1

U.S./NATO-RussianStrategicRelationshipandMissileDefense

TyttiErasto,PhD,RogerR.HaleFellowPloughsharesFund

terasto@ploughshares.org

FASWorkshop,WashingtonD.C.17May2017

2

IBACKGROUNDASSUMPTIONS

3

1.BACKGROUNDASSUMPTIONS

A) MissiledefensewillplayakeyroleinfutureU.S./NATO-Russianstrategicrelationship.

B) RussianconcernsaboutEuropeanPhasedAdaptiveApproach(EPAA)areexaggeratedbutnotbaseless.

A) IftheUnitedStateswantsnucleararmscontrol,itmustaddressRussianconcernsaboutmissiledefense.

4

2.BACKGROUNDASSUMPTIONS

D) EPAAiscurrentlynotdrivenbystatedsecurityconsiderations:anuclear/intermediate-rangemissilethreattoEuropefromtheMiddleEast(rationaleforPhaseIIIinPoland)doesnotexist.

D) SuspendingEPAAPhaseIIIwouldbetheeasieststeptowardsaddressingRussianconcernsaboutmissiledefense.

D) AsfarasRussianmotivationsfordevelopingtheprohibitedGround-LaunchedCruiseMissile(GLCM)aredominatedbyconcernsovermissiledefense,restraintonEPAAmightalsohelptotacklethecrisisovertheIntermediateNuclearForces(INF)Treaty.

5

IICASEAGAINSTEPAAPHASEIII

6

3.EUROPEANPHASEDADAPTIVEAPPROACH,EPAA

• EPAAannouncedbyPresidentObamainSeptember2009,• scalingdowntheBushadministration’splansfor3rdGround-Based

Interceptorsite(GBI)inEurope• adaptabilitytoIran’sactual,ratherthanhypothetical,capabilities

ü “ifthethreatfromIran’snuclearandballisticmissileprogramiseliminated,thedrivingforceformissiledefenseinEuropewillbeeliminated.”BarackObama7July2009

• EPAAadoptedbyNATOattheLisbonSummit,November2010

7

4.EPAAPHASES• PhaseI(Complete)

• X-bandradarplacedinKurecik,Turkey;• Aegis-equippedshipwithSM-3BlockIAinterceptorsdeployedinthe

MediterraneanSeain2011;• fourU.S.Aegisshipshome-portedinRota,Spain,in2014-2015

• PhaseII(Complete)• AegisAshoresite,withBlockIBinterceptorsandradar,builtinDeveselu,Romania

in2013-2016;• upgradedinterceptorsalsodeployedonships

• PhaseIII(Underway)• AegisAshoresitetobebuiltinRedzikowo,Poland,withBlockIIAinterceptors

(upgradedcapacityagainstinter-mediaterangemissiles)in2016-2018;• newinterceptorsalsodeployedonshipsandinRomania

• PhaseIV(Cancelled)• WouldhavedeployedBlockIIBinterceptors(againstICBMs)inPolandby2020

8

5.RANGEOFIRAN’SMISSILESIran’slongest-rangemissilesaremedium-range;theycannotreachPoland• Sajjil-2:2000km(indevelopment)• Ghadr:1600km(operational)

9

6.NOIRANIANIRBMTHREATINNEARFUTURE,EITHER

A) Developinglonger-rangemissilestakestimeandwillnotgounnoticed.• “Theneedtoflighttestmissilesbeforetheyaremadeoperationalprovides

advancedwarningofnewcapabilities.Flighttrialsinvolveadozenormoretestlaunches,andhistoricallyrequirethreetofiveyearstocomplete,sometimesmore.”

• manyexamplesofcountriesusinglong-rangeballisticmissileprogramsasabasisfordevelopingsatellitelaunchers,butnocountryhaseverdonethereverse

B)Iran’sapparentlackofinterestinIRBMs/ICBMs• forthepastdecade“Iranhasfocusedonimprovingtheaccuracyandreliability

ofitsmissiles,withlittleattentiontoincreasingrange.”

• “noevidencetosuggestthatIranisactivelydevelopinganintermediate- orintercontinental-rangeballisticmissile”

SOURCE:MichaelElleman 2016

10

7.NOIRANIANIRBMTHREATINNEARFUTURE,EITHER

C)JointComprehensivePlanofAction(JCPOA)2015• underJCPOA,Irancannotdevelopnuclearweapons;inforceatleastuntil2025• “breakout”timeofoneyear(toproducematerialfor1nuclearbomb)

• notincludingtimeforbuildingnuclearwarheadweighingnomorethan750kg

D)AndwhywouldIranwouldattackanuclear-armedAlliance?• leadershipinTehranisnotsuicidal;neverthreatenedEuropeorUnitedStates• Iranian-Europeanrelationsnotdefinedbyenmity,butratherbymutualinterest

intrade

11

8.AMPLEWINDOWTORESUMEPHASEIIILATERIFNEEDED

NoreasontoassumethatIranwoulddevelopIRBMs/attackEuropebut…

q IfIranwouldbegindevelopingIRBM, 3-5yearwindowtorespond

q IfIranembarksoncrashnuclearweaponsprogram,buildingonenuclearbombandmatingitintoamissilelikelytotakemuchlongerthanoneyear

