Valhalla’sWarriorsAHistoryoftheWaffen-SSontheEasternFront1941-1945.

ForMandyandHayley

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Preface

ThisbookisanexplorationoftheWaffen-SS,andbynecessityofevil.TheWaffen-SSarecommonlyregardedastheeliteofGermany’sarmedforcesduringWorldWarII.TheygainedmuchofthisreputationwhilstfightingontheEasternFrontinRussia.Germany’swaragainsttheSovietUnioninWorldWarII,inparticulartheroleoftheWaffen-SSformsmuchofthesubjectmatterofthisbook.

Thedeathanddestructionduringthisconflictwouldresultnotjustfrommilitaryoperations,butalsofromthesystematickillingandabusethattheWaffen-SSdirectedagainstJews,Communistsandordinarycitizens.Thisbookprovidesaclear,concisehistoryoftheWaffen-SScampaignofconquestandgenocideinRussiabylookingattheactionsbothonandbehindthefrontlines.BydrawingonthebestofmilitaryandHolocaustscholarship,thisbookdispelsthemythsthathavedistortedtheroleoftheWaffen-SS,inboththemilitaryoperationsthemselvesandtheunthinkablecrimesthatwerepartofthem.

TheconventionalwisdomthattheWaffen-SSinWorldWarIIfoughtarelativelycleanfight,unsulliedbytheatrocitiescommittedbytheNazis,ischallenged—andlargelydemolished.FocusingontheEasternFront,thebookcontendsthattheNazivisionofaracial-ideologicaldeathstruggleagainstSlavichordesandtheirJewish-BolshevikcommissarsresonatedwithsoldiersoftheWaffen-SS,steepedintraditionalanti-Semiticandracistdogmas.IndoingsothisbookclearlyshowsthattheWaffen-SSwasanorganisationthatcommittedwidespreadatrocities,andweretrulysoldiersofevil.

Contents:

Preface……………………………………..iiiContents:…………………………………….vListofTables:………………………………..viIntroduction………………………………….11.TheoriginsandideologyoftheWaffen-SS………….112.ThestructureoftheWaffen-SS………………….413.CombatoperationsoftheWaffen-SS………………574.Anti-partisanandEinsatzgruppenoperations………..805.TheConcentration-Camps…………………….1206.TheWaffen-SSasacriminalorganisation………….1457.AnexaminationofWaffen-SSactions…………….163Conclusion:…………………………………214GlossaryofTerms:……………………………221viValhalla’sWarriorsDramatisPersonae:……………………………223Appendix1:Waffen-SSRankStructure……………..238Appendix2:FeaturesofWaffen-SSOfficers………….239Appendix3:OrderofBattleoftheWaffen-SS………..241Appendix4:StrengthoftheWaffen-SS……………..246Sources:…………………………………..247Endnotes:………………………………….269

ListofTables:

Diagrams,illustrationsortablesTableofNSADPmembershipofseniorWaffen-SScommanders………………………32TrainingcurriculumoftheWaffen-SS.………………44TableshowingtheracialmakeupoftheWaffen-SS.……..54TablerepresentingthepersonnelmakeupofEinsatzgruppenA………………………….114TableshowingtheWaffen-SSofficersintheEinsatzgruppen..116TableshowingofficersoftheWaffen-SSwhohadservedinthecampsystem…………………………132

Introduction

WhytheWaffen-SS?

MyinterestintheWaffen-SS1wasfirstsparkedwhenIreadashorthistoryoftheTotenkopfDivisionmanyyearsago.Itstruckmethatherewasamagnificentfightingforce,yetatthebackofthisimagesomethingdarkerlurked.ThespectreoftheatrocitiesapportionedtotheWaffen-SSreareditsheadandservedtointriguemeastotherealstorybehindtheWaffen-SS.Tothisendadisturbingquestionarose.WeretheWaffen-SSjustsimplesoldiersdoingtheirdutyordidtheycommitsomeofthemostevilactsinrecenthistory?ItisenvisagedthatthisbookwillfillalargevoidinrelationtoexaminationsoftheWaffen-SSandtheperceptionofthisorganisationfromacriminologicalandhistoricalperspective.Thisexaminationisimportantforanumberofreasons.FirsttheanalysisoftheWaffen-SSallowsclosescrutinyofgrossorganisationalbehaviourwithinhistoricalframeworks.SecondtheexaminationoftheWaffen-SSbecomesevenmorepertinentwhenoneconsidersthattherehasbeennomeaningfulandobjectivediscussionofthecriminalactivitiesoftheWaffen-SS.Thestudyofthismilitaryformationallowsacloseexaminationofsituational,dispositionalandinteractionalfactorsthathelpedtopromotethegrowthandoccurrenceofevilinthecontextofthegenocidalbarbarityoftheEasternFront.FromthisunderstandingIhopetobeabletodrawanaccuratepictureandreachadefendableanalysisastotheactionsoftheWaffen-SS.

SinceStein’s(1966)2seminalexaminationtherehavebesomeanalysesofthecrimesofindividualunitsaswellasamajorworkbyTheile(1997)indefenceoftheWaffen-SS.TheWaffen-SShasalsobeenexaminedbyanumberofauthorswithitsformationandstructurebeingthemainfocus.However,thefewstudiesavailableontheWaffen-SSpointtoahighfrequencyofcrimesbeingcommittedbythiseliteforceduringtheconflictontheEasternFront(Christensen,Smith,&Poulsen,2003:9).ThepurposeofthisbookistodrawuponthesestudiesandothersourcestoexploretheWaffen-SSwithintheframeworkofthecriminalliabilityforactionsundertakenontheEasternFront.Wegnernotesthat:

IfonesurveystheliteratureonthehistoryoftheSSandtheWaffen-SS,itbecomesobvioushowimmensethediscrepancyisbetweentheveritableavalancheoftitlesandthequitemodestyieldofcredibleandscholarlyinsights.Thereasonforthisdiscrepancyisclear;morethanagenerationafterthecollapseoftheThirdReich,theSSasahistoricalphenomenonhasexercisedapowerfulemotionalattraction.Atthesametimeitdemandsthatwecometotermswithitmorally,andbothofthesefactorsaretheleitmotivsofpublicdiscussion.(Wegner,1990:1)

ThisabsenceofrealdiscussioninrelationtothecrimesandcriminalityoftheWaffen-SShasallowedproponentsbothforandagainsttheWaffen-SStocreatevariousmythsaboutwhoandwhattheWaffen-SSactuallywere.

TheWaffen-SSpossessesasurprisinglywidecultfollowingamongmilitarybuffs.ThestatusofamilitaryelitewithintheGermanarmedforces…theimpressivecombatrecordandauraoftoughnessthatsurroundedtheforce:allholdenormousfascinationformodellersandcollectorsalike,asthehugevolumeofpost-warphotographicand

illustratedmaterialrelatingtotheWaffen-SSattests.(Mackenzie,1997:135)

ItisforthisreasonthattheWaffen-SSisoneofthemostfrequentlydiscussedandpersistentlycontroversialsubjectsofthatera.Indeedthe“…SSposessociologicalandpsychologicalquestionstopoliticalsciencethatgofarbeyondthestillexistingneedtofurnishdocumentaryproofforthefunctionsassignedtocertainformationsoftheSS”(Paetel,1959:34).Oneofthemostpressingsocialandpsychologicalquestionsisthe“…extraordinarypowertoaccomplishpureevilthathelpstomaketheSSanendlesslyfascinatingsubjecttostudy”(Kren&Rappoport,1976:87).

SincethecloseofWorldWarIItheveteransoftheWaffen-SShavebeenactivelyinvolvedinthedenialofitsinvolvementinandresponsibilityforatrocitiesonthebasisthatitsmembersweresimplesoldierswithnolinkstotheterribleactionsthattookplaceonandbehindthefrontlines.Thisbookwillargueotherwise.ThroughoutthisbookIwillusethetermWaffen-SSapologists.ThisisaloosegroupingofproponentssupportiveofapositiveimagefortheWaffen-SS.BythistermIamreferringtothoseorganisations,veteransandwriterswhohavedeterminedlyundertakeneffortstorehabilitatetheimageoftheWaffen-SSandseparateitfromtheSSorganisationasawhole,andthecrimescommittedbysuch.Themotivationsoftheseapologistsaremanyandvaried,butthemostcommonunderlyingthemewouldseemtobethatthemilitaryachievementsoftheWaffen-SSfaroutweighanycrimescommittedbysuch,andthereforeanyelementsthatmaytarnishthefightingreputationoftheWaffen-SSshouldbediscountedorignored.ItisnotthatthisbookisseekingtoshowthatthecrimescommittedbytheWaffen-SSwereanymoreorlessevilincomparisontoothermilitaryformationsduringorsinceWorldWarII.AspointedoutbyKnopptheWaffen-SSwere“…notuniqueintheirbrutalbehaviour,andthedifferencebetweentheWehrmacht3andtheWaffen-SSwasbynomeansasgreatashasbeenclaimed”(Knopp,2002:xiii).

TheroleoftheWaffen-SSontheEasternFrontwassomethingakintoaholycrusade;itspurposewastodestroythosegroupswhowereabhorrenttotheidealsoftheNaziParty.TheseincludedSlavs,JewsandBolsheviks.DuringtheconflicttheWaffen-SSweretoprovethemselvestobeexcellentsoldiersandtheybecameknownastheFuhrer’sfirebrigade,withtheresultthatWaffen-SSunitswererushedwhereverthefightingwasfiercest.InhisextensiveworkonthewarasaglobalconflictWeinberg(1994:458)describestheWaffen-SSontheEasternfrontasfollows;“…thearmedformationsoftheSS.Fanaticalinspirit,favouredovertheregulararmyindeliveryofweapons,andnotalwaysparticularlyobedient,thesecontingentswereintheprocessofbecomingakindoffirebrigadefromcriticalpointsonthefront”.Butthisgroupwasalsoemployedinotherroles.Infact,clearlinkscanbedrawnbetweentheWaffen-SS,theconcentrationcampsystemandtheEinsatzgruppen4.

ThismilitaryformationwaspeculiarinthatitwasintegratedintotheoverallsystemofviolencethatwastheSSandassuchdidnotpossesstheprofessionalautonomyofthearmy.Forthisreasonitcannotbeseenasapuremilitaryforce,ratherithadallthehallmarksofbeingapoliticaltooloftheNaziregime.WhenItalybegantowithdrawfromthewarafterthefallofMussolini,Waffen-SSunitswererushedtoItalydespitethefacttheyweredesperatelyneededontheEasternFront.Foremostamongthembeingthe1stWaffen-SSPanzerDivisionLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler.ThereasoninggivenbyHitler

tohisgeneralsatamilitaryconferenceonthe26thJuly1943wasasfollows:

…Ihavetotakeunitsthatarepoliticallyreliable…InItalyIcanonlyaccomplishsomethingwithcrackformationsthatarepoliticallyclosewithfascism.Ifitweren’tforthatIcouldtakeacoupleofarmydivisions.Butasitis,Ineedamagnettogatherthepeopletogether…Imusthaveunitsthatcomeunderapoliticalbanner(Gilbert,1950:106-109).

ThesepoliticalaspectsareimportantastheyprovideabackgroundagainstwhichtheactionsoftheWaffen-SScanbeexaminedtodeterminetheperceivedliabilityfortheiractions.InordertoexaminetheWaffen-SSitisnecessarytolimitthescopeoftheinvestigationtothespecificactionsoftheWaffen-SSintheEast.Thisisduetotheenormityoftheconflictitselfandtheneedtoexamineadefinedandspecificgroupforthepurposeofthisbook.Toexaminemoreissimplybeyondthescopeofthisbook.TheEasternFront,inparticulartheactionsoftheWaffen-SS,provideanexcellentcasestudyofthetotalwardoctrineandgenocidalactions.TheexaminationofthisselectedandlimitedsectionoftheGermanarmedforces(theWaffen-SS),allowsdevelopmentofamorecompletepictureofthefactorsthatcancausesoldierstocommitactsofevil.TocompletethisexaminationthenatureoftheconflictontheEasternFrontisstudiedtoplacetheactionsoftheWaffen-SSinanoverallcontext.LastlyspecificactionsoftheWaffen-SSareexaminedandanalysedinthelightofthepost-warWarCrimeTrials.

TheEasternFront–Anintroduction

TheformationoftheNaziPartyandit’sascensiontopowerundertheguidanceofit’sleader,AdolfHitler,wasaneventthatwouldbegintheGermanrevolutionandinamatterof12yearsbringtoanendwhatwasgoingtobethe1000-yearReich.WorldWarIIwasoneofthemostpivotaleventsofthe20thcentury.TheconflictontheEasternFrontwasseenasthemostimportantphenomenonoftheconflictanditspoliticalrepercussionslastedfordecadesafterthewarended.ButofevenmoreimportanceistheimpactthattheEasternFronthadonthecourseofthewaranditseventualoutcome.Itwasawarthatunleashedunparalleledgenocidalbarbarityandresultedinadeathtollinexcessof30millionpeople.IndeedithasbeenarguedthatevenbeforeitbeganHitlerinsisteditwastobeaVernichtungskrieg,orwarofannihilationunlikeanyotherinhistory.Inhisdirectivenumber21issuedonthe18thofDecember1940tothearmedforces,HitlermadeclearthattheaimofOperationBarbarossa5wastocrushSovietRussiainarapidcampaign.ItwasenvisagedthattheEastwouldseeadifferentkindofoccupationfromthetypeusedintheconqueredcountriesintheWest.TheoccupationpolicieswouldseethebrutalimpositionofGermaninterests.ItwaspartoftheplanthattheconqueredterritorywastoberesettledbyGermansandthecurrentpopulationusedasslavelabourwherepossible.

TheseedsforthisbarbaritystemmedfromHitler’sramblingviewoftheworld.Hispoliciessprungfromapoliticalideologythatmixedtheideasoflivingspace(lebensraum),racism,anti-Semitism,economicindependenceandthevisionofGermanybeingaworldpower.HitlerperceivedGermanyasanationwithoutspaceandsheneededtoconquerlandintheEasttoobtainlivingspaceandextensionofGermanresources.CertainlyHitlersawtheconflictinRussiaasbeingawarofabsoluteswithtwooutcomes,

eithervictoryorannihilation.HitlerinvadedRussiatocrushapoliticalandideologicalsystemthatwasabhorrenttotheNationalSocialistideals.FurtherheenvisagedaNazistylecolonialismthatwouldgainlivingspacefortheraciallysuperiorGermansandreducetheSlavslivinginRussiatothestatusofsubhumanswiththeresultthatinthemilitaryspheretoo,thebloodinessandbarbarityofthestruggleowedmuchtoitsideologicalcharacter.ThisviewoftheRussianasasubhumanisreflectedinthepost-warcommentsofWaffen-SSgeneralMaxSimon:

AllhaveingreaterorlesserdegreetheAsiaticcharacteristicsoffrugality,cunning,cruelty,hatredofforeignersandindifferencetodeath.Thefactthat,asAsiatics,theyhavelittleornowilloftheirown,indulgingonlyinmassthinking,butatthesametimecanfacemassdeath,facilitatedCommunisteducationanduniformity.(Simon,1953:4)

DuringoneofhisprivateconversationsinAugust1941HitleroutlinedhisthoughtsonthewayinwhichtheseGermancolonistswouldlive:TheGermancolonistoughttoliveonhandsome,spaciousfarms.TheGermanserviceswillbelodgedinmarvellousbuildings,thegovernorsinpalaces.Beneaththeshelteroftheadministrativeservices,weshallgraduallyorganiseallthatisindispensabletothemaintenanceofacertainstandardofliving.Aroundthecity,toadepthof30to40kilometres,weshallhaveabeltofhandsomevillagesconnectedbythebestroads.Whatexistsbeyondthatwillbeanotherworld,inwhichwemeantolettheRussiansliveastheylike.Itismerelynecessarythatweshouldrulethem.(Trevor-Roper,2000:24).

ThenatureoftheRusso-Germanconflictwasdistinctinthatnotonlywasitabattleofracialoriginsandideology,butitwasalsoseenasawarofeconomicsurvival.HitlerneededthelandofRussiaforthreemainreasons:livingspacefortheGermanpeople,foodtofeedtheGermanpeople,andresourcestodriveGermanindustry.WithouttheseGermany,inHitler’sview,wouldbeunabletoconductalengthyconflictandwouldbeatriskbothfromamilitaryandeconomicstandpoint.Hitlerwasdrivenbystrategicandideologicalmotives,whichresultedinhisperceivedneedtodestroytheraciallyinferiorSlavsandtaketheirlandwhileatthesametimedestroyingtheJewish-BolshevikthreattoGermany.TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal(IMT)recognisedthatthisconflictwastobeconductedinamannerconducivetocommittingwarcrimes.

…warcrimesweredeliberatelyplannedlonginadvance.InthecaseoftheSovietUnion,theplunderoftheterritoriestobeoccupied,andtheilltreatmentofthecivilianpopulation,weresettledinminutedetailbeforetheattackwasbegun.Asearlyastheautumnof1940,theinvasionoftheterritoriesoftheSovietUnionwasbeingconsidered.Fromthatdateonwards,themethodstobeemployedindestroyingallpossibleoppositionwerecontinuouslyunderdiscussion.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946Vol1:227)

DuringthetrialofthemajorwarcriminalsbytheIMTitwasheldthatGermanyhadconductedanaggressivewaragainstRussia.TheplansfortheeconomicexploitationoftheU.S.S.R.,fortheremovalofmassesofthepopulation,forthemurderofCommissarsandpoliticalleaders,wereallpartofthecarefullypreparedschemelaunchedonthe22ndJunewithoutwarningofanykind,andwithouttheshadowoflegalexcuse.Itwasplainaggression.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946Vol1:215)

HitlersawtheopportunityofaquickblowagainstRussiaasbeingimperativein1941,asonceRussiawasoutofthewaritwouldallowGermanytofocusonthestill-defiantBritain,andAmericashoulditdecidetoenterthewar.UponhisrisetopowerHitlerhadalwaysseenhisdestinyandthatoftheGermanReichbeingdecidedintheEast.Foritwastherethathesawhistrueenemy.Atdinneronthe17thofSeptember1941HitlercommentedonthestruggleintheEast:

ThestruggleforthehegemonyoftheworldwillbedecidedinfavourofEuropebypossessionoftheRussianspace…theessentialthing,forthemomentistoconquer.Afterthateverythingwillbesimplyaquestionoforganisation…TheSlavsareamassofbornslaveswhofeeltheneedofamaster.(Trevor-Roper,2000:33)

Therecentexhibition“TheGermanArmyandGenocide”bytheHamburgInstituteforSocialResearchprovidedclearevidencethat:ThewarintheEastwasnotsimplyaparticularlyruthless,ideologicallychargedwar,butitnowappearedasadestructivewaragainstentirepopulations–awarwhichaimedatthetotalannihilationofsomegroupsofpeopleandthedecimationandenslavementofothers.(Bartov,1999:7)

ForthepurposeofthisbooktheEasternFrontshallbedeemedtoincludefront-lineactionsandoccupiedareasthatweretotheEastoftheGermanReichborderspriortothebeginningtheWorldWarII.Thetimeperiodbeingtakenintoconsiderationisfromthe22ndofJune1941untilthetakingofBerlinbyRussianforcesinMay1945.FromapurelymilitarystandpointconflictonthescaleoftheEasternFronthadnotbeenseenpriortoorsinceWorldWarII.IndeedOperationBarbarossa,theinvasionofRussia,pittedthelargestnationalarmieseverassembledagainsteachother.Onthe22ndofJune1941HitlerunleashedthreeGermanArmyGroupsupontheSovietUnion.ArmyGroupNortheventuallyadvancedtoLeningradandbesiegedthatcityforsome900days,butfailedtotakethecity.ArmyGroupCentreadvanceduponMoscowandcamewithinviewofthegoldenspiresoftheKremlin.ThiswasascloseastheGermanswouldcometotakingthecity.ArmyGroupSouthadvancedintotheUkraineandCrimeauntilthedisasterofStalingradin1942whereanentireArmywaslost.In1943theGermansgambledonastrategicvictoryatKursk,butultimatelyfailed,beingbeatenbythoroughRussianpreparationfortheoffensiveandGermanvacillation.FromtheendoftheKurskoffensive,withfewexceptions,thenextfewyearswouldbeonesofconstantretreatbytheGermanforcesuntiltheirultimatedefeatbeforethegatesofBerlin.AsnotedbySS-GruppenführerMaxSimoninapost-warstatement:

Verysoon,werealisedthatwehadunderestimatedouropponent…theflowerofourshocktroopshadbeenirretrievablylostbythen,andtodayIfeeljustifiedinsayingthatacompletemisjudgementandunderratingoftheRussianpowerofresistancewasoneofthereasonsforthefailureofGermany’scampaignagainstRussia.(Simon,1949:3)

SourcesofinformationontheWaffen-SS

TobuildapictureoftheoperationsandnatureoftheWaffen-SSIhavereferredtoanumberofsourcestogiveanaccurateaccount.TheprimarysourcesincludethemilitarytrialsheldafterthewarbytheAllies,andlaterbyGermanyitself.ThesebeingthetrialsoftheMajorWarCriminalsconductedbytheInternationalMilitaryTribunal(hereafter

referredtoastheIMT–commonlyreferredtoastheBlueseries),acomprehensive42-volumesetofdocumentsandtestimonyfromthefirstwarcrimestrialatNuremberg.InparticularvolumesIVandXX,whichdealwithvariousaspectsoftheWaffen-SS.Aswellasthis,theeight-volumesetofthedecisionoftheInternationalMilitaryTribunalagainstthedefendantsatNuremberg(commonlyreferredtoastheRedSeries),summarisesthecrimesforwhichthedefendantswereputontrialandexplainstheCourt’sdecisionagainsteachdefendant.Italsoincludesthedissentingverdictsandthesentenceshandeddowntothecriminals.ThissetwaspublishedintheUnitedStatesbytheOfficeofChiefofCounselfortheProsecutionofAxisCriminality.ItisgenerallyreferredtoastheNaziConspiracyandAggressionset.

TheNurembergMilitaryTrials(hereafterreferredtoastheNMT-TheGreenseries)a15volumesetofdocumentsandtestimonyfromthelast12Nurembergtrials.Thiswasaseriesof12trialsforwarcrimestheU.S.authoritiesheldintheiroccupationzoneinGermanyinNurembergaftertheendofWorldWarII.ThetrialsthatIshallrefertoincludetheDoctors’Trial,whichexaminedmedicalexperimentsonconcentration-campprisoners.TheEinsatzgruppenTrial,whichlookedattheactionsoftheSSmobilekillinggroupsintheEast,andthePohlTrial,whichexaminedtheroleoftheSSMainEconomicandAdministrativeOffice(WVHA)invariouscrimesagainsthumanity.

FurtherinformationwasavailablefromthewartrialsheldinGermanyafterthewar.TheGermanpost-wartrialsincludethoseconductedinWestGermanyintheFederalRepublic(hereafterreferredtoastheFRseries)and;EastGermanyintheGermanDemocraticRepublic(hereafterreferredtoastheGDRseries).

IhavealsoutilisedmanuscriptspreparedbyformerWaffen-SSofficersfortheHistoricalDivision,UnitedStatesArmy,Europe.6ThemanuscriptsdealwithvariousfacetsofthearmedconflictinvolvingtheWaffen-SS.TheStudiesconsistofsevenseriesasfollows:ETHINT(EuropeanTheatreInterrogations)1-80;A855-1000;B001-850;C1-102d;D001-431;P001-217andT1a-123K3.Thereare1,737itemsinEnglishand2,169itemsinGerman.CopiesofthemanuscriptsareheldattheNationalArchives,Washington(catalogueavailableonpaperandmicrofilm).

TherearealsoanumberofSSpublicationsreferredtothroughoutthetrialsthatprovideaninsightintotheideologyandpoliticaloutlookoftheSSanditsmembers.AnumberofthesedocumentsofthisnaturehavealsobeentranslatedintoEnglishandpublishedinrecenttimes.

Idecidedtoincludeunithistorieswrittenbyveteransandalsointerviewsgivenbysuchveteransforvideoproductionsandbooks,etc.Thisisbecauseitallowsaviewfrombelowincontrasttotheviewsofthecommandandcontrollevel,thedifficultieswiththesebeingthatwhiletheyprovidefirst-handaccounts,naturallyfewoftheveteransaregoingtodiscloseifanyatrocitieswerecommitted.IndeedtherehasbeenaconcertedcampaigntorehabilitatetheimageoftheWaffen-SSinpost-waryears.Tothisendorganisations,suchastheMutualAidSocietyoftheWaffen-SS(HAIGorganisation)havefinancedamultitudeofmemoirsandunitshistoriesthatfocuspurelyonthemilitaryroleoftheWaffen-SS(Mackenzie,1997;Paetel,1959;Sydnor,1973).Ihaveincludedtheseaccountsbecauseoftheirvalueasprimarysourcesandsecondbecausedirectquotesfromsomeofthemainactorsgiveaclearinsightintotheirintentionsandreasonsfortheiractions.As

notedbyformerWaffen-SSofficerGeorgMaierinhishistoryofthe6thSSPanzerArmy:“Contemporarywitnessesareabletoprovideessentialinsightforthecourseoreventsandevaluationofthem.Thecanhelpfillintheobviousgapsandfrequentlybringimportantinformativefactstolight,clarifyingthemforthehistorian”(Maier,2004:1).TothisendIhaveutilisedtheaccountsofmanyWaffen-SSveterans.

TherehasbeenaninterestbothinpopularjournalismandcontemporaryhistoryastotheactionsoftheWaffen-SS.AsnotedbySydnortherehasbeen“…anoutpouringofscholarlyliteraturerecording,andanalysingthepersonalities,agencies,andinstitutionsoftheSS…”(Sydnor,1989:249).However,oneofthedifficultiesindealingwiththeWaffen-SSisthatoftenstudiestendtobepolarisedinthattheyeitherportraytheWaffen-SSasaterrororganisationortheyadoptanapologetictoneandfocuspurelyonthemilitaryachievementsoftheWaffen-SS(Koehl,1962;Wegner,1985).Assuch:

…itsachievementsonthebattlefieldareisolatedfromthecontextofthehistoryoftheSSandNationalSocialismandpresentedasitwereinahistoricalvacuum.InthiswaymembersoftheWaffen-SSappeartohavebeenjustlikeothersoldiers.(Wegner,1985:221)

Asnotedbyoneauthor,sensationalistjournalismhasbeenresponsibleformanystoriesabouttheSSwhere“…theemphasisisonthegoryatrocity,thecloakanddaggerstory,thesexuallyabnormal,theidiosyncrasiesofpersonalitiesandthefantasticplansanddreamsofindividuals”(Koehl,1962:276).ItismyintenttopiercethisveilofmilitaryachievementandsensationalismtolookatthesystematicabusesthatwerecommittedbytheWaffen-SS.Othersourceshave,however,becomeavailabletoassistinanyanalysisoftheWaffen-SS.InrecentyearsanumberofnewbooksandscholarlyarticleshavebeenpublishedthatassistwithunderstandingandexploringtheactionsoftheWaffen-SSontheEasternFrontanditsassociationwithotheraspectsoftheSSstate.

AswellasthisIhavereliedonsuchcrucialsourcesofinformationastheprivateconversationsofHitler(Trevor-Roper,2000)andthetranscriptsofHitler’smilitaryconferencesandthemilitarydirectivesissuedfromsuch(Gilbert,1950;Heiber&Glantz,2003;Trevor-Roper,1964).FromthesevariedsourcesIhopetobeabletodrawanaccuratepictureandreachadefendableconclusionastotheactionsoftheWaffen-SSandtheapplicationoftheconceptofevil.ThisbookisalsoaccompaniedbyappendicesthatwillassistthereaderinacquiringtheknowledgerequiredinsuchaspecialisedareasuchastheWaffen-SS.

Outlineofthebook

Thisbookisstructuredinthefollowingmanner.Chapter1essentiallyexamineswhotheWaffen-SSwereandwhytheywerecreatedfromanorganisationalstandpoint.ThechapteralsostudiesthelogicoftheNazisandtheideologicalpurposebehindtheWaffen-SS.InparticulartheroleofHimmler’sinfluenceovertheWaffen-SSisdiscussed.

Chapter2examinesthestructure,organisation,training,economicandsociologicalmakeupoftheWaffen-SStosomedegree.FromthisdiscussionIhopetobeabletogivethereaderagoodunderstandingofwhotheWaffen-SSwereasanorganisation.

Chapters3,4and5lookattheactionsoftheWaffen-SSontheEasternFrontbylookingatlinkstotheconcentration-camps,involvementintheEinsatzgruppen,anti-partisanoperationsandgeneralcombatactions.Thesechaptersareessentiallyansweringthewhatpartofthequestion;thatbeing,whatcrimesdidtheWaffen-SScommit?InthesechaptersIdescribetheviolenceandatrocitythatwereundertakenbytheWaffen-SS.

Chapter6addressestheimportantquestionofgroupresponsibilityandcollectiveguilt.ThishasoftenbeenanareawhereapologistsfortheWaffen-SShavebasedmuchoftheirargumentthattheWaffen-SSwerejustinnocentsoldiers.TheargumentthattheWaffen-SSsoldiersweredemonicorevilisalsorejectedandtheconceptofdemonisationisrefuted.

InChapter7IanalysethereasonsbehindthecriminalandevilactscommittedbytheWaffen-SS.Thisisdonesothatonecanunderstandwhytheactswerecommitted.Iexamineanumberofareasthatarerelevantinexplaining(withoutcondoning)whytheWaffen-SScommittedthecrimestheydid.Theseissuesincludeobediencetoorders,thefactorsofdevaluingtheenemy,andresponsibilityoftheindividualsoldier.TheroleofdifficultlifeconditionsontheEasternFrontisthenexploredasabackgroundcontexttotheactionsoftheWaffen-SS.

1.TheoriginsandideologyoftheWaffen-SS

TheSSwereinitiallyformedasabodyguardforHitlerwhocouldnolongerrelyonthesupportorloyaltyoftheoriginalSA7stormtroopers,whowerethefootsoldiersoftheNaziParty.FromthishandfulofmentheWaffen-SSbecamethelargestbranchoftheSS.Indoingso,apologistsfortheWaffen-SSarguethatitbecamethedefactofourthbranchoftheGermanarmedforcesofWorldWarII,theothersbeingtheNavy,ArmyandAirForce.DuringthecourseofthisbookIwillshowthattheWaffen-SSwasclearlynotjustanotherbranchoftheGermanArmedforces.

TheWaffen-SSsoldierswereuniqueinthattheywerethefirstofGermany’sarmedforcesthatsworeapersonaloathofloyaltytoHitler,andunderwentarigorousprocessofindoctrinationtoNaziidealsandweretrainedtobeahighlydisciplined,motivatedandsuccessfulmilitaryformation.ForthisreasontheWaffen-SShasbeenviewedbysomeasa“…praetorianguardandelite”oftheNazistate(Wegner,1985:220).Indeed,duringadinnerconversationonthe1stofNovember1941Hitlerremarkedthat“WithinahundredyearsorsofromnowalltheGermanelitewillbeaproductoftheSS,foronlytheSSpracticesracialselection”(Trevor-Roper,2000:106).TheWaffen-SSgainedconsiderablerespectbothfromfoesandfriendsduetothefactthatTheWaffen-SSpossessedmilitaryqualitiesequalledbyfewothersandsurpassedbynone.Bywar’senditnumberedsome9000008men.

DefiningtheWaffen-SS

OneofthemostcontentiousissueswhendealingwiththeWaffen-SSisactuallyclearlydefiningwhatunitsanddepartmentsshouldbeconsideredtobepartoftheWaffen-SS.AsnotedbySydnor:

AttemptstodefinewhattheWaffen-SSwasleadinvariablytoquestionsabouttheextenttowhichtheWaffen-SSwasorwasnotanintegralpartoftheoverallSSorganisation,andthedegreetowhichitwasorwasnotinvolvedinthecriminalactsattributedtotheSchutzStaffel.(Sydnor,1973:339)

Onthe2ndofMarch1940HitleracceptedaproposalfromOberkommandoderWehrmacht(OKW)orArmedForcesCommandthatledtothere-organisationofSSunitsandtheuseofthetermWaffen-SSbecameofficial(Stein,1966).AsaresultofthisproposaltheWaffen-SSwasatthatstagetoincludetheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler,theSS-VerfügungstruppeDivision9(SSVTwastheforerunnertotheWaffen-SS),theTotenkopfDivision,theSS-PolizeiDivision,theSS-Junkerschulenortrainingacademiesandallreplacementandtrainingunits.OfcrucialimportanceisthattheproposalalsorecognisedtheSSTotenkopfverbändeaspartoftheWaffenSS,withthequalificationthat“…thedecisionastowhetherthisdutycountsasmilitaryserviceistobetakeninthefuture”(Stein,1966:49).

TheproposalalsoacknowledgedthattherewereadditionalsectionsoftheWaffen-SSthatwentbeyondthearmedfightingunits.Theseincluded“…sevenadministrativeorganisationshandlingrecruitment,supply,administration,justice,welfare,weapons

developmentandmedicalservices”(Stein,1966:49).Serviceinsuchunitswasconsideredtobemilitaryservice.InadditiontothisthetermWaffen-SSactuallyincludedallSSformationsandofficesborneonthebudgetoftheReichMinisterofFinance.Inamemorandumdatedthe11thofMay1942Himmler,whenreferringtothebudgetoftheWaffen-SS,includedthefightingdivisions,schoolsandtheconcentration-campsandotherancillaryunitsasbeingpartoftheWaffen-SS(Butler,2004;Krausnick,Buchheim,Broszat,&Jacobsen,1965).Thisorderwastobe:

ThemostcogentargumentagainstthoseSSapologistswhoclaimthattheWaffen-SShadnothingtodowiththeconcentration-camps.OnboththehighestformallevelandthelowestguardlevelHimmlerhadirrevocablyboundtheknightsofhisblackordertothemurkiestcornersofhisdeadlyempire.(Mollo,1982:42)

ThisatleastprovidesastartingplatformastowhatunitsorsectionscanbeconsideredtobepartoftheWaffen-SS.However,likemostapparatusoftheNazistatethisorganisationwassubjecttorevisionasthewarwenton.AsIproceedthroughthefollowingchaptersIwilldiscussmyargumentsinmoredetailastowhytheunits,whichundertookanti-partisanduties,andtheactivitiesoftheEinsatzgruppenandtheconcentrationcamps,wereeitherpartof,orheavilylinkedtotheWaffen-SS.

ItismyargumentthattheWaffen-SSwasnotjustlimitedtothefightingformationsatthefront.Afightingunitreliesonasupplyandadministrativeapparatustosurvive.Itisnotsensibletoseparatethecombatunitsfromtheotherunitsthatweresonecessaryfortheirabilitytoundertakethedutiesplaceduponthem.DuringhistestimonyatNuremberg,SS-OberstgruppenführerPaulHausserattemptedtodistancetheWaffen-SSfightingunitsfromtheconcentration-campguards.

HAUSSER:AllpersonswhoservedathomeandinthepolicehadtobeexemptedfrommilitaryserviceinthearmybytheWehrkreisordistrictcommanderinordertocarryouttheirpolicetasks.ThatdidnotapplywhenallguardunitsweredesignatedasWaffen-SS,forthesewereapartofthearmedforces.InthemainofficesinBerlintheseunits,inordertodifferentiatethem,weredesignatednominalWaffen-SS.ButallthisIlearnedonlyherelater.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:366)

HausserhasoutlinedamajorargumentofWaffen-SSveteransandtheirsupporters,thatbeing“…exceptfororganisationalconnectionstherewerenofundamentaltiesbetweentheSSandtheWaffen-SS”(Krenetal.,1976:88).Thisisjustsimplynotthecase.ApologistssuchasTheileattempttodistancetheWaffen-SSfromtheunsavourypartsoftheSSorganisation.Inhisstudy,TheileexcludesfromhisdiscussionoftheWaffen-SStheconcentration-camps,theEinsatzgruppenandthemainSSadministrativeoffices(Theile,1997).AsnotedbyStein,theSS-Totenkopfstandarten(Death’sHeadunitsformedfromconcentration-campguards)“wereeventuallyincorporated,unitbyunit,intothelargerfieldformationsoftheWaffen-SS”(Segev,1987;Stein,1966:50).TheDeath’sHeadunitswereusedtoformvariousWaffen-SSformations,whichsomedescribeasasecondWaffen-SS.ThiswasdueinthemaintotheappallingreputationoftheTotenkopfunits;itsuitedtheapologiststodistancethesegroupsfortheotherfightingunits.ThissecondWaffen-SSissimilartotheexpressionusedbytheSSintheirdefenceatNurembergwheresomemembersweredescribedasnominal.Thisisaflawedapproach;itseemsthat

theargumentisthatthosepartsoftheWaffen-SSthatappeartaintedshouldbeexcludedfromaccount.Thisissimplynotthecase;theseformationswerepartoftheWaffen-SSandassuchshouldbeincludedintheexaminationoftheWaffen-SSorganisationasawholejustasmuchasthefront-linefightingunits.

TheactionsofofficersandmenattachedtosuchastheaboveraisedproblemsforthedefenceoftheWaffen-SSatNuremberg.TotryandcircumnavigatethisproblemthedefencecoinedthetermnominalmembersoftheWaffen-SS,whichtheyalmostexclusivelyappliedtothosemembersoftheWaffen-SSwhowerenotinthecombatunitsorwhocommittedatrocitiesinplacessuchasthecamps.TheargumentofnominalWaffen-SSmemberswasaconstantthemeusedbytheSSdefencewitnesses.Itisofconcernthatatthetimeofthetrials,thedefenceandwitnessesneverpresentedanydocumentaryevidencethat,indicatedthattheWaffen-SScommandhadprotestedagainsttheinclusionofsuchofficersormenwithintheranksoftheWaffen-SS.CertainlythereisnoevidencethatofficerslikeHausserattemptedtoresigntheircommissionsorleavetheWaffen-SSinprotestatsuchactionsthattheyclaimedwereaninsulttotheirhonour.

InessencethewitnessesweretryingtosaythattheseotherpeoplewereWaffen-SS,butnotWaffen-SS.ThedifficultyinincludingsuchunitscanbeseenbytheanswersgivenbyWaffen-SSofficerssuchasRobertBrillwhenquestionedbytheRussianprosecutor:

MR.COUNSELLORSMIRNOV:Willyoutellus,please,whowasinchargeofthecommandwithintheconcentration-camp.WasitnottheWaffen-SS?BRILL:No,theywerenotcommandsoftheWaffen-SS.CertainmembersofthenominalWaffen-SSwerewiththecommands;butthereisaclearorderoftheHighCommandoftheArmedForceswhichIhavealreadymentioned.ItisincludedintheArmycircularofDecember1940,andstatesthatmembersoftheDeath’sHeadunitsdonotdoanymilitaryserviceinthesense’oftheWaffen-SS-MembersoftheDeath’sHeadunits.MR.COUNSELLORSMIRNOV:Iwouldliketoaskyoutobemoreconcise.Soyoucontendthatthecommandsinconcentration-campswerenotWaffen-SScommands?BRILL:ThecommandswerenotundertheHighCommandoftheWaffen-SS;butIwishtopointoutthatmembersoftheWaffen-SSwerewiththecommands.Thisisthedifference.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:352)

Thiswouldappeartobeaninaccuratestatement.ThequestionneedstobeaskedatwhatpointdidthesemembersoftheWaffen-SSbecomenominal?WasitbeforetheyjoinedthefightingdivisionsoftheWaffen-SS,orwasitaftertheyleftthemandtookupdutiesinthecamps?AtwhatpointdidMaxSimon,commanderoftheReichsführer-SSDivision,orGeorgBochmann,commanderoftheGotzVonBerlichingenDivision,considerthemselvestobemerelynominalWaffen-SSmembers?SimonandBochmannbothservedatSachsenburgandDachau(MacLean,1999a).

OnepurposeofseparatingtheWaffen-SSfromtheseotherorganisationsisthatitallowsthereputationoftheWaffen-SStoberehabilitatedtosomedegree,andthishasoftenbeentheaimofpost-warapologists.AsstatedbyWegnerwhenhebeganhisstudyoftheWaffen-SS:

InitialinvestigationssoonrevealedthattheanalysisoftheWaffen-SSsolelyintermsofits

militarycharacteristicswouldnotbehistoricallyrelevantbecausethisapproachwouldhavehiddenthecentralfactthattheWaffen-SS,asaresultofitsintegrationintotheall-encompassingsystemoforganisedviolencethatwastheSS,neitherpossessedtheprofessionalautonomyofthearmynorcoulditbedefinedasstrictlymilitaryinthetraditionalsense.(Wegner,1990:3)

ThisstudyrejectsthenotionofthenominalWaffen-SSmemberasitwasrejectedatNuremberg.ItismycontentionthattheWaffen-SSneedstobeexaminedasawholeorganisation,ratherthenjustisolatingcertainsectionsoftheorganisation.ItisbeyondthescopeofthisbooktoperformafullanalysisoftheSSorganisation.ThemaindepartmentsastheyrelatetotheWaffen-SSonlyhavebeenincludedinthisbook;assuchitisnotacompleterepresentationoftheSSstate.FurtherdiscussionofspecificHimmlerandFührerorderswillshedmorelightontherelationshipbetweentheWaffen-SSandotherdepartmentsoftheSS.

TheNaziideologyandthecreationoftheWaffen-SS

Isweartoyou,AdolfHitler,asLeaderandChancelloroftheReich,loyaltyandbravery.Ipledgetoyouandthesuperiorsappointedbyyou,obedienceuntodeath.SohelpmeGod.

“Loyaltyismyhonour”,thiswastheoathofallegianceoftheWaffenSSman.ItwaswiththisoaththatthemembersoftheWaffen-SSboundtheirdestinytoamanwhocommittedsomeoftheworstatrocitiesinhistoryandembarkedonapathofmurderandmayhemthatwouldresultinthedestructionoftheNazistateandthedeathsofmillions.ThepurposeofthischapteristobasicallyexplorewhotheWaffen-SSwerefromanideologicalstandpoint.ThattheWaffen-SSwasaprodigyoftheNazisisbeyonddoubt;Wegnerstatesthat“…therewasanintimateconnectionbetweenthedevelopmentoftheWaffen-SSandthewholeoftheSSasapartyorganisation”(Wegner,1990:62).IndeedtheWaffen-SSasanorganisationwaspreparedtosurrenderitsmoralresponsibilitytotheNazistate.Thefollowingpageswilloutlinehowthisoccurred.

TheSSwasinitiallyformedin1925asaprotectionsquadforHitlerandotherleadingNazis.Itwasformedfromonlythemostactiveandreliablepartymembersandwasseentobeanintegralpartofthepartystructure.UpontheelectionofHitlertotheofficeofChancellor,SS-ReichsführerHeinrichHimmlerandtheSStookupanumberofofficialadministrative,policeandmilitaryfunctions.ItwasintheserolesthattheSSwouldbecometheultimateterrormachineryoftheNazistate.IndeedattheInternationalMilitaryTribunal(IMT)theprosecutiondescribedtheSSasbelow:

FortheSSwastheelitegroupoftheParty,composedofthemostthorough-goingadherentsoftheNazicause,pledgedtoblinddevotiontoNaziprinciples,andpreparedtocarrythemoutwithoutanyquestion,andatanycost,agroupinwhicheveryordinaryvaluehasbeensosubvertedthatitsmemberscanask,“Whatisthereunlawfulaboutthethingswehavedone?”.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:161)

FromitsinitialbeginningstheSSdevelopedintothreemainmanpowersections.Initiallytherewasthepoliticalarm,theGeneralorAllgemeineSS,fromwhichgrewtheSS-Totenkopfverbände(Death’sHeadunits)orcampguards,andfinallytheWaffenor

fightingSS.Attheoutbreakofwarin1939theWaffen-SSemergedfromafewregimentstosome38divisions10bywar’send.TheGeneralSSbywar’sendwouldceasetobeasignificantforceandtheDeath’sHeadunitswouldbeabsorbedintotheWaffen-SS.AsnotedbytheNurembergMilitaryTribunal(NMT):

Aftertheoutbreakofwar,unitsfromboththeSpecialServiceTroopsandtheDeath’sHeadFormationswereusedinthePolishcampaign.ThesetroopscametobeknownastheWaffenorarmed[Combat]SS.By1940theWaffen-SScontained100,000men,56,000comingfromtheSpecialServiceTroopsandtherestfromtheAllgemeineSSandtheDeathHeadTroops.Concentration-campguarddutiescametobeperformedprimarilybymembersoftheAllgemeine-SS.TheWaffen-SSfoughtineverycampaignwiththeexceptionofthoseinNorwayandAfrica.Bytheendofthewaritisestimatedtohavecomprisedabout580,000men.Thus,itwasnumericallybyfarthelargerbranchoftheSS,theAllgemeine-SShavingdeclinedinstrengthtolessthan40,000.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:214)

TheSSrosetosignificancewithintheNaziworldbybeingutilisedtospyonothermembersofthepartyandotherpartyorganisations(Muhlberger,1991).HimmlerandtheSSwerealsousedbyHitlertocounterthegrowingpowerandthreatfromErnstRohmandtheSturmAbteilung(SA)orNaziBrownShirts,whoweretheoriginalfootsoldiersoftheNazis.ThepoliticalreliabilityoftheSSwasconfirmedwhenmembersoftheLeibstandarteandotherSSunitswereusedbyHitlertoeradicatetheleadershipoftheSAin1934duringtheRohmpurge,thesocalledNightoftheLongKnives.DuringthisactiontheSAleadershipwasemasculatedanditsleadersexecuted.Asaresulttheorganisationwasneveragainaseriouspoliticalthreat.AtNuremberg,SSGeneralPaulHausserdeniedanyinvolvementoftheWaffen-SSinthisincident.OtherWaffen-SSgeneralsstatedadifferentstory.SS-ObergruppenführerKarlWolfflaterrelatedhisroleonthisnightafterthewar.Herecountedhowa“charmingfellow”,whowasthepersonaladjutantforRohm,theleaderoftheSA,and“…alsoaclosepersonalfriend,weoftendinedtogether”wasexecuted(Messenger,2002).ClearlyfriendshipwasnottostandinthewayoftheSS.

