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Changing channels : flexibility in empathic emotion processes

Hawk, S.T.

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Citation for published version (APA):Hawk, S. T. (2010). Changing channels : flexibility in empathic emotion processes. Amsterdam.

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Download date: 01 Oct 2020

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CHAPTER 4 Affective Perspective-Taking and Mimicry as

Routes to Empathic Embarrassment

This chapter is based on: Hawk, S.T., Fischer, A.H., & Van Kleef, G.A. (in

review). Taking your place or matching your face: Embodied paths to

empathic embarrassment. Submitted to Emotion.

Empathic Embarrassment

107

Empathic responding is imperative to the maintenance of interpersonal

connections, and to human survival, more generally. Empathy fosters social

bonds between individuals and within groups (Bavelas et al., 1986; Preston &

de Waal, 2002; Yabar & Hess, 2007; Van Kleef et al., 2008), inspires

generosity in negotiations (Galinsky et al., 2008), and prompts helping

toward distressed others (e.g., Batson et al., 1997). It also provides useful

information to empathizers, both about experiences that should be pursued or

avoided (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef, 2009) and about the extent to

which they value other's welfare (Batson et al., 1995). It is no surprise, then,

that this topic has enjoyed much attention in the last century of psychological

research. The term "empathy" has been defined in many ways throughout

this time, but is typically conceptualized as a vicarious affective response that

is a stronger match to another person's emotional situation than to one's own

circumstances (Eisenberg et al., 1991; Hoffman, 1984, 2008). In the present

research, we investigate the different paths leading to empathy, and which

cues in an observer's environment activate these processes.

Empathic reactions range from complementary feelings of sympathy

and tenderness (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; Lamm et al, 2007; Van Kleef et al.,

2008) to emotions that more closely match a target's expressed feelings or

specific circumstances (e.g., Hatfield et al., 1992, 1994, 2008; Hess & Blairy,

2001; Miller, 1987). This latter, matching emotional response is the focus of

the present investigation. Even when situations have no immediate

consequences for ourselves, we can be angered by an injustice toward

someone else, or cringe with embarrassment when witnessing another's gaffe.

Interestingly, individuals can respond empathically toward another, even

when affective cues from that person are limited, or altogether absent. A

critical issue is how empathy, which is usually viewed as a reaction to the

affective state of another, occurs under such circumstances. Such an

important aspect of human relations is likely instigated by multiple processes,

in order to maximize adaptive responding (Hoffman, 1984, 2002, 2008).

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Different kinds of contextual and emotional cues may instigate

several distinct processes that result in empathic emotions (see Hoffman,

1984 and 2008, for a more extensive review). Although such a notion has

existed for some time, these multiple sources of information have rarely been

directly investigated within a single study. We address this equifinality in the

present research, by examining how the salience of particular cues can

instigate different routes to empathic responding. We focus upon empathic

embarrassment (Miller, 1987) as a specific reaction that can illustrate these

multiple routes to empathy. We investigate the role of emotion displays in

fostering empathic embarrassment, as well as how this response can occur

when such affective cues are absent.

An Embodiment Perspective on Empathic Embarrassment

While people typically feel embarrassed when their own self-image is

threatened or discredited (Sabini, Siepmann, Stein, & Meyerowitz, 2000),

they can also experience this emotion empathically, on behalf of others

(Miller, 1987). For example, watching someone give a bad audition on the

television program American Idol may be sufficient to elicit embarrassment.

While this empathic reaction may be understandable when performers

noticeably signal their embarrassment, through behaviors such as

combinations of gaze aversion, smiling, and touching their faces or bodies

(Keltner, 1995), regular viewers of the Idols program are also likely aware of

the personal mortification one can feel even when performers do not display

such emotion cues. This suggests that while targets' expressions of

embarrassment are sufficient to foster empathy in others, they are not

completely necessary (Hoffman, 1984, 2008; Marcus & Miller, 1999; Marcus

et al., 1996; Miller, 1987). The presence or absence of particular cues,

including a target's expressive displays, may result in different processes

ultimately being responsible for experiences of empathic embarrassment. We

utilize recent theories on embodiment of emotion (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2003;


109

Niedenthal, 2007; also see Preston & De Waal, 2002, and Van der Gaag et

al., 2007) to provide a unifying framework for these different processes.

The embodiment perspective can accommodate a variety of processes

suggested to instigate empathic emotions. This theory holds that partially

simulating or reenacting perceptual, expressive, and introspective

components of prior experiences is central to understanding and responding

to others' emotion cues. An individual's own history of experiencing particular

emotions or emotion-eliciting situations is thus fundamental to their

understanding and adoption of others' feelings. This perspective therefore

proposes that individuals draw upon their own personal knowledge of emotion

expressions, subjective experiences, and eliciting contexts in order to make

sense of others' emotional circumstances and to share in their joy, rage, or

(in this case) embarrassment. In the present study on empathic

embarrassment, we focus upon two types of embodied processes, in

particular, namely observers' affective perspective-taking and their nonverbal

mimicry of a target.

Perspective-Taking as an Independent Route to Empathic

Embarrassment

The notions of simulation and reenactment explain the first proposed

process contributing to empathic embarrassment, participants' affective

perspective-taking, or imagining how they would feel in another's situation.1

1 While other research has distinguished between "imagine-self" and "imagine-other" types of perspective taking (Batson et al., 1997; Lamm et al., 2007; Stotland, 1969), we focus explicitly on the former, for several reasons. First, "imagine-other" perspective-taking draws heavily upon information provided by targets (e.g., Davis, 2005), which we viewed as redundant with our focus on the role of expressive behaviors. Second, a great deal of evidence exists that the self is a "default" platform on which to base inferences about others (Decety, 2005, Preston & De Waal, 2002). Third, although conceptually distinct, experiments attempting to manipulate the two forms through explicit instructions have shown rather poor differentiation in participants' self-reported focus (Batson et al, 1997; Davis et al., 1996). Thus, in the remainder of this article, we use the term "perspective-taking" to describe the act of imagining oneself in another's situation.

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When instructed to engage in such perspective-taking, individuals show

higher physiological and self-report indices of personal distress while

witnessing another's expressions of distress (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; Lamm

et al., 2007; Stotland, 1969), as well as enhanced empathic embarrassment

reactions (Miller, 1987). An embodiment perspective would suggest that a

range of environmental cues, including simply hearing about a person's

plight, can prompt individuals to reflect on their own potential emotions.

