utnif 2010 afghanistan starter pack aff_neg

8/9/2019 UTNIF 2010 Afghanistan Starter Pack Aff_Neg

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UTNIF 2010 AFGHANISTAN AFF/NEG

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AFGHANISTAN COUNTER-TERRORISM AFF/NEG

AFFIRMATIVE

1AC.................................................................................................................................................................. 3

Afghanistan Advantage Extensions.............................................................................................................. 14

Pakistan Advantage Extensions.................................................................................................................... 16Solvency Extensions ...................................................................................................................................... 19

Russian Relations DA 2AC Aff Answers...................................................................................................... 20

Russian Relations DA Aff Answers Ext. Defense......................................................................................... 22

Russian Relations DA Aff Answers: Link Turns ......................................................................................... 24

2AC AFF Answers: Counterplan.................................................................................................................. 25

AFF Answers: Counterplan Extensions ....................................................................................................... 27

NEGATIVE

1NC Afghanistan Advantage ........................................................................................................................ 28

2NC Afghanistan Advantage: Extensions .................................................................................................... 31

2NC: AT Economy Add On .......................................................................................................................... 32

1NC Pakistan Advantage.............................................................................................................................. 33

2NC Pakistan Advantage Extensions............................................................................................................ 35

1NC Solvency................................................................................................................................................. 36

1NC Russian Relations DA ........................................................................................................................... 38

Russian Relations DA NEG: Uniqueness Extensions................................................................................... 40

Russian Relations DA Neg: Link Extensions................................................................................................ 41

Russian Relations DA NEG: Internal Link Extensions ............................................................................... 43

Russian Relations DA NEG: Impact Extensions Key to START ................................................................ 44

Russian Relations DA NEG IMPACT Extensions ....................................................................................... 45Russian Relations DA NEG: Turns Case ..................................................................................................... 46

Advantage Counterplan 1NC........................................................................................................................ 47

Advantage CP Solvency extension................................................................................................................ 48

Advantage CP AT: Perm .............................................................................................................................. 49


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1ACINHERENCY:

THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER AFGHANISTAN HAS CONFLATED COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

STRATEGIES. THE DUAL MISSIONS HAVE CREATED AN INTRACTABLE STALEMATE THAT ENSURES ENDLESS

INTERVENTIONIST WARFARE.

MICHAEL J. BOYLE 2010 (LECTURER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND A RESEARCH FELLOW AT THE CENTRE FOR THESTUDY OF TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 86: 2 (2010

333353 DO COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY GO TOGETHER?)This episode indicates the extent of the confusion over counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) that marks thecontemporary debate over Afghan- istan. Both CT and COIN would envisage military action in Afghanistan but to very different ends. A CT mission would focus exclusively on Al-Qaeda while offering little or nosupport to the Karzai government; a COIN mission envis- ages a comprehensive commitment to defeating theTaleban and rebuilding the Afghan state while destroying Al-Qaeda operatives there. Yet it has now becomecommonplace for politicians and military officials alike to mention CT and COIN in the same breath, or to treatthem as if they were functionally equivalent. The official US government definition now frames counterterrorism in classic hearts and minds counterinsurgency languageactions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.12 Terrorist threats are now regularly described as insurgencieand vice versa. The influential US Army and Marine Corps Counter- insurgency Field Manual states that todays operational environment also includes a new kind of insurgency, one wh ich seeks to impose revolutionarchange world- wide. Al-Qaeda is a well known example of such an insurgency.13 An official from US Central Command (CENTCOM), for instance, has gone so far to define counterterrorism as a whole of governmenCOIN approach.14 Meanwhile, insurgent threats in places such as Chechnya, Indonesia and Thailand are now regularly redescribed as terrorist threats, as analysts speculate on whether local conflicts will become magnetfor Al-Qaeda or otherwise spill out into acts of horrific violence on the international stage.

This confusion over the differences between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is not new, but it has become more serious over the last eight years.15 Since the events of September 11, these concepts

have regularly been conflated as policy-makers have struggled to come to grips with the threat posed by Al-Qaeda. To some extent, this is natural: Al-Qaeda is a global terrorist organization which intervenes directly in local conflicts(often insurgencies, defined here as organized violent attempts to overthrow an existing government) to bait theUS and its allies into exhausting wars of attrition. In other words, it is a terrorist organization which dabbles (sometimes successfully, sometimes less so) in insurgenciesBut the fact that the threats of terrorism and insurgency are so often intertwined in contemporary conflictsdoes not make them fundamentally equivalent or susceptible to the same remedies. Nor does it warrantextending counterinsurgency operations on a global level, as some prominent authors have suggested.16 The fusion othe threats from terrorism and insurgency, so often described as symptomatic of the complexity of the modern security challenges, can be misread to imply that the responses to them should be similar or equivalent. In fac

while intermixed in practice, these threats remain distinct, and require a policy response which disaggregatesand prioritizes threats and separates those actors who have a negotiable political programme from those whoremain incorrigible. Similarly, the fact that terrorists and insurgents operate in the same theatre, and in some cases function in tandem, is not an argument for a response that seamlessly interweave

elements of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Indeed, there is no reason to assume that counterterrorism and counterinsurgencystrategies are fully compatible or mutually reinforcing. The record of the war in Afghanistan suggests ratherthat both models of warfare involve tradeoffs or costs that may offset the gains made by the other. Unless thesetradeoffs are properly managed, the simultaneous deployment of counterterrorism and

counterinsurgency operations may operate at cross-purposes and make long-term strategic success

more elusive. The fact that US and UK leaders have been so willing to split the differ- ence betweencounterterrorism and counterinsurgencyand to ignore the offsetting costs of eachmay help to account forthe current painful stalemate in Afghanistan. This article will argue that counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are twodistinct models of war which can operate at cross-purposes when jointly applied to low-intensity conflicts suchas that in Afghanistan. The conflation of these two different models of warfare stems from an intellectual error, which assumes that a fused threat (for example, between a nationalist insurgent groulike the Taleban and a transnational terrorist group like Al-Qaeda) must necessarily be met by a joint or blended counterterrorism and counterinsurgency approach. In fact, these two models o

warfare involve divergent assumptions about the roles of force, the importance of winning support among thelocal population, and the necessity of building a strong and representative government. Such approaches are noneces- sarily mutually reinforcing or even compatible. At the tactical and strategic level, there are at least four possible offsetting costspopular backlashcountermobili- zation of enemy networks, a legitimacy gap and diminished leveragethat may be incurred when counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are deployed simulta- neously. At the politicallevel, the conflation of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency risks producing an overly interventionistforeign policy which distracts and exhausts the US and UK as they treat an ever-increasing number olocalized insurgencies as the incubators of future terrorist threats.


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1ACPLAN: THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD REMOVE ALL FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN THAT ARE

UNNECESSARY FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS.

ADV 1: AFGHAN STABILITY

THE CURRENT COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY HAS MADE THE UNITED STATES BEHOLDEN TO THE CORRUPT

KARZAI GOVERNMENT, UNDERMINING DEMANDS FOR REFORM AND GOOD GOVERNANCE.


333353 DO COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY GO TOGETHER?)

Finally, a counterinsurgency mission can have offsetting effects on counterterrorism goals if it sends a signal ofcommitment that inadvertently reduces the leverage the foreign backer has over its partner government. Just asthe US learned to its peril with South Vietnam, each decision to send additional troops and resources revealshow much the US needs to win, thereby reducing its leverage over its local partner.87 This is problematicbecause counterterrorism cooperation depends on leverage, especially when the foreign backer asks the locagovernment to undertake or authorize costly operations to capture or kill suspected terrorists. There is certainlyevidence that this dynamic is in play in respect of Pakistan, which has received $15 billion in aid from the US

much of it earmarked for counterterrorism support, only to find that the funds are diverted into weapons to beused against India.88 Pakistan has refused to end its tacit support for the Afghan Taleban, who operate freely in Quetta, and there are unconfirmed reports that the Taleban still receive funds from itintelligence service.89 Similarly, President Obamas declaration of Afghanistan as a necessary war and his

decision to send 30,000 additional US troops appear to have made the Karzai regime less willing to

accede to American demands over corruption reform and improved governance. Rory Stewart has pointedout that the more we give, the less influence we have over the Afghan government, which believes we need it more than it needs us. Whaincentive do Afghan leaders have to reform if their country is allowed to produce 92 percent of the worlds heroin and still receive $20 billion of international aid?90 It remains to be seen whether this lack of complianc

will spill over into responses to counterterrorism demands, but it is worth asking whether this renewed commitment to COIN strategies in theAfPak region will leave the US punching beneath its weight with both governments. The US is so heavilyinvested in stopping the spread of violence in the regionto the point that it will tolerate both

Afghanistan and Pakistan exploiting their crises for profitthat it may find it lacks the leverage needed

to achieve its essential counterterrorism goals.