FormurderingmanyoftheirformercomradestheSSearntHitler’sfavourandgratitude.Waffen-SSGeneralVonEbersteinhadthistosaywhenaskedaboutkillingtheirformercomrades:

MAJORJONES:Youarenotansweringmyquestion,youknow.Youarewanderingoffintodetailsthathavenorelevancetomyquestionatall.IsuggesttoyouthatthekillingsbytheSSonthe30thofJune1934wereacharacteristicuseoftheSSasthefistofNazism.VONEBERSTEIN:Theeventsofthe30thofJune1934were,accordingtomyfirmconvictionandtothatofmycomrades,theresultofastateofemergencyandtheorderswhichweregivenwereadheredtobecausetheyweretheordersoftheheadoftheState.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:312)

TheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlersuppliedtroopsthatexecutedanumberofhigh-rankingSAofficials.TheaffirmationoftheirloyaltyandthatofotherSSunitstoHitlerwassignedinthebloodoftheirformerSAcomrades.Waffen-SSGeneralOttoKummnoted:“ThatisthenthattheimageoftheSSreallychangedforthefirsttime,aftertheFührersaid‘SSmen,yourhonourliesinloyalty’.Youseeforusthatwasnaturallyvery

uplifting”(Halliley,2003).AsaresultoftheRohmpurgetheSSbecamethemostpowerfuleliteorganisationwithintheNazistate.TheroleoftheSSintheRohmpurgeeffectivelyensuredthatfromnowontheSSdisplayedawilltoactinconformitywiththewilloftheFührer.TherecanbelittledoubtthatthemenoftheWaffen-SSenjoyedaspecialrelationshipwithHitler.ForinstanceonHitler’sbirthdaymembersoftheWaffen-SSusuallyreceivedabottleofwinefromtheirNazipoliticalofficerasagift(Verton,2007).NicolausVonBelowwasHitler’sLuftwaffeadjutantfrom1937to1945.HeprovidesaglimpseofHitler’sspecialrelationshipwiththeWaffen-SS:

HitlerspedbytraintoMetz,wheretheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerwerequartered.Amongthesemenhewasalwaysingoodspirits.Inhisspeechhegavethisfeelingvisibleexpression.TheSS-Leibstandartemustalwaysexpecttobedeployedtothehottestspotsofthebattle.Hesaid,“Itisforyouwhoarehonouredtocarrymynametostandattheforefrontofthestruggle”.(VonBelow,1980:80)

ItwasinthisrolethattheWaffen-SScametorepresentasortofelitethatplacedheavyemphasisonloyaltytoone’scomrades,commonvaluesandpracticesandasenseofobediencetotheNazicauseandideology(Gingerich,1997;Ripley,2004;Staub,1989;Stein,1966;Sydnor,1990;Wolfson,1965;Ziegler,1989).ThisnotionoftheSSbeingaNazieliteattachedtotheSSbecauseofthefactthatitsdutieswerecarriedoutonbehalfoftheNaziregime.Itwasseentobeanelitefromasocial,racialandpoliticalaspect.InthisrespectlimitedresearchofsomeWaffen-SSofficershasindicatedthatmanyjoinedtoensurethattheycouldachieve“…amoresatisfyingself”throughtheapparentlylegitimateandsociallyacceptablemeansofjoiningthiselite(J.Steiner,1963:416).

TheSShadprovenitsloyaltybeyonddoubt;itwasforthisreasonthattheFührercouldplaceabsolutefaithinhisSSlegions.AssuchtheSSwereindependentfromboththePoliceandtheWehrmacht,andavailableforHitler’sexclusiveuse.TothispurposeHitlerissuedasecretFührerorderonthe17thofAugust1938,whichoutlinedtheroleandusesoftheWaffen-SSbothinpeacetimeandinwar.HeclearlydelineatesthattheWaffen-SSisindeeddifferentfromjustordinarysoldiers.

II.TheArmedUnitsoftheSS.TheSS-Verfügungstruppe.1.TheSS-VerfügungstruppeisneitherapartoftheWehrmachtnorapartofthepolice.Itisastandingarmedunitexclusivelyatmydisposal.AssuchandasaunitoftheNSDAP,itsmembersaretobeselectedbytheReichsführer-SSaccordingtotheideologicalandpoliticalstandardswhichIhaveorderedfortheNSDAPandfortheSchutzstaffeln.Itsmembersaretobetrainedanditsranksfilledwithvolunteers…(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:170)

SoldiersoftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlermarchinginBerlin.

NotethatHitlerhimselfhasdescribedtheWaffen-SSasanorganisationoftheNaziParty.ThisstatementbyHitlerisstrongevidenceagainstthoseapologistsoftheWaffen-SSwhoclaimthatitwasnotanorganisationwithpoliticalaffiliationstotheNaziParty.HimmleralsostipulatesthepoliticalrootsoftheSSinanindoctrinationpamphletwherehestates:“NowIcometotheSchutzstaffelitself.ItisapartofthisNationalSocialistGermanWorkersPartycreatedandtrainedbyAdolfHitler.WithinthemovementoftheFührerithasreceiveditsspecialtaskfortheprotectionoftheReichinternally”(PruessPublishing,2001:25).ThistaskwasbeingcarriedoutbytheSSasearlyas1938whenHitler’sArmyAdjutant,MajorGerhardEngel,recalledHimmlerreportingtoHitler“abouthiscleansingmeasures”thatwerebeingundertakeninViennaafterAustriawasabsorbedintotheGermanReich(Engel,1974:37).HitlerhimselfstipulatedtheroletheWaffen-SSwillplayintimesofconflict.

III.OrdersincaseofMobilisation.A.TheemploymentoftheSS-Verfügungstruppeincaseofmobilisationisadoubleone.1.BytheSupremeCommanderoftheArmywithinthewartimearmy.Inthatcaseitcomescompletelyundermilitarylawsandregulations,butremainsaunitoftheNSDAPpolitically.2.Incaseofnecessityintheinterioraccordingtomyorders;inthatcaseitisundertheReichsführer-SSandChiefoftheGermanPolice.IncaseofmobilisationImyselfwillmakethedecisionaboutthetime,strengthandmanneroftheincorporationoftheSS-Verfügungstruppeintothewartimearmy;thesethingswilldependontheinternalpoliticalsituationatthattime.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:170)

Ascanbeseenfromthisorder,theWaffen-SSwastoundertakeapolicingroleinternally

aswellastakepartinanyconflictwithexternalenemies.ThisisclearlyillustratedbycommentsmadebyHitlerduringdinneronthe24thofJuly1941whereheisreferringtothelossessufferedbytheWaffenSSintheopeningstagesoftheRussiancampaign.

Foraneliteforce,likeourSS,it’sgreatlucktohavesufferedcomparativelyheavylosses.Inthiswayitisassuredofthenecessaryprestigetointerveneifneedbe,onthehomefront,whichofcoursewon’tbenecessary.Butit’sgoodtoknowthatonedisposesofaforcethatcouldshowitselfcapableofdoingsoonoccasion.(Trevor-Roper,2000:13)

ThisisfurtherproofthatHitlersawtheWaffen-SSasapoliticalforcetobeusedagainsttheirfellowGermansifneedbe,somethingthatwasnotexpectedoftheotherGermanarmedforces.HitlermadethedifferentiationoftheWaffen-SSevenmoresuccinctwhenhecommentedonitsroleinrelationtotheotherarmedforcesafterthewaronthe4thofJanuary1942.

Assoonaspeacehasreturned,theSSwillhavetobegivenitsindependenceagain,acompleteindependence(fromtheArmy).11Therehasalwaysbeenarivalrybetweentroopsofthelineandguardsmen.That’swhyit’sagoodthingthattheSSshouldconstituteinrelationtotheothers,anabsolutelydistinctworld.Inpeacetimeit’sanelitepolice,capableofcrushinganyadversary.(Trevor-Roper,2000:167)

Duringaconversationonthe19thofApril1938HitlerexpressedhisviewsontheWaffen-SStohisArmyadjutant,MajorEngel:Hewantstokeepthiselitesmalloritwillnotbeaneliteforlong.IthastobeapoliticalforceblindlyloyaltostateandFührer.Intheeventofdisturbances,thisforcewouldputthemdownbrutally.HeseesitasarealPraetorianGuardtosnuffoutallthose,evenwithinitsownranks,whoswimagainstthecurrent.(Engel,1974:38)

Hitler’sfavouritismfortheWaffen-SSwastodisplayitselfinotherformsasheinsuredthatitremainedindependentoftheGermanarmedforces.

TheSSCourts

TherewastobeoneimportantamendmenttotheorderissuedbyHitlerregardingtheroleoftheWaffen-SS.ThatwastheremovaloftheSSfrommilitaryjusticeandregulationsbyvirtueofaHitlerdecreeonthe17thofOctober1939(Krausnicketal.,1965;Weingartner,1983).AllmattersofmilitarylawsandregulationsandenforcementweretobeundertakenbytheSScourts,notthemilitary.HimmlersawthisasbeinganimportantstepinensuringtheindependenceoftheSSfromtheWehrmacht.ItwouldensurethattheWaffen-SSwasjudgedbytheirownunderthesupervisionofHitlerandHimmler.OnlyHitlercouldimposeadeathsentenceonofficersandcommandersoftheWaffen-SS,andHimmlerreservedtherighttomakedecisionsincasesconcerningSSmenwithmembershipnumberslessthen15,000(Krausnicketal.,1965).

ThejudgesoftheSScourtswerealmostentirelymadeupofWaffenSSofficers.AnofficerlistoftheSScourtsin1944showsthatsome599belongedtotheWaffen-SSwithjustsixbelongingtheAllgemeineSS(Krausnicketal.,1965).

ThejudgesintheSScourtswereSScommandersqualifiedfortheoffice,theywere

nominatedbyHitlerhimself,werenecessarilymembersoftheWaffen-SS,andfordisciplinarymattersweredirectlysubordinatetotheReichsführer-SS.MembershipoftheWaffen-SSwasobligatorysincetheprivilegedpositionoftheSSinthepossessionofitsownlegalsystemwasbasedupontheexistenceoftheWaffen-SS…(Krausnicketal.,1965:253)

Himmlercommentedthat“…wetrytotrainourlawyersbyputtingthemintheSSandinfusingthemwithourownspirit”(J.Steiner,1963:439).InthepervertedviewoftheSScourts,justicewouldservetheideologicalgoalsoftheNazimovement.ThedecisionsoftheSSjudgeswererequiredtofurthertheideologicalaimsoftheregimeandalsoserveaspreceptssupplementingtheideologicalindoctrinationofSSmembers.

Inanominouspremonitionofwhatwastocome,HitlerhadremovedtheWaffen-SSfromtheaccountabilityofnormalmilitaryexpectations;itwasnowtobejudgedbyitsown.ThisisofevenmoreimportancewhenoneconsidersthatinitiallyonlytheSSunitswhowereatthecuttingedgeoftheSSoperationswereincludedunderthisprotection.Theseunitsincludedtheconcentration-campoperatives,membersoftheSSbureaucracy,theSS-Verfügungstruppe,membersofpoliceunitsonspecialactionsandtheSS-Junkerschulen(Weingartner,1983).ItwouldappearthattherealintentofthismovewastoensurethatthoseSSunitswhocouldbecalledupontocommitcrimeswouldbeprotectedbytheSSjusticesystem.Himmlerhadinfactcreatedalegalsysteminwhichthecriminalordersthatweretobeissuedhadbeenlegitimised.

Politicalandideologicalroots

EventheGermanpeopleheldtheWaffen-SSinsometrepidationwithsecretreportsindicatingthattheimpressionofsomeGermancitizenswasthattheWaffen-SSwas“…themostruthlessforce.Ittakesnoprisioners,buttotallyannihilatesitsenemy”(Simpson,1990:7).HimmleritseemedenjoyedhisSSsoldiershavingthiskindofreputation.InapamphletpresentedattheNurembergTrialstitled,“TheSSasanAnti-BolshevistFightingOrganisation”(document1851-PS),HimmlersaidthisofhisSS:

IknowthattherearesomepeopleinGermanywhobecomesickwhentheyseetheseblackcoats.Weunderstandthereasonforthisanddonotexpectthatweshallbelovedbytoomany.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:182)

ManyapologistsarguethattheWaffen-SSwasjustamilitaryformationthesameastheArmy,NavyandAirForce.FormerWaffen-SSadjutanttoHitler,RichardSchulze-Kossensarguedthat“TheideathatwiththeWaffen-SSHimmlercreatedapoliticaltroopafterhisownimageiscompletelyincompatiblewithhistoricalreality”(Schulze-Kossens,1982:33).NotedauthorHeinzHohneattemptstopaintseniorWaffen-SSgeneralssuchasHausserandSteinerasbeingnon-political;asbeingsoldiers“…whojustwantedtodevotethemselvestoanexclusivelymilitaryjob”(Hohne,1969:449).YetbothHausserandSteinerweremembersoftheSAandalsomembersoftheNaziParty(Yerger,1997;,1999).AnorderofthedayissuedbySteinerafterheavyfightingdatedthe30July1944wouldseemtoindicatethatSteinerhadpoliticalaffiliationsevenuptothelatestagesofthewar.

Comrades,todayyouhavegainedadefensivevictory…Withyourexcellentsoldierly

moraleandperformanceyouhaveprovedyourprofoundloyaltytoourFührerAdolfHitler.Ideeplythankeachofyouforhisunshakeablesteadfastnessandshakehishandincomradeship.Steiner.(Ertel&Schulze-Kossens,2000:179)

IncontrasttoHausserisSSColonel,SS-StandartenführerLeonDegrelle,aBelgiumnationalandfavouriteofHitlerwhowasthecommanderofthe28thSSWallonienDivision.HegoestogreatlengthstostressthattheWaffen-SSwasan“…organisationthatwasbothpoliticalandmilitary”(Degrelle,1983:11).ThepoliticalnatureoftheSSisevenmorerecognisableifoneconsidersthat“…fromtheverystarttheonlypersonnelselectedfortheSSwerethosethoughttohavequalificationsbeneficial…”totheNaziParty(J.Steiner,1963:430).InthebiographyofSS-ObergruppenführerKarlWolffitisnotedwhenhefilledouthisapplicationformtojointheSSthatitincludedthebelowstatementundertheheadingofcommitment:

IcommitmyselftosupportAdolfHitler’sideas,toobservethestrictestpartydiscipline,andtoconscientiouslycarryouttheordersoftheReichSSLeader.IamGerman,ofAryandescent,IdonotbelongtoanyMasonicLodgeorsecretsocieties,andIpromisetopromotethemovementwithallmystrength.(VonLang,2005:7)

ThiswasthestandardapplicationformusedforallSSmen.AsnotedbyatleastoneauthortheargumentthattheWaffen-SSwasjustanothermilitaryformationmayseemplausibleonthefaceofit,however,anentirelydifferentpictureemergeswhenweconsideritsorigins.SSGeneralHausserclaimedthattheWaffen-SSwaspartoftheArmywhenquestionedatNuremberg.

HERRPELCKMANN:SurelyyoufeltyourselftobeapartoftheArmy?HAUSSER:WewerecompletelyincorporatedintotheArmy,andthedesignation“fourthbranchoftheArmy,”althoughitwasnotanofficialdesignation,wasreallymuchtothepoint.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:367)

However,eventhegeneralsoftheWehrmachtmadeitclearthattheWaffen-SSwasnotpartoftheregulararmybutratheracreatureofHimmler’s.FormerchiefoftheWehrmachtGeneralVonBrauchitschstatedthisatNuremberg:

DR.LATERNSER:Now,thesubordinationoftheWaffen-SSwillhavetobeclearedupaswell.JustwhatwasthesubordinationofaWaffen-SSdivisiontotheArmy?VONBRAUCHITSCH:TheWaffen-SSwassubordinatedtotheArmyonlyfortacticalpurposes.ItwassubordinatedtotheArmyneitherfordisciplinenorforjudicialmatters.TheArmyhadnoinfluenceonpromotionsordemotionsofpeople,andsoforth.DR.LATERNSER:TowhomwasaWaffen-SSdivisionsubordinate,whenitwasnotengagedinatacticaltask?Thatis,whenitwasneitherinbattlenorintheoperationalarea?VONBRAUCHITSCH:Inanyevent,nottheArmy.ItwassubordinatetotheReichsführer-SSortotheHighCommandoftheArmedForces.DR.LATERNSER:Andtowhomwasitsubordinateinthehomearea?VONBRAUCHITSCH:TotheReichsführer-SS.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:580)

TheRoleofHimmler

TheReichsführer-SS;thiswaswhotheWaffen-SSansweredto,exceptwhenindirectcombat.IntheyearssincethewarmanyhavepaintedHimmlerasthemeekandmildbureaucratwhocommittedatrociousactsofevilandyetwasnotthekeeperoftheWaffen-SS.Realitywouldpaintadifferentpicture.HimmlerkeptatightcontrolontheWaffen-SSbyensuringthatadministrativemattersinrelationtopersonneloftheWaffen-SSremainedunderhiscontrol.HimmleralsoremainedthenominalCommanderinChiefoftheWaffen-SSthroughhisfieldcommandpostandallrecruitingfortheWaffen-SSwashandledbytheMainSSOffice.AspartoftherehabilitationprocessoftheimageoftheWaffen-SS,Himmlerinsomerespectshasbeenportrayedasaleader“…heldincontemptandfrequentlydisobeyed”bytheSSgenerals(Sydnor,1973:340).SSGeneralPaulHausserhadthistosaywhenquestionedastoHimmler’sleadershipcapabilities:

HAUSSER:HeinrichHimmlermostassuredlytriedinpeacetimetoexerthisinfluenceonthesmallVerfügungstruppe.Duringthewarthiswaspracticallyimpossible.HedidnotaddresstroopsoftheWaffen-SS.Onoccasionhedidtalktosomeofficersandcommandersofsomedivisionsinthefield.ItwasgenerallyknownthatHeinrichHimmler,whohaddoneonlyoneyear’smilitaryservice,hadnoconceptionofthemilitaryandunderestimatedthemilitarytasksandtheworkinvolved.Helikedtoplaytheroleofthestrongmanthroughexaggerationandthroughsuperlatives.Ifsomeonecomesalongwithbigwords,thesoldieronthefrontdoesnotpaymuchattention.Therefore,theinfluenceofHimmlerwasveryinsignificantduringthewar.Heworehisuniform,ofcourse,butthereputationoftheWaffen-SSwasestablishedbyitsofficers,bytheexampletheysetandbytheirdailywork.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946Vol20:368)

WhilesomeWaffen-SSGeneralsandothershaveattemptedtowriteHimmleroffassomewhatofanuisance,otherauthorsstatethatHimmlerwasapowerfulandeffectiveleader,firmlyincontroloftheentireSSorganisation.AtleastoneauthorraisestheimportantpointthattheSScouldneverhavereacheditspowerfulpositionintheNazistatewithoutaneffectiveleaderintheformofHimmler(Noakes&Pridham,1988).Respectedauthor,AlexanderDallin(1981),makestheimportantpointthatifithadcometoashowdown,nootherleadingNaziwouldhavebeencapableofmatchingHimmlerinregardstopower.

ThosewhoderideHimmler’sinfluenceforgetoneimportantfact;hewassuccessfulinorderingthemurderofmillionsofinnocentpeople,afeatthatsomeone,whoisindeedabumblingeccentric,wouldbeunlikelytoachieve.IndeedtheSSwasaconscious,preconceivedandcentralconcernofHimmler’ssocialthinking.HecontrolledtheWaffen-SSanddirecteditinaccordancewiththepoliticalandideologicalwilloftheFührer.Anorderofthe4thSSPolizeiDivisionprovidesevidencethatHimmlerremainedincontrolofthepoliticaltrainingofthetroopsevenwhentheywereservingwitharmyformations:

AsofthedayofintegrationintotheSS-PolizeiDivision,thenewlyformedelementswillbesubordinatedtotheCommanderinChiefofthearmy…theauthorityoftheReichsführer-SSandChefderDeutschenPolizeiintheareaofpoliticaltraining…remainsunaffectedbythis.(Husemann,2003:10)

DuringthewartheSSdivisions,whosepersonnelowedtheirloyaltypersonallytoHitlerratherthantheGermanstate,andwhomhethereforetrustedmorewereusedtimeand

timeagainforcrucialoperationsthattheFührerwouldratherentrusttohispoliticalsoldiersthantheregulararmy.AsnotedinthestudyofKrausnicketal(1965),tosaythattheWaffen-SSwasafourthbranchofthearmedservicesistotallyuntrue,itispoliticallyandhistoricallyuntrue;theWaffen-SSowedallegiancetotheFührer.

ApamphletonSScultureandtitledSoldierhadthistosayabouttheWaffen-SS.“Todayitmayalreadyseemincomprehensiblethattherewereoncenon-politicalofficersandnon-politicalsoldiers…ThegreathistoricalendofsuchideologicaldivisioncameaboutthroughtheFührerthroughthecreationofthepoliticalsoldierinhisembodimentoftheWaffen-SS!”(PruessPublishing,2004a:34).TheapologistsandothershaveoftentriedtomaintainthattheWaffen-SSwasmerelyanothermilitaryorganisation.TothisendtheyhaveattimesenlistedtheassistanceofseniorWehrmachtgeneralssuchasColonel-GeneralHeinzGuderian,whostated:

IcanthereforeassertthattomyknowledgetheSSdivisionswerealwaysremarkableforahighstandardofdiscipline,ofespritdecorps,andofconductinthefaceoftheenemy.Theyfoughtshouldertoshoulderwiththepanzerdivisionsofthearmyandthelongerthewarwentonthelessdistinguishabletheybecamefromthearmy.(Guderian,1996:447)

TheWaffen-SSwasnevermeanttobeapermanentpartoftheGermanmilitarysystem.TheWaffen-SSwaspartoftheSSsystem;itwasnotpartoftheWehrmacht.AssuchitisbesttoapproachanystudyoftheWaffenSSbyviewingitasanintegralpartoftheSSratherthanasanordinaryelitemilitaryforce.ItfollowsthenthatclaimsthattheWaffen-SSwasanorganisationnotcontrolledbyHimmlerortheSSaresimplynottrue.Thiswastohavechillingimplications.WithHimmlerincontroloftheSS,legitimacywaslenttothecriminalpoliciesthatwouldbeissuedandactedonbytheWaffen-SS.

TheWaffen-SSaspoliticalsoldiers

TheSSwasabeastbornofpoliticalnecessity,anditwasapoliticalbeastbynature.Ashasbeennoted,theWaffen-SS“…wasoneofthefewmilitaryformationsthatoweditsexistenceexclusivelytotheemergenceofaparticularpoliticalsystem,andwhosenaturereflectedinmicrocosmtheessenceoftheregimeitserved”(Lucas&Cooper,1975:1).TheinitialmembersoftheSSweremadeupofyoungpoliticalfighterswhohadbeenemployedasbodyguardsandbouncersbytheNaziParty.ButitwasnotlongbeforeHimmlerenvisagedthattheirrolewouldextendfarbeyondthis.TheywereseentobetherevolutionaryshocktroopsoftheReich.AssuchtheyweretoholdaspecialplaceintheaffectionsoftheFührer.UnitssuchastheTotenkopfDivisioncouldnotdenytheirbirthright;“…fromthedayofitscreationuntiltheendofthewar,theTotenkopfDivisionremainedboundbythegeneralpolitical,racialandadministrativelawsoftheSS”(Sydnor,1973:360).

Hitler’saffectionfortheWaffen-SSisevidencedbythelevelandtypeofequipmenttheyreceived.CertainWaffen-SSformations12receivedequipmentinpreferenceandfaroutofproportiontothesizeofitforceswhenconsideredagainsttheWehrmacht(Darman,2004;Engel,1974;Krenetal.,1976;Ripley,2004;Weinberg,1994).ThiswasdespitethefactthattheWehrmachtcontinuallyresistedtheWaffen-SSreceivingsuchequipment.OneofHitler’sadjutantsrecallsthat:

During1943theimportanceoftheWaffen-SShadincreased.Atthebeginningofthewar,andmoresosincethebeginningoftheRussiancampaign,Hitlerhadbuiltupthesedivisionssystematically.Theyembodiedallhisideasforafightingforce.Divisionafterdivisionwasformed;privilegedastoitspersonnelandmateriel…HitlerwasextraordinarilyproudoftheseSSdivisionsandtrustedthemandtheircommandersutterly.(VonBelow,1980:189)

ThepreferentialtreatmenttheWaffen-SSreceivedinrelationtotheallocationofarmourhighlightsthisfavouritismshownbytheFührertothem.AnexampleofthisistheSchwerePanzerabteilung(heavytankbattalions)thatwereformedbyHitlerasameanstoturnthetideofbattlethroughtheuseofsuperiortechnologytoovercomethenumericalsuperiorityoftheenemy.TheseunitswereheavilyutilisedontheEasternFront.SSGeneral,SS-ObergruppenführerArthurPhelpshadbeggedthattheWaffen-SSbegivenmoretanks,“…getustanks,withoutthemthismagnificentforcewillberuined”(Hohne,1969:471).Giventheimportancethattankshadtakenincombat,theseunits,whichutilisedthelatestinGermanytechnologyandweaponry,wereseenaselite.Theseunitswerenormallyequippedwith40to50tanksofeithertheTiger1orlaterKingTigervariety.TheWaffen-SShadthreesuchSchwereSSPanzerabteilungassignedtothem,againstsome10fortheWehrmacht.

Overall,almostathirdofallGermany’sPanzerDivisionsbelongedtotheWaffen-SS.BytheendofthewarsomeoftheSSPanzerDivisionshadtankbattalionsthatweresome20percentstrongerthanequivalentarmyunits.Outof38DivisionstheWaffen-SShadsomesevenPanzerDivisionsandsevenPanzergrenadierDivisions13.ThiswasaratiothatfarexceededthatoftheWehrmacht.TheWaffen-SSinfact,whileonlybeing10percentofthestrengthoftheWehrmacht,madeupaquarterofGermanPanzerunits.

ThefactthatmanyofHitler’soldpartycolleaguesheldcommandsintheWaffen-SSalsocausedhimtofeelaspecialfondnessfortheirunits.HehadthistosayaboutSS-OberstgruppenführerSeppDietrich,commanderoftheLeibstandarteDivision:

TheroleofSeppDietrichisunique.I’vealwaysgivenhimopportunitytointerveneatsorespots.He’samanwho’ssimultaneouslycunning,energeticandbrutal.Underhisswashbucklingappearance,Dietrichisaserious,conscientious,scrupulouscharacter.Andwhatcarehetakesofhistroops…FortheGermanpeople,SeppDietrichisanationalinstitution.(Trevor-Roper,2000:168)

SS-OberstgruppenführerDietrich

Hitler’sregardfortheWaffen-SSwassohighthatmanyofthedivisionswerepermittedtowearthearmbandsthatwerethehallmarkofGermaneliteunits.WhentheGotzVonBerlichingenDivisionreceivedtheirarmbandsaspecialceremonywasorderedbythedivisioncommander,andthiswasattendedbyHimmler.Thedivisionaldiaryrecordedtheeventasfollows:

Thevariouspreparationsfortheceremonyforthepresentingofthearmbandtothedivisionwerecompletedonthe9.4.44.ThatsameeveningtherealsoarrivedtheRF-SS(Reichsführer-SSHimmler),makingtheceremonyanextraspecialoccasion.However,afterhistiringjourneytheeminentguestretiredearly.(Perrigault&Meister,2004:88)

ThiscloserelationshipwithHitlerisexemplifiedintheactionshetookwhenthe6thSSPanzerArmy14ledbyDietrichfailedinitsoffensiveagainsttheRussiansnearViennaandBudapestinearly1945.RatherthenremoveorsacktheSSgeneralsashehaddonetomanyoftheirArmycolleagues,heorderedtheWaffen-SSDivisionstoremovethe

honorificarmbandtitles15thathehadallowedthemtowear.ThiswasthemostdemeaningpunishmentthathecouldthinkofforhisSSsoldiers.FormerDeputyChiefOperationsofficerofthe6thSSArmy,GeorgMaier,wrote,“Thedecreewasconsideredtobeamoralpunishment,and,inpractice,meanttheendoftheWaffen-SSasanelitebodyinHitler’seyes”(Maier,2004:303).

ItisofnotethatwhenformedtheWaffen-SSwasfirstandforemostaunitforuseininternalpolicingtasksandonlysecondwasittobeusedinanexternalroleifaconflictarose.Atalltimes,however,theuseoftheunitwasatthepersonaldiscretionofHitler.SSGeneralPaulHausserattemptedtodenythispolicingrolewhilegivingevidenceatNuremberg:

HERRPELCKMANN:WastheVerfügungstruppe,therefore,meanttobeapoliticalnucleus?TheProsecutionaccusesitofbeingaspecialinstrumentfortheoppressionandeliminationofpoliticalopponentsandofhavingaidedrealisationoftheNaziideologybyuseofforce.HAUSSER:Thatisnottrue.TheVerfügungstruppehadneitherpoliticalnorpolicetasks.Itdevelopedgraduallyintoatesttroopwhichincorporatedalltheoldsoldierlyvirtueswiththerequirementsofoursocialistage.Itpaidspecialattentiontotherelationsbetweenofficersandmen,encouragedadvancementwithoutspecialexaminations,anddidawaywithanyandallexclusiveness.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:358)

OnewillrecallthatthepreviousFührerorderclearlyoutlinedthattheWaffen-SSwastobeapoliticalinstrument.HimmlersawtheWaffen-SSaspoliticalsoldieryandtoensurethisanindoctrinationprogramwasimplementedthatpermeatedalllevelsoftheSS.AsoneWaffen-SScompanycommanderwrotehome,“ThismorningIhaveheldanhourofideologicalinstruction,consequentlythemenhavehadthenecessarypoliticalknowledgeconveyedthattheyrequireforthebattleagainstworldBolshevism”(Huffman,2005:96).ThisprogramcoveredsuchissuesasthethreatposedtoGermanybytheJewsandCommunism,andtheimportanceofGermanVolkandtheNordicrace.ItneedstoberememberedthattheWaffen-SSinitsinitialstagesatleast,itwasanallvolunteerorganisation,assuchtherecanbelittledoubtthatthosevolunteeringwerenotawareofitscloseassociationwiththeNaziPartyanditsideology.HoweverveteransstilltrytoclaimalackofpoliticalaffiliationwiththeNazisascanbeseenbythecommentsofWikingDivisionveteranHendrikVertonwhostated“ThefieldgreycladmenoftheSSdidnotwantapoliticalarmyandforthatreasonremovedthemselvesfromHimmler”(Verton,2007:57).AdmissiontotheSSwasideologicallyanchoredintheNationalSocialistdoctrineofracialpurity.TheSSevenhaditsownnewspapercalledtheDasSchwarzeKorps,whichwasapprovedin1936byHimmlerandwaspublishedinanefforttowidelydistributealloftheSSmessagesofhate.Itcontinuedtobedistributeduptothelastmonthofthewar.

DasSchwarzeKorpsdidmirrortheideasoftheSSleadership,andinitspagesbasicelementsofSSideologyarepresent.Inthisrespect,itwasindeedthevoiceoftheSSandnotjustanotherNazinewspaper.(Combs,1986:35)

AtNuremberg,however,thedefencewitnessesfortheWaffen-SSattemptedtoignorethispoliticalaffiliation.LeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerofficerRobertBrillgavethefollowingevidence.

HERRPELCKMANN:Andnow,togobacktothevolunteers,canyoutellusanythingaboutthemotivesforvolunteering?BRILL:Yes.InmyofficeIreadthousandsuponthousandsofapplicationsforadmission.Icansaythatupto1939theenthusiasmfortheSS,foritsdecentandproperconduct,wasthemainreasonforvolunteering.Besidesthese,manyvolunteeredforprofessionalreasons.HERRPELCKMANN:Didthatchangeafterthebeginningofthewar?BRILL:Afterthebeginningofthewar,themainreasonforvolunteeringwasthatthemenwantedtodotheirmilitaryserviceinaclean,modern,eliteformation.Professionalreasonsalsoplayedapartinvolunteering.AfterthebeginningofthewarveryfewcametotheWaffen-SSforpoliticalreasons…(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:341)

Brill’sclaimsdonotmatchthepoliticalrealityoftheWaffen-SS.Forexample,oftheapproximately6000DaneswhovolunteeredforserviceintheWaffen-SS,some75percenthadsomekindofaffiliationwiththeDanishNaziParty(DNSAP)(Smith,Poulsen,&Christensen,1999).Ofthe125,000WestEuropeanvolunteers,aboutathirdbelongedtopro-Naziorganisations(Hohne,1969).Some30percentoftheSSFlemishLegionweremembersoftheDutchNationalSocialistparty(Buss&Mollo,1978).Oftheapproximately950SScampofficersstudiedbyMacLeanabout80percentweremembersoftheNaziParty(MacLean,1999a).AcorrectideologicalattitudewasnecessaryforentryintotheSS;beingamemberoftheNaziPartymadethisalltheeasier.Himmlerhimselfconstantlyremindedhissoldiersoftheirunderlyingidealsandmission.ShortlyaftertheGermansinvadedRussiain1941,HimmlermadethefollowingspeechtoWaffen-SSsoldiersofKampfgruppeNord.

Foryears,foroveradecadenowweoldNationalSocialistshavestruggledinGermanywithBolshevism…Theseanimals,thattortureandill-treateveryprisonerfromourside,everywoundedmanthattheycomeacrossanddonottreatthemthewaydecentsoldierswould,youwillseeforyourself.ThesepeoplehavebeenweldedbytheJewsintoonereligion,oneideology,thatiscalledBolshevism…(Quarrie,1991:64)

Speechessuchastheaboveallowedtheprocessofdistancingtobegin.TheWaffen-SSwasclearlybeingencouragedtodistanceitselffromthoseelementsofsocietyviewedbytheNazisasdispensable.DespitethefactthattheWaffen-SSwasentwinedwiththerootsoftheNaziPartyformermembersstillattemptedtodenythisassociationatNuremberg.BrillgoesontoexplainwhypeoplejoinedtheWaffen-SSfornon-politicalmotives.

HERRPELCKMANN:IsittruethatinGermanytheWaffen-SSwasconsideredasthefourthbranchoftheArmedForcesandnot,astheProsecutionsays,thepickedtroopoftheNazis?BRILL:Yes.IbelieveIcanaffirmthis,atleastformyfieldofduty.OnlytheselectionwascarriedoutaccordingtoSSdirectives,whileacceptancefortheWaffen-SSdependedontheapprovaloftheWehrbezirkskommando…WecanalsosaythatwehadnoconnectionwhateverwiththeParty,forthePartygaveusnoorders.ThefewPartymemberswhowereintheWaffen-SSpaidnoPartyduesfortheperiodoftheirservice…(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:344)

ThereweremorethanafewpartymembersintheWaffen-SS;therecanbelittledenialof

thelinkbetweentheNaziPartyandtheWaffen-SS.Yerger(1997;,1999)inhisvasttwo-volumestudyexaminedthecommandersoftheWaffen-SSDivisions,corpsandarmies.Heprovidesdetailsforsome105seniorWaffen-SScommanders.Ananalysisofthesecommandersshowsthatsome97percenthadjoinedtheNaziPartyin1933orprior.NinetypercentoftheseofficersweremembersofthegeneralSSpriortojoiningtheWaffen-SS.Afurther31percenthadbeenmembersoftheSA.InhisstudyoftheWaffen-SS,Wegnerestimatesthatabouttwo-thirdsoftheseniorWaffen-SSofficershadbeenmembersofthegeneralSSpriortojoiningtheWaffen-SS.AnexaminationoftheDienstalterslisteorSSOfficerslistforJanuary1942providesaninterestinginsightintothepoliticalaffiliationsoftheseniorofficercorpsoftheWaffen-SS.Ofthe30WaffenSSgeneralslistedsome25,or83percent,weremembersoftheNaziParty(SchifferPublishing,2000).Thebreak-upisasfollows.RankNumberofofficerslistedasmembersoftheWaffen-SSMembersofthe%membershipNaziParty

SS-ObergruppenführerSS-GruppenführerSS-BrigadeführerTotal31116303100109112752583

Note:SourcedfromSchifferPublishing2000.ThefiguresshowthoseofficerslistedashavingWaffen-SSrankintheSS-OfficerlistforJanuary1942.

By193369percentofthefutureofficersoftheWaffen-SSweremembersoftheNaziParty.Afurther20percentoftheseofficerswouldjointheNaziPartyatalaterstage(Wegner,1990).ThesefigurescanleavelittledoubtastotheconsensusheldamongWaffen-SSofficersastotheirpoliticalviews.WegnermakestheinterestingobservationthatwhiletheSSgeneralshadabouta25percentmembershipoftheNaziPartypriortotheNazistakingpower16,thisfigurewasashighas50percentforlowerrankssuchasSS-ObersturmbannführerorLieutenant-Colonel(Wegner,1990).TheseweretheofficerswhowouldbecommandingtheregimentsandbattalionsoftheWaffen-SSinthefield.Thispoliticalaffiliationmadeobediencealltheeasier.TheOrganisationBookfortheNaziPartyitselfsuccinctlystatestheroleofpoliticalobediencethattheSSsoldierwasexpectedtoshowtotheNaziregime:

Obedienceisunconditionallydemanded.ItarisesfromtheconvictionthattheNationalSocialistideologymustreign.Hewhopossessesitandpassionatelysupportsitsubmitshimselfvoluntarilytothecompulsionofobedience.Therefore,theSSmanispreparedtocarryoutblindlyeveryorderwhichcomesfromtheFührerorisgivenbyoneofhissuperiorsevenifitdemandsthegreatestsacrificeofhimself.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:179)

ThisclearlyindicatesthestrongpoliticalaffiliationthatseniorofficersoftheWaffen-SShadwiththeNaziParty.AsnotedbyWegner:WhatmattersisnotsomuchthefactthattherewasagreaternumberofconvincedNazisintheWaffen-SSthaninthearmy.WhatactuallymadethetwoofficercorpssofundamentallydifferentwasthefactthatwithintheWaffen-SStherewasfromtheoutsetnoplaceforofficerswhosepoliticalpastcouldhavebeenanythingotherthanNationalSocialist.(Wegner,1990:280)

ButtheSSwasseenasmorethenjustapoliticalforcedrivenbytheNaziideology.HimmlersawthattheSSmanwouldhaveatwo-foldrolethatwouldhavetheSSheavilyinvolvedinthepoliticalapparatusofthestateandalsothegeneticfoundationofthenew

Germanicnationaswell.HimmlersawtheSSasakinshiportribalorderthatwouldbindGermanicmentogetherwithaviewtostrengtheningAryanblood.

TheSSwouldessentiallybethecoreofthenewmasterrace;theywouldbethebiologicalagentwithwhichhewouldachievehisAryandream.HimmlersawtheSSbeinggroundedinthetermsofbloodandbone;heheldromanticvisionsofNordicpeasantsforminganeweliteintheNaziReich.ThesewerenotjusttheramblingsofaromanticHimmler,HitlerhimselfclaimedtohaveseentheresultsofhisSSpropagatingthespeciesfirst-handnearhishomeatBerchtesgadeninApril,1942:

AtBerchtesgadenweoweagreatdealtotheinfusionofSSblood,forthelocalpopulationtherewasofspeciallypoorandmixedstock.InoticedthisparticularlywhiletheBerghof17wasbeingbuilt,andIwasmostanxioustodosomethingtoimproveit.Today,thankstothepresenceofaregimentoftheLeibstandarte,thecountrysideisaboundingwithjollyandhealthyyoungchildren.Itisapracticewhichmustbefollowed.Tothosedistrictsinwhichatendencytowardsdegeneracyisapparentwemustsendabodyofelitetroops,andin10or20yearsthebloodstockwillbeimprovedoutofallrecognition.(Trevor-Roper,2000:434)

ThispureracewastobepreservedbyensuringthatonlythepurestofbloodlineswereallowedtoenterhisSS(thiswouldchangelaterinthewarasmanpowerneedstookprecedence).ForthisreasonAryanbloodlineshadtobeprovedforgenerationsasfarbackas1750forSSofficersand1800forenlistedmen.SSGeneralOttoKummexplainedhowthemembersoftheSSwereinitiallyselected;

Ifirsttookalookatthem,howtheywerebuilt,whatimpressiontheymadeonmeandthenweselectedaccordingly.Therewassuchalotofthemthatwecouldn’ttakeallthosewhoapplied.Big,blond,blueeyed,thatwasourfirstchoice,wewouldonlytakethebest.(Halliley,2003)

ItwasforthisreasonthatallrecruitexaminationsfortheWaffen-SS(atleastintheearlywaryears)consistedofadoctorandaracialexaminer,whowastodetermineiftherecruitwasraciallyacceptabletotheNordicideals.RecruitswererequiredtopossessamedicalandracialfitnesscertificatebeforegainingentrytotheWaffen-SS.Therecruit,intheearlydaysofthewaratleast,facedafivepointracialcheck“…toevaluatetheracialfeaturesoftheapplicant.ThisstretchedfrompurelyNordicdowntosuspicionofextra-Europeanbloodmixtures”(Wegner,1990:134).ClearlytherecanbenodenyingthattheWaffen-SSwasaraciallybasedorganisation.Indeedaslateas1944HimmlerrefusedtoreducetheracialstandardsfortheWaffen-SSanyfurther,arguingthattheracialselectionwasaninseparablepartoftheSSOrden.

Waffen-SSveteranJurgenGirgensohnrelatedtheimportanceofthisconceptofthemasterraceinapost-warinterview:“…thefactthatweweregenuineAryanswasaveryimportantpoint.WeasAryansfeltsuperiortootherraces,webelievedthatwereallywouldruleEuropeoneday”(Halliley,2003).ThismixtureofelitisminthetraditionalsenseofaguardunitandthebiologicalpurityofthememberswouldensurethattheSSwouldbecapableofcarryingouttherevolutionaryroleitwasenvisagedtoperformintheneworder.HimmlerexplainedthereasoningandimportancebehindhisvisioninaNordicorderinthefollowingspeech.ThisspeechbyHimmlerwascontainedinapublication

entitled,“OrganisationandObligationsoftheSSandthePolice”.Itwaspublishedin1937inabookletcontainingaseriesofspeechesoressaysbyimportantofficialsofthePartyandtheStateknownas“NationalPoliticalCoursefortheArmedForcesfrom15to23January1937”(document1992a-PS).

Accordingly,onlygoodblood,bloodwhichhistoryhasprovedtobeleadingandcreativeandthefoundationofeverystateandofallmilitaryactivities,onlyNordicblood,canbeconsidered.IsaidtomyselfthatshouldIsucceedinselectingfromtheGermanpeopleforthisorganisationasmanypeopleaspossible,amajorityofwhompossessthisdesiredblood,inteachingthemmilitarydisciplineand,intime,theunderstandingofthevalueofbloodandtheentireideologywhichresultsfromit,thenitwillbepossibleactuallytocreatesuchaneliteorganisationwhichwouldsuccessfullyholditsowninallcasesofemergency…Theyareverythoroughlyexaminedandchecked.Of100menwecanuseontheaverage10or15,nomore.Weaskforthepoliticalrecordofhisparents,brothersandsisters,therecordofhisancestryasfarbackas1750,andnaturallythephysicalexaminationandhisrecordfromtheHitlerYouth.Further,weaskforaeugenicrecordshowingthatnohereditarydiseaseexistsinhisparentsandinhisfamily.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:176)

FromtheaboveitwouldbedifficulttoseehowanyrecruitfortheWaffen-SScouldclaimthattheywereunawareofthepoliticalorideologicalbasisoftheSS.InthenewworldorderenvisagedbyHimmler,seenfromaneo-Darwinismviewpoint,onlythestrongwouldsurvive,theweakwouldbedestroyed.Asaveteranofthe4thSSPolizeiDivisionrecounted,“Wearetheracethatmustruletheworld,that’swhattheysaidtous,andallotherracesmustbesubordinatedtotheAryanrace.Theyarenomorethenswine,werulethewholeworld”(Halliley,2003).IndeedastudyconductedonmembersoftheSSin1933showedthatmostwere“…openlyandviciouslyanti-Semitic…”,andfurther,thatthosewiththemostintenseantiSemitismwereinseniorleadershippositions(Staub,2002:21).

TheSSattemptedtofosteratribalorfamilyidentitybyinvolvingitselfinallaspectsofitsmembers’lives.Himmler’sGermanisationpolicy,hisproclamationofatribalorderinsteadofanexclusivelymaleorganisation,themarriagelawsoftheSS,thepolicyofLebensborn,thepromotionofbirthsoutofwedlockandHimmler’sconsiderationofintroducingpolygamy,wereallmeasuresintendedtoinfusenewbloodintotheGermanpeople.(Wegner,1990:24)

ThispolicyofGermanisationandpromotionofAryanbloodwastobeachievednotonlybythecullingofthoseofnon-Aryanblood,butalsobyprolificreproductionoftheAryans.TofacilitatethisHimmler“…demandedtotaldedication,serviceandsubmissionwithoutcontradictiontohisownwill,eveninprivatematters”(Birn,1991:356).MembersoftheSSwereencouragedandevenpressuredtorelinquishmembershipofthechurch.ThelevelofchurchmembershipcancellationsincreasedrapidlyintheWaffen-SSasaresultofanunderstanding.Ateveryopportunitybytheuseofspeeches,pamphletsandlecturestheSSwereexposedtoanideologythatfocusedonthegoodoftheVolkorrace.Waffen-SSGeneralKarlWolffstatedthat“Himmlerhadsetouttoachieveadream,hewouldinspireanewawakeningoftheGermanicracewithintheGermanpeople”

(Bloomberg,2000).Thisattempttoforgeafamilyidentityandinvolvementinallaspectsofthemembers’livesledtheSStobecomeatotalinstitution;thisbeinganinstitutionwherealllifeactivitiesareundertakenuniformlybyasingleauthority.ForthisreasonthevastmajorityoftheWaffen-SSofficercorps“…werebroughttogetherunderoneandthesameideologicalroof”(Wegner,1990:268).ThiswouldenableHimmlertocallupontheSStoundertakeanumberofatrocitiesinthenameofthissharedidealism.

InmanyofhisspeechesHimmlerreferredtotheexterminationrolethatheandtheSShadbeencalledontoperform.HearguedthatthisburdenthattheyundertookwasproofoftheirfaithtotheGermaniccause.ManyoftheWaffen-SStriedtodistancethemselvesfromHimmlerafterthewarandstatedthattheydidnottakehimseriously.ItisnotthecasethattheofficersoftheWaffen-SSwereunawareofHimmler’sintentions.HimmlerclearlyalludedtothisriddingofundesirablesinaspeechtoofficersoftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerDivisionin1941wherehemakesreferencetotheinvasionofRussiaandthetasksthatwillhavetobeundertakenthere:

VeryoftenthememberoftheWaffen-SSthinksaboutthedeportationofthesepeoplehere.ThesethoughtscametometodaywhenwatchingtheverydifficultworkoutthereperformedbytheSecurityPolice,supportedbyyourmen,whohelpedthemagreatdeal.ExactlythesamethinghappenedinPolandinweatherwith40degreesofcold,wherewehadtohaulawaythousands,tensofthousands,hundredsofthousands;wherewehadtohavethetoughness,youshouldhearthisbutalsoforgetitagainimmediately,wherewehadtohavethetoughnesstoshootthousandsofleadingPoles,otherwiseonemightlatersorelyregretit.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:348)

Inaspeechonthe16thofMay1944toofficersofthe14thSSGaliciaDivisionatNeuhammerHimmlerstatedthat“Yourhomelandhasbecomesomuchmorebeautifulsinceyouhavelost–onourinitiativeImustsay–theresidentswhoweresooftenadirtyblemishonGalicia’sgoodname,namelytheJews”(Littman,2003:78).SS-ObergruppenführerWolffrecountshowthemenoftheSSwere:

…subtlyconditionedtoseethemselvesasthesonsoflight,thattheywereengagedinastruggleagainstthepowersofdarkness,anditwastheirdutytofeelthattheywereatalltimesondutyforthenationandinawidersensefortheneworderinEurope.(Bloomberg,2000)

Himmler,ifevertheidealist,wasalsoopentothepracticalitiesofthewar.Whenaddressingthe14thSSDivisionhemadenomentionofthesubhumanSlavinhisspeech.ThisbeingbecausethedivisionwasconstitutedbyUkrainians.Indeed,whilemostoftheWestEuropeanrecruitsreceivedthesameideologicalindoctrinationastheGermanrecruits,specialallowancesweremadefortherecruitsfromEasternEurope.TheUkrainianswerenotgivenlecturesabouttheinferiorityoftheSlavrace,andtheBosnianMoslemswerenotexposedtothecriticismsoforganisedreligions.

