U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGIC PLANNING:THE MISSING NEXUS

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.Thomas-Durell Young

September 1, 1995

LL

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authorsand do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position ofthe Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or theU.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should beforwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. ArmyWar College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also maybe conveyed directly to the authors by calling Dr. Lovelace atcommercial (717) 245-3010 or DSN 242-3010; or Dr. Young atcommercial (717) 245-4058 or DSN 242-4058.

LLL

FOREWORD

This is the pilot in a series of reports on strategicplanning conducted within the U.S. Department of Defense. Itfocuses on the strategic planning responsibilities of theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because planning at thatlevel provides the critical nexus between the strategic directionprovided by the National Command Authorities and itsimplementation by the unified combatant commands and militarydepartments. The authors’ thorough understanding of the statutoryrequirements for strategic planning and the interactions betweenthe Chairman’s complex strategic planning process and other keyDOD planning systems enables them to explicate today’s strategicplanning challenges and offer insightful recommendations.

Strategic planning in the post-Cold War era has proven to beexceptionally problematic. The plethora of national andinternational tensions that the east-west confrontation of theCold War in large measure subdued combine now to create a worldreplete with diverse challenges to U.S. interests. Equallydisturbing is the fact that these challenges are not as clearlydefined and easily articulated as was the monolithic Sovietthreat. The authors point out that the Cold War provided inherentstability in U.S. strategic planning and that the basic elementsof a strategic military plan evolved over time. They go on toargue that the elimination of the National Military StrategyDocument and the abandonment of the Base Case Global Family ofOperation Plans amounted to recision of the Chairman’s strategicplan, and that nothing has been developed to take its place.

In this thought-provoking study, the authors define a formalstrategic plan: one that contains specific strategic objectives,offers a clear and executable strategy for achieving objectives,illuminates force capability requirements, and is harmonized withthe Future Years Defense Program. They discuss the reasons why astrategic plan is needed and the value it would have incoherently connecting the guidance provided by the NationalCommand Authorities to the integrated activities of the unifiedcommands, the Services, and other components of DoD. Theyconclude by examining three alternatives to improve the strategicplanning processes and to facilitate efficient development ofstrategic plans. They settle on a set of recommendations thatthey believe would comprehensively link the major elements of

LY

current strategic planning, albeit modified in some cases, andestablish a clearer military foundation for DoD resourcedecisions.

Thus, the National Military Strategic Plan, proposed by theauthors, would stand as the centerpiece of a systemincorporating:

• Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments;

• CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists;

• The new Chairman’s Program Recommendation;

• The Unified Command Plan;

• The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan; and,

• Joint Military Net Assessments.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish thisreport as a contribution to the ongoing defense planning debate.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOONColonel, U.S. ArmyDirector, Strategic Studies Institute

Y

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. joined SSI in September 1994 on hisretirement from active duty with the U.S. Army. His Army careerincluded a combat tour in Vietnam and a number of command andstaff assignments. While serving in the Plans, Concepts andAssessments Division and the War Plans Division of the JointStaff, he collaborated in the development of documents such asthe National Military Strategy, the Joint Strategic CapabilitiesPlan, the Joint Military Net Assessment, NSD 74, PDD 25, andothers. He was also Director of Military Requirements andCapabilities Management at the U.S. Army War College. He is acontributor to The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War . He holds aB.S. in aerospace management and an M.A. in business from EmbryRiddle Aeronautical University. He is also a graduate of the U.S.Army Command and General Staff College and the National WarCollege.

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG has held the Henry L. Stimson Chair ofMilitary Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S.Army War College since 1992. From 1988 to 1992, he was a NationalSecurity Affairs Analyst at the Institute. Prior to thisappointment, he was a country risk analyst for BERI, S.A., aSwiss-based consulting firm. Dr. Young received his Ph.D. fromthe Graduate Institute of International Studies, University ofGeneva, Switzerland, and is a 1990 graduate of the U.S. Army WarCollege. He has published extensively on U.S. alliance issueswith particular emphasis on Western Europe and the SouthwestPacific.

YL

PRECIS

The development of strategic plans by the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff should provide the critical nexus inconnecting the National Command Authorities’ strategic directionof the U.S. armed forces with the planning and operationsconducted by the combatant commands and the support provided bythe Services and defense agencies. Title 10, United States Code,establishes a structured hierarchy for strategic direction,strategic planning, and contingency planning for the Departmentof Defense. The Chairman is responsible for assisting theNational Command Authorities in their strategic directionendeavors, for preparing strategic plans, and for providing forthe preparation and review of contingency plans. The absence ofstrategic plans in the post-Cold War era has precluded theidentification and establishment of priorities for specificstrategic objectives, inhibited planning for future militarycapabilities, and has not allowed for the integration of theoperation planning and theater strategies of the combatantcommands. Additionally, without strategic plans, there is a voidin the underlying rationale for the assignment of servicefunctions and the development of joint doctrine. This essaydefines “strategic plans” and offers an approach to theirdevelopment.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Chairman should develop a National Military StrategicPlan .

• The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan should continue inits current form, but the guidance, force apportionments, andtaskings it provides should be based on the National MilitaryStrategic Plan .

• The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments should bereoriented so they evaluate, integrate, and prioritize the CINCs’requirements.

• The JROC should be divested of its oversightresponsibility for the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessmentsreaffirming its original charter. Oversight of the JointWarfighting Capability Assessments should become a Director of

YLL

the Joint Staff responsibility on behalf of the Chairman and theVice Chairman.

• The Chairman’s Program Recommendation should be publishedas a product of the reoriented Joint Warfighting CapabilityAssessment process.

• Assessment of force capabilities, strengths anddeficiencies identified by the CINCs should be based on theNational Military Strategic Plan .

• The evaluation, integration, and establishment ofpriorities for the CINCs’ requirements should be based upon theNational Military Strategic Plan .

• DoD should discontinue use of Defense Planning Guidancescenarios in the development of service programs in favor ofconformance to the National Military Strategic Plan .

(Note: The full set of recommendations derived from thisstudy begins on page 31.)

�

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGIC PLANNING:THE MISSING NEXUS

Introduction .

Strategic planning is a challenging, but necessary, endeavorfor any organization, small or large. For the U.S. Department ofDefense (DoD) it is a sacred responsibility to the Nation.President Eisenhower said in 1958, “No military task is ofgreater importance than the development of strategic plans whichrelate our revolutionary new weapons and force deployments tonational security objectives.” 1 In spite of its attention tostrategic planning, DoD has not enjoyed great success in thisarea. For example, in 1985, a congressional staff reportcharacterized DoD’s strategic planning in the following manner:

Inattention to strategic planning has led to numerousdeficiencies, including a lack of clarity of DoD’sstrategic goals. The stated goals are vague andambiguous. In an organization as large as DoD, theclear articulation of overall strategic goals can playan important role in achieving a coordinated efforttoward these goals by the various components andindividuals within them. Clarity of goals can enhanceunity and integration. DoD loses the benefit of thisunifying mechanism through its failure to clarify itsstrategic goals. To correct this problem and otherstrategic planning deficiencies, DoD needs to establishand maintain a well-designed and highly interactivestrategic planning process. 2

Following up on this staff finding, Congress, in theGoldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of1986 (GNA), prescribed for DoD a hierarchical process forstrategic direction, strategic planning, and contingency planningfor the U.S. Armed Forces. 3 This process was designed to improvestrategic planning by harmonizing strategic direction andplanning with the development of defense programs that wouldenable DoD to achieve its strategic goals. It was also designedto integrate and rationalize the strategic and operationalplanning conducted by the combatant Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs).To these ends, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)was assigned key and specific responsibilities. 4 Since passage of

�

the GNA, which is now codified in Title 10, United States Code(10 USC), the JCS and then the Chairman have developed,implemented, and revised specific processes for fulfilling mostof these statutory responsibilities.

Enactment of the GNA notwithstanding, strategic planningcurrently conducted by the Joint Staff, on behalf of theChairman, does not adequately establish and specify strategicobjectives nor does it integrate and establish priorities forthem. In short, current strategic planning for the U.S. ArmedForces is of limited use in planning for future militarycapabilities and integrating the planning conducted by the CINCs.It should ensure that both of these efforts conform to nationalmilitary and security objectives. Equally disturbing, it does notprovide sufficient underlying rationale for the review of servicefunctions nor does it provide unequivocal and compelling basesfor the development and implementation of joint doctrine.

This essay will describe and assess the strategic directionand planning processes used by the Chairman, identify and discussdifficulties with the extant processes, and assess potentialsolutions. It will focus on the strategic planning conducted atthe Chairman’s level because that planning should provide thecritical nexus between national security policy formulation andthe execution of that policy by the CINCs. It should also serveas the critical link between the requirements of the CINCs andthe programs designed by the Services to meet those requirements.

We recognize that substantial and ultimate responsibilityfor strategic direction and strategic planning resides with theSecretary of Defense and President, and that the processes theyuse and the products they produce affect the efforts of theChairman. Therefore, this essay will also examine and assessaspects of the President’s National Security Strategy ( NSS) andthe Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) issued by the Secretary ofDefense to initiate the Planning, Programming, and BudgetingSystem (PPBS). 5

To provide a foundation for analysis, this essay will firstdefine “strategic plans” as used in the GNA and 10 USC. To framemore clearly and describe the strategic planning responsibilitiesof the Chairman, a brief review of the President’s and Secretaryof Defense’s roles in this arena will be conducted. Next an

�

examination of the current Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)will be presented, followed by a discussion of many of thestrategic planning initiatives implemented since passage of theGNA. Inadequacies within the current strategic planning processeswhich inhibit their utility in assisting the Chairman inproviding integrated strategic advice to the National CommandAuthorities (NCA) 6 will be identified and assessed to show thatthese deficiencies result from the absence of a comprehensivestrategic plan. The current planning processes produce a plethoraof documents designed to provide unified strategic direction tothe Services, CINCs and defense agencies, and timely militaryadvice to the National Command Authorities. However, assessmentsof those documents reveal significant inadequacies because theprime integrating document, a strategic plan, is absent. Theessay concludes with recommendations for changes in the currentstrategic planning system.