GOOD GOVERNANCE KEY TO AFGHAN STABILITY

SHANTHIE MARIET D'SOUZA 2009 (ASSOCIATE FELLOW AT INSTITUTE FORDEFENCE STUDIES AND ANALYSES, TALKINGTO THE TALIBAN: WILL IT ENSURE 'PEACE' IN AFGHANISTAN? STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, VOLUME 33, ISSUE 2 MARCH 2009)More than three decades of incessant fighting has led to a situation of 'reconciliation deficit' in Afghanistanwhich is reflected in the ongoing inter-ethnic distrust and ongoing power struggle between the Pashtun and Northern Alliance groups. Serious challenges to governance have plagued the COIN effort and the credibility of theAfghan Government. Lack of access to basic amenities such as roads, electricity, and drinking water are key concerns of the rural population. The 'governance deficit' isfurther exacerbated by rampant corruption, a system of patronage, and the absence of public institutions capableof mediating in local, national, and regional conflicts. The failure to establish rule of law has underminedconfidence in the Afghan Government. The international development effort in Afghanistan is, moreover, under-resourced and even the limited resources are being squandered.18

The new Afghan institutions that have emerged out of the 2001-2002 Bonn Process are still regarded by manyas unrepresentative, the subsequent elections notwithstanding. A number of individuals with direct ties to thecountry's warlords, and those closely associated with the drug trade were elected to Afghanistan's newparliament, promoting a 'culture of impunity'.19 Presently, some of the tribes and communities that do not feelincluded in the current political process or do not benefit adequately from the reconstruction and developmenthave reasons to support anti-government activities, even in a passive way. Thus, to achieve a stable security environment and a government that earntrust and legitimacy, the COIN effort will have to include 'po litical outreach to disaffected groups'.20 In o ther words, the 'disaffected communities' within Afghanistan will have to be engaged th rough a serious negotiation anreconciliation process to make maximum use o f the rapidly shrinking political space.


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1AC

ENDING THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY WOULD SPUR A POLITICAL TRANSITION TO NEGOTIATIONS , ENDING

CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN

SHANTHIE MARIET D'SOUZA 2009 (ASSOCIATE FELLOW AT INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES AND

ANALYSES, TALKING TO THE TALIBAN: WILL IT ENSURE 'PEACE' IN AFGHANISTAN? STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

VOLUME 33, ISSUE 2 MARCH 2009 , PAGES 254 272)

Defying the initial expectations of total and swift annihilation in the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the Taliban continue to mount lethal attacks withinAfghanistan from their sanctuary in the Pakistani tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan. While Southand East Afghanistan have traditionally been happy hunting grounds for the Taliban, other areas, even in therelatively stable North, have witnessed increased insecurity and instability. The net impact of these waves of violence and propaganda war launched by the Taliban-led insurgency1 has been significant on the Afghan populace, most of whom are not supporters of the Taliban . This regime of intimidation and violencecombined with the ineffectiveness of the international community's Counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign2 toprovide security and the sluggish progress in rebuilding the country, has had an adverse impact on the AfghanGovernment's legitimacy among its populace. Its reach, as a result, has been curtailed and its authority haswaned. Optimism among the Afghans, which was generated in the aftermath of the toppling of the Taliban regime, is gradually giving way to despondency.In light of the deteriorating security situation, there is a growing recognition among Afghan and NATO leadersthat peace in Afghanistan will not be won by the military effort alone. Mere reorienting of military manoeuvresrisks prolonging and intensifying the armed conflict, without initiating processes of negotiations andreconciliation, to rebuild a broad political consensus in support of the Afghan Government . Reconciliation and negotiations arviewed as mechanisms to weave-in disaffected elements inside the 'tent' which in turn could erode the support base for the Taliban. The politically disaffected groups - only someof whom are with the Taliban, or others who now have common ground with the Taliban - need to be broughtover. It would be timely to explore such policy alternatives in effectively tackling the present insurgency.The need for such reconciliation, talks, and negotiations used interchangeably in this article is characterized by the common parlance, of 'negotiating with the Taliban'. For obvious reasons, it continues to evoke strong

reactions from many quarters. It is important to note at the outset that this article does not promote acquiescence to Taliban demands nor extol Taliban's virtues. The article looks primarily atan alternative policy option that many international and Afghan analysts are increasingly proposing and that isgaining currency - to move towards a national reconciliation which includes negotiating with the insurgentsThe Afghan Government has indicated its willingness to negotiate with the 'Afghan Taliban' . The focus of the article, therefore, wilbe on prospects for negotiations and reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban and their affiliates, and not the 'moderate Taliban'.3 Of late, both the Afghan Government and the international community have been involved indifferent levels of communications and dealings with the Taliban. Many concerns and doub ts abound as far as the desirability and feasibility of such a process is concerned. This article is a stock-taking exercise of the nuanceand implications of such policy postures that could aid or impede peace-building processes in the conflict-ridden country.The role of talks and reconciliation in add ressing the Afghan insurgencyThe issue of reconciliation and negotiations is an essential component of any COIN strategy, especially in a country whose social fabric has been severely damaged through decades of conflict. This has been enumerated in

various recent studies. According to a recent study by RAND Corporation, 'Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of

terrorist groups and nearly half of the terror groups analysed ended as a result of a transition into the

political process.'4 Another study that reviewed 80 conflicts in the period from 1990 to 2007, concludes thatonly 7.5 per cent of them ended in a military victory and not always for government forces.5 Thus, in the longrun, a number of insurgencies have ended through a negotiated settlement.


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1ACA FOCUS ON TERRORISM ONLY WILL GIVE THE UNITED STATES THE DISTANCE FROM THE KARZAI GOVERNMENT

NECESSARY TO SUPPORT GOOD GOVERNANCE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL.


333353 DO COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY GO TOGETHER?)

Accordingly, it is now essential for the US to think about ways to manage these tradeoffs effectively, so that the CT and COIN missions reinforce each others effects. Three important steps can be identified. First, theUS needs to restrict the number of potential targets of commando raids and drone strikes, and to tighten therules of engagement to prevent civilian casualties and reduce the risk of public backlash. Force should be usedsparingly, especially in Pakistan, and directed only at networks directly operating with Al-Qaeda and theAfghan Taleban. These strikes should not be extended to other Islamist networks whose support for or linkswith Al-Qaeda and the Taleban might be incidental. The US must be mindful that the long-term political costsof employing these strikes against militant networks in Pakistan may outweigh the tactical benefits of doingso.91 Second, as President Obama has recognized, the US needs to preserve its leverage over the governmentsof Afghanistan and Pakistan by explicitly making aid, and the contribution of troops, dependent on reform, theend of corruption and improvements in self-policing capacity. Third, the US needs to limit its focus inAfghanistan to the problem of violencethat is, destroying Al-Qaeda and reversing the momentum of the

Talebanand to put some distance between itself and the Karzai government. Rather than trying to enhancethe legitimacy of the Karzai government, it should focus its energies on supporting good governance at thelocal and tribal level and on ensuring that the local delivery of security, justice and public services suffers lessfrom corruption.92 Such a bottom-up approach would see the Afghan state remaining a patchwork of territoriesrun by local warlords and strongmen with indirect links to the central government in Kabul. This end-state ishardly inspiring, but it is far more realistic than assuming that it is possible to defeat an ever-expanding circleof enemies while remaking Afghani- stan into a centralized modern state.At the political level, however, the effects of the conflation of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency areperhaps more serious. One of the unfortunate by-products of the experience of the last eight years, which hasseen two major national insurgencies conducted concurrently with a global struggle against Al-Qaeda, is that policy-makers have begun to conclude (as Miliband did) that counterterrorism is counterinsurgency. Th

dangers of such a position are manifest. To treat every terrorist threat through the lens of counterinsurgency isto commit the US to undertaking countless state-building missions abroad, often with limited prospects ofsuccess. To treat every insurgency as the potential incubator of a future terrorist threat is a recipe foroverextension, distraction and exhaustion. The struggle with Al-Qaeda can be won only if the US keeps sightof its priorities and avoids entangling itself in an ever-increasing number of distant conflicts. But it wilcertainly be lost if the US exhausts itselffinancially, militarily, even morallyby forever scanning thehorizon for new monsters to destroy.93

INSTABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN SPILLS OVER THROUGH CENTRAL ASIA.

