US DOE/NNSA - INECP

InternationalNonproliferation

Export Control Program

Tim HastySavannah River Site

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INECP Presentation Outline

• Overview, Mission, History

• Proliferation Risk and Assessment-Based Engagement Process

• Spotlights on Three Main Pillars of INECP Activity- Licensing- Enterprise Outreach- Enforcement

• INECP Today

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International NonproliferationExport Control Program

• Strengthen global efforts to prevent

proliferation of WMD-related

materials, equipment, and

technology

• Proliferation Risk Analysis in the Licensing Process

- Ensure the license review process competently assesses proliferation risks associated with end-uses and end-users, and ensure technical specialists are being utilized

• Government Outreach and Enterprise Compliance

- Assist governments to establish outreach programs and promote enterprise compliance at key enterprises and technology holders

• WMD-related Commodity Identification Training and reach-back for Customs

- Ensure enforcement personnel are sensitized to WMD-related materials and equipment, and have access to technical/analytical resources and support

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International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP)

• Threat- Networks of procurement agents, brokers, and companies

systematically maneuver around and through national export control efforts to obtain commodities and technology needed for WMD development and production facilities

• INECP Mission- Strengthen global efforts to prevent proliferation of WMD-related

materials, equipment, and technology

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Responding to the dynamic threat…INECP evolution over time

• 1990’s: - INECP helped create export control systems from whole cloth in the

Newly Independent States starting in the mid-1990s, focusing on the key nuclear suppliers- Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

- Initial focus was on outreach to nuclear enterprises and the creation of licensing systems

INECP’s approach is based on identifying, training, and developing a cadre of technical/nonproliferation specialists in each partner country that can sustain that

country’s export control system over the long term

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Responding to the dynamic threat…INECP evolution over time

• 2000’s:- Systematic threat assessment drove geographic expansion

- 1st phase of geographic expansion took the program to the transit states adjacent to the “big-3” nuclear suppliers:- Caucasus, Central Asia, Baltics

- 2nd phase (post 9/11), recognizing the threats of procurement networks, non-state actors, weak links in the regime, and secondary suppliers took the program global:- Asia Pacific, Middle East, Europe, Americas

- Systematic vulnerability assessment drove topical expansion- Recognition that effective export control systems depend not only on

licensing and enterprise compliance, but also on the ability of frontline enforcement agencies to interdict illicit trade, led to development of Commodity Identification Training (CIT)

INECP’s Country Plans implement these systematic assessments

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INECP’s Global Proliferation Risk Assessment guides country selection and prioritization

• Risk is based on Threat and Vulnerability

- Threat = Supply Threat and Conduit Threat- Supply Threat = capacity to supply CBNM-related goods- Conduit Threat = Geostrategic position and trade flows

- Vulnerability = Export Control System defects- Three elements necessary for export control system effectiveness- Licensing- Enterprise Compliance- Enforcement

- Defects in any of these system elements create opportunities for proliferators

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• Threat = Supply Threat and Conduit Threat

- Supply Threat = capacity to supply CBNM-related goods

- Conduit Threat = Geostrategic position and trade flows indicate access to goods and opportunities for diversion

Measuring Proliferation THREAT

Potential Supply Threat Potential Conduit Threat

5Clear capacity to provide the most vital and sensitive items

and know-how.

Suspected/known NW program or possesses enrichment or

reprocessing facilities

Military producer of Cat 1 systems and/or posesses

ICBM capabilitySuspected/known CW program Suspected/known BW program

4 Ability to provide more sensitive items and know-how

Produces/Supplies nuclear fuel cycle faciliites (NSG TL)

Space launch program or produces MTCR Cat I systems

Schedule 1 chemical production capability or legacy

CW program

Declared or suspected biodefense program or BW

legacy program

3Clear capacity to supply many

of the relevant dual-use commodities and technology

Produces/Supplies NSG DU items

Produces MTCR Cat II systems or subsystems

Produces/supplies Schedule 2 chemicals or AG DU chemical

production equipment

Bio-related DU equipment supplier

2Ability to provide at least some strategic commodities on the multilateral export control lists

Nuclear technology holder Active aerospace industry

Produces/supplies unscheduled or Schedule 3 chemicals or utilizes them in

domestic industry

Active biotech or pharmaceutical industry

1 Virtually no capacity to supply the necessary goods

None NoneMinimal capability for producing

controlled chemicalsMinimal capability for producing

bio-agents

GENERALNuclearSupplier

MissileSupplier

ChemicalSupplier

BiologicalSupplier

5 Regime Insider*Significant trading partner with

countries pursuing WMD programs

4 Significant trading partner with a regime insider*

Operates a Free Trade Zone**

3 Geographically adjacent to a regime insider*

Major transit/transshipment hub

2 Adjacent to a country pursuing WMD

Significant international trade relative to GDP

1 Isolated Minimal trade

Geo-strategicposition

Trade Flows

*

**

"regime insider" includes members of the NSG, MTCR, or AG, as well as countries inside a customs union or open market with a regime member

"free trade zone" encompasses the broader category of special economic zones, including free ports, export-processing zones, special economic zones, etc.