Strategic Planning Defined .

At the outset, one must begin with a clear definition ofstrategic planning, particularly strategic planning at the Chairman’s level. Although 10 USC requires the Chairman toprepare strategic plans, it provides no convenient definition. 7

The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and AssociatedTerms defines a “strategic plan” simply as “the plan for theoverall conduct of a war.” 8 This definition is clearly deficientsince it is not in consonance with the statutory references tostrategic plans, nor does it allow for strategic planning, exceptfor war. One can, however, arrive at a useful definition bydetermining the purposes for which strategic plans are intended.The intent of the legislation can be determined by a review ofcongressional action leading up to the passage of the GNA. Such areview shows that strategic plans should enumerate specificstrategic objectives, identify fiscal and other constraints,offer strategy for securing objectives, and play a key role indetermining force capability requirements. 9

An amalgamation of the various specific references tostrategic plans within 10 USC provides a comprehensivedefinition. These plans:

• are to be prepared by the Chairman and should conform tothe resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be

�

available for the periods during which the plans are to beeffective;

• should be useful for assessing the capabilities of U.S.and allies’ armed forces versus potential adversaries;

• are differentiated from, and are a level above,contingency plans prepared by the CINCs; 10

• should serve as a standard against which force capabilitystrengths and deficiencies are measured; 11

• should contain strategic priorities that can be used toassess contributions of service programs; 12 and,

• should integrate the theater strategies and plans of theCINCs to ensure conformance to national military and securityobjectives. 13

From the above, one can distill a succinct definition of astrategic plan that is appropriate for the strategic planningrequirements specified in 10 USC. It is a plan that specifies, inmilitary terms, the national strategic objectives for the defenseplanning period under consideration (the Future Years DefenseProgram–FYDP period) and describes a strategy that rationalizesthe resources expected to be available during the FYDP with thestrategic objectives described in the plan. 14

To support further the intent of 10 USC, a strategic planmust be based on a global perspective and should also provide:

• a definitive statement of strategic priorities;

• a means of providing unified, strategic direction for thecombatant commands;

• a template for formulating and assessing changes in theassignment of service functions; and,

• a basis for strategic concepts upon which joint doctrineshould be based.

This definition and description of strategic plans are

�

crucial in understanding the strategic planning responsibilitiesspecified in 10 USC and current imperfections in strategicplanning at the Chairman’s level.

Strategic Planning of the National Command Authorities .

The President . Atop the strategic planning hierarchypresented in section 153 of 10 USC, rests the strategic planningresponsibilities of the President and the Secretary of Defense.The National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) requires thePresident to transmit to Congress each year, along with thebudget for the next fiscal year, a comprehensive report on theU.S. national security strategy. 15 The statute requires thenational security strategy report ( National Security Strategy[NSS] ) to present the national security strategy of the UnitedStates and a comprehensive description and discussion of thefollowing:

• the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of theUnited States that are vital to the national security of theUnited States;

• the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and nationaldefense capabilities of the United States necessary to deteraggression and to implement the national security strategy of theUnited States;

• the proposed short-term and long-term uses of thepolitical, economic, military, and other elements of the nationalpower of the United States to protect or promote the interestsand achieve the goals and objectives referred to above;

• the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States tocarry out the national security strategy, including an evaluationof the balance among the capabilities of all elements of thenational power of the United States to support the implementationof the national security strategy; and,

• such other information as may be necessary to help informCongress on matters relating to the national security strategy ofthe United States. 16

Traditionally, however, administrations to varying degrees

�

have been loath to use the NSS as the effective policy instrumentenvisaged by Congress. The most recent strategy, published inFebruary 1995, is entitled A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement . 17 As much as 20 percent of thedocument is devoted to describing accomplishments of the currentadministration. 18 (Although this is not a novel use of the NSS,there are more appropriate fora for reporting administrationaccomplishments. 19) While this NSS provides useful definitions of“vital,” important," and “humanitarian” interests, a noteworthyimprovement over its predecessors, it does not describe specificareas where those interests are at stake. Moreover, it does notoffer policy guidance establishing clear priorities of nationalinterests. 20 In essence, therefore, the NSS generally describeswhat is to be accomplished, and to some extent how, but is notsufficient to translate general policy into executable strategy. 21

An assessment, therefore, of the NSS leads to the conclusionthat, in general, it is not the “comprehensive description anddiscussion” required by the National Security Act of 1947 (asamended by the GNA). 22 While this is an important finding, it isnot damning with respect to the strategic planning for which theChairman is responsible. The NSS provides useful guidance for thedevelopment of the National Military Strategy (NMS) and theChairman can develop the strategy in whatever degree of detail hedesires so long as it does not contradict any of the generalguidance contained in the NSS. The more general the NSS, the moreflexibility the Chairman enjoys in designing the NMS. Continuingthis logic a step further, one can conclude that the NSS wouldnot inhibit the development of strategic plans by the Chairman;it is not sufficiently specific to have that effect.

The Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is anintended beneficiary, but not an author, of strategic plans. 23

However, to complete an assessment of the policy guidance uponwhich the Chairman bases his strategic planning, two of theSecretary’s statutory responsibilities must be addressed. 10 USCrequires the “Secretary of Defense, with the advice andassistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [to]provide annually to the heads of the Department of Defensecomponents written policy guidance for the preparation and reviewof program recommendations and budget proposals of theirrespective components, including guidance on:

�

• national security objectives and policies;

• the priorities of military missions; and,

• the resource levels projected to be available for theperiod of time for which such recommendations and proposals areto be effective." 24

To fulfill this responsibility, the Secretary publishes theDefense Planning Guidance . 25

It is a misperception that the strategic direction providedin the National Security Strategy travels along two brancheswithin DoD, one to the Secretary of Defense who translates itinto the DPG, and the other to the Chairman who uses it todevelop the National Military Strategy . In actuality, thebranching of strategic direction occurs at the Chairman’s level,and the DPG, although a Secretary of Defense document, is moredirectly influenced by the Chairman’s strategy than by the NSS. 26

Given this relationship, it can be concluded that the DPG neitherenhances nor inhibits the strategic planning of the Chairman.However, the Secretary of Defense must provide the Chairman witha realistic projection of the defense resource levels expected tobe available for the planning period under consideration. 27 TheChairman, in turn, is obliged to provide the Secretary of Defensewith key recommendations resulting from his strategic planningwhich should inform the development of the DPG. The Chairman’sstrategic planning provides the foundation for the first “P” inthe Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. 28

However, the very general nature of the National MilitaryStrategy precludes its use as the vehicle for transmittingspecific recommendations. The DPG, itself, is a much morecomprehensive document than the National Military Strategy . Itreflects a great deal of strategic decisionmaking. It providessome, but not necessarily clear, guidance on regional prioritiesas well as some overall priorities for force planning. 29 It alsoprovides general programming priorities and specific programmingguidance. 30 Since the DPG offers no further elaboration on thenational security and military strategies than that contained inthe National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy ,one could reasonably question the basis for the strategicplanning and programming decisions it reflects. Absent the

�

influence of strategic plans, and since the National MilitaryStrategy is not sufficiently specific to provide such a basis,the DPG features Illustrative Planning Scenarios (IPS).

The IPSs are interesting inventions. They postulate, forillustrative purposes, scenarios in which the United States,perhaps with allies, becomes embroiled in conflict withhypothetical adversaries. The scenarios are described in theDefense Planning Guidance as reflecting some of the militarychallenges anticipated over the Future Years Defense Program, butare neither predictive nor exhaustive regarding those challenges,and they are not intended to reflect policy decisions. Thesequalifiers notwithstanding, the scenarios purportedly illustratethe types of military capabilities needed, enable DoD componentsto perform detailed program planning, provide a basis forensuring consistency among various DoD component programs, andserve as analytical tools for evaluating component programs afterthey are submitted. 31

From this analysis, one may conclude that DoD developsdefense programs based on an incomplete set of capabilitydeterminants that do not presume to predict future conflicts anddo not necessarily reflect current policy. Alternatively, acomprehensive strategic plan would derive from an actualassessment of the strategic environment over the Future YearsDefense Program, establish a priority for specific strategicobjectives achievable within that time frame, describe anexecutable strategy for achieving those objectives, and definethe military capability required to effect the strategy. Ratherthan basing program planning on hypothetical scenarios, it shouldbe based on tangible requirements distilled from the actualstrategic plan DoD intends to implement over the Future YearsDefense Program.

10 USC also requires the Secretary of Defense, with theapproval of the President, and after consultation with theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “[to] provide annually tothe Chairman written policy guidance for the preparation andreview of contingency plans. Such guidance shall includeguidance on the specific force levels and specific supportingresource levels projected to be available for the period of timefor which such plans are to be effective.” 32 The vehicle used bythe Secretary of Defense to fulfill this responsibility is

�

entitled the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) . 33

The CPG is a close-hold, highly classified document that issignificantly different in form and content from the DefensePlanning Guidance . Assessment of the CPG is limited by itsclassification and restricted circulation. However, someobservations concerning its relationship to strategic planningcan be made. The CPG has limited direct impact on the Chairman’sstrategic planning. There is no traceable flow of strategicdirection from the CPG into the Chairman’s strategic planningprocess. Additionally, there is no formal process by whichstrategic planning conducted by the Chairman impacts theContingency Planning Guidance . 34 The CPG is published annuallyand, therefore, is a short range document. 35 The annual policyadjustments contained in successive CPGs may combine to indicatethe need for a renewed national military strategy but,presumably, that need would have already been identified throughthe Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process. 36 Also, the highlyclassified content of the CPG is directly translated into theJoint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and is not used as inputinto the Chairman’s strategic planning process. 37 Although the CPGdoes not directly affect the Chairman’s strategic planning, it isrelevant in discerning the true nature of the JSCP.