LAL, 06 (ROLLIE, RAND CORPORATION, "CENTRAL ASIA AND ITS ASIAN NEIGHBORS. SECURITY AND

COMMERCE AT THE CROSSROADS," WWW.RAND.ORG/PUBS/MONOGRAPHS/2006/RAND_MG440.PDF)

The Asian states neighboring Central Asia have historic links and strong interests in the region. China, IranAfghanistan, India, and Pakistan are critical players in the security and economic issues that will determine thefuture of Central Asia and affect U.S. interests in the region. All of these states are of importance to the UnitedStates, whether due to the war on terrorism, economic ties, arms control, nonproliferation, or other reasons. ChinaIran, and India have all aggressively sought to build trade ties to and through Central Asia, and China and India have also invigorated security cooperation. But regional states are concernedabout the situation in Afghanistan, which they fear might lead to a spillover of conflict onto their soil, and they also feathe possibility of Pakistani activity and influence, which has led them to keep that state at arms length.

[LAI 06 CONTINUED NO TEXT DELETED]


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China has indicated that security is a primary interest in the re-gion through its initiative in establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Taji- kistan, and Russia (pp67). Concerns regarding Chinas Muslim Uighur separatists, as well as concerns of U.S. encirclement, underpin Chinas efforts to promote regional security cooperation (pp. 46, 910). China has also moved aggressivelto expand its economic interests in the region through commodity trade and agreements to im- port oil via pipeline from Kazakhstan (pp. 78).

Iran has a similar perspective toward its Central Asian neighbors. Stability in Afghanistan lies at the heart ofIrans concerns, as the Taliban has historically been anathema to Iran (p. 12). Iran main- tains that aninternational, United Nationsled military presence should remain in Afghanistan to prevent a deterioration of

the security situation (pp. 1112). However, U.S. presence there and in Central Asia creates concern in Iran thatU.S. intentions are to surround and isolate Iran rather than enhance regional security (p. 16). To increase its leverage in the region, Iran ideveloping economic links with each country in Central Asia. Transport links are another important initiative, with routes being developed via Afghanistan, connecting Iranian ports and landlocked Uzbekistan (pp. 1316).India shares Irans concerns regarding the threat of militants based in Afghanistan. However, India welcomes U.S. presence in the region as a stabilizing influence (p. 34). Economic ties are growing, and India is developintransport and energy links to the region via Iran and Afghanistan (pp. 3334). The Central Asian states have close relations with India dating to the years of the Soviet Union and the Afghan war, a history that negativelaffects their relations with Pakistan.Pakistans relations with Central Asia suffer from lingering memories in the region of Pakistans role in supporting the Taliban and Islamic militancy in general. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan all remain suspiciouof Pakistans regional intentions, and trade with Pakistan has been weak as a result (p. 25). The establishment of the Karzai government in Kabul has been a blow to Pakistans regional security strategy. Whereas the Talibaregime would have been friendly to Pakistans interests, the current government is more open to ties with India (p. 23 ). Although Pakistan is moving to overcome its regional reputation, robust cooperation will take time an

effort (p. 26). Afghanistan remains critical to the future of Central Asia and its neighbors, as instability in Afghanistanhas the potential to destabilize the region (pp. 1920). A potent combination of drugs, weapons, and militants traverseAfghanistan and cross into Central Asia and beyond. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan fear that Islamicmilitants trained in Afghanistan may slip back across their borders (p. 20). Iran remains apprehensive that hostileanti-Shia elements may take control of Afghanistan, putting Iranian security at risk(p. 12). And Pakistan and Indiaboth compete to ensure that the Afghan regime in power is friendly to their interests (pp. 26, 29). Although the countries across Asia do noagree on how to secure Afghanistan against threats, unanimous agreement exists on the fact that a stable Afghanistan is critical to theirown security interests. The U.S. presence has led both the Central Asian states and their neighbors to ponderhow long the United States plans to keep troops in the region. U.S. intentions in the region have been inter-preted in various ways. Both China and Iran are apprehensive that U.S. military presence and security interestsin the area have the dual purpose of containment (pp. 3, 910, 1112, 16). Conversely, Af-ghanistan would like to see a continued strong role for the United States icombating militancy and fostering stability (p. 22), and Pakistan and India see the potential for security cooperation with the United States in the region (pp. 27, 34). Despite the divergentperspectives of their Asian neighbors, the Central Asian states continue to see a role for the United States inpromoting stability in the region.

INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA DRAWS IN RUSSIA, CAUSING NUCLEAR WAR.

BLANK2K(STEPHEN, JUNE, WWW.STRATEGICSTUDIESINSTITUTE.ARMY.MIL/PDFFILES/PUB113.PDF)In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into

confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat.72 Thus many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict inwhich third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many Third World conflictsgenerated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feeobliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other sidesstakes since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclearweapons to prevent a clients defeat are not as well established or apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapiand almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case.73 Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally

Russian nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic natureof Russias declared nuclear strategies). The real threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to defendMoscows interests and forces in the Transcaucasus makes the danger of major war there higher than almoseverywhere else. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious

instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the others perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventionaforces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.74 Russian perceptions of theTranscaspians criticality to its interests is tied to its continuing efforts to perpetuate and extend the vasdisproportion in power it possesses relative to other CIS states. This power and resource disproportion between Russia and the smaller states of thTranscaspian region means that no natural equilibrium is possible there. Russia neither can be restrained nor will it accept restraint by any local institution or power in its pursuit of unilateral advantage and reintegration.75


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1AC

AND AFGHANISTAN STABILITY IS KEY TO MIDDLE EAST STABILITY BECAUSE IT IS THE LYNCHPIN IN THE WAR ON

TERROR.

ANATOL LIEVEN, 2007 (SENIORRESEARCH FELLOW WITH THE NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, MIDDLE EAST

POLICY, SPRING, HTTP://WWW.MEPC.ORG/FORUMS_CHCS/47.HTML)

So looking at the inevitable consequences of American withdrawal, the situation after America does withdraw, what should we be concerned with most critically? Well, the first is something which is too often not talked

about in the context of the Middle East, and that is of course Afghanistan. De facto defeat in Iraq will be bad enough. De facto defeat in Afghanistanwould be a catastrophic humiliation for the United States, and would in effect mark defeat in the war on terroras a whole. Now by defeat in Afghanistan I don't mean that the Taliban can actually chase us out like Vietnam i'75. But that we also get into a situation where America, and Britain for that matter, and whoever remains there, which won't be very many allies, I think, aresuffering a continual stream of heavy casualties with no prospect of actually creating a successful, halfwaysuccessful and stable Afghan state.Now this fits into the Middle East not just because American strategy as awhole in the war on terror, but also because Iran is absolutely critical to the stabilization, the development ofAfghanistan. And not just that, but if in the future we ever face the situation in which we are going to withdrawfrom Afghanistan as well, well then, we go back to the situation before 9/11 in which Iran and Russia werecritical to keeping the Northern Alliance going against the prospect of the Taliban conquering the whole

country.

ANOTHER WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL GO NUCLEAR.

JOHN STEINBACH 2002 (DC IRAQ COALITION,

HTTP://WWW.WAGINGPEACE.ORG/ARTICLES/2002/03/00_STEINBACH_ISRAELI-WMD.HTM)

Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation firemissiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, wouldnow be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gainingmomentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It iswidely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images

of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launchingits own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartlandseriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possessionof nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actualuse, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining itsweapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepeningMiddle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)


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1ACADV 2: PAKISTAN

THE CURRENT COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MASSIVE INCREASE IN

DRONE ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN, WHICH IS STRENGTHENING RADICAL ELEMENTS IN THE PAKISTAN MILITARY.