TheseracialandideologicalmessageswerewellacceptedbymostoftheWaffen-SS.Forinstance,soldiersoftheTotenkopfDivisionwereexposedtothisdepictionoftheevilJewish-BolshevikenemywhowoulddestroytheGermannation.AsaresulttheyfoughttheconflictontheEasternfrontwithindifferencetohardship,contemptfordeathand

genuinehatredoftheJewish-Bolshevikenemy.TheproductsofEicke’stutelagedevelopedalustforkillingRussiansandfoughtwithacorrespondingtenacitythatearnedthemtheunqualifiedrespectoftheirenemies.Asaformerconcentration-campcommandantandWaffen-SSofficerinthe3rdTotenkopfDivision,SS-SturmbannführerJohannesHassebroekstatedafterthewar,“Wewerethebestandthetoughest”(MacLean,1999a;Segev,1987:63).NorwerethesoldiersoftheTotenkopfaloneinthisviewoftheworld.ThisisreinforcedbythecommentsofWaffen-SSHauptsturmführerMathieuKleinofthe1stWaffen-SSPanzerDivisionLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler:

WhydidIvolunteerfortheWaffen-SSandnottheWehrmacht?TheBolshevikswereseenbymeandbytheWaffen-SS,astheprincipalenemy,againstwhoIwantedtofightasamemberofaneliteforce.(Williamson,1995:22)

ThisviewwasreinforcedbyofficialideologicaltrainingmanualsproducedfortheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler,whichincludedsuchsubjectsasGermanHistory,TheFührerandthehistoryoftheNationalSocialistmovement,JewryandBolshevism.Indeed,upontakingoverthe5thSSPanzerDivisionWiking,SS-ObergruppenführerFelixSteinerorderedtheformationofanideologicaltrainingunit,whichthengavethemenabroadintroductiontotheracialandideologicalthemesoftheNazis(Smithetal.,1999).Waffen-SSveteranOswaldVanOoteghem,aFlemishvolunteer,outlinedoneofthemainreasonsforhimjoiningtheWaffen-SSwassothathecouldjointhefightagainstBolshevism(Halliley,2003).Inhispost-warmemoirsSwedishveteranErikWallin,amemberofthe11thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionNordland,showedjusthowresilientthisviewoftheenemyintheeastwas:

AftermorethenthreeyearsofstruggleintheEast,andtwoyearsofalmostcontinuousretreat,ourfightingspiritwasstillunbroken.Weperseveredunderthehardestconditions.Everyday,comradesfaceddeathanddestruction.Thelastphysicalenergyandmentalforcewasalmostdrainedoutofthecommonsoldier,butourfightingspiritwasstillthere.Ourfaithlayfirmlyinthefinalvictoryofthesuperiorpowerofourweapons.Ourtrustinourowncombatskill,againstthebarbaricmassesfromtheEast,wasasstrongasever.(Hillblad,2002:11)

Theabovecommentshowsthatevenafteryearsofdefeat,membersoftheWaffen-SSstillsawtheRussiansasbarbarians,barbarianswhocould,however,consistentlydefeatanarmyofsupposedAryansupermen.AsoneWaffen-SSveterancommented;

InretrospectIthinkthattherewasaverystrongspiritofcomradeship,whichwasbasedonthesamebeliefssotospeak.Basedonthefactthatwewereconvincedthatwewereconductingajustfight.Thatwewereconvincedthatwewereamasterrace.Wewerethebestofthismasterraceandthatreallydoesformabond.(Halliley,2003)

OtherveteranshavesteadfastlymaintainedthattheWaffen-SSwasnotapoliticalorideologicalbeast,butratherjustmeresoldiers.JohannVoss,amemberofthe6thSSMountainDivisionNord,arguesthisinhispost-warmemoirs:

ThenotionoftheWaffen-SSaspoliticallyorraciallyindoctrinatedfanatics,drivenbypartyideologyandhate,wasinmyexperiencefarfromreality.Ourtrainingwasfocusedonpreparationforvictoryinmodernwarfare,andallofuswerevolunteerswhowanted

justthatkindofpreparation.Yes,wedidfeelabitdifferentfromtheotherpartsofthearmedforces…(Voss,2002:57)

SS-ObersturmbannführerRichardSchulze-KossensoftheSSLeibstandartedivisionstatedinapost-warinterviewthattheWaffen-SSsoldiersjustlaughedofftheideologicalideasofHimmler.However,itisofnotethatlaterhestated,“…wewouldgointoactionifiteverbecamenecessary–notforHitlertheman,butforGermany.Asfaraswewereconcerned,HitlerwastheembodimentoftheGermanStateinthosedays”(Mollo,1982:86).Thesecommentsfromtheveteranseematodds,asononehandhedismissestheinfluenceofHitler,butinthenextsentenceemphasisestheimportanceofHitlerasapoliticalleaderandassuchthepoliticalaffiliationoftheWaffen-SStoHitler.ThecommentsofSchulzeKossensareunderminedevenfurtherwhenoneconsidersthattheuseofideologyintheWaffen-SSwas“…thereforenotsolelyameasuremeanttoimposementaluniformityonitowntroops,butalsotoserveitsambitiontoassertitselfvis-à-vistheWehrmacht”(Wegner,1990:213).

ThisideologicalbasisiswhatdifferentiatedtheWaffen-SSfromtheregulararmy.CertainlytheaccountrenderedbyoneveteranoftheSSHitlerjugend18Division,HerbertWalther,wouldseemtoillustratetheloyaltytodeathshownbyeventheboysoldiersofthisdivisionoftheWaffenSS:

Ayoungladwhodiedinmyarms,whoseeyesIclosedasIcriedasababy,saidtome‘Leutnant,asktheleaderofmycompanytowritetomymotherandtellherIdiedasabravesoldier,formyFührerandmyfatherland”.(Halliley,2003)

OtherveteransoftheHitlerjugendDivisionalsoconfirmthat“…todiefortheFatherlandwasanhonourableact”(Luther,1987:16).VeteranswhotrytopainttheWaffen-SSasjustsimplesoldiersaresupportedtosomedegreebyauthorswhoclaimthattheWaffen-SSunits,forexampletheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler,whilenotbeingordinarysoldiers,werenotideologicalfanatics.Rathertheywerean“…elitemilitaryunitwhich,infusedwiththefreebooterspiritwhichrecognisednomorallimitations,actedasanimmediateexecutoroftheFührer’swill…”(Weingartner,1974:172).Thereissomedifficultywiththisstatement.Ontheonehandtheunitsarenotideologicalfanatics,yetontheothertheyaredescribedasamilitaryunitwithoutmoralconscienceandactingatthewillofanideologicalandpoliticaldemagogue.Ifailtoseemuchdifferencebetweenthetwoconcepts.TheiractionsontheNightoftheLongKniveswouldseemtoindicatetheoppositetothisclaim.

WhentalkingabouttheWaffen-SSasawholeIwouldagreewithSydnorwhostatesthat“…toconcludethatallofthesemenweremurderersorcriminallunaticswhowillinglyindulgedinatrocitieswouldbejustasludicrousastheeffortsbytheapologiststoprovethattheWaffen-SSreallywasnotpartoftheSS”(Sydnor,1973:341).CertainlyitisnottheargumentofthisbookthatallthesoldiersoftheWaffen-SSwereideologicalwarriorsbentondestruction.Butcertainlythehigher-commandechelonsandalargecoregroupoftheWaffen-SSweremotivatedbypoliticalandideologicalconcernsandcarriedoutwhatcouldonlybedescribedassystematicorendemicatrocities.Thisraisestheissueofgroupresponsibility,whichwillbediscussedlater.

TheWaffen-SSdisplayedanti-Slavicprejudicesinitsmilitaryactivities.Thistypeof

attitudewascontributedtobytheideologicaltrainingoftheWaffen-SS.AspartofthepreparationofhisTotenkopfdivision,SSObergruppenführerEickehadaspecialcourseofpoliticalindoctrinationdevised.ThisinvolvedbreakingthesoldiersintosmalldiscussiongroupswithSSofficerswheretheywoulddiscussnationalityandhome,history,geographyandbiology(Sydnor,1990).Eickeconsideredthesetopicstobeofgreatimportanceas“…theyrepresentedmostofthebasicNaziracialandpoliticaltheories”(Sydnor,1990:143).Ofnoteisthat;

Manypresent-dayapologistsfortheWaffen-SS,thosewhoclaimthatitsfunctionsandconductwerestrictlymilitaryandnotpolitical,maintaineitherthatnosuchtrainingprogramsexisted,orthatiftheydidtheaverageSSmandidnottakethemseriously.IntheTotenkopfdivisionsuchpoliticalandracialindoctrinationdefinitelyexisted…thereputationitsubsequentlyearntinRussia,moreover,leavesthedistinctimpressionthatEicke’smentookthelessonsoftheirpoliticaltrainingveryseriously.(Sydnor,1990:146)

TheTotenkopfwasnotaloneorpeculiaramongWaffen-SSunitsinthistypeoftrainingandattitudetowardscertaingroupsofsociety.TheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitleralsohadacourseofweeklyindoctrinationlessonsthatwereconductedbyeducationofficers.SessionssuchasthesewerestandardisedfortheentireSSin1935throughtheuseofindoctrinationjournals,whichcarriedtheusualNaziracialthemessuchas“…onehadbetternotspeakatallaboutafeelingofhonouramongJews”(Weingartner,1974:30).IthasbeenarguedthattheWaffen-SSasawholewasnotnaiveinrelationtotheaimsandpoliciesoftheNaziParty,“thereisalsonodoubtthattheywerealreadyawareofHitler’sracistpolicies,especiallytowardstheJews…”(Reynolds,1999:3).WhenengagedinbitterfightingwithRussianforcestheWaffen-SSbegantoreadilylabeltheenemyasJewishorotherenemiesoftheNazistate.ItbecamestandardpracticethatwheretherewasdesperateRussianresistancethiswouldbeattributedto:

…Jews,bandits,partisansorthesinisterinfluenceofcommissars.TheobjectwastointensifytheSSmen’shatredfortheenemybyidentifyingtheRussiansoldierwiththemostperniciousandlethalenemiesoftheThirdReich,whowoulddestroyGermanyfirstunlessannihilated.(Sydnor,1990:165).

TheabovequoteencapsulatestheunderlyingethosoftheWaffen-SSthattheywereengagedinabattleofsurvivalagainstideologicalandpoliticalenemies,withwhichtherecouldonlybeoneoutcome,destroythemorbedestroyed.InconclusionitcanbeseenthattheWaffen-SSwasinfactpartoftheoverallNazipoliticalapparatus.Itwasneveralegitimatepartofthearmedforces,butratheranarmedadjunctoftheNaziParty,availableforutilisationatthewilloftheFührer.Theargumentsbyveteransthattheywerejustsimplesoldiersofnoparticularpoliticalpersuasiondonotholdupunderexamination.TheWaffen-SSwasanorganisationthatwasheavilybasedontheracial,ideologicalandpoliticalbeliefsoftheNaziParty.

2.ThestructureoftheWaffen-SS

UnderstandingtheideologybehindtheWaffen-SSisbutonepartofunderstandingtheorganisationasawhole.Tofullyformapictureastotheorganisationitselfitisnecessarytoexaminethestructural,economicandsociologicalmakeupoftheorganisation.ThisallowsthespectatortoappreciatethecloserelationshipbetweenthevariousarmsoftheSSEmpire,andtheWaffen-SS.

TheTrainingSchools

Inapost-warmemoirPaulHausserhadthistosayoftheWaffen-SS:“Foryearstheformersoldiersofthistroop,andalsosoldiersoftheHeer,havebeenconcernedtoshowandtoprovethattheWaffen-SSwastrainedaccordingtotheregulationsandinstructionsoftheHeer…”(AssociationofSoldiersoftheFormerWaffen-SS,1973:9).InhispleaforjusticefortheWaffen-SSHausserisnotaccurateindescribinghowtheWaffen-SSweretrained.TheSStrainedtheirofficersatseparateofficercandidateschoolsorSS-Junkerschulen.Eachyeartheschoolspassedoutsome300militarilytrainedSSofficers(Wegner,1985).ThisnumberwasinexcessofthatrequiredbytheWaffen-SS,sosomeoftheseofficersservedinotherareasoftheSSotherthentheWaffen-SS.Itservedtwopurposes,however,tohavethisexcess,first,itmeantthattherewasareadyreserveofmilitarilytrainedSSofficers,andsecondithelpedtostrengthenthetiesbetweenthevariousSScomponents.AsnotedbySS-BrigadeführerDoerfflerSchuband:“Theschoolsalsotrainedyoungpoliceofficersforwhomtherewasincreaseddemand.YoungSSofficerswhowereslatedforadministrativeassignmentswerealsotrainedattheofficercandidateschoolsoftheSS”(Doerffler-Schuband,1949:2).AnumberofSS-Junkerschulenoperatedbetween1934and1945,withperhapstheJunkerschulenatBadTolzbeingthemostwell-known.ThebenefitofhavingseparatetrainingschoolsfromtheregularforceswasthattheSScouldensurethatapoliticalleadershipcorpswastrainedintheeducationalandideologicalareasthatHimmlersawasessentialwithoutinterference.By1944someone-thirdofWaffenSSregimentalorbattalioncommanderswereproductsoftheJunkerschulen;theywere,infact,givenpreferenceforfieldcommands(Wegner,1990).

TheSS-Junkerschulenprovidedacurriculumthatdealtwith“…militarysubjectsandpracticalweaponsandcombattraining,similartotheofficeracademiesofthearmy”(Wegner,1985:226).However,unliketheWehrmachttheWaffen-SSundertheauspicesofex-armyofficerSS-ObergruppenführerFelixSteineradoptedamorephysicalapproach,withrecruitstraininginathleticsandsportratherthanparade-grounddrills(Gingerich,1997;Hohne,1969).ItwasthisphysicalpreparationthatsomeWaffen-SSveterans’claimmadethemsocombateffectiveintheharshclimatesofRussia.Theaimsoftheschools’trainingaccordingtoSS-BrigadeführerDoerffler-Schubandwereto“…buildcharacterbyemphasisingintegrity,fearlessness,chivalry,honour,obedience,helpfulnessandgoodfellowship.Moreover,irreproachableconductinpublic,andthedevelopmentofafamilyspiritwerefurtherrequirements”(Doerffler-Schuband,1949:7).

IdeologicaltrainingwasalsoundertakeninanefforttoproduceaspecificallyNationalSocialisttypeofprofessionalsolider.Waffen-SSofficerandcommanderoftheBadTolz

school,RichardSchulze-Kossens,attemptedtodenyanysuchindoctrinationinhisbookontheSS-Junkerschulen:“AmentalattitudedevelopedinwhichcommonEuropeaninterestsrankedaboveofficialpartydoctrine…therewasnosenseinbotheringEuropeanJunkers…insimplifyingEuropeanhistorytoacourseofeventsinwhichtheNordicprinciplereignedsupreme”(Schulze-Kossens,1982:28).However,thepurposeoftheideologicalindoctrinationsubjectwas:

Tosupportthecadet’sinneracceptanceofthesemilitaryandspecificallySSvaluesbyillustratingtheirideologicalbackground…ThebasicthemesofSSideologyconstitutedthecontentsofthissubject:theeternallawoflife,theirrealisationthroughNationalSocialism,butaboveallanextensiveportrayalofGermanandEuropeanhistorysinceearlyTeutonictimesfromaracialandgeopoliticalperspective.(Wegner,1990:171)

OtherveteranswoulddisagreewithSchulze-Kossen’sattempttodismisstheideologicalindoctrinationundertakenattheJunkerschulen.AsLeonDegrelleexplainstheWaffen-SSsoldierswere“…taughtwhytheywerefighting,whatkindofGermanywasbeingresurrectedbeforetheirveryeyes…theyweretaughtthatallGermansrepresentedanethnicunity”(Degrelle,1983:16).AsnotedbyVuksic,“Inadditiontophysicaltraining,politicsandideologywereanintegralpartoftheirtraining”(Vuksic,2005:1).Instructorsattheschoolstaughtthestudentsthatthewarwasacontinuationofthe2000-year-oldconflictbetweentheAryanandthenonAryan,theJewandtheSlav.ThishadtheeffectofcreatingdistancebetweentheWaffen-SS,theAryans,andtheirpotentialvictims.

Waffen-SSveteran,ZvonimirBernwald,aracialGerman,recountedhowtheyweretrainedattheofficercadetschoolsinmilitaryaspects,butaboveallintheprinciplesofNationalSocialism(Halliley,2003).Astheveteranexplained,thiswasseenasacrucialpartofthesoldier’scraftforelitetroopsbytheWaffen-SS(Halliley,2003;Smithetal.,1999).ThisallowedindoctrinationthatstimulatedtheSSman’simpetustoactaccordingtoafewbasicrulesofNazimorality.AspecialtrainingcampwassetupatAusbildungslagerSennheimforintegratingGermanicvolunteersintotheWaffen-SSin1940.Aspartofthistraining“…ideologicaleducationwasconsideredthemostimportantcomponentoftheprogram”(Gingerich,1997:822).Thesetrainingschoolscanbeseenasthefirststepinmomentumbuildingonthepathtogenocide.TheWaffen-SSofficerswereclearlybeingconditionedtomovedownthepathofgenocideagainstthoseelementsthattheNazissawassubhumanorpoliticallydispensable.

ChiefWaffen-SSrecruiter,SS-ObergruppenführerGottlobBerger,wantedtoensurethenon-Germanrecruits“…receivedthesameideologicalinstructionastheirGermancounterparts,learningaboutthegreatideaofNazism,racialscienceandmethodstorecognisetheenemyinallforms”(Gingerich,1997:822).TheenemyinallformscanbetakentoincludethatenemiesoftheReichwerebothexternalandinternal.Ofnote,however,isthatfewofficersintheWaffen-SScamefromoutsideGermany.Wegnerstudiedsome582officersoftheWaffen-SSandonly48officersoreightpercentcamefromoutsideGermany(Wegner,1990:235).AsnotedbyHatheway,theSS-JunkerschulenwereinexorablylinkedtotheNaziPartyanditsideologicalandpoliticalgoals:

Fromtheirinceptionin1934untiltheirdemisein1945.TheJunkerschulen,therefore,remainedpoliticalinstitutionsinservicetotheNationalSocialistrevolutionandtothevariousorganisationsofthepartyandstate…indeeditwaspreciselybecausetheSSwas

sohighlypoliticalandrevolutionarythatHimmlerconsideredthedevelopmentofastandardised,professionaleducationalprocessessential.(Hatheway,1999:9)

Ideologicaltrainingtookupsome10percentofacadet’scoursework.Somemayarguethatthisisasmallcomponentoverall,however,ideologicalindoctrinationwasgivenspecialweightinginexcessofitstimeallotmentinthefinalevaluationsofallofficercandidates(Hatheway,1999;Wegner,1990).SS-BrigadeführerDoerffler-Schubandstatedthatpoliticalindoctrinationwasgiventhesameweightingastacticsinthecurriculum,withbothsubjectshavingthegreatesttimeallocationcomparedtoothers(Doerffler-Schuband,1949).Hegivesabreakdownofcomparativeweightingsofsubjectsanditisreproducedbelow.SubjectWeighting

Tactics8PoliticalIndoctrination8OrganisationoftheGermanArmy5SpecialServicesCourse3TerrainOrientation3TroopDuty5SignalCommunication3Engineering2Aviation1MotorTransport1Gymnastics5MountedDrill1

Note:SourcedfromDoerffler-Schuband1949.Thefiguresshowtherelativeamountoftimespentoneachsubject.ForinstanceeighttimesasmuchtimewasspentonTacticsascomparedtowiththetimespentonMotorTransport,etc.

Itisinterestingtoreadthepost-warmemoirsofsomeWaffen-SSmembers;despitetryingtowalkthepoliticallycorrectlineonecanglimpsetheirdeeperfeelingscomingtothefore.Forinstance,inhisbiographyHansSchmidt,aveteranoftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerDivision,commentsonthetraininghereceived.

Amongotherthingswetouchedonsuchsubjectsasracialstudies,culture,EuropeanhistoryfromaNationalSocialisticpointofview,religioningeneralandsocialprogress…themanyhoursaweekofourtrainingwasevenlysplitbetweenpracticalfieldserviceandtheoreticalinstruction…Duringourinstructionsaboutracenoattemptwasmadetoimbuehateofothergroupsinus,althoughitwasquiteclearlypointedoutthatmostoftheaccomplishmentsofthemodernman,beginningwiththeancientGreeks,camefromwhiteAryans.Perhapsduetotimelimitswetouchedonthevariouscharacteristicsofthemajorracesi.e.white,yellowandblack.Jewsdidnotfallintoeitherofthesecategories,andwere,withonesentence,merelydefinedasamixedraceseeminglynotworthyofgreaterconsideration.(Schmidt,2001:51)

FurtheronSchmidtcomestothefollowingconclusion,whichseemstosuggestthathewasinstructedabouttheJewswithmuchmorethanjust“onesentence”.

LeaderslikeMartinLutherandFredericktheGreathadallbeenrealGermans,andsuddenlythesegiantsandotherlikethemhadbeensupplantedbyanethnicallyandgeneticallydifferenttribethatbelieveditcoulddoeverythingbetter.Inotherwords,noGermansolutionofGermanproblemswaspossiblewiththeJewsstillinpower.(Schmidt,2001:56)

ThisclaimoftrainingbeingconductedwithoutanyracialorideologicalindoctrinationwasalsoputforwardbySS-OberstgruppenführerHausser,whowasinitiallyinchargeoftheWaffen-SStrainingprogram.

HERRPELCKMANN:TheProsecutionisparticularlyaccusingtheVerfügungstruppeforincitingracialhatredandforthepersecutionoftheJewsasoneofitsspecialtasks.Wasthetrooptrainedforthesepurposes?HAUSSER:Thepoliticalandideologicaltrainingcouldonlybeachievedbyschooling.I,personally,asdirectoroftheschoolandasaninspector,havecloselywatchedthistraining,forIwasanewmanmyselfandhadfirsttoacquaintmyselfwiththesewaysofthinking.IcantestifythatracehatredandtheexterminationofJewryoroftheEasternpeopleswasnevertaughtandwasneverdemanded.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:359)

SS-OberstgruppenführerHausser

ThistestimonyfromHausserbearsexamination.ThisistheSSgeneralwhoalsoclaimedthathedidnotknowabouttheconcentration-camps,yetslavelabourwasemployedattheSS-Junkerschulenthathewasinchargeof.IntheJunkerschulenatBadTolztherewerecellsbuiltunderneaththeschooltohouseconcentration-campinmateswhosejobitwastomaintainthefacilitiesoftheschool.Infact,thecellsinthebasementoftheschoolwereusedasasub-campforDachauandcouldhouseupto50prisonersatanyonetime(Hatheway,1999:83).AsnotedbyStein,toclaimthatthetrainingoftheWaffen-SSwasnotinideologicalsyncwiththeNaziswasjustnottrue;

…Inviewoftheamountoftimedevotedtoideologicalindoctrinationinthepre-warSSandthenatureofthematerialpresented,therecanbelittledoubtthatmanyofthemenwhomadeuptheWaffen-SSof1941–particularlytheofficersandNCOs–subscribedtothebasicviewsetforthinHimmler’sstatementsontheracialstruggleandsimilarmatters.(Stein,1966:125)

WhiletheSS-JunkerschulenmayhaveprovidedthetrainingforthefutureleadersoftheWaffen-SS,theyandthefuturedivisionsoftheWaffen-SScouldnothaveoperatedwithoutaneconomicandadministrativeapparatustosupportthem.

TheEconomicandAdministrativeMainDepartment(WVHA)

ThePohlTrial(orWVHATrial)wasthefourthofthe12trialsforwarcrimestheU.S.authoritiesheldintheiroccupationzoneinGermanyinNurembergaftertheendofWorldWarII.These12trialswereallheldbeforetheNMT,notbeforetheIMT.Inthiscase,OswaldPohland17otherSSofficersemployedbytheWirtschafts-undVerwaltungshauptamt(WVHA),theEconomicandAdministrativeDepartmentoftheSS,weretriedforwarcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanitycommittedduringthetimeoftheNaziregime.Themainchargelevelledatthemwastheiractiveparticipationin,andadministrationof,thegenocideoftheJewsandothertargetgroups.Theywerealsoaccusedofslavelabour,participationintheconcentration-campsystem,euthanasiaprograms,economicexploitationandvariousmedicalexperimentscarriedoutoncampinmates.TheWVHAwastheSSofficethatrantheconcentrationandexterminationcamps.ItalsohandledtheprocurementfortheWaffen-SS.

AsfarastheWaffenSSwasconcerned,responsibilityforsupplywasdividedbetweentheSSOperationalHeadquartersandtheWVHA.Broadlyspeaking,theoperationalheadquarterssuppliedarms,ammunition,andothertechnicalequipment,whiletheWVHAwasresponsibleforrations,clothing,fuel,andpersonalitemsofequipment.Amongotherthings,AmtsgruppeBwasresponsibleforthesupplyoffoodandclothingtoconcentration-camps.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:217)

ExamplesoftheexploitationconductedbytheWHVAforthebenefitoftheWaffen-SSarenothardtofind.SS-ObersturmbannführerBoberminreportedhowearthworkswouldbeobtainedfortheWaffen-SSinalettertoWVHAChiefOswaldPohlin1944.

…consideringthatwehaveatechnicallywell-equippedestablishment,andthatthemenoftheforcedlabourcampwillbeatourdisposalatfavourableconditions,weshallmostlikelyshowaprofit.ThemainreasonforthetakingoveristhesufficientsupplyofbuildingmaterialtotheWaffen-SS.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:249)

TheWVHAalsoplayedaroleintheestablishmentoftheWaffen-SSfightingdivisionsasisshownbythisorderconcerningthesettingupofthe17thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionGotzVonBerlichingenin1943.

SS-FHAAmtIVwillraiseby15.11.43SectionIVAofthedivisionwiththedivisionaltreasury…ThepersonneldepartmentoftheSS-WVHAisrequestedtoallocatethenecessaryadministrativeofficersatonce.(Perrigaultetal.,2004:25)

TheWVHAhadthefollowingorganisationalstructure.DivisionAoftheWVHAwasresponsibleforthebudgetoftheWaffen-SSaswellaspromotionsandtransfersoftheWaffen-SSandthesamesuchmovementsfortheconcentration-campsamongotherthings.DivisionBwasresponsiblefortrooporganisationincludingfoodsupplies,

military-campstores,clothingfactoriesandfunds,maintenanceofvehicles,etc.DivisionCwasresponsibleforconstructionsandrealestate,etcoftheWaffen-SS.DivisionDwasresponsibleforthecommandoftheconcentration-camps.DivisionWwasresponsibleforeconomicenterprises.Pohl,whenquestionedbeforetheNMT,confirmedthattheWVHAwasanintegralpartoftheWaffen-SS.

Q.WhatotheragencyoftheGermanWehrmachtcouldbecomparedwiththeWVHAasitwasorganisedinFebruary1942?A.Onecouldcompareitwiththearmyadministrativeoffice.Whatthatofficewasforthearmy,theWVHAwasfortheWaffen-SS.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:327)

WVHAdeputy,SS-GruppenführerGeorgLoerner,supportedthiswhenhewasquestionedabouttheroleoftheWVHA.Q.What,speakingquitegenerally,wasthemainfieldoftaskoftheWVHA?A.TheWVHAwasthehighestadministrativeauthorityoftheWaffen-SSandtoalesserdegreeoftheAllgemeineSS.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:744)

AnumberofSSofficerswerebroughttotrialinrelationtowarcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanityinrelationtotheactionsoftheWVHA.Ofthe17defendantsbroughttotrialsome12wereofficersoftheWaffen-SS,somehavingservedinvariouscombatunits.Theyincludedthebelow:

OSWALDPOHL—SS-ObergruppenführerandGeneraloftheWaffenSS;ChiefoftheSSEconomicandAdministrativeMainDepartment(SSWirtschaftsundVerwaltungshauptamt,commonlyknownas“WVHA”)andchiefofDivisionWoftheWVHA.AUGUSTFRANK—SS-ObergruppenführerandGeneraloftheWaffenSS.DeputyChiefoftheWVHAandchiefofDivisionAoftheWVHA.GEORGLOERNER—SS-GruppenführerandGeneralleutnantoftheWaffen-SS.DeputyChiefoftheWVHA,chiefofDivisionBoftheWVHA,anddeputychiefofDivisionWoftheWVHA.HEINZKARLFANSLAU—SS-BrigadeführerandGeneralmajoroftheWaffen-SS.ChiefofDivisionAoftheWVHA.Fanslauhadalsoservedinthe5thSSWikingDivision.ERWINTSCHENTSCHER—SS-StandartenführeranddeputychiefofDivisionBandchiefofOfficeIofDivisionBoftheWVHA.Tschentscherhadservedinthe4thSSPolizeiandthe5thSSWikingDivisions.RUDOLFSCHEIDE—SS-StandartenführerandchiefofOfficeVofDivisionBoftheWVHA.Scheidehadservedinthe1stLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerDivision.MAXKIEFER—SS-ObersturmbannführerandchiefofOfficeIIofDivisionCoftheWVHA.FRANZEIRENSCHMALZ—SS-StandartenführerandchiefofOfficeVIofDivisionCoftheWVHA.KARLSOMMER—SS-SturmbannführeranddeputychiefofOfficeIIofDivisionDoftheWVHA.SommersawcombatwiththeWaffen-SS.HERMANNPOOK—SS-ObersturmbannführeroftheWaffen-SSandchiefdentistoftheWVHA,ofOfficeIII,DivisionD.PooksawcombatwiththeWaffen-SS.LEOVOLK—SS-Hauptsturmführer,personaladviser(PersoenlicherReferent)onPohl’sstaff,andheadoflegalsection(LeiterderRechtsabteilung)intheexecutiveofficeof

DivisionWoftheWVHA.HANSBOBERMIN—SS-ObersturmbannführerandchiefofOfficeIIofDivisionWoftheWVHA.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5)

OftheseofficersPohl,EirenschmalzandSommerweresentencedtodeathbyhanging,therestweresentencedtovarioustermsofimprisonment.Scheidewasacquitted.SS-BrigadeführerGlucks,responsiblefortheconcentration-camps,wasnevertriedashecommittedsuicideafterbeingcapturedbytheBritish.

PersonnelCompositionoftheWaffen-SS

TheWaffen-SSwasseverelylimitedbytheWehrmachtinthenumberofGermansitcouldrecruit,soitwasforthisreasonthatitlookedtosourcesofmanpoweroutsideGermanytoexpand.ToaddressthismanpowershortagetheSSundertookthreemethodsofcombatingit,firsttheyattemptedtonegotiatehigherconscriptquotaswiththeWehrmacht,secondtheyattemptedtoencouragevolunteers,andthirdtheyutilisedsourcesofmanpoweroutsideoftheGermanReich.

TooverseethisrecruitmentdriveHimmlerappointedchiefoftheSSMainoffice(SS-HA)andWaffen-SSGeneral,SS-ObergruppenführerGottlobBerger.Bergerwastoundertakehisdutieswithrelishandwithhisstaffhe“…developedthemeansandmethodstoprovidethemanpowerwhichmadetheWaffen-SSapoliticalandmilitaryforcetobereckonedwith”(Rempel,1980:107).OfnoteisthatwhenrecruitingBergerhadinstructedhisstaffthattheyweretoemphasisethefollowingpointswhenrecruiting:“AfterageneraldiscussionofcompulsorymilitaryserviceandtheroleoftheWaffen-SSasabranchofthearmedservices,recruitersweretosketchthehistoryoftheSS,stressingtheconceptofthepoliticalsoldier.”(Rempel,1980:109).AtthetimeoftheinvasionofRussiathereweresome160,425soldiersoftheWaffen-SSwithacombatstrengthofsome95,868(Koehl,1983:200).Some90percentofthesesoldierswereGermansfromwithintheGermanReich,soevenatthisstageofthewartheWaffen-SSwasstillverymuchapureNordicorganisation(Koehl,1983).

By1938theWaffen-SSofficercorpscontainedsome90percentofofficerswhocamefromapeasantbackgroundascomparedtoonlysometwopercentforthearmy(Hohne,1969;Simpson,1990:18).ThislackofmilitarybackgroundisfurtherillustratedwhenitisconsideredthatonlyfivepercentofWaffen-SSofficershadamilitarybackgroundofthistypeasagainstsome49percentforarmyofficers(Hohne,1969;Simpson,1990).Wegnerargues,however,thatatleastforthegeneralsoftheSStheyhadthesamepercentagemilitarybackgrounds,some25percent,astheirarmycounterparts(Wegner,1990).

TheeverresourcefulBergeridentifiedtheHitlerjugendorHitlerYouthasanexcellentrecruitinggroundfortheWaffen-SSandevenbeforethewarBergerwasrecruitingheavilyfromthissourceofmanpower.Himmlerwasalwaysonthelookoutforideologicalsuitablerecruits.TothisendheenticedleadersoftheHitlerjugendleaderstohisJunkerschulenbyofferingthemashortenedcourseforofficercandidates,inthiswaymanybecameofficersandNCOsintheWaffen-SS(Rempel,1980).TheWaffen-SSreliedheavilyontheyouthfulidealisminGermanytoprovidethismanpower.In1941,forinstance,ofsome50,000recruitsovertwo-thirdsofthemwereundertheageof20

(Rempel,1980).ManyofthemcamethroughtheHitlerYouthmovementtojointheWaffen-SS;thishadthebenefitthatbothorganisationswereinideologicalsync.Koehlgivesafigureofsome40,000HitlerYouthvolunteeringfortheWaffen-SSin1941/42,“…manywithextensivepoliticalindoctrination”(Koehl,1983:208).Hans-JoachimLindowwasamemberoftheHitlerYouth,whojoinedtheWaffen-SSasamatterofcourse;itwasseenasanaturalprogression(Halliley,2003).HesawtheWaffen-SSasaguardsregimentwithitsassociatedattractionsandbenefits.

Inadditiontothistherewereanumberofnon-GermanvolunteerswhojoinedtheWaffen-SS.Inallitisestimatedthatsome125,000WestEuropeanvolunteersservedintheWaffen-SS.Theseincludedsome50,000Dutch,20,000Walloons,20,000Flemings,6,000Danesand6,000Norwegians,etc(Hohne,1969;Simpson,1990;Stein,1965).Forexample,inJune1941withintheranksoftheWikingDivisionweresome1143volunteerswhichincluded631Dutch,294Norwegians,216Danes,oneSwedeandoneSwiss(Solarz,2003:15).Otherauthorsclaimthatupto500,000Waffen-SSsoldierscamefromforeignsources,withtheresultthatalmosthalfofthepersonneloftheWaffen-SSwerefromsomenon-Germanorigin(Gingerich,1997;Hatheway,1999;Rempel,1980).Some375,000ofthesecamefromcountriesinEasternEurope,thesebeingracialGermans(foreignersofGermandecent)(Hatheway,1999;Lumans,1993).Whatevertheexactfigureofforeignnationalsithighlightsanimportantpoint,themythoftheWaffen-SSbeingapureGermanicforceofNordicwarriorsisnotcorrect.Ofnoteisthatallforeignnationalswhoundertookofficertraining“hadtoalsoproveGermanic(Aryan)origin,anddemonstratetoaboardofexaminersloyaltytoHitler,totheReich,andtoNationalSocialism”(Hatheway,1999:114).ThisensuredthatthepoliticalandracialloyaltiesoftheWaffen-SSwerestillmaintainedtosomedegree.AtleastintheinitialstagesofforeignrecruitmentitwasstilltheintentoftheWaffen-SStomaintaintheirracialpurity.ForthisreasonrecruitmentwaslimitedtotheirfellowNordiccountriessuchasSwedenandDenmark,etc.

TherecruitmentofGermanicvolunteersinfactdevelopedasanexpressionofSSracialandpoliticalthoughtandambition.Thedecisiontorecruitnon-Germansof“GermanicBlood”fortheWaffen-SSwasinextricablyconnectedwiththedreamofradicallytransformingthefaceofEuropeaccordingtotheNaziconceptsofraceandethnicity.(Gingerich,1997:817)

Lateryearsrecruitment

By1943theWaffen-SSwassufferingseveremanpowershortages.AsaresultHimmlerandBergerwereforcedtolookfurtherafieldandconsidersourcesthatwouldneverhavepassedinspectionintheearlyyears.Overone-thirdoftheoriginalWaffen-SSDivisionshadfalleninRussiaby1943(Hohne,1969).Asaresult,in1943some25percentofWaffen-SSrecruitswereracialGermans.AnotherchangealsotookplaceintherecruitmentoftheWaffen-SS.Whereastheyhadpreviouslyreliedonanall-volunteerforce,nowtheywereforcedtoresorttopress-gangingconscriptsintoservice(Hohne,1969;Rempel,1980;Stein,1966).ThejudgesoftheIMTnoted:

Until1940theSSwasanentirelyvoluntaryorganisation.AftertheformationoftheWaffen-SSin1940therewasagraduallyincreasingnumberofconscriptsintotheWaffen-

SS.ItappearsthataboutathirdofthetotalnumberofpeoplejoiningtheWaffen-SSwereconscripts,thattheproportionofconscriptswashigherattheendofthewarthanatthebeginning,butthattherecontinuedtobeahighproportionofvolunteersuntiltheendofthewar.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol1:270)

TheyalsoreceivedlargedraftsfromtheAirForceandNavy.ThisaffectedtheeliteintegrityoftheWaffen-SStosomedegree,asnolongerwasitpurelymadeupofideologicallyalignedvolunteers(Dallin,1981;Hohne,1969;Krausnicketal.,1965;Krenetal.,1976;Stein,1966).SSGeneralKarlBrennernotedtheeffectconscriptshadonthe6thSSMountainDivisionNordinearly1945afterithadsufferedsome50percentlosses.

Numerically,thelosseshadbeenmoreorlesscompensatedbyassignmentofnewreplacements.TheseconsistedforthegreaterpartofyoungforeignnationalsofGermandescent(Volksdeutsche–racialGermans)whohadreceivedonlyabrieftrainingandhadnotvolunteered,butbeendraftedtotheWaffen-SSinthenormalconscriptionprocedure.Theirfightingvaluewasthereforecorrespondinglylowerthenhadbeenthecasewiththeformerpersonnelandnaturallyloweredthecombatefficiencyoftheentiredivision.(Brenner,1947b:1)

IndeedBergerwasforcedtoaddressissuesthatarosefromthenegativeattitudetowardstheWaffen-SSthatmanyoftherecruitsdisplayed.ThisnegativityarosefromthehighcasualtyratesoftheWaffen-SS,thefactitservedinthemilitaryhotspots,hardtraining,littlechanceofpromotionandforcefulrepudiationofreligiousbeliefs.AlloftheseBergerattemptedtodiscountasonlybeenrumoursfarremovedfromthetruth(Rempel,1980).Itwouldappear,however,thatthehighcasualtyratesmayhavebeenmoretruththenfiction,asHitlercommented,“ForaneliteforcelikeourSS,it’sgreatlucktohavesufferedcomparativelyheavylosses.Inthiswayitisassuredofthenecessaryprestige…”(Trevor-Roper,2000:13).

EvenGermanFieldMarshalEricVonMansteincommentedonhighcasualtiesinhispost-warmemoirs,whereheclaimedthattheWaffen-SS“…paidatollofbloodincommensuratewithitsactualgains…theblameforsuchunnecessaryconsumptionofmanpowermustliewiththemenwhosetupthesespecialunitsforpurelypoliticalmotives…”(VonManstein,1982:188).HeseemedtoforgetthathehimselfcommandedtheSSDivisionsandinfactstatedthefollowinginanorderofthedaydated12thJuly1941:“TheSS-TotenkopfDivisionattackedwithgreatcourage…thedivision’sregimentshavesufferedhighcasualtiesinthisfighting.Iexpressmygratitudetoalltheofficersandmenofthiscorpsfortheirdedication;myrecognitionforyourhighachievement”(Ullrich,2002:90).

SovariedwerethemanpowersourcesoftheWaffen-SSthatitdefiesputtingthemintoanyspecificgroup.In1943the13thSSHandscharDivisionwasformedbyrecruitingBosnianMoslems.AsecondMoslemDivision,the23rdSSKamaDivision,wasplannedbutneverreacheddivisionalstatus,anditscadreswerelatertransferredtotheHandscharDivision.Himmlerwasforcedtosomedegreetolessenhisracialstandardsandhisabhorrenceofreligion.TheHandscharDivisionwasallowedImamsandthe14thSSGaliciaDivisionmadeupofEasternCatholicsfromtheUkrainewasallowedchaplains(Bender&Taylor,

1975;Lepre,1997).Twodivisionswereformedfrompolicemen,thesebeingthe4thand35thSSDivisions.However,itisworthnotingthateventhoughHimmlerwasforcedtoreducehisracialstandardsinsomerespects,hestillbelievedthattheywereessentialtothenatureoftheWaffen-SS.Tothisendtherewasa

FundamentalseparationbetweentheGermanandGermanicSStroopsaspartofthewholeSSOrdenontheonehand,andthenumerousSSvolunteerunitswithoutspecialracialqualifications–asortofsecond-classWaffen-SS–ontheother,whichactuallybeganthetransformationoftheSSfromtheFuhrer’sguardintoamultinationalarmy.(Wegner,1990:139)

ItwasthentheturnoftheBalticStatestocontributetotheSSwarmachine.TwofurtherSSDivisionswereraisedbytheLatvians,onebytheEstonians.Bylate1944Germanywasacceptinganyhumanmaterialitcouldfindandnosourcewasleftuntapped.ItisthereforenotsurprisingthattheGermansintheiringenuityturnedtotheirownterrorapparatus,theconcentration-camps,toobtainmorerecruitsfortheWaffen-SS.SSColonelDrOscarDirlewanger,aPhDscholarandWaffen-SSOberführer,proposedusingcampinmatesinhisunit.Hehadalreadybeenusingpoachersandothercriminalsforsometime.Now,however,heobtainedpermissiontoutilisepoliticalprisonerscurrentlyheldinthecampsystem(Breitman,1991;MacLean,1998;Stein,1966).Some1910menwererecruitedfromcampssuchasAuschwitz,Buchenwald,Dachau,RavensbruckandMauthausen,etcinlate1944.ThisveryrelianceonsuchavarianceofmanpowersourcesprovidedaquandaryforHimmlerastheyunderminedhisveryvisionoftheWaffen-SSbeingideologicallyandraciallypureeliteforthenewGermanReich.ItwasduetothisexpansiontheWaffen-SS,whilestillremainingatoolofNaziconquestandannihilation,lostsomeofitsdistinctivepoliticalandideologicalmakeup.WhilemanyoftheWestEuropeanvolunteersfellintotheideologicalcategory,manyoftheEastEuropeanmembersoftheWaffen-SSwerefightingfornationalisticreasonsatbest,orwerereluctanttofightatallatworst.

Therewerestill,however,someideologicalreservoirsofmanpoweravailabletoHimmler.In1944theWaffen-SShierarchydecidedtorecruitadivisionfromtheyoungmenandboysoftheHitlerjugend.AsnotedbySSBrigadeführerHugoKraas,commanderofthe12thSSPanzerDivisionHitlerjugend,aslateasNovember1944thedivisioncouldrelyonthefollowingreplacements:“Theyoungreplacementsconsistedofvolunteers,whosetraininghadbeenveryshort”(Kraas,1947:5).ThisrelianceontheHitlerjugendensuredthatthesoldierswererecruitedfromthe“…racially,ideologicallyandphysicallyfityouthofNaziGermany”(Simpson,1990:61).TheotherinherentbenefitondrawingonsucharesourcewasthattheboysoftheHitlerjugendhadbeensubjectedto“…yearsofideologicalindoctrination,coupledwiththepurposefulmanipulationofyouthfulidealismwithintheHitlerYouth…”;inshorttheyweretheperfectideologicalwarriorsfortheWaffen-SS(Luther,1987:12).

Withthisinmindsome17,000werecalleduptoformtheSSHitlerjugendDivision,whileanother25,000weredistributedtootherWaffen-SSformations(Rempel,1980).TheseboysoldierswouldbeaseffectiveasanyofthepremierWaffen-SSdivisions.InfacttheywereseenasalmostapseudoLeibstandarte,giventheiridealismandthefactthatalargepercentageoftheofficerandNCOcadrefortheHitlerjugendwastransferredfromthe

LeibstandarteDivision.Thefactthattheywereyoungboyshowever,couldnotbeoverlooked.AsoneveteranoftheSSHitlerjugendDivision,BernhardHeisig,recalled,“Theyoungestamongusdidn’tgetanycigarettes,welltheydidn’tsmokeanyway.Theyactuallygotsweets,confectionery”(Halliley,2003).CountryofOriginApproximatenumberofmenSSFormations

NetherlandsBelgiumFranceItalyDenmarkNorwayFinlandSpainSwedenSwitzerlandSovietUnionLatviaRomaniaEstoniaHungaryCroatiaAlbaniaBulgariaSerbia50,00040,00020,00015,00010,000

60003000100030030060,00080,00050,00025,00020,00020,000700060010,00022ndand34thdivisions27thand28thdivisions33rddivision29thdivision5thand11thdivisions5thdivisionSSRegimentNordland28thdivision5thand11thdivisions5thdivision29thand30thdivisions15thand19thdivisions7thand8thdivisions20thdivision25thand26thdivisions13thand23rddivisions21stdivisionVariousVarious

Note:SourcedfromBishop2005.SomeofthesmallernationalitiesthatcontributedtotheSSarenotmentionedhere.Thetotalfigureofvolunteersmaydifferfromthatofotherauthorsbutnonethelessgivesanaccountofthevariedsourcesofmanpower.

ThetableaboveillustratesthenumbersofvariousnationalitiesthatservedintheWaffen-SSand,mainunitsthattheyservedin.BytheendofthewartheWaffen-SScontainedsoldiersofforeignoriginthatincludedDanes,Norwegians,Finns,Swiss,Swedes,Flemings,Walloons,Frenchmen,Italians,Latvians,Estonians,Russians,Ukrainians,Croats,BosnianSerbs,Hungarians,Albanians,Romanians,Netherlanders,Spaniards,andevensomeBritonsandIndians.WiththisinfluxofforeignerstheWaffenSShadgrown

fromasmallGermanicelitebodytoalargemultinationalforce.Ithad,infact,gonefromsome0.7percentofWehrmachtstrengthin1939to5.4percentin1944(Scherzer,2006).Accordingtoonesourcebytheendof1944theWaffen-SScontainedsome400,000Germancitizens,310,000Volksdeutsche(foreignersofGermanicorigin)and200,000foreignvolunteers(Ploetz,Schramm,&Hillgruber,1960).ThisillustratesthatevenwiththeinfluxofforeignerstheWaffen-SSwasstill,however,primarilyGermanic.Someofthesenationalitieswereonlypresentinsmallnumbers,butnonethelesstheywerepartoftheWaffen-SSatonepointoranother.TheapologistsfortheWaffen-SShaveraisedtheargumentthattheyweremerelythereplicationofthepost-warNATOmilitaryformations;theywere,infact,aEuropeanarmy(Mackenzie,1997).Theargumentbeingthattheywereamultinationalforceformedtoopposecommunism.Indeed,formerWaffen-SSofficershavearguedthattheEuropeanvolunteerswerenotpro-Nazi,butrathershouldbeseenas“anti-Bolshevists”(Erteletal.,2000:6).SS-ObergruppenführerSteinerarguedinhispost-waraccountoftheWaffen-SSthat“…theforeignvolunteersweremenofspiritwho,liketheirGermancomrades,sawthediabolicalthreattoWesterncivilisationposedbyBolshevismandfoughtlikelionsagainstitunderthebanneroftheWaffen-SS”(Mackenzie,1997:138).