The JSCP is the tool used by the Chairman to cause the CINCsto prepare operation plans. 38 10 USC assigns the Chairman theresponsibility for “providing for the preparation and review ofcontingency plans which conform to policy guidance from thePresident and the Secretary of Defense” and “[p]reparing jointlogistic and mobility plans to support those contingency plansand recommending the assignment of logistic and mobilityresponsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with thoselogistic and mobility plans.” 39 Policy set forth in theContingency Planning Guidance reaches the CINCs via changes to,or republication of, the JSCP. The flow of strategic direction isfrom the Contingency Planning Guidance to the JSCP, ultimatelyresulting in new or revised operation plans.

After examining the significant National CommandAuthorities’ influences on the Chairman’s strategic planning, wefind that while they may not provide comprehensive policy andstrategy guidance, they are not unduly constraining. We move nowto the crux of our assessment, the strategic planning conducted

��

by the Chairman.

The Chairman’s Strategic Planning .

During the period beginning with the passage of GNA in 1986through the end of superpower confrontation in the early 1990s,a series of events combined to render ineffectual the strategicplanning conducted at the Chairman’s level. Although the GNAsought to improve strategic planning, by 1990 formal strategicplanning at the Chairman’s level was minimal.

The three principal strategic direction and planningresponsibilities assigned to the Chairman by GNA (codified in 10USC) are to:

• “. . . [ assist] the President and the Secretary ofDefense in providing for the strategic direction of the armedforces;”

• “[ prepare] strategic plans, including plans which conformto the resource levels projected to be available for the periodof time for which the plans are to be effective” and to “. . .[prepare] joint logistics and mobility plans to support thosestrategic plans and recommending the assignment of logistic andmobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance withthose logistics and mobility plans;” and,

• “[conduct] net assessments to determine the capabilitiesof the armed forces of the United States and its allies ascompared with those of potential adversaries.” 40

Nominally, strategic planning at the Chairman’s level isconducted principally within the Joint Strategic Planning System(JSPS).

The Joint Strategic Planning System . The formal processestablished to assist the Chairman in strategic planning is theJSPS. At the time of passage of the GNA, the JSPS was defined byJCS Memorandum of Policy 84 (JCS MOP 84). This MOP, firstpublished in 1952, survived until 1990 when it was replaced byCJCS MOP 7. 41 The MOP 84 version of the JSPS was unwieldy,complex, and bureaucratic and produced no less than 10 majordocuments every 2-year planning cycle. 42 It was roundly criticized

��

by Congress and others. 43 Nevertheless, planning under theprovisions of MOP 84 produced the National Military StrategyDocument (NMSD) and the Base Case Global Family of OperationPlans, which collectively approached a strategic plan. 44

Although the 1990 version of the JSPS (CJCS MOP 7) sought tostreamline the JSPS in order to make it more responsive “in arapidly changing national security environment,” it did notsurvive a single planning cycle. 45 This streamlined JSPS envisagedone strategic planning process and three primary products:

• Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process;

• National Military Strategy Document;

• Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan ; and,

• Chairman’s Program Assessment.

The new Memorandum of Policy described a system that beganwith the Joint Strategy Review. The review was to determine ifthe National Military Strategy should be changed. 46 The NMSD wasto include the National Military Strategy , written and publishedby the Chairman, but approved by the President. Additionally, theNMSD was to contain recommended national military objectives;recommended fiscally constrained force levels; military strategyand force options; and a risk assessment of the recommendedstrategy, forces, and military options. 47 The NMSD was also tofeature functional annexes to supplement the base document. Theannexes were to provide concise military taskings, priorities,requirements, or additional guidance. 48 The NMSD was to serve asthe Chairman’s advice to the Secretary of Defense with respect tothe development of the Defense Planning Guidance . The JointStrategic Capabilities Plan, retained in CJCS MOP 7 as a keyproduct of the Joint Strategic Planning System, continued toserve as the principal vehicle by which the CINCs were tasked todevelop global and regional operation plans. 49

The final document prescribed by CJCS MOP 7 was theChairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) . It was to provide theChairman’s assessment of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM)forces proposed by the Services. 50 The CPA was to assist theSecretary of Defense in making decisions on the defense program

��

subsequent to receipt of the POMs from the military departmentsand other DoD components. It was to accomplish this in two ways.First, it was to contain the Chairman’s assessment of the extentto which the various service POMs conformed to the prioritiesestablished in strategic plans and for the priorities establishedfor the CINCs’ requirements. Second, the CPA was to containalternative program recommendations to achieve greater programconformance to established priorities. 51 The 1990 version of theJoint Strategic Planning System was aborted before completion ofthe Joint Strategy Review, which led to yet another revision ofthe process.

In mid-1992, the Joint Staff began revising CJCS MOP 7 tomake it more accurately reflect the manner in which jointstrategic planning had been conducted during 1990 and 1991. Theintent was to make it a less precise, more open-ended processthat afforded the Chairman greater flexibility in forging theNational Military Strategy . Feeling somewhat dis- enfranchisedfrom the process that produced the 1992 version of that document,the Services and many of the CINCs resisted the Joint Staff’sefforts to dismantle the formal system. 52 The compromise thatresulted retained many of the original CJCS MOP 7 provisions, butalso featured several important changes. The most significantchange was elimination of the National Military Strategy Documentin favor of an unclassified, generalized National MilitaryStrategy . 53 This, combined with the abandonment of the Base CaseGlobal Family of OPLANs, effectively eliminated the elements thatcollectively served as a strategic plan. To date, nothing hasfilled this planning void.

The new National Military Strategy took a form radicallydifferent from that envisioned by the original CJCS MOP 7. 54

Whereas the classified National Military Strategy Documentprovided national military objectives, policy, strategy, forceplanning options and assessments, and risk evaluations; theNational Military Strategy, in its new form, did not addressnational military objectives, but merely reiterated nationalinterests and objectives from the 1991 National SecurityStrategy . 55 While the national military strategy contained withinthe National Military Strategy Document published in 1989consisted of some 50-pages of text specifying strategicobjectives, assumptions, and priorities; the 1992 NationalMilitary Strategy provided a 10-page discussion of what appears

��

to be national military doctrine, void of any specific strategicobjectives and priorities. 56 It is interesting to note thatalthough the National Military Strategy, in its new form, lacksthe specificity of the strategy set forth in the NationalMilitary Strategy Document , detailed operation planning guidanceand tasks continue to be given to the CINCs via the JointStrategic Capabilities Plan . Hence, one might ask what is thebasis for translating the National Military Strategy into thespecific tasks and guidance contained in the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan ?

The Joint Staff began implementation of CJCS MOP 7 (Revision1), even before the revision was officially approved. A concertedeffort was made to adhere to the established procedures and time-lines as closely as possible. The Joint Strategy Review wasinitiated in the fall of 1992. By mid-summer 1993 a JointStrategy Review report was provided to the Chairman and worksubsequently began on a new National Military Strategy . However,a number of factors delayed publication of the new NationalMilitary Strategy until February 1995. 57 Although more brightlycolored and featuring some new lexicon, the 1995 NationalMilitary Strategy is of the same form and not substantiallydifferent from its predecessor. 58

The Chairman’s Strategic Plans: Current Lacunae .

Unified action of the armed forces is predicated uponunified direction. 59 The National Security Act of 1947 (asamended) states that “. . . it is the intent of Congress to . . .provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatantforces, for their operation under unified command, and for theirintegration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces. . . .” 60 In providing for the unified action and strategicdirection of the U.S. Armed Forces, the Chairman plays a criticalrole as the key military advisor to the National CommandAuthorities. His responsibilities in assisting the NationalCommand Authorities in this regard hinge upon his ability todevelop coherent strategic plans for the employment of the U.S.Armed Forces. Effective strategic planning on the part of theChairman is a major determinant of the quality of the unifiedstrategic direction provided to the CINCs and the servicesecretaries by the National Command Authorities.

��

Since the end of the Cold War, comprehensive strategic plans have not been developed. As a consequence, key planningdocuments have not been based upon strategic plans of globalscope. Rather, they have been based upon ambiguous objectives anda near term outlook. 61 However, this is not to suggest that thisvoid in strategic planning be filled by a return to a globalfamily of operation plans and a national military strategydocument that contemplate global war. That is clearlyinappropriate. What is needed is a new type of strategic planthat addresses the realities of the post-Cold War era.

For almost 50 years, the United States assumed the strategicdefensive in dealing with the containment of the monolithicSoviet threat. Two generations of military strategic plannershave passed through this defensive strategic planning paradigm.“Threat-based” planning became so inculcated into the militaryculture that it became universally regarded as the only type ofmilitary strategic planning that made sense. 62 After thedissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of theSoviet Union, the U.S. military encountered great difficulty inbreaking out of the threat-based planning paradigm and enteringinto a new era of objectives-based planning. The type ofstrategic plan advocated in this essay is a proactive plan thatwould enable the U.S. Armed Forces to contribute positively tothe international environment to further U.S. interests andvalues. Such a proactive strategic plan would assist the Chairmanin fulfilling several of his statutory responsibilities.