PhaseIIIoriginallyscheduledtotake2yearsand8months• only1yearand8monthsleftforcompletionnow(May2017)

àNoneedtobuildtheAegisAshoresiteinPolandinadvance;plentyoftimetorespondtoIranianIRBMthreatlaterifneeded—evenifconstructionwouldbeginfromzero

12

9.COUNTRIESWITHBALLISTICMISSILES

13

10.EUROPEANMISSILEDEFENSEMOTIVATIONS

ü “theNATO[ballisticmissiledefense]commitmentisasmuchaboutpolitics,alliancecohesionandultimatelyRussia,thanitisaboutIran.”

AndrewFutter 2015

ü while“someNATOstatesseethepurposeoftheprojectprimarilyinprotectionagainstthreatsfromthesouth,”othersviewitas“avisibleexpressionofAmerica’ssecurityguaranteesforEurope– bywhichthey

meanaboveallprotectionagainstRussia.”Dickow &al2016

ü “NATO’sinsistenceonpushingaheadwithamissiledefence systemdoesnotnecessarilyimplyagreementoveritspurposeandgoal.ThelackofadebatecanbeexplainedbyWashington’ssustainedwillingnesstofundtheprogramme almostentirelyitself.Formany,thepoliticalcostsofchangingcoursealsoappearshigherthanthoseofcontinuingthe

programme.”Dickow &al2016

14

IIILINKBETWEENMISSILEDEFENSEAND

NUCLEARARMSCONTROL

15

9.RUSSIANCONCERNSABOUTEPAA

RussianconcernsaboutEPAAareexaggerated

• SM-3sinPolandcannotreachRussianICBMsheadingtotheUnitedStates

• RussianmissilesoutnumbertheplannedamountofinterceptorsinEurope

• SM-3unlikelytoworkreliablyinreal-lifecircumstances(Postol &Lewis2010)

Buttheyarenotbaseless

• uncertaintyaboutthefuturedevelopmentU.S.ABMtechnologyandpolicy• increaseinthenumber/ capabilityofinterceptorsthatfitVLSlaunchtubes?

• Aegisshipsaremovableü When“launching[SM-3BlockIIA]fromtheBalticSeanearStockholm[…]More

trajectoriesheadingtowardtheUSeastcoastcannowbepotentiallyintercepted”(Wilkening2012)

16

10.SM-3BLOCKIIADEPLOYMENTSWORLDWIDE

• BlockIIAdeploymentstobeginin2018

• IflocatedatseanearUScoasts,BlockIIAinterceptors couldprovidethebasisforcontinentalmissiledefense(iftheycouldinterceptincomingmissilessuccessfully).

• Thecurrentnumber(35)ofBMD-capableshipscouldincreaseto80-100bylate2030s—eachwithabilitytocarry90-122BlockIIAinterceptors.

ü “Bythemid- tolate-2030s[…]thenumberofUSstrategic-capableinterceptors,includingground-basedsystems,couldberoughlycomparabletothenumberofsurvivableRussianICBM/SLBMwarheads...iftheroleswerereversed,thiswouldbeanabsolutelyunacceptablesituationtotheUnitedStates”

SOURCE:GeorgeN.Lewis2016&2017

17

IVMISSILEDEFENSEDISPUTEANDINFCRISIS

18

11.ALLEGATIONSOFINTERMEDIATENUCLEARFORCES(INF)TREATYVIOLATIONS

Inthe1987INFTreaty,theUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionagreedtoeliminateall“shorter”- and“intermediate”-range[500-5500km]land-basedmissilesandlaunchersofsuchmissiles.

U.S.concerns• Russiandevelopment(since2008)&deployment(sinceDec2016)ofprohibited

Ground-LaunchedCruiseMissile(GLCM)• SSC-8– ground-basedversionofKalibr Sea-LaunchedCruiseMissile?

Russianconcerns• multi-purposeMK-41VerticalLaunchingSystem(VLS)atAegisAshoresitesin

RomaniaandPolandcouldbeusedtolaunchprohibitedTomahawkGLCM,alongsideSM-3interceptors

19

12.BACKGROUNDASSUMPTIONSREGARDINGINFCRISIS

A) Ifunresolved,theINFcrisiswillpreventfurtherprogressinarmscontrolandmightleadtodangerousescalationinEurope.

A) AsfarasRussianmotivationsfordevelopingprohibitedGLCMaredominatedbyconcernsovermissiledefense(bothinthesenseof“missile-defense-counter-force”capabilityandbargainingtool),thereisroomfordiplomacywhennegotiationinvolvesEPAA.