ThisstandssomecredenceuntiloneconsidersthattherecruitmentofGermanicvolunteerswasdone“…withtheNazigoalofcreatingaGermanicReichbydrawingupontheGermanicbloodintheentireworld”(Gingerich,1997).Therewerenoplansforautonomyofthecountriesthatthevolunteerscamefrom,theywouldcontinueafterthewarundertheGermanyoke.Indeed,unlikeNATO,whichisastandingforceamongequalpartners,theforeignerswhoservedintheWaffen-SSwereforexpediencyonlyandwerecertainlynotequalsintherelationship.

NorweretheGerman-raisedlegionsintendedasapermanentforce,sincetheywereformedforonepurposeandonepurposeonly–thedefeatoftheSovietUnion.HadthewarendedwithGermanvictory,thelegionsweretohavebeendisbanded,theirpurposehavingbeenserved.(Bussetal.,1978:10)

AswellasthismanyoftheforeigngroupswhojoinedtheWaffen-SSlaterinthewar“…weremotivatedtofightfordifferentreasonsthantheirReichGermancounterparts”(Wegner,1990:311).Manyfoughtfornationalistreasons,howevertheystilldisplayedandsharedtheGermandislikeforJewsandBolshevism.TheinclusionofraciallyinferiorgroupslaterinthewarwasdoneforthesakeofmilitaryexpediencyasgreatholesweretorninthemanpoweroftheWaffen-SSontheEasternFront.TheWaffen-SSremainedaGermanicorder.AsSteinnotes:“TheWaffen-SShadindeedbecomeanarmyofEuropeans;itneverwasaEuropeanarmy”(Stein,1965:22).

InsummaryitcanbeseenthattheWaffen-SSwasgivenspecialtreatmentinrelationtoitsrelationshipwithHitler,initstrainingschoolsandtheSScourtsystemusedtoregulateit.Thesewerebenefitsthatwerenevergiventotheregulararmyunits.ThetrainingoftheWaffen-SSwasdeliberatelyaimedatproducingeffectivemilitaryleaderswhowouldalsobepoliticallyandideologicallyreliable.Therecanbelittledoubtthatintheearlydaysatleast,theWaffen-SSwasseenasthegeneticbaseofthenewGermanicReich,andforthisreasonHimmlerandHitlerhelditinspecialregard.Whileinthelateryearsofthewartheracialandpoliticalelitewasdilutedtosomeextentduetomanpowershortages,theredid,

however,remainalargehardcoreofWaffen-SSofficersandmenwhowerealignedwiththeracial,politicalandideologicalviewsoftheNazis.ThisconsensusonaworldviewwouldallowtheWaffen-SStoundertakemassiveatrocitiesinasystematicwayastherevolutionaryshocktroopsoftheThirdReichduringtheirwarofdestructioninRussia.

ItcanbeseenthattheWaffen-SSorganisationwasamixtureofsituationalanddispositionalfactorsthatwereconducivetotheconductofevilacts.ItwasanorganisationcreatedtoundertakewhateverwasnecessarytofurthertheNazistateanditattractedandaccepted(intheearlyyearsatleast)onlythosewhowereinideologicalsyncwithitsaims.ItcanalsobeseenthattheWaffen-SSwassettingthefoundationsforthegenocidethatwastofollow.

3.CombatoperationsoftheWaffen-SS

Icanimaginetheneedtodiganantitankdikeandabout10,000Russianwomendyingofexhaustionduringthecourseofthework.Thisisofnointeresttome.Theonlyquestioniswhetherthedikeiscompletedornot.

ThisspeechgivenbyHimmlertoofficersoftheWaffen-SSinPosenin1943succinctlyoutlinesthebrutalpracticalityoftheSSpsyche.InfactitgivesclearrepresentationofwhatIwouldterminstrumentalevil.Thelogicwaslet10,000Russiansdie,theirlosswillpreventthelossofGermanlivesandforthisresultthecostisacceptable.IndeedaccordingtoSS-ObergruppenführerBach-Zelewski,asearlyasthebeginningof1941HimmlerhadameetingwithtwelveSS-Gruppenführers;wherehestatedthatthepurposeoftheRussiancampaignwastoreducetheindigenouspopulationbysome30millionpeople(Breitman,1991:147).

IndealingwiththeactionsoftheWaffen-SSontheEasternFrontitisnecessarytoclearlyoutlinetheaspectsthatthisbookwilladdress.Thepreviouschaptershavealreadysetthesceneandtoneoftheconflict,whatthisdiscussionshallattempttodoisoutlinewhatactionstheWaffen-SSundertookontheEasternFront.IndeedtheconflictontheRussianfronthasanunenviableassociationwiththeSSdueto“…theirpartinpolicingthecountry,inthemassacresofJews,inthehuntforpoliticalcommissarsandpartisans,inthereprisalsonvillages,andintheround-upofslavelabour”(Reitlinger,1957:166).

ItisnotmyintenttodiscussthemilitaryexploitsoftheWaffen-SStoanylargedegree,thatisnotmypurpose.Idointend,however,toexaminevariousactsoftheWaffen-SSinanattempttoshowthatthismilitaryforcedidcommitsomeofthemostheinousactstooccurduringWorldWarII.TothispurposeIintendtoexaminethefollowingareasinthefollowingchaptersinanefforttoprovideexamplesofwhatmaylaterbecalledevilactions.Theseareaswillinclude:

Generalcombatduties;Anti-partisanoperations;Einsatzgruppenoperations;Theconcentration-campsand;Othermiscellaneousactions.

ItisimportanttooutlinetosomedegreetheactionsoftheWaffen-SSasitwillprovidesupportformyconclusionsinthefinalchapterwhenIconductananalysisoftheWaffen-SS.

TheuseoftheWaffen-SSontheEasternFrontsawtheinstigationofawarofideologyandracism.TheinvasionofRussiasawtheWaffen-SSbuildaformidablereputationasafightingforce,butitalsoconfirmedthattheywerewarriorsforatrulyevilcause.(Ripley,2004:73).

IthasbeennotedthattheWaffen-SSingeneralearntareputationforbrutalityinthewayitconducteditselfinarmedconflicts.DuringtheconflictontheEasternFronttheshootingofprisoners,themassacreofciviliansandthedestructionofvillagesbecamesignaturebehaviouroftheWaffen-SS.TheWaffen-SSwereaccusedofviolationsoftheGeneva

ConventionandthegenerallyacceptedrulesofwarduringtheconflictinRussiaandalsotoalesserextentintheWesternconflict.ItisacknowledgedthattheconflictontheEasternFrontwasfoughtwithbarbarityonbothsides,however,the“…brutalreprisalsforSovietcrimestakenbyWaffenSSsoldierswereoutofallproportion,andrepugnanttomanyoftheirfellowcountrymen”(Hohne,1969:469).

TheSSwenttogreatlengthstoportraytheRussiansoldierasadifferentopponenttothoseencounteredintheWest.TheSSnewspapershowed“…Russianprisonerswholookespeciallynon-Aryan,andtheyaredescribedasbeinginragsandlice-infested”(Combs,1986:138).AllthiswasdesignedtoensurethattheWaffen-SSsoldierdidnotseetheRussianasafellowsoldier,butratherasasubhuman.SS-GruppenführerMaxSimonclearlyespousedtheviewheldoftheRussiansoldierinapost-warmanuscript,“…theprimitivewayofthinkingandthementalsluggishnessoftheRussianpeasantdidnotpermittheemploymentofcomplicatedweapons”(Simon,1949:12).TheEasternFrontwasnotaplaceofcomradelypityforavanquishedfoe.AnexampleofthisthinkingisgivenbyaGermanArmyofficer,BernFreytagVonLoringhoven,whorecountedhowhesawarowofRussianprisonerslinedupandagroupofSSsoldiersgettingreadytoshoottheprisoners.WhenqueriedanSScorporalturnedtoVonLoringhovenandsaid,“AhLieutenant,theyarejustbrutes”priortokillingthem(Halliley,2003).Heisnotaloneinrecountingincidentslikethis.AtNuremberg,evidencewasgivenabouttheexecutionofprisonersbytheWaffen-SSin1941byacapturedRussiansoldier,MojzeszGoldberg:

On23June1941IwascalledupintotheSovietArmyinLemberg.InthemiddleofJulyIwastakenprisonerbytheGermans.AtalocalityfivekilometresfromPodwoloczysktheSScompaniessoughttheJewsoutofthewholemassofprisonersandshotthemonthespot.IremainedaliveastheydidnotrecognisemeasaJew.IstressthefactthatitwastheWaffen-SSwhodidthis.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:388)

SS-GruppenführerMaxSimon

ThehighcommandoftheWehrmachtissuedguidelinesforthe“ConductofTroopsinRussia”inwhichitwasstatedthatBolshevismwasthemortalenemyoftheGermanpeopleandthefightagainstthisenemydemanded“…ruthlessmeasuresagainstBolshevistsagitators,irregulars,saboteursandJews”(Heer,1999:126).Thisallowedindividualstocommitactsthat,couldthenbeideologicallyandmorallyjustified(notethat

thiswouldbesubjectivemoraljustification)inthatcontext.AnexampleofthiswastheshootingofRussianArmypoliticalcommissars19onsightwhencaptured.TheWaffen-SSsoldiersoftheTotenkopfdivisionreadilyexecutedCommissarsandtherecordsofthedivisionindicatethatthe“…menzealouslycarriedoutHitler’sCommissarorder”(Sydnor,1990:314).

AnexampleofthesecriminalordersbeingcarriedoutwasWaffen-SSlieutenant,SS-UntersturmführerTaubner,whowasattachedtotheWaffenSS1stBrigade20inRussiain1941.TaubnerwasnotpartofthekillingunitsorinvolvedincleansingoperationsagainsttheJewsorso-calledpartisans,hewaspartofaworkshopdetailrepairingequipment(Klee,Dressen,&Riess,1988;Rhodes,2002).TaubnerandanumberofotherWaffen-SSmentookituponthemselvestocommencekillingJewsthattheycameacross,oftenwithincrediblebrutality.Taubnerorganisedandparticipatedinthekillingofchildren,womenandmen,oftenpausingbetweenthekillingstoplayhisaccordion.OfnoteisthefactthatTaubnerwaseventuallybroughtuponchargesbeforeanSScourt,whichdeliveredthefollowingverdict:

TheJewshavetobeexterminatedandnoneoftheJewsthatwerekilledisanygreatloss…theaccusedshouldhaverecognisedthefactthattheexterminationoftheJewswasthedutyofcommandoswhichhavebeensetupespeciallyforthispurpose…ItisnottheGermanwaytoapplyBolshevikmethodsduringthenecessaryexterminationoftheenemyofourpeople.Indoingsotheconductoftheaccusedgivesrisetoconsiderableconcern.Theaccusedallowedhismentoactwithsuchviciousbrutalitythattheyconductedthemselvesunderhiscommandlikeasavagehorde.(Kleeetal.,1988:201).

TheactionsofTaubnerdidnotfitinwithHitler’sideasof“AnewantiSemitismbasedonreason”.Thistypeofthinkingresistedkillingsthatwerebasedonemotionssuchaspleasureorrevenge.IndeedHimmlerhadindicatedthatSSmenwhocarriedoutunauthorisedshootingsforpoliticalpurposesshouldnotbesubjecttopunishment,butthosewhocarrieditoutforsadisticorsexualreasonsshouldbetriedformurder.Asearlyas1935HimmlerhadlaiddownstrictinstructionsregardingactionsagainsttheJews.Inanorderdatedthe16thofAugust1935,SSmenwereprohibitedfromindependentindividualactionas“…thesolutionoftheJewishquestion,asofallotherquestions,isthebusinessoftheFührer,andnotofindividuals.AndeventhemostminorcontraventionofthisorderwillbypunishedbydismissalfromtheSS”(Krausnicketal.,1965:351).

ClearlyTaubnerwasactingouthisneedtosatisfyhispersonalsadisticdisposition,hewasnotrequiredbytheorganisationtoundertakesuchactions.AnimportantfactorinthebehaviourofTaubnerwasthathewasaninitiatorofindependentactions,notjustasoldierfollowingordersoftheauthorities.ThemostpoignantfactisthathewaspunishedforhisactionsbytheveryorganisationthatwasundertakingtheexterminationoftheJews.Hisroleinthesystemwasnotmeanttobethatofakiller.Hewasmeanttorepairequipment.Butbyundertakingthekillingshehadallowedhispersonaldispositiontointerferewiththerunningoftheorganisationandassuchwaspunishedbytheorganisation.

IndeedTaubner’scaseisanexampleofoneflawthathasbeenseeninapplyingsituationalmodelssuchasMilgram’s21toeventssuchastheHolocaust.ThisperceivedflawisthatMilgram’sexperimentwashighlycentralised.Thestudentswereunderthedirectcontrol

oftheauthorityfigure(Blass,1993;Hilberg,1980;Milgram,1974).ClearlyTaubnerwasnotunderthedirectcontrolofHitlerorHimmler.HewasinfactthousandsofmilesawayfromBerlin,thecentreofauthorityinrelationtotheexterminationpolicies.Further,hisunitwasnotpartofthekillingsystemthathadbeenputinplace.HewastheproducerofhisownactionsinrelationtothekillingsofJews.Itwouldappearthathisdispositiondrovehimtocommitactsofevil.Indeedthekillingswerenotonlypropelledbythebureaucracy,butalsoby“…individualinitiativeandasharedsetofbeliefs,valuesandgoals”(Kressel,2002:163).

Examplesofthistypeofbehaviourcanbefoundfromothersources.Asoldierofthe16thSSPanzergrenadierReichsführerSSDivisionwroteinaletterthat,

InthevicinityofourcampthereissituatedaRussianprisoner-of-warcamp.Intheretheydidnotwanttocorrectlyobeyorders.Nowwehaveshot800men.Nowtheyarequiet.Yes,theymustbehappythattheystilllive,sinceweknownomercy.Nowtheyhavethefirstwarning,theconfoundeddogs.(Huffman,2005:153)

Waffen-SSveteranHansSchmidtrecountsinhisautobiographyanincidentwithasergeantontheRussianFrontin1944:ThesergeantandIhadbeentalkingaboutrathermundanethingswhenwecameuponthewoundedenemysoldier.Whenwecamecloserandsawthehorribleshapethefellowwasinthesergeantquietlyliftedhismachinegun,aimedatthewoundedman,shothimdeadwithashortburstoffire,andthenwalkedonasnothinghadhappened.(Schmidt,2001:231)

Schmidtlaterattemptstojustifythisactasamercykillinganddidnotconsideritawarcrime.TwoSwedishvolunteersintheWaffen-SShadthistosayduringavisittotheSwedishembassyinBerlinin1941:

PrisonerswereseldomtakenbytheWaffen-SS.Unlesstheysurrenderedingreaternumbersthancompanysizetheywouldbeshotonthespot.Theprisonerswereharshlytreatedandwerethenmovedforwardbykicksandbeatings.Femalesoldierswerekilledinstantly…(Christensenetal.,2003:21)

Evenasthewarendedin1945soldiersoftheWaffen-SSactedwithcrueltytowardsRussiansoldiers.Forexample,twoescapedRussianPOWswereexecutedbyasolideroftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerinMarch194522(Ruter&deMildt,2004:Vol16).ThisdismissalofthevalueoflifeisclearinthecommentsofHansHossfelder,anofficeroftheDasReichDivision:

ItwasonethingtoenterRussiaandcombattheRedArmy,killpartisansandthelike.Wehadbeenindoctrinatedtobelievethattheywereasubhumanculture,slightlyabovethestatusofanimals,andthiswasnottoohardformanyofustobelieve.However,forthemenwhoenteredGreecebeforeJune1941(theinvasionofRussia),asIwasoneofthem,itwouldhavebeendifficulttocarryoutorissueanordertokillpeoplesimplybecausetheyhadtodie.ThiswasnotthecaseinRussia.NowwhenthesepeoplereturnedfromRussiaandthebrutalanti-partisanwarinYugoslavia,itwasjustadifferentmatter.Menhadseenanddonesomuchkilling,italmostseemedtobejustapartofthejob.Idonotsaythatitisrightnow,oreventhatitwasrightbackthen.Itwasonlyrightaccordingtothetimeswefoundourselvesin,giventheparticularsofthecircumstances.Itwasvery

sad.(Heaton,2001:85)

ThistypeofattitudewasexhibitedbyahostofWaffen-SSunits.SocommonplaceandwidespreadweretheseactsofbrutalitythatIwouldcontendthesetypesofactionswereendemictotheWaffen-SSunitsasawhole.

ForemostamongthemwastheTotenkopfdivision,whichconductedsuchactionsas“…theburningofvillages,themurderofprisonersandthesummaryexecutionofcapturedcommissarsandpolitruks”andearntitsreputationasoneofthemostbrutalSSunitsontheEasternFront(Sydnor,1990:316).ItiswithlittlesurprisethenthatattheendofthewartheRussiansaskedforandsucceededingettingallTotenkopfpersonnelwhohadsurrenderedtotheWesternAllieshandedovertothemforpunishment.TheTotenkopfwasnotaloneinthedestructionofvillagesandthekillingofcivilians.Onthe2ndofJuly1941menfromtheWestlandRegiment(partofthe5thWaffen-SSWikingPanzerDivision)exactedrevengewiththedestructionofavillageandreprisalsagainsttheinhabitantsinreturnforasniperkillingtheircommander,SS-StandartenführerWackerle(Smithetal.,1999).TheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerconductedthemurderof200RussianciviliansnearthetownofSluczforthemurderofGermansoldiers.Thecivilianswereherdedintoapetrol-soakedcottage;“Thewindowsanddoorswerethenbarricadedandahandgrenadedroppeddownthechimney.Theexplosionandholocaustwerespectacular…”(Wykes,1974:125).

SomeWaffen-SSveteransclaimedthatnoatrocitieswereevercommitted.Asoneveteranofthe6thSSMountainDivisionNordstated“…asIrecallmytimewiththebattaliononRussianterritory,Ican’tthinkofanyactionswhichcouldhavetarnishedourbattalion’shonour.Itisalsomyfirmbeliefthatthisnotionistrueoftheotherunits.”(Voss,2002:147).ItisofinterestthatlaterinthememoirsofthisparticularveteranhedescribeshisfirstcombatwithAmericanforceswheretheAmericanswereallowedtotendtotheirwoundedonthefield.Hestates,“Icouldn’tbelievemyeyes.Whatkindofwarwasthis?NothinglikethatwouldhavehappenedattheEasternFront,butheresomeoftherulesofwarseemedstilltobeinforce,validforbothsides”(Voss,2002:183).ThisstatementwouldseemtocontradicthisearlierclaimregardingalackofatrocitiesorknowledgeofsuchontheEasternFront.

DuringJune1941thesoldiersoftheWaffen-SSbegantofighttheirwayintoRussiaagainstdisorganisedRussianresistance.HugelosseswerebeinginflictedupontheRussians,theresultbeinglargegroupsorpocketsofRussiansoldiersthatwerebypassedandcutofffromtheirmainforces.The1stTotenkopfInfantryRegiment(partofthe3rdWaffen-SSTotenkopfDivision)wassubjectedtoattacksbythesegroupsofstragglingRussiansoldierswiththeresultthattheregimentalcommander,SS-StandartenführerMaxSimon,orderedthattheseRussiansoldiersbeseenaspartisansandbe“…dealtwithmostruthlessly”(Mann,2001;Sydnor,1990:160).This,Sydnor(1990:160)argues,resultedinthelikelyconsequencethattheSSsoldiers“…shotthemajorityoftheRussianstragglerstheyencountered,especiallythosewhoofferedresistanceratherthenimmediatesurrender”.

ThisclaimissupportedbyseveralreportsfromWaffen-SSofficersofthisunittohighercommandsdescribingtheRussiansoldiersinpanicstrickentermsas“…fanatical,

inhumancreatureswhoemployedthevilesttrickstokillGermansoldiers”(Sydnor,1990:160).Tosupporttheseclaimstheofficersgaveexamplessuchassome200Russiansoldierscomingforwardtosurrenderwithhandsraised,whothensuddenlybeganfiringontheSSsoldiers.TheresultbeingthattheSSkilledalloftheRussians,includingthosewholaterattemptedtosurrender(Sydnor,1990).AtZhitomirtheSSWikingDivisioncarriedoutthefollowingordersinthetown.

Itsmenweregiventheinstructionstosearcheveryhomeandbuildingfor,inadditiontoPeople’sCommissars,allofthetown’sofficials,whethercivilianormilitary.Whentheseofficialswereroundedup,theywereshot.(Butler,1978:106).

TheattitudeoftheWaffen-SStotheRussianciviliansisreflectedinthecommentsofWaffen-SSGeneralKarlHerrmann.Herecalls:Duringtheentireadvanceweencounteredscatteredsnipers,saboteursandpartisangroups.Usuallydressedascivilians,thesepartisanscarriedoninsidiousguerrillawarfarebehindourlines;theyengagedinraids,demolitionandallotherformsofsabotage…theemploymentofthesepartisangroupsascombatunitsconstitutedaflagrantviolationoftherulesofwarfare…asarulecapturedpartisanswerehungryandfilthy.Amongthemwerehalf-starvedunderworldcharacters.Somewereadolescents,15to17yearsold,whosefacesbetrayedtheirlustformurder…womenwerealsoamongthepartisans.Almostallofthemclaimedtobedoctorsornurses,buttojudgebytheirhardandbrutalfaces,therewasmanyanactivepartisanamongthem.(Herrmann,1947:2)

WhentheDutchSSvolunteersoftheNederlanddivisionfoundthattheircommunicationswerebeingsabotagedthecommanderofthedivision,SS-BrigadeführerJurgenWagner,decidedthatanexampleneededtobemade.Asaresultcertainareasweredeclaredofflimits.TheSSsoldiersthenconductedasweepofthearea.

EveryLatvianwhocouldbefoundwasroundedup.Inashortspaceoftime,morethan150civilianswerecaptured…Wagnerdecidedtohaveanumberofthemexecutedinfrontofeveryonesoastowarnthepeopleofthegravityoftheconsequencesofpartisanactivity.(Pierik,2001:240)

EyewitnessAndrejWachranovrecalledhowuponenteringthenewlyconqueredRussiantownofBorisovoin1941,SSsoldiersoftheDasReichDivisioncollectedallthevillageactivists,theheadofthecollectivefarms,etcandtookthemtoatrenchandexecutedthem,claimingthattheywerepartisans(Halliley,2003).SS-ObersturmbannführerOttoWeidinger,thelastcommanderofthe4thSSPanzerGrenadierRegimentDerFührer,wroteanextensivehistoryoftheDasReichDivision.ItisofnotethathereferstothebattleforBorisovobetweenthe21-23ofOctober1941,however,nomentionismadeoftheaboveshootings(Weidinger,1998,,2002).HerecallshowafterenteringthetowntheWaffen-SSsoldiersengagedin“…bitterhouse-to-housefighting”torootouttheRussiandefenders(Weidinger,2002:145).Anorderofthedaywasissuedonthe23rdofOctober1941bythedivisionalcommander,SS-BrigadeführerWilhelmBittrich,whichstated:

SS-DivisionReichhasattackedfromthe6-21October1941withhardlyabreak…strongenemyforcesweredefeatedoreliminated…bottomlessroads,stormsandbitingfrostpresentedjustaslittlehindrancetothedivisionasthedeterminedcounterattacksofthenumericallyfarsuperiorenemy…WewillhelpdestroyBolshevismsothatGermanycan

live.HailtotheFührer.(Weidinger,2002:148)

Nomentionismadeofthemassacreofcivilians.InNovember1942the8thSSFlorianGeyerDivisionwasinvolvedintheencirclementofseveralRussianunits,whichwascalledtheBeliyepocket(Trang,2000).Attheconclusionofthebattlethepocket“…wasfinallyclosedafterfivedaysfighting,withtheSovietunitcompletelywipedout.OnlyafewelementsmanagedtoescapeinanisolatedbreakoutatZizina”(Trang,2000:89).DanishvolunteersintheWaffen-SSrecountedthekillingofRussianPOWsforminorinfractionsandalsoinretaliationfordeathsoftheircomrades(Smithetal.,1999).TheyexecutedanumberofRussianprisonersinretaliationforthedeathoftheircommander,withoneofficerwritinghomethatnoprisonersweretakenthatday(Christensenetal.,2003).AsoneDanishvolunteerwroteinhisdiary:

6/9/1942AJewinagreasykaftanwalksuptobegsomebread,acoupleofcomradesgetaholdofhimanddraghimbehindabuildingandamomentlaterhecomestoanend.Thereisn’tanyroomforJewsinthenewEurope,they’vebroughttoomuchmiserytotheEuropeanpeople.(Smithetal.,1999:92)

DuringfightinginFebruary1943theLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerreportedkillingsome500Russiansoldierswhiletakingonlyfiveprisoners(Weingartner,1974).ThesehighenemydeathratesandlowprisonercountswerenotunusualforotherunitsoftheWaffen-SS.Duringthe6thofJuly1941theSSsoldiersoftheTotenkopfdivisionengagedinsuchfiercefightingthatnoprisonersweretakenfortheday(Sydnor,1990).The49thSSPanzergrenadierRegimentDeRuyter,partofthe23rdSSPanzergrenadierDivisionNederland,reportedduringfightingintheKurlandpocketin1944thatinafewdaysfighting520Russiansoldierswerekilledwithonlysome14beingtakenprisoner(Pierik,2001:239).

ThisviciousnessofthefightingbetweentheWaffen-SSandRussianarmyunitsishighlightedbythefateofthe9thWaffen-SSMountainCorpsduringitsdefenceofBudapestinearly1945.AmongotherunitstheCorpscontainedthe8thSSCalvaryDivisionFlorianGeyerandthe22ndSSCalvaryDivisionMariaTheresa.Some24,000Germansoldiers(themajorityofwhichwereWaffen-SS)attemptedtobreakoutofthecitythroughRussianlinesonthe11thofFebruary1945.FormanyoftheWaffen-SSsoldiersthisattempttoescapewastoresultintheirslaughter.Membersofthe22ndDivisionwereambushedbyRussiantroopsastheytriedtobreakoutoftheencirclement,theRussians“…slaughteredtheGermansbutsparedtheHungarians”(Ungvary,2005:235).Of24,000whoattemptedtobreakoutonlysome170Waffen-SSsoldiersweresuccessfulinreachingtheGermanlines23.ForthoseWaffen-SSsoldierswhowerecapturedanominousendawaitedthem.“TheWaffen-SSandwoundedweremostatrisk.Theformerwerekilledforpoliticalreasons…inthesportsgroundinBudakezi,SSsoldierswereforcedtodigtheirowngravesbeforebeingshot.”(Ungvary,2005:333).

ThepinnacleoftheWaffen-SS,thebattleofKharkov

In1943theWaffen-SSgainedagreatvictoryinthebattleofKharkovwheretheydestroyedsubstantialRussianforcesandrecapturedthecity.Itwastobethelastmajor

victorybyGermantroopsontheEasternFront.Butmorethanthis,itwassolelyaWaffen-SSvictory,thefeatbeingachievedbythe1stSSPanzerCorpscontainingtheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler,DasReichandTotenkopfPanzerDivisions.Hitler’sspecialrelationshipwiththeWaffen-SSisevidentbythefactthathelavishedalargenumberofKnight’sCrossesonhispoliticalsoldiersfortheiractionsinretakingthecity.FourteenwenttotheLeibstandarte,10totheDasReichandfivetotheTotenkopf(Butler,1978;Schneider,1993).Thebattleturnedintoamassacrebyitsend.DuringthefightingsoldiersoftheTotenkopfdivision:

DrewalongsidetheretreatingRussiansatdistancesof20to30yards,machinegunningatwillthetruckscrammedwithinfantry…theRussianshadabandonedmostoftheirvehiclesandequipmentandweretryingtoescapeonfoot…theSSTKFirstPanzergrenadierRegiment…methodicallycutdownthepanickedherdsofstampedingRussiansfleeing…(Sydnor,1990:269)

SS-SturmbannführerRalfTiemannoftheSSLeibstandarteDivisiondescribedtheactionasfollows:Panzersofthe7.PanzerkompanydrovethroughBulachitothepositionofthebreakthroughandwereabletoeffectivelysupportthegrenadiersoftheIIbattalionduringtheannihilationoftheenemyforces…Atadistanceof3000to4000metreswecouldobservetheSoviethorse-drawnsledsandtanks.DuringtheattackIsuccessfullypositionedmypanzerIIIinasmalldepressionandwasabletokill48Russianswithmachine-gunfire.(Tiemann,1998:35)

ThistypeofactionisgraphicallyillustratedinNipe’s(2002)photoessayontheKharkovcampaign.ItshowsaseriesofpicturesdepictingsomeRussiansoldierswithhorse-drawncartsontheemptysteppetryingtofleefromWaffen-SSsoldiersoftheSSLeibstandartedivision.TheSSsoldiers,heavilyarmedandmountedinhalftracksandassaultguns,rapidlyovertaketheRussiansoldiers,whowithnohopeofflightattempttosurrender.TheSSsoldiersthenmachinegunthesoldiersattemptingtosurrender.Oneauthordescribestheactionasfollows,“…forthesoldiersoftheSSPanzerCorpsitwaslikeafielddaywithliveammunitionandmovingtargets”(Simpson,1990:58).ClearlytheaboveactionsareincontraventionofArticle23oftheHagueConventions,whichstatesitisforbidden“…tokillorwoundanenemywho,havinglaiddownhisarms,orhavingnolongermeansofdefence,hassurrenderedatdiscretion…”.PlainlyheretheactionsoftheWaffen-SSareoutsideofsuch.GunterOehmke,asoldierintheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler,admittedthat“…especiallyinoffensivecombatunitssuchasthePanzerandfast-movingPanzergrenadierelements,prisonerswereattimesshotorsimplynoteventakenbasicallybecauseofmilitarynecessity”(Huffman,2005:151).

DuringthebattleforKharkovin1943theLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerDivisionwasaccusedofsettingfiretoabuildingcontaining300woundedSovietsoldiersinoneincidentandshootingsome400woundedofficersintheirhospitalbedsinanother(Darman,2004;Reynolds,1999;Ripley,2004;Stein,1966).WhentheRussiansrecapturedKharkovevidencewasuncoveredofatrocitiescommittedbytheWaffen-SS.Thisincludedsome10,00024civilianswhowerekilledbyEinsatzgruppenandotherunitsfollowingbehindtheWaffen-SS(Darman,2004;Halliley,2003;Stein,1966).OnedoctorrecountedhowSSsoldiers“…threwincendiarygrenadesthroughthewindows,the

buildingsbegantoburnandthewoundedtriedtosavethemselves”,fewsurvived(Halliley,2003).Thismatterwasinvestigatedafterthewarandoneauthorhadthefollowingtosay.

InresponsethejudicialauthoritiesinNurembergcarriedoutalengthyinquiry,examiningnolessthan688witnesses,allbut13ofwhomwereformermembersoftheLeibstandarte.OnlyfourofthemprofessedtohavingeverheardofSovietprisonershavingbeenshotandthegeneralviewwasthattheLeibstandartewouldneverhavebeenpermittedtoshootdefencelessprisoners.Whatcouldbeestablishedwasthatthehospitalitselfwaswithintheareaoftheattackmadebythe1stSSPanzergrenadierRegimentandthatthemainSovietdefensivebeltwasjustnorthofthehospital.Itisthusverylikelythatitbecameembroiledinthebattle,andgiventhatstreetfightingisoftenconfusedandmerciless,itisquitepossiblethattheLeibstandartesoldiersmayhavebelievedthattheywerebeingfireduponfromthehospitalanddecidedtoeradicateallpossibleoppositioninsideit.(Messenger,1988:211)

TheaboveexplanationhardlystandsscrutinywhenexaminedinthelightofthebackgroundandotheractionsoftheWaffen-SSingeneral,andtheLeibstandarteinparticular.HimmlerarrivedinthecityshortlyafterwardsandarecordingwasmadeofthefollowingspeechtotheWaffen-SSsoldiersofthe1stSSPanzerCorps.AtthispointintimeSS-OberstgruppenführerPaulHaussercommandedthecorps.FootageofthetimeshowsaneagerHaussergreetingHimmlerwiththeNazisaluteashearrivesinKharkov.Himmler’sspeechcontainedthefollowingexhortationtohissoldiers:

Wehavebutonetask.Tofightthisracialbattlewithoutmercy.ThisgreatweaponoffearandterrorwhichhasguidedussincethevictoryofKharkovmustneverbeallowedtoweaken;insteadwemuststrengthenitfurther.HeilHitler.(Halliley,2003)

HausserattemptedtoplaydownthisspeechlaterwhenitwasintroducedintoevidencebeforetheIMT.However,thecommentsofDasReichveteranHans-JoachimLindowservetoillustratethemotivationsoftheWaffen-SSatthispointintime;“…atonepointtherewasthissillysaying,thattheLeibstandartesawitastheirmissiontolayKharkovatHitler’sfeet,andthatmotivationwascertainlythere,letsnotfoolourselves”(Halliley,2003).ThecitychangedhandsonanumberofoccasionsandtheWaffenSSwereresponsibleforitsdefence.InpreparingthedefencesoftheKharkovtheSSLeibstandarteusedslavelabourintheformof25,000Russians,presumablybothprisonersofwarandconscriptedcivilianstocarryouttheworkrequired(Weingartner,1974).TheinvolvementoftheWaffenSSincommittingatrocitieswastocontinueinavarietyofconflicts.

TheWarsawUprisings

TwoactionsstandoutinthehistoryoftheWaffen-SSandthesebothconcernthecityofWarsawinPoland.Twouprisingstookplaceinthiscity.ThefirstbeingtheuprisingoftheJewsintheghettoin1943;andthesecondbeingtheoffensiveofthePolishHomeArmyin1944.

TheuprisingoftheWarsawGhetto

Onthe19thofApril1943theJewsintheWarsawGhettoroseupagainsttheirNazioppressorsandengagedincombatagainstthemforsome28days.Thiswasasaresultofsome300,000JewsbeingtransportedfromtheghettotothedeathcampatTreblinkasinceJuly1942.Timewasrunningoutfortheremaining60,000orsoJews.TheWaffen-SSwastohaveamajorroleinsuppressingthisuprisingbothfromacommandpointofviewandalsoinrelationtothecombatunitsutilised.

ThecommandofsuppressingtheuprisingwasputinthehandsofWaffen-SSGeneral,SS-BrigadeführerJurgenStroop,whowaslatertotakeonthepositionofSSandPoliceLeader(SSPF)Warsaw.StroophadservedintheTotenkopfDivisionontheEasternFrontin1941.HethenbecametheHigherSSandPoliceLeader(HSSPF)forRussiaSouthandwasthenmadeSSPFforLvovintheUkrainebeforebeingsenttoWarsawtodealwiththeJews.AfterthewarhewasextraditedtoPolandandtriedforthecrimescommittedduringtheGhettouprising.Hewasconvictedandexecutedonthe8thofSeptember1951(MacLean,2001).WhileStroophaddirectcontroloftheoperationsinWarsaw,hewasoverseenbySS-ObergruppenführerFriedrichWilhelmKruger.KrugerwastheHSSPFforthePolisharea.HegainedextensiveexperienceintheWaffen-SSbattleformationsbyservingcommandpositionsinthe6thSSNordDivision,the7thSSPrinzEugenDivisionandhethencommandedthe5thSSMountainCorps.Hecommittedsuicideonthe9thofMay1945toavoidcapture(MacLean,2001;Yerger,1999).

StroophadthefollowingSSunitsavailabletohimtocombattheuprising:The1stand2nd

battalionsofthe22ndSSPoliceRegiment,the3rdbattalionofthe23rdSSPoliceRegiment,the3rdSSPanzergrenadierTrainingandReplacementbattalion(thiswasthereplacementbattalionfortheTotenkopfDivision)andtheSSCalvaryFieldReplacementDetachment(thiswasthereplacementunitfortheSSCalvaryDivision)(MacLean,2001).

AswithmanyGermanactionsStroopkeptdetailedreportsastotheactionsundertakenbytheunitsunderhiscontrol.ThesewerethensenttoHimmlertokeephiminformedofevents.Stroopcompiledafinalreportdatedthe16thofMay1943tocataloguehisdestructionoftheghettoanditistitled;“TheWarsawGhettoisnomore”.Itwastenderedasanexhibit(documentnumber1061-PS)atNurembergandprovidesproofofWaffenSSinvolvementandactionsundertakenduringthecombatoperations(OfficeoftheUnitedStatesCounselforProsecutionofAxisCriminality,1946:Vol3:718).OnpageoneofthereportStroopliststhedailyaverageoftroopsinactionduringtheconductoftheconflict(numberofsoldiersinvolvedindicatedasofficers/men).OfinterestistheinvolvementoftheWaffen-SS.

WaffenSS:SSPanzerGrenadierTrainingandReserveBattalion3,Warsaw4/440.SSCav.TrainingandResBat.Warsaw5/381(OfficeoftheUnitedStatesCounselforProsecutionofAxisCriminality,1946:Vol3:718)

TheGermanswerebetterarmedandbettertrained.TheJewscouldneverhopetowinsuchaone-sidedfight,andtheydidnot.FromthestartoftheconflictStroopmakesitclearinhisreportthatthehardestmeasureswereusedagainsttheJews:

TheresistanceputupbytheJewsandbanditscouldbebrokenonlybyrelentlesslyusing

allourforceandenergybydayandnight.On23April1943theReichsführer-SSissuedthroughtheHigherSSandPoliceFührerEastatCracowhisordertocompletethecombingoutoftheWarsawGhettowiththegreatestseverityandrelentlesstenacity.(OfficeoftheUnitedStatesCounselforProsecutionofAxisCriminality,1946:Vol3:725)

Thefightingprovedtoughandhard,evenforthesoldiersoftheWaffen-SSasStrooprecounts:ThenthemenoftheWaffenSS,thePoliceortheWehrmachtEngineerscourageouslyclimbeddowntheshaftstobringouttheJewsandnotinfrequentlytheythenstumbledoverJewsalreadydead,orwereshotat.ItwasalwaysnecessarytousesmokecandlestodriveouttheJews.Thusonedayweopened183sewerentranceholesandatafixedtimeloweredsmokecandlesintothem,withtheresultthatthebanditsfledfromwhattheybelievedtobegastothecentreoftheformerGhetto,wheretheycouldthenbepulledoutofthesewerholesthere.AgreatnumberofJews,whocouldnotbecounted,wereexterminatedbyblowingupsewersanddug-outs.(OfficeoftheUnitedStatesCounselforProsecutionofAxisCriminality,1946:Vol3:725)

EventuallyalltheJewswerekilledorevacuatedfromtheGhettotothedeathcamps.StrooppaidspecialhomagetothetroopsoftheWaffen-SSunitsandtheirresilience:

Thelongertheresistancelasted,thetougherthemenoftheWaffenSS,PoliceandWehrmachtbecame;theyfulfilledtheirdutyindefatigablyinfaithfulcomradeshipandstoodtogetherasmodelsandexamplesofsoldiers.Theirdutyhoursoftenlastedfromearlymorninguntillateatnight.Atnight,searchpatrolswithragswoundroundtheirfeetremainedattheheelsoftheJewsandgavethemnorespite.NotinfrequentlytheycaughtandkilledJewswhousedthenighthoursforsupplementingtheirstoresfromabandoneddugoutsandforcontactingneighbouringgroupsorexchangingnewswiththem.(OfficeoftheUnitedStatesCounselforProsecutionofAxisCriminality,1946:Vol3:726)

StroopcontinuesonandpraisesthededicationwithwhichtheWaffenSSappliedthemselvestothedestructionoftheJewsofWarsaw;ConsideringthatthegreaterpartofthemenoftheWaffen-SShadonlybeentrainedforthreetofourweeksbeforebeingassignedtothisaction,highcreditshouldbegivenforthepluck,courageanddevotiontodutywhichtheyshowed…Onlythroughthecontinuousanduntiringworkofallinvolveddidwesucceedincatchingatotalof56,065Jewswhoseexterminationcanbeproved.TothisshouldbeaddedthenumberofJewswholosttheirlivesinexplosionsorfiresbutwhosenumberscouldnotbeascertained.(OfficeoftheUnitedStatesCounselforProsecutionofAxisCriminality,1946:Vol3:726)

Thisreportcontainsaninterestingfact,thatmanyoftheSSsoldiershadonlybeenmembersoftheWaffen-SSforsomeweeks.ThesewerenottheSSstormtroopersofthe1930s.Yettheywerestillpreparedtoundertakethemassacreofunarmedciviliansandfightwiththemostbrutaloftactics.Ibelievethatthisprovidesstrongevidenceoftheeffectofthesituationonindividuals.Whencalleduponthesenewrecruitsshowednohesitationincommittingatrocities.StroopwentontogointodetailastothekillingwroughtontheJews:

Ofthetotalof56,065Jewscaught,about7,000wereexterminatedwithintheformerGhettointhecourseofthelarge-scaleaction,and6,929bytransportingthemtoT.II,

whichmeans14,000Jewswereexterminatedaltogether.Beyondthenumberof56,065Jewsanestimatednumberof5,000to6,000werekilledbyexplosionsorinfires.(OfficeoftheUnitedStatesCounselforProsecutionofAxisCriminality,1946:Vol3:727)

DespitethehighnumbersofkilledonlyminimalweaponswerelocatedbytheGermans.Strooplistedthebooty,ashecalledit,thatherecoveredfromtheJews.

7Polishrifles,1Russianrifle,1Germanrifle,59pistolsofvariouscalibresSeveralhundredhandgrenades,includingPolishandhome-madeonesSeveralhundredincendiarybottlesHome-madeexplosivesInfernalmachineswithfusesAlargeamountofexplosives,ammunitionforweaponsofallcalibres,includingsomemachine-gunammunition.(OfficeoftheUnitedStatesCounselforProsecutionofAxisCriminality,1946:Vol3:728)

Itcanbeseenwithoutdoubtthatobviouslymostofthosekilledwereunarmedcivilians.SomeoftheWaffen-SSsoldierssuchasHugoMielkeofthe8thFlorianGeyerCalvaryDivisionwerebroughttotrialfortheircrimesafterthewar.25MielkewasconvictedandsentencedtolifeimprisonmentforleadingadestructionunitthatsetfiretohousesandshotJewsastheytriedtoescapefrombeingburntalive(Ruteretal.,2004:Vol3).SSGeneralPaulHausserwasquestionedinrelationtotheuseoftheWaffen-SSforcombatdutiesbehindthefrontlines,withreferencetotheGhettouprising:

HERRPELCKMANN:Apartfromtheaccusationconcerningtheconcentration-camps,theProsecutionfurtherassertsthattheWaffen-SS,onthebasisofitstraining,wasaparticularlycruelmilitarytool;andthatistobeshown,allegedly,bytheparticipationoftheWaffen-SSmenintheevacuationoftheWarsawGhettoand,sosaystheProsecution,intheviolationsofinternationallawsuchasthemurderofprisonersofwar.Isthatcorrect?HAUSSER:Ialreadytestified,yesterday,thatourtrainingwasnotorganisedtothatend,thatourmethodoffightingwassupervisedandorderedbytheArmy,andthatwedidnotgainprestigethroughcruelmethods.Thecommanderswhohadpersonalprideinleadingacleanfightingunitagainsttheenemysawtothat.IlearnedonlyhereoftheparticipationofsmallunitsoftheWaffen-SSintheevacuationoftheWarsawGhettoorintheexecutionswhichtookplaceinBohemiaandMoravia.Thiscanonlybeaquestionofsmalldetailsofreplacementunits,whichweretemporarilysubordinatedforabriefperiodoftime.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:367)

HausserraisesanimportantpointherethattrainingandreplacementbattalionsoftheWaffen-SSformationswereusedforcombatoperationsbehindthelineswhennecessary.ThiswasaresultofHimmlergaininganagreementwiththeWehrmachtin1941thatthesetypesofunitwouldremainunderSScontrol.Theresultwasthat:

HimmlerlostnotimeinscatteringtheSSreplacementunitsalloverGerman-occupiedEurope,thusmenwhohadbeenrecruitedforfront-lineservicefoundthemselvesattimesduringtheirtrainingperiodcalledupontoengagein‘policeactivities’.(Stein,1966:47)

ThisensuredthatHimmlerwouldhaveareadysourceofpoliticallyreliabletroopsavailabletodealruthlesslywithsituationsjustsuchastheGhettouprising.Thecityof

WarsawwouldfeatureagaininyetanotherterrorcampaignundertakenbytheWaffen-SS.

TheuprisingofthePolishHomeArmy

Onthe1stofAugust1944thePolishHomeArmyGeneralBorKomorovski,withaforceofbetween35,000and50,000partisans,attackedtheGermansinWarsaw.TheuprisingwasinstigatedastheRedArmywasontheoutskirtsofWarsaw,however,theRussianoffensivecametoastopoutsidethecityandtheGermanswereabletodirectalltheirattentiontotheinsurgents.Theconflictwastolastforsome63daysbeforeitwasdefeated.AnumberofWaffen-SSunitstookpartinthecombatagainstthePolishHomeArmy.

OnesuchunitwastheWaffen-SSSturmBrigadeRona(alsoknownastheKaminskiBrigadeafteritscommander),whichwasformedinJuly1944fromelementsoftheRussianPeopleFreedomArmy(RONA)(A.J.Munoz,1997;Nafziger,2001;Stein,1966;Westwood,2001).Thisunitwouldlaterformthe29thSSGrenadierDivision,butwouldonlyexistforashortperiodoftime.InJune1944thisunitcameunderthecontroloftheReichsführer-SSafterbeingtransferredfromarmycontrol.TheunitwassenttoWarsawtocombattheuprising.UnitsoftheTotenkopfandWikingdivisionswerealsousedtosuppresstheuprising(Davies,2003;Quarrie,1981).

Ahugesweepthroughtheforestwaslaunchedonthe27SeptemberbythreebattalionsoftheHermannGoeringPanzerDivisionandtheSSPanzerDivisionsTotenkopfandWiking,whoactedlikebeatersinagrouseshoot.Allthevillages,whichhadgiventheinsurgentsshelter,wereburned,allthemalevillagersshot.ItwastypicalNazianti-partisanwarfare.(Davies,2003:397)

TheseWaffen-SSunitscameundertheoverallcommandofWaffen-SSGeneralBach-Zelewski.Heretheyengageduponanorgyofslaughterandrape.TheKaminskiBrigadeenteredahospitalforcancerpatientsandrapedandkilledmostofthestaffandpatients.Theactionsofthisbrigadeextendedtoshootingofinnocentciviliansinacarte-blanchefashion.SoexcessivewerethetacticsofthebrigadethatseveralsourcesclaimthattheSSluredtheBrigade’scommanderKaminskitoameetingandthenexecutedhimforhisactions(Clark,1965;MacLean,1998;A.J.Munoz,1997;Stein,1966).