The following analysis of current institutional tools forachieving unified strategic direction of the U.S. Armed Forcesshows that their full potential must rest upon the Chairman’sformulation of strategic plans. 63

Unified Command Plan (UCP). 10 USC requires the Chairman to“. . . review the missions, responsibilities (includinggeographic boundaries), and force structure of each combatantcommand; and . . . recommend to the President, through theSecretary of Defense, any changes to such missions,responsibilities, and force structures as may be necessary.” 64 TheUCP establishes the broad missions, responsibilities, forcestructure, and geographic areas of responsibility of the CINCs. 65

The missions assigned by the UCP are significantly more generalthan the specific tasks the Chairman assigns the CINCs in the

��

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan . 66 Like the National MilitaryStrategy , the UCP is a relatively general document while theJoint Strategic Capabilities Plan is quite specific. TheChairman’s task is to take the general strategic foundations andprinciples presented in the National Military Strategy , translatethem into the broad CINC responsibilities presented in the UCP,and then to further translate them into specific tasks to focusthe regionally oriented strategic and operational planningconducted by the CINCs. 67 The Chairman’s strategic planning shouldpoint to the most appropriate combatant command structure; toinclude assignment of geographic and functional areas ofresponsibility, enduring missions, and forces. In doing so, thisplanning would enable the Chairman to assist in providingglobally integrated, strategic direction to the CINCs. However,such direction cannot be logically derived from discreteassessments of each region, but must be based on a strategic planof global scope. As stated earlier, given the current andprojected national security environments, the strategic planwould not necessarily contemplate global war, but would provideoverarching rationale for the most appropriate unified commandstructure.

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Chairman isresponsible for ensuring that the deliberate operation plans ofthe CINCs are integrated at the national level to effect thepolicy guidance promulgated by the National Command Authorities. 68

Through the JSCP, the Chairman causes the CINCs to preparecontingency (operation) plans in support of national objectives. 69

The JSCP contains a précis of the National Military Strategy ,general planning guidance to the CINCs, Armed Services and theDefense agencies, specific planning tasks for each CINC, alisting and apportionment (for planning) of the forces expectedto be available at the beginning of the plans’ effective period,an intelligence estimate for planning, and other forms ofspecific planning guidance. 70 A close comparison of the NationalMilitary Strategy to the JSCP reveals that a tremendous amount ofinterpretation of the National Military Strategy is required totranslate this very general document into one which is much morespecific. One might ask how this interpretation of the NationalMilitary Strategy is accomplished and where it is documented.Without an overarching strategic plan, the basis for thistranslation of the National Military Strategy into specific JSCPguidance and tasks is unclear.

��

The Joint Staff has asserted that the JSCP, as its nameimplies, is a strategic plan. However, it does not satisfy the 10USC description of a strategic plan. According to the JointStrategic Planning System (as described in CJCS MOP 7), thepurpose of the JSCP is to “[provide] strategic guidance,including apportionment of resources, to the CINCs and the Chiefsof the Services, to accomplish assigned strategic tasks based onmilitary capabilities existing at the beginning of the planningperiod . . . [it is] the principal vehicle by which the CINCs aretasked to develop global and regional OPLANs.” 71 In revising CJCSMOP 7 in 1993, the Joint Staff made no substantive changes in thedeclared purpose of the JSCP, but added a provision that the JSCP“fulfills the Chairman’s responsibility to ‘. . . preparestrategic plans’ specified in 10 USC 153.” 72 There was no suchclaim made in the original CJCS MOP 7, nor in its predecessor,JCS MOP 84.

In the JSCP itself, the Joint Staff describes the document’spurpose: “. . . provides guidance to the CINCs and Chiefs of theServices to accomplish tasks and missions based on near-term(emphasis added) military capabilities.” There is no claim thatit fulfills the Chairman’s responsibility for preparing strategicplans. 73 Additionally, the revised CJCS MOP 7 points out that theJSCP is directly impacted by the Contingency Planning Guidance , anear-term document revised or republished annually. 74 Clearly,therefore, the JSCP is structured primarily to cause CINCs toprepare contingency (operation) plans and, by itself, does notmeet the 10 USC requirement for a strategic plan. However,strategic planning conducted by the CJCS should provide the basisfor the JSCP. The Chairman’s strategic plan is critical inlinking the strategic direction provided by the National CommandAuthorities to the disparate deliberate planning efforts of theCINCs.

Force Strengths and Deficiencies. Contained within theContingency Planning and Preparedness paragraph of Section 153 of10 USC is the requirement for the CJCS to “[advise] the Secretaryof Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in forcecapabilities . . . identified during the preparation and reviewof contingency plans and assessing the effects of suchdeficiencies and strengths on meeting national securityobjectives and policy and on strategic plans.” 75 Here again,

��

strategic planning plays a key role. As the CINCs prepare theiroperation plans and as the plans are reviewed, it is expectedthat specific force capability strengths and deficiencies will beilluminated. These strengths and deficiencies have relevance onlywithin the context of particular regional plans until theChairman performs an integrated assessment of them to determinetheir impact on strategic plans, national defense policy, andnational security objectives. A strategic plan prepared by theChairman would provide the necessary standard against which forcecapability strengths and deficiencies could be weighed from anational perspective.

Integrating and Establishing Priorities for CINCRequirements. Strategic plans would facilitate the fulfillment ofother responsibilities of the Chairman. If we combine theresponsibilities assigned in sections 153 and 163 of 10 USC, wefind the Chairman is responsible for soliciting the requirementsof the combatant commanders; evaluating, integrating, andestablishing priorities for their requirements; and advising theSecretary of Defense of the commands’ requirements, individuallyand collectively. Additionally, he is to advise the Secretary ofDefense on the extent to which service program recommendationsand budget proposals conform to the priorities established instrategic plans and for the combatant commanders. This advice mayinclude alternative program recommendations that differ fromthose submitted by the Services. 76 By developing strategic plans,the Chairman can establish appropriate rationale for thepriorities he assigns to the various requirements of the CINCs,for his assessments of service programs, and for alternativeprogram recommendations he may submit to the Secretary ofDefense. The absence of strategic plans has caused the Chairmanto devise other means of underpinning his recommendations,specifically the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments(JWCAs), the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR) , and thelinking of the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) to the JointRequirements Oversight Council process.

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The revision ofthe charter of the JROC and the initiation of Joint WarfightingCapability Assessments by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff are recently implemented means for the Chairman todevelop and support recommendations concerning requirements formilitary capability. 77 Under its 1992 charter, the JROC was

��

oriented toward reviewing, validating and approving requirementsfor future military capabilities identified by the CINCs,Services, and others. 78 The 1995 revision of the chartersignificantly expanded the mission and functioning of the JROC.It now “[assists] the Chairman . . . in carrying out hisresponsibilities to assess warfighting capabilities . . .[and] .. . to assess the extent program recommendations and budgetproposals of Military Departments and DOD components conform withestablished priorities.” 79 In assessing warfighting capabilitiesin addition to requirements for future capabilities, the JROC nowappears to be also concerned with current force capabilitystrengths and deficiencies, an area previously assessed by othermeans. 80

Assessment of current force strengths and deficiencies, toinclude their “effect . . . on meeting national securityobjectives and policy and on strategic plans,” is a task quitedissimilar from identifying future force requirements. It isclear 10 USC places responsibility for assessing currentcapability on the Chairman but it is equally clear the CINCs areto be principal participants. 81 Bringing the assessment of currentforce capability under the auspices of the JROC can have theeffect of emphasizing Service perspectives while marginalizingthe participation of the CINCs. 82

Assessment of current force capability can serve twoimportant purposes. First, and most immediately, it can provide astrategic level risk assessment with respect to the use of themilitary element of national power. Secondly, but equallyimportant, it can provide strategic relevance to force capabilitystrengths and deficiencies identified by the CINCs by pointingout which strengths and deficiencies really matter given thepriority of strategic objectives. 83

The difficulty with the JROC assessing current militarycapability is that contemporary deficiencies do not necessarilytranslate into requirements for future capabilities. Asignificant current force deficiency, one that may warrant amajor program, would take perhaps 10 years to result in acompensating fielded capability. However, in the interveningperiod, changes in the strategic environment, U.S. interests, andnational military strategy may mitigate or eliminate thedeficiency. So we cannot base requirements for future

��

capabilities on current deficiencies. If we were to do so, wewould always be developing and procuring capabilities to fightthe last war. To the extent the JROC assesses future capabilityrequirements, it relies on scenarios to extrapolate currentdeficiencies into the future. 84 A better approach would be to baserequirements on a strategic plan that anticipates the futurenational security environment, projects and establishes apriority for national military objectives, and provides the basisfor a national military strategy that rationalizes anticipatedresources with objectives.

Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR). The Chairmanrecently introduced a new document, the CPR, by which he providesprogramming advice to the Secretary of Defense. The purpose ofthe CPR is to inject the Chairman’s advice into the Planning,Programming and Budgeting System early enough to influence theDefense Planning Guidance . It is purported to be an integrationof the views of the CINCs with those of the Chairman regardingmilitary requirements. 85 CINCs formally submit their programpriorities, in the form of Integrated Priority Lists (IPL),through the Chairman to the Assistant Secretary of Defense forProgram Analysis and Evaluation (ASD [PA&E]). 86 The IntegratedPriority Lists are keyed to the Future Years Defense Programunder consideration. For example, the Integrated Priority Listsfor the FY 94-99 Future Years Defense Program were required to besubmitted in the fall of 1991 so they could influence the FY 94-99 Defense Planning Guidance . However, the CPR is not basedprincipally on the CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists, but on theJoint Warfighting Capability Assessments performed under theauspices of the JROC. 87 The CPR should be based principally on theChairman’s evaluation, integration, and prioritization of theCINCs’ Integrated Priority List . It should not depend on theconsensus of the JROC membership. Development of the CPR and itssubmission to the Secretary of Defense is a noteworthyinitiative. Nonetheless, by basing it on the Joint WarfightingCapability Assessments, its focus is directed away from therequirements of the CINCs and toward the desires of the Services.Orienting the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments more onthe requirements of the CINCs could overcome this problem;however, this too would require integration by the Chairman basedon the global strategic perspective contained in a strategicplan.

