v2x security credential management system (scms) proof-of...
TRANSCRIPT
1 October 2015
V2X Security Credential Management System (SCMS)
Proof-of-Concept Implementation
funded by US DOT/NHTSA
Benedikt Brecht, CAMP Principal Investigator, VWGoA
2 October 2015
CAMP Partners
Project funded by Supported by
3 October 2015
What is V2X?
Photo Source: U.S. DOT
4 October 2015 4
Remote Vehicles sends position and
speed
Do Not Pass Warning
Photo Source: Continental
5 October 2015 5
Remote Vehicles sends position and
speed
Left Turn Assist
Photo Source: Cadillac
6 October 2015
Traffic Light Assistant
Traffic light sends current state and time
to next state
Dept: VWGoA Safety
Affairs
Photo Source: Audi/jalopnik.com
7 October 2015
V2X Public Perception, Market and
Mandate Activities
GM announced V2V for the 2017 Cadillac CTS
“We’re doing it because it’s what customers around the
world want. Through technology and innovation, we will
make driving safer.”
USDOT Secretary - Anthony Foxx
“The Department wants to speed the nation toward an
era when vehicle safety isn’t just about surviving
crashes. It’s about avoiding them”
MIT Technology Review
Announced V2X communication as one of the 10
breakthrough technologies 2015.
http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/534981/
car-to-car-communication
8 October 2015
Establish Trust
Photo Source: Shutterstock
9 October 2015
Ensure Privacy
Photo Source: Independent.co.uk
10 October 2015
Photo Source: moviepilot.com
Avoid Intrusion
11 October 2015
Initialization
Device receives keys and information to establish trusted connections to SCMS components
Photo Source: Wikimedia Commons
12 October 2015
Enrollment
Device receives long-term certificate to use in interaction with SCMS components
Photo Source: depositphotos.com
13 October 2015
Pseudonym Certificates Short-term certificates to use in interactions with other devices
Photo Source: REUTERS/Ricardo Moraes
14 October 2015
Misbehavior Detection Device detects misbehavior and might report to MA or MA detects
misbehavior on a global level
Photo Source: Liudmila P. Sundikova
15 October 2015
Penalty / device revocation Device should no longer be trusted - MA revokes certificates and informs devices and SCMS components
Photo Source: Andy Devlin/NHLI via Getty Images
16 October 2015
Certification Lab
Linkage Authority 1
Linkage Authority 2
Location Obscurer Proxy
Root CA
CRL Store
Policy Technical
SCMS ManagerSCMS Manager
Device 1 Device 2 Device 3Device 3
Device Config. Manager
CRL Broadcast
Intermediate CA
Legend
Regular communication
Out-of-band communication
Not Intrinsically Central
Intrinsically Central
Enrollment CA
Pseudonym CA
Internal Blacklist Manager
GlobalDetection
CRLGenerator
Misbehaviour Authority
RegistrationAuthority
SCMS Architecture
17 October 2015
A Security Credential Management System (SCMS) for
Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communications
William Whyte (CAMP VSC5)
18 October 2015
Motivation
• V2V system can alert the driver (thus help prevent crashes) by issuing different safety warnings, e.g.:
• Forward Collision Warning (FCW)
• Intersection Movement Assist (IMA)
• Electronic Emergency Brake Light (EEBL)
• Messages include information on current position, velocity, etc.
• Messages received over the air: integrity and authentication required
• CAMP VSC5 Choice:
• Unencrypted messages with signature based on asymmetric cryptography (ECDSA-256)
• Certificates (incl. public key) issued by a Public-Key-Infrastructure (PKI)
19 October 2015
Contradicting requirements
• Privacy (OEM privacy goals)
• Prevent SCMS from collecting Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
• Prevent trip tracking by outsiders: frequent change in pseudonym certificates
• Prevent trip tracking by SCMS insiders: separation of duties and information such that trip tracking is only possible by a collusion of several SCMS components
• Trustworthy messages • Incoming messages must be verifiable
• Misbehaving units need to be removed
20 October 2015
• Privacy from attacks by an SCMS insider
• Introduce extra SCMS components, e.g. 2nd LA, LOP, etc.