333353 DO COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY GO TOGETHER?)A second, and related, problem is that the target set for the application of lethal force tends to expand over timefrom counterterrorism targets to ones associated with the counterinsurgency effort. Such an expansion is oftenjustified on the grounds that militant networks in the insurgency operate in tandem with, or otherwise supporta terrorist organization and vice versa. However, the expansion of the target set produces a range of direct andindirect offsetting costs to the counterinsurgency mission by increasing the ranks of ones enemies and byrealigning existing militant networks against the foreign power.

The effects of this mission creep can be seen with commando raids and the use of Predator drones inPakistan. These were originally used sparingly and only against Al-Qaeda operatives; then the US graduallybroadened its target set to include senior Taleban officials in Afghanistan.63 By 2009, aware that high-rankingTaleban were operating freely across the border in Pakistan, the US expanded commando raids into its triba

regions.64 At least four raids were conducted, two of which were directed against so-called high-value targetsnear the border. Similarly, in 2008 the US expanded the target list for Predator drone strikes to include Talebanofficials and related hostile Islamist networks (such as the Haqqani network) operating across the Pakistani border. In summer 2009, concerned over growing threats to thstability of Pakistan, the US began to direct strikes against factions of the Tehrik-i-Taleban in Pakistan (TTP) and eventually killed its leader, Baitullah Mehsud.65 From 2007 to 2009, the change in the number of strikes and

the target set has been dramatic. According to an analysis by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedmann, in 2007 the US launched only five drone strikes, threeagainst Taleban targets and two against Al-Qaeda. By contrast, in the first ten months of 2009 it launched 43strikes against a variety of targets, including 18 against the Taleban, 16 against Baitullah Mehsud, sevenagainst Al-Qaeda and four against the Haqqani network.66 Under the Obama administration, the number of Predator strikes and the diversification of the targets haactually increased.67 There is considerable evidence that these raids and drone strikes have been successful in degradingAl-Qaedas capabilities.68 Obama administration officials believe that they have eliminated more than half othe top Al-Qaeda targets over the last year.69 There are numerous anecdotal reports that Al-Qaeda has been demoralized by the strikes, which they see as causing disarray in theranks.70 But the blowback effects have been significant. The immediate reaction to the drone strikes and

commando raids in Pakistan has been public outrage . A recent Pew study revealed that 58 per cent of Pakistanis did not believe that missile strikes were necessaryand 93 per cent believed that they killed too many civilians.71 Even though the Pakistani government approves some drone strikes, approximately 58 per cent of Pakistanis now believe that the US conducts them without th

autho- rization of the government in Islamabad.72 What influence the US has is now seen as negative: 64 per cent of Pakistanis now believe the US is their countrys enemy.73 The commando and Predator drone operations have reinforced a percep- tion that the government is weak and cannot say no to the US even when the latter conductunsanctioned air strikes and ground incursions on Pakistani territory.74 The growing sense that the Pakistangovernment is paralysed in the face of US intervention has contributed to the countermobilization ofmilitant networks.75 This was precisely the fear of the Pakistani military, who warned after the first major US commando raid that such action[s] are completely counterproductive and can result i

huge losses because it gives the civilians a cause to rise against the Pakistani military.76 At present, there is only anecdotal evidence to suggest thatrecruitment into militant networks has increased out of a desire for revenge for commando raids and dronestrikes.77 Since no reliable data on the supply of militant recruits to Pakistani Islamist networks exist, no one

knows whether the use of commando raids and drones creates more enemies than it kills.78

But it is clear thathe expansion of these strikes has accelerated the radicalization of existing militant groups andencouraged them to make common cause with jihadi groups. The result has been a political realignment among existing militant groups in opposition to the Uand its alleged puppet government in Pakistan. The TTP, formed out of a coalition of disparate militant networks in December 2007, now comprises more than 40 militant groups, and has developed operational links witlong standing Kashmiri and Punjabi groups, which themselves are showing increasing susceptibility to jihadi ideologies. The use of commando raids and Predator drone strikes has pushed the TTP closer to Al-Qaeda, th

Haqqani network and its counterpart in the Afghan Taleban. Together, these groups now form an inchoate insurgency against the Zadari government. These strikes have also transformedthe priorities of the Pakistani networks and turned some that were exclusively focused on challenging or

[BOYLE 2010 CONTINUED NO TEXT DELETED]


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overthrowing the incumbent regime in Islamabad towards actively countering the US and NATO inAfghanistan. Worse still, Al-Qaeda appears to gain from this dynamic: Hakimullah Mehsud, the former leader of the TTP, stated unequivocally in October 2009 that we have respect for Al-Qaeda and thjihadist organizationswe are with them.79 He also declared his allegiance to Afghan Taleban leader Mullah Omar as the amir of his movement. The use of commando raids and drone strikes against militant networks in

Pakistan has furthered the radicalization of existing groups and expanded the international horizons of militant groups whose focus was previ- ously the Pakistani government or Kashmir. Ironically, theresult of the expansion of strikes into Pakistan may be to encourage the process of fusion that Kilcullendescribed and to pull these groups even closer to Al-Qaeda.The expansion of raids and strikes in Pakistan has added to the ranks of the enemies that the US is nowfighting. In doing so, it has turned the US into a party to the counterinsurgency effort in Pakistan, as the bureaucratic designa- tion AfPak recognizes. But such involvement has direct and indirect costs to thecounterterrorism effort. The direct cost becomes apparent when Al-Qaeda and Pakistani militant networkstarget US counterterrorism assets, as occurred on 30 December 2009 when the Jordanian Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi blew himself up at a meeting with CIA agents in Afghanistan, killinseven American and one Jordanian intelligence officials. This attack was facilitated by Hakimullah Mehsud, who declared that the attack was revenge for the killing of Baitullah Mehsud in a Predator drone strike.80 Thiattack was particularly costly for the CIA, which lost senior operatives with the highly specialist skills needed to pursue high-ranking Al-Qaeda members.81

The indirect costs are numerous. It is hard to measure what the US loses from the strikes, but it is obvious thait gains no intelligence from dead (as opposed to captured) operatives. It also loses the moral high ground if thestrikes acciden- tally kill high numbers of civilians. But perhaps the greatest indirect cost is its contribution toinstability in Pakistan. The pressure placed on Al-Qaeda and its affiliates has accelerated the crisis facing thePakistani government and encour- aged local militant networks (including ethnic separatist and tribal groups) to form tactical andideological alliances with Al-Qaeda, thus magnifying the threat they pose. As a result, the US is now stumblinginto a war across South Asia with a growing number of militant Islamist networks, many of whom have strong familial and tribal ties witthe local population and stronger regenerative capabilities than Al-Qaeda. The creeping expansion of the target set has transformed a set of

tactics originally reserved for counterterrorism operations into a tool for fighting an ever-widening circle

of insurgents in Pakistan. The dilemma is that, while the counterterrorism benefits of these operations areclear, in adding to the ranks of its enemies the US now faces a more durable network of militants that will fuelthe Talebans insurgency against the United States, Pakistan and the Karzai government.

AND THE INCREASE OF TROOPS ON THE GROUND UNDERMINES PAKISTANS OWN CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE

PAKISTAN TALIBAN.

SYED MANZARABBAS ZAIDI 2010 (LECTURER, POLICING AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, UNIVERSITY OF

CENTRAL LANCASHIRE, ASIAN POLITICS & POLICY VOLUME 2, ISSUE 2, PAGES 257-277 NEGOTIATIONS AND

THE ANTI-TALIBAN COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN)

The situation in Pakistan is volatile enough without being "nudged" by a U.S. territorial intrusion in Pakistanthis would only lead to an Afghanistan- and Iraq-style state implosion, allowing the Islamists even greaterpredominance in Pakistani politics. The fallacy inherent on relying upon a purely military strategy has been anunmitigated disaster in neighboring Afghanistan. Besides causing a huge number of civilian casualties, it hasalso contributed to the political strengthening of the Taliban by making them appear like freedom fighterstaking on a colonial force. A purely military solution will again backfire ; Islamist propaganda would then carry the power for an even greater tacticstimulus of militants from all over the world, exacerbating an already grave situation. It has to be acknowledged that Pakistan is set to see a COINcampaign that will extend over a few years at least to pay tangible dividends. Any efforts to "fast-track" this

campaign by putting foreign boots on the ground will only aggravate the militancy. For better or worsethe Pakistani army is the only viable option to spearhead the COIN campaigns, and continuous efforts by

the international polity have to be directed to retrain, equip, and back up this entity for a protracted

antiguerilla campaign. Pakistan's Taliban imperative has been marked by a laissez-faire attitude toward themindecisiveness and inaction on the part of the state to tackle a festering insurgency allowed it to blossom into awidespread movement. The widely prevalent belief in policy circles that the Taliban would continue concentrating on foreign troops in Afghanistan and encircling the Kabu l regime inculcated a sense ocomplacency, which now has to be shaken off. It must also be remembered that as army operations escalate in intensity, the Talibanal-Qaeda nexus will be hard at work to chalk out a course of further terrorist tactics acrosPakistan; this has the potential of opening multiple fronts for the state forces, for which a COIN regime should have adequate "buffer" logistical backup.


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1ACTHE DESTABILIZATION OF PAKISTAN BY RADICALS RESULTS IN NUCLEAR WAR.

STEPHEN J. MORGAN, 07 (FORMER MEMBER OF THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

BETTER ANOTHER TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN, HTTP://EZINEARTICLES.COM/?BETTER-ANOTHER-TALIBAN-

AFGHANISTAN,-THAN-A-TALIBAN-NUCLEAR-PAKISTAN?&ID=475808)

Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following

9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was "Osama

(not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditionswould be ripe for a coup d'tat by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalisedmasses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not takeplace outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations.The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestinethrough Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast.

Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir.Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possiblynuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out.Atomic Al Qaeda

Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a realpossibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a "Pandora's box" for the region and the world. With thepossibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nucleararsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclearand other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda.Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a realstrategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a newCold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.What is at stake in "the half-forgotten war" in Afghanistan is far greater than that in Iraq. But America's capacities for controlling the situation are extremely restricted. Might it be, in the end, they are also forced to acceptPresident Musharraf's unspoken slogan of "Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!"

AND A STRENGTHENED TALIBAN IN PAKISTAN WILL BE THE SOURCE OF THE NEXT MAJOR TERRORIST ATTACKS

THIS TIME WITH ACCESS TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS .

SYED MANZARABBAS ZAIDI 2010 (LECTURER, POLICING AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, UNIVERSITY OF

CENTRAL LANCASHIRE, ASIAN POLITICS & POLICY VOLUME 2, ISSUE 2, PAGES 257-277 NEGOTIATIONS AND

THE ANTI-TALIBAN COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN)

The Taliban insurgency in Pakistan has caused escalating concerns among U.S. policy echelons, sincePakistan's tribal areas are now being considered a likely source of the next 9/11; the fact that Pakistan hasnuclear weapons largely complicates the scenario. American concern for the militants' actions in these areas hasescalated exponentially, with repeated demands being made from the Pakistani establishment for firm andconclusive action against them. "I'm not convinced we are winning in Afghanistan. I am convinced we can," Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Navy Admiral Mike Mullen said in a testimonybefore the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. Mullen said he was already "looking at a new, more comprehensive strategy for the region" that would cover both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan

border. "We can hunt down and kill extremists as they cross over the border from Pakistan, but until we work moreclosely with the Pakistani government to eliminate the safe havens from where they operate, the enemy wilonly keep coming," he said (Daily Times, September 11, 2008).Apparently, the United States has been thinking about and p reparing for direct intervention in Pakistan's tribal areas for some time, notwithstanding that the unmanned drone attacks currently being conducted in FATAs are

link in this chain. Ostensibly, the Iraqi engagement has held these plans in abeyance ("Secret U.S.," 2008). There has also been an ongoing tussle between theproponents of use of direct force and the school of thought that endorses unmanned attacks but decries landingtroops in a sovereign state, with the potential to turn a populace already disgruntled by U.S. policies in theregion further against it ("Secret U.S.," 2008). It is also a fact that the United States is not adequately prepared for aPakistani engagement, since the administrative level of expertise, particularly within the ranks of the CIA,regarding this region is inadequate ("Secret U.S.," 2008). However, this has not stopped American territorial incursions utilizing unmanned Predator drones, which have been used regularlto target al-Qaeda and Taliban in the Pakistani tribal theater.


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THIS RESULTS IN EXTINCTION.

YONAH ALEXANDER2003 (PROF AND DIR. OF INTER-UNIVERSITY FORTERRORISM STUDIES, WASHINGTON

TIMES, AUGUST 28)

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that theinternational community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terroristthreats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastatinblow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada thatbegan almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are theUnited States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of themanifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and th

exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists haveintroduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. Theinternationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age ofSuper Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implicationsconcerning national, regional and global security concerns.

REDUCING FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN AND FOCUSING ON COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS STOPS INCREASING

RADICALISM IN PAKISTAN.

MALOU INNOCENT 2009 (FOREIGN POLICY ANALYST AT THE CATO INSTITUTE

HTTP://WWW.CATO.ORG/PUB_DISPLAY.PHP?PUB_ID=10479 THE US MUST REASSESS ITS DRONE POLICY)

Drone strikes also contribute to the widening trust deficit between Pakistanis and the US. A recent pollconducted by Gallup Pakistan for Al-Jazeera found that 59 percent believed the US was the greatest threat toPakistan. Most Pakistanis oppose extremism; they simply disagree with American tactics.America's interests lie in ensuring the virus of anti-American radicalism does not infect the rest of the regionYet Washington's attempts to stabilize Afghanistan help destabilize Pakistan, because its actions serve as arecruiting tool for Pakistani Taliban militants. Just as one would not kill a fly with a sledgehammer, using overwhelming firepower to

kill a single insurgent creates collateral damage that can recruit 50 more. Military force against insurgents mustbe applied precisely and discriminately. On the ground, Pakistani security forces lack training, equipment, andcommunication gear to carry out a low-intensity counterinsurgency. But drones provide a poor substitute if thegoal is to engage rather than alienate the other side.A better strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan is for the United States to focus on limiting cross-bordermovement by supporting local Pakistani security forces with a small number of US Special Forces personnel.To improve fighting capabilities and enhance cooperation, Washington and Islamabad must increase the numberof military-to-military training programs to help hone Pakistan's counterterrorism capabilitiesand serve as aconfidence-building measure to lessen the Pakistan Army's tilt toward radicalism.Ending drone strikes is no panacea for Pakistan's array of problems. But continuing those strikes will certainlydeepen the multiple challenges the country faces. Most Pakistanis do not passively accept American actions,

and officials in Islamabad cannot afford to be perceived as putting Washington's interests above those of theirown people. Long-term success in both Afghanistan and Pakistan depends on the people's repudiation ofextremism. Continued US actions add more fuel to violent religious radicalism; it is time to reassess both UStactics and objectives in the region.


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SOLVENCY:

ABANDONING THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN WILL ALLOW WITHDRAW OF MAJOR

AMERICAN UNITS, SUCCESSFULLY ISOLATE THE KARZAI REGIME, AND ALLOW FOR BUILDING A MORE STABLE-

DECENTRALIZED AFGHANSTAN.

BING WEST APRIL 7, 2010 (AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, HASREPORTED ON THE AFGHAN WAR SINCE 2001. HOW TO SAVE AFGHANISTAN FROM KARZAI NEW YORK

TIMES. )

The United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, was guilty of understatement last fall when he told Washington that''Karzai is not an adequate strategic partner.'' Still, getting rid of Mr. Karzai at this point wouldn't be easy, and anymajor upheaval would clearly imperil President Obama's plan to start withdrawing American troops nextsummer.The Marja offensive, however, may have shown us an alternative approach to the war. For one thing, itdemonstrated that our Karzai problem is part of a broader failure to see that our plans for Afghanistan areoverambitious. The coalition is pursuing a political-military strategy based on three tasks. First, ''clear'' the guerrillas from populated areas. Second, ''hold'' the areas with Afghan forces. Third, ''build''responsible governance and development to gain the loyalty of the population for the government in Kabul. To accomplish this, the coalition military has deployed reconstruction teams to 25 provinces. We may

call this a counterinsurgency program, but it's really nation-building.The problem with building a new and better Afghanistan is that, above the local level, President Karzai has

long held the levers of political power by controlling provincial finances and leadership appointments, includingthose of police chiefs. Regardless of the coalition's success at the district level, an obdurate and erratic MrKarzai is an obstacle to progress. The success in Marja, however, changed the dynamics of the conflict. It now seems that the planned surge of 30,000 additional troops will likely achieveprogress in ''clearing and holding'' Kandahar and other Taliban-controlled areas by mid-2011. At that time, the force ratio will be one coalition so ldier for every three Afghan soldiers and policemen, and the Afghan Army wil

still rely upon us for firepower and moral support. Ideally, we could then begin to withdraw major American units and leave behind smaltask forces that combine advisory and combat duties, leading to a new ratio of about one American to 10Afghans. Not only would this bring our troops home, but it would shift the responsibility for nation-building toAfghan forces. At the same time, we would have to pivot our policy in two ways. First, Mr. Karzai should betreated as a symbolic president and given the organizational ''mushroom treatment'' -- that is, we should shut offthe flows of information and resources directly to the national government.President Ronald Reagan did something similar with another erratic ally, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines. In February 1986, Reagan warned Marcos that if government troops attacked opposition forces hole

up on the ou tskirts of Manila, it would cause ''untold damage'' to his relations with the United States -- meaning the aid spigot would be turned off. When his countrymen saw that he was stripped of prestige and support, theforced Marcos into exile.