This,however,wasnottheonlyWaffen-SSunitpresentatthebattle;norwasittheonlyonetocommitatrocities.TheDirlewangerSS-Sonderkommandowasalsosenttothecityandthereitfoughtwithitsusualbrutalityandruthlessness.

Duringthedefeatoftheuprising,theDirlewangerbrigadeburnedprisonersalivewithgasoline,impaledbabiesonbayonetsandstuckthemoutofwindowsandhungwomenupsidedownfrombalconies…(MacLean,1998:177)

Dirlewangerhadahistoryofevilactionsandwouldbeamplysuitedtoputtingdowntheuprisingwithterror.Itneedstoberememberedthatinwartherewillalwaysbesomeformofharminflictedtoachievethegoalsoftheconflict.Butgenerallytheinternationallawsregulatingwarseektoensurethatminimumorreasonableforceisusedtoachievetheseaims.ClearlytheconductofDirlewangerwouldgooutsidetheselimitsandcouldbeclaimedtobeevil.AsHimmlerexplainedtoGoebbelsthepurposeofthiswastocreate

suchterrorandsheerviolencethattheuprisingwouldbestopped“…inaveryfewdays”(Clark,1965:391).ToensurethisaimwasachievedHitlerandHimmlerissuedanordertothecommanderoftheSSforcesinWarsaw,SS-ObergruppenführerBach-Zelewskitoundertakethefollowing:

CapturedinsurgentsoughttobekilledregardlessofwhethertheyarefightinginaccordanceoftheHagueConventionornot.Thepartofthepopulationnotfighting,womenandchildren,shouldlikewisebekilled.Thewholetownmustbelevelledtotheground…(MacLean,1998:177).

DuringtheconflictDirlewanger’sunitoperatedaspartofaKampfgruppeunderthedirectcontrolofSS-GruppenführerHeinzReinefarth,whowaslatertocommandthe18thSSCorps.WhileunderhiscommandtheDirlewangerunit“…usedcrowdsofwomenandchildrenashumanshieldswhileadvancingonrebelstrongpoints”(MacLean,1998:188).ForhiscommandduringtheWarsawconflictReinefarthwasawardedtheOakleavestohisKnight’sCross.DirlewangerwasalsorewardedforhisactionsduringtheconflictbybeingawardedGermany’shighestmilitaryhonour,theKnight’sCross,onthe30thofSeptember1944(MacLean,1998;Schneider,1993).

YetdespitemenfromthisunitbeingawardedGermany’shighestmilitaryawards,manyWaffen-SSveteranssimplyignoredtheunit’sexistencewhenwritingtheirmemoirs.Dirlewanger’srecommendationfortheawardreferredtohimasbelongingtothe“…bravestofthebrave”andwaswarmlysupportedbySS-ObergruppenführerBach-Zelewski(MacLean,1998:195).Onewouldwonderhowthekillingofinnocentcivilianscouldbedeemedbrave.Bach-Zelewskiofferedadifferentversion,however,whilegivingevidencebeforetheIMT.

DR.THOMA:IfIunderstoodyoucorrectly,youdisapprovedofthemannerinwhichthefightingagainstpartisanswascarriedon,involvingmanyinnocentpeople;andyoudisapprovedalsooftheexistenceoftheDirlewangerRegiment…BACH-ZELEWSKI:Yes.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:493)

SS-ObergruppenführerBach-Zelewski.

AGermanofficerofferedadifferentviewwhenherecountedhowhehadtoldBach-Zelewskithattheexecutionswereawasteofresources,“Bach-Zelewskivoicedhisoppositiontothisnotionandstatedhewasfulfillingadutytothefatherland”(Kleeetal.,1988:122).Bach-Zelewski’sinaccuratememorydidnotendthere.Hewasawardedthe

Knight’sCrossalsoon30thofSeptember1944forhisleadershipduringthecrushingoftherebellion.However,whenaskedaboutthisbeforethetribunalheclaimedthefollowing.

BACH-ZELEWSKI:No.Ireceivednodecorationforthewaragainstthepartisans.Ireceivedallmydecorations,beginningwiththeclusterstotheIronCrossII,atthefrontandfromtheWehrmacht…(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:493)

Dirlewangerandhisunitwereamilitaryabnormalitybyanystandards.DuringthedefenceofHungaryin1944,Colonel-GeneralFriessnernotedthefollowingwhenhevisitedDirlewanger’sunit:

WhenIreachedDirlewanger’sstaffIwasmetbyastrangesight.TheBrigadeführer,anotveryappealingadventurertype,wassittingathisdeskwithalivemonkeyperchedonhisshoulder.Themonkeywassaidtohaveaccompaniedhimeverywhere,includingPoland.WhenIdiscoveredthatthestaffwaspackingupIorderedthemtostayonthespot.Theunitwas,assuggestedbefore,awildbunch.Onecompany,communistswhowereexpectedtoprovethemselvesonthefront,hadjustdesertedtotheenemy.(Ungvary,2005:30)

Theuprisingwassubsequentlydefeated,butsurprisinglygiventheferocitywithwhichtheWaffen-SShadtreatedthegeneralpopulationtheremnantsofthePolishHomeArmyweretreatedasPOWswhentheysurrendered.WhenqueriedbytheprosecutionatNuremberginrelationtotheroleoftheWaffen-SSinthisconflict,SS-OberstgruppenführerPaulHausserattemptedtodenythattheWaffen-SShadanyinvolvement:

MAJORJONES:…ThosewerecrimesoftheSS,weretheynot,Witness?HAUSSER:ThatwasnottheWaffen-SS.TheyarealwaysonlyagroupofmenwhobelongedtoHimmlerandwhohadnothingwhatsoevertodowiththefightingtroops.WeneverfoughtatWarsaw.MAJORJONES:AreyoudenyingthattheWaffen-SStookpartinthedestructionofWarsaw?HAUSSER:IhavenotbeenthereandthereforeIcannotmakeanycomments.Buttomyknowledge,therewasnofightingthere;itwasariot,whichwasquelled,asseveralwitnesseshavetestified.MAJORJONES:ItwasarevoltandthenthemassexterminationbytheSStroops;that’swhathappenedinWarsaw,wasn’tit?HAUSSER:TheWaffen-SSparticipatedonlytoaverysmallextentbecausetheWaffen-SSwasincombat.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:382)

Theevidenceofthisdiscussionwouldsuggestotherwise.

OtherexamplesoftheWaffen-SSethosincombat

InthissectionIintendtoprovidesomegeneralexamplesoftheactionsoftheWaffen-SSincombat.Idonotintendtoaccounteveryatrocitycommitted,butratherprovidethereaderwithanappreciationoftheethosoftheWaffen-SSasindicatedbytheactionsofthe

soldiersthemselves.DuringthebattleofTaganrogsoldiersoftheSSLeibstandartelocatedsixoftheirfellowswhohadbeenmutilatedandtortured.Thediscoveryofthemen’sbodieswasmadeonthe28thofMarch1942,whentheremainswerelocatedintheformerGPU26buildinginTaganrog.Thefollowingaretheresultsoftheautopsiesperformedonthemen:

…SturmannGehrkenhadfourfingersofhisrighthandmissing.Hisskullwasshattered,buttherewerenogunshotwoundstothebody.SturmannLippkehadbeenshotintherighttemple.SturmannSchwillinskyhadashatteredskullandnogunshotwoundswerefound.SturmannSteinerhadashatteredskullandbrokenspine,nogunshotwounds.SSMannPlotzhadabrokenspineandshatteredleftridcage.Nogunshotwounds.(Mooney,2004:87)

AsaresultthecommanderoftheDivision,SS-OberstgruppenführerSeppDietrich,orderedthatnoRussianprisonersbetakenforthenextthreedays(Quarrie,1991;Reitlinger,1957;Stein,1966;Weingartner,1974;Wykes,1974).Thisresultedinsome4000Russiansoldiersbeingexecuted(Quarrie,1991;Reitlinger,1957;Stein,1966;Weingartner,1974;Wykes,1974).OfnoteisthatArticle23oftheHagueConventionsforbidsthedeclarationthatnoquarterwillbegiven.ByanobjectiveassessmenttheactionsoftheWaffen-SSwouldseemtoindicatethattheyareoutsidethenormofacceptablebehaviour.

TheWaffen-SSwastofeaturefarmoreprominentlyinwarcrimereportsthantheirsmallnumberswouldsuggest.AreportbytheGeneralOfficeoftheWehrmachtin1943intothecommissionofwarcrimesconcludedthat;“…intheperiodcoveredbythisreport151casesofthisnaturecametonotice.In19casestheculprits’belongedtothearmy,in53casestotheWaffen-SS,whilein79casestheculpritsunitscouldnotbeestablished”(Hohne,1969:470).ClearlytheethosofhardnessandnopityfortheenemystoodtheWaffen-SSoutandabovetheWehrmachtwhenitcametothecommissionofwarcrimes.

DuringthetrialsoftheIMTevidencewasofferedastoWaffen-SScomplicityintheshootingofcivilians.ThisevidencecameintheformofaletterfromtheChiefoftheCommandOfficeoftheWaffen-SStotheReichsführer-SS,dated14October1941;subject:“IntermediateReportonCivilianStateofEmergency”.TheletterclearlyoutlinedthetypesofactionsthatwerebeingundertakenontheEasternFront:

IdeliverthefollowinginterimreportregardingthecommitmentoftheWaffen-SSintheProtectorateBohemiaandMoraviaduringthecivilianstateofemergency.InturnallbattalionsoftheWaffen-SSintheProtectorateBohemiaandMoraviawereassignedtoshootingsandhangings.UptillnowthereoccurredinPrague99shootingsand21hangings,inBrünn54shootingsand17hangings;total:191executions(including16Jews).Acompletereportregardingothermeasuresandontheconductoftheofficers,non-commissionedofficersandmenwillbemadefollowingtheterminationofthecivilianstateofemergency.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946Vol4:221)

ThiswouldnotbethefirstnorthelasttimetheWaffen-SSwouldbeusedtoputdownuprisingsinconqueredterritories.InAugust1944arebellionroseupinSlovakiaagainstthepuppetgovernmentofPresidentJosephTiso.Toquellthisuprisingunitsofthe14thSSGaliciaDivision,the18thSSHorstWesselDivisionandEinsatzgruppenHwereutilised

bytheHSSPFforthearea,Waffen-SSGeneralSS-ObergruppenführerHermannHöfle(Benderetal.,1975).ItwasputdownwiththeusualNaziefficiencyandharshness.Theunitsofthe14thDivisioncameunderthedirectcommandofSS-ObersturmbannführerFriedrichBeyersdorff;hewastoleadhisunitsinthecommissionofanumberofatrocitiesthatwillbediscussedshortly.

AsthewarcametoanendmanysoldiersoftheWaffen-SScommittedwhataretermedfinal-phasecrimes.Forinstanceinearly1945asoldierfromthe12thSSPanzerDivisionHitlerjugendshottwoRussianlabourersforallegedlythreateningaGermanwoman27(Ruteretal.,2004:Vol13).Waffen-SSsoldiersexecutedsome151RussianlabourersonthebasisofdangertotheGermanpeopleduetoGermantroopshavingtowithdrawin1945fromtheadvancingRussianarmy28(Ruteretal.,2004:Vol16).

TheactionsoftheWaffen-SSwerenotsolelydirectedattheenemy,otherGermansalsofellfoulofthebrutaltacticsofthesesoldiers.AnexampleofthisoccurredinApril1945atBadeninAustria,wheremembersoftheWaffen-SSJagdverbandSüdshottwoGermansoldiersandapriestformakingderogatoryremarksaboutthecrumblingGermanmilitarysituation29(Ruteretal.,2004:Vol2).ThesecaseshighlightthatevenuptotheendofthewarWaffen-SSunitswerepreparedtocommitatrocities.FriedhelmBusse,aveteranoftheSSHitlerjugendPanzerDivision,offersthefollowinginsightintowhytheWaffen-SSweresopreparedtokilltheirowncountry-meninthefinaldays.HerecountsanexecutionhewitnessedofGermans.

Westoodthereinthesquareandthesentencewasreadout.Andallofasuddenthebarrelswerekickedawayandtheydangledthere.AndImustsaythatmyfeelingsatthetimewerethatthepigsdeservedtohangbecausetheystabbedusintheback.Youdon’tgiveupinwar,youdon’tsabotage,youhavetodoyourdutyuntiltheend.(Halliley,2003)

ThisattitudewasreflectedbySSsoldiersoftheSSHitlerjugendwhoshotacivilianforcallingthemwarprolongers30(Ruteretal.,2004:Vol13).AnotherexampleofWaffen-SSatrocitiescanbefoundintheactionsofSSOberführerDirlewangerwhocommandedanSS-SonderkommandoontheEasternFrontthatwasresponsibleforthehuntingdownofJewsandRussianpartisans:

Thenhemadeso-calledscientificexperiments,whichinvolvedstrippingthevictimsoftheirclothes.Thenthey(thevictims)weregivenaninjectionofstrychnine.Dirlewangerlookedon,smokedacigarette,asdidhisfriends,andtheysawhowthesegirlsweredying.Immediatelyafterthatthecorpseswerecutintosmallpieces,mixedwithhorsemeatandboiledintosoap.(MacLean,1998:61)

AstheIMTsurmised,itwasnotsurprisingthatunitsoftheWaffen-SSandthebranchesthathadthusbeenemployedinexterminationactionsandintheexecutionofcivilianswerealsotobefoundviolatingthelawsofwarfarewhencarryingonordinarycombatoperations.FortheWaffen-SSthelawofwardidnotholdswayontheEasternFront.Ratherthiswasanideologicalcrusadethathadtobewonatanycost.ItwasforthisreasonthattheWaffen-SSwerefearedopponentsandhighlyrespectedfortheircombatvalueontheEasternFront.Butitwasintheanti-partisanrolethattheWaffen-SSwouldrevealitstruebrutality.ItisbehindthefrontlinesthatamoremenacingpictureoftheWaffen-SSappears.

4.Anti-partisanandEinsatzgruppenoperations

IfthereputationoftheWaffen-SSwassulliedinthemaelstromoffrontlinecombatontheEasternfront,itwastobedestroyedintheconflictthatwentonbehindthefrontlines.ForitwasherethatthesoldiersoftheWaffen-SScouldgivefullventtotheirpoliticalandideologicalfanaticism.Undertheauspicesoftheanti-partisanoperations,andbycontributingtotheEinsatzgruppen,theWaffen-SSwouldirretrievablylinkitselftothecrimeofgenocide.

ThePartisanproblemandtheGermanresponse

TheconflictwiththepartisansontheEasternFrontservedtounleashabarbaricconflictinareasbehindthefrontlines.OrderssuchattheoneissuedbyGeneralVonReichenau(regardingconductofthetroopsontheEasternFront)accusedtheJewsofbeingbehindtheever-increasingpartisanattacksthattheGermanforceswereexperiencinginrearareas.ThiswasacommonaccusationmadebytheGermanauthoritiesandservedasanexcuseunderwhichtoconducttheirexterminationprogram.Thereislittleevidencetosupportsuchaccusationsandinfactmuchtothecontrary.AmemberoftheGermanMilitaryEconomicsDepartmentintheUkrainepreparedareportontheJewsandcommentedthat“…therewasnoevidencethattheywerewidelyengagedinsabotageandsimilaracts,northattheycouldbeconsideredtorepresentathreattotheGermanWehrmacht”(Krausnicketal.,1965:65).

Inhisdirective33Adatedthe22ndJuly1941HitlerhadgiventhegoaheadforGermanforcestoactoutsidethelawofwarintheconductofpartisanwarfare.ThiswasconfirmedduringbytheevidenceofWaffen-SSGeneralBach-Zelewski:

COL.TAYLOR:Wasanordereverissuedbythehighestauthorities,thatGermansoldierswhocommittedoffencesagainstthecivilianpopulationwerenottobepunishedinthemilitarycourts?BACH-ZELEWSKI:Yes,thisorderwasissued.COL.TAYLOR:Wasthisorderanobstacletocorrectingtheexcessesofthetroops?BACH-ZELEWSKI:Yes,inmyopinionthisorderpreventedtheorderlyconductofoperations,sinceonecantraintroopsonlyifonehasadequatedisciplinarypowersandjurisdictionoverthemandisabletocheckexcesses.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946Vol4:479)

Hitleralreadyrecognisedthathavingsufficientmanpowertomanagethecapturedterritorywasgoingtobeaproblem.Tocircumnavigatethisheauthorisedanorderoutliningtheactiontobetaken:

ThetroopsavailableforsecuringtheconqueredEasternTerritorieswill,inviewofthesizeofthisarea,besufficientfortheirdutiesonlyiftheoccupyingpowermeetsresistance,notbylegalpunishmentoftheguilty,butbystrikingsuchterrorintothepopulationthatitlosesallwilltoresist…TheCommandersconcernedaretobeheldresponsible…theywillcontrivetocontainorder,notbyrequestingreinforcements,butbyemployingsuitablydraconianmethods.(Trevor-Roper,1964:144)

ThisorderwasgivenonlyamonthaftertheinvasionofRussiacommencedanditisclearevidencethatHitlersoughttofightthewaroutsidethenormalboundsofconflictandthatheexpectedhissoldierstodolikewise.ExamplesoftheWaffen-SScarryingoutsuchdraconianmeasuresarefoundinreprisalshootingstheyconductedinretaliationforcasualtiestheysuffered.ThefollowingisanextractfromareportbySS-SturmbannführerBreimeier,31whowasthecommanderofabattalioninthePrinzEugenDivision:

On3November1943,around2000hours,aGermansoldierontheVelikaStreetinSinjwasambushedandkilled.Since,despiteallefforts,theculprithasnotbeenfoundandthepopulationhasnotsupportedusinthismatter,24civilianswillbeshotandonehanged.Thesentencewillbecarriedouton5November1943at0530hours.—Signed—Breimeier,SSSturmbannführerandBattalionCommander(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:402)

SS-BrigadeführerOttoKummhadthistosayaboutreprisalsinhishistoryofthe7thSSPrinzEugenDivision.Theiractivities(thepartisans)weremadepossiblebysympatheticelementsofthelocalpopulation.Itwas,therefore,necessaryforthetroopstotakemeasuresagainstthesethroughlocalreprisals,inordertoensurethatthepartisansdidnotmaintaintheinitiative.However,thesoldiersdisdainedactionsagainstthelocalpopulation.Sosuchoperationswereonlycarriedoutwhennecessary.(Kumm,1995:268)

Exactlywhatnecessarysituationsentailedisopentoconjecture,buttherecanbelittledoubtthattheWaffen-SSutilisedreprisalsasterrortacticsinthefightagainstthepartisansonawidespreadscale.InresponsetotheassassinationofSS-ObergruppenführerReinhardHeydrichinPraguein1942Waffen-SSgeneral,SS-ObergruppenführerKarl-HermannFrank,orderedSSforcestodestroythevillagesofLidiceandLezakywithover1,300peoplebeingkilled.Frankissuedthefollowingspecificinstructions:

Alladultinhabitantsaretobeshot.Allfemalesaretobeevacuatedtoaconcentrationcamp.Thechildrenaretobecollectedtogether,ifcapableofGermanisation,theyaretobedeliveredtoSSfamiliesintheReich,andtherestaretoundergoadifferenteducation.Theplaceistobeburntandrazedtotheground.(Miller,Schulz,&McCanliss,2006:359)

Theeuphemismofdifferenteducationcanonlyintonethemurderofinnocentchildren.In1943Waffen-SSsoldiersfromtheNordlandDivisioncameunderfirewhileperforminganti-partisandutiesinYugoslavia,withtheresultthattheyattackedavillage“…andfindingnoadultmentheretheyapparentlykilledtheinhabitants”(Christensenetal.,2003:13).SuchreprisalactionswereconsideredintheEinsatzgruppentrialwheretherelevantlawofwarwasappliedbytheNMT.TheyfoundthattheactionsoftheSSinreprisalswereunjustifiedinthattherewasalackofnexusbetweentheactsandthevictimsofthereprisals:

Whilegenerallythepersonswhobecomevictimsofthereprisalsareadmittedlyinnocentoftheactsagainstwhichthereprisalistoretaliate,theremustatleastbesuchcloseconnectionbetweenthesepersonsandtheseactsastoconstituteajointresponsibility.Article50oftheHagueRegulationsstatesunequivocally—“Nogeneralpenalty,pecuniaryorotherwise,shallbeinflicteduponthepopulationonaccountoftheactsofindividualsforwhichtheycannotberegardedasjointlyandseverallyresponsible.”

(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:493)

ThatmanyofthereprisalsconductedbytheSSweredisproportionatetotheoriginalactwasalsonotedbytheNMT.Waffen-SSGeneral,SSObergruppenführerErichBach-ZelewskigaveevidenceattheIMTastotheseverityinwhichtheanti-partisanoperationswereconducted.Attheendof1942Bach-ZelewskiwasappointedChiefofAnti-partisanCombatUnitsontheEasternFrontandhereporteddirectlytoHimmler.

COL.TAYLOR:Didthehighestmilitaryleadersissueinstructionsthatanti-partisanoperationsweretobeconductedwithseverity?BACH-ZELEWSKI:Yes.COL.TAYLOR:Didthehighestmilitaryauthoritiesissueanydetailedinstructionsastothemethodstobeusedinanti-partisanoperations?BACH-ZELEWSKI:No.COL.TAYLOR:Whatwastheresult,intheoccupiedterritories,ofthislackofdetaileddirectivesfromabove?BACH-ZELEWSKI:Thislackofdetaileddirectivesresultedinawildstateofanarchyinallanti-partisanoperations.COL.TAYLOR:Inyouropinion,werethemeasurestakeninanti-partisanoperationsfarmoreseverethanthecircumstanceswarranted,orweretheynot?BACH-ZELEWSKI:Sincetherewerenodefiniteordersandthelowercommanderswereforcedtoactindependently,theoperationsvariedaccordingtothecharacteroftheofficerincommandandthequalityofthetroops.Iamoftheopinionthattheoperationsoftennotonlyfailedintheirpurposebutevenovershottheirmark.COL.TAYLOR:Didthesemeasuresresultintheunnecessarykillingoflargenumbersofthecivilianpopulation?BACH-ZELEWSKI:Yes(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946Vol4:479)

TheabovetestimonyhighlightstwoimportantfacetsoftheconflictontheEasternFront.FirstunlawfulactionsbyGermansoldierswereapprovedbyhigherauthorities;andsecondaspreviouslymentionedtheremovalofsuchactionsfromjudicialrevieworpunishment.Assuchtheconductofanti-partisanwarfarebytheGermanswasanintegralpartofthewarofannihilationandexploitationthatwasthecampaignagainsttheSovietUnion.TheWaffen-SSalsohadthebenefitthateventhoughitsunitsmightbeservingwiththeArmedForces,theywerenotsubjecttoitsmilitaryjustice.TheWaffen-SScameunderthecontroloftheSSinrelationtopersonnel,training,replacementsandmilitaryjustice.TheobviouspointbeingherethatgiventheideologyoftheSSthiswastacitapprovalforatrocitiesaslongastheyfellwithinthegoalsandaimsoftheSS.

ThisisevidencedbyastatementofHitlerwhereherespondedtoStalin’scallforRedArmysoldierstobecomepartisansiftrappedbehindenemylines.Hitlerarguedthat“…thispartisanwarfaregivesusanadvantagebyenablingustodestroyeverythinginourpath…inthisvastarea,peacemustbeimposedasquicklyaspossibleandtoachievethisitisnecessarytoexecuteevenanyonewhodoesn’tgiveusastraightlook”(Buchler,1986:14).Afurtherexampleofthisisanorder,whichwasissuedtotheSSWikingDivisionjustpriortotheinvasionthatstatedcivilianscouldbeshotwithouttrialaspartisans(Smithetal.,1999).

Tobefairitwasnotthecasethatbrutalitywasonlyusedononeside.ThepartisansinfactusedvarioustacticsinanefforttoincitetheGermanforcestogreatercrimes.One

standardtacticofthepartisanswastoattackGermanforcesthenwithdrawintoanearbyvillage,withtheexpectationthattheGermanswouldattendthevillageandcarryoutreprisalkillingsthatwould“…createevenmorepartisans”(Heaton,2001:111;Lucas,1991).ThisannihilationwasmadealltheeasierbythetacticsusedbythepartisansandtheGermansinreprisal.AsSS-BrigadeführerOttoKummcommented,thistypeofactionhadpredictableresults.

Naturallythedestructionofvillages,killingpeopleevenifproventobepartisans,rapidlydestroyedourcredibility,andincreasedtheresistanceagainstus…Whatwasperhapstheworstthingforuswasthenarrowmindedapproachweasacollectivemilitarybodyusedinhandlingtheseproblems.Thelessonsshouldhavebeenlearnedmuchsooner,butunfortunatelytheywerenot.(Heaton,2001:128)

AWaffen-SSofficergivesafurtherexampleoftheprovocativeactionbythepartisans.HerecoveredthebodiesofanumberofGermansoldiersafterapartisanattackonaWehrmachtconvoy.“Thepartisanshadfirstshotthem,andimmediatelyafterwardsmutilatedorstrippedthem.Aswefoundthemurderedsoldiersbelongingsinoneoftheisbas,itwasaclear-cutaffair…”(Trang,2000:89).TheSSthenidentifiedandexecutedthesuspectedpartisans;ofinterestisthatuponreturningtothetrainaWehrmachtofficeraskedwhythewholevillagewasnotshot,afterallguiltwasnotaprerequisiteforpunishmentontheEasternFront.ThepartisanswerenotaversetodealingruthlesslywithSSmenwhofellintotheirgrasp.TheBielskiPartisangroupwasmainlymadeofJews.InhisaccountofthegroupTec(1993)outlinesthefateofthreecapturedSSmen.Onewitnessrecalledthatthefollowing:

Iwillneverforgetit,howontheirkneestheSSmenwerebeggingfortheirlives.Theypleadedformercybecausetheyhadchildrenandwivesathome.Theysworethatthey’renottoblameforanythingthathadhappenedtotheJews…Thentwopartisanscameoutleadingatall,blondGerman,handstiedbehindhisback…ThefirsttoreachtheSSmanwasPupko,theoldestmanintheotriad…Withknifeinhand,Pupkoscreamed:“God,mygrandfatherwasnotamurderer,myfatherwasnotamurderer,butIwillbeamurderer”…AsifinatrancethismainactorbeganthejobofcuttinguptheSSman…Inafewintense,highlychargedmomentstheSSmanwasunrecognisableanddead.Theothertwowereshot.(Tec,1993:197)

TocountertheactivitiesofthepartisanstheGermans,inparticulartheWaffen-SS,resortedtoabrutaldoctrineofcounterinsurgencyactivity.Thesebrutaltacticsextendedtothetakingofhostagesandshootingofinnocentciviliansinreprisalforactsofterrorismandsabotage.Forexample,onthe23rdofAugust1941theSSCalvaryBrigadeenteredthetownofStarobininRussiaandtookthefollowingaction:

Thetensionbynowwasextreme:thenewmayorwaskilledbythreeJewsandduringthenightthepartisanstriedtoburndownmanyhouses.WaldemarFegelein32orderedallmaleJewsintheareatobeshotinreprisal.Altogether21personswereexecuted.(Trang,2000:35)

Theuseofthisdoctrine,whilehelpingtoensuresurvivaloftheWaffenSSunits,alsocontributedtotheRussianciviliansjoiningthepartisansinresponsetotheactionsoftheGermans.ThedoctrineutilisedbytheGermansalsohadtheresultof“…enhancingthe

legendarybrutalitythatwouldbeattributed…”tovariousWaffen-SSunits(Heaton,2001:117).ThemajorityofWaffen-SSdivisionshadsomeinvolvementinfightingpartisansandtheassociatedatrocitiescommittedduringsuch.

Bylate1942partisanactivityhadreachedsuchsignificantlevelsthatHitlerfeltobligedtoissueadirectivedetailinghowthismenacewastobecombated.Heissueddirective46onthe18thofAugust1942andinitheoutlinedtheactiontobetakenandthecommandroletheSSwastoplayinthefightagainstthepartisans:

InrecentmonthsbanditryintheEasthasassumedintolerableproportions,andthreatenstobecomeaseriousdangertosuppliesforthefrontandtotheeconomicexploitationofthecountry…Thefollowingmeasuresarenecessary.1.Rapid,drasticandactiveoperationsagainstthebanditsbytheco-ordinationofallavailableforcesoftheArmedForces,theSSandPolicewhicharesuitableforthepurpose…(Trevor-Roper,1964:198)

Hitlerwentontooutlinethetypeofprinciplesthatheexpectedhisarmedforcestouseinthefightagainstthepartisans.Thefightagainstbanditryisasmuchamatterofstrategyasthefightagainsttheenemyatthefront.Itwillthereforebeorganisedandcarriedoutbythesamestaffs.Thedestructionofthebanditscallsforactiveoperationsandthemostrigorousmeasuresagainstallmembersofthegangsorthoseguiltyofsupportingthem…Inthisstruggleagainstthebanditstheco-operationofthelocalpopulationisindispensable.Deservingpersonsshouldnotbeparsimoniouslytreated;rewardsshouldbereallyattractive.Ontheotherhand,reprisalsforactioninsupportofthebanditsmustbeallthemoresevere.(Trevor-Roper,1964:198)

TocarrythisfighttothepartisansHitlerentrustedittohisloyalfollowerHimmler,andhisHigherSSandPoliceLeaders(HSSPF).TheReichsführer-SSandtheChiefoftheGermanPoliceisthecentralauthorityforthecollectionandevaluationofallinformationconcerningactionagainstthebandits.Inaddition,theReichsführer-SShasthesoleresponsibilityforcombatingbanditryintheReichCommissionersterritories…HigherSSandPoliceLeaderswillifnecessaryassumetemporarycommandofforcesoftheArmedForcesforuseintheiroperations.(Trevor-Roper,1964:199)

JusthowseriouslyHitlerandHimmlertookthefightagainstthepartisansisshownbythecreationin1944oftheAnti-partisanWarBadgeforallsoldierswhotookpartinsuchactivitiesforacertainnumberofdays.Thisshowsthatthemilitarycampaignagainstthepartisanswasseenanimportantcontributiontotheoverallmilitaryeffort.ItisofinterestthatnumerousWaffen-SSofficersinvolvedinthefightagainstthepartisanswereawardedthehighestGermanMilitaryhonours.SS-ObergruppenführerBach-ZelewskiwasawardedtheKnight’sCrossforthesuppressionoftheWarsawRisingin1944.PriortothishehadbeenawardedtheIronCross1stand2ndClassandtheGermanCrossinGoldforhisactionsagainstthepartisans(Schneider,1993;Yerger,1997).SS-OberführerOskarDirlewangerwasawardedtheKnight’sCrossin1944andhadalsobeenawardedtheIronCross1stand2ndClassandtheGermanCrossinGoldforhisactions(Schneider,1993;Yerger,1997).SS-GruppenführerHermannFegeleinwasawardedtheKnight’sCrossin1942withthelateradditionofOakleavesin1942,andswordsin1944.AswellasthishehadbeenawardedtheIronCross1stand2ndClassandtheGermanCrossinGold

(Schneider,1993).SS-ObergruppenführerFriedrichJeckelnreceivedtheKnight’sCrossin1944withthatlateradditionofOakleavesin1945.AswellasthishewasawardedtheIronCross1stand2ndClassandtheGermanCrossinGold(Schneider,1993;Yerger,1997).Themajorityoftheawardswereissuedatthetimeoftheseofficersperforminganti-partisanduties.

The8thFlorianGeyerDivision,ananti-partisanunit,hadmoreKnight’sCrossesawardedthanfront-linePanzerdivisionssuchasthe12thHitlerjugend,the9thHohenstaufen,the10thFrundsbergandthe23rdNederland.Anumberofanti-partisanunitshadsubstantialnumbersoftheKnight’sCrossesawarded.TheseincludedtheFlorianGeyerDivisionwith23,33PrinzEugenDivisionwithsix,HandscharDivisionwithfourandtheMariaTheresaDivisionwithsix(Simpson,1990;Williamson,1994).ThesewerethehighestmilitaryaccoladesthatGermanycouldconfer;theywerealsothesameaccoladesthattherecipientsfromthefrontlineunitsreceived.

ForthepurposeofthisdiscussionIwilladoptthedefinitionusedbyHeatonanddefineapartisanasbeing“…anirregularforcepoliticallymotivatedintoparamilitaryactionagainstanarmedexternalaggressor,imbuedwithlimitedmilitaryorparamilitarycapabilitiesanddedicatedtowagingunconventionalwarfarethroughsmalllocalisedunitsonanindividuallevelaswellascollectivebasis”(Heaton,2001:18).SS-GruppenführerHermannFegelein,thecommanderoftheunitsthatwouldbecomethe8thSSCalvaryDivisionFlorianGeyer,offersthefollowinginsightintocombatoperationsagainstpartisansinRussia:

TheenemyforceswerealwayswipedoutwhentheyweremadeupofregularRussianArmytroops.Thegreatestdifficultieswereposedbythepartisans.Militarilytheywerethebiggestthreattobefoundbehindafightingarmy.Ruthless,braveuptothemomentofannihilation,withAsiancruelty.(Trang,2000:35)

ItwasforthisreasonthatFegeleincouldreportthefollowingdivisionalresultsin1943.InMayandJune1943OperationVistulawasconducted,Fegeleinreportedsome4,018personskilled,thedeportationof18,860labourers,theconfiscationof21,000headofcattleandthedestructionof61villagesintheareasouthwestofGomel.DuringOperationZeithenconductedinJune1943Fegeleindestroyedsome63villagesandwasinpersonalcontactwithHitlerwhoinstructedhimtoneutraliseallpartisansfound.DuringOperationSeydlitzFegeleinreportedsome96villagesdestroyed,5,106personskilled,9,166personsdeportedandtheconfiscationof19,941headofcattle(Milleretal.,2006:313).

ItwasinthecombatagainstthepartisangroupsthattheWaffen-SSbegantofightwithextremebrutality.ForthefirsttimeduringtheRussiancampaigntheTotenkopfdivision’srecordsmentiontheshootingofciviliansandindicatethatwhenSSTKunitsencounteredgroupsofpartisansorsuspectsnoprisonersweretaken.(Sydnor,1990:201).

IndeeditwasclearthattheconflictwiththepartisanswasusedasanexcusefortheannihilationofJewryandSlavism.AnumberofSSDeath’sHeadregiments(TotenkopfStandarten)cameunderthepersonalcommandofHimmlerwheretheywereusedforthefightagainstpartisanswhichwasaconvenientcloakunderwhichtheSScouldcleansetheoccupiedEasternTerritoriesofallpolitical,intellectualandracialenemies.Thebrutality

extendedtomurderofinnocentciviliansanddestructionofvillages.Substantialoperationswerecarriedoutwherethepopulationsofsuspectareasweresimplyroundedupandshippedoutasslavelabour.InJanuary1943SS-SonderkommandoDirlewangerconductedananti-partisanoperationintheMinskareawhere“SS-SturmbannführerMagillorderedthebattaliontoroundupallpersonsintheareabetweentheagesof16and50whowerefitforwork-theywouldbeshippedofftoGermanyasslavelabour”(MacLean,1998:107).

The2ndSSPanzerDivisionDasReichdevelopedaninfamousreputationfordealingoutofhandwithsuspectedpartisansorguerrillas.SSHauptsturmführerHansHossfelder,anofficeroftheDasReichDivision,relatedinapost-warinterviewthesituationfacedbyWaffen-SSsoldiersastheysawit:

Manypeoplehaveoftenwonderedifweactuallyhadstandingorderstoshootwomenandchildren,andIknowthattherehavebeenmanydenialsregardingthisbyformerSSmembers.However,itwasunfortunatelytrue.Icanstatethatthetypesoforderswerenotascommonplaceinmyunitasinothers,obviously.Whenwespeakaboutpartisans,itmustbeunderstoodthatthesewereofcoursecriminalsevenaccordingtotheGenevaandHagueConventions,sincetheyforfeitedtheirnon-combatantstatusupontakinguparmsagainstus.Ourhandlingofthesepeoplewasconsideredwithinourright,althoughthereweremanyexcessesandoutrightwarcrimescommittedagainstinnocentpeople.Thiscannotbecompletelyoverlooked.(Heaton,2001:127)

ThisopinionwouldnotseemtobesupportedbyArticles1and2oftheHagueConferenceof1907,LawsandCustomsofWaronLand(HagueIV);October18,1907,whichoutlinethedutiesandregulationsrespectingthelawsandcustomsofwaronlandregardingbelligerents:

Article1.Thelaws,rights,anddutiesofwarapplynotonlytoarmies,butalsotomilitiaandvolunteercorpsfulfillingthefollowingconditions:Tobecommandedbyapersonresponsibleforhissubordinates;Tohaveafixeddistinctiveemblemrecognisableatadistance;Tocarryarmsopenly;andToconducttheiroperationsinaccordancewiththelawsandcustomsofwar.Incountrieswheremilitiaorvolunteercorpsconstitutethearmy,orformpartofit,theyareincludedunderthedenomination“army”.Art.2.Theinhabitantsofaterritory,whichhasnotbeenoccupied,who,ontheapproachoftheenemy,spontaneouslytakeuparmstoresisttheinvadingtroopswithouthavinghadtimetoorganisethemselvesinaccordancewithArticle1,shallberegardedasbelligerentsiftheycarryarmsopenlyandiftheyrespectthelawsandcustomsofwar.

IseetheHagueConventionsusefulinthattheycanbeusedtoformthebasisofanobjectiveassessmentofactions.HeatoncontendsthatitwasthefailureofsomeirregularforcestocomplywiththeidentificationrequirementsthatcausedthemtobeexposedtothefullextentofGermanretaliation.Whilethismaybelegallyacceptableitcertainlydoesnotextendtotheshootingofhostages,killingofcivilians,thedestructionofpropertyandtheshootingofsuspectedpartisanswithouttrial,whichwasthenormontheEasternFront.Furthermore,theassumptionhereisthatpeoplehadactuallycarriedoutthecrimesforwhichtheyhadbeenexecuted;directevidenceindicatesthatsuchaccusationsof

criminalityweresimplymanufacturedbytheGermans.ThejudgesoftheNMTconsideredthequestionofpartisansintheEinsatzgruppencaseandtheyarrivedatthefollowingconclusionwhenconsideringtherelevantsectionsofTheHagueConventionsandtheactionsoftheSS:

Itisunnecessarytopointoutthat,undertheseprovisions,anarmedcivilianfoundinatreetopsnipingatuniformedsoldiersisnotsuchalawfulcombatantandcanbepunishedevenwiththedeathpenaltyifheisprovedguiltyoftheoffence.Butthisisfardifferentfromsayingthatresistancefightersinthewaragainstaninvadingarmy,iftheyfullycomplywiththeconditionsjustmentioned,canbeputoutsidethelawbytheadversary.AsTheHagueRegulationsstateexpressly,iftheyfulfilthefourconditions,“thelaws,rights,anddutiesofwar”applytotheminthesamemannerastheyapplytoregulararmies.Manyofthedefendantsseemtoassumethatbymerelycharacterisingapersonapartisan,hemaybeshotoutofhand.Butitisnotsosimpleasthat.Ifthepartisansareorganisedandareengagedinwhatinternationallawregardsaslegitimatewarfareforthedefenceoftheirowncountry,theyareentitledtobeprotectedascombatants.TherecordshowsthatinmanyoftheareaswheretheEinsatzgruppenoperated,theso-calledpartisanshadwrestedconsiderableterritoryfromtheGermanoccupant,andthatmilitarycombatactionofsomedimensionswasrequiredtoreoccupythoseareas.Inbelligerentoccupationtheoccupyingpowerdoesnotholdenemyterritorybyvirtueofanylegalright.Onthecontrary,itmerelyexercisesaprecariousandtemporaryactualcontrol.ThiscanbeseenfromArticle42oftheHagueRegulationswhichgrantscertainwell-limitedrightstoamilitaryoccupantonlyinenemyterritorywhichis“actuallyplaced”underhiscontrol.ThelanguageusedintheofficialGermanreports,receivedinevidenceinthiscase,show,however,thatcombatantswereindiscriminatelypunishedonlyforhavingfoughtagainsttheenemy.Thisiscontrarytothelawofwar.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:492)

AnotherWaffen-SSveteran,SS-SturmbannführerRudolfvonFalkenhahnclaimed“Irarelymetsoldiersregardlessofrankwhoactivelypursuednon-combatants.Ididseeithappenanditwaswrong…”(Heaton,2001:135).Theabovecommentseemsconfusingtosaytheleast.Ononehandtheofficerissayingheknewno-onewhocommittedatrocities,buthethensaysthathesawthembeingcommitted.OttoKumm,whileanofficeroftheDasReichDivision,relatedhowinonefightwithpartisansnearKharkovinFebruary1943soldiersoftheDerFührerRegimentstormedabarncontainingpartisansandkilledorcapturedtheentireforce.Thosecapturedweresummarilyshot,adecision,whichKummclaimed,hedisagreedwith(Heaton,2001:142).ItisofnotethatKummwouldlatergoontocommandoneofthemostbrutalanti-partisanformations,theSSPrinzEugenDivision(Bender&Taylor,1972;Heaton,2001;Kumm,1995;Westwood,2001).ClearlytherewasaroleplayedbytheWaffen-SSincombatingthepartisanthreat.Letusnowexaminethisrole.

TheroleoftheWaffen-SS

LeadingWaffen-SSGeneral,PaulHausser,whenaskedabouttheroleoftheWaffen-SSinanti-partisanoperations,deniedthattheywereinvolved:

HERRPELCKMANN:Witness,wastheWaffen-SSaspecialfightingunitforthe

combatingofpartisans,andwasthefightagainstthepartisansconsideredtobeawarofextermination?HAUSSER:Thefightagainstpartisansisageneralmilitaryandpoliticalpolicemeasure,whichcanbeassignedtoanytroop;front-linetroopsoftheArmyandoftheWaffen-SSwereusedonlyinexceptionalcases,forinstancewhentheywereintherearareas.Therewereusuallynopartisanfightsintheoperationalareas;theymostlytookplaceintherearareasonly.ThisfightingwasmainlythetaskoftheSecurityDivisionoftheArmyandspecialdefencebattalions,andbesidestheseofpolicetroops.UnitsoftheWaffen-SSatthefrontwerenotespeciallytrainedforthiskindoffightingandwereassignedthisdutyjustaslittleasPanzerdivisionsoftheArmy,forinstance.IntheEast,unitsofmydivisionswereneverusedinthefightagainstpartisansatanytime.ThereforeitwasnotaspecialtaskforSSunits,andtheywerenotespeciallytrainedorinstructedforthispurpose.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:365)

TheFührerseemedtohaveotherideas.Atamilitaryconferenceonthe1stofDecember1942hewastalkingaboutthepartisanproblemwithhisgenerals.TheconversationleadtotheuseoftheWaffen-SSandtheappointmentofWaffen-SSGeneralBach-Zelewskitoheadanti-partisanoperations.Hitlerhadthefollowingtosay:

It(theSS)34hasmoreexperience.ListentowhatisbeingsaidabouttheSS,becauseithasthisexperience.TheyarealwayssayingthattheSSactsbrutally…Bach-Zelewskiisoneofthecleverestpeople.Evenintheparty,Iusedtoalwaysusehimforthemostdifficultthings.IftheCommunistresistancecouldn’tbebrokensomewhere,Itookhimthereandhesmashedit.(Heiberetal.,2003)

Bytheendof1944theGermanshadbeendrivenoutofRussiaandtheneedforahigheranti-partisancommandwasmaderedundant.BachZelewskilatercommentedthatthecorpsstafffromthe14thSSCorps“consistedmainlyofthepersonneloftheformeroperationalstaffoftheChiefoftheanti-partisanformations”(Bach-Zelewski,1946:2).ThiswouldnotbetheonlytransferofWaffen-SSsoldierstoandfromanti-partisanduties.

TheuseoftheWaffen-SSasboththeconductorandorchestraforantipartisanoperationsledtoaseriesofcampaignsin1942-43thatwereconductedsobrutallyandruthlesslythatnothinglivingwasleftinvitalcommunicationszones.TheclaimthatthefightingunitsoftheWaffen-SSwerenotinvolvedwithexterminationactionscanberejected.SS-ObergruppenführerKurtKnoblauchwasappointedtothestaffoftheReichsführer-SSasthechiefoftheWaffen-SSCommandbranchinJuly1942.KnoblauchhadpreviouslyservedintheTotenkopfDivisionin1940(Westwood,2001).Himmlergavehimtheroleofco-ordinatingsupportforthearmy“…withtheSSandtoprovideallHigherSSandPoliceLeadersintheEastwithSSunitsasneeded”(MacLean,1998:77).TheseunitswereavailabletotheHSSPFwhowereresponsibleforexterminationmeasuresbeingcarriedoutinoccupiedareas(Littman,2003;Padfield,1990;Reitlinger,1957).AsnotedbyStein“…thereweremanyotheroccasionswhenfieldunitsoftheWaffen-SSwereemployedagainstpartisans,suspectedpartisans,orordinarycivilianswhohadthemisfortuneofbeingproscribedunderNaziracialpolicies”(Stein,1966:275).

ForexampleonerearareacompanyoftheDasReichdivisionhelped“tomassacre920JewsatLachoisk,nearMinsk”aspartofanexterminationoperation(Reitlinger,

1957:169).InJuly1941the4thSSPolizeiDivisionaspartofArmyGroupNorthwasconfrontedbyanallegedseriouspartisanproblem,whichresultedina“decisiveandruthlessresponse”(Heaton,2001:123).InMay1944theGermaniaRegiment,whichwaspartoftheWikingDivision,tookpartinoperationMaigewitter,“…thegoalofwhichwastheliquidationofthePeoplesArmy(AL)partisandivisionsintheParczewforest”(Solarz,2003:55).SS-ObergruppenführerLotharDebesrecalledhowunitsofthe6thSSMountainDivisionNordwere“…committedagainstthepartisantroopswhowerethreateningthesupplyfromthenorth”(Debes,1947:16).SS-BrigadeführerOttoKummconfirmedinhispost-warinterrogationbytheUSArmythatthe7thSSDivisionPrinzEugenwasusedextensivelyin1944/45tocombatpartisansinYugoslavia(Kumm,1947).

Waffen-SSunitswereheavilyinvolvedincombatingthepartisanproblemontheEasternFrontanditsoccupiedterritories.DuetothevastexpansesofRussiatherewereinsufficientGermansecurityforcestodealwiththepartisanthreat,inresponsefrontlineunitswerecalledupontoassistwithsecurityoperationsandtheseunitswereprimarilyWaffen-SS.Infactsomeunitssuchasthe8thSSCalvaryDivisionFlorianGeyerwerespecificallycreatedanddesignedfortheanti-partisanrole.The14thWaffen-GrenadierDivision,alsoknowastheGaliciaDivision,wasconstitutedmainlyofUkrainianvolunteers.Itwasformedprimarilytobeapoliceformation(Benderetal.,1975;Dmytryshyn,1956;Littman,2003).TheGermanOrderPolicewereaskedbySS-ObergruppenführerGottlobBerger,oftheMainSSoffice,tosupplytrainingofficerssothatthedivisionwouldbe“…effectiveinfightingbanditsbeforebeingmovedtothefrontline”(Dmytryshyn,1956;Littman,2003:62).