Contextual cues may thus be sufficient to facilitate conscious simulations of

introspective states (Barsalou et al., 2003; Niedenthal, 2007), independent of

whether such reflections are further supported by a target's emotional

behavior (Hoffman, 1984, 2008). Empathic embarrassment may thus not be

fully contingent on targets' emotion displays, but instead be possible

whenever observers witness situations that (would) have caused them

personal embarrassment (Miller, 1987).

The notion that individuals can consciously simulate the introspective

component of emotions, through affective perspective-taking, can thus

address empathic emotions that arise even in absence of another's overt

emotional behaviors. In this sense, however, the paradigm typically utilized in

research on perspective-taking presents a problem for determining the exact

nature of its influence. This methodology involves exposing participants to an

emotion-provoking situation, in which a target's objective emotion cues are

either uniform across conditions or are not examined in further detail.

Observers are explicitly instructed to remain objective or to engage in

perspective-taking as they witness the targets' distress (e.g., Batson et al.,

1997; Davis et al., 1996; Lamm et al., 2007; Miller, 1987; Stotland, 1969).

This particular approach, however, cannot address whether conscious

perspective-taking can indeed independently influence empathic emotions, in

absence of a target's concordant nonverbal displays.

A critical test of this position is whether perspective-taking increases

empathy not only when targets convey their distress in an emotion-eliciting


111

situation, but also when they show no overt reaction. A recent study (Vaish,

Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009) suggests that this may indeed be the case.

Toddlers in this research were exposed to situations in which one adult stole

or damaged another's possessions, or performed a similar action that did not

incur harm. The victim never responded with an expression of emotion.

Regardless, children in the "harm" condition showed more facial expressions

of concern, as well as more helping behavior toward the actor. The authors

implied perspective-taking as a specific process influencing these reactions.

Although it would seem that perspective-taking plays a central role in eliciting

observers' congruent affect when emotion information from a target is absent,

we are aware of no research directly examining this issue. We thus sought to

examine this idea more explicitly in the context of adult observers' empathic

embarrassment.

The Role of Embarrassment Displays

The embodiment perspective would also suggest that the availability of

a target's emotion signals can further strengthen empathic responding, by

activating multiple processes that lead to convergent emotions. Perceptions of

targets' embarrassment do indeed appear to be associated with observers'

own empathic embarrassment (e.g., Miller, 1987). For example, in

naturalistic settings such as classroom presentations, individuals who report

the strongest embarrassment during their own talks also foster the greatest

embarrassment in observers (Marcus & Miller, 1999). We propose that

observing emotion displays will activate two embodied processes that

contribute to experiences of empathic embarrassment. The first process,

affective perspective-taking, has been discussed previously. However, in

contrast to the experimental manipulations of perspective-taking that

demonstrate effects of deliberate and motivated introspection (e.g., Batson et

al., 1997; Davis et al., 1996; Galinsky et al., 2008; Lamm et al., 2007; Miller,

1987; Stotland, 1969), the factors that spontaneously prompt this activity

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have received much less attention (but see Gruen & Mendelsohn, 1986). In

particular, the potential for nonverbal displays to activate this process has not

been subjected to empirical testing in past research. Others have previously

conjectured that emotion displays may prompt observers to spontaneously

reflect upon their own potential feelings, or about similar past experiences

(Batson, Sympson, Hindman, Decruz, Todd, Weeks, et al., 1996; Hoffman,

1984, 2002, 2008; Ruby & Decety, 2004). This may be especially relevant for

emotion displays that are known to facilitate social bonding and affiliation,

including expressions of embarrassment (e.g., Fischer & Manstead, 2008;

Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Semin & Manstead, 1982).

The embodiment principles of simulation and reenactment additionally

suggest a second process contributing to empathic embarrassment, nonverbal

mimicry. From an embodiment view, individuals utilize mimicry of emotion

expressions across different nonverbal channels as a way to increase their

understanding of others' feelings. The simulation of these expressive cues can

subsequently activate introspective simulations of an emotion in a cascading

fashion, resulting in subjective experiences of concordant feelings (Barsalou

et al., 2003; Niedenthal, 2007). This is similar to the view expressed in

primitive emotional contagion theory (Hatfield et al., 1992, 1994, 2008)

which suggests that mimicry of emotion-related nonverbal behaviors

generates afferent feedback that subsequently prompts experiences of

concordant emotions. Importantly, however, mimicry can be distinguished

from perspective-taking in that its effects are entirely dependent on the

availability of a target's nonverbal emotion cues. While experiencing empathic

embarrassment may not be entirely dependent on the presence of a target's

emotion displays, in contrast to the primitive contagion view, the embodiment

perspective would suggest that mimicry of observed expressive cues can

further support or facilitate subjective experiences of concordant feelings

(Barsalou et al. 2003; Niedenthal, 2007; also see Preston & De Waal, 2002

and Van der Gaag et al., 2007). To date, research on the mimicry-empathy


113

link has focused primarily upon "basic" emotions such as joy and sadness

(e.g., Hatfield et al., 1992, 1994). Our research is the first to examine

whether mimicry also occurs for expressions of embarrassment, and whether

these expressive reenactments facilitate subjective experiences of a

concordant, "self-conscious" emotion.

Overview and Hypotheses

In sum, we present methodologically novel and theoretically important

extensions of prior studies on empathy. In Study 1, we explicitly examine for

the first time whether actively simulating an emotional state (in the form of

deliberate perspective-taking) can independently influence empathic

embarrassment, even when a target displays no emotional reaction to her

situation. We examined this by orthogonally manipulating the presence of

emotion displays and perspective-taking. In Study 2, we investigate whether

displays of embarrassment can instigate empathy by simultaneously

activating two processes, namely spontaneous perspective-taking (i.e.,

conscious introspective simulations) and nonverbal mimicry (i.e., simulations

of expressive behaviors). In particular, this is the first study to examine

spontaneous perspective-taking as a mediator of the link between emotion

displays and empathy, which has been a topic of much conjecture but scant

empirical testing. We further examine whether prior experience with a

target's emotion-eliciting situation enhances either of these processes, as

would be suggested by the embodiment perspective. The research can thus

provide insight into how different empathic processes operate in the presence

or absence of particular environmental cues (Hoffman, 1984, 2008).

Study 1

In Study 1, we tested whether perspective-taking increases observers'

empathic embarrassment, even in the absence of a target's emotional

expressions. We addressed this issue by exposing participants to a potentially

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embarrassing situation, namely observing a target (actually a confederate)

dancing to pre-recorded pop music (cf. Apsler, 1975), and manipulating both

participants' perspective-taking and the presence versus absence of a target's

embarrassment displays. We expected that individuals would feel stronger

embarrassment when the target showed embarrassment displays. Consistent

with the notion that perspective-taking can exert direct effects upon empathy,

we also expected that participants' imagining how they would feel in the

target's embarrassing situation would increase their own embarrassment,

even in absence of the target's emotional behaviors.