Second, the coalition must insist that the Afghan military play a primary role in the governance of the districtsand provinces, including in the allocation of aid and the supervision of the police. We should work directly withthose local and provincial leaders who will act responsibly, and cut off those who are puppets of Kabul.

This is happening, to some extent, in Helmand Province, site of the Marja battle, where the coalition hasindependent control over $500 million in reconstruction aid and salaries. We have been fortunate that the provincial governor, Gulab Mangal, while a Karzai appointee, has proved an innovative partner. But in anycase, we know that coalition aid need not flow through Kabul.Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the head of Central Command, already seems to be considering this approach as the battle for Kandahar gains intensity. ''One of the things we'll be doing in the shaping is working with politica

leaders to try to get an outcome that makes sense'' including ''partnering inside the city with the Afghan National Police,'' he told reporters last month.Although isolating Mr. Karzai willstrike many as a giant step backward, the truth is that we don't have a duty to impose democracy on

Afghanistan. The advancement of liberty doesn't necessitate a ''one person, one vote'' system, as the 1.5 millionfraudulent votes cast for Mr. Karzai in last summer's sham election showed. We cannot provide democracy ifwe desire it more than the Afghans.The Philippines -- and South Korea as well -- evolved into thriving democracies at their own pace, well after American aid helped to beat back the military threats facing them. It was enough to prevent the Communis

takeovers and leave behind governments controlled in the background by a strong military. We didn't spend tens of billions of dollars on material projects to inculcate democratic principles.Similarly, a diminished Hamid Karzai can be left to run a sloppy government, with a powerful, American-financed Afghan military insuring that the Taliban do no t take over.Admittedly, this risks the emergence of the Pakistan model in Afghanistan -- an army that has a country rather than a country that has an army. But we are not obliged to build a democratic nation under a feckless leader.

We need to defend our interests, and leave the nation-building to the Afghans themselves.


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A COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD ONLY REQUIRE 20,000 TROOPS, A REDUCTION OF

70,000 FROM CURRENT TROOPS LEVELS.

RORY STEWART 2009 (SERVED BRIEFLY AS AN OFFICER IN THE BRITISH ARMY (THE BLACK WATCH), IN

2003, HE BECAME THE COALITION DEPUTY GOVERNOR OF MAYSAN AND DHI QAR-- TWO PROVINCES IN THE

MARSH ARAB REGION OF SOUTHERN IRAQ.LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS VOL. 31 NO. 13 9 JULY 2009 THEIRRESISTIBLE ILLUSION HTTP://WWW.LRB.CO.UK/V31/N13/RORY-STEWART/THE-IRRESISTIBLE-ILLUSION)

After seven years of refinement, the policy seems so buoyed by illusions, caulked in ambiguous language and encrusted with moral claims, analogies and political theories that it can seem futile to present an alternative. Iis particularly difficult to argue not for a total withdrawal but for a more cautious approach. The best Afghanpolicy would be to reduce the number of foreign troops from the current level of 90,000 to far fewer perhaps20,000. In that case, two distinct objectives would remain for the international community: development andcounter-terrorism. Neither would amount to the building of an Afghan state . If the West believed it essentialto exclude al-Qaida from Afghanistan, then they could do it with special forces . (They have done it successfully since 2001 and could

continue indefinitely, though the result has only been to move bin Laden across the border.) At the same time the West should provide generous developmentassistance not only to keep consent for the counter-terrorism operations, but as an end in itself.A reduction in troop numbers and a turn away from state-building should not mean total withdrawal: good projects could continue to be undertaken in electricity, water, irrigation, health, education, agriculture, ruradevelopment and in other areas favoured by development agencies. We should not control and cannot predict the future of Afghanistan. It may in the futurebecome more violent, or find a decentralised equilibrium or a new national unity, but if its communities continue to want to work with us, we can, over 30years, encourage the more positive trends in Afghan society and help to contain the more negative.


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AFGHANISTAN ADVANTAGE EXTENSIONS

MIDDLE EAST WAR GOES NUCLEAR: ISRAEL STRIKE.

GAFFNEY 03(MARK, A RESEARCHER, WRITER, POET, ENVIRONMENTALIST, ANTI-NUCLEAR ACTIVIST WILL IRAN BE NEXT?ALTERNATIVES: TURKISH JOURNAL O FINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, SUMMER VOL 2

WWW.ALTERNATIVESJOURNAL.NET/VOLUME2/NUMBER2/GAFFNEY.PDF)

It is very possible--some would say probable--that the U.S., possibly in conjunction with Israel, will launcha preventive raid and destroy the Bushehr reactor before it goes on line.

Such a raid would be fateful for the region and the world. It would trigger another Mideast war, and possibly a confrontation with Russia, with effects that

are difficult to predict. A war with Iran might bring about the collapse of the NPT, lead to a new arms race, and plunge the world into

nuclear chaos. Such a crisis holds the potential to bring the world to the nuclear brink. This article will review the background, and provide an analysis. Iwill discuss the reactor at Bushehr first, then the other suspect site

AFGHAN INSTABILITY SPILL OVER INTO IRAN

RHINEFIELD 6 [JEFFREY D., LIEUTENANT, UNITED STATES NAVY B.S., JACKSONVILLE UNIVERSITY; IMPLICATIONS OFSOCIETAL FRAGMENTATION FOR STATE FORMATION: CAN DEMOCRACY SUCCEED IN AFGHANISTAN?

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

HTTP://STINET.DTIC.MIL/CGI-BIN/GETTRDOC?AD=A445561&LOCATION=U2&DOC=GETTRDOC.PDF]In addition, Irans key interest in Afghanistan is to exert its own influence over the western part of that nation and to protect the Shia minority groups that live within the central region of Afghanistan.241 According to

Peimani, the possibility of instability, chaos, and criminal activities in Afghanistan could spill over into Iran which, unsurprisingly has

caused the Iranian government to watch their Afghan neighbors closely and has caused concern about the paceof events within Afghanistan with the potential of inducing instability into Iran.242

NUCLEAR WAR

EISENSTADT 4 [MICHAEL, SENIORFELLOW @ WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FORNEAREAST POLICY, IRAN WATCH # 899, THEIAEA AND IRAN: THE PERILS OF INACTION, 9-16, HTTP://WWW.IRANWATCH.ORG/PRIVATEVIEWS/WINEP/PERSPEX-

WINEP-EISENSTADT-NUCLEARIRAN-091604.HTM]

Implications of Instability in Iran? Instability and unrest in a nuclear Iran could have dire consequences. Were antiregimeviolence to escalate to the point that it threatened the survival of the Islamic Republic (unlikely in the near term, but a possibility in thefuture should popular demands for po litical change continue to be ignored by conservative hardliners), diehard supporters of the old order might lash out atperceived external enemies of the doomed regime with all means at their disposal, including nuclear weapons.

The apocalyptic possibility of nuclear terrorism by an Islamic Republic in its death throes, though unlikely in the near term,cannot be dismissed as a source of concern.