ThestatementofHausserregardingtheWaffen-SSnotbeinginvolvedinanti-partisanoperationsisinaccuratetosaytheleast.TheWaffen-SSwastoplayamajorroleinthecombatofpartisansontheEasternFrontanditsoccupiedterritories.ItwasnecessarytocalluponanyWaffen-SSunitswhichmighthappentobeinthevicinitywhencombatingthepartisanproblem.TothisendatthestartoftheinvasionSSTotenkopfinfantryregimentsremainedunderthecontrolofHimmlerforuseinoperationsagainstthepartisans,whichservedasacloakforthemassexecutionofcivilians.

TheSSCalvaryBrigade,35consistingofthe1stand2ndSSCalvaryRegiments,wasunderthecontroloftheHSSPFforCentralRussia.TheseunitswereusedbytheCommanderoftheArmyGroupCentrerearareainRussiainJuly1941whocommented,“…thestrangersinthearea,RedArmysoldiersandJewishCommissars,weretakenprisonerbytheSS,andthemajorityofthemwereshot”(Birn,1997).IndeedtheregimentswereabletoreporttotheHSSPFleaderthe“…executionofsome14,000marauders,whowereactuallySovietsoldiersthathadbeencutofffromtheirunits,partisansandraciallyundesirablecivilians(JewsandGypsies)”(Trang,2000:33).SomehavearguedthatastheseunitswereunderthedirectcontrolofHimmlertheyshouldnotbeconsideredWaffen-SSunits.SSGeneralFegeleinobviouslyheldadifferentviewwhenonthe27thofNovember1940hehadthistosayabouttheactivationofthecavalryunits:“TheFührerhasauthorisedourregimentsfordeployment.WearenowbeginningthecavalrytraditionintheWaffen-SS”(Landwehr,1998:67).MembersofthisBrigadewerebroughttotrialfortheseoperationsinthe1960sandtheyadmittedthatsuchoperationswerenothinglessthenthewholesaleexecutionofJewsinthearea(Birn,1997).In1941thepartisanthreat

wasnotgreatandtherewaslittlepartisanactivity,infacttheoperationswerenothinglessthenasubterfugeforracialcleansing.Inhispost-warinterviewWehrmachtColonel-GeneralErhardRaussconfirmedtheabovebystatingthat“…generallyspeaking,RussianpartisangroupsontheEasternFrontwereformedinearly1942”(Tsouras,1995:138).

InJune1940HimmlerauthorisedthetransferofSS-ObersturmführerOskarDirlewangertotheWaffen-SS.AttheinstigationofHitlerandHimmlerhewastoformananti-partisanunitofWaffen-SSsoldiersconsistingofconvictedpoachers,concentration-campinmatesandothercriminals(MacLean,1998).ThisunitwouldbeknownastheSS-SonderkommandoDirlewanger,beforelaterbecomingthe36thSSGrenadierDivision.ItisoftenarguedbyapologistsfortheWaffen-SSthatthisandotherunitslikeitwerenotpartoftheWaffen-SS.SS-ObergruppenführerBach-ZelewskiwasaskedabouttheDirlewangerunitattheInternationalMilitaryTribunalwhilehewasgivingevidence.

DR.EXNER:WasitaformationoftheArmyortheSS?BACH-ZELEWSKI:No,itwasnotaformationoftheWaffen-SS;itwassuppliedbytheAllgemeineSS36,thatis,bytheBergeroffice.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:487)

PaulHausseralsoattemptedtodistancetheWaffen-SSfromtheDirlewangerunitwhenaskedaboutit:HAUSSER:Dirlewangerwasthecommanderofapickedtroopofmenfromtheconcentration-camps.HehadnoconnectionwiththeWaffen-SS.Ididnotmeethimpersonally,norhistroops,soIcangivenofurthertestimonyfrommyownknowledge.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:383)

Thisissimplynottrue.TheunitwascommandedbyWaffen-SSofficers,itreceivedcommandsfromtheheadquartersoftheWaffen-SS,andalsoreceivedreplacementsfromthemainfightingunitssuchastheDasReichDivision,whichonthe28thofAugust1940wasaskedtoarrangeforthe“…transferoffourjuniornon-commissionedofficers”toassistwiththeformationoftheunit(MacLean,1998:57).Onthe29thofJanuary1942theunitreceivedordersfromtheWaffen-SScommandtoundertakedutiesunderthecommandstaffoftheReichsführer-SSandhisHSSPFinRussia:“ItisclearthattheSonderkommando,atthispointintime,wasclearlyconsideredaunitoftheWaffen-SSproper…”(Krausnicketal.,1965;MacLean,1998:65).

TheSS-SonderkommandoDirlewangerwouldburnapathofdeathanddestructionthroughRussia.Tacticsemployedbytheunitincludedroundingupinnocentciviliansandmarchingthemthroughminefields,aswellasthisDirlewangerwouldflyonreconnaissanceoversuspectareas,andifhereceivedfirefromavillagehewouldlaterreturnandburnthevillageandkilltheinhabitants(MacLean,1998).HSSPFVonGottbergconductedOperationHornunginFebruary1943intheMogil’ovarea,theSS-SonderkommandoDirlewangerwasamongtheunitsinvolvedintheoperation.AttheconclusionoftheoperationVonGottbergclaimedtohavekilledsome9662partisans;inamessagetoanotherSSleaderVonGottbergadmittedthatsome3300Jewswerekilledintheoperation(MacLean,1998:113).InApril1943theSonderkommandotookpartinoperationsDraufgangeroneandtwo.Recordsindicatethatduringtheseoperationstheunitcollectedslavelabourers,confiscatedagriculturalproductsandkilledanumberofpartisansaswellasexecutingsome65womenandchildren(MacLean,1998:119).

OtherfrontlineWaffen-SSunitswereusedinthefightagainstthepartisans.The1stand2ndSSdivisionswerejusttwoofthepremierWaffen-SSdivisionswhoatsomepointintimeconductedanti-partisanoperations.Soldiersofthe1stSSPanzerDivisionLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerengagedinanti-partisancombatdutiesinCroatiaduring1943(Mooney,2004).PartsofthedivisionwereorderedtocombatpartisansintheKievsectoroftheEasternFrontinlate1943(Tiemann,1998).Thefirstactofthenewlyformed3rdSSPanzerCorpsunderthecommandofSS-ObergruppenführerFelixSteinerin1943wastoundertakeanti-partisandutiesinCroatia(Tieke,2001).TheCorpsconsistedofthe11thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionNordlandandthe14thSSPoliceregimentinSeptember1943.Inthebrutalfightingthatensuedmembersofthe24thSSPanzergrenadierRegimentburntdownvillagesandexterminatedtheoccupants(Smithetal.,1999).The18thSSHorstWesselDivisionundertookanti-partisanoperationsinMoraviain1945(Benderetal.,1975).The13thSSHandschar,21stSSSkanderbegand23rdSSNederlandDivisionsallundertookanti-partisanduties(Erteletal.,2000).

AsthepartisanproblemgrewtheWaffen-SSbeganthecreationofWaffen-SSunitsforspecialuseinpartisan-filledareas.The7thSSMountainDivisionPrinzEugenwasoneoftheseunits.ItwastoearnitselfareputationforbrutalityandfeaturedprominentlyintheNurembergtrials.AsoneauthornotedtheactionsofthePrinzEugenDivisioninYugoslavia“…blazedanotablyruthlesspaththroughoutthecountry”(Heaton,2001:100).ThedivisionwasmainlymadeupofethnicGermansfromSerbianBanat,thesehavingtobesupplementedbyothersfromRumania(Benderetal.,1972;Kaltenegger,1995;Windrow&Burn,1982).

AtNurembergareportwasenteredintotherecordfromtheYugoslavStateCommissionintowarcrimescommittedbytheNazis.ItoutlinestheactivitiesofthePrinzEugenDivisioninananti-partisanoperationcalledOperationBlack,whichwasconductedinMay1943intheNiksicarea:

Immediatelyafteritsinvasion,thisformation,openingfirewithallitsarms,commencedtocommitoutrageouscrimesonthepeacefulvillagesfornoreasonatall.Everythingtheycameacrosstheyburneddown,murderedandpillaged.TheofficersandmenoftheSSDivisionPrinzEugencommittedcrimesofanoutrageouscrueltyonthisoccasion.Thevictimswereshot,slaughteredandtortured,orburnedtodeathinburninghouses.Whereavictimwasfoundnotinhishousebutontheroadorinthefieldssomedistanceaway,hewasmurderedandburnedthere.Infantswiththeirmothers,pregnantwomenandfrailoldpeoplewerealsomurdered.Inshort,everycivilianmetwithbythesetroopsinthesevillageswasmurdered.Inmanycaseswholefamilieswho,notexpectingsuchtreatmentorlackingthetimeforescape,hadremainedquietlyintheirhomes,wereannihilatedandmurdered.Wholefamilieswerethrownintoburninghousesinmanycasesandthusburned.Ithasbeenestablishedfromtheinvestigationsentereduponthat121persons,mostlywomen,andincluding30personsaged60-92yearsand29childrenofagesrangingfromsixmonthsto14years,wereexecutedonthisoccasioninthehorriblemannernarratedabove.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:375)

SS-GruppenführerArthurPhelps,commanderofthedivision,considereditawasteof

timetobeprecisewithreprisalmethodsagainstpartisans,itwasmucheasierjusttochoosetheclosestvillagetowheretheattacktookplaceanddestroyit(Gumz,1998).Indeedtheatrocitiesbeingcommittedbythedivisionunderitssecondcommander,SS-BrigadeführerCarlReichritterVonOberkamp,reachedsuchalevelthatincorrespondencetoPhelps,HimmleraskedhimtointercedewithhisolddivisionandrestoresomeorderasitwasaffectingrelationsinCroatia.

InJuly1943,acompanyfromPrinzEugenmachine-gunnedtheresidentsoftheMuslimtownofKosutica,womenandchildrenincluded,afterthecompanyfoundthebodyofadeadSSmaninthetown.Concludingthatpartisanswereendangeringtheunit,thecommanderorderedhismentoopenfireonacrowdofresidents,whowerethenlistedasenemydead.(Gumz,1998:42)

SS-ObergruppenführerPhelps

DespitetheeffortsofPhelps,Himmlerwassooninformedthatthedivisionhadinthespringof1944killedsome3000civiliansinDalmatia.37AsaresultPhelps,whowasnowcommanderofthe5thSSMountainCorps“…attemptedtosubmergethecivilianskilledasenemydead,anindicationofthewidelatitudeGermancombatcommandershadassumed”(Gumz,1998:42).AftertheconclusionofthewartheYugoslavWarCrimesCommissionfoundthatthedivisionhadcommitted:

SomeoftheworstatrocitiesattributabletoanysoldiersduringtheSecondWorldWar…itcommittedvariousexcessessuchasthemurderofunarmedprisoners,lootingandburningofvillagesandthetortureandmassacreofhelplesscivilians.(Benderetal.,1972:16)

Phelpswasnotaloneinhisambivalentattitudetowardsactuallyidentifyingwhothepartisanswereandwhothecivilianswere.AtNurembergareportfromtheWehrmacht1st

MountainBrigadecommandingofficer,ColonelPericic,outlinedhowSStroopshadbeenattackedbypartisansinavillageinBosniaandforcedtoretreat.DuringtheretreattheSScommanderreportedthat“…whenhehadtoretreat,hehadkilledallpersonswhowereintheopenbecausehehadnochancetodistinguishbetweentheloyalpopulationandthepartisans.”(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:373).

The14thSSGaliciaGrenadierDivision,consistingmainlyofUkrainianvolunteers,wasinvolvedinanti-partisanoperationsin1944inPolandintheChelmareawhereunitsunderthecontrolofSS-ObersturmbannführerFriedrichBeyersdorffandSS-HauptsturmführerBristotcommittedanumberofatrocities.Beyersdorffwascommanderofthe14thSSArtilleryRegimentoftheDivision,BristotwaslatertocommandtheFusilierBattalionoftheDivision(Benderetal.,1975;Westwood,2001).Overthenextfewmonthstheseunitswouldbeinvolvedinnumerousatrocitiesagainst“bandits”andciviliansthatwouldresultinthehanging,torture,beating,burningandshootingofciviliansaswellasexecutionsingasvans.AttheconclusionoftheseoperationsitwasestimatedthattheunitsledbyBeyersdorffhad“…shot,hanged,gassedandburnedmorethan1500men,womenandchildrenbetweenFebruary1943andMarch1944”(Littman,2003:74).GermanFieldMarshalWalterModelnotedthatthetroopshadfoughtgallantlyduringthisperiod.

InJune1944the14thSSGaliciaDivisionhadconductedalongbattleagainstpartisansinYugoslaviaandclaimedthefollowinglossesamongthepartisans.4526counteddead,3766additionaldead,1246prisoners.Howevertheyonlylocated19machinegunsand825rifles(Lepre,1997:222).Lessthenoneweaponforeach10partisans.Theonlyconclusioncanbethatthemajorityofdeadwereinfactinnocentcivilians.Onthe27thofFebruary1945menfromthe14thSSDivisionalongwithothertroopssurroundedthevillageofHutaPieniackainPolandandattackeditaftertwoSSsoldiershadbeenkilledinasmallfirefightnearthevillagethepreviousday.AsaresultoftheSSattackmorethan1200villagerswerekilledandexecutedandthevillagedestroyed(Littman,2003:77).Theseexamplesshowthatfront-linefightingunitsoftheWaffen-SSdidcommitnumerousatrocitieswhileengagedinanti-partisanactivities.ThemajorityoftheseactionsweredoneundertheauspicesoftheHSSPF,Himmler’srepresentativesintheoccupiedareas.

TheHigherSSandPoliceLeaders

ItisworthexploringtheroleoftheSSPoliceLeadersorHSSPFandtheirrelationshipwiththeWaffen-SS.TheHSSPFwereresponsiblefortheconductofanti-partisanandexterminationoperationsbehindthefrontlines.TheaimofHimmlerincreatingthesepositionswastobringallthecomponentsoftheSSandpolice,includingtheWaffen-SS,underonecommandintheoccupiedterritoriesandareasofcommandoftheHSSPF.Notonlywasitanattemptatintegrationoftheseunits,butitwasalsointendedthattheHSSPFwouldprovidepoliticaldirectiontotheseunits.Forexample,SS-ObergruppenführerOttoWinkelmannwastheHSSPFforHungary,andwasresponsiblefortheconcentrationanddeportationofJewsin1944.HewasalsoinchargeoftheWaffen-SSunitsinBudapestuntilshortlybeforethecitywasbesiegedbytheRussiansinlate1944(Lozowick,2000;Ungvary,2005).

Inanorderissuedonthe21stofMay1941Himmlerorderedthat“TheHigherSSand

PoliceLeaderisplacedinchargeofSSandPolicetroopsandalsooftheoperationalpersonnelintheSecurityPoliceinordertocarryoutthetasksallocatedtohimbymepersonally”(Headland,1992:138).DuringthePohlcase,HSSPFforItalySS-ObergruppenführerKarlWolffconfirmedthecloselinkbetweentheHSSPFandHimmler:

Q.AsaHighestSSandPoliceLeader,whowasyourimmediatesuperior?A.TheReichLeaderSS.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:771)

ItwasinthisrolethattheHSSPFbecametheagentsforimplementingthewholerangeofoccupationpolicyinsofarasHimmlerwas–orcouldbearguedtobe–responsibleforit.IndeedtheroleoftheHSSPFinRussiawouldflourishinitsattempttoputintoactiontheideologicalideasoftheSS.TheabilitytocommandunitsoftheWaffen-SSmeantthattheHSSPFcouldusethisauthoritytocarryout“…ruthlessdirectivestoconductantipartisanwarfareandreprisals”(Sydnor,1989:253).AswellashavingtheseunitsundertheircontrolmostHSSPFalsohadtheSScourtsattachedtotheirheadquarters(Weingartner,1983).ThisrelationshipwouldproveusefulshouldtherebeanyproblemswithspecialdirectivescarriedoutatHimmler’sbehest.

TheWaffen-SSunitswereatthedisposaloftheHSSPF.AnexampleofthisisaletterfromHimmlertoWaffen-SSGeneral,SS-ObergruppenführerWilhelmKoppe,theHSSPFforPoland.InthisletterHimmlertoldKoppetousethe14thWaffen-SSGrenadierDivision“…inanywaynecessarytoholddownresistance”inthePolishareain1944(Littman,2003:73).SSOberstgruppenführerPaulHausserattemptedtodistancetheWaffen-SSfromtheHSSPFandtheiractivities.WhenaskedbythedefencecounselfortheSSabouttheHSSPFhehadthefollowingtosay.

HERRPELCKMANN:DidtheHigherSSandPoliceLeadersbelongtotheofficercorpsoftheWaffen-SS?HAUSSER:TheHigherSSandPoliceLeadersdidnotbelongtotheWaffen-SS.Theyhadnoauthoritytocommandandtheyhadnothingtodowithus.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:366)

ThelinkbetweentheHSSPFandcommandoftheWaffen-SSwasstrong.ManyoftheHSSPFhadservedintheWaffen-SS.Ofapproximately58HSSPFleaders,38atleastsixHSSPFleaders,or10percent,heldcommandsatdivisionallevelorhigherwithintheWaffen-SSatsomepointintime.Infact,HimmlersentseveralSSOfficersmarkedasHSSPFtounitsoftheWaffen-SSforaperiodofmilitarytraining.ThelinkbetweentheHSSPFandtheWaffen-SSwascementedevenfurtherwhenHimmlerorderedthatallHSSPFweretobecomepartoftheWaffen-SSin1944.SSGeneralandHSSPFFriedrichVonEbersteingavethefollowingevidencetotheIMTwhenquestionedbythedefencecounselfortheSS:

HERRPELCKMANN:YoujustsaidthatyouwereageneraloftheWaffen-SS.SofaryouhavetoldtheTribunalonlythatyouwereamemberoftheGeneralSS.WhenandforwhatreasondidyoubecomeageneraloftheWaffen-SS,althoughuptothenyouhadhadnothingwhatevertodowiththeWaffen-SS?VONEBERSTEIN:Inthefallof1944Himmlerbecamecommander-inchiefofthe

reservearmy.Whenhetookoverthisoffice,thePrisonersofWarOrganisationalsocameunderhisjurisdiction.Inthefallof1944HimmlertransferredtotheHigherSSandPoliceLeaderstheresponsibilityforsafeguardingprisoner-of-warcampsagainstmassescapesandagainstattemptsfromtheoutsidetoliberateprisoners.Forthispurpose,theHigherSSandPoliceLeadersweremadeseniorcommandersoftheprisonersofwarintheirdefenceareas.Accordingtointernationalregulationsregardingprisonersofwar,policecouldnotbeusedtoguardprisonersofwar,sotheHigherSSandPoliceLeadersweretakenoverintotheWaffen-SSandappointedgeneralsoftheWaffen-SS.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:306)

Ebersteinfailstomentionhowheauthorisedtheremovalof400RussianprisonersofwarfromRegensburgtoBuchenwaldwheretheywereexecutedontheordersofGestapochiefHeinrichMuller(Milleretal.,2006:277).

Ashasbeennoted,thecontributionstogenocidebytheWaffen-SSunitsunderthecommandoftheHSSPFwas“…nolesssignificantinquantityorbrutalityasthoseoftheEinsatzgruppen”(Buchler,1986:14).ThefollowingdiscussiongivessomeinsightintothisrelationshipbetweentheHSSPFandtheWaffen-SS.UndereachHSSPFwereanumberofsubordinateSSandPoliceLeaders(SSundPolizeiführer-SSPF)whocontrolledsmallerareaswithintheoverallareaofcontroloftheHSSPF.ErichBach-ZelewskiSS-ObergruppenführerandGeneraloftheWaffen-SSandPolice,wasalsotheHSSPFforcentralRussia.HewasprovidedtheSSBrigadesbyHimmlertoundertakethemassmurderoftheJewsinoccupiedRussia.Theseunitswereassistedin1942bytheDanishSSFreikorps39,aunitmadeupofDanishvolunteers,inanti-partisanduties(Smithetal.,1999).Hewashospitalisedin1942asaresultofsuffering“thepsychologicaleffectsofcarryingoutordersinvolvingtheexterminationpoliciesintheEastwithinhisHSSPFcommand”(Yerger,1997:37).HewasappointedbyHimmlerashisspecialdeputyforanti-partisanwarfareinOctober1942andeventuallytookcommandofallanti-partisanoperationsontheEasternFrontuntil1944.Thispositiongavehimtheresponsibilitiesofissuingreports,proposingcoursesofactionandactingasaliaisonbetweentheHighCommand,theArmyandSSonanti-partisanmatters.Hewentontocommandthe10thSSCorpsinlate1944.AnexampleofthecomplicityofBach-ZelewskiisthatheorderedtheSSCalvaryBrigadetorefertomurderedJewsaslootersandpartisansintheirreportstohidethetruenatureoftheiractions.Hesurvivedthewar,andtoescapedeathgaveevidenceattheNurembergtrials.

AfurtherexampleofthiscloselinkbetweentheWaffen-SSandtheanti-partisancommandstructureisSS-GruppenführerHeinzLammerding,whowasthechiefofstafftoBach-Zelewskiin1943andwasresponsiblefortheclearingofthePripetMarshesanditsassociatedkillingoperations,whichresultedinthedeathsof15,000Russians(Mann,2001;Yerger,1999).Heservedinthe3rdSSDivisionandlaterwentontocommandthe2ndSSand38thSSDivisions.

SS-ObergruppenführerandGeneraloftheWaffen-SSandPoliceKurtVonGottbergtookoverfromBach-ZelewskiandservedastheHSSPFinCentralandWhiteRussia.HeinitiallyservedintheindoctrinationofficeoftheSSandgaveuphisWaffen-SSrankin1942,butwaspromotedtotheaboverankintheWaffen-SSonJune30th1944afterservingforsometimeinhisHSSPFrolefightingthepartisansinRussia(Yerger,1997).

Gottbergcarriedoutanumberofoperationsagainstsupposedpartisansintheoccupiedareasforwhichhereceivedvariousawards.Ofinterestareanumberofoperationsthatwererunin1943,whichearnthimtheGermanCrossinGold.

Thefollowinginformationwasdrawnfromextractsofreportssubmittedfortheseoperations.OperationErntefestresultedin3721enemycasualties,however,thearmstallywasonly433rifles,nineheavymachineguns,19lightmachineguns,eightmachinepistols,etc(Yerger,1997).TheSS-SonderkommandoDirlewangerservedinthisoperationinJanuary1943.DuringthecourseoftheoperationtheSonderkommandoreportedkilling48partisans,whileitcaptured26partisans,executed34suspiciouspersonsforthelossofthreekilledandfourwounded(MacLean,1998:110).OperationCottbusresultedin6042enemycasualtiesinbattle.Some3709mensuspectedofbeingpartisanswereexecuted,599menweretakenprisonerforthelossofonly127Germansoldierskilled(Milleretal.,2006;Yerger,1997).Theweaponscapturedconsistedofsome19cannons,30heavymachineguns,45machinepistols,903rifles,etc.VonGottbergtacitlyadmittedthatprisonerswerebeingkilledwhenheissuedaninstructiononthe11thofAugust1943tounitsunderhiscontrolthat“HenceforthnocapturedpartisansorpartisanswhohaddesertedtotheGermanswouldbeshot”(MacLean,1998:132).

SS-OberführerDirlewanger

Whenonelooksatthefiguresthereisagreatdisparitybetweenthenumberofsupposedpartisanskilledandactualweaponscaptured.ForexampleinOperationCottbuslessthenonepartisaninninehadagunifthefiguresinGottberg’sreportsareaccurate.ForOperationErntefesttheratiowaseightpartisanstoeachrifle.Clearlywhatwastermedpartisanscouldonlyhavebeenaeuphemismforoutrightslaughterofcivilians.ThelowcasualtyrateforGermanforcesalsosupportsthisproposition.Thisandothertermssuchaspacificationandpurificationcouldonlyserveascodewordsforthewantonmurderof

innocentpeople.OtheroperationssuchasOperationTurov,whichwasconductedbytheelementsoftheSSCalvaryBrigade,hadsimilardisproportionateresults.InthisoperationtheSSsoldiersreportedthat600-700partisanswerekilledwithjust10takenprisoner.The2ndSSCalvaryRegimentreportedthedeathofsome400partisansforthelossofjustfourGermansdeadand12wounded(Trang,2000:35).

EventheGermanauthoritiesthemselvesadmittedthisdisparity,aswasshownatNuremberg.TheresultsofOperationCottbuswassubjectofareportfromtheGeneralCommissarforWhiteRutheniatotheReichMinisterforOccupiedEasternTerritoriesthatwascriticaloftheslaughterofcivilians:

SS-Brigadeführer,MajorGeneralofPoliceVonGottbergreportsthattheoperation“Cottbus”hadthefollowingresultduringtheperiodmentioned…thefiguresmentionedaboveindicatethatagainaheavydestructionofthepopulationmustbeexpected.Ifonly492riflesaretakenfrom4500enemydead,thisdiscrepancyshowsthatamongtheseenemydeadwerenumerouspeasantsfromthecountry.TheBattalionDirlewangerespeciallyhasareputationfordestroyingmanyhumanlives.Amongthe5000peoplesuspectedofbelongingtobands,therewerenumerouswomenandchildren.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:220)40

Inaletterdatedthe19thofJuly1943aPolicegeneralstationedintheUkrainecomplainedtoSS-ObergruppenführerVonHerff,headoftheSSPersonnelofficethat:

YesterdayaGauleiterandGeneral-KommissarunintentionallyandunwittinglybroadcastcertainsecretreportsintendedfortheFührer,showingthatsome480rifleswerefoundon6000deadpartisans.Putbluntly,allthemenhadbeenshottoswellthefiguresofenemylossesandhighlightourownheroicdeeds.(Krausnicketal.,1965:346)

Indeedithasbeennotedthat“…themassiveanti-partisanoperationsheconductedinthefirsthalfof1943intheLakePelikareawereespeciallybrutal”(Yerger,1997:204).AttheconclusionofoperationCottbusaGermanpropagandaofficertouredtheareaandnotedthat“…someofthepartisanshadbeenburntaliveandtheirhalf-roastedbodieshadbeeneatenbypigs”(MacLean,1998:141).VonGottbergwentontocommandthe12thSSCorpsin1944.HecommittedsuicideinMay1945.

FriedrichJeckeln,SS-ObergruppenführerandGeneralintheWaffenSSandPolice,servedastheHSSPFleaderfortheBalticStatesandNorthandSouthRussia.HesawcombatserviceintheWesterncampaignwiththeTotenkopfDivisionbeforetakingontheroleofvariousHSSPFappointmentsinRussiain1941(Birn,1991;Simpson,1990).HepersonallyoversawthefirstkillingactionofEinsatzkommando4intheUkrainewheresome90Jewswerekilled(Lozowick,1987).HisreigninRussiawaspunctuatedbyvariousmassacreswhere:

Massexecutionstookplaceonnumerousoccasions…atKamenetsPodolsky,Jeckeln’sunitskilled23,600peopleinAugust1941.InaravineoutsideofKievonSeptember29/30,1941,another33,000peoplewereexecuted…InDnepropetrovsk,15,000werekilledduringOctober1941,andafurther15,000wereexecutedinRovnoonNovember7/8…(Yerger,1997:274)

InthemonthofAugust1941itisestimatedtheJeckelnwasresponsibleforthemurderof

some44,000JewsintheareaoftheUkraine(Buchler,1986;Lower,2002).JeckelnismentionedinvariousOperationalSituationReportsoftheEinsatzgruppen,whichoutlinetheaboveatrocities.InOperationalSituationReport80dated11thofSeptember1941itoutlinestheassistanceprovidedbyJeckelninsupplyingacommandotoassistwiththeliquidationofJewsatKamenets-Podolsky(Arad,Krakowski,&Spector,1989).OperationalSituationReport101datedthe2ndofOctober1941outlineshowpoliceunitsunderthecontrolofJeckelnassistedtheEinsatzgruppenwiththeslaughterofJewsinKiev.ThiswastheinfamousslaughterofBabiYar.ThereportstatesthatanumberofJewsandcommunistswerekilled.WithtypicalthoroughnesstheEinsatzgruppennominatedthenumbersinvolved.

…Intheperiodcoveredbythereport,thetownsofNikolayevandKhersoninparticularwerefreedofJews.Remainingofficialstherewereappropriatelytreated.FromSeptember16to30.22,467Jewsandcommunistswereexecuted.Totalnumber35782…(Aradetal.,1989:168)

AtleastonesourcelistsunitsoftheWaffen-SSassistingwiththeslaughteratBabiYar(Lozowick,1987).OperationalSituationReport136datedthe19thofNovember1941outlineshow:

Ofapproximately100,000JewsoriginallylivinginDnepropetrovsk,about70,000escapedbeforetheGermantroopsenteredthetown.Oftheremaining30,000approximately10,000wereshotonOctober13,1941byadetachmentoftheHigherSSandPoliceChiefs.(Aradetal.,1989:242)

Jeckelnperformedvariousanti-partisancombatdutiesin1942and1943wherehehadcontroloftheSSVolunteerLegionNorwegen,41unitsofthe4thSSPolizeiDivisionandvariousarmyunits.InAktionSumpffieber(OperationMalaria),carriedoutinearly1942,theanti-partisanunitsunderhiscommandinBelorussialiquidatedmanyghettosandslaughteredtensofthousandsofJews(Gutman,1990).HewaspromotedtoGeneraloftheWaffen-SSin1944whilehecontinuedtofillthepostofHSSPFleader(Yerger,1997).AttheendofthewarJeckelnwascapturedbytheRussiansandtried.HewashunginRiga,Latviaonthe3rdofFebruary1946.

Friedrich-WilhelmKrugerwasanSS-Obergruppenführer,aGeneralintheWaffen-SSandthePolice.HewasalsotheHSSPFleaderforEastPoland,apositiontowhichhewasappointedinOctober1939(Yerger,1999).SobrutalwerehisactionsagainstthePolesthatafailedassassinationattemptwasmadeonthe20thofApril1943.HewasresponsiblefortheliquidationofvariousghettosandtheoperationoftheBelzec,SobiborandTreblinkaexterminationcamps,where1,720,000Jewsweremurdered(Gutman,1990).Hereceiveddivisional-leveltrainingwiththePrinzEugenDivisionfromNovember1943toApril1944andwasgiventherankofGeneraloftheWaffen-SSin1944.Hewasmadecommanderofthe6thSSMountainDivisionNordin1944andlaterwentontocommandthe5thSSMountainCorps(Bender&Taylor,1971;Westwood,2001;Yerger,1999).Hecommittedsuicideattheendofthewar.

SS-GruppenführerandGeneraloftheWaffen-SSCarlGrafVonPückler-BurghausservedasdeputyHSSPFforCentralRussiatoBach-ZelewskifromJanuary1942untiltakingthe

latter’splaceinlate1942whenBachZelewskiwassickuntilearly1943(Yerger,1999).HetransferredtotheWaffen-SSonthe1stofAugust1942andtookcommandofthe15thSSLatvianGrenadierDivisionin1943.HesurrenderedtotheAmericans,butwashandedovertotheRussians.Toavoidatrialhecommittedsuicideonthe12thofMay1945.

SS-GruppenführerOdiloGlobocnikservedinanSSdivisioninPolandasanenlistedman.HewaslaterresponsibleforthesupervisionoftheexterminationcampsofBelzec,Sobibor,TreblinkaandMajdanek(Arad,1987;Birn,1991;Krausnicketal.,1965;MacLean,1998;Poprzeczny,2004;Reitlinger,1957).MajdanekreceivedtheofficialtitleWaffen-SSPrisonerofWarCampLublin.ThecampwasconstructedbytheLublinCentralConstructionBoardoftheWaffen-SSandPolice(White,1990).Himmlerhadinstructedthat“Inoperationsagainstguerrillatroops,men,womenandchildrensuspectedofguerrillaactivitieswillberoundedupandshippedtothecampsinLublinorAuschwitz”(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:234).ThisresultedinthousandsofchildrenbeingconsignedtotheMajdanekcamp.GlobocnikhadseenhisroleintheEastasbeingthe“…biologicalcrushingofthePolishpeoplefromtheEastandWest”(Scheffler,1985:32).AstheSSPFfortheLublindistrictinPolandGlobocnik:

Hadthepoweroflifeanddeathovereveryoneinorpassingthroughthisrecentlyacquireddistinct;Pole,JewandUkrainians.Bythetimehelefthehad,invariouswaysmurderednofewerthen1.5millionJews…Twoofhislargekillingcompoundsweresituatedwithinthisdistrict,BelzecandSobibor,whilethethird,Treblinka,wasoutsidethedistrict.(Poprzeczny,2004:93)

TheworkofGlobocnikwasnotedbytheNMTinthePohlTrial.

TheexterminationcampsinthevicinityofLublin,suchasTreblinkaandMajdanek,gaverisetospecialproblemsbecauseofthemagnitudeoftheiroperations.Thesecampswere,untilthelatterpartof1943,underthejurisdictionofoneOdiloGlobocnik,theHigherSSandPoliceLeader,Lublin.Inordertocoordinatetheundertaking,aspecialstaff“G”wascreatedwithintheframeworkoftheWVHA.TheheadofthisstaffwasGlobocnik,whiletheadministrativeandaccountingpersonnelwassuppliedbytheWVHA.Itwasthetaskofspecialstaff“G”toseizeandaccountforallpropertyintheGovernmentGeneralofoccupiedPolandderivedfromtheexterminationandenslavementofJews.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:254)

SoinspirationalweretheactionsofGlobocniktotheNazisthattheyweredeemedworthyofamajorstoryintheSSnewspaperDasSchwarzeKorps,titledPicksandSpadesfortheworkthattheJewsweredoing.Thearticlepraises:

…SS-BrigadeführerOdiloGlobocnik,thepolicecommanderinLublin,forhavingprovidedsomanytasksfortheJewstherethattheyscarcelyhavetimetocatchtheirbreath.ItsaysthatgettingthingsdoneinPolandrequires“guys”whounderstandhowtogettotherootoftheJewishproblem.Onlyspecialpersonalitiesandcharactersuffice.(Combs,1986:131)

OthermembersoftheHSSPFhadclosetieswiththeWaffen-SS.JosefFitzthumhadservedintheFlemishVolunteerLegionin1942(Birn,1991;Milleretal.,2006;Westwood,2001).AsanSS-Gruppenführerhelaterwentontocommandthe18thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionHorstWesselandthe21stSSMountainDivisionSkanderberg

forshortperiodsin1945.42KonstantinKammerhoferservedinthe5thSSPanzerDivisionWikingin1941(Westwood,2001).WalterSchimanawasresponsiblefortheformationofthe14thSSGrenadierDivisionGaliciabeforebeingtransferredtoGreeceastheHSSPF(Birn,1991).

InherstudyoffiveHSSPFleadersintheBalkans,Birn(1991)foundthattheyweredeeplyinvolvedinthepersecutionoftheJews.ToachievethistheHSSPFleadersreliedonthecontributionofallpartsoftheSSapparatus,includingtheWaffen-SS:

Thewholemachinerywasinvolvedonaroutinebasis.TheWaffen-SSdivisions,forinstance,setupunderthesupervisionoftheHSSPF,wereveryactiveinanti-Jewishmeasures,contrarytothepopularbeliefthattheywerefightingunitsuninfluencedbyNaziideology.(Birn,1991:358).

In1943HimmlerorderedtheJewsofLublin,Polandtobedealtwith.TothisendhehadanorderpassedontoSS-ObergruppenführerFriedrichKrugertoundertakethisactionandtoassistinthishewasto“…formaspecialcordonof2000soldiersfromunitsofaWaffen-SSBrigade”todealwiththeJewishproblem(Poprzeczny,2004:105)ThisinvolvementinoperationsagainsttheJewsissupportedbythefactthattheHSSPFweremadefullyawareofthenatureofthecleansingoperationstobeundertakenbytroopsundertheircontrol.TheHSSPFwereinformedinatelegramfromSS-ObergruppenführerHeydrichdatedthe2ndofJuly1941oftheactivitiestobeundertakenbytheEinsatzgruppen(Headland,1989;Krausnicketal.,1965;Longerich,1997).Thisordercontainedalistofthosewhoweretobeeliminated:

Cominternfunctionariesandcommunistprofessionalpoliticiansgenerally,lowerfunctionariesofPartycentral,higher,middleand(radicallower)functionariesofPartycentral,regionalandlocalcommittees,PeoplesCommissars,Jewsinpartyandstatepositions,otherradicalelements…(Longerich,1997:262)

CertainlytheaboveorderwastakentoextendtoallJewsbythecommandersofthekillingunits.IndeedsomeofthecommandersoftheEinsatzgruppentestifiedinlatertrialsthattheordertokillallJewswasgiventothempriortoenteringRussia.InanyeventtheEinsatzgruppencertainlyundertookthesystematicliquidationofcertainethnicgroupswithgreatgusto.

IntheareaofSerbia,SS-GruppenführerAugustMeysznerundertookthedailyroutineofkillingJews.FurthertothisasaresultofhisactionsMeysznerreceivedseveralmillionmarksfromconfiscatedJewishpropertyforthenewlyformedPrinzEugenSSDivision(Birn,1991).Thiswasnotanunusualarrangement;oftenWaffen-SSunitswouldreceivebenefitsfromtheactionsagainsttheJewsintheformofgoodsormoney.InthedistrictofLublin,SSPFSS-GruppenführerGlobocnikhadvariousSSmenandJewsassignedtohisstaffwhowere“…involvedinsortingandstoringthehighvaluepossessionsremovedfromhundredsofthousandsofJewishfamilies”whohadbeenkilledortransportedtothecamps(Poprzeczny,2004:115).ThiscollectionofmaterialwasreportedtoWaffen-SSGeneral,SS-ObergruppenführerOswaldPohl,whowasinchargeoftheSSEconomicandAdministrativeMainDepartment(SSWirtschaftsundVerwaltungshauptamt,commonlyknownas“WVHA”)andchiefofDivisionWoftheWVHA(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:200).

On4July1944,Pohl,inacommunicationtotheMainOfficechiefs,announcedthenamesofofficersresponsibleforthepropertyseizedinseveralareas,andstated:“Asamatterofprinciple,ithastobekeptinmindthattheentireJewishpropertyistobeincorporatedintotheReichproperty.”PropertyfromtheActionReinhardtwhichhadbeendeliveredtotheReichMainTreasurywaskeptinaseparateaccount,appropriatelycalled,“DepartmentBooty.”MovedbytheChristianspiritofChristmas,Pohl,on6November1943,wrotetoHimmler,statingthatheintendedtomakegiftsofwatchesandfountainpenstoSSunits.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:988)

SS-GruppenführerFrankoftheWVHAgaveevidenceastowherethemoneythatGlobocnikobtainedwent,“…themoney,thecash,wentintothetreasuriesoftheWaffen-SS…”(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:759).

WitnessesfortheWaffen-SSbeforetheIMTdeniedknowingaboutthistypeofactivityduringthewar.SS-ObergruppenführerVonEbersteingavethefollowingevidence.

MAJORJONES:DidyoueverhearofOswaldPohl?VONEBERSTEIN:Yes.MAJORJONES:HewastheheadoftheEconomicandAdministrativeMainOfficeoftheSS,washenot,theWVHA?VONEBERSTEIN:Yes.MAJORJONES:Didyouknowthatthisorganisation,usingSSpersonnel,wasemployingmurderasameanstoestablishlootonacolossalscaleforthebenefitoftheWaffen-SSandotherSSorganisations?VONEBERSTEIN:Yes;IheardthatfromthereportsonthistrialwhileIwasinthecamp.Ihadneverheardbeforethatgoldteeth,etcetera,werecollected.MAJORJONES:DidyouknowofthegreatbusinessindeaththatwasbringingmillionsofmarkstothecoffersoftheReichbank?AnditwasinvolvingnumerousdepartmentsoftheThirdReich.VONEBERSTEIN:No,Ididnotknowthat.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:315)

ThefollowingletterfromWaffen-SSGeneral,SS-ObergruppenführerAugustFranktotheAuschwitzconcentration-campandLublinDistrictSSadministrations(documentNo–724)leaveslittledoubtastotheutilisationbytheWaffen-SSofthepropertyofthecampinmates.Theletterhasnotbeenproducedinfull,however,thesalientpartsarebelow:

TotheChiefoftheSSGarrisonAdministrationLublinTotheChiefofAdministrationConcentration-campAuschwitzSubject:UtilisationofpropertyontheoccasionofsettlementandevacuationofJews.WithouttakingintoaccounttheoverallregulationswhichareexpectedtobeissuedduringOctober,pertainingtotheutilisationofmobileandimmobilepropertyoftheevacuatedJews,thefollowingprocedurehastobefollowedwithregardtothepropertycarriedbythem—property,whichwillinallordersinthefuturebecalledgoodsoriginatingfromthefts,receivingofstolengoods,andhoardedgoods…Watchesandclocksofallkinds,alarmclocks,fountainpens,mechanicalpencils,handandelectricalrazors,pocketknives,scissors,flashlights,walletsandpursesaretoberepairedbytheEconomicandAdministrativeMainOfficeinspecialrepairshops,cleaned,andevaluated;andhavetobedeliveredquicklytofront-linetroops.Deliverytothetroopsisonacashbasisthroughthe

postexchanges.Three-fourthpricegradesaretobesetandithastobemadesurethateachofficerandmancannotbuymorethanonewatch…Ordinaryfurs(lamb,hare,andrabbitskins)aretobereportedtotheSSWVHA,AmtBII,andaretobedeliveredtotheclothingplantoftheWaffen-SS,RavensbrucknearFuerstenbern(Mecklenburg)…IthastobestrictlyobservedthattheJewishStarisremovedfromallgarmentsandoutergarmentswhicharetobedelivered.Furthermore,itemswhicharetobedeliveredhavetobesearchedforhiddenandsewedinvalues.Thisshouldbecarriedoutwiththegreatestpossiblecare.ACTINGFOR

[Signed]FRANKSS-BrigadeführerandBrigadierGeneraloftheWaffen-SS.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:695)

NotonlyweretheWaffen-SSdirectlyinvolvedintheatrocities,buttheyalsobenefitedmateriallyfromthepersecutionoftheJewsandotherraciallyundesirableelements.

TheinvolvementoftheHSSPFandWaffen-SSunitsinatrocitiescontinuedwithmembersofthe31stSSGrenadierDivisionkillingJewswhoupto1944hadbeenusedasslavelabourersinmines(Birn,1991).

InthevillageofCzervenka,theHungarianguardswererelievedbyunitsfromthe31stSSDivision…DuringthenighttheSSmenshotseveralhundredJews,whowereburiedinamassgrave.Thenextday,onthemarch,theSSmenamusedthemselvesbyshootingattheJewsfortargetpractice,andtheroadsidewaslitteredwithcorpseswellintoHungarianterritory.(Birn,1991:359)

InCroatiasimilaractionswereconductedbytheWaffen-SSundertheguidanceofSS-GruppenführerKonstantinKammerhofer.Soldiersofthe13thSSMountainDivisionHandscharandthe23rdSSMountainDivisionKamacommittedregularatrocitiesinthepersecutionoftheJews(Birn,1991;Heaton,2001).

TheHandscharkilled22JewsinTuzia,whereitwasstationedduringthesummerof1944…abuildingunitconsistingofmembersofbothdivisions…wereguardingHungarianJewishforcedlabourersbuildingfortificationsattheAustrianvillageofJennersdorf.TheytreatedtheJewswithsuchcrueltythatlocalvillagerswereinfuriated.Manyoftheinmateswhowereincapableofworkingwereultimatelytakenfromthegroupandshot.(Birn,1991:360)

The7thSSMountainDivisionPrinzEugenalsohadahandinthekillingofJewsinlate1943.IntheTownofSplitontheAdriaticcoastofCroatia,membersofthedivisionusedJewstoexhumethemassgravesofpreviousvictims,“…afterwhichtheythemselveswereshot”(Birn,1991:361).Thedivisionalcommanderrecalledthatinearly1944aGermansupplycolumnwasambushednearthetownofOtokintheSplitarea,asaresult“…alltheresidentsofthetownwerekilled.ThebattalionfromtheDivisionPrinzEugenparticipated”(Kumm,1995:269).

InAlbaniaitwastheroleofHSSPFJosefFitzthum,SS-GruppenführerandgeneralintheWaffen-SSandPolice,toensureactionwastakenagainsttheJews.Heutilisedthe21stSSMountainDivisionSkanderbegtotakeactionagainsttheJewsasheheldtheviewthattheyweretoblamefor“…allpoliticalagitationandeconomicshortages”(Birn,

1991:363).Thisdivision,underthecontrolofSS-BrigadeführerAugustSchmidhuber,roundedupJewsandexecutedanywhoresisted.ManyofthoseroundedupwerelatertransportedtoBelsenconcentration-campwheretheyperished.SchmidhuberservedintheGermaniaRegimentinPoland.HewasthenaregimentalcommanderinthePrinzEugenDivisionbeforeservingasadivisionalcommanderforboththePrinzEugenandSkanderbegDivisions.SchmidhuberhadalsobeenincommandofthePrinzEugenDivisionwhenithadcommitteditsearlieratrocitiesinthetownsofSplitandDubrovnik(Birn,1991;Kaltenegger,1995;Westwood,2001;Yerger,1999).OfinterestisthatSchmidhuberneverjoinedtheNaziPartyandwas,infact,opposedtotheirpoliticalviews.Byhisactionsitisclearhoweverthathewasideologicallyalignedwiththem.HewascapturedbytheRussiansinMay1945,triedinBelgradeandexecutedforwarcrimesonthe19thofFebruary1947.TheSSCalvaryBrigadealsoparticipatedheavilyinanti-partisanoperations,firstasthisBrigadeandlaterasthe8thSSCalvaryDivisionFlorianGeyer(Trang,2000).Oneveteranofthedivisionrecallshowapartisangroupwasneutralisedinoperationsduring1943whenitwasplacedatthedisposalofBach-Zelewski:

Inoneintensiveoperationseveralbandswereneutralised.Apartisanwastakenprisoner.Themanwassentencedtobehanged.Theentirecompanyhadstrictorderstowatchtheexecution.ThetimecameandawhistlewasblownasIwassittingcomfortablywithafewcomrades.Everyonesetoffatarun.Somewereevenquitemerry.(Trang,2000:97)

Duringoneoftheseoperationsthedivisionmanagedtoencircleandwipeoutalargegroupofpartisan:therewere1256killed(includingmanyduringsummaryexecutions)and206prisoners.TheSShadcasualtiesof22killedand56wounded(Trang,2000:95).