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Measuring VULNERABILITY

- Defects in any of these system elements create opportunities for illicit procurement- Licensing- Enterprise Compliance- Enforcement

1 2 3 4 5

No licensing process and no dual-use control lists

Licensing agencies/process identified and rudimentary

control lists in place

Ad hoc links between technical expertise and licensors

employed to review licenses and Control lists consistent NSG Part 1 or AP Annex II.

Dedicated/trained groups of nonproliferation technical

specialists capable of reviewing DU licenses are used and

control lists consistent NSG Part 2.

Competent proliferation risk evaluation, including end

use and end user analysis and ontrol lists consistent

NSG/MTCR/AG/WA.

No inventory of enterprises Enterprises identified;

Guidelines PromulgatedOutreach happening but not to

all key enterprises

US-supported, indigenously-staffed outreach to key

suppliers

Self-sustainable, indigenous outreach at all

key enterprises

No training or no technical expertise available

Basic export control training for enforcement officials and Technical Experts Identified

CIT indigenization underway and

Ad hoc referrals to technical experts

Ongoing US-supported CIT and regularized reachback between front line and technical experts

established

Indigenous and locally customized CIT established

and Technical experts trained and equipped to

provide support as requested

En

terp

rise

sE

nfo

rcem

ent

WMD/DU Training and Reachback for

Customs

Government Outreach to Industry

Proliferation Risk Analysis in Licensing

Process

Lic

ensi

ng

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The combination of threat and vulnerability guides INECP’s country selection and prioritization

INECP Global Risk Assessment

New Zealand

Iceland

Vietnam

AUS

HK

Croatia

ROK

Macedonia

KAZTurkey

US

S&M

Singapore

Indonesia

Azerbaijan

Japan

Ukraine

India

Philippines

Kyrgyzstan

Brazil

Argentina

Canada

SF

Jordan

MalaysiaThailand

Armenia

Mexico

Georgia

Taiwan

Russia

EU

Israel

Pakistan

China

UAE

0%

50%

100%

0% 50% 100%

Proliferation Threat

Sys

tem

Vu

lner

abili

ty

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The combination of threat and vulnerability guides INECP’s country selection and prioritization

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Tailored ENGAGEMENT

• For each country engaged, INECP tailors its approach according to the assessed deficiencies in the three export control system elements

• The Evaluation and Planning Matrix diagnoses the export control deficiencies that INECP can most effectively target and identifies specific offerings to address those deficiencies

• This matrix forms the basis for all of INECP’s annually updated Country Plans.

1 2 3 4 5

Met

ric No licensing process and no dual-use control lists

Licensing agencies/process identified and rudimentary

control lists in place

Ad hoc links between technical expertise and licensors

employed to review licenses and Control lists consistent NSG Part 1 or AP Annex II.

Dedicated/trained groups of nonproliferation technical

specialists capable of reviewing DU licenses are used and

control lists consistent NSG Part 2.

Competent proliferation risk evaluation, including end

use and end user analysis and ontrol lists consistent

NSG/MTCR/AG/WA.

INE

CP

Offe

rings Tech Exchange

Proliferation Awareness Workshop

Gap Analysis

ELAN

End Use/End User Training I

Share DOE Handbooks/Guidebooks

Multilat Workshop I

Contract with tech experts

TEWG

NSG Outreach Workshop

End Use/End User Training II

Multilat Workshop II

Develop/Deploy Automated License Review

Maintenance

Met

ric

No inventory of enterprises Enterprises identified;

Guidelines PromulgatedOutreach happening but not to

all key enterprises

US-supported, indigenously-staffed outreach to key

suppliers

Self-sustainable, indigenous outreach at all

key enterprises

INE

CP

Offe

rings

Tech Exchange

Proliferation Awareness Workshop

Identify/train cadre to conduct outreach

Indigenous enterprise study

Government-industry seminar

Outreach dataproducts/websites

Site-specific, industry-specific, or regional

outreach workshops to:1. nuclear suppliers2. nuc tech holders

3. AP Annex I Activities4. WMD DU enterprises

Site-Specific Workshops

Handbook Development

Negotiate transfer of responsibility

Maintenance

Met

ric No training or no technical expertise available

Basic export control training for enforcement officials and Technical Experts Identified