A) AsfarasRussianmotivationsaredominatedbyUS/NATOadvancedconventionalweapons,thereisroomfordiplomacywhennegotiationinvolvessuchweapons.

A) AsfarasRussianmotivationsaredominatedbyChinese,Indian,PakistaniandIranianINF,thereisroomfornegotiationwhenthatnegotiationinvolvessuchcountries.

20

VTHREESCENARIOS

21

13.SCENARIOI:DOWNWARDSPIRALq EPAAPhaseIIIcompletedasplanned,byendof2018

à Russianresponse• Iskanders willstayinKaliningradindefinitely• threatsagainstPolandanotherEuropeanABMsystemhostswillincrease• INF-rangeGLCMscontinuetobedeployed• Iskanders toCrimea?RussianwithdrawalfromNewSTART?

à US/NATOresponse• additionalmeasurestoprotectRedzikowo site(morePAC-3s)?• increasingcallsfordirectingmissiledefensesagainstRussia,as

wellastheintegrationofair,ballistic&cruisemissiledefense?• deploymentofUSINFinEurope?

à Russianresponse• missiledefensethreatseenasincreasinglyimminent• maximizingabilitytopenetrate/outnumberU.S.

interceptorsandpreventcounter-forcestrike• increasingthenumberofINF-rangeGLCMs?

22

14.MEDVEDEV’SNOVEMBER2011“ULTIMATUM”• Russiatotakesteps1-4immediately• Ifmissiledefensedisputeremainedunresolved,alsostep5and,potentially,6-7

1.EarlywarningradarstationinKaliningradoncombatalertþ

2.Addedprotectionforstrategicnuclearweaponsthoughair& spacedefenseþ

3.Developadvancedpenetrationsystems&warheadsforstrategicnukesþ

4.Plansfordisablingmissiledefensesystemdata&guidancesystemsþ

5.DeploymodernoffensiveweaponssystemstoensureabilitytotakeoutanypartoftheUSmissiledefence systeminEuropeþ

• OnlyIskanders mentionedbyMedvedev,butINF-rangeGLCMscouldservethispurposeaswell.

6.Othermeasuresdeemednecessary☐ ?

7.WithdrawalfromtheNewSTART☐ ?

23

15.TALKABOUTREPURPOSINGEPAA• InternalNATOdebateonthisissueapparentlyongoingtosomeextent—thusfarthose(EastEuropeans)callingforEPAAtobedirectedagainstRussiaconstituteaminority

• Someanalystsalsopromotethisview:

ü AdditionalstepsareneededtoupdateandexpandEuropeanairdefensesintoanIntegratedAirandMissileDefense(IAMD)networktailoredtodeteranddefeatlow-tierRussianthreatswhileenhancingstrategicstability.[…Missiledefense]architecturetailoredtoIran[…]doesnotdeterRussia.Boththesouthernandtheeasternproblemsrequirerespective,albeitrelated,solutions.The[Warsaw]summitaffirmedthatNATOwillhave“thefullrangeofcapabilitiesnecessarytodeteranddefendagainstpotentialadversariesandthefullspectrumofthreats[…].ApplyingthistoairandmissiledefensewillmeangoingbeyondcurrentEuropeanPhasedAdaptiveApproach(EPAA)plans,whileremainingconsistentwiththeEPAA’sguidingprincipleofadaptability.(Karako 2016)

24

16.SCENARIOII:“UPWARD”SPIRALq EPAAPhaseIIIishaltedbyendof2018.

à Russianresponse• threatsagainstPolandandothersdecrease• Iskanders withdrawnfromKaliningrad?• perceivedneedforINF-rangeGLCMsdecreases?

à US/NATOresponse• limitednatureofEPAAreflectedbothinrhetoric& actions• opennesstotransparencymeasuresinRomanianAegisAshoresite?

à Russianresponse• perceivedthreatfrommissiledefenselessimminent• opennesstonucleararmscontrol• opennesstoINFtransparency/verificationmeasures

à USresponse• opennesstocomprehensivestrategicarmscontrol

talks,includingglobalmissiledefense

25

17.SCENARIOIII:MIXEDDEVELOPMENTS

a) DespitecompletionoftheRedzikowo site,EPAA’slimitednatureissignaledbyothermeans(e.g.adecisionnottodeployBlockIIAinterceptorsinEurope),pavingthewayforcomprehensivearmscontrol.

a) DespitesuspendingPhaseIII,RussiafocusesontheabsenceoflegallimitstoEPAA,andcontinuesprohibitedINFdeployments.TheUS/NATOrespondinkind,consideringanyfurtherrestraintregardingmissiledefenseasappeasement.

a) Despiteinitialpositivesteps,noprogressisultimatelymadetowardsarmscontroldueto…

A) USrefusaltoshowrestraintregardingitsbroadermissiledefensepolicy;B) Russianrefusaltoreducenuclearweapons,despiteUSrestraintonmissile

defense;C) lackofinterestinnucleararmscontrolineither/boththeUSandRussia