happen soon. “Egypt has helped us crackopen a door to Gaza that didn’t exist a few weeksago, and we see it as a possible opportunity,”the official said (10/22).Then two days later, Kushner, Powell, and

Greenblatt made a surprise, unannounced tripto Saudi Arabia (10/25–28). The White Housewould not disclose with whom they met butmedia reports indicate Kushner met with PrinceMohammad, who in November worked toconsolidate his power by arresting dozens ofministers, and 11 princes. While Kushnerreturned to the U.S. on 11/28, Greenblattcontinued on to Amman, Cairo, Ramallah, andJerusalem (Politico, 10/29/2017). Within days,Prince Mohammad summoned Hariri, whosuddenly announced his resignation fromRiyadh, as well as Abbas. These events hadanalysts indicating that Saudi Arabia, supportedby Trump through Kushner, was working tomarginalize Iran’s growing power in the regionand to force Abbas to accept Israel’s conditionson the unity govt.As the initial surprise of the reconciliation

deal wore off, both the Israelis and Palestinianscontinued meeting to discuss the Trump peaceinitiative. On 10/29, Israeli minister of financeMoshe Kahlon met with PA PM RamiHamdallah for the 2d time in 6 mos., reportedlyfollowing U.S. pressure to make progress onmeasures that could strengthen the Palestinianeconomy. The meeting resulted in no newagreements, but the 2 men made “important

progress . . . on key issues,” according toGreenblatt (10/29). Then, after mos. ofunconfirmed reports that PA Security Forces(PASF) had resumed some coordination withthe IDF, the chief of the Palestinian police, Maj.Gen. Hazem Atallah, confirmed the news on11/8. “Everyone is coordinating now. Thatmeans things returned to what they werebefore,” Atallah said, referring to Abbas’s 7/21announcement of an indefinite suspension ofPASF-IDF coordination in response to newIsraeli security measures at Haram al-Sharif.The suspension had been extremely popularamong the Palestinian public (see “PalestinianOpinion” below). Atallah also said that securitycoordination had never ceased completely, asmany Israeli politicians pointed out at the time.“The only thing we stopped is we didn’t meetthem in the field,” he said, explaining thatapproximately 95% of coordination activitiescontinued.As the quarter came to a close, the New York

Times unearthed a few more details about theTrump plans on 11/11. According to WhiteHouse officials, the plan was set to be ready inearly 2018, considerably later than the 3–4month window Kushner had promised Abbason 8/24. The officials also said that Trump’score team—Kushner, Greenblatt, amb. toIsrael David Friedman, and Powell—had puttogether a series of “non-papers” coveringvarious issues related to the Palestinian-Israeliconflict, including settlements and the statusof Jerusalem, over the course of Trump’s first10 mos. in office. “We have spent a lot of timelistening to and engaging with the Israelis,Palestinians and key regional leaders over thepast few months to help reach an enduringpeace deal,” Greenblatt said (11/11). “We arenot going to put an artificial timeline on thedevelopment or presentation of any specificideas and will also never impose a deal.”



SETTLEMENTGROWTH IN THE TRUMP ERA

With the Palestinians demanding that theU.S. take a firmer position on Israeli settlementgrowth and Trump steadfastly refusing to doso, the most contentious debates this quartertook place within the ranks of the Israeli govt.They played out similarly to other conversationsin the Knesset that had become even moreheated ever since Trump assumed office in1/2017. Netanyahu, wary of a notoriouslymercurial Trump blaming him for any possiblebreakdown in the peace process, made enoughconcessions to his ultranationalist coalitionpartners to maintain power, but not so manyas to draw anything more than tepid criticismfrom the international community, includingthe U.S. Yet, in view of trends that transpiredin both the Knesset and the JerusalemMunicipality during this quarter, it is evidentthat Netanyahu and his far-right coalitiongovt. were intent on sealing Jerusalem off fromthe rest of the West Bank, further enclosingPalestinians in isolated bantustans. While therewas much settlement news this quarter, fivespecific settlement-related developmentsstood out for their magnitude and implications.The first concerned the imminent issuance

of tenders for the new settlement of GivatHamatos, which, once built, would create animpassable barrier between Bethlehem andJerusalem, effectively dividing the West Bank.Next, two settlement projects were announced,one establishing a strong Jewish presenceinside the Palestinian neighborhood of JabalMukabir in East Jerusalem and the other in thecity of Hebron. And, lastly, the Knesset debatedtwo pieces of legislation that would foreverchange the demographic makeup of Jerusalem,in contravention of international law, includingArticle 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.The five developments constituted further

evidence of continued Israeli efforts to augmentPalestinian displacement, expropriating evermore Palestinian land and dividing the WestBank in such a way as to make a contiguousPalestinian state a physical impossibility.On (10/2), Netanyahu spoke at a Likud Party

meeting inMa’ale Adumim—a major settlementunder the ambit of the aforementioned GreaterJerusalem bill calling for the de facto annexationof severalWest Bank settlements. The PM openlysupported the proposed legislation, saying, “Thisplace will forever remain part of Israel.” Thelocation of Netanyahu’s remarks was importantbecause of the ties betweenMa’ale Adumim andthe proposed E1 settlement bloc. Together, thetwo settlements carve out a significant portionof theWest Bank, making it more viable for fullannexation. The following day (10/3), Netanyahuindicated that he would move ahead withconstruction of Givat Hamatos between Giloand Har Homa, effectively cutting off Bethlehemfrom Jerusalem. Strategically, Givat Hamatoshas far-reaching implications, according toTerrestrial Jerusalem. “Givat Hamatos is agame-changer, if not a game-ender. It is not asdevastating as E1 in dismembering theWestBank, but it is equally or more devastating thanE1 in its impact on a political division of the city,”Peace Now wrote in 2012 when constructionplans were first approved. The Israeli settlementwatch NGO described the latest move as follows:

The preparation for a tender in Givat

Hamatos, together with Netanyahu’s state-

ments last week regarding the construction

of thousands of housing units in Ma’ale

Adumim with heavy hints towards E1, are

all a part of the govt.’s effort to create a de

facto annexation and prevent the possibili-ty for two states on the ground. Netanyahu

is taking far-reaching steps, which he has

thus far avoided, and by doing so he risks


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the two-state solution and the future ofIsrael (Peace Now, 10/16).

Although the original plans for GivatHamatos had been approved in 2014, theywere shelved under pressure from the admin.of then U.S. pres. Obama, but the policy chaosand pro-settlement stance of the incomingTrump admin. only emboldened theNetanyahu govt.Under pressure from Israel’s pro-settlement

politicians who had been discussing annexationas recently as 1/2017 (see JPS 46 [3])—andwith Netanyahu’s blessing—the Knesset plannedto vote on the Greater Jerusalem bill on 10/29.Four days after informing the Knesset that thevote on the bill would go ahead, Netanyahurequested a delay. “The current version of the . . .bill invites international pressure and involvesdifficult legal issues,” explained (10/29) a seniormbr. of the ruling coalition, adding thatNetanyahu could “not allow himself to advancethis version at this time.” During a cabinetmeeting that evening, the PM indicated that theTrump admin. had intervened. “The Americansturned to us and inquired what the bill wasabout. As we have been coordinating with themuntil now, it is worth talking and coordinatingwith them,” he said. Later, a senior U.S. officialcommented (10/29), “It’s fair to say that theU.S. is discouraging actions that it believes willunduly distract the principals from focusingon the advancement of peace negotiations.The [Greater Jerusalem bill] was considered bythe admin. to be one of those actions.”The Knesset’s second proposed bill called

for excising from Jerusalem Palestinianneighborhoods such as Kafr ‘Aqab, and theShu‘fat r.c., which are inside the city’sboundaries but on the West Bank side of theseparation wall. At least 100,000 PalestinianJerusalemites live in these areas.

The above-referenced plans to transferIsraeli Jews into settlements inside Palestinianneighborhoods in Hebron and East Jerusalemwould not only greatly disrupt Palestinians’freedom of movement but irreversibly fracturethe contiguity necessary for a Palestinian state.On 10/25, the Jerusalem Municipality andDistrict Council issued (10/25) buildingpermits for 176 new residences in Nof Zion, asettlement inside the Palestinian neighborhoodof Jabal Mukabir. “This is not a matter of realestate but a matter of politics and sovereignty,as the Israelis moving to homes insidePalestinian neighborhoods are motivated solelyby ideology, and are trying to prevent a futurecompromise in Jerusalem,” Peace Now wroteon 9/6/2017. Likewise, the Civil Admin.’sLicensing Subcomm. on 10/16 approved31 building permits for new housing units in c.Hebron on Shuhada Street, once the mainthoroughfare through the Old City. For years,the Israeli military has prohibited Palestiniansfrom using or crossing Shuhada Street becauseof nearby settlements. The new constructionwill be the first development in Hebron in15 years and the first within the city itself.The announcement came a few weeks after

Israeli DM Avigdor Lieberman announcedthe creation of a new Israeli municipal centerfor settlers in Hebron, a move that willfurther disenfranchise Palestinians there.“The settlement in Hebron represents theoccupation in its most ugly [form]. In orderto protect a small group of settlers, tens ofthousands of Palestinians had been forced tomove from their homes, and roads and shopsha[ve] been closed. The permits approvedtoday would increase the number of settlersin Hebron by 20%. . . . While doing everythingin his power to please a small group of settlers,Netanyahu is . . . crushing basic values ofhuman rights and dignity,” Peace Now wrote



in a statement (10/16). Netanyahu had madeclear his intention to fast-forward settlementplans early on, and received little or nopushback from the Trump admin. until theGreater Jerusalem bill came up for a vote.In late 8/2017, after mos. of pressure from

far-right religious nationalists in his coalition,at an event commemorating the 50th anniversaryof Israel’s occupation of the West Bank,Netanyahu proclaimed (8/28), “We are here tostay, forever. There will be no more uprootingof settlements in the land of Israel. It has beenproven that it does not help peace. We’veuprooted settlements. What did we get? Wereceived missiles. It will not happen anymore.”A senior U.S. official responded (8/29) bysaying that Netanyahu’s pledge would notderail Trump’s peace initiative. “It is no secretwhat each side’s position is on this issue,” theofficial said. “Our focus is on continuing ourconversations with both parties and regionalleaders to work toward facilitating a deal thatfactors in all substantive issues.” The Trumpadmin. likewise proffered no criticism whenthe Israeli cabinet approved (9/3) a budget forAmichai, the new settlement due to replacethe illegal Amona outpost (see JPS 46 [3, 4]),which was forcibly evacuated months earlier.The new budget, allotting NIS 55 m. (approx.$15.3 m.) to the project, allowed constructionto resume 2 mos. after it was suspended due toa shortfall in funds.Notwithstanding the PM’s aggressive

statements, the pro-settlement factions withinthe coalition govt. remained unsatisfied. In9/2017 and 10/2017, simmering tensionsescalated after Netanyahu postponed a scheduledmeeting of the Civil Admin.’s High PlanningComm. to accommodate Trump’s meetingswith various heads of Middle East states at theUNGA (Haaretz, 9/24). The delay enraged thesettler umbrella group Yesha Council and its

allies in the govt. In a closed-door meeting withNetanyahu on 9/26, they told the PM that hewas not meeting their expectations, “especiallyafter the change in the [U.S.] admin.,” one of theparticipants said. He also reported Netanyahuas promising that the High Planning Comm.would approve thousands of new settler homesat its next meeting and that he had managedto convince the Trump admin. to drop itsdistinction between the so-called settlementblocs, which were seen as possible targets forland swaps under any final agreement with thePalestinians, and more isolated settlements. Itis worth noting that Yesha Council leaders hadmet with Greenblatt, in the spring. The meeting,the first official encounter between settlers andthe representatives of any U.S. pres., raisedconcerns among the international communityabout the continued perception of the U.S. asan “honest broker” in peace negotiations.When the High Planning Comm. finally

published (10/10) its agenda, which includedplans to advance 3,800 new settler residences,Haaretz reported that the number of housingunits was greatly inflated. Knesset mbr. (MK)Bezalel Smotrich (Jewish Home) and SamariaRegional Council head Yossi Dagan dismissed(10/11) the agenda as “spin,” and the YeshaCouncil released a statement expressingdisappointment: “We are aware of the pressuresbeing exerted on the PM, but nevertheless, assettlement leaders it is our obligation to statethe facts accurately.”On 10/24, Dagan set up a protest tent outside

the PM’s residence in Jerusalem, and aftermeeting with him and a group of settler leadersthe following day, Netanyahu promised (10/25)investments of NIS 800 m. (approx. $228 m.)in road construction and other infrastructuredevelopment in theWest Bank, starting in 2018.The reaction was mixed: Yesha Council headAvi Roeh said it was a “significant message” to


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the settler community; others, including Dagan,were dubious. “We are fed up with promisesand spin,”Dagan said, returning to his tent.On 10/29, with the Greater Jerusalem bill on

hold, Dagan escalated his protest. On 11/4, heand his allies announced that they would begoing on hunger strike until Netanyahu upheldhis promise of NIS 800 m. for settlementinfrastructure. “It should not have come to this,”Dagan said. “Mr. PM, do the right thing. . . . Givea real source of funding for the paving of thebypass roads and the means of security.”According to an 11/5 report in the Times ofIsrael, Netanyahu’s efforts to appease the settlerssucceeded in deflating the Dagan protest effort.Only 2 of the 24 local and regional council chairsrepresenting settlements in the West Bank hadjoined Dagan in his tent by 11/5. Roeh, for his

part, said that Yesha Council would not beparticipating because he believed Netanyahuwould honor his pledge.Also of note: Israeli settlement debates were

not restricted to the Far Right. On 10/16, theleader of Israel’s Labor Party, Avi Gabbay, saidthat settlements would not necessarily need tobe evacuated under a final peace agreementwith the Palestinians, breaking from his party’straditional stance on the issue. Gabbay “madea deliberate decision to take the risk that hisbase would flee in order to wink at centrist andsoft-right voters,” according to one source close tothe Labor leader (Haaretz, 10/16). Along thoselines, there was some speculation in the Israelipress that Gabbay was attempting to woo formerDMMoshe Ya’alon to defect from Likud. Nohigh-ranking Labor officials challenged Gabbay

A Palestinian child observes Israeli soldiers as they check vehicles at the entrance of Kafr Qaddum on3 November 2017. Villagers there had been protesting further expropriation of their land by Israeli settlersfrom the settlement of Kedumim. The soldiers also prevented journalists from crossing the checkpoint,thereby prohibiting their access to the protests. (Jaafar Ashtiyeh/AFP/Getty Images)



on the record, but several expressed reservationsabout his comments in private.

PERSECUTING ISRAEL’S PALESTINIANMINORITY AND OTHER OPPONENTS

As they squabbled over settlement growth,Netanyahu and his right-wing govt. advancedtheir years-long campaign to consolidate power,with a renewed push to pass the so-called nation-state bill and efforts to undermine opposition to it.As with the Greater Jerusalem bill (see above),

right-wing MKs had been debating competingdrafts of the nation-state bill for years. Eachone held to the same basic idea that Israel’srole as the nation-state of the Jewish peopleshould be codified in the country’s Basic Law,which serves as a de facto constitution sinceIsrael lacks one. In 5/2017, the Knesset approveda preliminary amendment in one draft of thebill, canceling the status of Arabic as an“official language.”Members also excluded acontroversial provision from previous draftsthat would have required “that courts rule ‘inlight of the principles of Jewish law’ in theabsence of clear legislation or legal precedent”(Haaretz, 10/31). There were concerns thatthe bill did not contain the word “democracy,”amid fears that Jewish religious law could replacea democratic judiciary as well as discriminateagainst minority populations, most notablyPalestinians. Throughout the summer, theKnesset debated various amendments andcompeting drafts. MKs from the ruling coalitioninsisted upon focusing solely on the “Jewishcharacter” of the state, while left-wing andnon-Zionist parties argued that doing so wouldunjustly discriminate against Palestinian citizensof Israel. By the end of the quarter, the govt.coalition drafting the bill conceded and amendedwording so that “all legislation in Israel will beinterpreted according to both democratic valuesand the country’s Jewish nature—without giving

one priority over the other” (Haaretz, 11/9).Although the new draft was still controversial,primarily due to lingering discriminationconcerns, it was widely expected to pass itsfirst reading on 12/12.Also in the Knesset, the Ministerial

Comm. for Legislation approved (11/5) anamendment to the so-called anti-boycott law,which passed in 7/2011 and allowed anyIsraeli to sue activists calling for boycottcampaigns against Israel or its settlements.A version of the amendment had passed asa provision of the 2011 law, but the HighCourt of Justice struck it down in 2015because of concerns that there was no limiton compensatory damages from lawsuitsthat did not demonstrate actual harm. Underthe new proposal, judgements against thosewho repeatedly call for boycotts would becapped at NIS 100,000 (approx. $28,000),while the maximum financial judgementagainst people who organize systematicboycotts would be held at NIS 500,000(approx. $143,000).Outside the Knesset, Netanyahu and his

right-wing allies continued cracking downon activists, journalists, and politicians whoopposed their treatment of the Palestinians.On 8/16, Israel’s Govt. Press Office (GPO)revoked the credentials of an Al Jazeerareporter for allegedly acting as an “activepartner in Palestinian resistance.” The reporter,a Palestinian citizen of Israel called EliasKarram, had said in a 2016 interview that“journalistic work is an integral part of theresistance.” After Karram publicly disavowedterrorism, the GPO reversed (8/30) its decision.“In the months to come, the GPO will keeptrack of the network’s reports in Israel, inArabic and in English, and will not hesitate toreach the necessary conclusions after consultingwith legal and security officials,” GPO dir.


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Nitzan Chen said at Karram’s 8/30 hearing(Haaretz, 8/30).On 9/12, the Israeli press reported that the

Israeli govt. was planning to cancel the specialtax status of Amnesty International (AI) inresponse to its summer campaign, titled “Israel’sOccupation: 50 Years of Dispossession.” Hadthe govt. persevered, the measure would havemarked a rare implementation of the 2011anti-boycott law. In response, AI released (9/12)a statement condemning the reported plans:“While we have not been officially informed ofany such action by the authorities, if true, thiswould be a serious setback to freedom ofexpression and an ominous sign for the abilityof human rights–focused nongovernmentalorganizations in Israel to operate freely andwithout arbitrary interference.”Although authorities abandoned plans to

revoke AI’s tax status, Israeli authorities diddeny Raed Jarrar, the Amnesty InternationalUSA advocacy dir. for the Middle East andNorth Africa, entry into Israel on 10/30. AnIsraeli spokesperson later confirmed that PublicSecurity and Strategic Affairs Minister GiladErdan, who was leading Israel’s efforts tocounter the growing BDS movement, hadrequested Jarrar’s denial. Jarrar was reportedlyattempting to visit his family in Israel after thedeath of his father.Finally, the population, immigration, and

border authority office of Israel’s interiorminister announced (11/13) plans to deny entryto 7 of the 20 mbrs. of a European delegationset to arrive in Israel the following week becauseof their support for BDS. Erdan explained(11/13), “We will not permit entry to thosewho actively call to harm the State of Israel,especially in light of their request to meet andoffer support to the arch-terrorist [andimprisoned Fatah leader] Marwan Barghouti.”By conflating support for Barghouti with calls

for boycotts, the announcement marked a new,expanded interpretation of Israel’s anti-boycottlaws. According to a document produced by asenior official in the Strategic Affairs Ministry,“The issue of prisoner visits was not theresponsibility of the Strategic Affair Ministry.Still, the issue of Palestinian prisoners andefforts to delegitimize Israel are intertwined.The ministry’s position is to not allow anydelegation mbr. to visit Marwan Barghouti, asa visit is liable to give him a tailwind.”

HAMAS CRACKS DOWN ON ISLAMISTGROUPS

Hamas’s agreement with the Egyptian govt.last quarter to increase security along Gaza’sborder with Sinai led to renewed violencebetween Hamas and the various small Islamistgroups in Gaza in 8–10/2017, which in turnproduced multiple exchanges of cross-borderviolence with Israel. Tensions between Hamasand these groups had broken out into similarintermittent episodes in recent years (see JPS 45[1]), with the Islamists both directly attackingHamas personnel and baiting the IDF intoattacking Hamas with rocket fire. This quarterwas no different, and it threatened toundermine both Hamas’s rapprochement withCairo and the 10/12 Palestinian nationalreconciliation deal.The violence began on 8/17. Hamas forces

were responding to a report of militantsinfiltrating Gaza from Sinai when theyencountered 2 men carrying light arms at themouth of a small tunnel. As the Hamas troopsapproached, 1 of the men detonated a bombbelt, killing himself and 1 of the Hamas fighters,and injuring 5 others. The assailant was lateridentified as a supporter of the Islamic Statein Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The day after the attack,Hamas shut down the offices of the IslamicState of Gaza and the Army of Islam, and



arrested dozens of their mbrs. in raidsthroughout Rafah and Khan Yunis. Thecrackdown continued into 10/2017, withHamas announcing (10/7) the arrests of severalIslamist leaders in an overnight raid in Rafah,possibly related to continuing reconciliationtalks in Cairo, some analysts said. Then onSunday (10/8), militants, thought to be possiblyISIS sympathizers retaliating for the arrests,fired a rocket toward Israel, which landed in anopen area short of the border fence. Thoughthere were no casualties, an IDF tank targeted(10/8) a Hamas observation post e. of al-Maghazi and Israeli artillery shelled a site nr.Gaza City. (Neither attack led to any seriousinjuries.)A few days after the rocket attack, Sinai

Province of the Islamic State (SPIS) fighterslaunched (10/15) 2 rockets from n. Sinai intoIsrael. These also landed in open areas,causing no damage or injuries. The rockets’targets remained unclear as it could not beascertained if Israel alone, Israel and Hamas,or Egyptian security forces had been theintended target. The attack followed a day ofviolence in al-Arish, Rafah, and ShaykhZuwayd, in which Egyptian forces killed atleast 24 armed fighters after SPIS mbrs.assaulted an Egyptian soldier at a vacantchurch in al-Arish (see Chronology).Regardless, the Egyptian authorities decided(10/15) to cancel a planned opening of theRafah border crossing on 10/16. (The promiseof more frequent openings of the crossingwas among Hamas’s key victories in itsagreement with the Egyptian govt. lastquarter.)The violence in Gaza continued through the

end of the quarter, with no further spillover intoIsrael or Egypt. On 10/27, Dep. Minister ofInterior and Internal Security Tawfiq Abu Naimwas slightly injured in an alleged assassination

attempt. His jeep exploded as he was leavingFriday prayer at the Abu al-Hassan Mosque inc. Gaza. Hamas officials initially blamed Israelfor the attack, but later said they suspected localIslamists. The next day, Abu Naim alleged thatit was a politically motivated attempt toundermine the reconciliation process. “Theobjectives of those who committed thisdespicable act will not be achieved,” he said,affirming that Hamas was still on track tomeet its 11/1 deadline to hand over control ofGaza’s border crossings to the PA (see“Intra-Palestinian Dynamics” below).

OCCUPATION DATA AND TRENDSAfter the flare-up of violence surrounding

new Israeli security measures at Haramal-Sharif last quarter, Israeli-Palestinianviolence returned to pre-crisis levels. As a result,the number of Palestinians killed by Israeliactions this quarter fell to 21, down from 38.The number of Israelis killed by Palestinianactions was 4, down from 6 last quarter.Therefore, the comprehensive death toll sincethe beginning of the Second Intifada in 9/2000reached 10,978 Palestinians (including 64Palestinian citizens of Israel and 19 cross-border“infiltrators”); 1,270 Israelis (including at least250 settlers and 440 IDF soldiers and othersecurity personnel); and 73 foreign nationals(including 2 British suicide bombers). Thesenumbers include individuals who died innoncombat-related incidents if their death wasa direct result of Israel’s occupation or theongoing conflict (e.g., ailing Palestinians whodied because they were denied access tomedical care, and Palestinians killed insmuggling tunnel accidents). They do notinclude the Palestinian killed in the Swedishtown of Limmared on 8/20, despite the


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accusation made by various Palestinians thatIsrael’s Mossad agency was responsible. Alsoexcluded is the Palestinian killed in a firefightwith PASF troops on 9/13 (see Chronology).

Overview of the Violence

The number of Palestinians killed becauseof Israeli actions in the West Bank and EastJerusalem decreased significantly this quarter.Although tensions across the oPt overlongstanding issues like settlements anddemolitions of Palestinian property remainedhigh, there were fewer protests, clashes, andindividual or so-called random attacks. Overall,only 5 Palestinians were killed in this context(down from 29 last quarter): 2 died (on 8/26,a car driven by Israeli settlers ran over 8-year-old Aseel Abu Oun, who died from her injurieson 8/27, and on 10/31, Israeli soldiers fired intoa car near a checkpoint, killing the driver);1 succumbed (9/3) to injuries sustained inclashes with the IDF on 8/9; 1 was killed (8/19)after allegedly attempting to stab Israeli bordersecurity guards; and 1 was killed (9/26) aftershooting and killing 3 Israeli security forces.There were far fewer Palestinian injuries aswell. According to the UN Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Affairs(OCHA), 275 Palestinians were injured between8/15 and 11/6 (down from 1,794 last quarter).Apart from the 1 major incident of cross-

border violence, the number of Palestinianskilled in the Gaza Strip because of Israeliactions was comparable to totals in recentquarters. Overall, 16 Palestinians were killed inthis context; 2 Hamas fighters died during atunnel collapse on 9/15; 1 Hamas fighter diedin an unspecified “training accident” on 9/19; 1Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighter died inan “accident” during an unspecified missionon 8/28; and the remaining 12 were all Hamasand PIJ fighters killed when Israeli forces

detonated a tunnel leading from Khan Yunisinto Israeli territory on 10/30 (see “PrisonerSwap” and Chronology). The number ofGazans injured because of Israeli actions thisquarter decreased substantially. According toOCHA, 52 Palestinians were injured between8/15 and 11/6 (down from 162).The IDF strictly enforced the unilaterally

defined buffer zone, or so-called AccessRestricted Areas, along Israel’s border withGaza, as in previous quarters. Israeli troopsviolently dispersed Palestinian protestersgathering along the border fence on 9 differentoccasions (down from 16 last quarter); shotat Palestinian shepherds, farmers, and birdhunters on 2 occasions (8/18 and 10/10); andfired on Palestinian land or other property12 times (9/9, 9/16, 9/17, 10/13, 10/15, 10/22,10/25, 11/2, 11/6 [2], 11/9, and 11/13). Israeliforces also conducted 11 limited incursions tolevel land and “clear sightlines” into Gaza (8/21,8/28, 9/5, 9/11, 9/12, 9/24, 10/10, 10/16, 10/24,10/27, and 11/5), and arrested 9 Palestiniansattempting to cross into Israel (8/16 [2], 8/19,9/16 [2], 10/10 [2], and 10/14 [2]).Also of note: Maj. Gen. Yoav Mordechai, the

IDF’s Coordinator of Govt. Activities in theTerritories (COGAT), said (10/11) that Hamasfighters had started using lasers to blind IDFtroops operating along the border in recentweeks. “The continuation of the provocativeblinding operations . . . could lead to anescalation at a sensitive moment fordevelopments in the Palestinian theater,” hesaid. “You’ve been warned.”Although the Israeli authorities again decided

to temporarily expand (10/18) the fishing zoneoff Gaza’s s. coast (see “Movement and Access”below), Israeli naval forces violently harassedGazan fishermen throughout the quarter. Theyopened fire on or otherwise confronted thefishermen on at least 62 separate occasions,



up from 52 last quarter. Over the course ofthese incidents, 1 Palestinian was slightly injured(11/8), 8 were arrested (9/18 [2], 10/15 [4], and11/6 [2]), and 4 boats were confiscated (9/18,10/15 [2], and 11/6). In a related incident, Israelinaval forces shot and injured a Palestinian sailingoff the coast on 10/19.

Movement and Access

The Israeli authorities again changed theirprocedures for processing applications byPalestinians trying to exit the Gaza Strip thisquarter, imposing yet another hurdle formerchants conducting their business, studentspursuing education opportunities abroad, andthose in need of specialized medical care notavailable at home, among others (see figure 1).Just 5 mos. after Israel’s Liaison Office informedthe authorities in Gaza that they were planningto extend the expected processing time for

exit-permit applications from 24 working days,COGAT put the new rules in place in 10/2017.The maximum processing time was set at23 working days for non-urgent medical carecases; 50 days for applications to visit sickrelatives or attend weddings, work meetings,or conferences in the West Bank or Israel; and70 days for other commercial trips to Israel andhigher education abroad. It’s important tonote that these new maximums had no impacton the results of individual applications. Theywent into effect as the Liaison Office was dealingwith a massive backlog of permit applications—approximately 16,466, according to COGAT(9/6). “The situation assessment among therelevant security agencies requires adjusting thesecurity check process in accordance withdeveloping threats,” a COGAT spokespersonexplained (9/6). “In recent months, we haveengaged in staff work together with the relevant

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source: Gisha - Legal Center for Freedom of Movement reports and data. See Gisha, “Exits of Palestinians to Israel and theWest Bank via Erez Crossing,” 17 November 2017, http://gisha.org/graph/2392.

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Figure 1. Palestinians exiting Gaza via the Erez border crossing. Since April 2016, the number of Palestinians(merchants, medical patients, and others) able to exit Gaza via Erez, the principle means of departing Gaza apartfrom the frequently closed Rafah border crossing, has steadily decreased.


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security agencies, and as part of this work, weset a timetable for completing the processingof applications to enter Israel in a way thatpermits a professional examination process.”Palestinians in Gaza also had infrequent

opportunities to leave via the Rafah bordercrossing with Egypt. The Egyptian authoritiesopened the crossing in both directions on only3 days (8/16–17 and 8/28), up 1 from lastquarter. On 6 other days, they opened thecrossing partially to allow Muslim pilgrimsreturning from Mecca to enter. Overall, 6,535Palestinians were able to enter Gaza and 5,203were able to leave.It’s also worth noting that the 10/12 intra-

Palestinian reconciliation deal had little effecton Egypt’s administration of the Rafah crossing.The day after Hamas formally relinquishedcontrol of the crossing, the PA announced(11/2) that the Egyptian authorities would openit permanently, starting on 11/15, but that didnot happen. “We don’t have any informationabout when the Rafah border [crossing] willreopen again,” said the PA’s dir. of bordercrossings, Nazmi Muhanna, at the quarter’sclose (AFP, 11/15).As mentioned above (see “Overview of the

Violence”), COGAT announced (10/15) that,starting on 10/18, the fishing zone off Gaza’s s.coast would be expanded from 6 naut. mi. to9 naut. mi. for a period of 6 weeks. A similar,temporary expansion in 5/2017 reportedlyallowed Gaza’s fishermen to increase theircollective revenues by more than NIS 500,000(approx. $175,000), and comparable increaseswere expected by the end of 11/2017.The IDF’s near-daily raids, house searches,

and mobile checkpoints again served as theprincipal obstructions to Palestinian movementand access in the West Bank and EastJerusalem this quarter. According to OCHA,the IDF conducted 893 search and arrest

operations in the West Bank between 8/15 and11/6, or almost 10 raids per day. There werefewer alleged stabbings, vehicular assaults, andother attacks this quarter, but the IDF crackeddown on each one disproportionally, to thedegree that was common at the height of thehabba, the surge of Palestinian resistance,random attacks, and protests that began inJerusalem in 9/2015 (see JPS 45 [2, 3]). After aPalestinian shot and killed 3 Israeli securityguards outside the Har Adar settlement nr.Jerusalem on 9/26, the IDF imposed (9/26) alockdown on Bayt Surik, the attacker’shometown. Over the following 2 days, Israelisoldiers arrested tens of Palestinians,confiscated dozens of cars, and issued stop-work orders to various construction sites inthe village. They also imposed a generalclosure on 8 other Jerusalem-area villages(9/26–10/1).As in previous quarters, the Israeli

authorities imposed additional restrictionson Palestinian movement during Jewishholidays. They suspended border crossingsin and out of the West Bank and Gaza forRosh Hashanah (9/19–23), suspendedcrossings and barred Palestinian laborersfrom entering Israeli settlement on YomKippur (9/29–30), and suspended crossingsagain around Sukkot (10/4–11). DMLieberman pointed (10/1) to the Har Adarincident on 9/26 to justify the exceptionallylong closure for Yom Kippur. Later,Lieberman and IDF Chief of Staff GadiEisenkot decided (10/5) to downgrade the11-day closure and allow West BankPalestinians “employed in required sectorsof the economy” to enter Israel.

Gaza Electricity Crisis

The crippling power shortages plaguing Gazasince its sole power plant was forced out of



commission in 4/2017 continued throughoutthe quarter. As a result, Gaza’s approximately2 m. residents were forced to get by on 4–6hours of electricity per day and suffereddeteriorating basic services, such as access topotable water (see figure 2).International humanitarian aid helped

improve the situation marginally in 9/2017,but relief efforts from Israeli and Palestinianauthorities were scant. According to a Times ofIsrael report on 9/14, COGATMordechai sent aletter to PA minister of civil affairs Husseinal-Sheikh informing him that Israeli authoritieswould begin deducting money from monthlytax revenue transfers to the PA in order to fundincreased electricity supply to Gaza. The movewas explicitly intended to alleviate thehumanitarian crisis and reverse, at least in part,the Israeli authorities’ earlier decision toacquiesce to the PA’s 4/27 request to decrease

the amount of electricity supplied to Gaza by40% (see JPS 46 [4] and 47 [1]). Through theend of the quarter, however, there were noreports of any increases to the supply ofelectricity to Gaza.The Palestinian national reconciliation

process offered the greatest hope for relief.The day before Hamas and Fatah officialsannounced that they had signed a nationalreconciliation deal (see “Intra-PalestinianDynamics” below), the acting dir. of thePalestinian Energy Authority (PEA), ZaferMilhem, said (10/11) that the PEA hadalready created a plan to ease the crisis,which would be implemented once the PAtook control of Gaza. Specifically, he indicatedthat Gaza was operating with only 147 ofthe 400–500 MW of power it needed, andthat the PEA’s plan would increase thesupply to between 200 and 230 MW quickly.

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source: OCHA’s Humanitarian Bulletin - 10/2017. See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),“The Humanitarian Bulletin,” 17 November 2017, https://www.ochaopt.org/reports/humanitarian-bulletin.

Figure 2. Gaza water supply for domestic consumption. The water Palestinians in Gaza consume at home comesprimarily from municipal networks supplied by underground wells. Recent power shortages reduced the waterpumped from these wells, causing individuals to have access to far less than the 100 L per capita/day World HealthOrganization minimum.


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The strategy reportedly included efforts torehabilitate Gaza’s power grid and reformlocal bill collection systems. More importantly,it also called for the PA to rescind its 4/27request, which PA pres. Abbas had used topressure Hamas into negotiating thereconciliation deal in the first place. Althoughunresolved issues threatened to underminethat deal as the quarter ended, it was widelyassumed that the PA intended to implement thePEA plan and bring relief to Gaza.

Judaization of Jerusalem

Following the Palestinians’ victory on theissue of Haram al-Sharif, resulting from peacefulprotests that made the Israeli authorities removenewly installed checkpoints and cameras at thesanctuary, new Israeli efforts to dominate EastJerusalem and the Old City kept tensions high.On 8/29, Israeli authorities temporarily liftedthe ban on MKs and ministers visiting Haramal-Sharif. PM Netanyahu had imposed the banin 10/2015 to de-escalate growing unrest acrossthe oPt. The PM agreed to a 1-day exceptionfollowing mos. of pressure from leader of themessianic Temple Mount movement, Orthodoxrabbi and Likud MK Yehuda Glick, as well asother ultranationalist leaders. On 8/29, Glickand fellow MK Shuli Moalem-Refaeli (JewishHome) were the only previously banned Israeliofficials to visit the sanctuary. A small group ofactivists protested their tour, but it proceededwithout incident.The constant presence of Israeli forces in

Palestinian neighborhoods led to anothercontroversy later in the quarter. In mid-10/2017, the parents of approximately 4,300Palestinian students in Issawiyya kept theirchildren home from school in protest at theIsraeli police’s practice of patrolling theneighborhood every afternoon just as childrenmade their way home from school at the end

of the day. The parents reported that thepolice presence provoked disturbances andled to arrests and clashes on 10/16, duringwhich 1 Palestinian youth was seriously injured.As a parents’ comm. was set to meet with thecity’s Education Office reps. and the police on10/18, Jerusalem mayor Nir Barkat canceledthe meeting at the last minute. “A group ofparents from the neighborhood chose todeclare a general strike in the schools, andinstead of instructing their children to refrainfrom violence the parents decided to inflamepassions,” a statement from Barkat’s officeread. “This extreme group, which was neverelected to represent the neighborhood parents,decided to impose the strike on the parentsand enforce it through intimidation andthreats.” Included in the statement was awarning from the Jerusalem police commandersaying, “The police won’t speak to the strikeleaders until there is quiet in the neighborhoodand the repeated stone-throwing stops.” Overthe next week, the police cracked down onthe neighborhood, arresting at least50 residents, including 23 youths (seeChronology).Also of note: Israel’s High Court of Justice

ruled (9/13) against the Israeli authorities ina 10-year-old case over their attempt to revokethe residency status of 4 East JerusalemPalestinians elected to the PalestinianLegislative Council (PLC) on a Hamas-affiliatedslate in 2006. The 4 men were expelled fromJerusalem in 2011, following years of protestsand demonstrations against a reportedultimatum from the Israeli authorities: eitherresign from the PLC or give up residencystatus. While the court rejected the expulsions,it put a 6-mo. stay on reversing them, allowingIsrael’s Ministry of Interior to push for a newlaw that would retroactively justify thedeportations.



Palestinian Prisoners

In the wake of the Dignity Strike, the massprisoner hunger strike last quarter, the numberof Palestinians being held in Israeli prisonsremained relatively stable. According toAddameer Prisoner Support and HumanRights Association, there were 6,200Palestinians in Israeli prisons in 5/2017, whenthe hunger strike ended, and 6,198 in 11/2017.The number of Palestinian administrativedetainees declined slightly over the same period,from 490 in 5/2017 to 463 in 11/2017.Meanwhile, fallout from the strike continued.

On 9/4, Fadwa Barghouti, wife of imprisonedFatah leader and strike organizer MarwanBarghouti, said she had been denied entrypermits to visit her husband until 2019. Aspokesperson for the Israel Prison Servicethen confirmed (9/4) that she was barred for“security reasons” in connection with the strike.Later, Haaretz reported (9/10) that the PAhad suspended its funding for the PalestinianPrisoners Club (PPC), an NGO that advocateson behalf of Palestinians in Israeli prisons. PPCsources said that the decision had resulted frompressure by both Israel and the U.S. over thePA’s support for the prisoners and the PPC’ssupport for the strike. While the PPC receivessmall donations and support from otherinstitutions as well as the PA, the loss of PAsupport led to speculation that the organizationwould disband. The PPC insisted (9/13) thatit had no plans to do so; however, furtherreports showed that there was a power struggletaking place within the organization, and itsfuture was far from certain.

Prisoner Swap

With the Israeli govt. under increasingpressure from its constituents to secure thereturn of the 2 Israeli civilians and the remains

of the 2 IDF soldiers allegedly being held inGaza, Israeli and Hamas officials resumedtheir intermittent indirect talks on a possibleprisoner swap this quarter. However, personnelchanges on the Israeli side and the ongoingPalestinian reconciliation process complicatedthe affair, and there was no apparent progressmade by the end of the quarter.The Israeli official tasked with leading the

indirect talks, Lior Lotan, resigned after 3 yearsin the role on 8/24. Sources familiar withLotan’s work said (8/24) that he quit because hismost recent initiative hit a dead end andbecause Netanyahu gave his office too littleleeway (see JPS 47 [1]). His resignation sparkeda fresh wave of criticism from the family ofHadar Goldin, 1 of the 2 IDF soldiers killedduring the Israeli assault on Gaza in thesummer of 2014. “Following Lior’s resignation,we feel we have been abandoned by the govt.,”the family said (8/24), in a statement. Inresponse, Lieberman reaffirmed (8/27) thegovt.’s desire to bring Goldin’s remains home.“Nevertheless, we must not repeat the mistakeof the Shalit deal,” he said, referring to the2011 prisoner swap that exchanged 1,027Palestinian prisoners for IDF soldier GiladShalit, captured in Gaza in 2006 (see JPS 41 [2]).An 8/28 report on Israel’s Army Radio

illuminated the internal Israeli conflict over apossible prisoner swap. The report featuredrecordings of Lotan, allegedly made mos.earlier: “I want [to play with] a full hand onthe issue of prisoners,” Lotan could be heardsaying. “If we have 1 captured [soldier], [thewar] needs to end with 200 to 1. If it’s 2[captured soldiers] then 400 to 2, if 3 then 600.”His comments were widely interpreted as anargument for the IDF to adopt a policy ofkidnapping Hamas fighters as bargaining chips,but it was unclear at the time if his superiorsfound the argument persuasive.


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After a few more weeks of rumors,speculation, and some confirmed reports ofongoing talks, al-Quds reported (9/14) thatEgyptian mediators had presented a newframework for a possible exchange. It wouldreportedly see Israel transferring the bodies of39 deceased Palestinians to their families inexchange for definitive information on theremains of the 2 IDF soldiers and the 2 Israelicivilians. After that initial exchange, designed tobe a confidence-building measure, theframework reportedly stipulated that Israelwould free 54 Hamas-affiliated prisoners whohad been rearrested after being freed in theShalit deal, and Egyptian intelligence officerswould mediate a new round of talks on a morecomprehensive swap. Two weeks after theal-Quds report, the leader of Hamas in Gaza,Yahya Sinwar, said (9/28) that Hamas agreed tothe new Egyptian framework. “The ball is nowin Israel’s court,” he was reported as saying.Deflecting, the Israelis adopted a new

strategy. First, Netanyahu appointed (10/21)Yaron Blum to replace Lotan. Blum, who hadbeen on the team that negotiated the Shalit deal,was known for the hard-line stance he hadtaken on the prisoner swap issue, arguing thatIsrael should offer fewer Palestinian prisonersfor captured Israelis and that the responsibilityfor negotiating such swaps should be movedfrom the PM’s office to the Defense Ministry.Second, in a move that was not immediatelylinked to the prisoner swap issue, the IDF staged(10/30) a “controlled detonation” of anunderground tunnel leading from Khan Yunisinto Israeli territory, immediately killing 7Palestinians, all mbrs. of either Hamas or PIJ,and injuring at least 18 more (see Chronologyand “Overview of the Violence” above). In theimmediate aftermath of the operation, whichtook place inside Israeli territory, Hamasaccused (10/30) Israel of a “desperate attempt to

sabotage efforts to restore Palestinian unity,”and the Egyptian govt. mobilized its diplomatsto prevent an escalation, according to a seniorHamas official. PIJ mbrs. stated (10/30) theywere “weighing their options,” alluding to thepossibility of a counterattack.It took days for the link between the tunnel

operation and the prisoner swap talks tomaterialize. On 11/2, COGAT released astatement, saying, “Israel will not allow searchoperations in the area of the security barrierin the Gaza Strip without progress on theissue of Israelis kidnapped and MIAs.” Hamashad reportedly appealed to the InternationalComm. of the Red Cross (ICRC) to pressureIsrael into allowing recovery efforts, andMordechai’s statement was in direct responseto an ICRC request. PIJ (11/2) and Hamas(11/3) both rejected Mordechai’s position,stating that they considered the 5 Palestiniansmissing after the tunnel explosion to be dead.An IDF spokesperson then confirmed (11/5)that the bodies of the 5 PIJ mbrs. had beenrecovered.The incident significantly escalated tensions

surrounding the prisoner swap and neither sideappeared eager to make concessions as thequarter came to a close.

Settler-Related Violence

Settler-related violence increased slightlythis quarter. There were 35 instances ofsettlers attacking Palestinians or theirproperty in the West Bank and East Jerusalembetween 8/15 and 11/6, according to OCHA.Settlers also harvested and stole the producefrom more than 3,000 olive trees. During theolive harvest season from mid-9/2017 to mid-11/2017, settlers damaged 5,582 olive trees,more than triple the 2016 figure of 1,652,the UN agency reported. Between 80,000and 100,000 Palestinian families rely on



olives for income, an activity described as a“key economic, social and cultural event forPalestinians,” OCHA said. In addition,settlers dismantled about 100 m (about330 ft.) of irrigation water pipes and threwthem in the Jordan River, according toOCHA.Ten of these attacks led to Palestinian injuries,

down from 18 last quarter, and the remaining25 resulted in damage to Palestinian property,up from 15 (see figure 3 and Chronology). Asettler also ran over and killed 8-year-old AseelAbu Oun near Nablus on 10/26 (see “Overviewof the Violence” above). Agencies report thatvehicular targeting of Palestinian children isquite common but rarely investigated by Israeliauthorities. Just before the quarter began, asettler ran his car into and injured a group offour 6-year-old boys. Also of note: a 70-year-oldIsraeli settler was found dead of apparent stab

wounds in an industrial area nr. Kafr Kassim inc. Israel. Israeli security sources said that theman was killed for “nationalistic reasons,”and Israeli forces later arrested 2 Palestiniansfrom Qabatiya village nr. Jenin in connectionwith the killing.

Demolitions and Displacement

For the first time in a year, Israeli forcesdemolished more Palestinian buildings in theWest Bank and East Jerusalem than they had inthe previous quarter. Between 8/15 and 11/6,they demolished 69 structures, according toOCHA, up from 55 last quarter. This included55 in the West Bank (up from 29) and 14 inEast Jerusalem (down from 26). Two of thedemolitions were carried out purportedly ascollective punishment: on 8/17, Israeli forcesdemolished the Dayr Abu Mash‘al home of1 of the Palestinians killed during an alleged

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source: OCHA’s biweekly reports from 1/2017 to 11/2017. See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(OCHA), “Protection of Civilians,” 17 November 2017, https://www.ochaopt.org/reports/protection-of-civilians.

Figure 3. Israeli settler attacks on Palestinian farmers, drivers, and other civilians, as well as Palestinian property,over time.


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attack in Jerusalem on 6/16; and on 11/15,they destroyed the Bayt Surik home (11/15) ofthe Palestinian killed after shooting 3 Israelisecurity forces on 9/26. Overall, this quarter’sdemolitions resulted in the displacement of 160Palestinians (up from 56 last quarter).

INTRA-PALESTINIAN DYNAMICS

“HISTORIC COMPROMISE”

After a year of increasingly acrimoniousrelations (see JPS 46 [3]–47 [1]), Hamas andFatah signed a major reconciliation agreementin 10/2017. The deal elided several key issues(e.g., the role of Hamas’s military wing), butboth parties made significant concessions andby the end of the quarter, the processappeared to have the potential to end thedecade-old rift between the govts. in Gaza andthe West Bank.In the opening weeks of the quarter, tension

between Hamas and Fatah was escalating. At ameeting with Knesset leaders of the left-wingMeretz party in Ramallah, PA pres. Abbasreportedly threatened (8/20) to cut off allfinancial support to Gaza, including the fundsused to buy electricity from Israel, unlessHamas dismantled the new administrativecomm. it established at the beginning of theyear. “We transfer $1.5 b. a year [to Gaza],but after Hamas declared its own govt., wediscontinued 25% of our support,” Abbasreportedly said (8/20). “We fear that if thereis no change soon that will gradually reach100%.” A complete suspension of PA supportwould have increased the pressure on Hamas,and exacerbated the humanitarian crisis inGaza, resulting from the 10-year-long siege ofGaza by Israel and Egypt, and other punitiverestrictions Abbas imposed earlier in 2017(see JPS 46 [4] and 47 [1]).

Abbas’s threat only led to more tension.Four days later, several news outlets reportedHamas released (8/24) a statement accusingthe PA of carrying out politically motivatedarrests of 9 of its mbrs. in the West Bank. In aseparate statement, the PIJ echoed (8/24)Hamas’s claim, arguing that the arrests“signaled” the “PA’s insistence on shuttingdoors” to any reconciliation efforts.The first sign that those doors were still

open came on 8/26, when PA PM Hamdallahspoke at an opening ceremony of new wardsat a Palestinian hospital in Hebron. Heannounced that the PA would be rehiring the6,145 Gaza-based civil servants it had forcedinto early retirement on 7/4 (see JPS 47 [1]).Although Hamdallah did not offer anyjustification or reasoning for the PA’s position,the 7/4 decision was framed by PA officialsas an effort to intensify the pressure onHamas. The rollback was therefore seen inthat context as well.Two weeks after Hamdallah’s announcement,

Hamas took the next step forward. Themovement’s leader, Ismail Haniyeh, led adelegation of high-ranking officials to Cairoon 9/9 for talks with Egyptian intelligenceofficials on bilateral relations and the prospectsfor Palestinian national reconciliation. Inpursuit of a more stable relationship with thePalestinians and border security, the Egyptiansreportedly urged Hamas to make concessionsfor the sake of unity, and the Hamas officials,hoping to see the blockade on Gaza eased,relented. On 9/11, Haniyeh said Hamas waswilling to dismantle its new administrativecomm. and embark on a new round ofreconciliation talks, without preconditions(Hamas had previously demanded that Abbasroll back the measures he had imposed earlierin the year before sitting down for talks).A week after Hamas’s announcement, senior



Hamas officials met with their counterparts inFatah for 2 days of talks in Cairo. Afterward,Hamas leaders released (9/17) anotherstatement reaffirming their willingness todismantle the administrative comm. and tocarry on further reconciliation talks, as well astheir openness to hold a new round of elections.The next day, Abbas called Haniyeh and toldhim he was “satisfied with the atmosphere”Hamas had created. Abbas then pledged tofollow up on the process after he returned fromthe UNGA in New York.Momentum built through the end of 9/2017.

Haniyeh invited (9/19) Abbas to send PAofficials to take control of Gaza “withoutobstacles,” and Hamdallah said (9/26) that thePAwas planning to establish new committees toadminister the transfer of power. Even theMiddle East Quartet, which includes the U.S., aswell as the UN, European Union (EU), andRussia, lauded (9/28) the process: “[We] urgethe parties to take concrete steps to reunite Gazaand the West Bank under the legitimate PA.This will facilitate lifting the closures of thecrossings, while addressing Israel’s legitimatesecurity concerns, and unlock internationalsupport for Gaza’s growth, stability andprosperity, which is critical for efforts to reachlasting peace.”As Hamdallah prepared to hold a PA cabinet

meeting in Gaza, there were signs the processwas not going as smoothly as it appeared. On9/28, senior Hamas official Musa Abu Marzuqsaid that Hamas was not ready to discuss theproposed disbanding of its military wing, theIzzeddin al-Qassam Brigades, in the context ofthe reconciliation talks. According to a report inal-Hayat on 9/30, the measure was 1 of the3 conditions Abbas required, along with a banon foreign involvement in the administration ofGaza and the demand that all reconstruction-designated funds flow through the PA.

According to analysts, these conditions weredesigned to block exiled Fatah leader andlongtime Abbas rival Mohammad Dahlanfrom reentering Palestinian politics. Dahlanhas lived in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)since 2011, amassing great personal wealthsince fleeing Ramallah under charges ofcorruption and allegations he participated intargeted assassination attempts against Hamasofficials. On 9/13, the New York Times reportedthat Dahlan had secured a $50 m. pledge tofund a program that would distribute $50,000payments to the victims of Fatah-Hamasviolence that followed Hamas’s electoral victoryin Gaza in 2006. Because Dahlan has been inexile and is seen to have “burned bridges,” thisnew program was perceived, in part, as an effortto rehabilitate his reputation and a way toreturn to Palestinian leadership.Neither Dahlan’s apparent ambition nor

Hamas’s military wing proved to beinsurmountable hurdles. On 10/2, Hamasheld a formal welcome ceremony forHamdallah in Bayt Hanun. “We return toGaza again to end the division and achieveunity,” Hamdallah told a crowd of at least2,000. The next day, he convened the PAcabinet in Gaza for the first time since11/2014 and said he was ready to takeresponsibility for the administration ofGaza “in full cooperation and partnershipwith all the Palestinian factions and forces.”He also said that reconciliation would putpressure on international donors to makegood on their pledges of reconstructionsupport, and that all administrative issueswould be resolved “within the [framework of]available resources.” The head of Egypt’sGeneral Intelligence Directorate, KhaledFawzy, who was in Gaza on 10/3 to helpmediate the process, said (10/3) that theEgyptian govt. planned to invite Hamas and


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Fatah officials back to Cairo soon for furthertalks and was planning to use as a frameworkthe reconciliation deal the 2 sides hadsigned in Cairo on 5/4/2011 (see update andDoc. B4 in JPS 40 [4]).While the PA cabinet was in Gaza for further

talks, Israel and the international communityweighed in with their views. In Israel, PMNetanyahu condemned (10/3) the entire affair,saying that Israel would not accept “imaginaryappeasement where the Palestinian side isreconciling at the expense of our existence.”Education Minister Bennett went further,calling (10/3) for Netanyahu to suspend themonthly transfers of tax revenues to the PA.In response, PLO secy.-gen. Saeb Erakat called(10/4) on Israel to fulfill its obligations underpast agreements now that the Palestinians hadmade a “historic compromise.” UN specialcoordinator Nickolay Mladenov, on the otherhand, expressed cautious optimism (10/3) aboutthe process. And U.S. special rep. forinternational negotiations Greenblatt releaseda statement timidly welcoming the process:“We will be watching these developmentsclosely, while pressing forward with the PA,Israel, and international donors to try toimprove the humanitarian situation in Gaza.”What the U.S. and the rest of the world

saw was more progress. On 10/5, after 4 daysof talks between Hamas and PA officials,Hamas announced that the PA had officiallytaken over as the administrative authority inGaza. In an interview on Egyptian television,Abbas reiterated (10/3) his demand for Hamasto dismantle its military arm before the PAlifted any of its new sanctions on Gaza, insistingthat he didn’t want to reproduce Lebanon’s“Hezbollah model.” Fawzy then reportedlyinformed (10/5) Abbas that Hamas wouldrefuse to consider dismantling the 27,000-strong force until a peace deal with Israel was

reached and new elections were held(Raialyoum, 10/5).As the disagreement over Hamas’s military

wing persisted, Abbas downplayed thereconciliation process. According to a readoutof a meeting of the Fatah RevolutionaryCouncil on 10/8, he said that national unitywould take more time, and that the PAwould not be able to assume all itsresponsibilities in Gaza absent consensus onthe agenda of the PLO agenda and the PA’ssole authority over security.Despite Abbas’s reservations, Hamas and

Fatah officials returned to Cairo the followingweek and in a joint press conference on 10/12they announced a new reconciliationagreement. They didn’t immediately revealany details, but information leaked to the mediaoutlined the following specific provisions: thePA would lift all sanctions imposed earlier in2017, Hamas would give up control of Gazato the PA by 12/1, Hamas and the PA wouldform a joint police force to patrol Gaza, andEgypt would host the 11/21 round ofreconciliation talks aimed at forming a unitygovt. While Netanyahu and other Israeliofficials decried the deal and uncertaintyabout its specifics lingered, the internationalcommunity and the Palestinian public greetedthe announcement with fanfare. On the eveningof 10/12, thousands of Palestinians gatheredin the streets of Gaza City to celebrate.After 4 days of unbroken positivity on both

sides, a Hamas spokesperson criticized (10/16)the PA for not prioritizing the rollback ofsanctions on Gaza. “It is not justified tocontinue the sanctions on Gaza, while the[PA] govt. is content with talking about gainingcontrol of border crossings and explorationfor [natural] gas in Gaza,” he said. Hiscomments came 1 day after the Fatah CentralComm. met to discuss the reconciliation deal,



neglecting to debate the specific issue ofsanctions, as had been expected. Another seniorHamas official commented (10/16) that “thefailure of Abbas to respond to popular andnational demands to cancel his arbitrarymeasures against our people in Gaza isunjustifiable.”In addition to Egypt, the 10/12 deal won

the Palestinians support from other alliesin the region. The Jordanian press reported(10/19) that King Abdullah planned to allowHamas to reopen its office in Amman(although other news reports refuted this),and the chair of Qatar’s Comm. to RebuildGaza, Mohammed al-Emadi, announced(10/24) that Doha would fund theconstruction of a new presidential residenceand “the headquarters of the Palestiniangovt. in Gaza after the consensus govt.assumes its duties fully.”Even Netanyahu reportedly saw potential

in the deal. According to 3 Israeli sources,despite not recognizing the agreement, theIsraeli PM told (10/16) his security cabinetthat Israel should cooperate with PAofficials, should they take control of Gaza,because averting a humanitarian crisis wouldserve Israel’s interest. The same sources saidthat Netanyahu had already informed boththe Egyptian and U.S. govts. that the dealwould not facilitate a resumption of peacetalks with the Palestinians. The next day,however, Netanyahu was apparentlyoverruled. The security cabinet imposed(10/17) conditions on any Israeliparticipation in talks related to Palestiniannational reconciliation (see “The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict” above).The Palestinians were undeterred. A little

more than 2 weeks after Hamas and Fatahofficials stood together at the Egyptian GeneralIntelligence Directorate’s office in Cairo, they

came together again to take the first big steptoward implementing the deal. At a ceremonyat the Rafah border crossing on 11/1, Hamasformally handed over control of Gaza’s bordercrossings to the PA. Hamas forces departed(11/1) from their posts on the Palestinian sideof the crossing and dismantled (11/1) theircheckpoints at the Erez and Kerem Shalomcrossings, allowing PASF to take control.Mladenov called (11/1) it a “landmarkdevelopment,” and both the EU (11/1) andthe U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem (11/3)welcomed the move.

PALESTINIAN OPINION

The following data come from a poll conductedby the Palestinian Center for Policy and SurveyResearch (PCPSR) between 9/14–16/2017.The results are based on a survey of 1,270Palestinians from the West Bank (includingEast Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. Thecomplete poll, the 65th in a series, can befound at www.pcpsr.org.

1. When thinking about the confrontationsthat erupted after the Israeli installationof metal detectors or electronic gates atthe entrance of [Haram al-Sharif] inJerusalem, do you see or do not see in suchconfrontations an effective means ofresisting occupation on other issues andareas [of contention] in the occupiedPalestinian territories?

Total West Bank Gaza Strip

1) Effective 63% 65% 58%

2) Ineffective 34% 32% 37%

3) Don’t know/Notapplicable

4% 3% 5%


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2. Various parties played a role in insuringthe success of efforts to remove theelectronic gates or metal detectors. Fromamong the following list of parties, whichone played the greatest role?

3. In light of the confrontations around[Haram al-Sharif], [Abbas] announced thesuspension of contacts with the Israelis,including the suspension of securitycoordination. Do you support or opposethis decision?

4. In your view, in light of the [Abbas]decision to suspend contacts and securitycoordination with the Israeli side, did thePA actually implement the decision andstop security coordination?

FRONTLINE STATES

EGYPT

The Egyptian govt., particularly itsintelligence apparatus, was instrumental inbrokering the new Palestinian reconciliationagreement. Dir. of Egypt’s General IntelligenceDirectorate Fawzy mediated the Hamas-Fatahtalks in Cairo that led to the 10/12 deal, andhe was expected to broker follow-up talksplanned for late 11/2017 as well. Egyptian pres.Abdel Fattah al-Sisi frequently framedPalestinian reconciliation as a prelude to abroader Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israelipeace. On the sidelines of the UNGA in NewYork, he reportedly told (9/17) Israeli PMNetanyahu and a group of U.S. Jewish leadersthat he was eager to build on the Palestiniandeal. “When the world sees the Palestinian sidesunited, this helps achieve comprehensive peacethat fulfills the ambitions of our nations,” hereportedly said in a recording obtained byal-Quds on 10/3. “We have no time to waste.”Meanwhile, the Israeli govt. took a major

step toward rebuilding relations with Egypt.On 8/23, Israel’s amb. to Egypt David Govrinled a delegation to Cairo, marking his firstvisit since the Israeli Embassy in Cairo wasevacuated over unspecified “security concerns”in 12/2016 (see JPS 46 [3]). The followingweek, Govrin and 8 staffers returned to Cairo,where they resumed their diplomatic dutiesout of his suburban home.


1) Jordan’s KingAbdullah

7% 7% 8%

2) [PA pres.] Abbas 6% 2% 12%

3) King Salman binAbdulaziz of SaudiArabia

1% 0% 3%

4) Jerusalemresidents whotook part in theconfrontations

73% 84% 54%

5) ReligiouspersonalitiesrepresentingHaram al-Sharifand the IslamicWaqf

9% 2% 22%

6) Others 1% 1% 0%


3% 3% 1%


1) Support 73% 74% 71%

2) Oppose 23% 20% 27%


4% 6% 2%


1) Yes 22% 16% 31%

2) No 66% 68% 63%


12% 16% 6%



JORDAN

Neither the Israeli nor the Jordanian govt.made any effort to restore diplomaticrelations after an Israeli security guard killed2 Jordanians on 7/23 and the Israeli govt.’ssubsequent recall of its embassy staff fromAmman. In the wake of the incident,Netanyahu had welcomed the guard back toIsrael, embracing him publicly, and theJordanian authorities vetoed the return ofembassy staff to Amman until Israel carriedout a full investigation into the killing, asrequired under the Vienna Convention onthe Law of Treaties (see JPS 47 [1]). After mos.of stagnant backchannel talks, Israeliauthorities reportedly threatened to suspendthe 12/9/2013 bilateral water-sharingagreement, which provided for jointconstruction of a water desalination planton the Gulf of Aqaba and a pipeline fromthe Red Sea to the Dead Sea (see JPS 43 [3]and 44 [4]), unless the Jordanian govt.allowed Amb. Einat Schlein and her staff toreturn (Channel 10 [Israel], 11/13). “Theposition of the Foreign Ministry and thePM’s office is that we cannot have a situationwhere on the one hand the Jordanians donot allow us to reopen the embassy and on theother hand we continue to advance projectsthat are important to them as if nothing hadhappened,” said an unnamed Israeli official(11/13). In response, Jordan reportedlythreatened to proceed on the project aloneor to bring Saudi Arabia on as a substitutepartner.

SYRIA

The Israeli govt.’s discontent with lastquarter’s U.S- and Russia-backed cease-fire insouthwestern Syria, which went into effect on7/9 (see JPS 47 [1]), persisted throughout the

quarter. It manifested in repeated IDF strikeson Hezbollah targets and other sites affiliatedwith the Syrian govt. and in an increasinglyenergetic diplomatic campaign against Iran’sinfluence in Syria.The IDF carried out a handful of high-

profile strikes on Hezbollah forces and Syriangovt.-controlled sites in the opening weeks ofthe quarter. On 9/7, the Israeli Air Forcebombarded a chemical weapons plant nr.Masyaf, killing 2 people and damaging at least5 major buildings, according to theinternational press. The attack, which wasmuch more destructive than earlier Israelioperations, prompted a response from bothHezbollah and the Lebanese govt. On 9/9,Lebanon’s Ministry of Foreign Affairsannounced plans to file an “urgent complaint”against Israel at the UN Security Council(UNSC), contending that Israeli planesviolated Lebanese air space. Hezbollah, forits part, reportedly sent backchannel messagesto Israel expressing a desire not to escalatehostilities in the wake of the strikes. However,Israeli forces launched another assault on 9/22,this time targeting a site outside DamascusInternational Airport. Later in the quarter, aSyrian antiaircraft battery fired on Israeli jetsflying in Lebanese air space (10/16), accordingto the Lebanese and international newsreports. Israeli forces then targeted the batterywith an air strike, causing a disputed amountof damage (the IDF said the battery wasdestroyed, while the Syrian army said it onlysuffered minor damage). After the exchange,the Syrian army warned (10/16) Israel of“dangerous consequences” should Israeli forcescontinue their forays into Syria.Amid the escalating tension over Israel’s

intervention in the Syrian civil war, therewere numerous reports of increasing Iranianinvolvement in s. Syria. These reports, which


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detailed alleged Iranian plans to build an airfieldnr. Damascus where its Islamic RevolutionaryGuard Corps (IRGC) could establish a moreformal presence, played to Israeli govt. fearsabout Iran’s intentions in the region and lentcredence to complaints about the 7/9 cease-fire(see JPS 47 [1]), with Iranian statementsunderscoring the tension. On a visit toDamascus on 10/18, Iranian gen. MohammadBaqeri said, “We are in Damascus to assert andcoordinate and cooperate to confront ourcommon enemies, the Zionists and terrorists.”Furthermore, the Associated Press reported(9/23) that the Iranian govt. and Hezbollahwere working together to broker arapprochement between Hamas and the Syriangovt., its former patron (Hamas was based inSyria until the outbreak of war in 2011).Two bouts of cross-border violence

ratcheted up tensions even more. On 10/19,a mortar fired from inside Syria landed in theIsraeli-controlled Golan Heights, causing nodamage or injuries. Israeli tanks then fired(10/19) on a Syrian army position nr. theIsraeli-occupied town of Qunaytra. Two dayslater, 5 projectiles fired from s. Syria landedin an open area in n. Israel, again causing nodamage or injuries. The IDF then shelled 3Syrian army targets nr. the border area. “Evenif this is just spillover, this is an exceptionalincident and the continuance of such eventswill be met with a more fierce Israeliresponse,” the IDF said (10/21). The Syriangovt. filed a complaint with the UN, accusingthe Israelis of coordinating with local “terrorgroups.” In an unusual escalation, IsraeliDM Lieberman accused (10/23) Hezbollah ofperpetrating the 10/21 attack. Later, Israelidefense sources said (10/23) that they couldnot certify Lieberman’s claim. “The remarksreflect the minister’s best judgment,” oneofficial said.

Meanwhile, the Israelis were appealing toboth the U.S. and Russia to alter the terms ofthe 7/9 cease-fire so as to marginalize Iranand its allies, to little avail. On 11/11, meetingon the sidelines of an economic conference inDa Nang, Vietnam, U.S. pres. Trump andRussian pres. Vladimir Putin issued a jointstatement. They reaffirmed the 7/7 agreementthat had resulted in the 7/9 cease-fire, decidedto “maintain open military channels ofcommunication,” agreed to continue theirefforts “until the final defeat of ISIS is achieved,”and, in the closest provision to a concessionto the Israeli position, they called for “thereduction, and ultimate elimination, offoreign forces and foreign fighters” in Syria.With conflicting reports and wide-ranging

speculation surrounding the statement, itwas unclear exactly what such a reductionwould entail. Some reports stated it appliedto Iranian-backed groups. Others suggestedthose groups would have to shift positions.One Israeli official said what had been agreedwas that the groups in question would bepermitted to maintain positions as close as5–7 km from the border with Israel. “Eventhough we view favorably the agreement onthe need to eliminate the foreign forces—namely, the Iranian forces, Hezbollah andthe [Shi‘ite] militias from the area, the testwill be on the ground, not in words but indeeds,” Israel’s intelligence minister Yisrael Katzcommented (11/13). That same day, Netanyahusaid that the IDF would continue operating inSyria “in accordance with our security needs”and with “the right combination of firmnessand responsibility.” As a U.S. delegationarrived (11/14) in Israel for talks on the Trump-Putin statement and the future of Iran-backedgroups in Syria, Russian FM Sergey Lavrovresponded to Netanyahu. Iran had a“legitimate” presence in Syria, he said, and



Russia would not commit to the removal ofIranian forces or Iran-backed groups.

LEBANON

Internal Lebanese politics became the focalpoint of longstanding regional tensions at theend of the quarter (see “Regional Affairs”below). But before PM Hariri’s unexpectedresignation in Riyadh on 11/4, tensions in ‘Aynal-Hilweh, the largest Palestinian refugee campin the country, again broke out into full-fledgedviolence.Earlier in the year, UNRWA had been

forced to temporarily suspend (2/25) servicesin the camp amid weeks of deadly clashesbetween Fatah security forces and armedIslamists led by Bilal Badr (see JPS 46 [4]).For 4 mos., an uneasy calm held in the camp.Then, on 8/17, armed fighters affiliatedwith Badr opened fire on a force of jointLebanese-Palestinian security troops thatwas established after the previous round ofclashes. Six Palestinians were killed and atleast 17 were injured in 1 week of fighting(8/17–23), prompting Hamas and Fatahofficials to hold an emergency meeting on8/22. According to Lebanon’s NationalNews Agency (NNA), there were more talkson a potential cease-fire on 8/23. By theend of that day, however, a “cautious calm”

had returned to the camp, with only a fewbreaches from occasional shelling and burstsof gunfire (NNA, 8/23).There were no further reports of violence in

the camp through the end of the quarter, butthere was 1 more noteworthy development: on11/13, Badr’s brother, Kamal Badr, turnedhimself into Lebanese armed forces at the s.entrance of the camp. It was unclear why he didso or if his incarceration would have any effecton the unrest in ‘Ayn al-Hilweh.

REGIONAL AFFAIRSThe growing rift between Iran and its

growing sphere of influence, on the one hand,and the Saudi-led so-called Sunni axis, onthe other, escalated further this quarter,with unresolved tensions over the previousquarter’s Saudi-led boycott of Qatar, whichhad repercussions as far away as Lebanon.As in previous quarters, the Saudi-Qatariconflict marginalized and divided thePalestinians and even threatened to upendthe faltering U.S. peace initiative and thePalestinian reconciliation process.Despite continued mediation efforts, the

boycott persisted throughout the quarter.In mid-8/2017, after a mbr. of the Qatari rulingfamily, Sheikh Abdullah al-Thani, met withSaudi crown prince Mohammad, the Saudigovt. announced it would make a partialexception to the boycott and allow Qataricitizens to make the annual pilgrimage toMecca. However, as al-Thani was part of abranch of the ruling family that had beenousted in a 1972 coup attempt, the Qatariestablishment appeared to interpret theconcession as a threat. Days later, Qatar’sForeign Ministry announced (8/24) that theemirate was reestablishing full diplomaticrelations with Iran. The Qatari amb. returnedto Tehran soon after the announcement, endingthe diplomatic impasse that had resulted fromSaudi Arabia’s execution of a prominent Shi‘itereligious figure in 1/2016 (see JPS 45 [3]).By mid-9/2017, there were signs that the

Qataris were interested in rolling back thetension. Two days after U.S. pres. Trumpoffered (9/7) to mediate in the crisis, Qatariemir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani called(9/9) Prince Mohammad and expressed thedesire to see the dispute between the 2 countriesresolved, in a gesture that marked the first


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high-level direct contact between the 2 sidessince the boycott went into effect on 6/5.However, any gains made by the call were lostby the end of the day. The Saudi Press Agencyinitially reported that Mohammad “welcomed”the emir’s sentiment. But after the state-runQatar News Agency reported that the 2 menstressed the need to resolve the crisis by way of aface-to-face “dialogue to ensure the unity andstability” of the Gulf states, the Saudi positionchanged. An official at the Saudi ForeignMinistry accused (9/9) the Qataris ofmisrepresenting Prince Mohammad’s position.“This proves that the authority in Qatar isnot serious . . . and continues its previouspolicies,” the official said. “The Kingdom ofSaudi Arabia declares that any dialogue orcommunication with the authority in Qatarshall be suspended until a clear statementexplaining its position is made in public.”As the boycott entered its fifth mo., 3

developments on 11/4 significantly ratchetedup tensions across the region. First, CrownPrince Mohammad was appointed by his father,Saudi monarch King Salman bin Abdulaziz, tolead a new Supreme Anti-Corruption Comm.,which resulted in the detention of more than200 mbrs. of the royal family, top officials,leading business figures, and other potentialrivals in a campaign that commentatorsdescribed as a major effort to consolidate thecrown prince’s own power base. Second, Houthifighters in Yemen fired a missile at Riyadh’sinternational airport, and although Saudiforces intercepted the missile before it couldcause any damage or injuries, they launched aseries of air strikes on Sanaa, causing unverifieddamage and injuries. “We see the [missile] as anact of war,” Saudi FM Adel al-Jubeir explained(11/6), accusing both Iran and Hezbollah ofsupporting the attack. “Iran cannot lob missilesat Saudi cities and towns and expect us not to

take steps.” Third, in a surprise move, LebanesePM Hariri announced his resignation fromRiyadh, saying he was afraid for his life andaccusing Iran of meddling in Lebanon.“When I took office, I promised you that Iwould seek to unite the Lebanese and endpolitical division . . . but I have been unable todo so. Despite my efforts, Iran continues toabuse Lebanon,” Hariri said, pointing to thegrowing influence of Hezbollah.Hariri’s resignation sent shockwaves across

the region. As the announcement was madein the Saudi capital and it aired on a Sauditelevision network, it sparked a wave ofspeculation about the possibility of Saudicoercion. After Lebanon’s pres. Michel Aouninitially requested (11/4) that Hariri stay onuntil a replacement could be found, his aidessaid (11/5) that the pres. would not acceptHariri’s resignation until he returned to Beirutto explain his reasons in person. Hezbollahsecy.-gen. Hasan Nasrallah went further,describing (11/4) the speculation over Saudicoercion as “legitimate” and suggesting thatHariri, a dual Lebanese-Saudi citizen, mighthave been caught up in the so-called anti-corruption crackdown. One Iranianspokesperson denied (11/4) Hariri’s accusationsas “unreal and baseless” and another echoed(11/4) Nasrallah: “Hariri’s resignation wasdone in coordination with Trump andMohammad bin Salman to foment tension inLebanon and the region.”Both the Palestinians and Israelis were

quickly embroiled in the evolving crisis. IsraeliPM Netanyahu, a de facto Saudi ally againstIran, said (11/4) that Hariri’s resignation was a“wake-up call” to the international communityto take action against Iran, “which is turningSyria into a second Lebanon.” According to areport on Israel’s Channel 10, Israel’s ForeignMinistry instructed (11/5) its ambassadors



around the world to lobby their host govts. infavor of the Saudi position. “[Recent events]should cause [the world] to increase thepressure on Iran and Hezbollah on a range ofissues, from ballistic missile production to itsefforts at regional subversion,” the memoreportedly stated.The Palestinian leadership in Ramallah also

toed the Saudi line. Days after Hariri’sresignation, PA pres. Abbas flew to Riyadh andmet with both King Salman (11/7) and PrinceMohammad (11/8). “The Palestinianleadership, as well as the Palestinian people,stand alongside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inthe face of attacks,” he said (11/8). King Salmanreaffirmed (11/7) his support for the Palestiniancause and his commitment to do “all that isrequired to bring about the establishment of anindependent Palestinian state with EastJerusalem as its capital.” However, Abbas’s tripto Riyadh drew comparisons to Hariri’spredicament, prompting speculation aboutSaudi intentions for the aging Palestinian leader.A senior White House official lent credence tothe rumors, saying that Abbas was told to either“accept Trump’s peace plan or quit,” accordingto an 11/12 report on Israel’s Channel 10. PLOExecutive Comm. mbr. Majdalani rejected thereport, calling the alleged ultimatum“fabricated, false, and untrue,” but his denial didnothing to quash the speculation that Abbaswould be the next Arab leader pushed aside inthe Saudi campaign for regional dominance.Through the end of the quarter, Hariri’s

predicament, and with it the future of Lebanonand the broader conflict between Saudi Arabiaand Iran, was in flux. “Everyone, I am just fine,”Hariri tweeted (11/14). “Inshallah, I will returnin 2 days.” It was still unclear, however, what theSaudi intentions were for Lebanon, howHezbollah and Iran might respond, or whetherHariri would follow through on his resignation.

By the end of the quarter on 11/15, Hariri hadstill not returned to Lebanon and was invited bythe French pres., Emmanuel Macron, to cometo France.

IRAN

After mos. of prevarication on the fate of the7/14/2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action(JCPOA), Trump took his first major step toabandon the Iran nuclear deal this quarter. TheIranian govt., for its part, continued to fulfill itsobligations under the JCPOA while exploringnew strategies to counter Trump’s saberrattling.Under U.S. law passed during the

negotiations to the JCPOA, the president wasrequired to certify to Congress every 3 mos. thatIran was upholding its commitments. Notdoing so would trigger a 60-day congressionalreview period, during which lawmakers wouldhave to decide whether or not to reimposesanctions on Iran, a move with the potential tosignificantly increase tensions in the MiddleEast and internationally. (Despite Trump’sfrequent promises on the campaign trail in 2016to dismantle the deal, U.S. secy. of state RexTillerson made the required certifications toCongress on 4/18 and 7/17—see JPS 46 [4] and47 [1]). As the quarter opened, however, Trumpwas increasingly dissatisfied with his admin.’sapproach and it remained unclear how hewould play his hand ahead of the nextcertification deadline on 10/15.In the opening weeks of the quarter, Trump

and his deputies tested out some new lines ofattack to undermine the JCPOA. Ahead of ameeting with International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) officials on 8/23, U.S. amb. tothe UN Nikki Haley said (8/22) that the Trumpadmin. was interested in inspections beingcarried out at specific Iranian military sites.“There were already issues in those locations, so


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are they including that in what they look at tomake sure that those issues no longer remain?”she said. No details of the 8/23 meeting weremade public, but an Iranian spokespersondismissed U.S. “dreams” of increasedinspections on 8/29: “We will not acceptanything outside [the JCPOA] from theAmericans—especially visits to military sites.”A few weeks later, IAEA chief Yukiya

Amano again verified (9/11) that Iran wasadhering to the JCPOA, and Reuters reported(9/12) that Trump was considering a new,more aggressive strategy for dealing with Iran.Defense Secy. James Mattis, Tillerson, andNational Security Advisor H. R. McMasterreportedly formulated a package of measures,including plans to counter alleged Iraniancyberattacks, as well as Iran’s support forso-called terrorist groups, and purportednuclear proliferation, and presented it to thepres. on 9/8. Trump deflected and revisitedthe “waive and slap” approach he had usedseveral times earlier in 2017. On 9/14, hisadmin. extended the suspension of nuclear-related sanctions on Iran in compliance withthe JCPOA, and had the Treasury Dept.announce (9/14) new sanctions on 11individuals and other entities alleged to besupporting the IRGC, or cyberattacksagainst the U.S.While Trump deliberated, Netanyahu

reportedly presented a different proposal duringa meeting with the U.S. pres. on the sidelines ofthe UNGA on 9/18. While details were notmade public, Netanyahu had said in BuenosAires on 9/12, “Our position is straightforward.This is a bad deal. Either fix it or cancel it.”Netanyahu found particularly problematic theJCPOA’s sunset clause, which he said (9/17)would “soon” allow Tehran access to “uraniumenrichment on an industrial scale for an arsenalof atom bombs.” Three days after the

Netanyahu-Trump meeting, Tillerson said(9/20) that the U.S. pres. had come to a decisionabout the 10/15 certification deadline.With the U.S. on a certain, yet undisclosed,

path, the Iranians opted for a show of force.In his address to the UNGA, Pres. HassanRouhani called (9/20) Trump’s rhetoric“ignorant, absurd, and hateful” and said itwould be a “great pity” if the JCPOA was“destroyed by rogue newcomers to the worldof politics.” Two days later, in a speech at amilitary parade, Rouhani pledged to strengthenIran’s ballistic missile program. “We willincrease our military power as a deterrent,”he said, as Iranian forces were showing off(9/22) a new ballistic missile with a purportedrange of 2,000 km, far enough to reach Israel.The next day, the Iranian press reported thatIranian forces had conducted a successfultest firing of the missile. In response, IsraeliDM Lieberman called (9/23) the test a“provocation and a slap in the face for theU.S. and its allies,” and Trump tweeted (9/23),“Iran just test-fired a Ballistic Missile capableof reaching Israel. They are also working withNorth Korea. Not much of an agreement wehave!”After the Washington Post reported (10/5)

that Trump was finally planning to “decertify”the deal, there were signs that Tehran wasinterested in de-escalating the situation.According to Western and Iranian officials,the Iranian govt. was open to talks on itsballistic missile program (Reuters, 10/6).“During their meeting on the sidelines of theUNGA last month, Iran told members of the[international community] that it could discussthe missile program to remove concerns,” anIranian official said. A former U.S. DefenseDept. official said, “Iran has put feelers outsaying it is willing to discuss its ballisticmissile program and is using contacts . . .



officials who were ‘holdovers’ from the Obamaadmin.” Later, an Iranian spokespersondismissed (10/6) the story and insisted themissile program was “nonnegotiable.”The following week, after the IAEA’s

Amano again confirmed (10/9) that Iran wascomplying with the JCPOA and UK PMTheresa May implored (10/9) Trump todefend it, Trump announced (10/13) that hewould not certify the deal by 10/15, triggeringthe abovementioned congressional reviewperiod. “I am directing my admin. to workclosely with Congress and our allies to addressthe deal’s many serious flaws so that the Iranianregime can never threaten the world withnuclear weapons,” he said. Trump alsoannounced (10/13) “tough” new sanctions onthe IRGC and urged U.S. allies to “join us intaking strong actions against Iran’s dangerousbehavior, including sanctions outside the[JCPOA] that target their ballistic missileprogram.”Congress was largely occupied by other

issues through the end of the quarter, but ahigh-profile debate over the future of theJCPOA was expected before the end of the60-day review period. Meanwhile, Rouhanithreatened (10/13) to expand Iran’s ballisticmissile program. Netanyahu said (10/15) thatTrump’s decision presented an opportunity to“fix” the JCPOA. May, Macron, and Germanchancellor Angela Merkel issued a statementsaying that they “stand committed” to theJCPOA (10/13). And finally, the IAEApublished (11/13) its quarterly assessment ofIranian adherence to the JCPOA, findingagain that Tehran remained in compliance.

Rebuilding Relations with Hamas

Following talks on a potentialrapprochement last quarter, leader of Hamasin Gaza Sinwar announced (8/23) that the

group had restored relations with Iran.“The relationship today is developing andreturning to what it was in the old days,” hesaid, referring to Iran’s patronage of Hamasbefore differences over the civil war in Syriacaused their estrangement in 2011. NeitherSinwar nor Iranian officials offered any detailson the nature of Iranian support for Hamas.Later in the quarter, after Israel conditionedits participation in any new negotiations withthe Palestinians on Hamas giving up its tieswith Iran (see “The Palestinian-IsraeliConflict” above), a Hamas delegation arrived(10/20) in Iran. One Hamas delegate said(10/20) that the group hoped to increasecooperation with Tehran and to “secureIranian financial and logistical support.”

TURKEY

The Turkish-Israeli rapprochement, whichwas sealed with the 2 countries’ 6/27/2016agreement to normalize relations (seeJPS 46 [1]), suffered a setback this quarterbecause of the 9/25 Kurdish independencereferendum. After 92% of Kurds voted infavor of independence, photos of Israeli flagsbeing waved at events celebrating the voteproliferated in the media. Turkish pres. RecepTayyip Erdoğan, who called the referenduma “threat to national security” for its potentialto embolden the Kurds in Turkey, threatenedto suspend (9/26) relations with Israel ifNetanyahu did not abandon his support foran independent Kurdish state. He also alleged(9/30) that the presence of the Israeli flagsshowed “one thing, that [the Kurdishleadership] has a history with Mossad, theyare hand-in-hand together.” Netanyahu denied(10/1) the accusation: “Israel played no partin the Turkish referendum, aside from thenatural, deep and long-standing sympathy theJewish people have for the Kurdish people


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and their aspirations.” Erdoğan repeated theclaim a few times, but took no further actionagainst Israel this quarter, opting instead towork with Iran and the Iraqi govt. to confrontKurdish separatists directly.

BAHRAIN

Amid the shifting regional dynamics,there were signs that Bahrain was ready tonormalize its relationship with Israel. On9/13, after Rabbi Marvin Hier had visitedBahrain, Prince Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa,the son of Bahrain’s monarch, visited theSimon Wiesenthal Center (SWC) in LosAngeles. The center was holding an event,titled “This Is Bahrain,” celebrating religiousfreedom and coexistence. There, SWC leadersHier and Rabbi Abraham Cooper recounteda meeting they had held with King Hamadbin Isa Al Khalifa earlier in 2017. They statedthat Al Khalifa had denounced the Arabboycott of Israel and decided to allowBahraini citizens to visit Israel, despite theabsence of Israeli-Bahraini diplomatic ties.Of particular interest is the fact that Hier

and SWC helped build the Museum ofTolerance in Jerusalem, amid years-longprotests and court cases: it was built atop theMamilla Cemetery, a Muslim site so old somecontemporaries of the ProphetMuhammad hadreportedly been buried there before their tombswere moved to make way for the museum.On 9/23, Bahraini and Western officials said

that Israel and Bahrain were on the verge ofnormalizing their relationship, in part, due totheir shared antipathy toward Iran.This was not the first time King Hamad

signaled a desire for better relations withIsrael. According to cables published byWikiLeaks in 2011, Hamad reportedly toldthe U.S. amb. to Bahrain in 2005 that hewould be willing to move beyond the then

secret “intelligence/security” coordinationwith Israel, but that he opposed the prospectof commercial relations with Israel until theestablishment of an independent Palestinianstate (Haaretz, 4/8/11).

INTERNATIONAL

UNITED STATES

Trump’s Ambassador on Settlements

U.S. amb. to Israel Friedman and hisexplicit pro-settlement views threatened toundermine Pres. Trump’s relationship withthe Palestinians and his broader peace initiativein 9/2017. When Friedman described Israel’soccupation of Palestinian land as “alleged” inan interview with the Jerusalem Post on 9/1,it threw into question the Trump admin.’sposition on a key aspect of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and drew harsh criticism fromthe Palestinians. The controversy grew until aState Dept. spokesperson clarified (9/7) thatFriedman’s comments “do not represent ashift in U.S. policy.” Later in the mo., however,Friedman made (9/28) another egregiousassertion about the “alleged” occupation in aninterview with the Israeli television channel,Walla. “I think the settlements are part ofIsrael,” he said. “The existing borders, the1967 borders, were viewed by everybody asnot secure, so Israel would retain ameaningful portion of the West Bank, and itwould return that which it didn’t need forpeace and security. So, there was alwayssupposed to be some notion of expansion intothe West Bank, but not necessarily expansioninto the entire West Bank.” Hours later, aState Dept. spokesperson disavowed Friedmanagain. “His comments—and I want to becrystal clear about this—should not be readas a way to prejudge the outcome of any



negotiations that the U.S. would have with theIsraelis and the Palestinians.” By the end of thequarter, however, it was reported that Trumphad appointed Friedman to the small group incharge of drafting his plan for peace betweenthe Palestinians and Israelis (see “The TrumpInitiative” above).

Legislative Backlash against BDS

The highest-profile battles over the growingBDS movement primarily played out at stateand municipal levels this quarter. In Maryland,where activists defeated anti-BDS proposals inthe state legislature in 2015, 2016, and earlierthis year, Gov. Larry Hogan signed (10/23) anexecutive order barring the state from enteringinto contracts with companies unless theycertified in writing that they were not engagedin a boycott of Israel. He also called on thetrustees of the Maryland State Retirement andPension System to divest from any companieswith holdings in entities that participate in BDS.“The goals of [the BDS] movement run counterto the strong economic relationship thatMaryland has sustained with our friends andpartners in Israel,” Hogan said (10/23). Thenext week, Wisconsin gov. Scott Walkerfollowed suit (10/27), signing an executiveorder barring state agencies from contractingwith companies that boycott Israel. WithWalker’s order, Wisconsin became the 24thstate with an anti-BDS law or executive orderon the books.Since the legislative crackdown on BDS

began in 2014, activists have argued that themeasures being used against individuals andentities participating in BDS infringe on theFirst Amendment right to free speech (e.g., theAmerican Civil Liberties Union [ACLU] filed alawsuit challenging the new anti-BDS law inKansas on 10/11). However, broader publicconversations over how these measures actually

work were relatively infrequent until thisquarter, when controversy broke out in Texas inthe wake of Hurricane Harvey, a massive stormthat devastated Houston in late 8/2017.Starting on 10/20, dozens of U.S. media

outlets picked up on the story that the cityof Dickinson, a suburb of Houston, requiredhurricane victims applying for emergencyrelief grants to sign a waiver stating thatthey do not support boycotts of Israel. Cityofficials explained that the followingprovision was added to the application formsto accommodate Texas’s new anti-BDS law,which passed on 5/2/2017 (see JPS 47 [4]):“By executing this Agreement below, theApplicant verifies that the Applicant: (1) doesnot boycott Israel; and (2) will not boycottIsrael during the term of this Agreement.”The ACLU was quick to condemn the move.“The First Amendment protects Americans’right to boycott, and the govt. cannotcondition hurricane relief or any otherpublic benefit on a commitment to refrainfrom protected political expression,” said theorganization’s Texas Legal Dir. Andre Segura(10/20). Phil King, the Texas state legislatorwho spearheaded the anti-BDS legislation,said (10/21) that Dickinson officials werelikely misreading the law, which barredstate entities from contracting with businessesthat boycott Israel. After 4 days of outcryand debate over the rights of BDS activists, theDickinson City Council voted (10/24) toremove the anti-BDS requirement from theapplication.Likewise, a development in the race for the

governorship of Illinois threw the debate overBDS into the spotlight once again. On 9/6,Democratic candidate and State Sen. DanielBiss announced that he had made the “difficult”decision to drop Chicago alderman CarlosRamirez-Rosa from his ticket over his support


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for BDS. “While I was honored to be chosenas Sen. Daniel Biss’s gubernatorial runningmate, it became clear over the past few days thatwhile we share a total commitment to peace,security, and statehood for the Israeli andPalestinian people, and both oppose pursuingBDS at the state level, the difference of opinionwe have on the role the BDS movement playsat the federal level would make it impossibleto continue moving forward as a ticket,”Ramirez-Rosa wrote (9/6) on Facebook. Bisshad chosen Ramirez-Rosa, a Bernie Sandersdelegate in 2016 and a mbr. of the DemocraticSocialists of America, as his running mate onlya week earlier, and the selection galvanizedprogressives in Chicago. Over the course ofthat week, however, pro-Israel and anti-BDSforces rallied against Ramirez-Rosa. On 9/3,for example, Illinois congressman BradSchneider withdrew his support from the Bisscampaign over Ramirez-Rosa’s support for theBDS movement.

Aid to Egypt

Since the ouster of Egyptian pres. HosniMubarak in 2011, U.S. aid to Egypt has beenin flux. This quarter, as Congress wasdeliberating 2018 humanitarian and economicaid to Cairo, the Trump admin. took its firststep toward establishing its position on theissue. On 8/22, 2 U.S. sources said the Trumpadmin. had decided to withhold approximately$290 m. in aid because the Egyptian govt. hadfailed to make adequate progress on democraticreforms ($195 m. was reportedly suspended,while $95.7 m. was cut altogether). The decisionwas partly a response to Egyptian pres. al-Sisi’sdecision to approve a law imposing additionalrestrictions on NGOs on 5/30/2017, they said.The decision led to a brief period of tension

between Egypt and the U.S. On 8/23, theEgyptian govt. canceled a meeting between

Egyptian FM Sameh Shoukry and Kushner,Trump’s senior advisor and son-in-law, whowas in Cairo for talks on the Trump peaceinitiative. “Egypt sees [the aid reduction] asreflecting poor judgment of the strategicrelationship that ties the 2 countries over longdecades and as adopting a view that lacks anaccurate understanding of the importance ofsupporting Egypt’s stability,” the ForeignMinistry in Cairo stated (8/23). However,Kushner still met with al-Sisi later that day,and Trump personally called al-Sisi the nextday to reaffirm “the strength and friendshipbetween Egypt and the U.S.,” according to astatement from al-Sisi’s office.The next mo., the tension was all but gone.

On the sidelines of the UNGA in New York,Trump had a friendly meeting with al-Sisi on9/20 and said he would “consider” unfreezingthe $195 m. At the same time, a White Houseofficial said (9/20) that $20 m. of withheldpayment to Egypt was redirected to the PAfor wastewater projects.

UNITED NATIONS

UNHRC

As the quarter opened, it had been morethan a year since the UN Human RightsCouncil approved a resolution calling forthe creation of a database, or “blacklist,” ofcompanies that operate in Israel’s settlements(see JPS 45 [4]). UN High Commissioner forHuman Rights Zeid Ra‘ad Al Hussein hadalready delayed publication of the so-calledblacklist once in 2017, in part due to U.S.pressure, according to Western diplomats(Washington Post, 8/21), but he wasreportedly intent on publishing it by theend of the year. In preparation, Al Husseinsent out a draft list to the govts. of countrieswhere listed companies were based in 8/2017,



seeking their comments by 9/1. Accordingto a report in Haaretz on 9/28, Al Husseinsent similar letters to the listed companiesthemselves in mid-9/2017. Senior Israeliofficials and Western diplomats said (9/28)that 150 companies were contacted, includingapproximately 30 based in the U.S. and 75 inIsrael, including global firms such asCaterpillar, Priceline.com, TripAdvisor, andAirbnb.As the end-of-year publication deadline

approached, both the U.S. and Israel rampedup their efforts to scuttle the project.They were likely motivated by the fact that

the blacklist was already having an effect.Senior Israeli officials said (9/28) that theOffice of Strategic Affairs at Israel’s Ministryfor Economic Affairs had learned that severalof the companies included on the draft listhad already informed Al Hussein of theirintentions not to renew contracts or sign newones in Israel. “Foreign companies will notinvest in something that reeks of politicalproblems,” one Israeli official said (9/28).“This could snowball.”

UNRWA

At the end of the previous quarter, on8/14, the United Nations Relief and WorksAgency (UNRWA) announced an indefinitesuspension of intakes of new patients for ear,nose, and throat treatments, cold ailments,and childbirths at its hospital in Qalqilya,pending an investigation into the recent deathof a Palestinian child at the facility. “Intenseefforts to reform the Qalqilya hospital havenot been successful in the past years and theAgency is no longer able to ensure thatmedical services provided in the hospital meetthe required health care standards,” an 8/14statement from UNRWA read. The PAMinistry of Health strongly condemned the

suspension of services, calling (8/14) onUNRWA to keep the hospital open “asrequired by international laws andresolutions.” The suspension also sparked awave of protests from the Palestinian public.For weeks after it went into effect on 8/21,Palestinians gathered outside the hospital forsit-ins and other demonstrations. AlthoughUNRWA had not reversed its decision byquarter’s end, the agency repeatedly reaffirmed(8/21) its commitment to “delivering healthand other services to Palestine refugees . . .including those residing in Qalqilya.”

UNIFIL

The Israeli effort to undermine Hezbollahin the diplomatic arena took on a newdimension this quarter. Israeli officials werealready calling for international attention toHezbollah’s alleged arms stockpiling and itsconstruction of a new weapons productionfacility in s. Lebanon, allegedly with Iraniansupport. In 8/2017, Israeli and U.S. leaderscited these issues in a campaign to alter themandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon(UNIFIL), giving the 10,500-strongpeacekeeping force more authority to policeHezbollah.As the 8/31 UNSC deadline to renew

UNIFIL’s annual mandate approached, UNIFILcommander Maj. Gen. Michael Beary rejected(8/23) the allegations that Hezbollah wasstockpiling weapons, explaining that his troopshad not come across any evidence to supportthe claims. In response, U.S. amb. to the UNHaley accused (8/25) Beary of ignoring theproblem, and Israeli PM Netanyahu raised theissue of Hezbollah with UN secy.-gen. Guterresduring a meeting on 8/28.The UNSC ultimately renewed (8/30)

UNIFIL’s mandate for another year with newlanguage authorizing more joint border patrols


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with Lebanese armed forces and requiringUNIFIL to file “prompt and detailed” reportswhenever its troops encounter Hezbollahroadblocks. Israel’s amb. to the UN DannyDanon welcomed (8/30) the decision, andIsrael’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs thanked theTrump admin. for its “leadership” in pushingfor the change. It was later reported (9/5) thatRussian diplomats were instrumental incountering the U.S. and Israeli efforts. Theyreportedly secured the removal of large portionsof Israel- and U.S.-proposed text that wouldhave expanded UNIFIL’s mission further.

UNESCO

On 10/12, a State Dept. spokespersonannounced that the U.S. was withdrawing fromthe UN Educational, Scientific, and CulturalOrganization (UNESCO). The announcementcame 6 years after U.S. pres. Obama hadpresided over an indefinite suspension in U.S.support for the organization, triggered by a U.S.law barring support for UN agencies and bodiesthat admit Palestine as a mbr. (UNESCO votedto admit Palestine in 10/2011; see JPS 41 [2]).Explaining the withdrawal, the spokespersoncited (10/12) the $550 m. that the U.S. owed inunpaid dues and UNESCO’s alleged anti-Israelbias. Shortly after the announcement,Netanyahu praised (10/12) the move as “braveand moral” and pledged to withdraw Israelfrom UNESCO as well.

World Tourism Organization

The UN’s World Tourism Organization(WTO) announced (9/13) that a vote on thePalestinian bid for membership, which wassubmitted in 9/2016 and on the agenda for theWTO’s 9/2017 general assembly in Chengdu,was being delayed until the next WTO meetingdue to be held in 2019. According to seniorIsraeli and U.S. officials on 9/13, the

Palestinians decided to suspend their bid afterU.S. officials insisted that it violated PA pres.Abbas’s pledge to refrain from unilateral movesat international forums (see “The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict” above).

INTERNATIONAL SOCCER

International soccer’s governing body,the Fédération Internationale de FootballAssociation (FIFA), delivered its final rulingon the Palestinian attempt to get Israelsuspended from international competitionthis quarter. For years, the Palestinians hadpushed for FIFA to enforce its own rules thatbar one national association from holdingmatches on the territory of another withoutpermission, citing the presence of 6 IsraelFootball Association (IFA)-sanctioned teamsin Israel’s West Bank settlements. On 10/27,however, the FIFA Council decided thatany “interference” might “aggravate” thesituation. “Given that the final status ofthe West Bank territories is the concern ofthe competent international public lawauthorities, the FIFA Council agrees thatFIFA, in line with the general principleestablished in its Statutes, must remainneutral with regard to political matters,”the Council ruled, according to a 10/27statement.At the same time, the Council decided (10/27)

that its monitoring comm., which wasestablished as a compromise measure in 2015(see JPS 45 [1]), would continue working to“facilitate the movement of players, officials,and football equipment in, out of, and withinPalestine.”IFA pres. Ofer Eini, who orchestrated the

Israeli efforts to undermine the Palestiniancampaign, celebrated (10/27) the decision asa “significant achievement.” The PalestinianFootball Association (PFA) criticized the



decision, but had already escalated the disputeto the relevant international court. After FIFAyielded to Israeli pressure and removed a debateon the Palestinian complaints from the FIFACongress’s agenda in 5/2017 (see JPS 46 [4]),the PFA filed an appeal with the Court ofArbitration for Sport (CAS). On 11/6, the CASannounced that its panel would hear the case on11/27, and a final ruling was expected in early12/2017.

INTERPOL

Despite Israeli and U.S. pressure to delay orsuspend the vote, Interpol’s general assemblyapproved Palestine’s petition for fullmembership on 9/27, with 75 mbr. states infavor, 24 against, and 34 abstaining. PA PMHamdallah lauded the decision as a “victory forthe Palestinian people,” and the PA put out astatement saying, “The State of Palestineconsiders this membership and theresponsibilities that it entails as an integral partof its responsibility towards the Palestinianpeople and a moral commitment to the citizensof the world.”However, there were indications that the U.S.,

Israel, and their allies in the internationalcommunity would still be able to obstructPalestinian participation in the internationalpolice organization. U.S. sen. Ben Cardin(D-MD), the top-ranking Democrat on theSenate Foreign Relations Comm., said (9/27)that he was concerned that the Palestinianswould be able to issue Interpol “red notices,”which function similarly to international arrestwarrants. The U.S., Israel, and many othercountries would not recognize the Palestinianred notices, according to Cardin. In a statementresponding to Cardin, Interpol pointed out keydifferences between red notices and arrestwarrants. The notices are merely meant as alertsto other countries, the statement said. They are

nonbinding, and each mbr. has the authorityto decide how to respond to them.

EUROPE

Following persistent reports of Israeli forcesconfiscating EU-funded constructionmaterials and demolishing EU-supportedinfrastructure projects in the West Bank,8 European govts. signed onto a letterdemanding that the Israeli govt. pay themmore than €30,000 (approx. $35,400) incompensation, according to Palestinian andEU officials (10/19). The Belgian govt.reportedly orchestrated the effort, withFrance, Spain, Sweden, Luxembourg, Italy,Ireland, and Denmark participating.European diplomats coordinated the measureafter their Israeli counterparts rejected aninformal request for compensation during ameeting in 9/2017. The Israelis reportedlyargued that the Europeans were facilitatingillegal development in Area C of the WestBank, and that their support did notconstitute humanitarian aid (Haaretz, 10/19).

AFRICA

Netanyahu’s outreach efforts on the Africancontinent suffered a setback this quarter.On 9/11, the Jerusalem Post reported thatthe Africa-Israel Summit, which in manyways was the culmination of Netanyahu’sdiplomatic campaign, had been indefinitelypostponed. The summit’s organizersexpected the heads of state from more than24 countries and representatives fromapproximately 150 Israeli companies tocome together in Lomé, the capital of Togo,on 10/23–27. While Israeli news outlets andsome Israeli officials pointed to politicalunrest in Togo, the postponement cameamid a growing pushback on the Israelioutreach efforts. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia,


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Mauritania, Sudan, and South Africa hadannounced they would be boycotting thesummit in solidarity with the Palestinians.Although the summit was a failure, the

Israelis were undeterred from pursuing theirbroader goals. In an interview with the Times ofIsrael on 9/14, the dir.-gen. of Israel’s Ministryof Foreign Affairs, Yuval Rotem, said thatpostponement actually showed that the Israeliefforts were working. “This is actually aparadox: if [our journey] wasn’t so successful,[the opposition] wouldn’t be so significant” (seeJPS 46 [1] and 47 [1] for more on Israel’soutreach to Africa).

DONORSThe Ad Hoc Liaison Comm., the main

policy-level coordination mechanism fordevelopment assistance to the Palestinians,convened on the sidelines of the UNGA inNew York on 9/18. Hosted by UN undersecy.-gen. Jeffrey Feltman, the attendees includedrepresentatives from the PA, Israel, theInternational Monetary Fund, World Bank,and the Middle East Quartet, as well as UNSpecial Coordinator Mladenov. In conclusion,the meeting’s chair and Norwegian FM BørgeBrende called for “concerted action” in 3 keyareas: fiscal sustainability, economicdevelopment, and reconstruction andrecovery efforts in Gaza. He also specificallywelcomed the Egyptian govt.’s efforts tofacilitate the return of the PA to Gaza (see“Intra-Palestinian Dynamics” above).There were announcements of new

international aid allocations to the Palestiniansthroughout the quarter, but no major increase inassociated dollar amounts. The biggest came on8/17, when a Palestinian official said that theUAE and a number of other donor countries

had agreed to provide $15 m. per mo. to fundprojects improving humanitarian conditionsin Gaza. He said that the money would beadministered by a new body, known as thePalestinian Joint Liability Comm., underEgyptian supervision, and that the comm. wasestablished in the wake of the agreementbetween Hamas and exiled Fatah leaderDahlan in 6/2017 (see JPS 47 [1]). Separately,Saudi Arabia transferred (8/21) $30.8 m. tothe PA to cover its monthly aid obligations from4/2017 to 7/2017. The EU made its quarterlypayment of €20 m. (approx. $23.4 m.) to thePA to impoverished families in the oPt. UNsecy.-gen. Guterres released (8/30) $4 m. fromthe UN’s Central Emergency Response Fundto support ongoing UN operations in Gaza.Japan agreed to give $3.2 m. (10/9) to theWorld Food Program projects in Gaza and$1 m. (10/5) for the construction of 2 wastedisposal stations in the West Bank.As in previous quarters, many

announcements of new aid for the Palestinianscame via UNRWA. The U.S. made (8/18) itsannual pledge of $2 m. to the agency. TheKuwaiti amb. to Jordan handed over (8/18) acheck worth $200,000, fulfilling a pledgemade on 5/21/2017. The development arm ofthe Organization of Petroleum ExportingCountries (Fund for InternationalDevelopment) committed (9/13) $1 m. toUNRWA’s education system in East Jerusalem.The EU agreed to provide (10/10) €9.5 m.(approx. $11.1 m.) as an emergency supplementto its €82 m. (approx. $99 m.) pledge for theagency’s core programs earlier this year.Austria contributed (9/22) €1.5 m. (approx.$1.8 m.) to support the agency’s health programsin the oPt. Japan gave approx. $10.2 m. (9/27) toa variety of programs across the oPt and $3 m.(9/8) to the agency’s humanitarian responseefforts following the clashes in Lebanon’s



‘Ayn al-Hilweh r.c. (see “Lebanon” above).Finally, the UK-based Al-Khair Foundationdonated (11/13) $40,000 to fund psychosocialactivities for individuals traumatized by the 3Israeli assaults on Gaza since 2008.

BOYCOTT, DIVESTMENT,SANCTIONS

Over 170 Palestinian civil society groupslaunched the Boycott, Divestment andSanctions (BDS) movement in 2005. Its aim isto create an international campaign of boycotts,divestments, and sanctions against Israel “untilit complies with international law andPalestinian rights.”

BOYCOTT

Canada was a hotbed of boycott-relatedactivity this quarter. Unifor National, thecountry’s largest private-sector trade union,endorsed BDS at its annual convention inWinnipeg on 8/18–20. The organizationspecifically called for BDS actions with regard to“sectors of Israel’s economy and society [that]profit from the ongoing occupation of theoccupied Palestinian territories.” Then, on 11/5,the Canadian BDS Coalition announced that AirCanada’s “five-year, multi-million-dollarcontract with Israel Aerospace Industries BedekAviation Group for heavy maintenance on AirCanada Boeing 767 jets was terminated in ‘early2017,’ with 2 years remaining.” According to areport at the Electronic Intifada, the contract wasworth tens of millions of dollars, and the#AirCanadaComplicity campaign won thesupport of trade unions and Palestinian solidaritygroups across Canada. Air Canada, the country’slargest airline, reportedly told the activists thatthe work was being transferred to anothercontractor, but didn’t offer an explanation.

There were a handful of boycott-relateddevelopments elsewhere in the world as well.On World Photography Day (8/19), a groupof more than 40 Portuguese photographers aswell as photography teachers and studentstook a pledge not to accept professionalinvitations or financing from Israel and torefuse partnerships with Israeli culturalinstitutions complicit in the occupation. On9/25, the Palestine Support Network Australia(PSNA) announced that the Royal FlyingDoctor Service South Eastern Section, whichdelivers health care in the Australian outback,canceled a planned partnership with ElbitSystems, an Israeli arms maker, following an18-mo. PSNA-led boycott campaign. Leadingup to the Round Tables culinary festival (11/5–10), which features internationallyrenowned chefs cooking in Tel Avivrestaurants, Irish chef JP McMahon andPeruvian chef Mitsuharu Tsumura withdrewfrom the event following appeals from BDSactivists not to participate in “culinarypropaganda.” Finally, Jordan BDS reported(10/3) that the local branch of UN Womenwas dropping its contracts with G4S, makingit the 5th UN agency based in Jordan to cutties with the UK security contractor.

DIVESTMENT

The University of Michigan’s (UM) centralstudent govt. passed (11/15) a resolution callingon the Board of Regents to assemble a comm. toinvestigate the university’s investments in 3companies complicit in Israel’s occupation ofPalestinian lands—Boeing, Hewlett PackardEnterprise, and United Technologies. BDSactivists at UM have been pushing for adivestment resolution since at least 2014. Eachprevious attempt failed, in part, because ofintervention from pro-Israel groups outside theschool.


Winter 2018 || 143

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