��

Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA). In 1994, the JROCbecame a principal participant in the development of the CPA. 88

Prior to that time, no relationship between the JROC and theJoint Staff’s CPA development efforts was apparent. In fact, theywere two separate and distinct activities. Notwithstanding this,the CPA remains the Chairman’s principal tool for assessing theextent to which the programs of the military departments andother DoD components conform “. . . to the priorities establishedin strategic plans . . .” and to the “. . . prioritiesestablished for the requirements of the CINCs.” 89 The CPA is alsoa vehicle by which the Chairman can offer alternative programrecommendations. Formally, it is a product of the Joint StrategicPlanning System that nominally serves as an interface with thePlanning, Programming and Budgeting System. The statute calls forthe Chairman to use the priorities established in strategic plansand those he establishes for the requirements of the CINCs as thebases for this assessment. Without strategic plans, there are noarticulated and documented strategic priorities. The requirementsof the CINCs are made known to the Chairman via the IntegratedPriority Lists. But the Chairman does not require the lists, noris he the principal user of the information they contain.However, he should be. He should evaluate, integrate, andprioritize them so that the programming advice he provides to theSecretary of Defense in the Chairman’s Program Recommendationsynthesizes the requirements of all the CINCs in accordance withthe strategic plan for the Future Years Defense Program underconsideration. The CPA, like the Chairman’s ProgramRecommendation , should also be strongly influenced by theIntegrated Priority Lists.

Force Capability Net Assessments. The Chairman has anotherassessment responsibility that warrants review. The StrategicPlanning paragraph of Section 153, 10 USC requires the Chairmanto “[perform] net assessments to determine the capabilities ofthe armed forces of the United States and its allies as comparedwith those of their potential adversaries.” 90 This assessmentresponsibility is distinct from, and in addition to, thatcontained in the Contingency Planning and Preparedness paragraphof 10 USC. 91 To fulfill this statutory requirement, the Chairmanhas prepared, and the Secretary has submitted to the Congress,Joint Military Net Assessments (JMNAs) .

While the JMNAs may be useful for Congress in considering

��

the merits of budget submissions and attendant Future YearsDefense Programs, they suffer from the same flaw as the DefensePlanning Guidance , i.e., they are scenario based. The placementof this net assessment requirement in the Strategic Planningparagraph of the Chairman’s functions section of 10 USC pointstoward a congressional intent to have the assessments based onstrategic plans, not hypothetical scenarios. This makes eminentsense. If a JMNA is based on an approved strategic plan, Congresswould be in a better position to judge the extent to which agiven Future Year Defense Program promises to achieve specificnational security and military objectives. Additionally, sincethe scenarios do not reflect established policy, it is difficultfor Congress to discern how much weight the JMNAs should begiven. The less compelling Congress views the JMNAs, the moredifficult it will be for DoD to counter the congressional forcesthat tend to suboptimize defense programs.

Roles, Missions, and Functions. 10 USC requires the Chairman triennially to “submit to the Secretary of Defense areport containing . . . recommendations for changes in theassignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the armedforces to achieve maximum effectiveness . . . .” In preparing thereport, the Chairman is to consider, inter alia , changes in thethreat, unnecessary duplication, and changes in technology thatcan be applied effectively to warfare. 92 Two such reports havebeen produced since passage of the GNA. The first received littlenotice; however, the second generated considerable controversy.It was not that the report proposed radical changes, but that itwas perceived to be, more or less, an affirmation of the statusquo. This led to the establishment of the congressionallymandated, independent Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM). 93

The present Chairman has indicated that identification of neededchanges may be a task too difficult for DoD. 94 Some argue that thetask also proved too difficult for the CORM. 95 If recommendedchanges to roles, missions, and functions were based, in part, onapproved strategic plans, the task of identifying needed changeswould be less difficult and the Chairman’s recommendations couldbe better supported.

Joint Doctrine. 10 USC also gives the Chairman theresponsibility for the development of joint doctrine. 96 Therelationship of strategic planning and joint doctrine is somewhatopaque but, nevertheless important. The value of joint doctrine

��

in improving joint (and unified) 97 warfighting capability iswidely accepted. However, effective joint doctrine has additionalvalue. It can serve as information to senior civilian leadershipand governmental agencies as to how they may expect the armedforces of the United States to be employed. It can also serve asimilar purpose for alliance and potential coalition governmentsand armed forces, particularly apropos establishing the U.S.national position for the development of multinational doctrine. 98

The Chairman’s strategic planning can help uncover jointdoctrinal challenges, voids, and opportunities; thus providingimpetus for the development of new doctrine and revision ofextant doctrine. Additionally, the unifying effect of strategicplans would enhance the implementation of joint doctrine acrossServices and combatant commands.

Conversely, the absence of strategic plans gives rise todisaggregated development of joint doctrine. Additionally,without strategic plans the Services are less likely to implementjoint doctrine in a standardized fashion. Finally, withoutstrategic concepts that should be established in strategic plans,there is no unified strategic basis for the development of jointdoctrine. Strategic plans would provide the critical linkagebetween the National Military Strategy and the development andimplementation of joint doctrine.

The Missing Nexus in Strategic Planning .

Recent measures taken to overcome the inadequacies instrategic planning have recognized and ameliorated some of thedifficulties resulting from the absence of strategic plans, butthey do not directly or fully address the problem. Theseinitiatives, including expansion of the responsibilities of theJROC, the initiation of Joint Warfighting Capability Assess-ments , and linking the Chairman’s Program Assessment to the JROCprocess, can be incorporated into a holistic solution and shouldnot be abandoned. Given the current state of the planningprocesses at the Chairman’s level, there appear to be threeviable alternatives for correcting the deficiencies in strategicplanning:

• revising and expanding the National Military Strategy sothat it meets the requirements of a strategic plan;

��

• expanding the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan making it,as its name implies, a joint strategic plan; or,

• creating a new document, the National Military StrategicPlan (NMSP) .

There may be other alternative solutions but these three aredirectly supported by statute, are executable within the currentstrategic planning framework, and do not require reengineering ofthe Chairman’s strategic planning processes.

Option 1: National Military Strategy Expansion. Prior to theend of the Cold War, the National Military Strategy Document ,coupled with the Base Case Global Family of OPLANs, closelyapproximated a strategic plan. However, the mutation of thenational military strategy from the detailed and comprehensiveversion contained in the National Military Strategy Document tothe unclassified, generalized form of the post-Cold War NationalMilitary Strategy was by design, and for good reasons. Thearrival of a post-Cold War era of significantly diminishedmilitary threats to U.S. national security and increased focus ondomestic social and fiscal issues brought with it an intensedemand on the part of Congress and the public for an explanationof what changes in military force levels are required and why.General Powell responded to the requirement for more widespreadcommunication of military strategy and the forces needed tosupport it by publishing an easily understood, unclassifiedNational Military Strategy . This new National Military Strategywas widely accepted because the Congress and the public weregenerally unable to understand the new strategic environment withany more clarity than it reflected. Nevertheless, the abandonmentof the National Military Strategy Document and shelving of theBase Case Family of OPLANs were tantamount to inadvertentabdication of the Chairman’s statutory strategic planningresponsibility.

Over half a decade has elapsed since the Berlin wall camedown. The “new world order,” or disorder as some havecharacterized it, has taken sufficient form for critics tosuggest that it is time to develop a strategy for coping withit. 99 The question before us now is should the Chairman replacethe National Military Strategy with a comprehensive, classified,modern version of the National Military Strategy Document ? The

��

answer is no. The current National Military Strategy is not astrategy per se, but a hybrid of national military doctrine andpolicy. It is an institutionalized form of communication amongthe Services, CINCs, OSD and other offices of the ExecutiveBranch, Congress, industry, academe, the public, and theinternational community. It effectively informs all of thegeneral rationale for U.S. military forces, reaffirms nationalsecurity policies, encourages debate, reassures allies, and putspotential adversaries on notice. This type of National MilitaryStrategy continues to serve the purposes for which it was createdand, therefore, warrants perpetuation. However, some measuresmust be taken to fill the strategic planning void which resultedfrom abandonment of the National Military Strategy Document andthe Global Family of OPLANs.

Option 2: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Expansion. Analternative to changing the form and content of the NationalMilitary Strategy is to expand the scope of the JSCP. As we notedearlier, although the JSCP in its current form compiles planningguidance, tasks, and force apportionments for all the CINCs underone cover, it falls short of meeting the requirements of astrategic plan. However, it could be expanded to contain astrategic plan. This approach is appealing at first glance. Theprécis of the National Military Strategy that appears at thefront of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan could be replacedby a comprehensive strategic plan that specifies strategicobjectives and priorities, forces expected to be available foreach 2-year deliberate planning period, and the globallyintegrated strategy for applying U.S and allied militarycapabilities to accomplish the objectives. If this were done theplanning guidance, specific tasks, and force apportionments thatfollowed would be placed in an unambiguous strategic context.This would allow the CINCs to devise more coherent andinterrelated theater strategies and develop operation plans thatcollectively better reflect national level strategic priorities.

However, this alternative is unattractive for at least threereasons. First, the JSCP in its current form is a large, complexdocument and, as such, is difficult to produce. It must bestaffed with all the CINCs, Services, and agencies it directlyaffects, and consensus-building is understandably problematic,particularly given the JSCP’s near-term impact on service supportand training responsibilities and operational responsibilities of

��

the CINCs. A document that combined the strategic plan and thederivative planning guidance, tasks, and force apportionmentswould likely prove too unwieldy to produce or change in a timelyfashion.