Method

Participants and Design

Eighty female undergraduate students (MAge = 22.40, SD = 5.35) at a

large Dutch university took part in the research. Participants received course

credit or 7 Euros ($10 U.S.). All participants were randomly assigned to a 2x2

factorial design, varying both instructions to the participant (objective vs.

perspective taking) and the target's nonverbal behavior (unembarrassed vs.

embarrassed).

Materials and Apparatus

We developed two videos of a confederate's dancing performance for this

research. In the "embarrassed" film, the confederate enacted behaviors found

in previous research to be associated with feelings of embarrassment (e.g.,

Keltner, 1995), including gaze aversion, smiling, touching her face, hair, and

clothing, and downward head movements (see Figure 1). The confederate

enacted these behaviors several times during the video. In the

"unembarrassed" version, the confederate remained cool and aloof while

dancing, and did not engage in these behaviors. All other behaviors were held

constant. The experiment was conducted in individual cubicles containing a

computer monitor and stereo speakers. All instructions, measures, and stimuli

were administered via computer.


115

Measures

Empathic embarrassment. A 14-item emotion inventory was given to

participants, who were asked to complete it with regard to their personal

feelings while watching the film. Six items assessed participants' personal

feelings of embarrassment: ongemakkelijk (awkward), beschaamd and

gegeneerd (embarrassed), onbeschaamd (unembarrassed, reverse-coded),

verlegen (shy), and in verlegenheid gebracht (flustered). Participants rated all

of these words on a 7-point scale (0 = not at all, 6 = a great deal). The

measure showed good reliability (Cronbach's α = .92).

Manipulation checks. To check the manipulation of embarrassment

displays, participants reported their impressions of the confederate's

embarrassment on the same 6-item scale used to assess empathic

embarrassment (α = .95). Additionally, participants also indicated on single-

item, 5-point Likert scales (1 = not at all, 5 = very much) their focus on

remaining objective and their focus on their own potential feelings in the

other's situation.

Figure 1. Unembarrassed (top) and Embarrassed (bottom) versions of dancing confederate film.

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Procedure

Participants were told that they would participate in a study validating

a new behavioral measure. It was explained that they would view a film clip

of a participant from an earlier project as she performed a randomly-selected

task, and were to provide their observations of that person. Participants were

given no warning as to what the task would be. Before viewing the film clip,

participants received instructions either to be as objective as possible in their

assessments of the confederate's thoughts and feelings (objective condition),

or to imagine themselves in the confederate's place (perspective-taking

condition; e.g., Miller, 1987). Participants then viewed the film of the dancing

confederate.

Afterward, participants filled out the emotion inventory, first for

themselves and then with regard to the confederate. We explained that it was

necessary to control for participants' own responses to the film in our

analyses, and thus they should report as accurately and honestly as possible.

Finally, participants completed the focus manipulation checks and provided

demographic information, followed by a debriefing.

Results

Manipulation Checks

Means and standard deviations are shown in Table 1.

Ratings of confederate embarrassment. The embarrassment

manipulation had its intended effect. Ratings of the confederate's

embarrassment were higher when she enacted embarrassment displays (M =

5.06, SD = .66), compared to when she did not (M = 3.03, SD = 1.40), F(1,

76) = 67.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .47. Perceived embarrassment did not differ as

a function of perspective-taking, and no significant interaction existed.

Reported objectivity. Participants in the Objective condition focused

on being objective to a greater extent (M = 3.00, SD = 1.28) than those in

the Perspective-Taking condition (M = 2.25, SD = 1.10), F(1, 76) = 7.70, p

= .007, ηp2 = .09. This did not differ as a result of the embarrassment display


117

manipulation, nor was there an interaction. In contrast, participants in the

Perspective-Taking condition concentrated on their own potential feelings to a

greater extent (M = 4.48, SD = .64), compared to the Objective condition (M

= 3.25, SD = 1.15), F(1, 76) = 34.64, p < .001, ηp2 = .31. This did not differ

as a result of the display manipulation, nor was there a significant interaction.

Thus, the perspective-taking instructions appeared successful.

Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Study 1

Objective Instructions

Unembarrassed Confederate

Embarrassed Confederate

M SD M SD Confederate embarrassment 2.93a 1.39 5.20b .72 Focus on own emotions 3.45a .89 3.05a 1.36 Focus on objectivity 2.90a 1.29 3.10a 1.29 Empathic embarrassment 1.15a 1.20 2.31b 1.28 Perspective-Taking Instructions Unembarrassed

Confederate Embarrassed

Confederate M SD M SD Confederate embarrassment 3.13a 1.44 4.91b .59 Focus on own emotions 4.45b .69 4.50b .61 Focus on objectivity 2.30b .92 2.20b 1.28 Empathic embarrassment 2.84b 1.41 2.96b 1.81 Note: Different alphabetical superscripts within each measure denote significant differences between conditions (p < .05).


Participants in the Perspective-Taking condition (M = 2.90, SD = 1.60)

reported more intense feelings of embarrassment while watching the film

than did those in the Objective condition (M = 1.73, SD = 1.35), F(1, 76) =

13.20, p = .001, ηp2 = .15. We also found a main effect of Embarrassment

Display: Those who witnessed the confederate's embarrassment displays felt

more embarrassed (M = 2.63, SD = 1.58), compared to those who saw an

unembarrassed confederate (M = 2.00, SD = 1.55), F(1, 76) = 3.91, p = .05,

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ηp2 = .05 (see Figure 2). The interaction between the manipulations was not

significant, F(1, 76) = 2.61, p = .11, ηp2 = .03. Thus, as expected,

participants' empathic embarrassment increased both with exposure to

embarrassment displays, and when imagining themselves in her situation.

Discussion

In Study 1, we tested the extent to which empathic embarrassment

responses follow from witnessing a target's emotional displays and from

perspective-taking instructions. We predicted that each manipulation would

exert independent effects upon observers' own feelings of embarrassment. As

expected, the results showed that empathic embarrassment can be influenced

by a target's emotion displays. More importantly, however, perspective-taking

also increased empathic embarrassment, even when the target did not signal

her embarrassment. This pattern of results suggests that conscious

simulations of introspective states, in the form of perspective-taking, provide

independent influences upon empathic embarrassment in the presence of

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

3,5

4

No Display Display

ObjectivePerspective-Taking

Em

path

ic E

mb

arr

ass

men

t

Confederate's Nonverbal Behavior

Perceptual Set

Figure 2. Study 1 scores of empathic embarrassment, per condition.


