urban w arfare study: city case studies compilation · urban warfare study: city case studies...

MARINE CORPSINTELLIGENCEACTIVITY

Urban Warfar e Study:City Case Studies

Compilation

April 1999

Urban Warfare Study: City Case Studies Compilation

This is a Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Publication

Information Cutoff Date: 1 February 1999

Prepared by: Intelligence Production Division Regional Analysis Branch Europe/Eurasia Section DSN: 278-6156 COMM: (703) 784-6156

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity ATTN: MCIA 04 Quantico, Virginia 22134-5011 DSN: 278-6126 COMM: (703) 784-6126

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section 1 - Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Lessons Learned. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Strategic Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Operational Lessons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Tactical Lessons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Technical Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Section 2 - Russian Experience in Chechnya. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Strategic Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Operational Lessons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Tactical Lessons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Technical Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Section 3 - Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE:Israel’s Intervention into Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21





Section 4 - British Experience in Northern Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35





Section 1Introduction

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Background

As the forward deployed expeditionary element ofUnited States military power, the United States MarineCorps (USMC) must be prepared to react quickly andeffectively in the most unconventional of theaters.Given this unique warfighting mission, the MarineCorps has had much experience throughout its historyoperating in urban environments. In this decade alone,Marines have deployed in several major peacekeepingoperations; all have required a concentration of forcein major urban centers. Operations in Somalia, Haiti,and Bosnia have proven that military operations onurbanized terrain (MOUT) are complex and challeng-ing. Preparing for the demands of urban operationsrequires continual innovations in strategy, operations,tactics, and technology.

In the future, Marine will face urban environment situ-ations where different categories and activities will beconducted concurrently. Missions such as humanitar-ian assistance operations; peace operations; and full-scale, high-intensity combat may occur simulta-neously within three city blocks. The Commandant ofthe Marine Corps has labeled this concept the “threecity block war.” Integrating and coordinating thesevarying missions — each of which has its own opera-tional characteristics — will challenge Marines to usetheir skill and determination in imaginative ways. Thepresence of large numbers of noncombatants and thepotential difficulty in distinguishing noncombatantsfrom hostile forces will further complicate the task ofoperating in the urban environment.

The Marine Corps has recognized these challengesand is staging URBAN WARRIOR exercises to testnew tactics and equipment designed to make theUSMC the leading U.S. force in MOUT. For example,

as part of URBAN WARRIOR, the Marine CorpWarfighting Lab (MCWL) has sponsored:

■ Three URBAN WARRIOR Limited ObjectiveExperiments that examined small unit combinearms operations in the urban environment;

■ Military Operations on Urbanized TerrainAdvanced Concept Technology Demonstratio(MOUT ACTD) experiments that examined the usof man-portable shields and breaching technogies; and

■ The first Responder LTA, a medical assessmeexamining new tactical possibilities for hospitacorpsmen in urban warfare.

Overview

In 1997, in light of the probability of future operationin urban environments, the Marine Corps IntelligenActivity (MCIA) was tasked to provide a preliminaryassessment of urban warfare lessons learned in supof the CSEEA Joint Wargame. Three scenarios acrthe spectrum of conflict from mid- to low-intensitywere chosen to represent urban operations. The sons are drawn from:

■ Russian military operations in urban areas Chechnya (with focus on the fighting in Groznybetween 1994 and 1996;

■ Israeli experiences operating in urbanized southLebanon during Operation PEACE FOR GALILEEin 1982; and

■ British military experiences in Northern Irelanfrom 1969 to 1996, with special emphasis on tperiod 1969 to 1976 when the British Army had thlead in security operations.

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Lessons Learned

Analysis of the Russian, Israeli, and British militaryoperations in urban terrain yielded the following overallstrategic, operational, tactical, and technical lessons.

Strategic Lessons

❏ Military action cannot solve deep-seated politicalproblems, but can buy time for politicians tosearch for political solutions.

❏ It is difficult to get well-defined policy objectives towhich the military can work steadily and logically.

❏ Contrary to expectations, urban operations areneither short-lived nor low cost.

❏ Lines of command and control are often unclearand/or conflicting in urban operations, especiallywhen police and military units are intermingled.

❏ Problems with disjointed command structurescan be exacerbated by too much senior leader-ship at the operational level.

❏ Operations can also suffer when there is a lack ofcontinuity in the senior command structure.

❏ Local paramilitary forces are likely to receiveoutside assistance.

❏ Concern for civilian causalities and propertydamage declines as casualties among securityforces rise.

❏ When security operations begin to achieveresults, the enemy may start attacking targets inthe security forces’ homeland and/or their per-sonnel stationed abroad.

❏ Paramilitary operations more often aim at achiev-ing political advantage rather than military results.

❏ A distinct advantage accrues to the side with lessconcern for the safety of the civilian population.

Operational Lessons

❏ It is important to have a well-developed militarydoctrine for urban operations, but that is notenough in and of itself.

❏ Situation-oriented training in urban warfare andtactics greatly improves military effectivenessand reduces losses.

❏ Clear rules of engagement are essential in urbcombat situations.

❏ Even clear rules of engagement, however, asometimes difficult to enforce, especially in thface of mounting losses among the security forc

❏ The tempo of operations in an urban enviroment is so intense that personnel tend to “buout” quickly.

❏ Overwhelming firepower can make up for organzational and tactical deficiencies in the short-runone is willing to disregard collateral damage.

❏ Urban combat is extremely manpower-intensivand produces significant attrition of men anmateriel among the attackers.

❏ Psychological operations are a key element any military operation in an urban environment

❏ Urban operations are very infantry-intensivaffairs that produce large numbers of causalitie

❏ Urban operations usually stress the logistics systbecause of unusual requirements and abnormhigh consumption rates in some classes of suppl

❏ The spatial qualities and perspective of urband conventional warfare differ — urban combis vertical in nature, whereas conventional combat is horizontal.

❏ Special forces are useful in urban settings, bare often misused because conventional focommanders do not understand how to use scial skills effectively.

❏ The large-scale movement of urban non-combants can significantly hinder military operations

❏ Noncombatants cannot be counted upon behave sensibly.

❏ Strategic bombing and close air support can be uto shape the battlefield, even in an urban setting.

❏ Standard military unit configurations are ofteinappropriate for urban combat.

❏ Failure to understand the importance of civaffairs can carry a high price.

❏ Amphibious operations can have an importarole in urban warfare — especially in achievintactical surprise.

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Tactical Lessons

❏ Rigorous communications security is essential,even against relatively primitive enemies.

❏ Night operations are especially difficult to carryout in an urban setting.

❏ Forces operating in cities need special equip-ment not in standard tables of organizationand equipment.

❏ Tanks and armored personnel carriers cannotoperate in cities without extensive dismountedinfantry support.

❏ Trained snipers are very cost effective, but likelyto be in short supply.

❏ If patrolling is central to the strategy of the secu-rity forces, it will be different from conventionalcombat patrolling and must be well coordinated.

❏ Fratricide is a serious problem in cities because itis harder to identify friend from foe.

❏ Major civilian structures in cities (e.g., hospitals,churches, banks, embassies) are situated in tacti-cally useful locations, command key intersec-tions, and/or are built of especially solidconstruction. Therefore, such facilities are espe-cially useful to urban defenders.

❏ Direct-fire artillery can be a valuable tool inurban combat, provided collateral damage is nota major concern.

❏ Small unit leadership, especially at the juniornon-commissioned officer level, is critical to tac-tical success in urban operations.

❏ Recovering damaged armored vehicles is moredifficult in urban areas.

❏ Intelligence, especially from human sources, iscritical to successful urban operations.

❏ Hit-and-run ambushes by small groups are thefavorite tactic of urban paramilitary forces.

❏ Tracked vehicles are preferable to wheeled vehi-cles in situations where large amounts of rubblelitter the streets. Otherwise, wheeled armoredvehicles are preferable.

❏ Helicopters are not well suited for urban combat,but are quite useful in redeploying forces and sup-plies to just behind the forward edge of operations.

❏ Soldier loads must be dramatically reduced becaurban warfare requires greater individual agility.

❏ Soldiers sometimes either deliberately misusemodify non-lethal technologies to make themore harmful than intended by their designers.

❏ Very accurate and up-to-date maps are essenfor successful urban operations.

❏ Shock value of artillery fire diminishes over time

Technical Lessons

❏ Some military equipment will probably have tbe modified in the field to counter enemy tactiand equipment.

❏ Small arms, though not decisive, play a disprportionately significant role in the outcome ourban battles.

❏ Individual flak jackets significantly reduce urbacasualties.

❏ Smoke enhances survivability in urban situationbut carries significant operational penalties (e.impedes visual communications, taxes drivinskills of vehicle operators, and slows the overrate of advance).

❏ Mortars are highly regarded by both attackeand defenders in urban operations, but may less effective than anticipated.

❏ Machineguns may be more valuable than assarifles for urban combat.

❏ Air defense guns are valuable for suppressiground targets.

❏ Heavy machineguns still offer good defensagainst close air attack, especially helicopters.

❏ Commercial off-the-shelf technologies can bemployed successfully for military purposes icities.

❏ Rocket propelled grenades are omnipresent avery effective weapons in urban combat.

❏ Armored vehicles require more protection wheoperating in cities and have a different distribtion than for a conventional battlefield.

❏ Remotely piloted vehicles can provide real-timintelligence, but analysts have considerable difculty achieving accurate interpretation.

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❏ The enemy often employs homemade weapons —even chemical weapons — against security forces.

❏ Lightly protected armored vehicles have limitedvalue in urban terrain.

❏ Combat engineering equipment, especially armoredbulldozers, is a critical asset in urban combat.

❏ Cluster munitions are very effective in cities, pro-vided collateral damage is not a major concern.

❏ Although available, artillery-fired precision-guidedmunitions were seldom used in urban operations.

❏ Air-delivered precision-guided munitions weremore commonly employed than artillery-firedprecision-guided munitions when not hamperedby bad weather.

❏ Bunker-busting weapons are invaluable forurban warfare.

❏ Non-lethal technologies were seldom used forurban combat missions; instead, they wereemployed for crowd control and riot suppression.

❏ Extensive use of non-lethal weapons can becomecounterproductive because demonstrators canbuild up an immunity to their effects, especiallythe shock value of such weapons.

❏ Conventional military radios are likely unsuit-able for urban operations and work poorly inbuilt-up areas.

Conclusion

In the future, U.S. forces are likely to engage in low- tomid-intensity operations in developing or underdevel-oped parts of the world. It is also likely that a large per-centage of these operations will draw U.S. forces intoMOUT. According to United Nations estimates, theurban population of developing countries worldwideincreases by about 150,000 people each day, with themost pronounced growth occurring in Africa and Asia.By the year 2025, three-fifths of the world’s population— 5 billion people — will live in urban areas. In somedeveloping nations, the pace of urban population growthwill exceed the development of city services. Housing,water, and jobs will be in short supply, giving rise topoverty, disease, and crime. Over-crowded conditions

will create an environment of social and economic tesion that might eventually find a violent outlet.

The Russian, Israeli, and British examples of MOUserve as examples of a military strategy being adopby weak conventional as well as non-conventional forcaround the world. Weaker forces — realizing themselvinferior to larger, better equipped militaries in the areof conventional battlefield tactics, heavy artillery, armoand advanced command and control technology attempt to compensate through asymmetrical mesuch as guerrilla warfare on urban terrain. By using familiar terrain of their native cities to launch guerrilloperations against intervening conventional armies, Chechens, the PLO, and the paramilitaries of NorthIreland exploited the Russian, Israeli, and British forceinability to adapt their tactics and technology to thurban environment. As this analysis has shown, thconventional forces learned that fighting an unconvetional war in an urban environment poses a set of dculties and challenges completely alien to militacombat in any other type of terrain. Though the Rusians, the Israelis, and the British demonstrated capaties to adapt to the challenges faced in their respecMOUT, in each instance the lack of preparedness mthe operation more time consuming and costly than oinally anticipated.

The near certainty that the National Command Authoties will again deploy U.S. Marines to urban enviroments, combined with the mandate to reduce casuaand collateral damage, requires that the U.S. concepfuture MOUT address and prepare for the unique chlenges that will be faced. The Russian, Israeli, and Bish experiences illustrate that factors such as granularity of urban terrain and the presence of noncobatants can combine to create friction that can pottially erode the effectiveness of basic operationcapabilities. Therefore, meeting the challenge of futuMOUT must continue to be a multi-step process requing an examination of doctrine, organization, traininand education, equipment, and support systems. As analysis highlights, it is essential that U.S. military planers study and understand the nature of the urban eronment and its implications for operational- antactical-level evolutions.

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Section 2Russian Experience in Chechnya

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The Chechen people have a long history of resisting
Russian control. Following the collapse of the SovietUnion, they began in earnest to seek full indepen-dence. During 1994, Chechnya fell into a civil warbetween pro-independence and pro-Russian factions.

In December 1994, Russia sent 40,000 troops intoChechnya to restore Russian primacy over the break-away republic. After reaching the Chechen capital ofGrozny, 6,000 Russian soldiers mounted a mechanizedattack. This attack was launched simultaneously fromthree directions and featured tanks supported by infan-try riding in BMP armored personnel carriers. Insteadof the anticipated light resistance, Russian forces

encountered heavy resistance from Chechens armwith “massive amounts” of antitank weapons. ThRussian attack was repulsed with shockingly hilosses. It took another 2 months of heavy fighting, achanging Russian tactics, to finally capture GroznThe following Russian troop losses occurred betweJanuary and May 1995:

The initial Russian campaign against irregular Chechforces can be broken into two primary phases. PhOne, running through the end of February 1995, cosisted of the initial intervention, the repulse of the firassault on Grozny, and the eventual capture of the cimonths later. This phase involved some of the mextensive urban combat of the campaign since opetions focused primarily on Grozny. Phase Twextended from March through June 1995, consistedantipartisan operations in the Chechen countrysidegain control of the rest of the country.

By late August 1996, Yeltsin’s national security advisbrokered a cease-fire that eventually resulted in the twithdrawal of Russian security forces from Chechnya

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The Republic ofChechnya

National CapitalMajor CityAdministrative BorderInternational Border

Killed Wounded Missing CapturedDefense Ministry 1,947 5,693 376 ---Total (Federal Troops) 2,805 10,319 393 133

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Strategic Lessons

Lesson 1

Military operations could not solve deep-seated polit-ical problems. Almost 2 years of covert and open mili-tary operations in Chechnya failed to prevent the localgovernment from asserting its administrative andpolitical independence from Moscow. In the end,Boris Yeltsin was forced to remove all Russian mili-tary and interior forces from Chechnya. Although thetwo sides still openly disagree on Chechnya’s ultimatestatus, Russian newspapers report that “Chechnyatoday is living its own life, separately from Russia.”Even the protocol that surrounded the signing of thefinal agreement suggested a meeting between leadersof sovereign states.