Second, the JSCP, a near-term document by design, isimpacted annually by the Contingency Planning Guidance. In itscurrent form, it has been able to accommodate annual fluctuations in contingency planning policy. While this mayremain true for the planning guidance and tasks sections of anexpanded JSCP, it would be untrue for the strategic plan section.If the Chairman is to realize any stability in strategicplanning, subjecting his strategic plan to annual adjustments maybe unwise. Additionally, the Chairman’s strategic plans should beviewed, in part, as military advice that informs the developmentof contingency planning policy, not the reverse.

Third, notwithstanding its substantial volume, the JSCP is acoherent, focused document. It serves one purpose–to provide forthe preparation and review of contingency plans. Given itslongevity in joint strategic planning, its purpose and format areclearly understood and it has genuine utility for combatantcommand, Service, and defense combat support agency planners. Ifit were enlarged to incorporate the Chairman’s strategic plan, itcould lose its central focus and its utility may be lessened. Forthese reasons, we conclude that the expansion of the JSCP is notthe preferred alternative for developing and promulgatingstrategic plans.

Option 3: The National Military Strategic Plan. The mostappropriate alternative is the creation of a new document, theNational Military Strategic Plan . It would be a product of theJoint Strategic Planning System, developed by the Joint Staff inconsultation with the CINCs and Services, and published by theChairman. It would be updated or republished as required inanticipation of changes in the geostrategic environment, revisednational security objectives and strategic priorities, and/orsignificant changes in fiscal guidance. The plan would beharmonized with the Planning, Programming and Budgeting Systemand focused on the Future Years Defense Program, but would alsofeature a long-range (FYDP + 14 years) section. It would derivespecific national military objectives from the broad nationalsecurity objectives expressed in the National Security Strategy

��

and present them in measurable terms. It would establish apriority of national military objectives and clearly describe astrategy for attaining them within the Future Year DefenseProgram period and the long-range planning period, asappropriate.

The National Military Strategic Plan would proactivelyorchestrate and guide the development of CINC theater strategiesto ensure that, in combination, they conform to the U.S. globalstrategy. It would undergird the planning guidance, tasks, andforce apportionments provided to the CINCs in the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan . It would be particularly useful since it wouldcontain near-, mid-, and long-term strategies. Additionally, itwould enable the Services and defense combat support agencies topredict more effectively the type and amount of militarycapability they must build into their respective programs tosupport the requirements of the CINCs. The National MilitaryStrategic Plan would also give them a preview of the standardagainst which their programs would be assessed. In short, theNational Military Strategic Plan would provide the critical nexusconnecting the strategic direction provided by the NationalCommand Authorities, the operation planning and requirementsdetermination by the CINCs, and the supporting militarycapabilities developed by the Services and defense combat supportagencies.

Implementation of the National Military Strategic Planalternative would not be without difficulty, but is certainlyfeasible within the current strategic planning framework. Much ofits basis would be developed during the Joint Strategy Reviewprocess of the Joint Strategic Planning System. Having beenbriefed on the results of the Joint Strategy Review, the Chairmanwould issue guidance outlining the key elements of the plan. At aminimum, the guidance would include national military objectivesand their priorities, anticipated resource levels for the FutureYear Defense Program period, and specific strategic elements thatshould be reflected in the plan. Armed with the Chairman’sguidance, the Joint Staff would develop the strategic plan andcoordinate it with the CINCs, Services, defense combat supportagencies, and selected officials within Office of the Secretaryof Defense. After approving the plan, the Chairman would presentit to the National Command Authorities in keeping with hisresponsibility to provide military advice and assist in the

��

strategic direction of the armed forces. While there would be norequirement for the National Command Authorities formally toapprove the plan, their endorsement would help ensure that theplan was resourced by the Future Years Defense Program.

Development of the National Military Strategic Plan ,therefore, would not disrupt any of the joint strategic planningprocesses or initiatives currently in place, but would modifysome. For example, the National Military Strategic Plan couldincorporate the Unified Command Plan and the latter’s biennialreview would become part of the strategic planning process.Additionally, the National Military Strategic Plan would informthe Chairman’s triennial review of roles, missions and functions.The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments would continue to beperformed. However, they would be guided by the militarycapability requirements and strategic concepts reflected in theNational Military Strategic Plan . Additionally, each JointWarfighting Capability Assessment would no longer be a discreetassessment but would be anchored to the National MilitaryStrategic Plan . The CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists would besubmitted to conform to the National Military Strategic Plan andthus have greater coherence. The Joint Warfighting CapabilityAssessments would integrate and establish priorities for the IPLsunder the staff supervision of the Director of the Joint Staff.The JROC would continue to be briefed on the integratedpriorities of the CINCs’ requirements, particularly those withmajor program research and development implications. TheChairman’s Program Recommendation would remain a Chairman’sreport to the Secretary of Defense. In conformance to themilitary capability requirements reflected in the NationalMilitary Strategic Plan , it would become the means of reportingthe CINCs’ integrated priorities.

A National Military Strategy , similar in form and contentto today’s document, would be developed from unclassifiedinformation extracted from the National Military Strategic Plan .The Chairman would be prepared to disclose classified aspects ofthe National Military Strategic Plan , as necessary, to assistselected members of Congress in deliberations on the defensebudget. The Joint Planning Document (JPD) would be assimilatedinto the National Military Strategic Plan. It would no longer bepublished as stand alone volumes. Neither the Defense PlanningGuidance nor the Joint Military Net Assessment would be based on

��

scenarios, but on the National Military Strategic Plan . Theresult would be a more efficient redirection of Joint Staffenergy toward strategic planning and not a net increase in theJoint Staff’s work load. Finally, the National Military StrategicPlan would provide the strategic basis for the development andimplementation of joint doctrine.

Conclusion .

This essay has argued that strategic plans should act as thecritical nexus connecting national security policy with operationplanning, military requirements determination, and militarycapability development. Without strategic plans, joint strategicplanning will continue to be flawed by:

• inability to establish specific priorities for nationalmilitary objectives;

• unnecessary duplication in the development of militarycapabilities;

• disaggregated, regionally-focused contingency plan- ning;

• inability to reach consensus on a more rational assignmentof service functions; and,

• continued difficulty in the development and imple-mentation of joint doctrine.

10 USC, as amended by GNA, vests the Chairman withresponsibility for the development of “strategic plans.” TheChairman holds the highest position in the strategic planninghierarchy that is not directly constrained by politicalconsiderations. This is not to infer that the Chairman isoblivious or immune to political forces, but only to point outthat he may have greater political latitude than the Secretary ofDefense or the President. There is no statutory requirement forthe Secretary or the President explicitly to approve thestrategic plans prepared by the Chairman. The National MilitaryStrategic Plan should be considered part of his military adviceto the National Command Authorities. So advised, the NationalCommand Authorities may develop a clearer and more conciseapproach toward implementing the National Security Strategy ,

��

without openly risking the political capital that a more preciseNSS might risk.

When Georgy Arbatov, Chairman of the U.S.A.-CanadaInstitute, said in late 1989 “We are depriving you of an enemy,”few realized the prescience of his comment. 100 The dissolution ofthe Warsaw Pact, demise of the Soviet Union, and end of the ColdWar unsuspectingly cut away the anchor that provided continuityin strategic planning for the U.S. Armed Forces. Set adrift, theship of state has successfully defended itself from encroachingmenacing vessels. It defeated a corrupt government of Panama,punished and ejected Iraq from Kuwait, and restored thelegitimate government of Haiti. However, the United States cannotdrift indefinitely lest it unexpectedly run aground or be caughtup in an unforeseen storm. The United States needs proactivestrategic plans that will equip the U.S. Armed Forces to face thechallenges of the 21st century. It is time to set sail and getunderway. The strategic planning machinery is already in place.All that is needed is a star by which to steer.

Recommendations .

• The Chairman should implement the National MilitaryStrategic Plan option described above.

• The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments should bereoriented so they evaluate, integrate, and prioritize the CINCs’requirements.

• The JROC should be divested of its oversightresponsibility for the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments,reaffirming its original charter. Oversight of the JointWarfighting Capability Assessments should become a Director ofthe Joint Staff responsibility on behalf of the Chairman and theVice Chairman. This would permit the assessments to be moreclosely coordinated with the Joint Strategy Review.

• A principal input into the Joint Warfighting CapabilityAssessment process should be the Integrated Priority Listssubmitted by the CINCs. This would help focus the identificationof military requirements on the CINCs, while continuing to ensuretheir requirements are integrated with national level warfightingconcerns.

��

• Continue to publish the Chairman’s Program Recommendation ,but as a product of the reoriented Joint Warfighting CapabilityAssessment process.

• Base the biannual review of the Unified Command Planprimarily on the National Military Strategic Plan .

• Continue the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan in itscurrent form, but base the guidance, force apportionments, andtaskings on the National Military Strategic Plan .

• Base the assessment of force capability strengths anddeficiencies identified by the CINCs on the National MilitaryStrategic Plan .

• Integrate and establish priorities for the CINCs’requirements based upon the National Military Strategic Plan .

• Use the National Military Strategic Plan as the basis forassessing the OPLANs developed by the CINCs.

• Base Joint Military Net Assessments on the NationalMilitary Strategic Plan , vice scenarios.

• Discontinue use of Defense Planning Guidance scenarios inthe development of service programs in favor of conformance tothe National Military Strategic Plan .

• Use the National Military Strategic Plan as input into thetriennial review of roles, missions and functions.

• The National Military Strategic Plan should guide thedevelopment and revision of joint doctrine.