ThefactthattheWaffen-SScommandnotonlyparticipatedintheactionsbutalsohadextensiveknowledgeofsuchisshowninthecommentsofSS-ObergruppenführerKarlWolff,whorecountedthatHimmlerhadaskedseniorWaffen-SSofficersonhowtoaddressthepartisanproblem.TheseofficersincludedatleasttwodivisionalcommandersoftheWaffenSS,SS-ObergruppenführerFelixSteinerandSS-BrigadeführerOttoKumm.WolffrecallsthatatHimmler’sbehesthespoketothesetwoofficersaboutthepartisanproblem:

IspoketoFelixSteinerandOttoKummaboutthis,andtheywereoftheopinion…thegreatestproblemwastryingtoundothedamagealreadydonefromtheinvasion(ofRussia)43forwardwithregardtothecivilianpopulations,especiallythemassexecutions,whichhadnotbeenhandledverywell.(Heaton,2001:106)

Furthertothis,accordingtoWolff,SteinerwasinvolvedwithBachZelewskiindecidinghowthepartisanthreatcouldbemet(Heaton,2001:128).ThisclearlyindicatesthatattheveryleastseniorofficersoftheWaffen-SSwhowereinchargeoffront-linefightingunitswereawareoftheatrocitiesbeingcommitted.IndeedthefactthatthemanyseniorWaffen-SScommanderswereawareofthekillingoperationstakingplaceisevidencedbythecommentsofSS-GruppenführerBittrichatameetingof15Waffen-SSGeneralsin1941,wherehecriticisedtheracialcleansingintheEastbeingundertakenbyHimmler(Heaton,2001;Yerger,1997).ThisisironicgiventhatBittrichwentontocommandtheSSCalvaryDivisionin1942,aunitthat,wasresponsibleformanyatrocitiesontheEasternFront.IndeedthisisthesameSSGeneralBittrichwhoinApril1938hadtakenoveran

apartmentinViennawithhiswifethathadbeenconfiscatedfromaJew(VonLang,2005:115).Onecouldperhapssurmisethathisconcernaroseoutofthemilitaryimplicationsoftheseactions,ratherthenanymoralconcernforthevictimsthemselves.CertainlyBittrichneverattemptedtoresignhiscommissionorbringtojusticeanyofthepersonneloftheSSCalvaryBrigadeinvolvedinthecleansingactions.Asoneauthorhasnoted,thecleansingactionsofunitssuchtheEinsatzgruppenandothersweretobe“…giventhehighestpriority:noexigencyofwar,noeconomicconsideration,noshortageofsupplieswoulddiminishthenecessityofcompletingtheassignmentdowntothelastJew”(Littman,2003:35).

AlsopresentatthismeetingweresuchSSnotablesasSeppDietrich(LeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerDivision),PaulHausser(DasReichDivision),TheodorEicke(TotenkopfDivision),KarlWolff(Himmler’sadjutant)andFelixSteiner(Wikingdivision)amongothers,allgeneralsoffrontlineWaffen-SSunits(Heaton,2001).YetatNurembergHaussermadethefollowingclaimthathedidnot“…rememberasinglecaseinwhichthefronttroopsofmydivisionhadevertakenhostagesordestroyedvillagesasapunishment”(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:363).SuchaclaimwouldnotseemtomatchtherecollectionsofotherWaffen-SSgeneralsandotherfacts.

AsnotedbyBirnattheconclusionofherstudy,“…allactionsofexterminationwerethecommonresponsibilityofthesecuritypolice,orderpoliceandtheWaffen-SS”(Birn,1991:364).ThisclaimissupportedbyBuchlerwhoarguesthat“…unitsofboththepolice(Orpo)andtheWaffen-SSplayedaveryactiveroleinthemassmurderofJewsinSovietterritory”(Buchler,1986:19).OneoftheargumentsraisedbydefendersoftheWaffen-SSisthatunitssuchasthe1stand2ndSSBrigadesandtheSSCalvaryBrigadewerenotpartoftheWaffen-SSassuch.Thisclaimcanberejected.Waffen-SSofficerscommandedtheseunits,theycontainedmembersoftheWaffen-SSandtheseunitswerelaterusedasthecadrestoformotherWaffen-SSunitssuchasthe18thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionHorstWesselandthe8thSSFlorianGeyerDivision.Theywereengagednotonlyinanti-partisanduties,butalsoincombatdutiesonoccasions.Perhapstheonlydifferencethatcanbedrawnbetweenthemandthefront-lineWaffenSSunitsisthatattimestheycameunderthedirectcontroloftheReichsführer-SS,ratherthehighcommandoftheWaffen-SSandtheArmy.LetusnowturnourattentiontotheSSkillingunitsthatoperatedinthewakeoftheadvancingarmygroups,theEinsatzgruppen.

TheroleandmethodsoftheEinsatzgruppen

TheEinsatzgruppenweremobilekillinggroupsthatoperatedbehindthefrontlinesontheEasternFrontconductingso-calledcleansingoperationswheretheywouldmurderJewsandanyotherswhowereseenasathreattotheNaziregime.Theseactionscanbeseentobethefirststepsonthepathtothefinalsolutionandthedeathcamps.Waffen-SSGeneralBach-ZelewskigavethefollowinginsightintothemissionoftheEinsatzgruppenattheIMTtrialatNuremberg:

COL.TAYLOR:AreyougenerallyfamiliarwiththeoperationsofthesocalledEinsatzgruppenoftheSD?BACH-ZELEWSKI:Yes.

COL.TAYLOR:Didtheseunitsplayanyimportantpartinlarge-scaleanti-Russianoperations?BACH-ZELEWSKI:No.COL.TAYLOR:WhatwastheprincipaltaskoftheEinsatzgruppen?BACH-ZELEWSKI:TheprincipaltaskoftheEinsatzgruppenoftheSicherheitspolizeiwastheannihilationoftheJews,gypsies,andpoliticalcommissars.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:477)

Bach-ZelewskihadfirsthandknowledgeoftheroleoftheEinsatzgruppen,hehadpersonallydirectedEinsatzkommando8inthekillingofsome1,100maleJewsonthe17thofJuly1941intheareaofSlonim(Milleretal.,2006:42).ThemethodsofkillingusedbytheEinsatzgruppenincludedshooting,gassing,burning,bludgeoningandothers.Somemethodsofexecutionwereassadisticastheywereunique.AdolfRuche,aformerSS-Hauptscharführer,gaveevidenceduringtheEinsatzgruppentrial44thatshowedhowoccasionallytherewereexecutionerswhodevisedoriginalmethodsforkillingtheirvictims:

OntheoccasionofanexhumationinMinsk,inNovember1943,ObersturmführerHeuserarrivedwithaKommandoofLatvians.TheybroughteightJews,menandwomen,withthem.TheLatviansguardedtheJews,whileHarterandHeusererectedafuneralpyrewiththeirownhands.TheJewswerebound,putonthepilealive,drenchedwithgasolineandburned.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:448)

ByDecember1942theEinsatzgruppenhadmurderedatleastsome1.1millionpeople45inlessthensixmonthsinwhichtheyhadbeenoperatinginRussia.InalltherewerefourEinsatzgruppenthatoperatedinconcertwiththeGermanArmyGroupsbehindthefrontlinesinRussiaandwereresponsibletoHimmler.Thegroupsweredividedintosmallersub-unitscalledSonderkommandosorEinsatzkommandos.TheEinsatzgruppenwererequiredtoreporttotheReichMainSecurityOffice(RSHA)andalsototheHSSPFintheirareaofoperations,whomHimmlerwouldusetopassonordersdirectlytotheEinsatzgruppen.

TheuseoftheWaffen-SSintheEinsatzgruppen

Inallsome3000menservedintheEinsatzgruppenandtheseweredrawnfromtheWaffen-SS,SD,SecurityPolice,Gestapo,CriminalPoliceandvariousotherpoliceservices.TheWaffen-SSprovidedsignificantforcestotheEinsatzgruppen.AsnotedduringtheEinsatzgruppentrial“…thetroopswerelargelymadeofemergencyservicedrafteesandofcompaniesoftheWaffen-SSandOrderPolice”(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:93).Oneauthorputsthefigureatsome1500Waffen-SSsoldiersbeingactivemembersoftheEinsatzgruppen(Stein,1966).AswellasbeingmembersoftheactualEinsatzgruppen,Waffen-SSunitsweresentassupportunitstohelpthemachievetheiraimofpacificationandpurificationoftherearareas.AsnotedbyLoweronAugust7th1941atZhitomir,menontheEinsatzgruppen“alongwithaWaffen-SSplatoon…collaboratedintheMassshootingof400Jewsatahorsecemeteryontheoutskirtsoftown”(Lower,2002:4).Someoftheseunitswerethe1stand2ndSSBrigades,theSS-SonderkommandoDirlewangerandtheSSCalvaryBrigadeaswellasregularWaffen-SS

units;theactionsoftheseunitshavealreadybeendiscussedtosomedegree.

YetagaintheWaffen-SSwitnessesdeniedanyknowledgeoftheactionsofthesekillinggroupsatNuremberg,yettheircomplicitycannotbedenied.OneformerEinsatzgruppenofficergaveaguidetothemake-upofaSonderKommando,whichhestatedconsistedof20drivers,15Waffen-SS,fiveadministrativeofficials,15Gestapo/Police,10SDofficialsandfiveinterpreters(Headland,1992:38).ServiceNumberofmenPercentageofEinsatzgruppenA

Waffen-SSDriversAdministrationSDCriminalPoliceKripoStapoAuxiliaryPoliceOrderPoliceFemaleemployeesInterpretersTelautographoperatorsWirelessoperatorsTOTALS

34034.417217.4181.8353.5414.1899.0878.813313.4131.3515.130.380.8

990100Note:Sourcedfrom(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:220)

TheIMTalsoheardevidenceoftheactionsoftheEinsatzgruppenandtheircomposition.TheprosecutionpresentedActivityandSituationreportnumbersix,whichcoveredtheactionsoftheSecurityPoliceandSDinRussiafromthe1sttothe31stofOctober1941(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:217).ThesereportsweresimilartotheOperationalSituationReportsproducedbytheEinsatzgruppen(whichwillbediscussedshortly),excepttheycoveredgreatertimeperiods.ThereportcoveredpersonneldetailsofEinsatzgruppenAatthistimeperiod.Thetableaboveindicatesthenumberofpersonnelandthepercentageofthetotalforce.

Ofinteresttousisthatsome34percentofthisgroupweremadeupofWaffen-SSpersonnel.OtherEinsatzgruppenalsohadasimilarmixofWaffen-SSmenandotherstaff.“Einsatzkommando6consistedofapproximately130-150men,includingaplatoonofWaffen-SS…”(Lozowick,1987:228).InhisstudySteinidentifiedthat:

Onthebasisoftheevidenceathanditmaybeconcludedthatatleast1500membersoftheWaffen-SSservedwiththeEinsatzgruppen,thatatleastsomeoftheseniorSScombatofficerswereawareofthemannerinwhichtheywereemployed,andthatforthesereasonstheWaffen-SSmustbearitsshareofresponsibilityforthecold-bloodedmurderofhundredsofthousandsofcivilians.(Stein,1966:264)

Itwasnotalwaysnecessary,orperhapsdesirable,toplacetheJewswithintheghettostoeffecttheirelimination.IntheBalticStatesamoredirectcourseofactionwasfollowed.AreportbySS-BrigadeführerStahleckertoHimmler,dated15October1941,entitled“ActionGroupA”,wasfoundinHimmler’sprivatefilesandwastenderedatNuremberg(documentL-180).ItreferstotheactionsofEinsatzgruppenA.Stahleckerreportedthat135,567persons,nearlyallJews,weremurderedinaccordancewithbasicordersdirectingthecompleteannihilationoftheJews(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:219).ThisreportalsogoesontotellusthattheWaffen-SSundertookcleansingactionsontheEasternFront:

…ItshowsfurtherthattheforcesoftheuniformedpoliceandtheWaffen-SSareactive

mainlyinfrontofLeningrad,inordertotakemeasuresundertheirownofficersagainstthestreamingbackofthepopulation…ItshouldbementionedthattheleadersoftheWaffen-SSandoftheuniformedpolice,whoareonthereserve,havedeclaredtheirwishtostaywiththeSecurityPoliceandtheSD.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:219)Inadditiontotheseenlistedmen,anumberofWaffen-SSofficersalsoservedintheEinsatzgruppen.OfalloftheEinsatzgruppenofficers,eightpercentservedintheWaffen-SS.Thisisincontrasttosome43percentofconcentration-campofficerswhoservedintheWaffen-SS(MacLean,1999b).Some23officersservedintheEinsatzgruppenthentransferredtotheWaffen-SS,whilesevenservedintheWaffen-SSandthentransferredtotheEinsatzgruppen(MacLean,1999b).Anumberofofficersalsoservedinnon-divisionalWaffen-SSorganisationsandtheseincludethe12thand3rdSSCorps,502ndSSHeavyTankBattalionandthe2ndSSFlakDetachment(MacLean,1999b).No.Nameofdivision/formationNumberofEinsatzgruppenofficers

1stSSPanzerDivisionLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler32ndSSPanzerDivisionDasReich13rdSSPanzerDivisionTotenkopf14thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionSS-Polizei38thSSKavallerieDivisionFlorianGeyer19thSSPanzerDivisionHohenstaufen212thSSPanzerDivisionHitlerjugend114thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(UkrainischeNR1)116thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionReichsführer-SS118thSSFreiwilligen-PanzergrenadierDivisionHorstWessel119thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(LettischesNR2)120thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(EstnischeNR1)129thSSWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDer(RussischeNR1)latertobecomethe(ItalienischeNR1)136thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS138thSSGrenadierDivisionNibelungen13rdSSCorps212thSSCorps1502ndHeavyTankBattalion12ndSSFlakDetachment12ndSSInfantryBrigade1SSRegimentDerFuhrer1SSRegimentLeibstandarteAdolfHitler1

WhilethesenumbersmaybesmallwhencomparedtothetotalnumberofmenservingintheWaffen-SS,thesalientpointisthis;theofficersoftheEinsatzgruppenwereatthecuttingedgeofthegenocidebeingconductedinRussia.TheyhadfullknowledgeofthekillingoperationsbeingundertakeninRussia,andtheywerewidelydispersedthroughtheWaffen-SS.Thetableaboveindicatesthedivisions/formationsinwhichEinsatzgruppenofficersserved.46

Thisbearingofresponsibilityisevenmoresowhenoneacknowledgesthatitisreasonabletoassumethatthegeneralsand,otherofficersoftheWaffen-SSknewabouttheEinsatzgruppenandwhattheyweredoing.ThisisindicatedbythetestimonyofSS-ObergruppenführerBach-ZelewskiduringthetrialsatNurembergwhenaskedabouthisknowledgeoftheiractivities.

BACH-ZELEWSKI:EinsatzgruppeBwaslocatedinSmolensk,andoperatedinprecisely

thesamewayasalltheotherEinsatzgruppen.OneheardeverywhereinconversationthattheJewswerebeingroundedupandsenttoghettos.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:481)ThelinkbetweentheWaffen-SSandtheexterminationunitswasadmittedbyacommanderoftheDasReichDivision,SS-GruppenführerGeorgKeppler,whooutlinedthat“…postingtotheformerwasapartofWaffen-SSdiscipline”,wherethepostingwasusedaspunishmentforinfractions(Reitlinger,1957:171).Themovementofpersonnelwasnotone-way,however.AftersufferinggrievouslossesontheRussianfronttheTotenkopfDivisiontransferredawholecompanyofsoldiersfromEinsatzgruppenAtoits3rdinfantryregiment(Sydnor,1973).

ThatseniorSSofficersknewabouttheactionsofthekillinggroupsisbeyonddoubt.Anorderdated21stSeptember1939fromSS-ObergruppenführerHeinrichHeydrich,chiefofthesecuritypolice,wassentouttovariousEinsatzgruppenleadersandseveralHSSPFoutliningthespecialmeasurestobetakenintheoccupiedcountries(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:127).Heydrichoutlinedthesespecialmeasuresweretobecarriedout:

Inaspiritfreefrombureaucraticandadministrativeinfluencesandwithaneagernesstoassumeresponsibility.Whiletheregulationsandordersoftheprisoners-of-warsystemwerehithertobasedexclusivelyonconsiderationsofamilitarynature,nowthepoliticalgoalmustbeattained,namely,toprotecttheGermanpeoplefromBolshevistagitatorsandtogainafirmgripontheoccupiedterritoryattheearliestpossiblemoment.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:127)

WhilethisorderwasissuedbeforetheinvasionofRussiaitisusefulinthatitclearlysetsoutthewayinwhichtheJewishquestionwastobesolvedintheoccupiedterritories.

TheOperationalSituationReports

TheGermansweremeticulousintheirrecordingtheactionsoftheEinsatzgruppen,withOperationalSituationReportsregularlybeingsubmittedbytheunitsinthefieldtotheauthoritiesinBerlinoutliningtheiractions.ThereportscataloguetheinvolvementofvariousWaffen-SSunitsintheatrocitiescommittedduringcleansingoperationsinRussia.DuringtheEinsatzgruppentrialstheauthenticityofthereportswereshownbeyonddoubtandnochallengetothemwasmountedbythedefence.OperationalSituationReport19datedthe11thofJuly1941outlinesWaffen-SSinvolvementinthekillingofJews,“Einsatzkommando4b…InZborov,600JewsliquidatedbytheWaffen-SSasaretaliationmeasureforSovietatrocities”(Aradetal.,1989:19).

Waffen-SSandPolicetroopsexecutedtheentireJewishcouncilintheRussiantownofBelzyonthe15thofJuly1941(Stokes,2002).OperationalSituationReport37statedthatthiswasinrelationtopartisanattacksonGermantroops:“Theprecisenumberofshootingscannotbeascertained…theKommandoappropriatelypunishedtheJewishCouncilofEldersinBelzyandotherJewsforfailingtocomplywithsecuritypolicedirectivesandaretributionforattacksonGermanmilitarypersonnel”(Aradetal.,1989:57).

OperationalSituationReport58datedthe20thofAugust1941outlineshowtheWaffen-SSwereinvolvedwiththeEinsatzgruppenintheareaofNovoselye,“…anexchangeofgunfiretookplaceonAugust151941betweenpartisansandtwosub-unitsoftheWaffen-SSplatoonattachedtotheEinsatzgruppeAnearBoskinaneartheH.Q.oftheEinsatzgruppeA.Thirteenpartisanswerekilled…”(Aradetal.,1989:94).

OperationalSituationReport59datedthe21stofAugust1941outlinestheactionsofEinsatzgruppenCintheNovo-Ukrainkaarea.Thereportcommenceswithinformationaboutpartisanactivityandtheshootingofciviliansdeemedresponsibleforsuch.Itthendescribestheinvolvementofthe1stSSBrigadeinthekillingofJews.Anextractofthereportisshowbelow:

AftertheGermantroopsenteredStaro-Konstantinov(thepresentseatoftheHigherSS,thePoliceChiefandtheMilitaryCommanderoftheRearArea),Jewswereemployedforcleaningthebarracks.SincetheJewsdidnotreportforworklately,themilitaryauthoritieshadtorounduptheJewishlabourforceearlyintheday.TheJewswereimpertinentandevenrefusedtowork.Outofabout1000Jewsthatwererecruitedforfieldwork,only70appearedonthefollowingday.Moreoveritwasestablishedthatharvestersweresabotaged.Finally,theJewishCouncilofEldersspreadtherumourthattheRussianswereadvancingagain;whereupontheJewspubliclythreatenedandabusedtheUkrainians.FinallyitwasestablishedthattheJewswereconductingaflourishingtradewithstolencattleandgoods.Inreprisal,the1SSBrigadecarriedoutanactionagainsttheJewsinthecourseofwhich300maleand139femaleJewswereshot.(Aradetal.,1989:100)

InOperationalSituationReport86datedthe17thofSeptember1941weagainfindthe1stSSBrigadeconductingcleansingoperationsintheNovo-Ukrainkaarea.InthetownofUshomirSSunitswereinactionwherethe1stSSBrigade“…shotallmaleJews”(Aradetal.,1989:134).The5thSSPanzerDivisionWikingalsoassistedinthecleansingoperationsinoccupiedRussiabyliquidating600Jews(Knopp,2002;Reitlinger,1957).SS-BrigadeführerHeinzKarlFanslauwasbroughttotrialinrelationtothismatterforactionswhenhewasincommandofthesupplybattalionforthedivision,butwasacquittedduetolackofevidence(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:998).TheevidenceabovehoweverdoeswithoutdoubtshowaclearlinkbetweentheEinsatzgruppenandtheWaffen-SS.

TheargumentsthattheWaffen-SSwerenotmajorplayersintheantipartisanoperationsandassociatedgenocidedonotringtrueontheevidencepresented.WithoutadoubttheWaffen-SSwereheavilyinvolvedintheactivitiesoftheEinsatzgruppen.TheseunitsweretheleadingedgeoftheefforttodestroytheJewsandotherundesirableelements.AssuchitwouldseemtorepudiatetheclaimsbytheWaffen-SSthattheywerejustsimplesoldiersanddistinctfromtheterrorapparatusoftheSS.WhenitwasfoundthattheEinsatzgruppenwerenotkillingJewsfastenoughtheNaziregimeturnedtoanotherSSterrorapparatustocompletethetask,theconcentration-camps.TheWaffen-SSwouldalsobelinkedtothissystemofterror.

5.TheConcentration-Camps

Itisnotthepurposeofthisbooktoverifythatthecrimesagainsthumanitywerecommittedintheconcentration-campsystemundertheNazis.Severalmillionpeopleperishedinthisterrorapparatus.47ThisIbelievehistoryandsubsequenttribunalshaveshownbeyonddoubt.TheNMTattemptedtoarriveataroughestimateastothehumancost:

Astothetotalnumberofprisonersdeliveredtothecamps,onlyareasonableestimatecanbemade.IfthenumberofdeadatAuschwitzaloneisconsidered,amountingtoatleast3.5million,itissafetoassumethatnolessthan10millionhumanbeingswereatonetimeoranotherincarceratedinaconcentration-camp.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:222)

WhatIwillshowinthischapteristheinvolvementoftheWaffen-SSinthisenterprise.However,tonotmakesomeattempttopainttheenormityorcallousnessofthisenterprisewouldbeafailingtohistory.Tothispointthepost-wartelevisioninterviewbelow,bySSCorporalRichardBochpaintsaterrifyingpicture.Bochtellsthestoryseeminglywithoutemotionandinanalmostdetachedfashion.48HewasapproachedbyafellowSSsoldierinrelationtothekillingoftheJewsinthegaschambers:

“Richard,youareinterestedintheactions?”,Isaid,“Yes,veryinterestedindeed.”Hesaid“Iwilltakeyouwithmethisevening.”Thenewarrivalshadtogetundressedandwhenacertainnumbergotinsidetheyshutthedoorsandthathappensthreetimes…theytookoutasortoftin,oneoftheSSguardsdidthat,andthenheclimbedupaladderandthenatthetoptherewasaroundholeandheopenedalittleirondoorandheldthetinthereandshookitandthenheshutthelittledooragain.Andthenafearfulscreamingstarted,approximately,Iwouldreckonafterabout10minutesitsuddenlywentquiet.IsaidtoHerblinger“Canwegetabitnearerwhentheytakethemout?”Sowewentabitcloser,theyopenedthedoor,thatwastheprisonersquadwhodidthat.ThenabluehazecameoutandIlookedinandIsawapyramid,theyhadallclimbedontopofeachotheruntilthelastonestoodontheverytop.Alloneontopoftheother,itwasapointedheap,allcameuptoapoint.Andthentheprisonershadtogoinandtearitapart.Theyhadtotugandpullveryhardtodisentangleallthesepeople.Thenwewentbacktothehall,thenitwastheturnofthelastlottogetundressed,theoneswhohadmanagedtohangbackabitallofthetime.Thentheprisonershadtocheckwheresmallchildrenhadbeenhiddenandcoveredup,theypulledthemoutandopenedthedoorsquicklyagainandwhoosh,theythrewallthechildreninandslammedthedoors.“Uh,I’mgoingtobesick,”Isaid.Isaid,“Oh,I’veseennothinglikeitinmylife,ohit’sabsolutelyterrible.”Andjustimaginewhentheythrewthechildreninhowthepeopleinsidescreamedbecausethenthepeopleinsidesuddenlyrealisedwhatwashappening.AndIsaid,“Karl,canweleavesoon,Ican’tstanditanymore?”,andhesaid,“Youdogetusedtoanythingintime.”(Bloomberg,2000)

Bochlaterrefusedtheorderstotakepartinsuchmassacres.Ofnoteisthathewasnotshotasaresult;aclaimoftenmadebytheSSinthedefenceoffollowingorders.AsnotedbySydnorregardingtheinvolvementoftheWaffen-SSinthecampsystem;“AnumberofmenfromtheTotenkopfDivisionbecameactivecogsinthegreatestdeliberateprocessof

humandestructioninthehistoryofmankind”(Sydnor,1973:361).IshallshowthatthelinksbetweenthecampsystemandtheWaffen-SSextendfarbeyondjusttheTotenkopfDivision.

LetmejustifywhyIamincludingtheconcentration-camps.TheseareincludedasthereisastronglinkbetweentheWaffen-SSandtheconcentration-camps,secondmanyofthedeathcampsweresituatedintheconqueredEasternterritoriesandthirdthemajorityofthevictimscamefromtheconqueredEasternterritorieswhileothersweresubjecttotheactionsoftheEinsatzgruppenbehindthefrontlinesintheeast.AsSydnornotesinhisstudyoftheTotenkopfdivision;

…AmongtheofficersandNCOsandSSenlistedmenwhofoughtintheranksoftheTotenkopfdivisionthereweremanywhohadcomefromorlaterwenttoSSagenciesoraffiliatesengagedinnon-militarytasks.PersonnelexchangesbetweentheSSTK49andtheexterminationcentres,theconcentration-camps,theEinsatzgruppen,theSSanti-partisanunits,thestaffoftheHSSPF,theSD,thedomesticpoliceforcesoftheReich,theadministrativepersonnel,andoperationalstaffsoftheSS,areallamatterofdocumentaryrecord.(Sydnor,1990:341)

HeissupportedinthisclaimbyWegnerwhostatesthefollowingregardingtherelationshipbetweentheWaffen-SSandthemoreinsidiousbranchesoftheSS:

Thestaffsoftheconcentration-campswereorganisationallypartoftheWaffen-SS.UnitsandformationsoftheWaffen-SSwereusedbehindthefrontaspartof“anti-guerrillaactions”andassigned,inlimitednumberstobesure,toEinsatzgruppen…(Wegner,1985:222)

InhandingdownitsjudgementthattheSSwasacriminalorganisationtheIMTstatedthefollowinginreferencetotheWaffen-SSanditsactivitiesandguilt:

ThereisevidencethattheshootingofunarmedprisonersofwarwasthegeneralpracticeinsomeWaffen-SSdivisions.On1October1944,thecustodyofprisonersofwarandinternedpersonswastransferredtoHimmler,whointurntransferredprisoner-of-waraffairstoSS-ObergruppenfuhrerBergerandtoSS-ObergruppenfuhrerPohl.TheRaceandSettlementOfficeoftheSS,togetherwiththeVolksdeutscheMittelstelle50,wereactiveincarryingoutschemesforGermanisationofoccupiedterritoriesaccordingtotheracialprinciplesoftheNaziPartyandwereinvolvedinthedeportationofJewsandotherforeignnationals.UnitsoftheWaffen-SSandEinsatzgruppenoperatingdirectlyundertheSSMainOfficewereusedtocarryouttheseplans.Theseunitswerealsoinvolvedinthewidespreadmurderandill-treatmentofthecivilianpopulationofoccupiedterritories.Undertheguiseofcombatingpartisanunits,unitsoftheSSexterminatedJewsandpeopledeemedpoliticallyundesirablebytheSS,andtheirreportsrecordtheexecutionofenormousnumbersofpersons.Waffen-SSdivisionswereresponsibleformanymassacresandatrocitiesinoccupiedterritories…UnitsoftheWaffen-SSweredirectlyinvolvedinthekillingofprisonersofwarandtheatrocitiesinoccupiedcountries.ItsuppliedpersonnelfortheEinsatzgruppen,andhadcommandovertheconcentration-campguardsafteritsabsorptionoftheTotenkopfSS,whichoriginallycontrolledthesystem.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol22:514)

Ishallexpandupontheseargumentsinthefollowingpages,butsufficefornowitprovides

thereaderwithsomeindicationofhowIintendtoframemyarguments.

Creationandmanagementofthecampsystem

In1934theSStookcontroloftheconcentration-campsystemandSSReichsführerHeinrichHimmlerwasnowtheregulatorofthisapparatusoftheNazistate.Waffen-SSGeneral,SS-ObergruppenführerTheodoreEicke,amanwithareputationforbrutality,wasgiventheroleofInspectorofConcentration-camps.EickewasthecommandantofDachau,andthiscampwasusedasthemodelforfuturecamps.ItwasEickewhoformulatedacodeofconductfortheSSguardsandalsothedisciplinaryandpunishmentregulationsfortheprisioners(Bracher,1969;Sydnor,1990).Thedisciplinaryregulationsbecamethestandardforconcentration-campsandremainedinuseuntil1945.Theyincludedpunishmentssuchasforcedlabour,solitaryconfinement,corporalpunishmentandthedeathpenaltyforcertainoffences.ThebrutalityofEickewasdemonstratedbythecodeofconductfortheSSguards:

ThecodeofconductfortheSSguardswasbaseduponEicke’sdemandforblindandabsoluteobediencetoallordersfromSSsuperiorofficers,anduponhisinsistencethateachprisonerbetreatedwithfanaticalhatredasanenemyofthestate.(Sydnor,1990:11)

SS-ObergruppenführerEicke

Eickewaslatertocommandthe3rdSSPanzerDivisionTotenkopfbeforebeingkilledontheRussianfront.Thisdivisionwasrecruitedalmostexclusivelyfromcampguardsduringitsformation.EickeprovidedtheNaziswithaconcentration-campsystemthatwas“…beyondthecontroloftraditionallawandauthority,inwhichtheenemiesofthestatewerebrokenanddestroyedbytheorganised,impersonalandsystematicbrutalities…”(Sydnor,1990:23).Thissystemwastoburgeonfromameresixcampsbeforethewartosome185by1944,andthisfiguredidnotincludehundredsofsub-camps.Waffen-SSGeneralOswaldPohlboastfullyreportedthisgrowthtoHimmlerinApril1944:

InApril1944thedefendantPohlinformedHimmlerthattherewere20concentration-campsand165labourcampsintheReichandGermanoccupiedterritory.ApostscripttothisletterinPohl’shandwritingboastfullystatesthat:“InEicke’stimetherewerealtogethersixcamps.Now:185!”(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:221)

ThatPohlwasawareofwhatwashappeninginthecampsisevidencedbyhiscommentduringhistrialwhenaskedbythejudgesifhewasawareofthedeathsinthecamps:

Q.WhatJudgePhillipsandIwereendeavouringtoascertain,andIthinknowwehaveascertained,iswhetheryouknewthenumberofdeathsoccurringintheconcentration-camps,andfromthislonginterrogationwenowconcludethatyoudidknow.A.Yes.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol45:433)

FurthertothisisadiaryentrybySSdoctorKremeratAuschwitz.

23September1943TonightsixthandseventhSonderatkion.51InthemorningObergruppenführerPohlandpartyarrivedattheWaffen-SSquarters.Aguardwasstandingoutsidethedoorandwasthefirsttostandtoattentionbeforeus.Intheevening,at20:00hours,dinnerwithObergruppenführerPohlintheofficersmess,arealfeast…(Kleeetal.,1988:260)

ThedenialsoftheWaffen-SS

OftenithasbeenarguedthattheWaffen-SSwasaseparateorganisationfromtheconcentration-campsystem.DuringhistestimonyattheNurembergtrialsSSGeneral,SS-OberstgruppenführerPaulHausserwasaskedbytheSSdefencecounseliftherewasalinkbetweentheWaffen-SSandthecampguards:

HERRPELCKMANN:DidtheWaffen-SSfurnishtheguardunitsandtheso-calledcommandpersonnelfortheconcentration-camps?HAUSSER:Theguardsoftheconcentration-campsandthepersonnelinthecommanddidnotbelongtotheWaffen-SS.OnlyinthecourseofthewarweretheseunitsdesignatedasWaffen-SSinordertoreleasethemfrommilitaryserviceandgivethemfreedomtocarryouttheirpoliceduties.ThemembersoftheWaffen-SSconsideredthismeasure,whichtheylearnedofonlyafterthewar,adeliberatedeceptiononthepartofHimmler.Wedidnothaveanythingtodowiththemenoftheconcentration-campsandtheguardpersonnel.HERRPELCKMANN:Ithasnotbecomequiteclearyet,Witness,justwhatyoumeantwhenyousaid“toreleasethemfrommilitaryservice.”Willyouexplainthatinmoredetail?HAUSSER:AllpersonswhoservedathomeandinthePolicehadtobeexemptedfrommilitaryserviceintheArmybytheWehrkreisordistrictcommanderinordertocarryouttheirpolicetasks.ThatdidnotapplywhenallguardunitsweredesignatedasWaffen-SS,forthesewereapartoftheArmedForces.InthemainofficesinBerlintheseunits,inordertodifferentiatethem,weredesignatednominalWaffen-SS.ButallthisIlearnedonlyherelater.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:366)

Hausser’stestimonyisconfusingtosaytheleast.AfterinitiallystatingthatthecampguardswerenotlinkedtotheWaffen-SS,inthenextbreathhethenadmitsthattheywerepartoftheWaffen-SSorganisation.ItneedstobeconsideredthatHausserwasoneofthemostseniorWaffen-SSofficersandhadservedonvariouscommandsstaffsandinvarioustheatresofwar,yethepurportedtohavenoknowledgeofWaffen-SSinvolvementinthecampsystem.YetthisisamanwhooversawtheSStrainingschoolsthathadcellsbuiltintothebasementsforconcentration-campinmatestoseetothecomfortofSSofficers.Of

evenmoreimportanceishisclaimthattheWaffen-SSsoldiersonlybecameawareoftheamalgamationofthecampswiththefront-lineunitsafterthewar.SS-BrigadeführerKurtMeyer,formercommanderofthe12thSSPanzerDivisionHitlerjugend,alsoputsforwardthisargumentregardinglackofknowledgeinhispost-waraccountofhiswartimeinvolvement.HeclaimsthatsoldiersoftheWaffen-SShavebeentarredwiththesamebrushasotherelementsoftheSS:

TheWaffen-SSisnowincriminatedwitheventsintheconcentrationcampsbecauseleadingindividualsofthegovernmenthaveplacedspecialformationsinthesamecategoryasthefrontlinetroops…ThesoldiershadneithermorenorlessknowledgeoftheeventsinGermanythatthemajorityoftheGermanpeople.(Meyer,2001:392)

Clearevidencewillbeshownthatthefront-lineWaffen-SSunitshadcloseandinseparabletieswiththecampguardsandcampsystemadministrationwellbeforetheendofthewar,andwiththistheobviousrequisiteknowledgeoftheoperationsofthecampswasalsopresent.Notonlythis,buttheWaffen-SSwereclearfinancialbeneficiariesofthecampsystem.

SS-BrigadeführerHeinzKarlFanslauwasoneofHausser’sformeradjutants.Hisrolewastoorganise“…replacements,recruiting,discharges,promotions,assignments,andtransfers.WithinthisfieldhedealtindiscriminatelywiththeWaffen-SSpersonnelandalsowiththatoftheconcentration-camps”(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:998;Reitlinger,1957).Fanslautriedunsuccessfullytoarguethateventhoughhewasresponsibleforpersonnelmattersinthecampshehadnoknowledgeofthecrimesbeingcommitted.Thetribunalrejectedthisclaimoutrightandhewasfoundguiltywiththefollowingjudgement.52

Astheofficerinchargeofpersonnel,hewasasmuchanintegralpartofthewholeorganisationandasessentialacoginitsoperationasanyother…Hewasincommandofoneoftheessentialingredientsofsuccessfulfunctioning.Thishasnorelationto“groupcondemnation”,whichhasbeensoloudlydecried.Personnelwerejustasimportantandessentialinthewholenefariousplanasbarbedwire,watchdogsandgaschambers.Thesuccessfuloperationoftheconcentration-campsrequiredthecoordinationofmenandmaterials,andFanslautoasubstantialdegreesuppliedthemen.Hewasnotanobscuremenial;hewasapersonofresponsibilityandauthorityintheorganisation,whowaschargedwithandperformedimportantandessentialfunctions…Hisclaimthathewasunawareofwhatwasgoingonintheorganisationandintheconcentration-campswhichitadministeredisutterlyinconsistentwiththeimportanceandindispensabilityofhisposition.Whetherornothewasawareofthecoldbloodedprogramofexterminationofuselessconcentration-campinmates,hemusthavebeenawarethatmillionsofhumanbeingshadbeenherdedintoconcentration-camps,inviolationofalltheirrightsandsolelybecauseGermanyneededtheirlabour,toworkunderthemostinhumanecircumstances.TheTribunalfindswithouthesitationthatFanslauknewoftheslaveryintheconcentration-campsandtookanimportantpartinpromotingandadministeringit.Thisbeingtrue,heisguiltyofwarcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:998)

PersonnellinksbetweenthecampsandtheWaffen-SS

ThislinkbetweentheWaffen-SSandtheconcentration-campsystemcanbeshownbyanumberoffactors.EickeformedanumberofTotenkopfStandartenorDeath’sHeadregimentsthatwereusedintheguardingoftheconcentration-campspriortothewar.Withthecommencementoftheconflictanother12regimentswereformed.AHitlerdecreeonthe18thofMay1939providedthattheDeath’sHeadunits(campguards)weretobeusedascombatreplacementsfortheWaffen-SS(Sydnor,1990).ThisestablishedareadyexchangeinpersonnelbetweenthecampsystemandtheWaffen-SS.In1941nineDeath’sHeadinfantryandtwocavalryregimentsweretransferredtothecontroloftheWaffen-SS,.ThreeDeath’sHeadinfantryregimentswereformedintoaWaffen-SSbattlegroup,SSKampfgruppeNord,andoneregimentwastransferredtotheWaffen-SSMotorisedDivisionReich(laterDasReich)(Mollo,1982).

TheapologistsclaimthattheWaffen-SSwerenotassociatedwiththecampsystem.Contrarytothisview,however,isanorderfromHimmler,whichincorporatedalloftheDeathHeadsunitsintotheWaffen-SS(Simpson,1990;Sydnor,1990).Infact,someofthedutiesthatEickehadperformedasInspectorofConcentration-campsweregiventotheWaffen-SScommandtooversee(Mollo,1982;Sydnor,1990:133).Asearlyas1940Waffen-SSunitssentpersonneltocampsfordutyandwoundedsoldiersweresentthereforrecuperation.TherewasaflowofWaffen-SSsoldierswhowereunfitforserviceorwoundedintothecamps,howeverlaterinthewarasmanpowerdemandsincreased“…greatnumbersofconcentrationcampguardswerere-draftedintothefielddivisionsoftheWaffen-SS”(Reitlinger,1957:266).OneexampleofthisisSS-SturmbannführerRichardBaerwhowasattachedtothe3rdSSTotenkopfDivision.Baerservedinthecampspriortothewarandthenundertookcombatdutiesuntilhewaswoundedin1942.HethenwastransferredbacktothecampsystemwherehewentontobecomecommandantofAuschwitz(MacLean,1999a;Segev,1987).

Whenorderedtoformanewtankbattalionin1942fortheTotenkopfdivision,SS-ObergruppenführerEickedrewonpersonnelfrom“…theSSMountainDivisionNord,andfromanadditionalgleaningofthevariousSSagencies–includingtheguarddetachmentsoftheconcentration-camps”(Sydnor,1990:259).SomecampcommandersrecalledthattheirmenweresentofftotheWaffen-SSdivisions.FromAuschwitzatleast2500weresentbetween1940and1943,andfromSachsenhausenbetween1942and1945some1500weresent(Stein,1966).FormercampinmateHelmutBickelhadthistosayabouttheinterchangeofSSsoldierstothecampsandtheircharacter.

IcanonlycomparetheactionsoftheSSmenwhocametousfromthefrontlinesandthoseSSmenwhohadneverbeeninthefrontlines:allofthemactedalike.TheSSmanwhowasassignedasaguardinaconcentration-camporasofficeroftheguardinaconcentration-camp,themomentheenteredthatbarbed-wirefencesimplybecameamemberofagroupofmurderers.Inordertogiveanexample,therewasanSSObersturmführerwhohadjustreturnedfromfrontlinedutyandhehadasmallterrierandwhileworkingoneoftheinmates,aJew,whilepushinghislittlecart,unintentionallyhithislittledog.Thedogjustgavealittleyelp;thatwasallthathappened.ThisSSmanlikedthedogsomuch,however,thatforthatreason,becausethemanhadmolestedthelittledog,hekilledtheinmate.Thatishowmuchhelikedtheanimalandhatedthehumanbeing.Thatwasnothischaracter.Thatwassimplytheoutstandingpositionwhichheheldandwherehehadpoweroverlifeanddeathoftheinmates.FortheSSmenitwasthe

sacreddutytowardstheFührertokillaninmateasbrutallyaspossible.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:785)

Anin-depthexaminationofpersonalfilesofover950SSofficerswhoservedinthecampsystemwasconductedbyMacLean(1999a),anditwouldseemtorefutethetestimonyofHausserregardingtherebeingnolinksbetweentheWaffen-SSandthecampsystem.Thisexaminationrevealedthatover43percentofallconcentration-campofficershadservedintheWaffen-SSfightingunitseitherbeforeoraftertheirserviceatthecamps(MacLean,1999a).YetdespitethefactthatamultitudeofofficersfromthecampsystemhadservedintheWaffen-SS,seniorofficerssuchasHausserstillattemptedtodistancetheWaffen-SSwhenquestionedbythedefencefortheSSatNuremberg:

HERRPELCKMANN:TheProsecutionassertsthattheWaffen-SSwasonlyapartofthewholeSSorganisationandthatassuchitwasneededforthecarryingthroughofthejointcriminalconspiracy.Pleasecommentonthis.HAUSSER:IbelievethatitcanbegatheredfromallofmytestimonythattheWaffen-SSwasacompletelyindependentunitandconnectedwithotherorganisationsonlythroughthepersonofHeinrichHimmler.Thisseparationofthevariousbrancheswasundoubtedlyintensifiedduringthewar.Therefore,wecouldnothaveharbouredcommoncriminalplanswiththeothersorparticipatedincarryingthemthrough.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:367)

Hausserwentasfarastoclaimthat“…TherewereneitherofficialnorpersonalrelationswiththeDeath’s-Headunits,whichhadthetaskofguardingtheconcentration-camps”(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:360).Indeedithasbeensuggestedbysomeex-Waffen-SSveteransthatHimmlerwascarefultotryandkeeptheWaffen-SSseparatefromthecampsforthesakeofitsimageandalsothetoavoidthesoldiersconfrontingmattersthat“…theycouldnotunderstandorjudge”(Reitlinger,1957:265).AtleastoneauthorattemptstoportraytheWaffen-SSasbeinginnocentandonlyvictimsbyassociationwiththeconcentration-campguards.ThiswasbecausetheTotenkopfcarriedthesamepaybooks,worethesameuniformasthetrueWaffen-SSwhich,hadneverbeenimplicatedintheterrorregimeoftheconcentration-camps(Hohne,1969).Thisisclearlynotthecase,asIwillshowevidencethattheWaffen-SSwereinvolvedin,andhadknowledgeof,thecampsystem.

DuringthepreparationforhistelevisiondocumentaryfortheThamestelevisioncompanyontheSS,authorAndrewMollocameacrossthisdenialofassociation.HehadcontactedSS-ObersturmbannführerRichardSchulze-Kossens53forthepurposeofaninterview;KossenshadbeenanofficerintheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerandwasalsotheWaffen-SSadjutanttoHitlerforpartofthewar.Schulze-Kossenswasbrieflythecommanderofthe38thSSGrenadierDivisionNibelungen,thelastWaffen-SSdivisionformedbeforetheendofthewar(Westwood,2001;Williamson&Andrew,2004b).UponfindingoutthatthetelevisionserieswastocoverallaspectsoftheSS,includingthecamps,Schulze-Kossenshadthistosay:

Ifthisreportiscorrect,ImustinformyouthatIamnotpreparedtogiveaninterviewwhichbeginswiththeeventsintheconcentration-camps,whichwillinevitablystirupfeelingsagainsttheSS.AsanofficeroftheformerWaffen-SSIamnotinterestedinallowingmyselftobedefamedagaininEnglandifourtroopsareagaintobeassociated

withtheeventsintheconcentration-camps.Ourstatementswhichwoulddistanceusfromsucheventswouldonlycreatetheimpressionofacover-up…Iwanttotakethisopportunitytosayhowdeeplyitwouldoffendmetohaveourtroopsportrayedonceagainasasortof“soldateska”whocommittedastringofwarcrimes…(Mollo,1982:2)

ThisisacrucialargumentraisedbymanyWaffen-SSapologists;thattheywereinfactseparatefromthecampsystemandhadnothingtodowiththepersonnelofthesystemandhadnoknowledgeofthecrimescommittedtherein.AtNurembergHausserarguedthefollowing:

HERRPELCKMANN:Towhatextentwerethecrimesinconcentrationcamps,suchastheexterminationoftheJews,knowntotheWaffen-SS?Ishouldlikeyoutorememberthatyouspeaknotonlyforyourselfasahighlyplacedgeneral,butthatyoualsospeakforthesimpleSSman,basedonyourownexperience,ofcourse.HAUSSER:Itsoundsquiteunlikely,andforeigncountriesdonotwishtobelievethatthemembersoftheWaffen-SSaswellasmyselfknewnothingofthecrimesofwhichwehaveheardhere.Thisperhapsmayserveasanexplanation:Athomeonlythosewhohadvictimsintheconcentrationcampslearned,anythingaboutthem;onlytheever-presentsecretoppositionspreadstoriesandrumours.ThiswaskeptfromtheSSman.Ifhehappenedtohearsomethingbychance,hethoughtthatitwashostilepropaganda.Foreignradiobroadcastsornewspaperswereunknowntohimfortheywereforbiddenathome.ThebulkoftheWaffen-SSwasfacingtheenemy.Thewartasksgrewfromyeartoyearandtheeffortsbecamemoreintense.TheSSmandidnothavethetimeoropportunitytocheckrumours,andlikemyselfhewassurprisedandindignantaboutallthesethingswhichHimmlerhaddonecontrarytowhathehadpreachedtousinpeacetime.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:369)

IwillpresentclearevidencethatitwouldhavebeenalmostimpossibleforofficerssuchasHaussernottobeawareofwhatwasgoingoninthecamps.AswellasadministrativetiestherewerealsopersonnellinksbetweenthecampsandtheWaffen-SS.CampofficersservedthroughoutthedivisionsoftheWaffen-SSincludingthedivisionscommandedbyHaussersuchastheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler,DasReichandtheTotenkopfdivisions.ThesecampofficersservedineverydivisionoftheWaffen-SSexceptforthe28thSSDivisionWallonien,37thSSDivisionLutzowandthe38thSSDivisionNibelungen(MacLean,1999a).Examplesofthisinteractionarenothardtofind,forinstanceHilmarWackerlebecamethefirstcommandantofDachauin1933.Helaterwentontoserveinthe5thSSWikingDivisionuntilbeingkilledatLvovinPolandin1941(MacLean,1999a;Segev,1987).OttoFoerschnerwasanSS-Sturmbannführerwhoservedinthe5thSSWikingDivisionandlaterwentontocommandtheDorasub-campatBuchenwald(MacLean,1999a;Segev,1987).Hewasexecutedonthe28thofMay1946.Thislackofdistancebetweenthetwogroupsissupportedbytheobservationthat:

…thetotalseparationbetweenthebattlefieldunitsoftheWaffen-SSandevenmoresinisterorganisationssuchastheEinsatzgruppenandtheTotenkopfverbände54aseparationofwhichpost-warapologistsmakemuch–doesnotstanduptodetailedexamination,therewasadivision,butitwassomewhatporous.(Windrowetal.,1982:6).