119

other salient environmental cues (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2003; Hoffman, 1984,

2008). Thus, not only can individuals be affected by witnessing a target's

overt distress, but observers predisposed or motivated toward perspective-

taking may experience increased embarrassment even when targets do not

display such feelings.

While the results support the hypothesis that perspective-taking

exerts independent effects upon empathic embarrassment, the nature of the

effect found for emotion displays remains unclear. Specifically, our results

cannot address whether the confederate's embarrassment displays would also

lead to spontaneous perspective-taking and/or mimicry, both of which could

subsequently affect empathic reactions. We addressed this issue in Study 2,

by unobtrusively filming participants as they viewed the same film, and

analyzing their nonverbal behaviors. In line with the proposed social function

of emotion expressions, we also addressed whether embarrassment displays

would increase spontaneous (as opposed to instructed) perspective-taking.

We examined this hypothesis by creating a measure of perspective-taking

and treating participants' scores as a dependent variable. Finally, we

examined whether these two processes individually and/or simultaneously

mediated the links between our manipulations and participants' empathic

embarrassment.

Study 2

In Study 2, we addressed the proposed dual influence of embarrassment

displays upon observers' empathic embarrassment. Considering the paucity of

investigations treating affective perspective-taking as a dependent variable,

as opposed to a manipulated or dispositional influence, it is also valuable to

examine additional predictors of this process. A second source of information

(besides emotional displays) proposed to influence perspective-taking is the

extent of an observer's prior experience with the target's situation. If

individuals have previously been in a situation similar to that of the target,

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this should allow for the activation of richer, more complex simulations of the

experience (Barsalou et al. 2003; Niedenthal, 2007; Preston & De Waal,

2002). Indeed, many have suggested that detecting relevant emotion cues

from another may prompt observers to spontaneously reflect on similar past

experiences of their own, and to subsequently empathize more strongly with

a target (Batson et al., 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1991; Hoffman, 1984, 2008).

Batson and colleagues (1996) suggested that prior experience enhances the

ease of perspective-taking, and demonstrated that shared history with a

particular hardship indeed enhanced observers' empathy. Additionally,

psychophysiological research has shown that participants who acquired

experience with an embarrassing task blushed more intensely when later

watching another perform the same act (Shearn, Spellman, Straley, Meirick,

& Stryker, 1999). The authors of this study suggested that this effect arose

from participants being reminded of their own previous embarrassment, but

they did not additionally examine targets' nonverbal behaviors. As

demonstrated by both of these studies, however, the idea that perspective-

taking is the mechanism responsible for the link between prior experience and

empathy is typically inferred from the pattern of results, rather than tested

directly.

We examined whether prior experience would moderate participants'

perspective-taking responses to embarrassment displays. To this end, we

asked half of Study 2 participants to perform the confederate's dancing task

before viewing the film. Our examination of prior experience differed from

past studies in one important way, however. Previous research has typically

examined participants' empathic responses as a product of their experience

with a target's exact situation, often in comparison with a control group with

no emotion-rich history (e.g., Batson et al., 1996; Shearn et al., 1999). This

method, however, conflates the experience of a situation with the experience

of an emotion. In Study 2, we contribute to this body of research by

investigating whether having previously been in the target's specific situation


121

increases empathy beyond merely having experienced a particular emotion,

more generally. Therefore, we asked the other half of the sample to perform

a different, but equally embarrassing, task than the confederate.

In sum, we refined our investigation of empathic embarrassment in

several ways. First, we tested the notion that embarrassment displays may

affect empathic embarrassment by leading observers to engage in expressive

(mimicry) and introspective (perspective-taking) simulations of the emotion

in a parallel fashion. Second, we attempted to heighten perspective-taking

through an additional, prior experience manipulation. We expected that prior

experience with the situation, and not merely with the emotion, would

increase the effects of embarrassment displays upon perspective-taking.

Finally, we examined whether nonverbal mimicry and conscious perspective-

taking mediated the links between our manipulations and participants'

empathic embarrassment.

Method

Participants and Design

Participants were 103 University undergraduates in the Netherlands

(23 male, 80 female; MAge = 20.30, SD = 3.09), who again received either

course credit or 7 Euros. Three participants were excluded from analyses

because they reported knowing the confederate. Two participants were

excluded because they declined to perform their assigned embarrassing task.

An additional four participants were excluded as statistical outliers due to

exceptionally low reports of personal embarrassment during their assigned

task. The remaining 94 participants (22 male, 72 female) were randomly

assigned to a 2x2 factorial design, manipulating the target's nonverbal

behavior (unembarrassed or embarrassed) and prior experience with the

confederate's task (no experience or prior experience).

Measures

Manipulation checks. Participants rated the extent of the

confederate's observed embarrassment on the basis of the same six-item

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scale from Study 1. To ensure that the two tasks assigned to participants

were equally embarrassing, they completed a similar scale with regard to

their own emotions directly after completing their task. Reliability was good

for reports of task-related embarrassment (α =.93), and confederate

embarrassment (α = .95).

Participants' nonverbal mimicry. We drew upon Keltner's (1995)

description of prototypical embarrassment displays to assess participants'

own embarrassment-related nonverbal behaviors as they watched the film.

These prototypical displays include behaviors such as smiling, gaze aversion,

downward head movements, and touching one's face or body. Importantly,

however, it is the combination of these behaviors - not their occurrence in

isolation - that produces reliable ratings of embarrassment (Keltner, 1995;

Keltner & Buswell, 1997). The behavioral representations activated by

witnessing such displays may often be incomplete and/or inaccurate, however

(e.g., Niedenthal, 2007; Preston & De Waal, 2002), and the full sequence of

prototypical behaviors may not always occur. As a compromise between these

two positions, the first author (blind to participants' conditions) rated the

number of times each participant engaged in two or more of the

aforementioned actions in close succession (separated by no more than one

second).2 A frequency score was constructed for each participant by totaling

the number of discrete behavioral incidences.

Participants' conscious perspective-taking was measured with four

items (e.g., "While watching the other participant… I imagined myself in her

situation; I thought about how I would feel if I were in her shoes; α = .67),

measured on a 7-point scale (0 = not at all; 6 = a great deal). These items

were randomly intermixed with those measuring empathic embarrassment

responses.

2 Given that downward head movements often also entail gaze aversion, we did not count the co-occurrence of these two actions as an instance of mimicry behavior. To be counted in our analyses, one or both of these actions had to co-occur with smiling and/or face-touching.