Lesson 2Local military commanders could not get clearpolicy guidance to which they could work steadilyand logically. Just after Russian military forcesentered Chechnya in mid-December 1994, Izvestiawas reporting “a visible split” within the top leader-ship of the Ministry of Defense over the nature andwisdom of the operation. Later that same month, thenew Russian military commander in Chechnyafound his headquarters in “tumult and disarray.”Poor or conflicting policy guidance continued overthe next 2 years; e.g., when Yeltsin’s national secu-rity advisor announced a cease-fire in August 1996,the Russian regional military commander said nosuch agreement had been signed nor had he receivedorders to cease hostilities

Lesson 3

The confusion generated by the minimal or conflicting policy guidance was exacerbated by poordefined lines of command and control. There was nodirect, unified chain of command for the operationsChechnya. Command and control was spread amthe Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, anthe Federal Counterintelligence Service (successothe KGB) resulting in commanders not knowing whwas on their flanks nor the missions of neighboriforces. Poor lines of communications were alresponsible for many incidents of “friendly fire.Additionally, the North Caucasus Military DistricCommand structure (the district that included Checnya) was bypassed and operational decisions were directly from the Russian Minister of Defense to loccommanders. Similarly, the overall operational heaquarters lacked an on-going staff planning relationshwith the assault units entering Chechnya from separaxes. Poor coordination between units and serviultimately led to slow rates of advance and sometimopened Chechen escape avenues.

Lesson 4

Overall, Russian command lacked continuity and waplagued by too much senior leadership at the opertional level. Russian units fighting in Chechnya experenced at least eight major changes in senior commbetween December 1995 and August 1996. The formCommander-in-Chief of Soviet Airborne troops, Colonel-General Achalov, also claimed that there was “tmuch [flag-level] leadership” on the scene. (Oth

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sources said there were as many as 100 general officerson the operational scene. If true, that would equate toabout one general officer per every 3,000 to 4,000 Rus-sian soldiers in Chechnya.) Achalov further explainedthat the presence of so many general officers was aproblem because “they confused one another” and“lied to put themselves in the best light.”

Lesson 5

Contrary to initial expectations, operations inChechnya were neither of short-duration nor lowcost. At the outset of the operation, then Defense Min-ister Pavel Grachev publicly boasted that he could“settle” Grozny in just 2 hours with one parachuteregiment and subdue all of Chechnya in 72 hours. Hewas later proven wrong by his own admission.Instead, it took 2 months to subdue Grozny the firsttime only to lose it to a second rebel counterattack inAugust 1996. Operations were also far from low cost.The first Russian assault column to enter Grozny, forexample, lost 105 of 120 tanks and armored personnelcarriers (APCs). The Russians lost about 70 percentof the 200 tanks committed to the New Year’s Eve1994 assault on Grozny. Overall, Russian sourcesestimate that the Russian army lost about 18 percent(400 vehicles) out of its total armored vehicle force of2,221 over the course of the campaign. Russians casu-alties were also high — perhaps constituting as muchas 12.5 percent of their total entering force in Chech-nya through March 1995 — 6 months before the sec-ond battle for Grozny where Russian casualties were“appalling.” Civilian losses were also high. Then Rus-sian National Security Advisor, Alexander Lebed,

estimated that 80,000 civilians were killed in thfighting in Chechnya and another 240,000 woundthrough September 1996.

Lesson 6

When Russian security operations began achievinresults, the Chechens started attacking targets withRussia. By May 1995, Russian security forces controlled major Chechen cities and operations wespreading into rural villages. A 100-man Chechraiding party seized hostages in the Russian townBudyonnovsk in June 1995. After Russian securforces botched a hostage rescue attempt, the Checescaped with a major propaganda victory. The Budonnovsk operation was repeated in January 1996 wChechen President Dudaev’s son-in-law seized a hpital and maternity home in the town of Kizlar. Evenin Kizlar played out as they had in 7 months prior Budyonnovsk: an unsuccessful rescue attempt by Rsian security forces, large numbers of Russian civilicasualties, escaping terrorists, and a major Checpropaganda victory.

Lesson 7

It was difficult to unite police and military unitsinto a single, cohesive force. Efforts to combinedisparate Ministry of Interior internal troops withregular Army units were problematic at several leels. First, Ministry of Interior troops were nodesigned, equipped, or organized for large-sccombat operations nor did they regularly train wiunits from the armed forces. Considerable antagnism existed between the army and Ministry of Intrior forces, with the military regarding Ministry ofInterior troops as incompetent and unreliable.

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Lesson 8

Distinct advantage accrues to the side with less con-cern for the safety of the civilian population. Russiansecurity forces initially obeyed orders to minimizecivilian casualties. Chechen fighters took militaryadvantage of this situation. Chechen civilians stoppedtruck convoys, punctured fuel tanks and tires, and evenset vehicles on fire in the early days of the conflictwithout reprisal from Russian security forces. Lackingnonlethal, crowd-control equipment and apparentlyconfused by inappropriate rules of engagement, Rus-sian troops stood by and took no action. Chechen com-manders even deployed guns close to schools or inapartment building courtyards to discourage Russianattacks. This was a relatively painless exercise forChechen commanders since most ethnic Chechens hadalready fled the cities to stay with relatives in thecountryside; the residue was mostly ethnic Russians.

Lesson 9Concern about civilian casualties and propertydestruction declined as casualties among securityforces rose. Over time, early Russian concerns aboutharming civilians and destroying property declinedas troops grew frustrated trying to distinguish enemyfighters from similarly attired noncombatants and as

their own losses mounted. Reports of “rampaginRussian soldiers engaged in looting, arson, indcriminate arrests, torture, and summary executionscivilians increased. Initially, Russian use of heavweapons in cities was restrained; eventually, hoever, restraint dissolved. At one point, 4,000 artilledetonations per hour were counted in Grozny. (comparison, Serbian shelling of Sarajevo reachonly 3,500 artillery detonations per day.)

Lesson 10Chechen forces received extensive outside assistanThe Russians claimed that the Chechens received u5,000 volunteers from 14 different countries — somwho had combat experience elsewhere in the Caucaor Afghanistan. In the 2 years prior to the Russian incsion, Chechen forces amassed a significant inventincluding 35 tanks; 40 armored infantry vehicles; 10

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artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers, and mortars;200 air defense weapons; and vast quantities of smallarms and man-portable antitank weapons. According tothe Russian military, up to 80 percent of those weaponswere unintentionally provided by the Russians them-selves when the Chechens seized them from unpro-tected military warehouses and abandoned Russianmilitary bases in the region. The Chechens supple-mented these seizures through purchases from corruptRussian military officers and arms dealers. After theinvasion, Russian soldiers remarkably continued to sup-ply Chechen forces with consumables either out ofgreed or carelessness. On one occasion, drunken Rus-sian troops sold a tank and an armored combat vehicleto Chechen separatists for $6,000. On another occasion,Russian troops unloaded and left behind boxes ofammunition from armored infantry vehicles to makeroom for looted household articles.

Operational Lessons

Lesson 11

Having well-developed military doctrine for urbanwarfare is not enough in and of itself. The Soviet mil-itary had considerable post-World War II experienceoperating in cities: Berlin (1953), Budapest (1956),Prague (1968), and Kabul (1979). The Russian mili-tary also inherited an extensive body of formal urbanwarfare doctrine from its Soviet predecessor. Despitethis sound theoretical grounding in urban doctrine,Colonel General Achalov (the former Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Airborne Troops), claimed that “noone ever taught anyone anything” when assessing the“blunders” in Chechnya.

Lesson 12Situation-oriented training would have improvedRussian military effectiveness. Russian tactical train-ing standards for squads, platoons, and companiesmandates 151 hours of total instruction, of which only5 or 6 hours are dedicated to urban warfare. Givenoverall reductions in Russian training, it is unlikelymost troops ever received those 5 or 6 hours of instruc-tion. Nor were there any mock-up training ranges ofthe city or individual blocks, as prescribed by Russianmilitary doctrine and World War II Soviet army prac-

tice. Instead, Russian troops had to rely on sources the instructional pamphlet prepared by the Main Cobat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces fthose fighting in Chechnya. Because the lack of funlimited the number of copies printed, soldiers had share them and pass them along on an ad hoc, indiual-to-individual basis. The situation was probabbest summed up by Colonel A. Kostyuchenko of tGround Troops Main Combat Training Directorat“[I]t so happened that, for our part, the tactics amethods of conducting combat operations in a cfound no place in combat training programs.”

Lesson 13

Inadequate training in even the most basic maneuveand combat skills inhibited Russian operations. PoorRussian combat performance can be traced to an oall lack of training in fundamental military skills. Thearmy conducted no division-level exercises in the

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years prior to the Chechnya conflict. In that sameperiod, regimental, battalion, and company exerciseswere reduced over 75 percent. No joint exercises wereheld between Ministry of Interior troops and the Rus-sian army. Even individual skill training was reduced;consequently, some half-trained units refused combator their commanders held them out. Operational defi-ciencies due to training shortfalls were not confined toground force units. Russian accounts of air force oper-ations in Chechnya also revealed that pilots were notpsychologically prepared for combat; had “squanderedtheir skills in employing their weapons;” and hadproblems flying in adverse weather because of reducedpeacetime training. Such readiness concerns also led11 Russian generals to tell the Russian Duma thatRussian forces were not prepared for such operations.

Lesson 14Urban combat is extremely manpower-intensive andproduces significant attrition of men and materielamong the attackers. The Russians discovered that a5:1 manpower advantage (consisting mostly of infan-try) was sometimes not enough since they had toguard every building they took. Attrition rates forboth men and materiel were also high. For example,Russian military officials, known for understatinglosses, admitted that 200 soldiers died and another800 were wounded in about 3 days of fighting duringthe second battle for Grozny in August 1996. Thesecasualty figures were in line with earlier Ukrainianestimates that Russian security force losses duringthe 31 December 1994 attack on Grozny were 600dead and 300 prisoners of war. Materiel losses werealso extreme; e.g., an element of the 131 MaikopMotorized Rifle Brigade lost 17 of 20 armored vehi-cles in just 1 day of fighting near the presidential pal-ace during the first battle of Grozny.

Lesson 15Overwhelming firepower can make up for organiza-tional and tactical deficiencies in the short-run if oneis willing to disregard collateral damage. When allelse failed, the Russians fell back upon their leastinventive option — overwhelming firepower — to takeGrozny. Heavy-handed use of massed artillery and air-delivered ordnance allowed Russian security forces togain control of Grozny after 2 months of fighting.

Lesson 16

The sudden requirement to deploy to Chechnya, copled with the unique supply problems posed by thChechen operating environment, overwhelmed thalready fragile Russian military logistics system. TheRussian Office of the Inspector General concluded tthe Ministry of Defense’s efforts to carry out a partimobilization of the transportation system to suppoRussian security forces in Chechnya was “an outrigfailure.” This was hardly a surprising finding sincColonel-General V. Semenov of the military council othe ground forces had sought to have the entire capaign postponed before it commenced on the grouthat military equipment was in a sorry state, more tha third of the army’s helicopters could not fly, anemergency supplies had already been partially csumed. Those deficiencies in the logistics systtranslated into some soldiers entering Grozny withoweapons or ammunition for machineguns on armorvehicles. Russian army supply officers were al

10

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unprepared for the abnormally high demands for handand smoke grenades; demolition charges; and dispos-able, one-shot ant-tank weapons generated by fightingin cities. Similarly, air force units entered the conflictwith only 50 percent of the prescribed norms for fuel,ammunition, spare parts, and food. The military logis-tics system also failed to supply enough clothing fortroops going into the field. Even the graves registrationand burial system broke down. Mistakes were so com-mon that parents and wives had to travel to Chechnyato identify their loved ones from a pile of bodies“stacked like cordwood.” Parents or wives were alsosometimes forced to pay for the burials, since manymilitary regions lacked the money to do the job asrequired by regulation. These inherent, structural limi-tations of the Russian military logistics system wereexacerbated by the difficulties of operating in Chech-nya. Poor roads limited ground transport and militarysupply convoys were subject to ambush and delays bycrowds of unarmed Chechen civilians blocking roads.Poor weather also restricted shipments by air.

Lesson 17

A lack of high-quality intelligence made operationsmore difficult and dangerous for Russian securityforces. During the pre-invasion planning phase, seniorRussian officers were forced to rely upon 1:50,000 and1:100,000 scale maps because they lacked better-suited1:25,000 or 1:12,500 scale maps. Current aerial or satel-lite intelligence was limited because the satellites hadbeen turned off to save money and few aerial reconnais-sance missions had been conducted. Lower-level com-manders fared even worse — many had no or outdated(1984) maps and photographs. Eventually, the Russianarmy’s cartographic service had to prepare a new set ofmaps from aerial photographs taken during the courseof the fighting. The lack of adequate maps made it moredifficult for Russian forces to coordinate their actions orto surround and fully cut off Grozny.

Pre-invasion intelligence assessments of Chechen mili-tary capabilities were severely inaccurate as both seniorand troop-level commanders were shocked by the degreeand intensity of Chechen resistance in Grozny. After theinitial assault on Grozny, some Russian prisoners of wardid not know their location; others asked reporters to“tell me who is fighting whom?” Despite these early

intelligence failures, little was done to rectify the sitution beyond initiating more aerial surveillance. As late March 1996, the Russian Minister of the Interior wstill complaining that poor reconnaissance and integence had allowed Chechen military forces to enGrozny again without warning. Interior MinisteKulikov went on to say that the “outrageous negligencof local authorities had resulted in “heavy fighting anlosses.” Kulikov’s blistering attack produced few resusince Chechen military forces recaptured Grozny August 1996, again with no intelligence warning.

Lesson 18

The spatial qualities and perspective of urban anconventional warfare are very different. Urban warfareis more “vertical” in that operations routinely reach uinto buildings and down into sewers. The “verticacharacter of fighting in an urban setting worked both and against Russian troops. On the positive side, Rsian troops were able to attack buildings from the tdownward, thereby achieving surprise and allowinthem to bypass strong, ground-level defenses. On negative side, “the whole city [was] armed with a grnade launcher in every third floor window.” Also, snipers operated regularly from roof-tops, deep withupper-floor apartments, and from basements, makthem difficult to spot. Chechens operating in this maner posed a serious problem since the guns on mRussian armored vehicles lacked sufficient elevatand/or depression to deal with these threats. Also, cussed in later lessons, few Russian armored vehiwere capable of resisting top attacks.

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Lesson 19

Composite units were generally unsatisfactory. Atthe start of campaign, few Russian units (even eliteunits like the Kantemirovskaya and Tamanskaya divi-sions) were up to authorized strength. Battalions wereoften manned at only 55 percent or less. Conse-quently, many units were “fleshed out” with lastminute additional personnel and equipment. Accord-ing to one report, up to 60 percent of the tanks andarmored vehicle crews were formed enroute to the ini-tial offensive. Similarly, the Chief of Staff of the 805thGuards Artillery Regiment complained that his battal-ions only received a small percentage of the trainedcrews necessary to fire its weapons. Many of the last-minute additions to the ranks of the 805th GuardsArtillery Regiment, including officers, had to learntheir trade “on the fly.” In some cases, soldiers did noteven know the last names of their comrades beforeentering battle. Some military districts also resorted tocreating ad hoc regiments of “volunteers” and sendingthem to Chechnya. The Volga and Transbaikal militarydistricts, for example, packaged genuine volunteerswith conscripts into new, ad hoc regiments and sentthem to Chechnya under armed guard. These ad hocregiments generally exhibited poor unit cohesiveness,were difficult to command, and sometimes lackedessential equipment. In the opinion of Deputy Minis-ter of Defense Colonel-General Boris Gromov (heroof Afghanistan), “the considerable forces that weremustered piecemeal across Russia were simply unableto collaborate without training.”

Lesson 20

Fratricide was a serious and continuing problemthroughout the campaign in Chechnya because was difficult to tell friend from foe, especially in cit-ies. Fratricide occurred frequently among Russiaforces in Chechnya because, in the words of one Rsian commander, it is “unbelievably difficult” to dif-ferentiate friend from foe. In one particularlyegregious case, and Ministry of Interior regimefought a 6-hour battle with an army regiment. Part the problem stemmed from both sides using equment (tanks, APCs, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVsetc.) of the same origin. Chechen forces, for exaple, wore Russian pattern camouflage coveralls aother items of military dress obtained from formeSoviet army stores in Chechnya. Usually this was na deliberate attempt to disguise Chechen fightersRussians, although Chechens used this ruse to cout operations to discredit Russian soldiers with tlocal populous. Wide-scale use of nonstandard uforms within Russian forces made combat identifiction even tougher, especially with elite troops whaffected a “Rambo” look. Russian troops were alallowed to wear civilian clothing to make up for thinability of the supply system to provide standaissue or to overcome poor military quality controstandards. Fratricide was also caused by poor coonation between different branches of the securforces. Although the ground forces made up tmajority of the troops at the beginning of the campaign, federal forces also included Ministry of Interior troops, Naval Infantry, and Spetsnareconnaissance troops under the control of the mtary intelligence branch. Miscommunicationbetween ground forces and tactical air support crealso led to numerous cases of fratricide.

Lesson 21

Standard Russian military unit configurations wereinappropriate for urban combat. The nature ofurban warfare led the Russians to employ a noconfiguration of assault detachments consisting infantry reinforced with heavier fire support ancombat engineer assets than found in standard fortions. The recommended configuration for suchgroup was: three motorized rifle platoons; one ta

12

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company; one flame-thrower (Shmel) platoon withnine launcher teams; two Shilka or Tunguska airdefense guns; one UR-77 line-charge minefieldbreaching vehicle; one combat engineer squad; onemedical team; and one technical support squad.

Lesson 22

Foregoing peacetime maintenance is a false econ-omy. The Russian army in Chechnya suffered the con-sequences of poor peacetime maintenance of armoredvehicles and automotive equipment. On the roadmarch into Grozny, for instance, two out of every tentanks fell out of formation due to mechanical prob-lems. In another case, the Russians were only able tofind one regiment’s worth of functioning armoredvehicles from an entire division’s inventory.

Lesson 23

The potential of special forces for urban operationswas never realized in Chechnya. Both foreign andRussian military observers agree that special forces,properly used, would have been of great value inGrozny. Units like the Alpha and Vympel teams werenever sent, despite Alpha team’s previous success ofcapturing the Afghan presidential palace in Kabulwith “little blood.” Spetsnaz troops, which weredeployed, would have been excellent in reconnais-sance and covert operations, but instead were wastedspearheading the assault column into Grozny on NewYear’s Eve; this action occurred because conven-tional force commanders did not know how to prop-erly exploit Spetsnaz capabilities. Even whenSpetsnaz were committed in their traditional recon-naissance role, serious problems developed. Teamswere frequently inserted without adequate means toextract them, usually due to poor coordination of orcooperation with helicopter units. Teams also lackedradios and other essential equipment.

Lesson 24

The nature of cities tends to channel combat opera-tions along narrow lanes of activity. Because combatconditions in Grozny were characterized by narrowfields of view, limited fields of fire, and constricted ave-nues of approach, operations tended to be channeled

along certain pre-ordained lines of march — weknown and heavily defended by Chechen fighters.

Lesson 25

Psychological operations, especially disinformatiowere central to both Chechen and Russian strategFrom the onset, both groups realized that domestic foreign perceptions of the war were almost as imptant as the actual ground situation. Thus, both sidtried to shape the news media’s coverage of the wFor the Russians, this meant a well-orchestrated capaign of withholding information and spreading deliberate disinformation. This campaign ran from militaofficers in the field, through government-controllenews services, up to senior government officials. TRussians: spread false information about the timiand nature of military operations; used “black” opertions to mask Russian involvement; lied about the tyof weaponry used against targets in civilian areas; aunder-reported the extent of their own military losseThe Russians also sought to shape perceptions by dering the activity of news correspondents in the wzone. Other Russian psychological operations includ

13

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dropping leaflets from aircraft and appealing to Groznycitizens over loudspeakers to lay down their arms andnot provoke Russian forces; jamming Chechen radiobroadcasts and destroying the local television station;and conducting useless talks to gain time and to intimi-date the Chechens. Likewise, the Chechens, too, useddisinformation. They also staged major news/propa-ganda events like the raids on the Russian towns ofBudyonnovsk and Kizlar to embarrass Russian secu-rity forces. There were also reports of Chechens,dressed in Russian uniforms, carrying out acts to dis-credit Russian forces with the civil population.

Lesson 26

Strategic bombing can be used in urban operationsto shape the battlefield, especially during the earlyphases. The Russians employed MiG-31 (Foxhound),Su-27 (Flanker), Su-25 (Frogfoot), Su-17 (Fitter), andSu-24 (Fencer) short-range bombers to strike 873Chechen targets, including bridges, petroleum facili-ties, ammunition dumps, road networks, fortifiedareas, military equipment repair facilities, commandand control facilities, and enemy airfields. The Rus-sians also employed Tu-22M3 (Backfire) long-rangebombers to close approach and escape routes aroundthe cities of Gudermes, Shali, and Argun.

Lesson 27

The Russian Air Defense Force “closed” Chechen air-space even before Russian troops entered Chechnya.The commander-in-chief of the Russian Air DefenseForce claimed that, as early as August 1994 (5 monthsprior to Russian security forces entering Chechnya),his command was ordered to “close” Chechen airspaceto ensure that further mercenaries, weapons or ammu-nition were not airlifted into Chechnya. This meantthat opposition forces would be limited to on-handequipment if the air blockaded remained effective.

Tactical Lessons

Lesson 28

Rigorous communications security is essential, evenagainst relatively primitive enemies. Apparently,much Russian tactical radio traffic was broadcast in

the clear. This allowed the Chechens to enter the Rsian tactical air control radio net in order to redireRussian air assets against their own troops. At ottimes, Russian forward air controllers broadcast thown coordinates in the clear only to have Chechartillery fire directed against them shortly thereafter.

Lesson 29

According to Russian after-action assessments, nigfighting was the single most difficult operation inChechnya for infantry forces. This assessment wasbased on a shortage of night vision equipment ainadequate training. As a result, some units used vecle headlights and other visible light sources to coduct night operations — a tactic explicitly forbidden iarmy directives. Such use of headlights and searlights was initially rationalized as a means to shoChechen forces. Instead, it made Russian forces mvulnerable to Chechen counterfire.

Lesson 30

Tanks and APCs cannot operate in cities withouextensive dismounted infantry support. The Chechensfielded antitank hunter-killer teams, equipped wi“massive amounts of antitank weapons,” which keyupon the engine noise from Russian armored vehicOnce these hunter-killer teams converged upon Rusarmor, they would volley-fire RPG-7 and RPG-18 antank missiles from above, behind, and the sides. Rsian armed vehicles had trouble dealing with theforces for a variety of reasons; e.g., poor visibility frothe vehicles and insufficient elevation/depression of oboard armament. Armor columns not accompanied

14

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dismounted infantry experienced staggering losses (inthe initial assault on Grozny, up to 70 percent tank lossrate). As one Russian airborne commander noted afterthe battle, “[W]ithout infantry cover, it was really sense-less to bring tanks into the city.”

Lesson 31

Forces operating in cities need special equipment notusually found in Russian tables of organization andequipment. The Russians came to believe each soldierneeded a rope with a grappling hook for enteringbuildings. Additionally, lightweight ladders werefound invaluable for assaulting infantry.

Lesson 32

Firing tracer ammunition in cities makes the user atarget for snipers. Russian forces eventually stoppedusing tracer ammunition in night fighting since itdirected enemy snipers back to the source of the fire.Later, army policy in Chechnya totally banned usingtracer ammunition — night and day — because of theseverity of the sniper problem.

Lesson 33

Trained snipers were essential, but in short supply.The Russian army, although well prepared on paperfor fighting a sniper engagement, proved totallyunready for the quantitative and qualitative demandsof sniper operations in Chechnya. Russian sniperswere both under equipped and poorly trained for theconditions they faced in Chechnya. Besides the tradi-tional technique of firing from rooftops, the Chechensused unexpected tactics in their own sniper operations;for example, they fired from deep within rooms ofbuildings, not from the window ledges as Russiancountersniper teams expected. Consequently, Russiansniper operations were less effective than anticipated.

Lesson 34

Obscurants are especially useful when fighting in cit-ies. Russian forces made extensive use of smoke andwhite phosphorus to screen the movement of forcesduring city fighting. Every fourth or fifth Russian artil-lery or mortar round was either smoke or white phos-phorus. (The Russians claimed that white phosphorushad the added benefits of toxicity, readily penetrated

Chechen protective masks, and was not bannedtreaty.) They also found tear gas very useful in Grozn

Lesson 35

Armored combat engineering vehicles can performimportant, specialized urban combat missions. TheRussians found that armored combat engineering vecles were indispensable for removing obstacles (a sous impediment to urban movement) and fmineclearing. The Russians employed the IMR, a mtirole engineer vehicle fitted to a tank chassis. TIMR has a bulldozer plow on the front and a traversicrane in place of the turret. The crane has a buckecargo boom at the end depending upon the job. (Thare two versions of this vehicle: the IMR built uponT-55 chassis, and the IMR-2 based on the T-72 chsis.) The Russians also extensively used the UR-7minefield breaching vehicle based on a modified 2self-propelled howitzer chassis. This vehicle hasrocket-propelled line charge launcher mounted on hull rear for explosive breaching of minefields. ThRussian army recommended every assault groinclude two IMRs and one UR-77.

Lesson 36

Recovering damaged armored vehicles is especiadifficult in cities. The Russians discovered that rubbldebris, narrow streets, sniper fire, and the shortcoings of recovery vehicles themselves made armovehicle recovery extremely difficult and perilous.

Lesson 37

Hit-and-run ambush attacks by small groups werethe favorite tactic of the Chechens. The Chechensnormally operated in groups of 15 to 20 fighterthese groups would further subdivide into smallgroups of 3 to 4 for combat missions. Each smgroup would generally include a sniper, a grenalauncher operator, and at least one machinegoperator. These units, employing antitank weapoand Molotov cocktails, then lay in wait to ambusRussian forces. Ambushes sometimes involvheavier weapons like artillery. In this case, thChechens would use one or two artillery pieces, fia few rounds, then flee. The Chechens used ambtactics against helicopters as well.

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Lesson 38

Direct-fire artillery can be a valuable tool inurban combat, provided collateral damage is not amajor concern. Upon entering Grozny, the Rus-sians found it difficult to employ artillery in anindirect mode because of the buildings and lack offire-direction specialists. They also found that tech-nical deficiencies in the main guns of most Russianarmored vehicles made them incapable of dealingwith entrenched snipers and shoulder-fired antitankgrenade launchers (RPG) teams on the upper floorsof buildings. Thus, the Russians employed artillery,multiple rocket launchers, and the 82-mm Vasilekautomatic mortar as direct fire weapons, usually atranges of 150 to 200 meters.

Lesson 39

A failure of small unit leadership, especially atthe NCO level, was a primary cause of Russiantactical failures in Grozny. The Russians have rec-ognized that urban warfare often devolves intoactions of small groups. Unfortunately, the tradi-tional Russian lack of a professional NCO corps,coupled with a shortfall of 12,000 platoon leaderson the eve of the campaign in Chechnya, crippledits small unit operations.

Lesson 40

Tracked armored vehicles are preferable towheeled armored vehicles in urban warfare. TheRussians discovered urban combat generated vastamounts of rubble — debris that wheeled vehicleshad trouble traversing. Tracked vehicles, by con-trast, could readily negotiate urban rubble.

Technical Lessons

Lesson 41When operating in cities, armored vehicles requiremore protection and that protection needs to be distrib-uted differently than for conventional battlefield opera-tions. Russian armor arrays, optimized across the frontalarc for NATO central front engagements, provided inade-quate protection in the urban conditions of Chechnya.Problems with the T-72 in Grozny centered upon cata-

strophic ammunition fires and inadequate protectagainst top attacks from shaped charges. Survivabilitythe T-80 was also criticized by the Russian Minister Defense, especially its vulnerability to top attacks froshaped charges. Diagrams of Russian armored vehin public Russian assessments showed the majoritylethal hits against tanks and infantry fighting vehicloccurred on their upper surfaces, especially through turret roofs and engine decks, as well as from the rColonel General Sergei Mayev, Deputy Commanderthe Ground Forces for Armaments, estimated that 98 pcent of tanks destroyed in urban operations were hiplaces where the design did not permit installation reactive armor. These same Russian assessmentsemphasized that armored vehicles in Grozny were sjected to extensive, multiple attacks. Every armored vecle had to deal with six or seven attacks by antitasystems, mostly RPGs. These vulnerabilities should have surprised senior Ministry of Defense officials sinRussian tank designers say they consciously shiftedbulk of armor protection to the frontal arc to deal with th

16

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anticipated threat to tanks — NATO tanks and antitankweapons firing against advancing Russian armor col-umns. Severe weigh limitations, imposed by the Ministryof Defense, forced designers to make this trade-off.

Lesson 42RPGs can be used against helicopters. There is atleast one recorded instance of the Chechens using anRPG to down a Russian helicopter.

Lesson 43Air defense guns are valuable for suppressingground targets. The Russians found that the ZSU-23-4 Shilka and the 2S6 Tunguska air defense guns werevery useful against multistory buildings because theirguns had sufficient elevation to hit targets in the upperstories. Air defense weapons worked so well in thisground suppression role that Russian authorities even-tually recommended that urban assault formations rou-tinely include Shilkas and Tunguskas.