CIT indigenization underway and ad-hoc referrals to

technical experts

Ongoing US-supported CIT and regularized reachback between front line and technical experts

established

Indigenous and locally customized CIT established

and Technical experts trained and equipped to

provide support as requested

INE

CP

Offe

rings

CIT Short-Course

Identify potential sources of tech expertise

Trade Flow Analysis

Technical Exchange

Develop Training Plan

Share CIT Instructional Materials

CIT Instructor Training

Share DOE Handbooks/Guidebooks

Nonproliferation/Tech Training (e.g., ELAN)

TEWG

Contract with tech experts

Conduct needs analysis for tech tools and guides

Contract development of indigenous guides

Collaborative CIT Pilot Course(s)

Deploy/train advanced tools (Vision Vest, XRF, etc)

Maintenance

Pro

lifer

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n R

isk

Ana

lysi

s in

Lic

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ss

Lic

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WM

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and

Rea

chba

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usto

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Gov

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En

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Three Pillars of INECP activity

Major Activity Who Why What

LICENSING

Licensing Officers and Analysts

Need to conduct competent proliferation risk analysis in the licensing process

End Use and End User Analysis Training (EUEU)

COMPLIANCE

Managers of public sector & legacy WMD enterprises, labs, manufacturers, etc.

These major technology holders are targets of opportunity for proliferants

Enterprise Outreach

ENFORCEMENT

Customs Officers and other enforcement personnel

Widespread ignorance regarding strategic commodities

Commodity Identification Training (CIT)

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Spotlight on LICENSING

• End Use/End User (EU/EU) Analysis focuses on strengthening the ability of analysts to uncover suspicious procurement activity and assess proliferation risk.

• Analysis of Strategic Commodity Transfers (ASCOT) helps analysts better understand multilateral controls, including the commercial and WMD applications of listed commodities.

Stated End Use

Commodity

Activities of the Consignees

(including stated end user)

history of diversion?

connections to entities of concern?

proliferation concerns or WMD activities associated with the end user country?

stated end use is a direct proliferation concern?

reason for control?

proliferation concern associated with this commodity?

commodity categorized correctly?

commodity appropriate for the stated end use?

(Quantity, specifications…)

stated end use makes technical sense?

stated end use consistent with the activities of the stated end

user?

existence and activities of the end user confirmed?

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Spotlight on Enterprise Outreach

• Our unique value added- Implementing compliance programs at US National Labs- Intangible technology control- Technical understanding of the control lists, commodities, WMD

programs, acquisition networks

• Our niche- Public sector, tertiary enterprises and legacy WMD sectors (nuclear,

missile, chemical, biological)- INECP’s flexibility has also allowed us to quickly respond to partner

government requests for assistance when other agencies cannot

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Spotlight on Commodity Identification Training• CIT gives inspectors “a trained eye” by familiarizing

them with the materials, components, and equipment sought by WMD procurement programs

• CIT simplifies export control lists by grouping items into technology “bundles” and by aiding recognition through a focus on physical appearance, using pictures and demonstration kits:

- Equipment- Fabricated Parts and Components- Electronics (Components and Equipment)- Industrial Equipment- Systems and Subsystems

- Materials- Structural Materials (metals and non-metals)- Special Materials (Nuclear, Chemical, Biological)

• Indigenization strategy- INECP follows a disciplined indigenization approach

based on our technical partnerships to establish ongoing training programs and reachback capabilities

CIT deployment is underway in 25 countries

Alloy Analysis with XRF provides capability to determine element composition of alloys and other controlled materials

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CIT Implementation Experience

CITConductedCITPlanned

CANAD A

UNITED S TATE S O F AMERI C A

MEXIC OCUB A

JAMAICABELIZE

DOMINICA NREPUBLICHAITI

PUERTO RICO

GUATEMALA

COSTA RI CA

NICARAGU A

HONDURA SEL SALVAD OR

PANA MA

COLOMBI A

VENEZUEL A

TRINIDAD &TOBAG O

GUY ANA

SURINA

M

FREN

CH G

UIAN

A

ECUADO R

BRAZI L

PER U

BOLIVI A

PARAGUAY

ARGENTIN A

URUG UAY

CHIL E

FALKLAND/MALVINA SISLAND S

GREENLAN D

ICELAN D

NORW AY

SWEDE NFINLAN D

DENMAR K

UNITEDKINGDO M

IRELAN D

FRANC E

LUXEMBOUR GGERMAN Y

ESTONIALA TVI ALITHUANI ARUSSI A

POLAN DBELARU S

UKRAIN E

S P AIN

PORTUG AL

CZEC HRE P.