123

Empathic embarrassment. Participants' empathic embarrassment was

assessed with the same six-item scale as in Study 1, which again achieved

good reliability (α = .90).

Materials and Apparatus

The experiment was conducted in individual cubicles containing a

computer monitor with a visible camera, a table-mounted microphone, stereo

speakers, a work booklet, and a set of colored pencils. All measures and tasks

were administered by the computer. The same confederate videos from the

previous study were again utilized for this experiment.

Procedure

The purpose of the experiment was ostensibly to study the effects of

music upon creativity and problem-solving. Upon providing informed consent

(including notification that they could withdraw at any point), participants

were instructed to sit in front of a computer in an individual cubicle, fitted

with a visible webcam and microphone. Participants were informed that the

camera and microphone would become active during the study. Participants

then began by responding to various personality measures, followed by a

bogus questionnaire that asked about the importance of music in their lives.

The computer informed participants that they would begin the first of

several tests designed to examine the link between certain types of music and

their creative abilities. The participants then heard the same song used in the

previous study, and the lyrics to the song were presented on the computer

screen. Participants were instructed to pay close attention as they listened to

the song. Following presentation of the music, participants were told that they

would perform a randomly-assigned task designed to test their own musical

and rhythmic abilities. Participants were then instructed to either dance to the

song (prior experience) or to sing along with the music (no prior experience)

in front of the supposedly active camera. Afterward, participants reported

their level of embarrassment during the activity. These manipulation check

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items were intermixed with items assessing their liking of the song and

whether they became more familiar with the lyrics.

Participants then engaged in approximately 30 minutes of unrelated

activities, including a timed maze-completion test and a "creative" coloring

exercise. Participants were then told that they would complete one final music

test, where their job was to provide observations of another participant.

Participants then viewed either the unembarrassed or embarrassed version of

the dancing confederate video. The webcam became active upon the start of

the film, unbeknownst to participants, and recorded their nonverbal behaviors.

After the video, participants completed the empathic embarrassment and

perspective-taking items, followed by their impressions of the confederate's

embarrassment. These latter items were also intermixed among other, bogus

items assessing the confederate's musical and rhythmic abilities. Participants

then provided demographic data and were debriefed. All participants gave

written consent for their films to be analyzed, and none indicated a suspicion

that they had been filmed.

Results

The means and standard deviations of all variables are in Table 2.

Manipulation Checks

A two-way ANOVA showed that participants' experienced

embarrassment while performing their assigned task did not differ depending

on whether they sang (M = 3.54, SD = 1.55) or danced (M = 3.96, SD =

1.01). An additional ANOVA again confirmed participants' perception of higher

confederate embarrassment in the presence of emotion displays (M = 4.98,

SD = .91), compared to no displays (M = 3.06, SD = 1.14), F(1, 90) = 81.97,

p < .001, ηp2 = .48. These scores did not differ based on prior experience,

and no significant interaction existed.


A two-way ANOVA examining participants' empathic embarrassment

revealed no main effect of prior experience, F(1, 90) = .01, p =.94, ηp2 < .01.


125

Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Study 2

No Prior Experience

(Singing Task) Unembarrassed


Confederate M SD M SD

Confederate embarrassment 3.28a 1.28 5.03b 1.05 Nonverbal mimicry frequency 1.29a 1.15 2.92b 2.87 Conscious perspective-taking 3.97a 1.29 3.84a, c .96 Empathic embarrassment 1.66a 1.31 1.37a 1.23 Prior Experience

(Dancing Task) Unembarrassed


Confederate M SD M SD Confederate embarrassment 2.83a .96 4.91b .74 Nonverbal mimicry frequency 1.57a 2.29 2.60b 2.60 Conscious perspective-taking 3.14b 1.05 4.39c 1.03 Empathic embarrassment .89b .76 2.08c 1.36 Note: Different alphabetical superscripts within each measure denote significant differences between conditions (p < .05).

There was a trend for embarrassment display, F(1, 90) = 3.27, p

= .07, ηp2 = .04, in which participants who observed an embarrassed

confederate tended to feel stronger empathic embarrassment (M = 1.70, SD

= 1.33) than those who saw the unembarrassed confederate (M = 1.29, SD =

1.13). We also found the anticipated Display x Experience interaction, F(1, 90)

= 8.99, p = .004, ηp2 = .09. Planned comparisons showed that there was no

effect of embarrassment display among participants who sang, F(1, 90) = .74,

p = .39, ηp2 < .01, but that such displays heightened empathic

embarrassment among participants who had experienced the confederate's

dancing task, F(1, 90) = 11.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .11 (see Figure 3).

We additionally used planned comparisons to examine whether prior

experience increased empathy in the presence of embarrassment displays.

Among those who saw these displays, dancers reported stronger empathic

embarrassment than singers (F[1, 90] = 4.37, p = .04, ηp2 = .05). Among

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those who saw no displays, singers reported stronger empathic

embarrassment than dancers (F[1, 90] = 4.62, p = .03, ηp2 = .05). Thus,

when displays of embarrassment were present, prior experience with the

confederate's task increased participants' empathy. When these displays were

absent, however, prior experience decreased empathy.

Perspective-Taking

A two-way ANOVA conducted on participants' perspective-taking

revealed no main effect of prior experience F(1, 90) = .38, p = .54, ηp2 = .00.

As predicted, there was a significant effect of embarrassment display, F(1, 90)

= 6.25, p = .01, ηp2 = .07, in which participants who saw the embarrassed

confederate engaged in more perspective-taking (M = 4.10, SD = 1.02), as

compared to the unembarrassed confederate (M = 3.56, SD = 1.24). There

was also a Display X Experience interaction, F(1, 90) = 9.50, p = .003, ηp2

= .10. Planned comparisons showed that there was no effect of

embarrassment display among participants who sang (F[1, 90] = .18, p = .68,

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

No Display Display

DanceSing

Em

path

ic E

mb

arr

ass

men

t


Task

Figure 3. Study 2 scores of empathic embarrassment, per condition.


127

ηp2 < .01), but that emotion displays prompted increased perspective-taking

for participants who had the same prior experience, F(1, 90) = 14.97, p

< .001, ηp2 = .14 (see Figure 4).

As with the analysis of empathic embarrassment, we investigated

whether prior experience increased perspective-taking when participants

viewed embarrassment displays. Among those who saw an embarrassed

confederate, dancers trended toward more perspective-taking than singers,

F(1, 90) = 3.18, p < .08, ηp2 = .03. Among those who saw an unembarrassed

confederate, singers reported stronger perspective-taking than dancers, F(1,

90) = 6.56, p = .01, ηp2 = .07. Thus, prior experience with the confederate's

situation tended to increase participants' perspective-taking when displays

were present. When displays were absent, however, prior experience

decreased perspective-taking.

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

No Display Display

DanceSing

Pers

pect

ive-T

akin

g


Task

Figure 4. Study 2 scores of perspective-taking, per condition.

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Nonverbal Mimicry

Observational data for ten participants was unavailable due to

technical errors with the recording equipment. Thus, analyses involving

observational data were based on 84 participants. Those who observed the

confederate's embarrassment displays showed an increased frequency of the

same actions (M = 2.77, SD = 2.73), compared to those who saw the

unembarrassed confederate (M = 1.43, SD = 1.77), F(1, 80) = 6.67, p = .01,

ηp2 = .08. There was no effect of prior experience, nor was there a significant

interaction. Thus, only the observation of embarrassment displays increased

mimicry of the confederate.

Mediation Analyses

For all mediation analyses, the experimental manipulations were

dummy coded as -1 (no display/no prior experience) and 1 (display/prior

experience). Only participants with no missing data (n = 84) were considered

in the mediation tests. All variables were centered prior to conducting the

analyses. We began by conducting a series of multiple regressions to

determine the relationships between our manipulations and each of the

dependent variables (empathic embarrassment, mimicry, and perspective-

taking). We then tested for simple and multiple mediation, using the non-

parametric bootstrapping procedure recommended by Preacher and Hayes

(2008). This test estimates the sampling distribution of indirect effects, and

avoids the assumption that such effects are normally distributed. We used

5000 bootstrap resamples to describe the confidence intervals (CIs) of

indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). To compensate for the loss of

statistical power that accompanies using this number of resamples with a

relatively small sample size, we set the CIs at 90%, indicating one-tailed tests

of mediation (Hayes, personal communication). Significant mediation is

demonstrated when the CI values do not bridge zero (i.e., the upper and

lower CIs have the same valence).


129

An initial regression with the predictors display, experience, and their

interaction showed that empathic embarrassment was predicted by the

interaction between the manipulations (B = .36, SE = .13, p = .008),

replicating the results of the ANOVA. There were no significant effects of

display (B = .17, SE = .13, p = .21) or experience (B = -.06, SE = .13, p

= .67). Also in line with the previous ANOVA, perspective-taking was

predicted by the two-way interaction (B = .40, SE = .12, p = .001). A main

effect of display also existed (B = .34, SE = .12, p = .006), indicating that

seeing embarrassment displays enhanced perspective-taking. There was no

main effect of experience (B = -.11, SE = .12, p = .38). Finally nonverbal

mimicry was predicted by the display manipulation (B = .66, SE = .26, p

= .01), but the main effect of experience (B = -.006, SE = .26, p = .98) and

the interaction (B = -.15, SE = .26, p = .55) were not significant.

Simple Mediation

Perspective-taking. As both empathic embarrassment and

perspective-taking were predicted by a Display x Experience interaction, we

used the bootstrap resampling procedure (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to

examine whether the interaction effect upon empathic embarrassment was

mediated by participants' reported perspective-taking. The main effects of

display and experience upon the mediating and dependent variables were

controlled for in these analyses. When considering the effects of both

perspective-taking and the interaction upon empathic embarrassment, the

direct effect of perspective-taking was significant (B = .28, SE = .12, p = .02),

and the aforementioned effect of the interaction was reduced (B = .24, SE

= .14, p < .08). As can be seen in Table 3, the CIs for perspective-taking did

not bridge zero, indicating that indirect effects of the interaction upon

empathic embarrassment occurred through perspective-taking (i.e.,

significant mediation).

Nonverbal mimicry. As shown by both the ANOVAs and the initial

regressions, participants' behavioral mimicry was predicted only by the

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manipulation of displays, but empathic embarrassment was predicted only by

a Display x Experience interaction (with no significant main effect of display).

It is still conceivable, however, that the display manipulation exerted indirect

effects upon empathic embarrassment through nonverbal mimicry (Hayes, in

press). To test for this possibility, we used the bootstrapping procedure to

investigate whether display exerted indirect effects upon empathic

embarrassment through nonverbal mimicry. The effects of the experience

manipulation and the Display x Experience interaction were controlled for in

this test. When considering the effects of both nonverbal mimicry and the

display manipulation upon empathic embarrassment, the direct effect of

mimicry showed a trend toward significance (B = .10, SE = .06, p < .08), and

the aforementioned (nonsignificant) effect of display was further reduced (B

= .10, SE = .13, p = .46). As shown in Table 3, the CIs for the simple

mediation test of mimicry did not bridge zero. Thus, the display manipulation

appeared to exert significant indirect effects on empathic embarrassment,

through nonverbal mimicry.

Multiple Mediation

Given that the display manipulation directly affected both perspective-

taking and nonverbal mimicry, we further explored whether embarrassment

displays exerted indirect effects upon empathic embarrassment through both

mediators, simultaneously. We used the non-parametric bootstrapping

procedure for multiple mediation, again controlling for the experience

manipulation and the Display x Experience interaction. When considering the

simultaneous effects of all three predictors (perspective-taking, mimicry, and

the display manipulation) upon empathic embarrassment, there were

significant direct effects of both perspective-taking (B = .29, SE = .12, p

= .02) and mimicry (B = .11, SE = .05, p = .05), and the previous

(nonsignificant) effect of display was further reduced (B = -.002, SE = .14, p

= .99). The results further indicated that embarrassment displays exerted

significant indirect effects upon empathic embarrassment through both


131

mediators, as neither of the mediators' confidence interval ranges included

zero (see Table 3). The contrast between the two putative mediators was not

significant (the CI crossed the zero boundary), indicating an equivalent

magnitude of these two indirect effects.

Table 3. Simple and Multiple Mediation of the Indirect Effects of Emotional Display and Prior Experience on Empathic Embarrassment through Perspective-Taking and Nonverbal Mimicry BCa 90% CI Point estimate Lower Upper Simple indirect effects

Behavioral mimicry .068 .007 .1773 Perspective-taking .109 .04 .219

Multiple indirect effects Nonverbal mimicry .074 .012 .180 Perspective-taking .097 .031 .211 Total .171 .076 .305 Contrast: Perspective-taking vs. Mimicry

.023 -.094 .151

Note. Based on n = 84; 5,000 bootstrap samples. Bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapping confidence intervals are adjusted for median bias and skew. All tests of mediation are one-tailed. Confidence intervals bridging zero are interpreted as not significant.

Discussion

Study 2 addressed our prediction that nonverbal expressions of

embarrassment would exert dual effects upon observers' empathic emotions.

First, we expected the presence of these displays to exert influences through

nonverbal mimicry. Second, we also predicted that witnessing such behaviors

would heighten empathy via participants' affective perspective-taking,

especially when they had prior experience with the target's embarrassing

circumstances. These predictions were supported by our data.

The results showed that the confederate's nonverbal embarrassment

displays prompted observers to enact these behaviors more frequently,

themselves, and this effect was not additionally heightened by the prior

experience manipulation. Further, although there were no direct effects of

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emotion displays upon empathic embarrassment (cf. Hess et al., 1998; Van

der Gaag et al., 2007), both the simple and multiple meditation analyses

demonstrated that embarrassment expressions did indeed exert indirect

effects via nonverbal mimicry. This finding suggests that such mimicry can

occur automatically, especially in absence of overt motivations to inhibit or

enhance mirroring behaviors (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001), but also that

it plays a more minor, supporting role in fostering empathic emotions than

would be suggested by primitive contagion theories (e.g., Hatfield et al.,

1992, 1994, 2008).

Also as predicted, the embarrassed confederate prompted stronger

perspective-taking in observers. This is consistent with the notion that

embarrassment displays can activate introspective simulations of an emotion

that prompt the experience of concordant feelings. It also supports prior work

demonstrating that displays of embarrassment serve the specific social

function of promoting affiliation with a target (Keltner & Buswell, 1997;

Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Semin & Manstead, 1982). As expected, this effect

was somewhat stronger when observers had earlier performed the

confederate's task. Participants confronted with an embarrassed confederate

reported both stronger perspective-taking and stronger empathic

embarrassment when they had prior experience with the confederate's

situation, as opposed to a different but equally embarrassing task. Prior

experience with a target's exact situation thus had effects that extended

beyond mere experience with the emotion, more generally (cf. Batson et al.,

1996; Shearn et al., 1999). Apparently, we are likely to feel the sting of

another's expressed emotion more intensely when we are familiar with the

particular details of a situation, and the specific ways that the other may be

affected, as this first-hand knowledge allows for a richer simulation of the

emotional experience (Barsalou et al., 2003; Niedenthal, 2007; Preston & De

Waal, 2002). These enhancing effects of prior experience parallel those in


133

earlier studies in which targets' expressions of distress were held constant

(e.g., Batson et al., 1996).

This insight into the other's circumstance, however, was also

responsible for a decrease in perspective-taking and empathy when observers

with prior experience saw an unembarrassed target perform an embarrassing

act. In comparison, even participants who saw no displays, but also had no

first-hand frame of reference, were able to engage in more perspective-taking

and subsequently experience stronger empathic embarrassment. Although

this result was unexpected, it has intuitive appeal. Individuals who have

embarrassed themselves by delivering a particularly poor classroom

presentation, for example, may have difficulty understanding another person

who gives an equally disastrous talk, but doesn't seem at all bothered. In

such a situation, embarrassment expressions likely signal not only an

awareness of poor performance, but also recognition that the situation and

others' evaluations are important. In contrast, an absence of embarrassment-

related behavior may communicate indifference, and perhaps even signal that

empathy is unnecessary or undesired. Thus, having experienced another

person's situation might not lead to a de facto increase in perspective-taking

or empathic emotion, and may even minimize such responses if the emotion-

eliciting aspects of the situation are not confirmed by a target's own

behaviors.

Finally, perspective-taking directly mediated the effects of our

manipulations upon empathic embarrassment. Additionally, it appeared to be

a pathway through which embarrassment displays exerted indirect effects.

These results are largely consistent with the results of Study 1. Conscious,

introspective simulations of an emotion, once initiated deliberately or

spontaneously, offer a route to empathizing with another's feelings or

emotional circumstances, even in the absence of a target's overt emotional

expressions. Combined with the aforementioned findings on nonverbal

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mimicry, these results demonstrate the dual influence of emotion displays

upon empathic responses.

General Discussion

The capacity for individuals to experience empathy in a variety of

circumstances is an indispensable component of social functioning, but cues

to another's distress are typically not the same from one situation to the next.

Several kinds of internal and external cues can likely instigate empathic

responding (Barsalou et al., 2003; Hoffman, 1984, 2008; Niedenthal, 2007),

but the extent to which these cues simultaneously activate different processes

has remained a relatively unexplored issue until quite recently. We focused

upon two embodied processes, namely mimicry of a target's emotion

expressions and observers' affective perspective-taking, which may be

differentially responsible for empathic emotions depending on the presence or

absence of emotion signals from a target. Our results help to clarify the roles

of these processes in fostering the specific reaction of empathic

embarrassment.

As predicted in Study 1, perspective-taking instructions increased

empathic embarrassment regardless of whether embarrassment displays were

present or absent. The results of Study 2 additionally showed that

perspective-taking mediated the interactive effects of target's emotional

displays and participant's prior experience on empathic embarrassment.

These findings thus contribute to the existing empathy literature by

suggesting that conscious simulations of introspective states, either when

initiated purposefully (Study 1) or when prompted more reflexively by

witnessing another's expressive displays (Study 2), can foster empathic

emotions.

Our research also demonstrated the potential for displays of emotion

to influence multiple processes leading to empathy. In Study 1, we showed

that embarrassment signals influenced the empathy of observers instructed to


135

provide objective assessments of the confederate's feelings. In Study 2, we

further showed that embarrassment expressions led observers to

spontaneously engage in both in nonverbal mimicry and increased

perspective-taking. Emotion expressions can thus influence empathy not only

through the mimicry-mediated routes typically examined in emotional

contagion studies, but also by activating more direct simulations of

introspective states (cf. Barsalou et al., 2003). This supports earlier

suggestions (e.g., Batson et al., 1996; Hoffman, 1984, 2008) that witnessing

emotion displays can prompt observers to reflect upon the situation as if they

were the target, and also that displays of embarrassment function to increase

bonding and identification with the expresser (e.g., Keltner & Buswell, 1997).

Participants' prior experience further informed this link, enhancing both

perspective-taking and related empathy when displays were present, and

decreasing such effects when the target showed no signs of embarrassment.

These results underscore the utility of examining perspective-taking as a

process variable, rather than manipulating such activity directly though

explicit instructions. Our findings also highlight the importance of considering

the external and internal cues salient to observers when studying the

potential effects of perspective-taking upon empathy.

Emotion displays affected participants' enactment of related motor

behaviors (Keltner, 1995), but these mimicked actions did not map directly

onto participants' conscious experience of concordant emotion. Instead, the

effects exerted through this route were rather subtle and indirect, suggesting

that motor mimicry may be a more automatic and unconscious process than

is an observer's assessment of their own emotional reactions (cf. Eisenberg et

al., 1991; Hoffman, 1984, 2008; McHugo, Lanzetta, Sullivan, Masters, &

Englis, 1985). This finding also suggests that, at best, mimicry of the target

played a facilitating or supporting role in the subjective feelings of empathic

embarrassment (supporting the embodiment perspective), but was not

directly responsible for conscious experiences of concordant feelings (in

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opposition to the primitive contagion view). This research, however, is the

first to demonstrate mimicry of embarrassment displays and related effects

upon empathic embarrassment. The findings additionally highlight the utility

of statistical bootstrapping procedures for uncovering indirect effects that are

difficult to isolate through more traditional forms of mediation testing (cf.

Baron & Kenny, 1986).

Strengths and Limitations

The present research had a number of methodological strengths,

compared to earlier investigations of empathic embarrassment, as well as

certain limitations. First, our direct manipulation of embarrassment displays,

when combined with a standard perspective-taking manipulation in Study 1,

allowed us to confirm that perspective-taking can enhance empathic emotions

even in the absence of emotional signals from a target. On the other hand, it

is perhaps unclear what was actually inferred from the unembarrassed

confederate's behavior. Interestingly, participants who viewed this version of

the tape still perceived moderate embarrassment in both studies. In these

conditions, participants' impressions may have been more swayed by

situational cues (cf. Marcus et al., 1996). Study 1 participants in the objective

condition also reported moderate amounts of perspective-taking. Some

amount of perspective-taking may therefore be a reflexive response to

encountering a potentially emotion-eliciting context (Hoffman, 2008; Ruby &

Decety, 2004), and this may have colored observers' interpretations of the

target's feelings. Extending the present study to include unambiguous

expressions of other emotions (e.g., amusement), in addition to a "neutral"

condition, may contribute to further understanding of this issue.

Another innovation concerned our treatment of perspective-taking as

a process variable in Study 2, as opposed to an experimental manipulation,

and the creation of an associated self-report measure. This approach allowed

us to test the notion that perspective-taking can exert direct influences on

observers' empathic emotions, and also to shed additional light on the factors


137

that can heighten such activity. On the other hand, the concomitant collection

of empathic embarrassment and perspective-taking self-reports – which

yielded correlational data – makes it difficult to certify that the process

occurred in this sequence. Alternatively, the manipulations could have initially

affected observers' emotions through conditioning or direct association

processes (Hoffman, 1984, 2008; Shearn et al., 1999), which then resulted in

the sense of being in the other's place (cf. Eisenberg et al., 1991; Hoffman,

1984, 2008). Indeed, many have acknowledged that this is likely a dynamic

process that carries the potential for bidirectional influences (e.g., Eisenberg

et al., 1991; Hoffman, 2002; Preston & De Waal, 2002), and that several

modes of empathic arousal are capable of operating simultaneously (Hoffman,

1984, 2008).

In a similar vein, while Study 2 extended prior research on mimicry-

mediated emotional contagion by investigating the novel emotion of

embarrassment, participants' mimicry behaviors and their self-reported

emotions should also be regarded as correlational data. Consequently, some

of the behaviors interpreted as mimicry in our study may instead have

actually been symptoms of observers' own emotional reactions (e.g. Van der

Gaag et al., 2007). The observed disconnects between participants' behaviors

and their self-reported emotions would seem to speak against such an

interpretation, however. Otherwise, we may have also expected behavioral

differences between the two no-display conditions that mirrored self-reported

emotion, and we did not find such effects. Nevertheless, future studies might

address this issue further by overtly manipulating mimicry and/or bodily

feedback.

Directions for Future Research

While the relative differences between experimental conditions in our

studies are indicative of the multiple processes that can foster empathic

emotion, the fairly modest scores of self-reported empathic embarrassment

that we obtained suggest that additional factors, not studied here, may

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intensify such an experience. For example, it would be interesting to

incorporate live performances by a confederate, or to manipulate prior

interaction history between a live confederate and participants. Both of these

factors likely have the potential to heighten empathic embarrassment (cf.

Miller, 1987; Preston & De Waal, 2002).

Additionally, while we focused on embarrassment that can be caused

when one is the center of attention while doing something foolish (e.g.,

Apsler, 1975; Sabini et al., 2000), it is clear that there are other types of

social misfires that can foster personal embarrassment, such as committing a

social faux pas, or "sticky situations" that strongly challenge one's

conventional roles (Sabini et al., 2000). It would be useful for future research

to examine whether the two processes examined here equally account for

empathic embarrassment to these other types of situations.

Finally, many studies explicitly examining empathy have focused on

emotional reactions such as sympathy, concern, and personal distress (e.g.,

Batson et al., 1997; Batson et al., 1996; Lamm et al., 2007; Van Kleef et al.,

2008), but less often on discrete and convergent emotional responses. We

chose to examine empathic embarrassment in this research, because it is one

of the few discrete emotions for which both intra-observer perspective-taking

and targets' displays of emotion have been considered in prior studies,

although typically with quite different methodological and analytical

approaches (e.g., Marcus & Miller, 1999; Marcus et al., 1996). We can

imagine a wide range of situations and emotions for which the processes we

have demonstrated here could exert similar influences. Additional research

should continue to focus on the discrete emotions communicated by targets

and evoked in observers, however, as particular expressions likely

communicate different social messages about targets' intentions and

relational orientations towards observers (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Keltner

& Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef, 2009). It is therefore important to examine

whether our findings generalize to other types of emotions and associated


139

eliciting events. Incorporating a social-functional account of emotions in this

manner can likely shed further light on the multiple processes resulting in

empathic emotions.

Conclusion

The idea that empathic emotions can be instigated by several kinds of

social and emotional cues has enjoyed a long history, yet empirical tests of

this notion, and the kinds of processes that different cues can instigate, have

remained elusive. We have attempted to inform debates on this issue by

demonstrating how different sources of information affect specific routes to

empathy. Perspective-taking does indeed appear to be an independent

avenue to empathy, in that it can boost emotional responding both in the

presence or absence of another's salient emotional signals. Spontaneous

forms of this process, however, appear to be somewhat more contingent upon

both the presence of targets' expressive behaviors and observers' own prior

experiences. We have also shown in this research that expressive displays,

when present, appear capable of activating different components of emotion

experience, including expressive and introspective simulations that ultimately

contribute to the experience of empathic emotions. Generally, the studies

presented here demonstrate that the availability of particular internal and

external cues can activate multiple pathways to empathic embarrassment,

and both "taking a target's place" and "matching her face" can contribute to

these concordant emotions.

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