• Don’t link certificates to VIN
• Separate operation of SCMS components:
Two or more components should not be run by the same
organization without “proper” separation
if
the combined information held by the components would allow the
organization to track* a vehicle
*predict next pseudonym certificate based on current one or find
out whether two certificates belong to the same device
Privacy by Design: OEM Perspective
21 October 2015
Basic Overview
To Enrollment
Certificate
Authority:
Prove Eligibility
Receive
ONE enrollment
certificate
Certificate
Provisioning
Participate
in V2V Enrollment
To Registration
Authority: Show
Enrollment Cert
Receive SET of
pseudonym
certificates
Current Assumptions on pseudonym certificates:
• 3120 pseudonym certificates
• 20 valid per week
• Frequent change of pseudonym certificate (e.g. every 5
minutes)
22 October 2015
SCMS Design
Certification Lab
Enrollment CA
Pseudonym CA
Linkage Authority 1
Linkage Authority 2
Registration Authority
Location Obscurer Proxy
Root CA
Misbehavior Authority
CRL Store
Internal Blacklist Manager
CRL Generator
Global Detection
Policy Technical
SCMS Manager
Device 1 Device 2 Device 3Device 3
Device Config. Manager
Legend
Regular communication
Out-of-band communication
Not Intrinsically Central
Intrinsically Central
CRL Broadcast
Intermediate CA
23 October 2015
Certificate Update
Certification Lab
Enrollment CA
Pseudonym CA
Linkage Authority 1
Linkage Authority 2
Registration Authority
Location Obscurer Proxy
Root CA
Misbehavior Authority
CRL Store
Internal Blacklist Manager
CRL Generator
Global Detection
Policy Technical
SCMS Manager
Device 1 Device 2 Device 3Device 3
Device Config. Manager
Legend
Provides information before execution
Directly acts in this use case
CRL Broadcast
Intermediate CA
24 October 2015
Misbehavior Reporting
Certification Lab
Enrollment CA
Pseudonym CA
Linkage Authority 1
Linkage Authority 2
Registration Authority
Location Obscurer Proxy
Root CA
Misbehavior Authority
CRL Store
Internal Blacklist Manager
CRL Generator
Global Detection
Policy Technical
SCMS Manager
Device 1 Device 2 Device 3Device 3
Device Config. Manager
Legend
Provides information before execution
Directly acts in this use case
CRL Broadcast
Intermediate CA
25 October 2015
Revocation
Certification Lab
Enrollment CA
Pseudonym CA
Linkage Authority 1
Linkage Authority 2
Registration Authority
Location Obscurer Proxy
Root CA
Misbehavior Authority
CRL Store
Internal Blacklist Manager
CRL Generator
Global Detection
Policy Technical
SCMS Manager
Device 1 Device 2 Device 3Device 3
Device Config. Manager
Legend
Provides information before execution
Directly acts in this use case
CRL Broadcast
Intermediate CA
26 October 2015
New SCMS Features
• Certificate Top-Up
• Device can top up certificates at any time
• Certificates are pre-generated at the RA (e.g. on a
week-by-week basis)
• Group Revocation
• Very efficient method of revoking multiple devices if
needed
• Optional Feature
27 October 2015
New SCMS Features
• Preliminary assessment of V2I applicability
• Certificate types
• OBE Enrollment certificate (V2V): enrollment certificate provided to OBE during bootstrap that OBE then uses to request application certificates
• OBE Pseudonym certificate (V2V): Pseudonym certificates for BSM authentication
• OBE Authorization certificate (V2I): e.g. for signal priority applications
• RSE Enrollment certificate (V2I): enrollment certificate provided to RSE during bootstrap that RSE then uses to request application certificates
• RSE Encryption and Authentication certificate (V2I): authenticated broadcast messages, confidential communication between OBE and RSE.
28 October 2015
Future Plans regarding SCMS Implementation
• Project ongoing to implement an SCMS that
supports anticipated year-one certificate requests
• All components except for Misbehavior Authority will be
implemented in this phase
• Misbehavior Authority will be implemented in a
subsequent phase
• Focus on Interface and Load Testing
29 October 2015
Thank you