AUSTRI ASWITZERLAN D

ITALY

SLOVENI A

CRO ATIA

SLOVAKI AHUNG ARY

SERBI ABULGARIA

ROMANI A

MOLDOVA

ALBANI A

GREEC ETURKE Y

CYPRU S

MOROCCO

WESTER NSAHARA

ALGERI ALI B Y A

TUNISI A

MAUR ITAN IA

SENEGA LGAMBIA

GUINEA-BISSA UGUINEA

SIER RA LEO NELIBERI A

MAL I

BURKIN AFASO

IVORYCOAST

TOGO

BENI

N

NIGERI A

NIGE R CHA D

EGYP T

SUDA N

ERITRE A

ETHIOPI ACENTRA LAFRICANREPUBLI C

CAMEROONEQUATORIA L

GUINEAGABON

CONG O ZAIR E

RWAN DABURUND I

UGAND A KE NYA

SOMALIA

ANGOL A

NAMIBI A

ZAMBI A

TANZAN IA

MALAWI

ZIMBABW E

BOTSWANA

MOZAMBIQUE

MADAGASCA R

SWAZILA ND

LESOTHOSOU T H AFRI CA

MAURITIU S

RƒUNIO N

GEORGIA

ARMENI A AZERBAIJA N

SYRI A

LEBANO NISRAE L

JORDAN

IRA Q IRA N

SAUD I

AR ABI AQATAR

UNITEDARAB

EMIRATES

OMAN

YEME N

INDI A

AFGHANI STAN

PAKISTAN

TURKMENI STANUZBEKI STAN

KYRGYZ STAN

TAJIKISTAN

KAZAKH S T A N

SRILANKA

NEPALBHUTAN

BANGLADES HBURM A

LAOS

THAILAN D

CAMBODI A

VIETNA M

MA L AYS I ABRUNE I

PHILIPPINE S

TAIWAN

INDON ES I A

PAPU ANE W

GUINE A SOLOMONISLANDS

FIJIVANUA TU

NEW CALEDONI A

AUSTRALI A

NEWZEALAN D

RUSSI A

MONGOLI A

NORTHKOREA

SOUTH KOREAJ A P A N

CHIN A

HONG KONG

ANDORR A

BOSNI A-HERZEGOVIN A

BAHAMAS

GHANA

MACEDONI A

SINGAPOR E

MALTA

GALAPAGOS

ISLANDS

North I .

South I.

Newfoundlan d

South Georgia

W E ST

IN

DI

ES

CANARYISLANDS

E

AS

T I N D I E S

ME

LA

NE

SI

A

A L E U T I A N

S VALBA R D

Z E M LY A F R A N T S A I O S I FA

No

va

ya

Z e m l y a

S E V E R N A Y A

NOVO SIBIRSK IV EOS TRO VO

HAWAIIANISLANDS

I S L A N D S

Z E M L Y A

C ommodi ty Id entif i cati on T ra i nin g

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INECP Today:• International Mandates bolster INECP’s timeliness and significance

- UNSCR 1718 (sanctions on North Korea) benefited by INECP strategic commodity identification training in sensitive destinations surrounding North Korea (e.g., China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, Japan)

- UNSCR 1696 (calling upon States to “to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of an items, materials, goods, and technology that could contribute to Iran’s …programmes”) benefited by INECP commodity identification and other export control training to potential suppliers and transit points: Cyprus, the European Union, Jordan, etc.

- UNSCR 1540 includes provisions that reinforce INECP’s three pillars:- Improve Licensing Procedures & Practices: 3.(d) “Establish, develop, review and

maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items…as well as establishing end-user controls…”

- Promote Industry Compliance: 8.(d) “To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws;”

- Strengthen Enforcement Capabilities: 3.(c) “Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat…the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items…”

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INECP Today:

• We are THE recognized experts in Strategic Commodity Control - CIT fills a critical need, and demand has far exceeded all

expectations- The recognized need for CIT affords INECP ready access to a wide

range of countries that would not otherwise accept “export control assistance”

• Confidence in INECP results in Outreach Partnerships- Japan, Australia, EU- Technical Experts Working Groups

• Regional institutions extend INECP’s reach and contacts- Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC)- Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)- European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC)