us industry response (w. webster)

© 2012 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

U.S. Industry Response to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident

William E. Webster, Jr. Senior Vice President, Industry Evaluations

March 20, 2012


Overview • New perspective – the way

forward

• U.S. industry response actions

– Near-term actions

– Diverse and flexible mitigation capability

• U.S. Nuclear Industry Event Response Framework

– Equipment and material support

– Technical support

• Conclusions


A New Perspective:

Nuclear Excellence =

Operational Excellence

and

Emergency Response

Excellence


The Way Forward Strategic Goals 1. Existing plant safety

2. Synchronize response capability

3. Effective industry emergency plan

4. Integrate strategies, consider multi-unit impact

5. External event margins

6. Spent fuel pool cooling protection

7. Primary containment protection

8. Radiological protection response


U.S. Industry Response

• Verify readiness for known conditions

• Improve countermeasures for beyond design conditions


Verify Readiness for Known Conditions

• INPO Event Report (IER)11-1, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Caused by Earthquake and Tsunami

• IER 11-1, Supplement 1

• IER 11-2, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Spent Fuel Pool Loss of Cooling and Makeup


Improve Countermeasures

• IER 11-4, Near-Term Actions to Address the Effects of an Extended Loss of All AC Power

• Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX)



IER 11-4, Near-Term Actions to Address the Effects of an Extended Loss of All AC Power

• Sensitivity review to understand limits

• Develop strategy to extend limiting conditions

• Develop strategy for critical instruments

• Develop strategy for fuel sources

• Develop strategy for communications


• Prevent core damage, protect containment

• Diverse equipment (number, location application)

• Flexible strategy

• Three phases

– Installed equipment

– On-site portable

– Off-site portable

• Site specific hazards

Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX)


Three Phased Approach for FLEX

Event

Phase 1 Phase 2

Installed Equipment

Off-site Portable Equipment

Phase 3

On-site Portable Equipment


U.S. Nuclear Industry Event Response Framework • US industry’s role

– Obtain and communicate operational information

– Provide technical information and support

– Facilitate equipment/material support

• Enhanced responsibilities

– Off-site equipment support (regional, national)

– Industry technical support

– Information needs

– Coordination with government agencies (NRC, FEMA, DHS, DOD, DOE)


Off-Site Equipment Support

• Diversity in supply

• Transport and install during Phase 2 of FLEX

• Large equipment/consumables

• Standardized connections

• Pre-established logistics

• Central accountability


Typical Off-Site Equipment

• High capacity pump (Diesel driven)

• High pressure pump (Diesel driven)

– Suction/discharge hoses, strainers, fittings

• Portable Diesel Generator sets

– Cables, connections

• Air compressors/Nitrogen bottles and regulators

• Portable ventilation fans

• Communications equipment

– Satellite phones, radios


Industry Technical Support

• Designated industry experts

• Utility, vendor, EPRI

• INPO emergency response center

• Information requirements


Current Nuclear Accident Response

Prevention/ Protection

• Design Bases

– Configuration/ Plant Status Control

• Safety Culture

• Training

• Operations: EOPs, AOPs, Fundamentals

Mitigation

• Station Blackout Coping Strategy

• External Event Strategy

• Security Order Strategies

Emergency Response

• Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs)

• Off-Site Protective Measures


Stabilization/ Restoration

• Long-Term Core Cooling – Closed Loop

• Long-Term SFP Cooling/Inventory Control

• Containment Closure

• Water Management

• Radioactive Material Control

• Redundancy Built In

• Environmental Monitoring


Future Nuclear Accident Response


• Design Bases

– Configuration/ Plant Status Control

• Safety Culture

• Training

• Operations: EOPs, AOPs, Fundamentals

Emergency Response

• SAMGs with SFP Cooling

• Extensive Damage Strategies Integration


• Hydrogen Control and Venting










Mitigation

• Station Blackout Coping Strategy

• Extensive Damage Mitigation Strategies, Repurposed and Integrated

• Extended Loss of AC Response


• Off-Site Resource Support

• Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Cooling Initiative


Future Nuclear Accident Response (Industry Response)


• Design Bases

– Configuration/ Plant Status Control (IER 11-1) (IER 11-2)

• Safety Culture (Common Language Initiative)

• Training (SOER 10-2)

• Operations: EOPs, AOPs, Fundamentals (IER 11-3)

Emergency Response

• SAMGs with SFP Cooling (EPRI Initiative)

• Extensive Damage Strategies Integration (Industry Initiative)


• Hydrogen Control and Venting










Mitigation

• SBO Coping Strategy

• Extensive Damage Mitigation Strategies, Repurposed and Integrated

• Extended Loss of AC Response (IER 11-4)


• Off-Site Resource Support (Industry Emergency Plan)

• SFP Cooling Initiative (IER 11-2) (Industry Initiative)


Implementation Status

• US Nuclear Industry Event Response Framework

– Coordinated guide for INPO, NEI, EPRI

• Equipment acquisitions

• Modifications

• Procedural changes


Equipment Acquisitions

• Nearly 400 equipment purchases have been made or arranged

• All utilities have committed to order equipment by March 2012 that will be compatible with the implementation of FLEX

• 40% of identified equipment is on-site and 82% will be on-site by the end of 2012


Equipment Acquired • Diesel-driven pumps

(B.5.b, AFW, SW)

• Air-driven pumps for flood response

• Fuel pumps

• Sump pumps

• Couplings and connections

• Hoses

• 2MW diesel generators

• 10KW diesel generators

• 6.5KW diesel generators

• Diesels for lighting

• Battery chargers

• 13.8kV switchgear

• 4.16kV switchgear

• Power transformers

• Cables

• Fire trucks

• Trailers

• Articulating wheel loaders

• Spent Fuel Pool temporary level and temperature monitoring equipment


Key Modifications

• Permanent connections for portable equipment

• Low-leakage RCP seals for SBO conditions (8 stations)

• Containment vents (3 stations)

• Distribution centers for portable generators

• Seismically qualified connections and cross ties to the condensate storage tanks


Procedural Changes

• Changes typically addressed:

– Operation of new equipment

– Revision and Improvement of accident response

– Instructions and curves for analysis of plant conditions

• Other procedure revisions of interest:

– Engineering review of modifications consider beyond-

design basis events

– Added the location of specific emergency equipment

– Added detail such as contact information for acquiring

additional fuel oil


Next Steps

• Engineering guide for FLEX

• Protocols for regional/national support

• Training, drills, exercises

• Industry-led follow-up reviews


Conclusion

• The Way Forward




Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

U.S. Industry Response to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident

William E. Webster, Jr. Senior Vice President, Industry Evaluations

March 20, 2012

us industry response (w. webster)

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