ENDNOTES

1. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Message to Congress,April 3, 1958, cited in Directions for Defense (Advance Copy),Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the ArmedForces, May 24, 1995, pp. 2-2.

2. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,

��

Defense Organization and the Need for Change, Staff Report, 99thCongress, 1st Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, 1985, p. 8.

3. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Report99-824, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC: U.S.Government Printing Office, 1986, pp. 5, 17.

4. Ibid ., pp. 17-18.

5. The Secretary of Defense’s Planning, Programming, andBudgeting System (PPBS) and the President’s National SecurityCouncil System (NSCS) are critical to national level strategicdirection and planning and are certainly worthy of criticalanalysis. However, we will address them in this essay only to theextent necessary to facilitate our study of Chairman levelprocesses and products. For example, the National SecurityStrategy (NSS), developed by the NSC, directly impacts and tosome extent predetermines the National Military Strategydeveloped by the Chairman. While we will refrain from assessingthe NSCS, we must examine the NSS. Similarly, while a completeassessment of the PPBS is beyond the scope of this study, we willexamine the Defense Planning Guidance and the manner in which itrelates to the strategic planning conducted by the Chairman.Therefore, we will focus on the interfaces between the Chairman’sJoint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the PPBS and NSCS.

6. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary ofMilitary and Associated Terms , p. 253, defines the NCA as thePresident and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputizedalternates or successors.

7. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee onArmed Services, Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, 103rdCongress, 1st Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, April 1993, Section 153.

8. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02: Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and Associated Terms , Washington, DC: U.S.Government Printing Office, March 23, 1994, p. 364.

��

9. Defense Organization and the Need for Change, pp. 493-500.

10. Title 10, U.S. Code. Armed Forces , sections 153(a)(1),(2), (3).

11. Ibid ., section 153(a)(3)(C).

12. Ibid ., section 153(a)(4)(B), (C), and (E).

13. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for JointOperations , Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,September 9, 1993, p. III-1.

14. The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) focuses on theperiod from 2-8 years into the future. For example, the FY 98-99Department of Defense budget would normally be submitted, as partof the President’s Budget, to Congress by February 1997. This DoDbudget would represent the first 2 years of the FY 98-03 FYDP.The FY 98-03 FYDP would be built largely during 1996, based onDefense Planning Guidance nominally published in 1995. Thus, workon the FYDP during late 1995 and 1996 would focus on the FY 98-03time period.

15. U.S. Congress, National Security Act of 1947 (selectedprovisions), inside U.S. Congress, House of Representatives,Committee on Armed Services, Title 10, United States Code. ArmedForces, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC: U.S.Government Printing Office, April 1993, p. 1735. Although the1995 National Security Strategy, in its preface, says it isproduced in accordance with section 603 of the GNA, thatprovision of the GNA has been codified by amending the NationalSecurity Act of 1947.

16. U.S. Congress, National Security Act of 1947, p. 1735.

17. White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagementand Enlargement, Washington, DC: February 1995, pp. 1-33.

18. Ibid. , passim , particularly pp. 3-5, 8-9, 11, 13-16, 18-25, 27-30.

��

19. Don M. Snider, The National Security Strategy:Documenting Strategic Vision , Carlisle Barracks, PA: StrategicStudies Institute, March 1995, pp. 9-10. An example of other moresuitable fora, see The Annual Report to the President and theCongress , Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,annual.

20. Ibid ., p. 14. Dr. Snider came to a similar conclusionconcerning the 1994 NSS saying, “Equally noticeable by theirabsence in this globalist approach are the priorities necessaryto make this strategy operative.”

21. To the current NSS’s credit, it does state unequivocallythat a two-war military capability is required–that is, armedforces that can fight and win two nearly simultaneous majorregional conflicts. It then goes on to say that programmed forceswill do just that. This type of overt commitment to a specificlevel of force capability is refreshing and contributes stabilityto strategic planning. The NSS specifically declares that thethreat of intrusion into our military and commercial informationsystems poses a significant risk to national security and must beaddressed. This also provides useful guidance to strategicplanners. Complementing the definitions of vital, important, andhumanitarian interests is a more complete set of interventioncriteria that now include “a clearly defined, achievable mission”and an assessment of the “environment of risk.” The NSS providesunambiguous guidance concerning the U.S. commitment to NATO andthe advisability of increasing its membership. So while thecurrent NSS has clear deficiencies, it also provides significantpolicy guidance and certainly is not without value. Ibid ., pp.12-13, 26.

22. National Security Act of 1947 (selected provisions), p.1735.

23. There is no requirement nor explicit authorization setforth in 10 USC for the Secretary of Defense to prepare strategicplans. That is an exclusive responsibility of the Chairman. Thepreparation of strategic plans is one means by which the Chairmanassists the President and the Secretary of Defense in providingstrategic direction to the U.S. Armed Forces. Title 10, UnitedStates Code , chapters 2-4.

��

24. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, section113(g)(1).

25. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (1st Revision, March 17, 1993), JointStrategic Planning System, Washington, DC, p. VII-3.

26. The “advice” of the Chairman is currently providedprimarily through the NMS. The NMS is based on the same strategicplanning that the Chairman would use to assign tasks to theCINCs.

27. The requirement in 10 USC, Section 153, for the Chairmanto prepare strategic plans that conform to resource levelsprojected by the Secretary of Defense to be available during theplans’ effective periods is based on recommendations contained inA Quest for Excellence , the Final Report to the President by theBlue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Washington, DC:1986), also known as the Packard Commission Report. The reportrecommended (p. xix) that defense planning should start with acomprehensive statement of national security objectives andpriorities by the President. The President would then provide theSecretary of Defense provisional 5-year defense budget levels.The Secretary of Defense would, in turn, direct the Chairman toconduct strategic planning based on the provisional budgetlevels.

28. Carl H. Builder and James A. Dewer, “A Time forPlanning? If Not Now, When?”, Parameters , Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer1994, pp. 4-15.

29. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense PlanningGuidance FY 1996-2001 , Washington, DC: May 23, 1994, pp. 4-11,15-25.

30. Ibid., pp. 29-40.

31. Ibid ., p. A-1.

32. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, section113(g)(2).

33. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (1st Revision, March 17,

��

1993), Joint Strategic Planning System, p. VII-3.

34. There is, however, informal coordination between theauthors of the CPG in the Office of the Secretary of Defense(OSD) and members of the Joint Staff’s Directorate for StrategicPlans and Policy. This coordination normally amounts to membersof the OSD referring drafts of the CPG to Joint Staff officersfor comment. The authors of the CPG are normally not part of theJoint Strategy Review process and the Joint Staff officers whoreview the drafts of the CPG may or may not be.

35. Ibid. , pp. V-2, VII-3.

36. Ibid ., pp. II-1 through II-11.

37. Ibid., pp. II-1 through II-11, V-2, VII-3.

38. Ibid ., p. V-1. Note that on page I-2 the Joint Staffasserts that the JSCP fulfills the Chairman’s responsibility forpreparing strategic plans as well. We will show this to beincorrect.

39. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, section153(a)(3)(A) and (B).

40. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, section153(a)(1), (2), (3).

41. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 84,(17th Revision–January 24, 1989), Joint Strategic PlanningSystem , Washington, DC, p. 1.

42. Ibid., p. 9.

43. The Senate Armed Services Committee identified theinability of the JSPS to provide useful strategic planning adviceand to formulate military strategy as one of the causes ofineffective strategic planning within the DoD. Admiral Zumwalt, aformer Chief of Naval Operations, commenting on a key JCS MOP 84JSPS document remarked “. . . I found this particular document tobe almost as valueless to read as it was fatiguing to write. Someof its prescriptions always were in the process of beingfalsified by events. Others were so tortured a synthesis of

��

mutually contradictory positions that the guidance they gave wasminimal.” See, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on ArmedServices, Defense Organization and the Need for Change, pp. 495-496.

44. Memorandum of Policy 84, Joint Strategic PlanningSystem, pp. 30, 35. The Base Case Family of Operation Plans was agrouping of OPLANs prepared individually by the CINCs inaccordance with the strategy and guidance presented in theNational Military Strategy Document and the specific tasksassigned in the JSCP. Collectively, they served as the “BaseCase” for Chairman-level force capability determinations andassessments as well as for identifying risks associated withimplementing national security policy and achieving nationalsecurity objectives. Each plan within the grouping related toothers with respect to force apportionments, assumptions, timing,and objectives.

45. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (Issued January 30, 1990),Joint Strategic Planning System, p. 1. Based on the author’snotes and experience as a member of the Joint Staff and the JointStrategy Review (JSR) Working Group from 1990 to 1993. Althoughdetailed JSR Administrative Instructions were published, theywere never implemented. The conduct of the JSR was deferred untilafter the annual CINCs’ Conference (also see Harry Rothman,Forging a New National Military Strategy in a Post-Cold WarWorld: A Perspective from the Joint Staff, Carlisle Barracks, PA:Strategic Studies Institute, February 1992, pp. 12-15.) Duringthe 1990 conference, the Chairman achieved consensus on a broadoutline for a national military strategy for the post-Cold Warperiod. Therefore, in consultation with the Service Chiefs andCINCs, the Chairman decided that the minutes of the conference,or more specifically the message that summarized the conferenceand resulting taskings, would suffice as Chairman’s Guidance andno JSR was required. This is the point at which the formal JSPSbegan to fall apart.

46. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (Issued January 30, 1990),Joint Strategic Planning System, pp. 20-31.

47. Ibid ., pp. 24-25.

48. Ibid. , pp. 32-39.

��

49. Ibid ., p. 40.

50. Each military department transmits its proposals forresource allocations, in accordance with its interpretation ofthe Defense Planning Guidance, to the Office of the Secretary ofDefense in the form of a document called the Program ObjectiveMemorandum (POM). It is the Secretary of Defense’sresponsibility, in consultation with the CJCS, CINCs, andsecretaries of the military departments, to rationalize andintegrate the POMs into a coherent defense program.

51. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (Issued January 30, 1990),Joint Strategic Planning System, pp. 48-49.

52. Based on one author’s experience as a member of theJoint Staff working group formed to revise the JSPS. The JointStaff office of primary responsibility, J-5, initially attemptedto remove almost all of the structure from the process andeliminate the regular publication of documents such as theChairman’s Guidance, NMS, and JSCP. The Services and several ofthe CINCs resisted this since they believed regular documentpublication would bring them into the process because ofstandard Joint Staff coordination requirements for jointdocuments.

53. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (lst Revision, March 17,1993), Joint Strategic Planning System, p. 1.

54. Although an NMSD was not published under either CJCS MOP7 or CJCS MOP 7 (Revision 1), NMSD FY 92-97 was published in 1989(JSSM-162-89, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject:National Military Strategy Document FY 92-97, September 21, 1989)in anticipation of revision of the JSPS.

55. The White House, National Security Strategy ofthe UnitedStates, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August1991, pp. 3-4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, NationalMilitary Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC: U.S.Government Printing Office, January 1992, p. 5.

56. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,JSSM-162-89, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject:

��

National Military Strategy Document FY 92-97, September 21, 1989,passim. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National MilitaryStrategy of the United States, Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, January 1992, p. 5.

57. While the Joint Staff was involved in the JSR, the newSecretary of Defense initiated the now well-documented “Bottom-UpReview.” The BUR, intentionally conducted outside the JSPS,served to delay publication of the new NMS. Additionally,although his predecessor had given guidance for the developmentof a new NMS, General Shalikashvili wanted the Joint Staff tohave the benefit of his guidance before proceeding. Anotherfactor is the delay by the new administration in publishing a newNational Security Strategy. It would have been poor form topublish the new NMS before the new NSS.

58. National Military Strategy of the United States,February 1995, passim . We make this statement cognizant of asubtle difference between the NMS published by General Powell andthe current NMS published by General Shalikashvili. In his lettertransmitting the 1992 NMS, General Powell states, “This strategyprovides a rationale for . . . a capability which will serve thenation well throughout the remainder of the 1990s. ” The 1992 NMSwas matched to the FY 94-99 FYDP. The comparable section ofGeneral Shalikashvili’s letter transmitting the 1995 NMS says“This new national military strategy describes the objectives,concepts, tasks, and capabilities necessary in the near term . .. . ” This NMS is matched to the FY 96-01 FYDP. The JSPS stilldescribes the NMS as a mid-range product. It is not completelyclear why the current Chairman infers his NMS is a near-termdocument. However, this could be additional evidence of the needfor stability in strategic planning that could be brought aboutby strategic plans.

59. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Forces, Pentagon,Washington, DC, August 11, 1994, p. I-5.

60. National Security Act of 1947 (Selected Provisions) inTitle 10, United States Code. Armed Forces , pp. 1724-1725.

61. “This new national military strategy describes theobjectives, concepts, tasks, and capabilities necessary in the

��

near term to adapt the Armed Forces’ proven capabilities to meetthis challenge. John M. Shalikashvili, Transmittal letter,National Military Strategy , February 1995.

62. It is interesting to note that after 20 years of effort,the Australian Department of Defence has developed a threat-ambiguous defense planning and force development methodology. SeeThomas-Durell Young, “Capabilities-based Defense Planning: TheAustralian Experience,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 21, No. 3,Spring 1995, pp. 349-369.

63. Certainly strategic planning conducted by the Chairmanis important for reasons beyond those discussed in this essay.However, we are focusing our analysis on these key areas becausethey stand to benefit most from strategic planning directly underthe purview of the Chairman.

64. Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces, Section161(b).

65. The White House, Memorandum for the Secretary ofDefense, Subject: Unified Command Plan, Washington, DC: September24, 1993, passim, and, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, MCM-144-93, Subject: Implementation of the UnifiedCommand Plan, Washington, DC: October 6, 1993, p. 1.

66. Unified Command Plan, passim.

67. Recall the Chairman’s responsibilities for strategicplanning and providing for the preparation and review ofcontingency plans enumerated in Section 153 of 10 USC.

68. Title 10 , United States Code, Section 153(a)(3).Deliberate operation plans are those plans developed by the CINCsduring non-crises periods. They take approximately 18 months todevelop and describe, in detail, the actions the CINCs would takeif crises commensurate with the JSCP taskings were to develop.They are based on assumptions and contrast with crisis actionplans that are developed in response to unanticipated crises.Crisis action plans can be developed by modifying deliberateoperation plans or built from scratch in “no-plan” situations.

69. Deliberate operation planning within the Joint Operation

��

Planning and Execution System uses the term “operation plan” vice10 USC’s use of the term “contingency plan. ” There is a historybehind this convention, but for the present it is sufficient topoint out that the plans tasked by the JSCP are of the typereferred to as “contingency plans” within 10 USC.

70. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (1st Revision, March 17,1993), Joint Strategic Planning System, pp. V-1 through V-7.

71. Memorandum of Policy No. 7 (January 30, 1990), JointStrategic Planning System, p. 40.

72. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (1st Revision, March 17,1993), Joint Strategic Planning System, pp. I-2, I-3.

73. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, MCM-126-92,Washington, DC: August 25, 1992, p. I-1.

74. Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (1st Revision, March 17,1993), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, p. VII-3.

75. Title 10, United States Code, section 153 (a)(3)(C).

76. Title 10, United States Code, sections 153(a)(4) and 163(b)(2).

77. Joint Requirements Oversight Council, CINC Newsletter,Vol. 1-94, Washington, DC: April 22, 1994, p. 1. Office of theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MCM-76-95, Subject:Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Washington,DC: February 7, 1995, pp. 1-2.

78. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,MCM-76-92, Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements OversightCouncil, Washington, DC: May 19, 1992, pp. 1-2.

79. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,MCM-76-95, Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements OversightCouncil, Washington, DC: February 7, 1995, p. 1.

80. See Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,Joint Pub 1-03. 31 , Preparedness Evaluation System, January 1993,

��

pp. 2-1 thru 2-7 and 4-1 thru 4-3 for a discussion of the CINC’sPreparedness Assessment Report (CSPAR) and the Chairman’sPreparedness Assessment Report (PAR). Also see Office of theChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 7, (1stRevision, March 17, 1993) Joint Strategic Planning System, pp.VII-2 thru VII-3 and Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 53 (1st Revision), MilitaryCapability Reporting, March 25, 1993, p. GL-3, for a discussionof the Chairman’s Contingency Capabilities Assessment (CCA).

81. Title 10, United States Code , section 153(a)(3)(C) and(D).

82. This observation is offered notwithstanding the recentlyimplemented Joint Monthly Readiness Reports (JMRRs) submitted bythe CINCs. While the JMRRs seem to be effective in highlightingreadiness strengths and deficiencies and can serve to inform theJROC in its deliberations, they do not go so far as to assess the effect current force capability strengths and deficiencies haveon achieving national security objectives and implementingnational security policy.

83. Given the JROC membership, which includes all the vicechiefs of the Services, there is a danger that these JROC-sponsored assessments will rest largely on service consensus.Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MCM-76-95,Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,Washington, DC: February 7, 1995, p. 2.

84. U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Ground ManeuverWorkshop III, workbook for participants, June 1995.

85. Robert Holzer, “Pentagon Chiefs Get New Policy Weapon,”Defense News, January 30, 1995, p. 1.

86. The ASD (PA&E) requests the IPLs by a memorandum to theCINCs. For example see the June 24, 1991, memorandum, Subject:Submission of FY 1994-99 Integrated Priority Lists.

87. Information received from a member of the Joint StaffForce Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, thedirectorate with staff responsibility for the JROC and CPR. Theofficer informed us the CPR will not replace the IPLs and the

��

IPLs will continue to be submitted to ASD (PA&E).

88. William A. Owens, “JROC: Harnessing the Revolution inMilitary Affairs,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1994, pp. 56-57.

89. Title 10 United States Code, sections 153(a)(4) and163(b)(2).

90. Ibid ., section 153(a)(2)(c).

91. Ibid ., section 153(a)(3)(C).

92. Ibid ., section 153(b)(1).

93. Robert Holzer, “U.S. Military Braces for Massive MissionReview,” Defense News, Washington, DC, August 29 - September 4,1994, p. 3.

94. “The Battle for Superiority in US Roles and Missions, ”Jane’s Defense Weekly, October 1, 1994, p. 27.

95. Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, “Armed Services Battle toStandstill Over Roles,” Baltimore Sun, May 15, 1995, p. 1; and,Mark Yost, “Mission Partly Accomplished,” Wall Street Journal ,May 24, 1995, p. 14.

96. Title 10, United States Code, section 153(a)(5).

97. “The concept of unified action highlights the integratedand synchronized activities of military forces and non-militaryorganizations, agencies, and corporations to achieve commonobjectives . . . ” Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations,Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 9, 1993, p. II-5.

98. Joint Pub 1-01 , pp. I-1 thru I-2.

99. Don M. Snider, Daniel Goure, and Stephen A. Cambone,Defense in the 1990s, Avoiding the Train Wreck, Washington, DC:The Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 15,1994, pp. 4-6, 17.

��

100. Georgy Arbatov, “We Are Depriving You of an Enemy, ”USA Today, November 16, 1989, Sec. A, p. 7.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. ChilcoatCommandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

DirectorColonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of ResearchDr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

AuthorsProfessor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Dr. Thomas-Durell Young

EditorMrs. Marianne P. Cowling

SecretaryMs. Rita A. Rummel

*****

CompositionMrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover ArtistMr. James E. Kistler