Lesson 44Heavy machineguns still offer good defense againstclose air attack, especially from helicopters. Impro-vised Chechen tactical air defenses, consisting oftruck-mounted 23-mm cannons and 12.7-mm heavymachineguns mounted on 4 x 4 utility vehicles dam-aged about 30 helicopters and destroyed 1 other. Otherreports indicate that Chechen ZSU-23-4s alsodestroyed at least one, possibly two Russian SU-25ground-attack fighters.

Lesson 45Both sides employed commercial off-the-shelf tech-nologies for military purposes. As previously men-tioned, Russian soldiers were allowed to substitutecivilian clothing for inadequate, missing or cumber-some military counterparts. This proved a problemsince it made identifying friend from foe more diffi-cult. Chechen experience was more positive. Theyconstructed ad hoc air defense systems by mating Zu-23-4 23-mm air defense cannons on civilian KAMAZtrucks and by placing 12.7-mm heavy machineguns onToyota Land Cruisers, Jeeps, and the Russian civilianUAZ-469. Similarly, the Chechens put mortars oncivilian-type trucks to improve their tactical mobilityand lessen their vulnerability to Russian counterbat-

tery fire. Chechen forces also employed Westemade, civilian radios for tactical communication duing the second battle of Grozny. Finally, the Checheturned industrial chemicals into home-made chemiweapons. [Refer to Lesson 48 for details.]

Lesson 46

Non-lethal technologies were seldom used. There areno reports of Russian forces using nonlethal technogies, except tear gas. It is not clear whether absence of nonlethal technologies was the resultconscious Russian tactical decisions or because tinventory did not offer them this option. Regardlesthe lack of nonlethal systems put Russian convcrews at a disadvantage when confronted by unarmcivilians blocking roads.

Lesson 47

Tactical communication proved very difficult inGrozny. Part of the problem stemmed from desigpractices that incorporated Russian army preferencfight from within armored infantry vehicles that led tinfantry tactical communications located inside dependent upon the BMP or BTR infantry fightinvehicles. Once the infantry dismounted their vehicleradios became hard to reach and communication wcumbersome. City buildings also disrupted the signof Russian military radios. Their short-term, tacticsolution to this problem was to establish ground-basand aircraft-based relay stations. Russian commentors, however, noted that ultimately the military wihave to acquire radio equipment better suited for urb

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operations, like mobile cellular telephone networks.Ministry of Interior units, equipped more like policeforces, tended to have a much wider selection of smalltactical radios, including individual radios, that couldoperate in cities. However, they had difficulty commu-nicating from the small unit level to higher headquar-ters or with the military services.

Lesson 48Indigenous forces can improvise crude chemicalweapons. Because Chechen forces had no access tomilitary chemical weapons, they improvised their ownby using on-hand supplies of industrial chemicals.Using chlorine gas, they built chemical mines thatwere remotely detonated by radio signal.

Lesson 49The cabs of supply trucks must be armored. As inAfghanistan, the Russian army in Chechnya soon dis-covered that it was essential to armor the cabs oftrucks, even those convoyed. Unarmored supply col-umns proved especially lucrative targets for snipersand roving bands of Chechen fighters. In addition,trucks were very vulnerable to both antipersonnel andantitank landmines; about 600 trucks and unarmoredvehicles were destroyed over the course of the cam-paign. Numerous casualties resulted from the absenceof mine protection on standard support vehicles.Although the Russian army developed armored ver-sions of the standard Ural 5-ton truck for convoys inAfghanistan, none were manufactured in quantity nordeployed in the Chechen theater. The Russian army isnow looking at a variety of armor packages for logis-tics vehicles for contingency operations.

Lesson 50“Bunker busting” weapons are invaluable for urbanwarfare. The highest acclaimed weapon in Chechnyawas the RPO Shmel. (A measure of its importance isthat 512 Shmel gunners received decorations for theirservice in Chechnya.) Although officially called aflame-thrower, it more closely resembles a rocketlauncher in Western armies. Unofficially, it is called“pocket artillery” by Russian troops. Shmel is a sin-gle-shot, disposable weapon resembling a large LAWor AT-4 rocket launcher. The rocket grenade isequipped with a thermobaric incendiary mixture that

can also be described as a fuel air explosive. Itintended primarily to attack enemy troops in confinspaces such as bunkers or interior rooms. It also hsecondary use against lightly armored vehicles. Grozny, it was widely used against Checheentrenched in buildings, especially snipers.

Lesson 51

Some Russian equipment was modified while in thfield to counter enemy tactics and equipment. TheRussians resurrected the Afghanistan concept of aon armor to address problems that surfaced in GrozThis led to the development of reshetka armor thatresembled a set of venetian blinds fabricated outsteel bars. It works on the principle that the majority RPGs striking the reshetka screens become trappebetween the bars or disintegrate without the fuses donating their shaped charge warheads. Reshetkascreens were first displayed at the Kubinka armotest range trials during a hastily called conferenceJanuary-February 1995 to examine the Chechen cpaign lessons to date. These reshetka screens werethen deployed to Chechnya in February 1995. Adtionally, some tanks and APCs were outfitted wicages made from wire mesh that stood about 25 tocentimeters away from the hull armor. These wimesh cages were intended to defeat both RPGs Molotov cocktails. The Russians also mounted 24mm rockets on helicopters for the first time in Checnya as a field expedient to gain sufficient standrange as protection against tactical air defenses. [Rto Lesson 52.]

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rerareli-is-lyov,esere

Lesson 52

Helicopters need standoff weapons. WidespreadChechen use of 23-mm cannons and 12.7-mm heavymachineguns encouraged Russian helicopter gunshipsto employ their weapons at ranges of 3,000 meters ormore. Helicopter crews, repeating tactics fromAfghanistan, found that antitank guided missiles(ATGMs) were very effective for attacking hardenedtargets with precision. The preferred type was theradio-command guided Shtrum (AT-6 Spiral). Thelonger ranged ATGMs, such as Shtrum, gave the heli-copter crew sufficient standoff range to foil Chechenair defense guns. (After Afghanistan, the Russians alsodeveloped a high explosive warhead using ther-mobaric principles for helicopter-fired ATGMs, butthere were no reports of such weapons being used inChechnya.) Smaller caliber rockets, such as like the57-mm S-5 series and the 80-mm S-8 series), althougheffective, lacked sufficient range to put them outsidethe reach of Chechen tactical air defenses. Conse-quently, Russian crews experimented with the 240-mm S-24 rocket for attacking targets protected by airdefenses. This appeared to be a field expedient sincethe Russians had never attempted to integrate S-24swith helicopters for fear the rocket plume might stallthe engine when the helicopter moved forward.

Lesson 53

Helicopters are not suited for urban combat. Thisverdict — delivered by the Commander of RussianArmy Aviation, Colonel General Vitaliy Pavlov —was surprising since Russian military doctrine speci-fies the preferred method of capturing a building isfrom the top-down, with troops helicoptered into posi-tion. That part of Russian doctrine notwithstanding,Colonel General Pavlov claims Russian doctrine alsospecifies that helicopters are too vulnerable to rooftopsnipers and ambushes in urban setting.

Lesson 54

The Russian air force made extensive use of preci-sion-guided weapons when not hampered by badweather. The Russians made large-scale use of laser-guided bombs and missiles fired from the Su-24.These weapons destroyed key bridges and communi-cations facilities with greater precision than previously

possible. Russian use of precision-guide munitionhowever, was severely limited by the frequent appeance of rain and fog over the battlefield, especiaduring the initial march to Grozny when “weather coditions were appalling and the use of precision weaonry was impossible.”

Lesson 55

Inadequate on-board navigation systems and pooradar limited the use of helicopters in adverse weathand at night. Technical shortcomings of on-board radand navigation forced the Russians to employ Mi-24 hcopters mostly during the day and fair weather when vibility exceeded 1.5 kilometers and pilots could clearsee their targets. According to Colonel General PavlCommander of Russian Army Aviation, these rulmeant that 95 percent of the days in February 1995 wlisted as “non-flying days.”

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Lesson 56

The Russians did not use precision-guided, artillery-fired munitions despite having such rounds in theirinventory. The Russians had the necessary equipmentto carry out precise artillery strikes with weaponssuch as the laser-guided Krasnapol, Santimetr artil-lery rounds, and the guided Smelchak mortar rounds.However, none of these were used in Chechnya. Inter-national Defense Digest, quoting unnamed sources inthe Russian “higher command,” claimed that seniorcommanders considered highly advanced munitionstoo expensive to be “wasted” in Chechnya. Thesemunitions may also have been considered unneces-sary by tactical commanders who received the bulk oftheir fire support from direct fire artillery workingclose (150 to 200 meters) to the targets. At such closerange, accuracy could be achieved without resortingto “expensive” precision-guided artillery munitions.

Lesson 57

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were used exten-sively in Chechnya. Russia used UAVs in combat forthe first time in Chechen. One such vehicle was theSterkh, which has two modular payloads: a recon-

naissance package with a daylight, stabilized Tcamera with a real-time transmission system; andelectronic warfare jamming package. The Sterkh’schief shortfall is its limited durability — between 5and 10 landings. The Russians also used the sencarrying Shmel remotely piloted vehicle (RPV),which could operate up to 2 hours out to a range60 kilometers. Apparently, the UAVs were used prmarily by Russian airborne forces who judged theextremely successful, particularly as a way of savithe lives of reconnaissance team members.

20

Section 3Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE: Israel’s Intervention into Lebanon

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n”asbeis-theFrryd,tu-a-e

Airina-ol- tois theheingternces

Israel’s intervention into Lebanon in 1982 was inresponse to a series of events over the previous decade inwhich Lebanon disintegrated politically and fell increas-ingly under the influence of Syria and the Palestine Lib-eration Organization (PLO). The Israeli Defense Force(IDF) prepared three options for the Israeli response:

1. A shallow penetration into Lebanon to clear outPLO camps near the border;

2. A deeper operation to the Alawi (Auwali) River orto the outskirts of Beirut to eliminate PLO strongholdsin Tyre and Sidon, but avoiding a clash with the Syri-ans or entry into PLO dominated Beirut; and

3. The “Big Pines Plan” that envisioned a confronta-tion with Syria and intervention into Beirut with the

objective of breaking Syrian influence in Lebanon adriving the PLO completely out of the country.

The Israeli Government rejected the “Big Pines Plaand approved the second, more limited option that wexpected to drive 40 kilometers into Lebanon and completed within 3 days. Instead, the Defense Minter deliberately manipulated events to ensure that “Big Pines Plan” was carried out. As a result, the IDwas entangled in a situation where it planned to caout a relatively limited, short-term operation. Insteathe IDF fought a much longer campaign that evenally lasted 3 months plus an additional year’s occuption of Lebanon due to senior Ministry of Defenscontravention of government authorization.

The fighting began on 5 June 1982 when the Israeli Force began a bombing campaign after an assasstion attempt on the Israeli ambassador in London. Flowing this, the IDF crossed the border on 6 Junecommence Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE. Thoperation consisted of a three-pronged assault withWestern Force advancing towards Beirut along tMediterranean coast, a Central Force advancthrough the Lebanese mountains to seize the wesheights over the Bekaa Valley, and the Bekaa For

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group whose aim was to destroy Syrian forces in theBekaa Valley in northeastern Lebanon. In terms ofurban warfare, only the Western Force experiencedextensive fighting in cities and it is the focus of thiscase study.

Strategic Lessons

Lesson 1Military action did not solve the political problems thatunderlay Israel’s difficulties in Southern Lebanon.Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE, which began on 6June 1982 when Israeli military forces invaded southernLebanon, was publicly portrayed as a limited operationto drive the PLO away from Israel’s northern border andsecure a 40-kilometer buffer zone. Privately, Israel’sDefense Minister saw this as an opportunity to elimi-nate the terrorist threat from Lebanon completely bydestroying the PLO’s military strength, eliminate theirinfrastructure, and driving them out of Lebanon. TheDefense Minister also hoped to reduce Syria’s influencein southern Lebanon. These private objectives broad-ened the political and strategic objectives of the war(without the apparent knowledge or concurrence of thegovernment) and gradually transformed its characterinto a war both against Syria and for control of Leba-non. The Israeli military achieved its tactical militaryobjectives, but Israel ultimately lost the wider politicalbattle. Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE ended withLebanon more hostile to Israel than when it began, thesubstitution of one set of terrorists for another, Syrianinfluence substantially greater than before, and Israel’sinternational standing sullied.

Lesson 2It was difficult for Israeli military commanders to getwell-defined policy objectives to which they couldwork steadily and logically. Israeli Defense MinisterAriel Sharon’s hidden agenda, and his consequentneed to conceal the true purpose of the war from theIsraeli cabinet, deprived his military commanders oftheir ability to plan and execute decisive operations.Secrecy, in turn, bred confusion and lack of commit-ment among lower levels of the IDF. The mismatchbetween stated political and military objectives pre-dictably led to major operational errors because

Israel’s key thrusts against the Syrians and Beinever received the overt priority needed for succeThus, operations against Syrian forces came late indecisively with the consequence that the IDF facprepared, well dug-in Syrian forces. The IDF’s sloadvance to Beirut and the consequent difficulty in taing the city after pausing on the outskirts were dueconfusion about operational objectives in the mindsfield commanders.

Lesson 3

Overall Israeli command throughout the campaignsuffered from a lack of continuity. Deployment of IDFforces during the overall campaign was marked by a fquent shifting of units from the operational control oone command to another; moving field commandersand out of positions of command; and by the formatiof small, task-oriented operations. Brigades woubegin under the command of one officer only to end under the command of someone else after havpassed through one or two interim commands along way. In one case, a command switched at least ftimes in less than 30 kilometers. Operational confusalso resulted when chains of command were disrupby the practice of continuously forming and disbandispecial military task forces.

Lesson 4

Problems with disjointed command structures werexacerbated by too much senior leadership at thoperational level. Many Israeli officers complainedthat there were too many commanders “runniaround the battlefield often with nothing to do or commanding piecemeal operations for short periods time.” This situation was a natural consequence IDF’s practice of forming special task forces for limited operations and shifting command responsibility units moved from one area to another.

Lesson 5

Contrary to initial government expectations, Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE was neither of shortduration nor low cost. The Israeli cabinet authorized limited incursion into Lebanon that was supposed last just 3 days and produce few casualties; insteamonths of fighting and a long-running, large-sca

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occupation resulted. During the 3 months of fightingand the following year of occupation, the IDF suffered3,316 casualties. While not large in absolute terms,these losses were staggering for a small country likeIsrael that was inordinately sensitive to casualty rates.[In adjusting these casualty figures demographicallyequivalent to the United States, they would haveequated to the U.S. sustaining 195,840 casualties forthe same period.] A large portion of the Israeli lossescame from urban operations; e.g., Israeli casualties forthe siege of Beirut equaled or were greater than thosetaken against the PLO in the entire war in the south.Indeed, losses in besieging Beirut cost the IDF almost24 percent of its dead and 32 percent of its woundedfor the entire war.

Lesson 6

Distinct advantage accrues to the side with less con-cern for the safety of the civilian population. Realizingthat the IDF wished to minimize civilian casualties forpolitical reasons, the PLO sought to exploit that reti-cence during the battle for Beirut. Thus, the PLOlocated many of its military resources, such as artilleryand ammunition dumps, inside civilian areas especiallywithin the densely populated districts like the refugeecamps and Fakahani. The PLO also chose to site weap-ons firing positions near or within noncombatant struc-tures (e.g., hospitals, schools, embassies) believedimmune to Israeli attack for political reasons. These tac-tics had mixed results. The IDF was restrained in attack-ing parts of Beirut that contained few Palestinians, butwere less cautious about sections of the city and refugeecamps where Palestinian civilians predominated.

Lesson 7

Wishful thinking and intellectual predispositionsprevented leaders and commanders from believinaccurate intelligence assessments. Senior PLO lead-ers had an excellent understanding of Israeli intentiobefore the incursion, even to the point of Arafat havia copy of an attack plan that was remarkably closethe actual Israeli plan for Operation PEACE IN GALLEE. For at least 5 months before the invasion, Arawas both publicly and privately warning that Israwas preparing a major attack, possibly even extendto Beirut itself. Timely and accurate intelligence waring of Israel intentions went unheeded by the PLcommand system, partly because PLO commandcould no longer distinguish real warnings from politcal gestures, particularly when numerous false waings were issued in the past.

Operational Lessons

Lesson 8

The IDF had a well-developed military doctrine forurban warfare that influenced its tactics, but not itsoverall force structure. The IDF began developingdoctrine for military operations in urban terrain i1973 as a result of its experiences in fighting for Jeralem in 1967, as well as in Suez City and Qantara1973. This doctrine envisioned two types of urbaoffensive — one in which armor leads, and the otherwhich armor supports infantry as it opens and secuan area. Traditional IDF reliance on armor usuafavored using the former technique until an arproved too difficult to take with armor. Israel’s relativlack of significant urban warfare experience to daplus a decided bias toward armored warfare, methat Israeli doctrine for urban warfare had little impaon its overall force structure. Thus, the IDF lacked sficient quantities of infantry necessary for urban opeations in Lebanon.

Lesson 9

Training in urban operations greatly benefited thoseIsraeli soldiers who received it. Unfortunately, not allsoldiers were afforded that opportunity. Israeli combtraining in military operations in urban terrain wa

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extensive prior to the invasion of Lebanon and wasjudged very valuable in the aftermath of the battle forBeirut. Units with such training better understood thehazards of fighting in a city and appeared more confi-dent than units without such training. Additionally,coordination of combat and combat support elements,as exercised in pre-invasion Israeli urban training, wasafterwards judged more effective because of pre-inva-sion training. Part of that training included small tacticaltraining exercises in captured Syrian towns in the GolanHeights and villages in southern Lebanon. Although theenvironment of these small towns differed significantlyfrom the situation later encountered in heavily built-upBeirut, the training served the IDF well. Unfortunately,only the regular army units received training in urbanwarfare. This was a serious problem since the IDFmaintains only a small cadre force fleshed out by largenumbers of reservists — none of whom received ade-quate training in urban operations because of the limitedannual training time available to reservists. Conse-quently, reservists performed poorly and experiencedmore casualties in urban fighting.

Lesson 10

Israeli rules of engagement were difficult to opera-tionalize. The IDF was given clear but conflictingrules of engagement. Initial rules of engagementstressed the need to minimize civilian casualties andcollateral damage in cities. These same rules also

mandated that Israeli commanders minimize their ocasualties and adhere to a fast-paced operational titable. The Israelis soon learned in the slow househouse fighting in the battle of Tyre that it was imposble to accommodate these conflicting instructions.

Lesson 11Rules of engagement are sometimes difficult tenforce. Every effort was made in the initial phase othe campaign to enforce the rules about limiting injries among noncombatants. Nevertheless, grouforce personnel often sought ways around such resttions upon the use of heavy weapons and target setion in cities. One method was to call for an air strikwhen the ground forces met stiff resistance. That wresponsibility for civilian casualties and collateradamage could be displaced to an anonymous platfo— the airplane — and to the difficulties of carryinout precision bombing in urban environments. Thefore, the ground forces strictly observed the letter the restrictions against firing into civilian areas whisuccessfully evading the spirit of those rules.

Lesson 12Concern about civilian casualties and property damage declined as IDF casualties rose. The Israelis soonrealized that heavy firepower was the only way to mimize their own casualties and maintain an adequoperational tempo. Consequently, the Israelis beganbring artillery fire to bear on Palestinian strongpoinwith the consequence that collateral damage rosharply. They also increasingly employed close air suport, even in refugee camps. By the battle of Beirut, IDF was engaging in “intensive bombardment” of Syian and PLO targets in Palestinian sections of the cit

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Lesson 13

Overwhelming firepower can make up for organiza-tional and tactical deficiencies in the short-run ifone is willing to disregard collateral damage. Earlyin the campaign, the Israelis realized that large num-bers of infantry would be necessary to clear built-upareas; something IDF lacked because of its tradi-tional emphasis on maneuver warfare. Lacking suffi-cient infantry, the IDF resorted to heavy weapons.Firepower over infantry was probably the preferred(and preordained) solution in Lebanon since the IDFhad earlier increased its reliance on mobile artilleryto suppress enemy infantry rather than expand itsown infantry forces in the wake of lessons learnedfrom the 1973 war.

Lesson 14

The tempo of urban operations is so intense thatsoldiers tend to “burn out.” After-action assess-ments of IDF performance during urban operationspoint out IDF’s difficulty in sustaining combat oper-ations because of the high stress level it imposed onindividual soldiers. This observation is borne out byIsraeli casualty figures: 10 to 24 percent of Israelisoldiers serving in Lebanon experienced psychologi-cal problems as a result of their battle experience.Compared with a psychological casualty rate of only3.5 to 5 percent in the 1973 war, this means that bat-tle shock casualties in Lebanon were two to five

times more serious. The number of soldiers ablereturn to their units after treatment was also mulower than expected.

Lesson 15

Non-combatants do not behave sensibly. ManyIsraeli military planners presumed civilians in urbacombat zones would practice “common sense” aabandon areas where fighting was taking place.many cases, this did not occur. For many reasonssome based on experiences in the earlier Lebancivil war — civilians instead tried to stay in theihomes. For example, some families were convincby PLO propaganda that if they left their homeduring an IDF truce, they would be killed by thIsraelis. Others probably underestimated the likeduration and intensity of the fighting and felt thecould withstand the effects of Israeli/PLO/Syriacombat. Still others simply feared that soldiewould loot their unprotected possessions — a resonable fear given the prevalence of looting durithe Lebanese civil war.

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Lesson 16

The large-scale movement of urban noncombatantscan significantly affect military operations. At theurging of Israeli psychological warfare units, over30,000 noncombatants fled the city of Tyre andheaded for the beaches southwest of the city. (Later,in the midst of the fighting, half the people returned tothe city.) The massive exodus clogged roads anddelayed IDF attacks on PLO strongpoints. Similarly,the need to impose cease-fires and open lanes forcivilians to escape the fighting in Beirut slowed IDFoperations in the city.

Lesson 17

Psychological operations were a major element ofIsraeli strategy. Psychological warfare played a vitalrole in the Israeli seizure of Tyre and Sidon as well asduring the siege of Beirut. Throughout the campaign,the IDF widely employed leaflets, pamphlets, andloudspeakers to get its message across. Israeli psy-chological operations were often successful inachieving tactical goals like encouraging large num-bers of civilians to abandon urban areas to facilitatecombat operations. However, they were not success-ful at the campaign nor strategic levels in gettingPLO fighters to lay down their arms, nor in convinc-ing the Lebanese Sunni Muslim population to pres-sure the PLO into leaving.

Lesson 18

Urban operations in Lebanon stressed the IDF’s logis-tics system because of unusual requirements andabnormally high consumption rates. The IDF took anumber of modest, but important steps to supplement thestandard equipment suites of units prior to deployingthem in cities. Hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenadelaunchers, light antitank weapons, and illuminationrounds for mortars were issued to infantry platoons inlarger numbers than normal. The number of short-rangetactical radios, especially hand-held radios, was alsoincreased beyond the usual unit allotments.

Lesson 19

Standard Israeli military unit configurations wereinappropriate for urban combat. During the battle for

Beirut, the IDF adopted a task-oriented form of tacticorganization that cross-attached tanks and self-ppelled artillery to infantry units. In such cases, tharmor and artillery generally remained under the infatry’s command for the duration of the tactical action.

Lesson 20Failure to understand the importance of civilaffairs cost Israeli commanders a high price. LocalIDF commanders did not understand the vital impotance of civil affairs for ongoing urban combat opeations. Thus, civil affairs efforts were ineffectuaCommanders failed to grasp the immediate combimplications or the larger political implications opoor population management. Israeli psychologicoperations convinced 30,000 noncombatants to flTyre and head for beaches outside the city. The ssequent inability of the IDF to provide food, wateclothing, shelter, and sanitation for these people pduced predictable consequences. Many tried return to the city; a process that complicated tnorthward movement of Israeli troops and the deliery of ordnance on selected targets in Tyre. IDcommanders compounded these oversights by infering with the efforts of outside relief agencies aid the displaced population of Tyre lest the PLbenefit in some way. This second civil affairs failurcreated an adverse situation that was quickexploited by PLO psychological warfare specialistThe IDF also failed to educate its troops in dealinwith Lebanese civilians. Although the Shi’a Muslimpopulation of southern Lebanon either initially wecomed or was neutral to Israeli presence, it sobecame hostile because of the behavior of IDF psonnel and other factors.

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Lesson 21Aircraft played several important roles in urbanoperations, especially at the battle of Sidon. TheIsraeli air force carried out seven major missions in theattack on Sidon:

1. Provided air cover for an amphibious landing.

2. Prior to the IDF entering Sidon, bombed selectedtargets both to take out strongpoints and to psycholog-ically demoralize PLO defenders in the refugee campsoutside the city.

3. Provided close air support during difficult battles forthe city.

4. Provided air cover over the city against the threatfrom Syrian fighters.

5. Transported troops and equipment via helicopteraround bottlenecks that developed on the ground in Sidon.

6. Removed wounded via helicopter.

7. Dropped psychological warfare leaflets over the city.

Lesson 22Amphibious operations have a role in urban war-fare. Israel conducted two amphibious landings — asmall one in support of operations in Tyre, and alarger one (about brigade strength) during the cam-paign to capture Sidon.

Lesson 23Special forces played a limited, but significant role inIsraeli operations. Israeli naval commandos made theinitial landings during amphibious operations just

north of Sidon and secured the beachhead for folloon landing forces. This was the first major amphibiooperation carried out by the Israeli navy.

Lesson 24

Naval forces can play an important supporting rolein urban operations. Israeli naval forces were usedto conduct amphibious operations to achieve tactisurprise and to isolate Tyre and Sidon at the outsethe campaign. These were technically difficult conduct due to a shortage of landing craft. The Isranavy had to keep shuttling the landing craft acrothe 55 kilometers between the beaches north of Sidand Israel. At Sidon, the navy also took the ancieport under fire. Due to Beirut’s coastal location, thIsraeli navy also played an important part in isolatinthe PLO and other hostile forces in West Beirut nethe coast. Additionally, the Navy provided modefire support using its 76-mm guns, but its main actities involved coastal patrols to prevent reinforcment of PLO positions or the seaborne delivery supplies. Other tactical missions included preventiopposition forces from either mining the beach preparing defensive positions.

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Tactical Lessons

Lesson 25The shock value of artillery fire diminishes with time.The IDF discovered shock value of indirect artillery firein urban warfare depending upon the frequency of itsuse. In urban areas like Tyre that were already accus-tomed to seeing and hearing artillery fire because of theLebanese civil war, Israeli artillery fire had less psycho-logical shock value than Israeli commanders expected.Likewise in Beirut, its value diminished as combatants(and civilians) became increasingly aware of its short-comings when used in moderation against built-up areas.

Lesson 26

Forces operating in cities need special equipment notfound in standard Israeli tables of organization andequipment (TO&E). Beyond increasing the quantitiesof standard TO&E equipment, the IDF also issued loud-speakers and snipping equipment not normally part ofan infantry unit’s kit. Supplemental armor was alsoadded to the sides and fronts of many tanks because ofthe heightened risk from antitank weapons in cities.

Lesson 27Urban civilian structures (e.g., hospitals, churches,banks, embassies) are located in tactically useful loca-tions, command key intersections, and/or are built ofespecially solid construction and therefore afforddefenders good protection. As mentioned earlier, weap-ons emplacements in “off-limits” structures such ashospitals, churches, schools, banks, and embassies

afford the defender “political” protection if the attackewish to minimize civilian casualties and politicallyunacceptable collateral damage to the urban infrastrture. Such facilities also offer significant tactical miltary value since they are located at key intersectiocommand the high ground in an area, and/or are so wbuilt that their construction affords defenders an unually high degree of protection. Thus, the decision place weapons in “off limits” facilities may be dictateas much, or on some occasions more, by tactical mtary necessity as by political considerations.

Lesson 28Rigorous communications security is essential. Over-all, IDF communications security was good, althoughfew lapses occurred. This was partly due to the wspread use of encrypted communications equipment employment of a double-cipher system. The IDchanged codes daily and prearranged changes in rfrequency. Conversely, the IDF regularly monitored Syian and PLO communications because neither practirigorous communications security; both made extensuse of commercial telephones throughout the urbareas of Lebanon. Commercial facilities provided instacommunications for those forces, but also enabled IDF to identify PLO locations and plan responses orders intercepted over commercial phone lines.

Lesson 29Snipers were very cost effective. The PLO activelyemployed snipers, even though its people receivedtle formal training and were not equipped with spcialized equipment. Nevertheless, PLO snipe

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delayed IDF operations in Sidon out of proportion tothe resources invested in such operations. Similarly,the Syrians used snipers effectively to block Israeliadvances in the southeastern suburbs of Beirut. TheIDF viewed snipers as extremely valuable for psycho-logical reasons as well. Even if they did not kill largenumbers of the enemy, their presence forced Israeliopponents to be wary, thus placing a higher level ofpsychological stress on enemy personnel. In addition,the Israelis believed sniper teams were a valuablesource of intelligence, since much of their time wasexpended patiently observing enemy actions.

Lesson 30

Explosive ordnance disposal teams are essential inurban areas. Israeli explosive ordnance disposalteams inspected captured weapons caches, eitherdestroying them or recommending their evacuation.They also performed their traditional function of neu-tralizing “dud” munitions (such as unexploded submu-nitions) and clearing bobby traps.

Lesson 31

Armored forces cannot operate in cities withoutextensive dismounted infantry support. The IDF,because of its traditional bias in favor of armor,often tried to use armor without proper infantry sup-port. It soon discovered, however, that unaccompa-nied armor strikes were almost always more costlyin lives and equipment than operations in whicharmor was supported by dismounted infantry. Thus,by the siege of Beirut, Israeli tanks almost alwaysentered battle with infantry support to suppress man-portable, antitank weapons.

Lesson 32

Direct-fire artillery can be a valuable tool in urbancombat provided collateral damage is not a majorconcern. The IDF made extensive use of point-blank,direct-fire artillery, especially 155-mm self-propelledhowitzers, during the fighting in Beirut; this techniquecalled “sniping.” The heavier 155-mm high explosiveprojectiles were found especially effective in reducingstrongpoints and reinforced buildings; in some cases,causing the entire building to collapse. The need toemploy self-propelled artillery in a direct-fire mode

was partly due to the inability of available HEAT anAPFDS tank rounds to penetrate concrete structuand to an absence of suitable HE-fragmentatirounds for tank guns.

Lesson 33

Small unit leadership was critical to Israeli tactical success. IDF doctrine endows small units, like companiewith the authority to operate with substantial independethroughout the battle zone. Thus, junior officers wetrained to exercise discretion and adapt to operationalcumstances without involving superior officers. Thewere important attributes since urban conflict, by its venature, places a considerable premium on small units oating independently in a tactically fluid situation.

Lesson 34

Tanks are central to Israeli urban warfare doc-trine. The centrality of the tank in Israeli tactica

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doctrine led the IDF to examine how tanks couldbest be employed in cities while simultaneouslyguarding against their recognized vulnerabilities.IDF doctrine also emphasized that the shock valueof tanks in cities could sometimes compensate for alack of dismounted infantry support. Despite thispredisposition for using unsupported tanks in cities,the IDF moved to using combined arms tactics dur-ing the siege of Beirut where the tank was judged thesingle most valuable weapon for suppressing enemyfire. The Israelis lost a few tanks in urban fighting; itis unclear whether this modest loss rate was due toextensive use of infantry support to suppress anti-tank fire, superior design characteristics, or poorPLO antitank tactics.

Lesson 35

Night operations are very difficult in urban terrain.The Israeli inventory included a variety of passiveand active night-observation devices, light-enhance-ment devices, and tank-mounted searchlights. Never-theless, night operations were very limited due to ashortage of night vision devices. (This shortage mayexplain why the Israelis used the headlights ofarmored personnel carriers and illumination roundsto capture Beaufort Castle in a rare night operation.)The relative absence of night operations was alsodue, in part, to the need for troops to rest in highlystressful urban battle conditions. Israeli commandersdid, however, use the cover of night to move toward atarget undetected, but waited until daylight to attackPLO positions.

Technical Lessons

Lesson 36

Small arms, although not decisive, played a disproportionate role in the outcome of urban battles. Atotal of 55 percent of IDF casualties were attributedsmall arms fire.

Lesson 37

Individual flak jackets significantly reduced Israelicasualties. Israeli forces were equipped with flak jackets that were light, easy to close, and fit higher thmost standard military protective vests. Israeli afteaction surveys of the number of hits on flak jackets (hthat otherwise would have penetrated the wearebody) indicate that casualties would have been 20 pcent higher without the use of protective vests.

Lesson 38

Smoke enhances survivability in urban situationsbut carries significant operational drawbacks. In thebattle for Sidon, Israeli forces found smoke very effe

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tive in reducing losses. The Israelis came to believethat smoke was effective between 100 and 300 metersin preventing PLO use of RPGs and light weaponsagainst advancing forces. On the downside, smokeoften caused as many problems as it solved. That is,smoke was found to impede visual communicationamong attacking Israeli forces, taxed the driving skillsof vehicle operators, and slowed the overall rate ofadvance. Perhaps these drawbacks limited IDF’s useof smoke during the siege of Beirut.

Lesson 39Mortars were highly regarded by all sides, but hadlimited effectiveness. Many participants placed greatemphasis on the value of mortars, especially as a psy-chological weapon. Also, some believed mortars wereparticularly useful in urban situations because of theirhigh angle of fire. Despite these perceptions of the par-ticipants, it appeared that the Israeli 60-mm and the81-mm small infantry mortars were largely ineffectivesince their high explosive projectiles could not, inmost cases, penetrate roofs. The heavier Soviet 120-mm mortar was better since it often penetrated roofs.Additionally, the Syrians found the Soviet 240-mmtowed mortar highly effective for cratering roads aswell as for gutting the top stories (one to three) ofbuildings. Finally, mortars were extensively used tofire smoke and illumination rounds.

Lesson 40Machineguns may be more valuable than assaultrifles for urban combat. Syrian experience in urbanwarfare in Lebanon suggests that machineguns, espe-

cially heavy machineguns (12.7-mm) were far mouseful than assault rifles. Aside from their greater rof fire, rounds from heavy machineguns were betterpenetrating concrete and cinderblock structures thrifle ammunition — an important consideration ibuilt-up areas.

Lesson 41

Air defense guns are valuable for suppressinground targets. The IDF found that M163 Vulcan 20-mm antiaircraft guns were very useful in urban setings because the Vulcan has sufficiently high elevtion to target the upper stories of buildings. Secondthe Vulcan offered a high rate of fire that was veeffective in suppressing snipers and intimidating oppnents. These views of antiaircraft weapons weshared by Israel’s opponents. As a result of earexperiences in the Lebanese civil war, standard Syrtactical doctrine called for employing an antiaircrasection of ZU-23 23-mm cannons with a tank battaliwhen operating in an urban environment. The Syriaconcluded that ZU-23s have a “devastating effecwhen employed against the outside walls because t“denude structures with their high rates of fire.” Simlarly, the PLO also employed antiaircraft guns in ground-support role.

Lesson 42

Commercial, off-the-shelf technologies wereemployed for military purposes. The PLO producedself-propelled antiaircraft artillery by mounting SovieZPU-1/2/4 14.5-mm heavy machineguns and ZU-23-mm autocannons on light commercial trucks. Addtionally, the PLO depended heavily upon commercUHF hand-held radios made by Motorola, Telefunkeand RACAL, as well as Japanese-made VHF commnications equipment for urban operations.

Lesson 43

Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) can provide reatime intelligence, but analysts have considerable difficulty interpreting it correctly. The Israelis employedRPVs to gather real-time intelligence on the movemeof people within cities, the state of the battlefield, afor immediate attack assessment. On-board TV caeras relayed the pictures to ground stations for anal

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or dissemination. Such RPV-generated photos, how-ever, only gave vague and contradictory data on troopmovements in built-up areas. Photo interpreters fre-quently misinterpreted the purpose of particular facili-ties and could only make estimates after this functionchanged. This was partly because the PLO learned toshelter many of its activities as well as adopt confusingand covert patterns of movement. All of this led to asignificant degree of mistargeting in Beirut as well asthe need to use area or multiple strikes. The photosfrom RPVs were only useful for pinpointing majorpieces of equipment like antiaircraft defenses.

Lesson 44

Helicopters are not suited for urban combat. TheIsraelis made virtually no use of helicopter gun-shipsin cities, apparently fearing they were too vulnerableto antiaircraft weapons and ground-fire. Helicopterswere used in cities only for transporting men andmateriel from rear areas to just behind the frontlines.

Lesson 45

Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) are omnipresentand very effective weapons in urban combat. ThePLO issued RPGs on a wide scale, although training intheir use was often poor. PLO forces were equippedwith one RPG per every three to six fighters. PLO-fired RPGs had little success against the IsraeliMerkava tank, but forced the IDF to stop using M113armored personnel carriers and trucks near the front-line. RPGs were more widely used as general purposeweapons for attacking troops in buildings, behind bar-ricades, or for harassing fire. The RPG was particu-larly useful since it was well suited to urban terrain.Fields of fire were seldom more than 300 to 500meters, making such short-range weapons adequate. Inaddition, the RPG, although not optimized for destruc-tion of concrete or cinderblock, was more effectivethan small arms fire.

Lesson 46

Armored bulldozers are critical assets in urban com-bat. IDF combat engineers used armored bulldozers toclear barricades (some of which were mined) as wellas other obstructions that slowed IDF operationaltempo. Bulldozers were also used to smother bunkers,

establish firing positions, widen and grade roads, ato create alternative avenues of advance to bypassurban infrastructure.

Lesson 47

Lightly protected armored personnel carriers are olimited value in urban terrain. Israeli infantrymoved mostly on foot in cities because the lightprotected M113 armored personnel carrier was foulacking in several respects after initial operations Tyre. PLO ambushes of Israeli columns with RPGcaused extensive casualties, in part because of tendency of the M113’s aluminum armor to catch ofire after being hit by antitank weapons. In some IDunits, men became so frightened at the possibilityRPG-induced fire that they simply walked next them or rode outside rather than risk being burneddeath. By the time of the siege of Beirut, armorepersonnel carriers were only used to carry suppliesadvancing troops, always stopping at least 1meters behind enemy lines. Besides the vulnerabiof M113s to RPG fire, the IDF found them unsatifactory for urban warfare because of their limiteability to provide suppression fire — their machineguns lacked sufficient elevation to use against upstories of building; extreme vulnerability of crewserving outside mounted machineguns to sniper fiand inability to maneuver in narrow roads and alleof cities and refugee camps.

Lesson 48

Some Israeli equipment was modified while in thfield to counter enemy tactics and equipment. Lack-ing an adequate infantry transport vehicle for urbsituations, the IDF fell back on several field-expediesolutions. For example, the unusual configuration the Merkava tank, with its rear mounted turret, prvided one option. This tank had been designed rapid ammunition resupply through a pair of redoors. By removing these ammunition racks, about troops could be carried in cramped quarters. TMerkava was also used as an improvised armoambulance to extract wounded infantry using the samethod. The IDF also adapted an armored engineevehicle, the Nagma-chon, that had a large compartment in the center to carry engineering troops, b

32

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totheps,andn-

otois-

ofrtstillfa-ey

d

dy-ofasw.eMsndde-gesus-hemsfor

could also be used for moving infantry. It was rela-tively invulnerable to RPGs because its glacis andsuperstructure were protected by Blazer reactivearmor. Additionally, the Israelis equipped somearmored personnel carriers with add-on passivespaced-armor for more protection.

Lesson 49

Dissatisfaction with the survivability of combatinfantry vehicles led to significant technologicalimprovements after the war. One of the outcomesof the war in Lebanon was the IDF decision in theearly 1990s to build a heavy armored infantry vehi-cle, the Achzerit, based on surplus T-55 tank hulls.About 250 Achzerits were build as a supplement tothe M113 armored personnel carrier, especially inurban combat situations. The Achzarit weights43 tons and carries a crew of 2 plus 10 infantry-men. It is armed with a Rafael OWS remote controlmachinegun station plus two 7.62-mm manuallyoperated FN machineguns. Additionally, theAchzarit carries an internally-mounted 60-mmmortar for use against man-portable antitank weap-ons. The M113 also underwent a series of upgradesto improve its survivability to RPGs and to make itmore suitable for urban terrain. With about 4,000M113s in service, the IDF had no choice but toimprove the M113 rather than replace the fleet witha more suitable urban assault vehicle. After thewar, the IDF developed an improved add-on spacedarmor based on Rafael’s TOGA applique armor.This was a carbon-steel, lighter-weight, perforatedapplique mounted to the sides of the M113’s hulland front. Not completely satisfied with theTOGA’s performance against RPGs, the Israelisdeveloped two more passive armor packages.Finally, in 1996, the IDF fitted their M113s with areactive armor package.

Lesson 50

Accurate and up-to-date maps are essential for sucessful urban operations. Recognizing the impor-tance of up-to-date maps, the IDF took great painsassemble accurate and highly detailed maps for Beirut operation. Besides conventional surface mathe IDF also was able to obtain maps of the sewers underground tunnels from their Lebanese allies. Coventional maps were also supplemented by phmosaic maps created from aircraft and RPV reconnasance missions that were highly valued becausetheir timeliness and detail. In spite of extensive effoto develop accurate maps, urban navigation sremained difficult as units easily became lost in unmiliar settings or were prevented from recognizing klandmarks due to smoke or dust in the air.

Lesson 51

Cluster munitions are very effective in cities, providecollateral damage is not a major concern. The Israelisfound that cluster munitions, including both air-droppeCBU bombs and artillery-fired DPICMs, were vereffective in city fighting. In the case of artillery, conventional ammunition usually struck the upper stories buildings, causing little damage below, whereDPICMs dropped their payload into the streets beloConversely, cluster munitions had little impact if thopponent had already reached shelter since DPIChad little penetration capability against concrete acinderblock. Therefore, cluster munitions were founmost effective when used in quick, short-duration, timon-target strikes and least useful in prolonged barrawhere the defenders could take cover in buildings. Clter munitions had a significant downside as well. Tresidue of unexploded sub-munitions posed problefor friendly forces occupying an area and especially returning civilians.

33

Section 4British Experience in Northern Ireland

gol-horyrd- tocivilal-

rtsed

yA

hefb-

h91n

heed

Substantial British military involvement in NorthernIreland began in August 1969 when the army intervenedin assistance of civil authorities after large-scale sectar-ian rioting in Belfast and Londonderry revealed policeinability to maintain public order. Some parts of bothcities were declared no-go areas by paramilitary forcesand the police dared not enter them. Eventually, Britisharmy strength in Northern Ireland grew from 3,000 inAugust 1969 to 32,000 in 1972. Subsequently, the max-imum strength of British forces in Northern Irelanddeclined and has fluctuated between 17,000 to 19,000.

From 1969 through 1976, the military had primacy insecurity operations in Northern Ireland with the police

playing a supporting role. The British army’s policinmission created a number of serious problems. Sdiers on the streets of Belfast and Londonderry wneeded to make arrests initially had no statutoauthority to do so. Soldiers also had to use exact woing when making arrests; failure to do so led courtsrelease the suspect and/or award the detainee damages for breaching his rights. Worse yet, overzeous soldiers faced criminal charges in civilian coufor their use of deadly force. (This was later amendso that soldiers would face military courts.)

Between 1972 and May 1974, the British armreduced the level of urban violence such that the IRhad difficulty operating in Northern Ireland. The IRAthen shifted to British targets in Europe and within tUnited Kingdom. This ultimately led to a series ospectacular attacks that included the Brighton boming in October of 1984, designed to kill the BritisPrime Minister and her cabinet; and the February 19mortar attack on 10 Downing Street while JohMajor’s Cabinet was in session at the height of tGulf War. During that same time frame, IRA activservice units targeted individual British soldiers anairmen assigned to NATO roles in Europe.

NORTHERNIRELAND

Lough Erne Lough Neagh

Atlantic Ocean

AtlanticOcean

IrishSea

Saint George's Channel

SCOTLAND

WALES

North C

hannel

Lough Conn

Lough Mask

LoughCorrib

Lough Ree

Lough Derg

AchillIsland

Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

Celtic Sea

BELFAST

DUBLIN

35

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l ofr-

rry.d

a-

ino-

d

if-henn-hele beolicticnralutrityld

all

Beginning in May 1976, the police began reassertingtheir primacy over security operations in an effort tocriminalize paramilitary operations. The idea was totreat terrorists like other violent individuals who hadbroken the law. Consequently, a reinvigorated andenlarged police force reentered the no-go areas. Overthe next 3 years, the army lost its primacy over secu-rity operations in Northern Ireland. Since then, thearmy has maintained a lower profile within cities andhas been called on only when events deem it neces-sary. The military is also responsible for sealing off thenorth-south border from contraband weapons and ter-rorist passage. The following lessons are drawn prima-rily from the 1969-1976 period.

Strategic Lessons

Lesson 1

Military action could not solve deep-seated politicalproblems, but did buy time for politicians to search forpotential solutions. Despite 28 years of British militaryinvolvement in Northern Ireland, the underlying politi-cal problems of Catholic-Protestant intolerance and

irreconcilable preferences for either union with the IriRepublic or continued membership in the United Kindom have never been resolved. British military preence, however, was able to reduce the overall leveviolence such that the civilian police could again opeate in so-called no-go areas of Belfast and LondondeSenior British military commanders often recognizethe limitations of their efforts and were frustrated bylack of initiative in the political arena. Lieutenant General Sir Henry Tuzo, General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland, specifically acknowledged this propsition in a BBC television interview in June 1971.

Lesson 2Well-defined policy objectives to which the army coulwork steadily and logically were difficult to obtain. Anyguidance received often vacillated greatly. Part of the dficulty in the early days stemmed from the fact that tBritish Army in Northern Ireland needed policy directiofrom two sources simultaneously: the Unionist Goverment of Northern Ireland located in Stormont; and tBritish Government in London. Even after Direct Ruwas established by London, governments continued totorn between the desires of the Protestant and Cathcommunities in Northern Ireland, as well as domesBritish political preference to minimize involvement ithe troubles. For example, Sir Ian Freeland, GeneOfficer Commanding in 1969, repeatedly asked for, bnever received, a statement of policy aims for the secuforces under his direction. On the whole, officers wouhave preferred either strong political control or none atinstead of the hesitant direction they did received.

NORWAY

SWEDEN

ENGLAND

PORTUGAL

SPAIN

FRANCE

ITALY

POLANDGERMANY

CZECHREP.

SLOV.

HUNGARYAUSTRIASWITZ

SLOVENIA

CROATIA

BOSNIA &HERZEGOVINA

Montenegro

Serb

ia

ALBANIA

NETH.

BELGIUM

LUX.

ANDORRA

NORTHERNIRELAND

NorthSea

BalticSea

AtlanticOcean

DENMARK

Boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.

Serbia and Montenegro have asserted the formation of a joint independent state, but this entity has not been formally recognized as a state by the United States.

Mediterranean Sea

LIECH.

SCOTLAND

IRELAND

WALES

36

terysesig-erhern-edeanal

ty

elyistr-ofo-y

Lesson 3

Contrary to initial expectations, operations in North-ern Ireland were neither short-lived nor low cost.When the British commenced military operations inNorthern Ireland in 1969, British Home SecretaryJames Callaghan told Parliament: “The GeneralOfficer Commanding Northern Ireland has beeninstructed to take all necessary steps, acting impar-tially between citizen and citizen, to restore law andorder. Troops will be withdrawn as soon as this isaccomplished. This is a limited operation.” Instead,British military presence in Northern Ireland grewfrom 3,000 prior to Callaghan’s statement to a high of30,000 in 1972. Overall, 300,000 British soldiers, sail-ors, and airmen served in Northern Ireland between1969 and 1994. Director General of MI5 (Britishcounterintelligence) admitted that half of MI5’sresources went to countering the threat from Irish ter-rorism. The death toll was also significant. If the levelof violence in Northern Ireland between 1969 and1981 was reproduced in a population the size of theUnited States, there would have been 340,000 deathsover that same period.

Lesson 4

Long-running operations in Northern Ireland ele-vated British army and the Royal Ulster Constabu-lary (RUC) force levels, as well as warped the army’soverall combat force mix. British operations in North-ern Ireland absorbed between 20 and 33 percent of allBritish infantry battalions at any one time between1969 and 1993; these figures include units in trainingto deploy to Northern Ireland as well as those already

on the ground. This led the British to keep a greanumber of infantry battalions within the overall armcombat force mix than they would have otherwineeded to meet operational requirements. These nificant manpower requirements also led to largforce levels than necessary to meet NATO and otexternal security requirements. The manpower-intesive nature of antiterrorist operations also increasthe size of the RUC. A White Paper written for thRUC estimated that, with a political agreement and end to terrorist violence in Northern Ireland, totpolice force size could shrink from 12,000 to 5,000

Lessons 5

Police and military activities overlapped to a poinwhere the demarcation between police and militarfunctions blurred. This worked to the detriment ofboth organizations. Police were neither adequatequipped nor trained to deal with an armed terrorarmy; similarly, the military was not prepared to rigoously enforce the law. The army’s performance police work had two major flaws. First, under the prvisions of the Specials Powers Act by which the arm

37

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e

inonh a onin94ighof —em,

ngr-blicers

-,ittle.

iedat

was deployed in Northern Ireland in aid of civilauthority, soldiers initially had no legal authority tomake arrests, conduct vehicle checks or break up gath-erings. (This oversight was later remedied by the Brit-ish Parliament.) Second, soldiers were expected toknow and use correct legal terms when making arrests;using the wrong terms obliged the government to paycivil damages and/or release well-known villains.

Lesson 6

Both Catholic and Protestant paramilitary groupsreceived substantial financial and materiel assistancefrom abroad. The Libyans admit providing aid to theIRA in the amount of L9 million in the 1980s; Theyshipped 130 tons of weapons to the IRA between 1985and 1987. These weapons are believed to include:

The Libyans also allegedly tried to send 20 SAM-7missiles to the IRA in 1987, but the ship was inter-cepted off France.

Lesson 7

Over time, both the Protestant and Catholic paramil-itaries increasingly turned to crime to finance theiractivities. Protestant and Catholic paramilitariesturned to robbery, extortion, and especially drug-deal-ing in England and Northern Ireland to finance their

military activities, pay salaries of full-time officersand support the families of jailed comrades.

Lesson 8

When British security operations began achievingresults, the IRA started attacking British targets on thContinent and within the United Kingdom. Since1972, the IRA has carried out a series of bombingsEngland. The most spectacular include: the Brightbombing in October 1984, designed to kill the BritisPrime Minister and members of her Cabinet duringParty Conference; the February 1991 mortar attack10 Downing Street while John Major’s Cabinet was session at the height of the Gulf War; and March 19mortar attacks on Heathrow Airport. Besides these hprofile events, the IRA also attacked a wide variety targets — pubs, resort hotels, and shopping districtsaffecting British citizens. IRA active service units havalso operated in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgiuand France against British soldiers and airmen fulfillithe UK’s NATO obligations. The Protestant paramilitaies also threatened to attack targets within the Repuof Ireland as well as to strike Republican sympathizresiding on the English mainland.

Lesson 9

IRA and Protestant paramilitary operations moreoften aimed at achieving political advantage than military results. Operations against Heathrow Airportshopping districts, pubs, and hotels seemed to have lmilitary value, but often translated into political gainEven attacks against military targets were often carrout for political advantage. IRA strategists believed th

AK-47 assault rifles 650General-purpose machineguns, 12DHSK armor-piercing machine-guns capable of shooting downing helicopters

20

Surface-to-air missile (SAM) 1

38

s,ontedndn-n-eces

ial.at-er-eisal

y sol-e,toentatns-

e-owthe

they had detected a pattern in past British colonial pol-icy. At the start of terrorist activity, the governmentwould affirm its intention to remain; over time, it wouldtire of the violence, decide the asset was not worth pre-serving, and the British would leave shortly thereafter.Initially, the IRA reasoned that if the deaths of 36 Brit-ish soldiers in Aden sapped British resolve, the sameresults could be achieved if they killed a small numberof soldiers in Northern Ireland. Even though it has notworked out that way, IRA strategists maintain that polit-ical gain is the chief goal of military operations.

Operational Lessons:

Lesson 10

Existing British military doctrine was inappropriatefor operating in Northern Ireland. Despite havingextensive experience in counterterrorist operations inKenya, Malaya, Aden, Hong Kong, Cyprus, and othercolonial outposts, the British Army could not applyproven approaches and methods due to the unique sta-tus of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom.For example, the traditional approach to suppressingriots involved the following steps: British soldierswould form into a tightly knit box formation, deploybarbed wire to separate themselves from the unrulycrowd, order the crowd to disperse or they would befired upon, and then shoot a few of the obvious ring-leaders in the hostile crowd. Shooting down UK citi-zens (captured on television) was understood bymilitary leaders as a no-go from the beginning. TheBritish military also had to abandon traditional, doctri-

nally prescribed, intelligence-gathering techniquesuch as interrogation in-depth, because they soaroused accusations of torture that were investigaby a special commission headed by Sir EdmuCompton. The uproar over using interrogation idepth on a small number of specially selected prisoers caught British military authorities off-guard sincthose techniques were taught at the Joint ServiIntelligence School for some time.

Lesson 11

Clear rules of engagement were deemed essentBecause the British Army was theoretically only opering in assistance of civil authorities, the actions of its psonnel were individually accountable under thprovisions of British law. Thus, if a soldier exceeded hauthority, he might be charged and tried in a crimincourt. (The Army resisted civil prosecution of militarpersonnel and eventually the government agreed thatdiers would only appear in military courts.) Thereforthe British Army issued yellow cards to each soldier define what he could do. These rules of engagemwere well below what the law allowed. This meant thsoldiers could theoretically exceed their instructioslightly without breaking the law. This approach of building a wide margin for error within the rules of engagment was probably wise since soldiers found the yellcards cumbersome and often felt that if they followed rules, they would not be doing their job properly.

39

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i-y

ndithge

st”,eepce

iceileand all

e

Lesson 12

Rules of engagement are sometimes difficult toenforce. Despite the British military headquarters inNorthern Ireland officially promulgating minimumforce/maximum respect for the law policies throughits yellow card rules of engagement, strong evidencesuggested that at times security forces in the fieldactually operated on a shoot-on-sight basis at theirown initiative. The rules of minimum force andrespect of the law were seriously challenged in late1982 after three RUC officers were murdered by theIRA from ambush in Lurgan. Shortly thereafter,security forces killed three IRA men when their carfailed to stop at a checkpoint. One week later, anRUC patrol spotted suspicious activity alongside adeserted cottage near Lurgan and opened fire on twosuspects carrying 65-year old Mauser bolt-actionrifles. Also, as soldiers increasingly became targetsof violence, some became rude, abusive, and evenviolent with transgressors.

Lesson 13

Situation-oriented training greatly improved Britishmilitary effectiveness. In the early years, training forservice in Northern Ireland was either nonexistent atworst or haphazard at best for two reasons. First, bat-talions were often rushed to Northern Ireland withlittle or no notice. Second, few knew what to train thetroops for. This situation changed in 1972 with theestablishment of Northern Ireland Training Assis-tance Teams (NITAT) in England and Germany toprepare units for deployment. The formation ofNITAT was the first decisive institutional step taken

by the British army toward dealing with the longterm nature of its commitment in Northern IrelanThe standard Northern Ireland training package infantry included urban patrolling techniques; riocontrol procedures; how to shoot at fleeing targefirst aid; powers and procedures for arrest; rulesengagement for using deadly force; descriptions IRA and Protestant paramilitary tactics, organizatioand capabilities; and use of internal security equment. Engineer troops received different traininsuch as search procedures and disarming botraps. Realism was added to the training through scially constructed urban combat ranges where troocould experience a wide variety of scenarios drawfrom actual experience in Northern Ireland. Addtionally, the British instituted a procedure wherebeach battalion on orders to go to Northern Irelasent an advanced party to familiarize themselves wthe actual ground situation and to gather knowledfrom the unit being replaced.

Lesson 14

The tempo of operations in an urban environment waintense. Therefore, personnel tended to “burn ouquickly. In addition to grim and poor living conditionssoldiers spent days in covert observation positions, slwas deprived, there were constant patrols, intelligengathering, base duties, administrative work, short-notdeployments, continuous threat of sniper attacks whon patrol and of mortar attacks when at base camp, a continuous barrage of insults and verbal abuse fromsides while moving within the community. To minimiz

40

a,6,u-.rs

ar-n

thethep-l-nd

t-

alsthr-dto

greshf alled

tal

nd

rgelyrioting

fs,

mistakes and maximize effectiveness of duty personnel,the British army allotted one 4-day rest and recreationleave to each soldier per tour and rotated out entire unitsafter 4 months on-station.

Lesson 15

Intelligence is even more critical in urban environ-ments fighting paramilitary groups than in moreconventional combat operations. Intelligence wascritical since troops operating Belfast and Lon-donderry were fighting an enemy indistinguishablefrom the local population. Good information allowedthe British military to perform selective target militaryoperations against specific individuals and to avoidhumiliating mistakes like arresting old women, theinfirmed, and pro-peace community leaders based onbogus tips anonymously supplied by the IRA disinfor-mation operations. Unfortunately, the RUC’s intelli-gence-gathering capabilities in Catholic areas wasvirtually nonexistent when the British Army inter-vened in 1969. Therefore, the Army had to build itsown intelligence system costing money, men, andeffort. Eventually, impressive results were producedand investment was fully returned. The Director Gen-eral of MI5 (British counterintelligence) estimates thatsecurity forces now prevent four out of every fiveattempted terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland.

Lesson 16

Urban operations (especially intelligence operations)required careful coordination among military, police,and civil agencies. At the beginning, many lessonslearned elsewhere about the value of coordination were

either forgotten or ignored. In the intelligence arenthere was virtually no coordination between MI5, M1the RUC, and the army. Differing loyalties and instittional rivalries were partly to blame for this situationFor example, both MI6 and the RUC would mark papeto prohibit the other’s access. Similarly, procedural briers generally inhibited the exchange of informatioamong army and police elements at the unit level in early phase of the joint army-RUC campaign against IRA and the Protestant paramilitaries. Eventually, cooeration and coordination improved; institutional rivaries, however, never completely disappeared acontinue to inhibit coordination to some degree.

Lesson 17

Psychological operations were a key part of the Briish military strategy for Northern Ireland. Therewere three primary goals for British psychologicoperations: winning public confidence (or at leareducing hostility to British military presence) througa ‘winning the hearts and minds’ campaign; counteing disinformation spread by the paramilitaries andamaging rumors; and spreading disinformation damage or unbalance the paramilitaries.

Lesson 18

British military operations were infantry-intensiveaffairs. In 1997, there were 18 battalions servininfantry roles in Northern Ireland. These figures aconsistent with the discussion in Lesson 4 that Irioperations absorbed between 20 and 33percent othe infantry battalions in the British army, and the nefor infantry in Northern Ireland led the British Army toretain a larger number of infantry battalions in the tocombat force mix.

Lesson 19Operations in Northern Ireland stressed the Britishlogistics system because of unusual requirements aabnormally high consumption rates. Units deployed toBelfast and Londonderry discovered they needed laquantities of a wide variety of items not usualassigned to combat elements; e.g., riot batons, shields, tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets, markdye for identifying specific demonstrators, handcuf

Ardoyne

Woodvale

NewLodge

Shankill

SpringfieldClonard

Lower Falls City Centre

Markets

ShortStrand

EastBelfastDonegall

Road

Andersonstown

Turf Lodge

Ballymurphy

NewBarnsley

ProtestantCatholicMixedMural Location

41

ascess:

eil-tt off-hintd

lyathld

en itd.ere

srity,re

and metal spikes for blocking roads to vehicular traffic.These needs, especially in the early days, put enormousdemands on the logistical system. During one large-scale deployment of additional combat forces to North-ern Ireland, British logisticians had to fly extra helmets,shields, and other riot gear in from Hong Kong on shortnotice. Eventually, some problems were eased by hav-ing departing units leave their special urban warfare kitsfor newly arriving troops. The other logistical difficultywas the high expenditure rate of consumables in majorurban operations. In one crowd control operation in Bel-fast, for instance, the security forces used 700 tear gascartridges and grenades. Conversely, consumption oftraditional combat supplies (artillery and antitankammunition) was abnormally low for units in action.

Lesson 20

The hard-core fighting strength of paramilitaryorganizations facing British security forces was rela-tively modest. Despite the widespread popularity ofProtestant and Catholic paramilitaries among the gen-eral population, the actual fighting strength of theseorganizations was modest. For example, activists inthe ultra-violent Irish National Liberation Army num-ber between 50 and 70 in Northern Ireland and anadditional 20 to 30 in the Irish Republic. Hard-coreIRA membership ranged from a high of about 1,000 inthe 1970s to a low of 250 to 300 in the mid-1980s.

Lesson 21

Special forces were useful military tools, but some-times became political embarrassments. Special AirService (SAS) personnel began operating in Northern

Ireland selectively as individuals in 1971 and later acknowledged SAS units in 1976. These special foreffectively carried out a number of general missionintelligence gathering, reconnaissance and survlance, training regular British military units in coverobservation techniques, ambush and harassmeninsurgents, retaliatory raids, and out-of-area/out-ocountry operations (e.g, incursions into the IrisRepublic and tracking of IRA terrorists through Spaand ultimately killing them in Gibraltar). These lastwo missions, although never publicly acknowledgeby either the British government or army, were widebelieved the work of the SAS — a perception thcaused great political angst in London. The Britisgovernment’s concern that introducing the SAS woucause detriment from a political perspective — givthe SAS’s fearsome reputation and the fact thatwould be operating domestically — was well foundeCharges of brutality, assassination, and terrorism whurled at the SAS by critics of British policy.

Tactical Lessons

Lesson 22

Patrolling was central to the British strategy inNorthern Ireland. Patrols in Northern Ireland werehigh-profile affairs whose main function initially wato reassure public and assert government authoespecially in the so-called no-go areas that we

42

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itm-

een

re

terni-ow Inheest.

sn

ng

declared off-limits to the police by paramilitary forcesin some parts of Belfast and Londonderry. More spe-cifically, patrolling was intended to: dominate theground thereby denying the enemy freedom of move-ment as well as asserting the primacy of governmentauthority, gather information about the territory and itsinhabitants for future operations, react to kill or cap-ture opportunities as they presented themselves.

Lesson 23

Patrolling in Belfast and Londonderry evolved into avery different kind of operation than patrolling in aconventional combat situation. Whereas traditionalcombat patrol procedures stressed low visibility andfurtiveness, British army patrols in Northern Irelandwere intended to be seen and so were intentionallyhigh-profile affairs. Whereas conventional combatpatrols are conducted to support the maneuver oflarger forces, patrolling in Northern Ireland was themaneuver. Finally, patrolling in Northern Ireland dif-fered from conventional patrolling practices since thefrequency of patrols was driven more by politicalexpediency than military necessity.

Lesson 24

Coordination was essential for the British urbanpatrolling tactics. Haphazard patrolling produced fewresults and it exposed patrols to unnecessary dangersbecause they lacked back-up support. Coordination,on the other hand, ensured the systematic and thor-ough canvassing of an area plus allowed commandersto have patrols moving in parallel so that they couldreinforce one another if necessary. Coordination also

reduced chances of patrols unknowingly confrontieach other and exchanging fire by accident. Coversely, predictable and repetitive patrolling madeeasier for the IRA to stage ambushes. Therefore, copany commanders had to strike a balance betwthese to conflicting requirements.

Lesson 25

Although the British used both vehicular and footpatrols, many commanders believed foot patrols wethe most effective approach. Many British commandersbelieved that patrolling on foot afforded soldiers a betopportunity to learn an area as well as offered opportuties to gain information because they could get to knthe people who lived in their assigned patrol area.doing so, commanders were faced with trading off tgreater safety offered by patrolling in armored vehiclversus better effectiveness gained by operating on foo

Lesson 26

The British concluded that wheeled armored vehiclewere preferable to tracked vehicles for operating iBelfast and Londonderry. Early on, the British highcommand in Northern Ireland decided against usi

43

innsg.

onnal

forn-tingisvyd

-ly

woid-nd

up-d,r-son-

tanks because they were difficult to operate underurban conditions (e.g., narrow streets), caused damageto roads, were noisy, and were expensive to operate.More importantly, however, senior British command-ers worried that, since most laymen categorized alltracked armored vehicles as tanks, the deployment oftracked vehicles would be politically unacceptable.

Lesson 27Human intelligence was more important than techni-cal intelligence in Northern Ireland and the responsi-bility for its collection rested at the battalion andcompany level. The paramilitaries offered fewer oppor-tunities for technical collection than conventional mili-tary forces because of the nature of their organizationand equipment. Consequently, the collection and evalu-ation of human intelligence became much more impor-tant. Increased need for human intelligence anddevolution of responsibility for its collection and assess-ment to battalion and company level, led to increasingthe normal wartime compliment of the battalion intelli-gence section from 5 or 6 people up to 30 people.

Lesson 28Special close observation platoons were createdaround traditional battalion reconnaissance pla-toons to conduct long-term, covert surveillance fromstatic observation posts. During 1973, the GeneralOfficer Commanding instructed more covert observa-tion posts be established in order to reduce the numberpatrols. Soldiers, trained by SAS members, would liein ad hoc, covert observation posts with binoculars,high-powered telescopes, and night vision devices fordays or weeks on end in order to target specific indi-viduals or areas. Equipped with tactical radios, thesecovert observation posts could link with patrols inorder to dominate an area.

Lesson 29Soldier loads had to be dramatically reduced becauseurban warfare requires greater individual agility.Urban operations required greater agility from Britishsoldiers. That is, they need to quickly enter and exitarmored vehicles, catch fleeing demonstrators, andclimb through buildings. Some regiments, for exam-ple, outfitted its fastest runners in track suits and tennisshoes so that they could catch fleeing rioters.

Lesson 30Small unit leadership, particularly at the junior NCOlevel, was an especially critical link in the British chainof command for urban operations. Most British opera-tions in Belfast and Londonderry involved small units almost continuous contact with citizenry, and situatiooften demanded quick, on-the-spot decision-makinThus, junior NCOs had an inordinately large impact British success or failure when compared to conventiocombat operations.

Lesson 31Fixed-wing aircraft played an important, but limited,role in Northern Ireland. Given the British rules ofengagement, there was no close air support role fixed wing aircraft. Instead, they were confined to coducting overhead reconnaissance and transporequipment and personnel to Northern Ireland. It impossible to understate the importance of the healift mission since equipment and/or units often arrivein-country on short notice.

Lesson 32Although helicopters were important assets in Northern Ireland, there is no evidence they were wideused in urban operations. The bulk of the Royal AirForce’s presence in Northern Ireland consisted of tsupport helicopter squadrons. Helicopters are consered vital for hazardous, near-border operations aserved several purposes including transporting splies to isolated security outposts, moving woundeairlifting quick-reaction forces to trouble spots, ovehead reconnaissance, and transporting senior per

44

-

ininas,heo-theedreof

me

e o of

thatndno-

s.t 1sed

nel. This last role produced a serious setback forBritish efforts in Northern Ireland when a helicoptercrashed in June 1994 with 29 senior intelligence offi-cials from the RUC special branch, army, senior mem-bers of MI5 (British counterintelligence), and severalofficials of the Northern Ireland Office aboard.

Lesson 33

Snipers were more effective in urban areas thanrural operations. The British made extensive use ofsnipers, especially from covert observations posts, inBelfast and Londonderry. Nevertheless, the Britishdiscovered that it was difficult for a sniper to hit a flee-ing target (even at ranges of 100 meters) because ofthe density of cover in built-up areas. Consequently,the ratio of shots fired to hits achieved in urban areaswas disappointingly low compared to sniper opera-tions outside cities.

Lesson 34

Paramilitary actions against British soldiers weregenerally carried out by small teams using hit-and-run tactics. The ambush, booby traps, mines, andremotely controlled mortar attacks were the mainstayof paramilitary tactics against British military forces,including helicopters. One such attack occurred in Jan-uary 1994 when the IRA rocketed a joint army/policebase at Crossmaglen in South Armagh as military per-sonnel were recovering a vehicle used in an earliermortar attack. Such attacks were usually carried out bysmall IRA active service units numbering having 8 to12 members.

Lesson 35Non-lethal technologies were useful for crowd control and riot suppression. British security forcesemployed a large number of non-lethal technologiescombating riots and dealing with unruly crowds Belfast and Londonderry. These included tear gwater cannons, dye for marking trouble-makers in tcrowd for later arrest, riot batons, rubber bullets (intrduced on a wide-scale basis in Northern Ireland in early 1970s), and plastic baton rounds that replacrubber bullets in 1975. The latter two weapons weespecially useful for keeping demonstrators out petrol bomb range.

Lesson 36Extensive use of some non-lethal weapons can becocounterproductive. British security forces in NorthernIreland discovered that young demonstrators’ toleranctear gas increased four- to fivefold over time becauseits extensive use. Another problem with tear gas was it indiscriminately seeped into neighborhood homes aaffected casual by-standers, consequently turning incent victims against security authorities.

Lesson 37Non-lethal technologies caused some accidental deathCasualty statistics from Northern Ireland revealed thadeath occurred per every 4,000 plastic baton rounds uand 1 fatality per 18,000 rubber bullets fired.

45

mor tow-renel to

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Lesson 38

Soldiers may sometimes have either misused or delib-erately modified non-lethal technologies to makethem more harmful than intended by their designers.There were claims that soldiers regularly and con-sciously disregarded minimum range instructions forfiring rubber bullets and plastic baton rounds, as wellas deliberately aimed high in order to produce moreserious injuries to demonstrators.

Lesson 39

Static facilities in Northern Ireland were hardened inthe same fashion as those in conventional conflicts.Hardening, stand-off layering, and defense in-depth wereall used in Northern Ireland to protect base camps andpolice stations.

Lesson 40

Rigorous communications security is essential, evenagainst relatively primitive enemies. At one point, theBritish discovered that the IRA had bugged telephones inBritish military headquarters.

Technical Lessons

Lesson 41

Some British military equipment was modified tocounter to enemy tactics and equipment. The Britishmade a number of technical adjustments: applique arwas added to soft-skinned vehicles (like land rovers)protect their crews from blast, fire, acid bombs, and lovelocity small arms fire; special unfolding screens weadded to the sides of the AT-104 (Pig) armored personcarriers so they could be extended in narrow streetsblock off a road as well as protect security personfrom missiles thrown by rioters; wire cages were fittover the superstructures of armored vehicles to depetrol bombs and rocket-propelled grenades; and cotermeasure packages were added to helicopters to with shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles.

Lesson 42Not all non-lethal technologies were judged suitable fowide-scale deployment in Belfast and LondonderryBetween 1969 and 1975, the British Army experimentwith rocket-fired nets to catch demonstrators; stun-guthat fired heavy, bean bag-type missiles to wind rioteand laughing gas in Northern Ireland. All were rejectedimpractical after army testing.

Lesson 43Conventional military radios were unsuitable for urbanoperations. The British Army experienced two seriouproblems with its standard military radios in urban opetions: most were too large, bulky, heavy, and complex use in the streets by small teams; and the signals ofstandard Larkspur A41 VHF radio, designed to opermost efficiently where there is a reasonable line of sibetween radio stations, were blocked and distorted in around the buildings of Belfast and Londonderry. Fthese reasons, the British introduced small, pocketphradios in the early 1970s that operated in both VHF aUHF modes via permanent ground stations.

Lesson 44

The British military fulfilled some of their equip-ment needs with commercial off-the-shelf technology. Over the years, the army supplied off-the

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shelf radios as a way of providing simple, efficientcommunications between ground patrols and com-pany and battalion level headquarters. At othertimes, troops in the field took the initiative in substi-tuting commercial equipment for military issue. Forexample, at the end of 1975, British soldiers werebuying the single point, commercially-made riflesight at their own expense because they said it pro-vided a quicker shot at terrorists than the authorizedarmy model.

Lesson 45

The enemy often employed homemade weaponsagainst security forces. The IRA developed andfielded at least 16 models of homemade mortars overthe course of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Thesemortars were typically 40 to 60 pound devices with an80 to 300 yard range. The IRA also make a horizon-tally-fired mortar (the Mark 10) that could hurl a 50-pound charge up to 80 yards for use against lightlyarmored security vehicles.

Lesson 46

Armored vehicles, not specifically designed for inter-nal security work, often afforded the crew poor visi-bility in cities. The British-designed Saracen armoredpersonnel carrier was the mainstay of the BritishArmy’s tactical vehicle fleet in Belfast and Lon-

donderry. Although judged a good all-around vehicvisibility was poor for drivers, especially in narrowtown streets, as well as for the commander in the tuand for men trying to see out the rear.

Lesson 47

Urban operations required specialized vehicles anequipment beyond standard issue. In one operation,the British brought in specialized tanks (designed 1944 to deal with concrete pill-boxes in the GermAtlantic Wall) to clear urban street barricades believmined. Each tank was fitted with a bulldozer blade the front and a wide, stubby-barrel main gun that fira projectile resembling a dustbin. Following this ontime operation, these specially-fitted tanks were widrawn from Northern Ireland.

Lesson 48

Irish paramilitary forces remained lightly armedthroughout almost three-decades of conflict. BothProtestant and Catholic paramilitary units only uslight weapons like small arms, machineguns, minerocket-propelled grenades, and mortars. Explanatiofor the continued IRA preference for light weaponrange from lack of military training to difficulty insmuggling heavier weapons into the country.

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