MIDDLE EAST INSTABILITY CREATES SANCTUARIES FORTERRORIST AND DESTROY THE GLOBAL ECONOMY.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT M. MONARCH 2009 (DENYING SANCTUARY, DTIC.MIL/CGI-BIN/GETTRDOC?LOCATION=U2&DOC=GETTRDOC.PDF&AD=ADA494801)

Sanctuaries are not only a threat to the newly formed governments of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the governments hosting therebels (Pakistan, Syria and Iran) and stability in the region. Eliminating these sanctuaries is vital to successfucounter- insurgencies, thus providing the fledgling states security to develop their governmental systems. The host countries also need these areas eradicated to purge foreign-armed groups from withitheir lands and restore sovereign control of their territory. Both of these factors contribute to stability within the countries and, ultimately, within their region. The United States seeks MiddleEastern and Southwest Asian regions noted for their stability and prosperity. Free trade of vital naturalresources and goods from these regions is critical to a growing globalized economy. The solution to this goal isinsurgent-free states allowed to flourish in the international system wi thout fear of armed conflict or overthrow. As noted, at stake in both Iraq and Afghanistan is the fate of both nations governmentInsurgencies are draining their national treasures and sapping the will of the populace to resist. For the UnitedStates and our coalition partners, the stakes are equally high. A stable Middle East and unhindered trade arenecessary for vital economies within the United States, its allies, and the Middle Eastern countries. Also, the world cannoafford for terrorists to once again establish bases in Southwest Asian nations with sympathetic regimes. Finally, defeating these insurgencies will slow the drain of our national treasures, both blood and resources, whil

providing a growth of prestige amongst friends and foes alike around the world.To defeat the insurgencies, the sanctuaries must be eliminated.


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AFGHANISTAN ADVANTAGE EXTENSIONS

EXTINCTION

PHIL KERPEN, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, OCTOBER 29, 2008, DON'T TURN PANIC INTO DEPRESSIONHTTP://WWW.CBSNEWS.COM/STORIES/2008/10/29/OPINION/MAIN4555821.SHTMLIts important that we avoid all these policy errors - not just for the sake ofour prosperity, but forour survival. The Great Depression, after all, didnt end until

the advent of World War II, the most destructive war in the history of the p lanet.

In a world of nuclear and biological weapons and non-state terroristorganizations that breed on poverty and despair, another global economic breakdown of such extended duration would risk armed conflicts

on an even greater scale.

EMPIRICALLY DENIED: RUSSIAN ECONOMIC COLLAPSE DECREASES THE RUSSIAN THREAT.

STEPHEN SESTANOVICH 2008 (SENIOR FELLOW FOR RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN STUDIES RUSSIA AND THE GLOBALECONOMIC CRISIS CFRBRIEF WWW.CFR.ORG/PUBLICATION/17844/RUSSIA_AND_THE_GLOBAL_ECONOMIC_CRISIS.HTML)

Any international economic crisis afflicts different countries in different ways, but an unfortunate few experience every painful dimension of it. In the current crisis, Russia isconfronting virtually all the negatives at once--sharply declining export earnings from energy and metals, over-leveraged corporate balance sheets and a chorus of bailout appeals, a credit crunch and banking failures, a bursting real-estate bubble and mortgage defaults, accelerating capital flight, and unavoidable pressures fo

devaluation. The Russian stock market is down 70 percent from late spring. The government has burned throughmore than 20 percent of its foreign-exchange reserves since August. The outflow of capital in October alonewas $50 billion. Next year's budget is based on a projected average price for oil of $95 per barrel; now budgetplanners have to work with forecasts of $50 or lower. Since Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin has said that Russian government spending goes into deficit at $70 per barrelpressures for spending cuts are starting to mount. Severe reductions have already been announced in housing and education programs. Russians, it seems, at last have an answer tothe question they have been asking since the economic collapse of 1998: Can anything approaching that crisishappen again? The vast hard-currency reserves they accumulated during years of h igh oil and gas prices (and thanks to conservative fiscal policies) make it hard to imagine that Moscow might default on its debtanytime soon. Yet the very fact that this crisis has engulfed the country at a moment of high confidence in the futurehas made it in some respects even more shocking. Debate about how it is being handled, how far it will go, and what changes it will bring with it is becoming intense andmuch more open. Russians remember, after all, that 1998 was not only an economic calamity but a political crisis--perhaps the low moment of the entire presidency of Boris Yeltsin. It toppled the government, ended thpolitical careers of key liberal policymakers, and actually brought Communists back into the cabinet. It offered a hearing to protectionist demands for Russia to insulate itself against the fluctuations of the internationaleconomy. It revived talk of the need to hew to Russia's collectivist traditions, rather than to alien Western ideas about markets and the primacy of the individual. The very fact that this crisis has engulfed the country at moment of high confidence in the future has made it in some respects even more shocking. In Russia's response to the crisis of 2008 there have been a few echoes of 1998 , including a generous share of anti-Western rhetoric

President Dmitry Medvedev and others have repeatedly criticized the United States and called for a reduction in its global influence. There have also been hints of a further tightening of authoritarian rule. Many Russiancommentators have interpreted Medvedev's proposal to lengthen the president's term of office as a sign that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin plans an early return to the Kremlin--perhaps to rule with heightened powers.

Yet, for all this, the most distinctive feature of the Russian leadership's overall response to the crisis has been itsemphasis on the importance of further reform and on cooperation with other countries. There has been norepudiation of liberal policymakers, and few suggestions that Russia should pursue a "Third Way," much lesswall itself off from the world economy. If there is one theme that unites Medvedev's many policy statements, itis that the restoration of state control of the economy must be avoided at all cost. "The government," says ArkadyDvorkovich, the president's chief economic adviser, "cannot replace the private sector, the market, and business, nor is it going to do so." For Medvedev, the state bureaucracy is already far too powerful and is guided by

Soviet-era mistrust of "free people and free enterprise." The only way to stabilize the economy and sustain growth, he has repeatedly and publicly argued, is through transparency, competition, accountability, and protection of property rights. WheMedvedev and others call for changes in international financial regulation, their message is that Russia should try to increase its influence in global processes, not withdraw from them, and abide by international norms, no

talk idly of creating alternatives. Many Russian commentators have said that if the goal is to keep a hard-hit Russian economyin the international mainstream, adjustments in Russian foreign policy are likely to follow as well. They do not

predict a complete change of direction, but a less confrontational, less ideological, more prudent, morresource-constrained approach to relations with the West. The need for such adjustments is particularly obvious where resources are concerned. With housingeducation, and infrastructure budgets under acute pressure, it is hard to imagine that military spending could be completely unaffected. Military officials who were told by Putin inSeptember that they would get a 50 percent funding increase over the next three years may well resistsuggestions by President Medvedev that their budget is now on hold. Yet arguments about the urgent need formilitary modernization can hardly have the same force that they did earlier in the fall. Already the armed forces have had to accept a planto cut the size of the office corps by almost 60 percent in the next three years. The Russian government's desire to delay large increases in military spending surely also contributes to its apparent interest in a new round ofarms-control agreements with the incoming U.S. administration.


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PAKISTAN ADVANTAGE EXTENSIONSCOUNTERINSURGENCY FAILING NOW: MARJAH.

JONATHAN WALLACE MAY 25 2010, (ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AT THE NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, AND ANINCOMING MASTERS STUDENT IN SECURITY STUDIES AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY FOREIGN POLICY SHOWTIME IN KANDAHAR

HTTP://AFPAK.FOREIGNPOLICY.COM/POSTS/2010/05/25/SHOWTIME_IN_KANDAHAR)

Kandahar will be the most important test thus far of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's strategy of increased resources

and a thorough counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Though it will be a "process" rather than one pitched battle, success or failure in thesouthern Afghan province -- a historical Taliban stronghold -- will determine operational momentum well into2011, when the first of the U.S. troops are scheduled to begin withdrawing. The Taliban are treating it like a major battle, attacking the boardwalk iKandahar air base during a sophisticated operation over the weekend.

If Kandahar is show time, then Marjah has been the dress rehearsal. It is not going well. The Marjah operationhas not been successful in rooting out Taliban elements, which continue to terrorize the population andundermine the Afghan government that was supposed to take root in the ineptly named "government in a box"experiment. It is clear that coalition forces, while seemingly able to clear out fighters during the initial battle, cannot fully eradicate the deep roots of the insurgency. As Carlotta Gall, one of the best Westernreporters in Afghanistan, noted last week, the Taliban "are village men who never left the area although they quit fighting soon after the military operation. Gradually they found a stealthierway of operating, moving around in small groups, often by motorbike or on foot." Rather than merely waitinguntil the time is ripe to resurge, then, local fighters must be convinced to throw in their lots with the Afghan

government. However, lack of security, poor performance of the Afghan armed forces, and the slow pace ofgovernment projects have undermined the credibility of the McChrystal strategy (and its partners in the Afghangovernment) and acted as force multipliers for the Taliban's intimidation tactics. Though still in progress, theMarjah offensive -- a "bleeding ulcer" -- leaves much to be desired.

NO UNIQUENESS TO THE TURNS: COUNTER-INSURGENCY IS DOOMED TO FAILURE AND IS ULTIMATELYUNNECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL COUNTER-TERRORISM.

STEVEN SIMON; JONATHAN STEVENSON 2009 (ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW AT THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN

RELATIONS, IS A PROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES AT THE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE AFGHANISTAN:

HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?', SURVIVAL, 51: 5, 47 67)

Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan also would probably fail. Counterinsurgency generally works only when

the domestic government resisting the insurgents enjoys the respect and support of most of the domestic population. Rising perceptions of Hamid Karzai's government as ineffectual and corrupt, and especiallysuspicions that it rigged the 20 August national election, indicate that it does not have that kind of credibilityamong Afghans. On the operational level, provisional and qualified counter-insurgency success in Iraq is not apersuasive precedent for a comparable result in Afghanistan. One ind irect indication is the difficulty the Obama administration is having in figuring out how to measure such success! While Iraq's priminsurgency challenges were essentially compartmentalised in the confined space and among the relatively small populations of Anbar, Diyala and Ninewah provinces and in Baghdad, Afghanistan's hazards permeate its Texa

sized national territory. Thus, applying the surge formula to Afghanistan, however it is adjusted, is likely to empower warlordsincrease factionalism and ultimately make Afghanistan harder to sustain as a functioning unitary state. Thiswould make Afghanistan more susceptible to being used as a strategic pawn by a number of regional actorsincluding Iran as well as India and Pakistan. Comprehensively successful counter-insurgency inAfghanistan, however, is not necessarily required to fulfil the US counter-terrorism mission. It remainsunclear whether a US-led counter-insurgency effort would aim to induce the Taliban factions to reject al-Qaeda,

or some other constellation of tribes to join forces against the Taliban. But none of the factions share the kind of overarching nationalist self-interest thaunified Iraqi Sunnis across tribal lines. They are more like Somali clans, and no visible daylight has emerged between the 'goodTaliban and 'bad' militants.Those advocating an extended counter-insurgency campaign note that 'the Taliban isnot a unified or monolithic movement', that many Taliban militants 'fight for reasons having nothing to do withIslamic zealotry', and that each Taliban grouping has 'specific needs' and 'particular characteristics'.' By the same tokenhowever, these home truths indicate such a high degree of motivational fragmentation within the Taliban that no single faction is likely to gain complete dominance. Thus, power is likely to remain devolved, and Afghanfactions, like Somali ones, will tend to worry about, and focus on, immediate rivals rather than external adversaries.9 To the extent that there is unity among Afghan factions, as with Somalis, it will be against foreigners."


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PAKISTAN ADVANTAGE EXTENSIONSCOUNTER-INSURGENCY FAILING NOW: KARZAI

DEXTER FILKINS JUNE 11, 2010 (STAFF WRITER, THE NEW YORK TIMES KARZAI IS SAID TO DOUBT

WEST CAN DEFEAT TALIBAN)

But their motivations appear to differ starkly. The Americans and their NATO partners are pouring tens

of thousands of additional troops into the country to weaken hard-core Taliban and force the group tothe bargaining table. Mr. Karzai appears to believe that the American-led offensive cannot work. At a newconference at the Presidential Palace this week, Mr. Karzai was asked about the Talibans role in the June 4 attack on the loya jirga and his faith in NATO. He declined to address either one. Who did it? Mr. Karzai said othe attack. Its a question that our security organization can bring and prepare the answer. Asked if he had confidence in NATO, Mr. Karzai said he was grateful for the help and said the partnership was working very, verwell. But he did not answer the question. We are continuing to work on improvements all around, Mr. Karzai said, speaking in English and appearing next to David Cameron, the British prime minister. A senior NATOofficial said the resignations of Mr. Atmar and Mr. Saleh, who had strong support from the NATO allies, were extremely disruptive. The official said of Mr. Karzai, My concern is, is he capable of being a wartimeleader? The NATO official said that American commanders had given Mr. Karzai a dossier showing overwhelming evidence that the attack on the peace conference had been carried out by fighters loyal to Jalalhuddin

Haqqani, one of the main leaders fighting under the Talibans umbrella. There was no doubt, the official said. The resignations of Mr. Saleh and Mr. Atmar revealed adeep fissure among Afghan leaders as to the best way to deal with the Taliban and with their patrons inPakistan.

NO LINK: CAN SIGNAL DEDICATION TO PAKISTAN WITHOUT TROOPS.

DANIEL MARKEY 2007 (A FALSE CHOICE IN PAKISTAN. BY: MARKEY, DANIEL, FOREIGN AFFAIRS

00157120, JUL/AUG2007, VOL. 86, ISSUE 4)Third, if and when greater coercion is deemed necessary, it should be applied through demands for moreengagement. Rather than threatening to cut off assistance, the White House should insist on greater access--toPakistani intelligence operatives, to army and other security forces, to information. Washington should put anend to any lingering doubts about its plans to stay actively involved in Pakistan and the region . Islamabad is deeplaverse to having U.S. armed forces operate autonomously within Pakistan, so these demands should not be raised publicly, and an effort should be made to find less conspicuous ways to integrate Americans into Pakistani

operations. Today's communications, reconnaissance, and long-range strike technologies can bring U.S. forces into afight without ever placing boots on the ground. Beyond possible tactical benefits, greater U.S. involvementwould send the signal that Washington plans to invest in long-standing, working-level ties and that its ultimategoal is deeper, closer cooperation.


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PAKISTAN ADVANTAGE EXTENSIONSINCREASED TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN INCREASES PAKISTAN INSTABILITY.

STEVEN SIMON; JONATHAN STEVENSON 2009 (ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONSPROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES , US NAVAL WARCOLLEGE AFGHANISTAN: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?', SURVIVAL, 51: 5)Al-Qaeda remains the biggest threat to the United States in Central and South Asia, and counter-terrorism is thus still Washington's most pressing taskThere is little dispute on this point. The question is whether counter-insurgency and state-building in

Afghanistan are the best means of executing it. The mere fact that the core threat to US interests now resides inPakistan rather than Afghanistan casts considerable doubt on the proposition. Unlike the Taliban, the secularPakistani government is not a viable target for the US military. Its relationship to al-Qaeda is far more subtle and complicated than was the Taliban's. Whereathe Taliban embraced alQaeda as an economic benefactor in the absence of international legitimacy, and thus amounted to a full strategic ally of an enemy, Islamabad perceives al-Qaeda as a kind of virus: it is ultimately

inimical to the Pakistani leadership, but the wrong kind of coercion could cause it to mutate into something more dangerous - towit, a catalysing movement that fuels Islamic radicalisation in Pakistan and imperils the secular regime. This isone reason that Pakistan's counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency cooperation has been so erratic . Another reason is thahelping to keep the Taliban a viable political player in Afghanistan serves Pakistan's regional strategic interests in providing Pakistan with strategic depth vis--vis India and in denying India a fully stable and cooperativregime there. President Obama has cast Afghanistan as a neglected war of necessity in contrast to the putative war of choice with Iraq. Yet for the United States, any analytic distinction between a war of choice anone of necessity at this point is arguably untenable: if necessity is a function of an existential threat - that is, one that imperils the American state - the United States faces none from any quarter, so no war it undertakes is trulnecessary in that sense. The Soviet Union, with abundant nuclear weapons and a vast, well equ ipped military, was an existential threat. Al-Qaeda, though extremely dangerous and disruptive, is not.' War, of course, may be onbalance a desirable or advisable way of advancing American interests. In the case of Afghanistan, the implicit assumption of US policymakers is that pacifying the country through coercive and expansive counter-insurgencoperations and a concerted effort to bring o rder to its politics will make it easier, or at least will not make it harder, to contain regional militancy and ensure stability in Pakistan. The United States plans to bring the Americatroop presence in Afghanistan to 78,000 by mid 2010, which would represent an increase of nearly a third over the mid 2009 number. Fiscal-year 2010 funding for Operation Enduring Freedom will increase by almost 40%including a $7.5 billion bump for the Afghan security forces and an additional $700 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, a flexible spending pr

utnif 2010 afghanistan starter pack aff_neg

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