FurthertothisnotonlydidhundredsserveinthefrontlineWaffen-SSdivisions,butsix

formerconcentration-campofficersalsorosetobecomedivisionalcommandersintheWaffen-SS.Itwasnotthecasethattheseofficersjustservedattheminorlabourcamps,rathermanyofthemservedatthemajorexterminationcampssuchasAuschwitz,Sobibor,Belzec,Belsen,DachauandMauthausen,etc(MacLean,1999a).YetdespitethefactthatofficerswithknowledgeoftheatrocitiesthatwerebeingcommittedinthecampswerewoventhroughoutthefightingunitsoftheWaffenSS,seniorWaffen-SSofficerssuchasHausserclaimednoknowledgeoftheactivitiesoftheconcentration-camps.

JustaswiththeEinsatzgruppen,theWaffen-SSusedtransfersbetweenthefront-lineunitsandthecampsasaformofpunishment.SS-ObersturmbannführerKarlKuenstlerisanexampleofthistypeoftreatment.AscommandantoftheFlossenburgconcentration-camphecameintodisreputeduetohisdrinking,asaresulthewastransferredtothe7thSSPrinzEugenDivisionwherehewaslaterkilledduringcombatduties(MacLean,1999a;Segev,1987).HansMaubachwasanSSofficeronthestaffofSSPFOdiloGlobocnikinLublinandhadanintimateknowledgeofthekillingcampsthroughtheadministrativeroleheplayedonthestaffoftheSSPF.InOctober1941hehadafallingoutwithGlobocnikandwassenttotheWaffenSSwhereheservedintheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler(Poprzeczny,2004).Therewereotherreasonsforsendingofficersfromthefronttothecampsandviceversa.Theseincludedincapacitationbyinjury,incompetenceandspecificexpertisethatcouldbeutilisedinthecampsystem(Sydnor,1973).

Hausserwasnotaloneinhisclaimoflackofknowledgeofthecamps.Waffen-SSofficer,RobertBrill,whoservedintheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerandalsoattheWaffen-SStrainingcentre,gavethefollowingtestimony:

MR.COUNSELLORSMIRNOV:AndyoucontendthattheWaffen-SSdidnotparticipateinthekillingsintheconcentration-camps?BRILL:IsaidthatIandcountlesscomradesoftheWaffen-SSknewnothingaboutthem.Thedefendant’scounseltoldmethatkillingswerecarriedout.Ididnotdenyit.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:352)

NotethatBrilldoesnotdenywhatoccurredinthecamps,butmerelynothavingknowledgeofsuchactions.Brillseemstobeunawareofthefactthatatleast16officersfromthecampsystemservedintheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler.ThelistbelowofofficersandtheWaffen-SSdivisionstheyservedinrendersuchclaimsregardingthislackofknowledgeasridiculous.No.NameofDivisionNumberofcampofficers

1stSSPanzerDivisionLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler162ndSSPanzerDivisionDasReich393rdSSPanzerDivisionTotenkopf1594thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionSS-Polizei295thSSPanzerDivisionWiking456thSSGebirgsDivisionNord577thSSFreiwilligen-GerbirgsDivisionPrinzEugen238thSSKavallerieDivisionFlorianGeyer289thSSPanzerDivisionHohenstaufen2210thSSPanzerDivisionFrundsberg2011thSSFreiwilligen-PanzergrenadierDivisionNordland1212thSSPanzerDivisionHitlerjugend613thWaffen-GebirgsDivisionDerSS(KroatischeNR1)Handschar914thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(UkrainischeNR1)5

15thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(LettischeNR1)516thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionReichsführer-SS1717thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionG_tzVonBerlichingen1518thSSFreiwilligen-PanzergrenadierDivisionHorstWessel719thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(LettischesNR2)320thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(EstnischeNR1)721stWaffen-GebirgsDivisionDerSS(AlbanischeNR1)Skanderberg422ndFreiwilligen-KavallerieDivisionDerSSMariaTheresia323rdWaffen-GebirgsDivisionDerSSKamalatertobecomePanzerdivisionNederland524thSSGebirgsDivisionKarstjager125thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(UngarischeNR1)Hunyadi226thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(UngarischeNR2)Hungaria327thSSFreiwilligen-PanzergrenadierDivision(FlamischeNR1)Langemarck528thSSFreiwilligen-PanzergrenadierDivisionWallonien029thSSWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDer(RussischeNR1)latertobecomethe(ItalienischeNR1)330thSSWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDer(WeissruthenscheNR1)231stSSFreiwilligen-GrenadierDivision232ndSSFreiwilligen-GrenadierDivision30Januar33rdWaffen-KavallerieDivisionDerSS(UngarischeNR3)latertobecomeWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(FranzosischeNR1)Charlemagne134thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSSLandstormNederland635thSSPolizeiGrenadierDivision136thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS737thFreiwilligen-KavallerieDivisionL_tzow038thSSGrenadierDivisionNibelungen0

Theconcentration-campsystemwasjusttoobig,andtheWaffen-SStoocloselyentwinedforthesoldiersoftheWaffen-SSnottohaveknownabouttheactivitiesthatweregoingonthere.Forinstance,SS-ObersturmbannführerJochenPeiperwasaleadingfigureintheWaffen-SS.ManywouldsaythathewastheepitomeoftheWaffen-SS,officerbeingresourceful,toughandbrutal.HewouldrisetoprominenceinthepubliceyeafterthewarwhenbroughttotrialforthemassacreatMalmedyinBelgiumofAmericansoldiers.FromNovember1939heperformedtheroleofmilitaryadjutanttoHimmlerbeforegoingtobecomeoneofthemostwellknownofficersoftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler.Althoughnotdirectlyassociatedwiththecamps,thereisnodoubtthathehadknowledgeofthecampsandtheirfunction:

AspersonaladjutanthewouldhavebeenprivytovirtuallyeverythinginHimmler’sofficeandhecouldnothavefailedtobeawareofHitler’sandHimmler’spoliciesforethniccleansingoftheGreaterReich,theorganisationandestablishmentofconcentration-campsandtheoverallpolicyforthegenocideoftheJewishrace.Indeed,thereisphotographicevidenceofPeiperwithHimmleratMauthausenduringavisittothis,themostdeadlyofalltheexistingconcentration-camps,attheendofMay1941.(Reynolds,2002:27)

HiscasehighlightsthefactthataswellasthosedirectlyinvolvedinthecampssystemtherewouldhavebeenhundredsofWaffen-SSsoldiersinvolvedintheadministrationorsupplyofsuchasystem.InadditiontotheseofficerswhoactuallyservedinthefightingdivisionsoftheWaffenSS,inexcessof50SSofficersalsoservedinotherWaffen-SSnon-divisionalorganisationssuchascorpsheadquarters,independentregiments,etc(MacLean,1999a).

EconomiclinksbetweenthecampsandtheWaffen-SS

InApril1941Himmlerissuedadirectivethatinstructedallexistingconcentration-campswere,foreconomicandadministrativereasons,tobelistedaspartoftheWaffen-SSestablishment(Hohne,1969;Stein,1966).FurtherreorganisationoftheSSdepartmentstookplacein1942whichplacedtheconcentration-campswithinoneunifiedeconomicadministrationforPolice,Waffen-SSandGeneralSS(Koehl,1983).Sonotonlywastherealinkinpersonnel,butalsoalinkalongadministrativeandeconomiclines.ThiswasindicatedbytheevidencegivenbyWaffen-SSofficerBrillwhenconfrontedwithareportbytheRussianprosecutorMrSmirnov,outliningtheusageofseventonsofhumanhairtakenfrom140,000femaleprisonersattheAuschwitzcamp(documentnumberUSSR-511).TheletterwassentfromWaffen-SSGeneralGluckstothevariouscampsadministrations:

ThechiefoftheSSEconomicandAdministrativeMainOffice,SS-ObergruppenführerPohl,onthebasisofareportsubmittedtohim,hasorderedthatallhumanhaircutinconcentration-campsbeappropriatelyutilised.Humanhairistobeusedforthemanufactureofindustrialfeltandtobespunintoyarn.Outofcombedandcuthairofwomen,hair-yarnsocksforU-boatcrewsaretobemade,aswellashair-feltstockingsforemployeesoftheReichrailways…Thehairgatheredinallthecampswillbeutilisedbycreatingaspecialproductionunitinoneoftheconcentration-camps.Moredetailedinstructionsastothedeliveryofthecollectedhairwillbegivenseparately.Reportsonamountofhairgatheredeachmonth,maleandfemalerecordedseparately,mustbesubmittedonthe5thofeachmonth,beginningwith5September1942.Signed:Glucks,SS-BrigadeführerandMajor-GeneraloftheWaffen-SS.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:353)

BrillisthenquestionedaboutWaffen-SSinvolvementinthecampsystem.MR.COUNSELLORSMIRNOV:Now,Witness,Iwouldlikeyoutolookatthestamp.Doyouseethisstamp?Itsays,“Waffen-SSCommandant,KLSachsenhausen.”DoyoustillassertthatthecommandofthecampswasnotcomposedoftheWaffen-SS?BRILL:Yes.Iwillexplainthat.ThecommandsoftheWaffen—SS-thecommandsoftheconcentration-campswereofficiallyonthebudgetoftheWaffen-SS…MR.COUNSELLORSMIRNOV:SotheywereonthebudgetoftheWaffen-SS,weretheynot?BRILL:IsaidtheywereonthebudgetoftheWaffen-SS.Foreconomicreasonsitwasnecessarythatthecommands,intheirdealingswiththeReich,operateunderthenameofanorganisation,whichhadthepossibilityofworkingwithReichfundsandwiththeReichauthorities.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:353)

BrillattemptstodiscountthislinkbetweenthecampsandtheWaffenSSasbeingofnoimportance,itwasmerelyeconomicandadministrative;butnone-the-lesstheyarelinked.CampsliketheoneatMajdanekweredesignedholdprisonerswhowouldworkforindustriesownedbytheSSandoperatedprimarilyforthebenefitoftheSS,inaccordancewithHimmler’splanstomakeLublintheindustrialcentreofanSSempire.LikeanymilitaryorganisationtheWaffen-SScouldnothavefunctionedwithouteconomicsupportandadministrativesupport.HimmlerhimselfespousedhowthecampswouldbeusedtotheeconomicandmaterialbenefitoftheWaffen-SS.ExamplesoftheeconomiclinksbetweentheWaffen-SSandthecampsystemarenothardtofind.SSclothingworksweresetupinthecampsinLublin.TheseactedassubsidiaryofthemainWaffen-SSclothing

workshopsatRavensbruckconcentration-camp(Arad,1987;White,1990).IndeedthecampatMajdanekwas“…intendedtoproducesuppliesnecessarytofeed,clothe,house,fuel,transportandarmtheSS”(White,1990:13).

InApril1943HimmlermadeaspeechtoofficersoftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitleratMetz.HeexplainedhowtheSSwouldbenefitfromtheworkinthecamps(document1918-PS):

Theapartment-buildingprogram,whichistheprerequisiteforahealthyandsocialbasisoftheentireSS,aswellasoftheentireleadershipcorps,canbecarriedoutonlywhenIgetthemoneyforitfromsomewhere.Nobodyisgoingtogivemethemoney.Itmustbeearned,anditwillbeearnedbyforcingthescumofmankind,theprisoners,theprofessionalcriminals,todopositivework.Themanguardingthoseprisonersservesharderthantheoneonclose-orderdrill.Theonewhodoesthisandstandsneartheseutterlynegativepeoplewilllearnwithinthreetofourmonthsandweshallsee.Inpeacetime,Ishallformguardbattalionsandputthemondutyforthreemonthsonly.Theywilllearntofighttheinferiorbeings;andthiswillnotbeaboringguardduty,butiftheofficershandleitright,itwillbethebestindoctrinationoninferiorbeingsandinferiorraces…ThisinturnisnecessarybecausewestandordiewiththisleadingbloodofGermany;andifthegoodbloodisnotreproduced,wewillnotbeabletoruletheworld.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:202)

AgainHimmlerisclearlyoutliningracialandideologicalmessages.OfnoteisHimmleragaingoestolengthstostatehowtheroleofthecampguardisjustasimportantandperhapsmoreonerousthanthatofthefightingSSsoldier,thisagainbeingamessageusedbyhimtoforgetheSSintooneorganicbody.

Thecampswererunwithchillingeconomicefficiency.AtNurembergareport(documentd-960)wastabledthatclearlyshowsthecallousnesswithwhichhumanlifewastreated.ItwasputtoSS-OberführerGuntherReinecke,whowaschiefjudgeoftheSupremeSSandPolicecourt.ItclearlyshowsthelinkbetweenthecampsandtheWaffen-SS.

Waffen-SS,NatzweilerConcentration-camp,Commander’soffice,24March1943.BilltotheSecurityPoliceandSD,Strasbourg.Forthe20prisonersexecutedandcrematedinthisconcentration-camp,costsamountingto127,05Reichsmarkarose.TheCommander’sofficeoftheNatzweilerConcentration-camprequeststheearlypaymentoftheabove-mentionedsum.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:459)

ThiseconomicwranglingoverthecoststobebornforthedestructionofhumanlivesisalsoclearlyillustratedinaletterfromthePresidentoftheReichResearchDepartmenttotheReichFinanceMinisterrelatingtowhethertheSSisentitledtopaymentsforexperimentsconductedoncampprisoners(document002-PS):

TheReichSurgeonSSandPolice,inapersonaldiscussion,toldmethatthebudgetclaim,whichhelookedafter,isusedprimarilyinthepuremilitarysectoroftheWaffen-SS.Sinceitisestablishedonasmallerscalefortheenlargingofscientificresearchpossibilities,theypertainexclusivelytosuchaffairs,whicharecarriedoutwiththematerial(prisoners),whichisonlyaccessibletotheWaffen-SSandarethereforenottobeundertakenbyanyotherexperimentaloffice.IcannotobjectthereforeonbehalfoftheReichResearch

CouncilagainstthebudgetclaimoftheReichSurgeonSSandPolice.Theletterissigned,“Mentzel,MinisterialDirector.”(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:210)

ReportssuchastheaboveclearlyshowboththetypeofactionsbeingundertakeninthecampsandtheadministrativeandeconomiclinkstheWaffen-SShadwithsuch.

Notonlyweretherethepersonnellinksinregardstothecamps,buttherewasalsotheissueofpropertyandmaterialtakenfromtheJewsandotherswhowereevacuatedtothecamps.TheWaffen-SSwereclearbeneficiariesfromtheconcentration-campsystem.WarrecordsoftheTotenkopfDivisionindicatethattheyreceivednumeroussuppliesfromtheworkshopsofthecampssuchasDachauandOranienburg(Sydnor,1973).Onthe13thofMay1943SS-ObergruppenführerFrankwrotetoHimmlerandinformedhimofthe“…utilisationofJewishconcealedandstolengoods”(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:709).IntheletterFranksuggeststhatsomeoftheproperty,inparticularmen’swatches,bedistributedinthefollowingmanner.

Isuggesttodistributetherepairedmen’swatchesasfollows:(a)Eachcombatdivisionreceivesimmediately—500items,beginning1October1943,“LeibstandarteAdolfHitler”,oncemore500items,division“DasReich”,“TotenkopfDivision”,(oncereceivedalready500watcheseach).(b)Thesubmarineservicereceivesimmediately3000itemsbeginning1October1943,oncemore3000items.(c)Concentration-campsreceiveforsquadsonoutsideduty,guard-commandersetc,accordingtothedecisionofthecommandant,200items.Thisisatotalofabout25,000watches;remainder2,000items.Fountainpens—Eachcombatdivisionreceives300items;thesubmarineservicereceives2000items;remainder1500items.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:710)

Waffen-SSunitsreceivedwinterclothingthathadbeenconfiscatedinthecampsandghettosintheEast.TheseunitsincludedtheLeibstandarteandTotenkopfDivisions(Reitlinger,1957;Sydnor,1990;Weingartner,1974).HereisconclusiveproofthattheWaffen-SSwerebeneficiariesofthelootingthatwasbeingdoneoftheJewishpopulations.Onewouldwonderwhatthe500soldiersoftheLeibstandartethoughtwhentheyreceived500watcheswithJewishnamesinscribedontheback?Inhisreplyonthe3rdofDecember1943Himmleragreedwiththedistributionofwatchesbutaddedthefollowing:

TheReichLeaderSShasagreedthatyou,accordingtoyourproposition,distributepocketwatches,wristwatchesandfountainpensamongtheindividualdivisions.Hemerelyrequeststhatthepolicedivisionshouldnotreceive700pocketwatches,butonly500.Those200watchesaretobedistributed,100watcheseach,amongthedivisions,“TheReich”,and“Death’sHead.”IhavereportedtotheReichLeaderSSimmediatelybecauseIthoughtthatwouldbebetterasyousuggestedtoputthewatchesandfountainpensinhisnameatthedisposalofthedivisionsfortheyuletidecelebration.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:713)

TheWaffen-SSundertooktheadministrationofthecampsandensuredthatitsrigiddisciplinecodewasenforced,ascanbeseenfromtheletterfromtwoWaffen-SSGenerals(document2189-PS).Itisdatedthe11thofAugust1942andisfromSS-Brigadeführer

Glucks,onbehalfofSS-ObergruppenführerPohl,tothecommandantsoftheconcentration-camps.

TheReichsführer-SSandChiefoftheGermanPolicehasorderedthatpunishmentbybeatingwillbeexecutedinconcentration-campsforwomenbyprisonersundertheorderedsupervision.Inordertoco-ordinatethisordertheMainOfficeChiefSSoftheEconomicAdministration,SS-ObergruppenführerandGeneraloftheWaffen-SSPohl,hasordered,effectiveimmediately,thatpunishmentbybeatingwillalsobeexecutedbyprisonersinconcentration-campsformen.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:201)

TherewaslittlemercyfromtheWaffen-SSsoldiersforthosecampinmateswhocouldnolongerfunctionorcommittedminorinfractions.Forexample,Waffen-SSsoldiersexecutedprisonersduringevacuationmarchesfromtheHersbruckconcentration-camptoDachauandshotoneprisonerfordaringtostealapotato55(Ruteretal.,2004:Vol6).

ThelinksbetweenthemedicalexperimentsandtheWaffen-SS

Butevenworseatrocitiestookplacewithinthecampsysteminthenameofmedicaladvancement,so-calledadvancementthattheWaffen-SSwastoplayapivotalrolein.Inapost-warinterviewSSGeneralKarlWolffclaims:

NeverwouldIhavethought;itneveroccurredtousthatwemightarrogantlytalkaboutexterminatinganybodywhodidn’thappentohavebeenbornwiththerightskinorwhowasculturallyinferiortous,orwasundesirable.(Bloomberg,2000).

YetinalettertotheStateSecretaryoftheReichMinistryofTransportationWolffexpressedhisthanksfortheassistancebeinggivenintransportingtheJewstotheexterminationcamps.ThisdocumentformedpartoftheprosecutionevidenceduringthePohlTrial,andreadsasbelow:

Thankyouverymuch,alsointhenameoftheReichLeaderSS,foryourletterof28July1942.Iwasespeciallypleasedtolearnfromyouthatalreadyforafortnightadailytrain;taking5000membersoftheChosenPeopleeverytime,hadgonetoTreblinka…Ihavecontactedthedepartmentsconcernedmyself,sothatthesmoothcarryingoutofallthesemeasuresseemstobeguaranteed.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:777)

WhenthiswasputtoWolff,whouptothatpointhaddeniedanyknowledgeoftheactionsinthecamps,hehadthefollowingtosay:Iadmitwithoutanyreservationthatthishadslippedfrommymemory.However,itisnotpossibleforahumanbeingtoremembereveryletterwhichIwroteduringanumberofyears.Igavetheanswersaccordingtothebestofmybeliefandknowledgeandtothebestofmyrecollection.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:778)

DuringthePohlCase,Wolffwasquestionedinrelationtohisknowledgeoftheactionstakingplaceatthecampsandelsewhere:Q.Well,didyoueverhearaboutRussiansandPoles,whowerenotJews,beingexterminatedandkilled,didyoueverhearaboutthat?A.No.Ihaveneverheardanythingaboutextermination.Iknowthatinthecasesofcombatingpartisans,andincasesof

attemptsatlife,harshmeasuresweretakenandpeoplewouldbeshot,butwhatyourHonourisprobablyreferringtoissystematicandplannedextermination.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:681)

ThisisthesameSSgeneralwhowasconvictedafterthewarofbeingresponsibleforthedeathsof300,000JewsatTreblinkaandfortheconductofmedicalexperimentsattheDachauconcentration-camp(Gutman,1990).

SS-ObergruppenführerWolff

ItwouldseemthatWolffwasnotsurprised,however,whenhesignedoffonmanyofthereportsfromtheconcentration-campsoutliningthedeathsoftheculturallyinferiororthe

disposalofpropertytakenfromcampinmatestoSSformations.FilmfootageoftheperiodshowsWolffvisitingaconcentration-campnearMinskin1941lookinganythingbutsurprisedashetouredtheconcentration-campwithHimmlerlookingatthecampinmatesconsistingmainlyofRussianPOWs.ThisisthesameSSgeneralwhohadknowledgeofandassistedwiththeadministrationofthecruelandabhorrentmedicalexperimentsbeingconductedatDachau,thatresultedininmatesbeingsubjectedtofatalcoldweatherandhigh-pressureexperiments.AtNurembergaletterwasproducedwhichshowscomplicityofWolffandtheseniorWaffen-SSadministrationbeyonddoubt(document343-PS).ItisfromLuftwaffeField-MarshalMilchtoWolffthankinghimandtheSSfortheirassistanceinconductingtheexperiments.

DearWolffInreferencetoyourtelegramof12May,oursanitaryinspectorreportstomethatthealtitudeexperimentscarriedoutbytheSSandAirForceatDachauhavebeenfinished.Anycontinuationoftheseexperimentsseemsnottobenecessary.However,thecarryingoutofexperimentsofsomeotherkind,inregardtoperilsonthehighseas,wouldbeimportant…Thelow-pressurechamberwouldnotbeneededfortheselow-temperatureexperiments.ItisurgentlyneededatanotherplaceandthereforecannolongerremaininDachau.IconveythespecialthanksfromtheSupremeCommanderoftheAirCorpstotheSSfortheirextensiveco-operation.IremainwithbestwishesforyouingoodcomradeshipandwithHeilHitler!Alwaysyours,E.Milch.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:204)

HimmlerhimselflaterwrotetoMilchandbeggedhimtoallowthedoctorresponsiblefortheseterribleexperiments,Dr.Rascher,tobetransferredtotheWaffen-SSsothatexperimentsinrelationtofrost-bite,etccouldbecarriedout.HewasdulytransferredtotheWaffen-SS.TheMedicalCaserevealedthatWaffen-SSdoctorsparticipatedinanumberofexperimentsinvolvingcampinmatesashumanguineapigsforissuessuchasfreezing,incendiaryexplosiveinjuries,poison,malaria,mustardgas,jaundice,boneandnervetransplantsandregenerationandtyphus,etc.Withoutgoingintothedetailofsuchitissufficienttosaythattheywereheldtobethemostgraveofcrimesagainsthumanitybythetribunal,whichresultedinthedeathsofthousandsofcampinmates.

Theseexperimentsincludedshootingprisonersinthelegwithaninfectedorpoisonedbulletandthencalmlywatchingthemastheydiedanagonisingdeath.ThebelowisanexcerptofareportpreparedbytheReichSurgeonfortheSSandPolice(documentL-103).IhaveincludedtheletterinfullasIthinkitisimportanttounderstandthecallouswayinwhichtheSSundertooktheseexperiments.TheSSdoctorsreportedonhowtheyshotprisonerswithpoisonedbullets”

On11September1944,inthepresenceofSS-SturmbannführerDr.Ding,Dr.Widmann,andtheundersigned,experimentswithaconitenitratebulletswerecarriedoutonfivepersonswhohadbeensentencedtodeath.Thecalibreofthebulletsusedwas7.65millimetres,andtheywerefilledwithpoisonincrystalform.Eachsubjectoftheexperimentreceivedoneshotintheupperpartoftheleftthigh,whileinahorizontalposition.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:208)

TheSSDoctorthengoesontooutlineingreatdealthefatalsufferingsoftheprisoners:Inthecaseoftwopersons,thebulletspassedcleanthroughtheupperpartofthethigh.

Evenlaternoeffectfromthepoisoncouldbeseen.Thesetwosubjectswerethereforerejected.Thesymptomsshownbythethreecondemnedpersonsweresurprisinglythesame.Atfirst,nothingspecialwasnoticeable.After20to25minutes,adisturbanceofthemotornervesandalightflowofsalivabegan,butbothstoppedagain.After40to44minutes,astrongflowofsalivaappeared.Thepoisonedpersonsswallowedfrequently;latertheflowofsalivaissostrongthatitcannolongerbecontrolledbyswallowing.Foamysalivaflowsfromthemouth.Thenasensationofchokingandvomitingstarts.Atthesametimetherewaspronouncednausea.Oneofthepoisonedpersonstriedinvaintovomit.Inordertosucceedheputfourfingersofhishand,uptothemainjoint,rightintohismouth.Inspiteofthis,novomitingoccurred.Hisfacebecamequitered.Thefacesoftheothertwosubjectswerealreadypaleatanearlystage.Othersymptomswerethesame.Lateronthedisturbancesofthemotornervesincreasedsomuchthatthepersonsthrewthemselvesupanddown,rolledtheireyes,andmadeaimlessmovementswiththeirhandsandarms.Atlastthedisturbancesubsided,thepupilswereenlargedtothemaximum,thecondemnedlaystill.Rectalcrampsandlossofurinewasobservedinoneofthem.Deathoccurred121,123and129minutesaftertheywereshot.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:208)

Itmayseemhardtocomprehendhowdoctors,supposedtosavelife,couldinfacttakeitinsuchabhorrentcircumstances.OneSSdoctor,HansMunch,whoservedatAuschwitz,gavethisinsightinapost-warinterviewastotheSSpsycheandtheirracistviews,“…thatwastheirreligion,theybelievedthatbyeliminatingtheJewstheywerenotonlyimprovingGermany,butalsothewholeworld”(Halliley,2003).

ItisofinterestthatthecampsservedasatraininggroundforWaffenSSmedicalstaff,withsome152Waffen-SSmedicalstaffhavingservedinoneormorecamps(MacLean,1999a).SS-ObergruppenführerErnstGrawitzwasthedoctorwhorecommendedtoHimmlerthatpoisongasbeusedtokilltheJews,healsoservedwiththe1stSSInfantryBrigadeandtheWikingDivision(Milleretal.,2006:468).JohannesKremerwasaSS-ObersturmführerintheWaffen-SSreserve.56Heheldadoctorateandwasalsoadoctorofmedicine.In1942hereceivedorderstoproceedtotheAuschwitzconcentration-campwherehekeptmeticulousdiariesastotheeventsthatoccurredthere(Weitz,2003).Heattendedhisfirstactionandrecordedthefollowingdiaryentry:

…3.00AMattendedmyfirstSonderatkion(gassingofcampinmates).Dante’sinfernoseemstomealmostacomedycomparedtothis.Theydon’tcallAuschwitztheexterminationcampfornothing.(Weitz,2003)

Kremerlaterrelateshowheselectedinmatesfromthecampsickbay,administeredthemalethalinjectionandthenusedtheirorgansforresearch(Weitz,2003).AnotherexampleofWaffen-SSinvolvementisthatSSofficersfromtheMainHygienicOfficeoftheWaffen-SSwereresponsibleintroductionofZyklonBgasasthemaininstrumentofkillinginthecamps(Arad,1987).IntheMedicalcase57beforetheNurembergTribunal,ofthe23defendantsindictedinthiscase,somesevenweremembersoftheWaffen-SS.

KARLBRANDT—PersonalphysiciantoAdolfHitler;SS-GruppenführerandGeneral-LeutnantintheWaffen-SS;ReichCommissionerforHealthandSanitationandmemberoftheReichResearchCouncil.

KARLGENZKEN—SS-ObergruppenführerandGeneral-LeutnantintheWaffen-SS;andChiefoftheMedicalDepartmentoftheWaffen-SS.KARLGEBHARDT–SS-GruppenführerintheSSandGeneral-LeutnantintheWaffen-SS;personalphysiciantoReichsführer-SSHimmler;ChiefSurgeonoftheStaffoftheReichPhysicianSSandPoliceandPresidentoftheGermanRedCross.JOACHIMMRUGOWSKY—SS-OberführerintheWaffen-SS:ChiefHygienistoftheReichPhysicianSSandPoliceandChiefoftheHygienicInstituteoftheWaffenSS.VIKTORBRACK—SS-OberführerintheSSandSS-SturmbannführerintheWaffen-SS;andChiefAdministrativeOfficerintheChancelleryoftheFuehreroftheNSDAP.FRITZFISCHER—SS-SturmbannführerintheWaffen-SS;andAssistantPhysiciantothedefendantGebhardtattheHospitalatHohenlychen.WALDEMARHOVEN—SS-HauptsturmführerintheWaffen-SS:andChiefDoctoroftheBuchenwaldConcentration-camp.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol1:8)

Allwerefoundguiltyofwarcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity.Brandt,Gebhardt,Mrugowsky,BrackandHovenweresentencedtohang,whiletheothersweresentencedtovarioustermsofimprisonment.

OthercrimeslinkingthecampsandtheWaffen-SS

Manyoftheconcentration-campofficerssawthemselvesat“…firstandforemostsoldiers”,indeeduptotwo-thirdsofconcentration-campofficershadsomekindofmilitarybackground(Segev,1987:60).OfnoteisthatMacLean’sanalysisisonlyconcernedwithofficerswhoactuallyservedinfront-lineWaffen-SSunits.HedoesnottakeintoaccountofficersoftheWaffen-SSwhodidnotcompleteactivemilitaryserviceatthefront.TheseofficersincludedthelikesofSS-HauptsturmführerAmonGoethamemberoftheWaffen-SS.Goeth,whowascommanderoftheCracowconcentration-camp,wastriedafterthewarinPoland58andhungin1946.Hewasfoundguiltyofthemurderof8000inmatesattheCracowcamp,theliquidationoftheCracowghetto,whichresultedinthedeathsof2000people,theclosingdownoftheTarnowghettoandthesendingofthesurvivorstoAuschwitzandtheclosingdownoftheforcedlabourcampatSzebnie,whichresultedinthedeathsofseveralthousandpeople(TheUnitedNationsWarCrimeCommission,1946Vol7:1).Goethwouldgo,

…ontothebalconyofhisvillainthemorningwitharifleandbinocularsandscanthecampground.Whenhesawaprisonerdoingsomethingthatdispleasedhim–pushingacarttooslowly,standingratherthanmoving,orcommittingsomeotherunfathomablecrime,hewouldshoottheprisoner.(Staub,1989:138)

ItisbeyondbelieftotryandstatethatdespitethefactthathundredsofofficersfromthecampsystemwereindailyservicewiththeunitsoftheWaffen-SS,theWaffen-SSwerenotawareofthecrimesthathadandwerebeingcommitted.SS-SturmbannführerPerSorenson,commanderofthe24thSSPanzergrenadierRegimentDanmark,recountedhowduringhisofficertrainingfortheWaffen-SSheandothersweretakenonanexcursionoftheDachauconcentration-campandofamentalasylumtoreinforcetheideologicalandracialmessagesoftheSS(Smithetal.,1999).Indeedtheactualexistenceofthe

concentration-campscouldhardlybedeniedbycertainunits,when,forexample,allnewofficersoftheLeibstandartereceivedtheirtacticaltraininginthesameareaastheDachauconcentration-camp(Reynolds,1999:3).The24thWaffen-SSDivisionKarstjagerwasformedin1942usingtheSStrainingcampatDachau(Nafziger,2001).

InadditiontothisanumberofWaffen-SSatrocitieshavebeencataloguedsincetheendofthewar.Ihaveincludedjustafewofthese.Onthe3rdofNovember1943OperationHarvestFestivalwascommenced.Thisresultedintheshootingofsome42,000inmatesoftheMajdanekconcentration-campbyunitsoftheWaffen-SS(Arad,1987;Scheffler,1985;White,1990).Theseexecutionswerenotallowedtobecarriedoutbythecamppersonnel,rather“…butwerecarriedoutbyPoliceandWaffen-SSunitsbroughtfromotherareasoftheGeneralGovernmentforthispurposealone”(Scheffler,1985:45).InApril1945racialGermanrecruitsoftheWaffen-SS,whowerefromanarmouredwarfareschool,wereseentobeindiscriminatelyshootingtheinmatesoftheBelsenconcentration-camp(Reitlinger,1957:266).Waffen-SSsoldierswereconvictedofshootingprisonersduringanevacuationmarchfromtheHersbruckconcentration-camptotheDachauconcentration-camp59(Ruteretal.,2004:Vol6).Asoldierofthe11thSSInfantryRegimentwasfoundguiltyofshootingJewsatadetainmentcampnearRadominPoland60(Ruteretal.,2004:Vol6).SoldiersoftheUkrainian14thWaffenSSDivisionwereinvolvedinthe“…shootingofSovietprisonersofwaratSzebnie,theliquidationofPoles,GypsiesandJewsinthetownofModerowkaandthereinforcementofGermanunitsguardingtheconcentration-campatSzebnie”(Littman,2003:73).SoldiersoftheSSGotzVonBerlichingenDivisionwereconvictedofshootingforeignconcentration-campprisonersasthewardrewtoaclose61(Ruteretal.,2004:Vol3).MembersoftheDasReichdivisionshotJewishcampinmatesandaRussianPOWnearMelkinAustriain194562(Ruteretal.,2004:Vol26).TheseexamplesservetoillustratetheinvolvementoftheWaffen-SSinthecrimescommittedinthecampsystem.

ItcanbeseenbeyonddoubtthattheWaffen-SSperpetratedsomeoftheworstatrocitiesofWorldWarII.MostofthesewerecommittedontheEasternFrontinthewhirlwindofthebrutalcampaignthere.ItwasontheEasternFrontthattheWaffen-SSgavefullventtotheirideologicalandpoliticalcrusadetocreateanAryanutopiaandriditofundesirableelements.

WhilenotexaminingeveryminuteactioncarriedoutbytheWaffenSS,IbelieveIhaveshownthattheconductoftheWaffen-SSincommittingatrocitiescanbeconsideredsystemic.Theywereinvolvedinatrocitiesincombat;theywereinvolvedintheEinsatzgruppenandtheirdeadlycampaignsofmobilegenocide.Theyconductedthemselveswithutterbrutalityinthefightagainstpartisans,andlastbutnotleast,theywereirrevocablyentwinedinthetwistedterrorthatwastheconcentration-campsystemanditsassociatedgenocide.WehaveseenwhattheWaffen-SSdid;Imustnowaddressthenextcrucialquestion,whydidtheydoit?

6.TheWaffen-SSasacriminalorganisation

“Soldatenwiedieanderenauch”

Justsoldiersliketheothers.ThisistheclaimmadebyveteransoftheWaffen-SSandtheirsupporters.In1953WestGermanChancellorKonradAdenuaerutteredtheseverywordsindescribingtheWaffen-SS.LegitimacywaslenttotheWaffen-SSclaimofinnocencewhenUSPresidentRonaldReaganvisitedawarcemeterycontainingWaffen-SSgravesinanefforttoputthepasttorest.VeteranscontinuetoclaimthattheywerenodifferenttotheotherarmedforcesofGermanyduringthewar.DasReichDivisionveteran,SS-ObersturmbannführerOttoWeidingerstatedinhishistoryoftheDerFührerRegiment;“…thetruthwillbeservedbythestatementthatthesoldiersoftheWaffen-SSandtheDerFührerRegimentinparticularneverconsideredthemselvesaspecialforceorguard.AllfeltthattheywerejustGermansoldiers”(Weidinger,1998:20).WeidingerneglectstomentionthathejoinedtheNaziPartyin1933andservedintheSSguardunitatDachauin1934(Yerger,2000).WhileindeedtheWaffenSSwereGermansoldiers,therewasagreatdifferencebetweenthemandthemembersoftheWehrmacht.AsnotedbyHuffman:“Waffen-SStroopswerethemostradicalisedandpoliticisedtroopsintheGermanarmedforces,andthefanaticizedmilitaryeliteandpoliticalsoldiersofNaziGermany”(Huffman,2005:iv)

AleadingspokesmanforformerWaffen-SSveterans,SS-BrigadeführerKurtMeyer,aformercommanderofthe12thSSPanzerDivisionHitlerjugend,wasjustoneofmanytoclaimtheinnocenceoftheWaffenSS.InaspeechtoWaffen-SSveteransafterthewarheclaimedthattheWaffen-SS“…committednocrimesexceptthemassacreatOradour63andthatwastheactionofasingleman.Hewasscheduledtogobeforeacourtmartial,buthediedahero’sdeathbeforehecouldbetried”(Stein,1966:255).ThroughtheseeffortsofformerveteransandotherstheWaffen-SShasbeenabletogainacceptancedespitethefactthatlarge-scaleatrocitiescontinuetotarnishitsimage.

WhengivingevidenceatNurembergSSColonelSS-OberführerGuntherReinecke,whowaschiefjudgeoftheSupremeSSandPolicecourt,madethefollowingclaiminrelationtotheatrocitiesoftheSSbeingsystematicwhenquestionedbythedefencecounselfortheSS.

HERRPELCKMANN:…DidtheWaffen-SScommitcrimesagainstthecivilianpopulationintheoccupiedterritoriesandatthefront,andwerethesecrimescommittedsystematicallyandinviolationofinternationalagreements,inviolationofthepenallawexistinginthecountriesconcerned,andinviolationofthegeneralprinciplesofpenallawofallcivilisednations?REINECKE:No,therecanbenoquestionofthat.ItisclearthatonthepartoftheWaffen-SSviolationsofinternationallawoccurredinindividualcases,justastheytookplaceontheothersidealso.Butallthesewereisolatedoccurrencesandnotsystematic…(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:430)

Reinecke’sargumentissupportedtosomedegreebycommentsfromauthorssuchasthefollowingregardingtheliabilityoftheWaffen-SS;“ThedoctrineofcriminalconspiracyandcollectiveguiltformulatedduringtheNurembergeranolongersatisfiesserious

investigators”(Stein,1966:vii).OtherauthorsarguethatthecriminalityoftheWaffen-SSisnotoutstanding.“TheWaffen-SSasagrouphadarecordnoworsethanthatoftheWesternAllies”(Rikmenspoel,1999:vii).However,asIhaveshowninthelastchaptertheclaimthattheWaffen-SSdidnotcommitsystematicviolationsisbankrupt.Still“…evenoutsidethecirclesofSSapologists,however,manyGermansinsistthatcriminalactscommittedbytheWaffen-SSpersonnelwereexceptionstopersonandcondition”(Koehl,1962:278).Thiswouldseemtosuggestthatratherthenbeingseenfromanindividualstandpoint,thecrimesoftheWaffen-SSshouldbeviewedfromanorganisationalone.Thisstatementbringswithitthefollowingquestion.Istheapplicationofcollectiveguiltandgroupresponsibilityappropriateinthiscase?

GroupResponsibilityorCollectiveGuilt?

IsitfeasibletoholdtheentireWaffen-SSresponsiblefortheevilsactscommitted,whennotallofthemembersoftheWaffen-SSweredirectlyinvolved?ThiswasjustthepropositionputforwardbyLieutenant-ColonelMurrayBernays,whowasaJewishlawyerintheUSWarDepartment’sSpecialProjectsBranch,whichwasresponsiblefordecidinghowwarcriminalswouldbedealtwith.Bernaysarguedthatcentraltotheplanshouldbethenotionofcollectivecriminality,inwhichthecrimeofmembershipwouldmakeeachmemberofacriminalorganisationliablefortheactscommitted(Ball,1999;VanSliedregt,2006).Thiswasanapproachfraughtwithdanger.Levinsonnotes,“Greatdifficultiesemergewhenoneconsidersthequestionofcriminalresponsibilityforactionsoccurringwithinanorganisationalcontext.Ifwewishtoengageincommunalcondemnation,whomshouldtheopprobriumbedirected?”(Levinson,1973:371).Fletchersuccinctlysurmisesthecorequestioninrelationtocollectiveguilt:

Asthefightovercollectiveguiltiswonorlost,soarelargerstakesdecided:Istheindividualtheultimateunitofactionandresponsibility,orarewe,asindividuals,invariablyimplicatedbytheactionsofthegroupsofwhichweareapart?(Fletcher,2002:1499)

TheWaffen-SSwasdeclaredacriminalorganisationbytheIMT.However,despitethefactthattheleadershipcorpsoftheSSwasseenascriminal“…thequestionisnotonlywhetheranorganisationcanhaveacriminalpurpose,butwhetheritsmemberscanbeguiltybyvirtueofassociationormembershiporsomethingmoreisrequired?”(Bassiouni,1999:389).

Thenotionsofgroupresponsibilityandcollectiveguiltbecomemuchmorerelevantwhenthecrimescommittedhaveeverythingtodowiththegroupandnottheindividual.Inotherwords,whenthecrimescommittedaresystematic,theissueofgroupaccountabilitycomestothefore.WhilethepriordiscussionshaveshownthattheWaffen-SSdidcommitsystematicviolationsofinternationallawandactsthatthisbookmaywellconsiderevil,thereisoneimportantpremisetothisconclusion.ThatisthatnoteverysoldieroftheWaffen-SScommittedatrocities.AsnotedbySydnor“…itwouldbepueriletoassumethereverseoftheapologistbook;namelythatalloramajorityoftheofficersandmenwhoservedintheWaffen-SSwerecriminals”(Sydnor,1973:341).InhisstudyWiggerssupportsthisviewbyarguingthebelow:

Bythesametoken,thispaperdoesquestionthewholesaleclassificationofWaffen-SSmembersascriminalswhowereideologicallyseducedormentallyill,orvolunteermembersofaphysical,racialandideologicalelite…Acarefulandcomprehensiveanalysisofthewar-timeWaffen-SSorganisation,itscharacterandactivities,indicatesthatthepictureofthecriminalorganisationpresentedbytheprosecutionatNurembergandpost-warcriticswasoverblown,aresultofheightenedpost-waremotion,andavictimofafailedlegalinnovationconcerningcollectiveguilt.(Wiggers,1990:178)

CertainlytheIMTrecognisedtheimportanceofknowledgeofthecrimesthatwerecommitted,asdistinctfromjustpuremembershipoftheorganisationbeingrequiredtoentailcriminalguilt:

Acriminalorganisationisanalogoustoacriminalconspiracyinthattheessenceofbothisco-operationforcriminalpurposes.Theremustbeagroupboundtogetherandorganisedforacommonpurpose.ThegroupmustbeformedorusedinconnectionwiththecommissionofcrimesdenouncedbytheCharter.Sincethedeclarationwithrespecttotheorganisationsandgroupswill,ashasbeenpointedout,fixthecriminalityofitsmembers,thatdefinitionshouldexcludepersonswhohadnoknowledgeofthecriminalpurposesoractsoftheorganisationandthosewhoweredraftedbythestateformembership,unlesstheywerepersonallyimplicatedinthecommissionofactsdeclaredcriminalbyArticle6oftheCharterasmembersoftheorganisation.Membershipaloneisnotenoughtocomewithinthescopeofthesedeclarations.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol22:500)

FromapurelegalviewpointtheaboveargumentsmayhavecredenceinlimitingtheabilitytoapportionblameorguilttotheWaffen-SSinitsentirety.Ontheotherhand,itmustalsoberememberedthattheatrocitiescommittedbytheWaffen-SSwerenotjustisolatedeventsconductedbyafewpsychoticpersonalities.Thecrimesaresimplytoowidespreadandenormousintheirundertakingforthistobeavalidargument.Itisbeyondthescopeandpurposeofthisbooktoconductafullexplorationofthenuancesofcollectiveguiltfromalegalstandpoint.Iwill,howevertouchonsomeissuesthatwilljustifymyinclusionoftheentireWaffen-SSmembershipinregardstoresponsibilityfortheactionscommittedbytheorganisationmorefromamoralthanlegalviewpoint.

ThecrimescommittedbytheWaffen-SSwerespreadthroughouttheorganisationanditsformations,theywerelegitimisedandcondonedbythecommandandcontrolelementsoftheorganisation,andfinallyontheevidencepresented,theymusthavebeenwell-knowntothemajorityofthoseservingintheWaffen-SS.Thecrimeswereplannedandcarriedoutateverylevelofwar.FromthestrategiclevelwhereHimmlerandhiscommandstructuresplannedthegenocide,totheoperationallevelwheredivisionalcommandersandHSSPFsissuedordersincompliancewithstrategicgoals,tothetacticallevelwherethesoldierscommittedthekillings.Withthiscomestheissueofgroupresponsibilityandcollectiveguilt.IwouldarguethattheWaffen-SSshouldbeheldmorallyresponsible(asagainstlegal,criminal,orcollectiveguilt)asagroup.Iwilldiscussthisindepthpresently,aswellastheprerequisitesforsuchresponsibility.However,itisworthnotingthatmoralresponsibilityensuingfrommoralcondemnationdoesnotnecessarilycoincidewithlegalresponsibility.MymajorpurposeincomingtotheaboveconclusionisthatIamnotposturingintherealmofpunishment,ratherIamlookingtoapportionresponsibility(in

thiscasemoralratherthanlegal),andthesearetwokey,butentirelydifferentconcepts.

Themajorquestionposedisthatifthesepersonsareactingasagentsfortherestofthegroup(i.e.theWaffen-SS),doesitfollowthatWaffen-SSshouldalsobeheldresponsiblefortheactionsoftheagents?ItwasthistypeofthoughtprocessoflettingothersactasagentsthatallowedmanyciviliansinGermanytoonewayoranothercondonethedirtyworkthatwasbeingdonebyothers.However,lettingotherscommittheatrocitiesdoesnotnecessarilyabsolvetheothersfromthedominantgroupfromresponsibility(moralratherthenlegal)forwhatisoccurring:

WhensomemajorevilsuchasgenocideissaidtobecommittedbysomelargecollectivitysuchastheGermanstate,eachindividualGermanis,asitwere,underasortofmoralcloud,apresumptionthatheorsheprobablyorpossiblyhadsomethingtodowithit.(Narveson,2002:188)

Insituationssuchasthisthereisadenialofthevictim,whichiscreatedwhenindividualsrationaliseactionsinsuchawaythatreducestheimmoralityoftheactionagainstacertainindividual(Day&Vandiver,2000).Asoldierfromthe22ndPanzerDivisionservingontheEasternFrontuponseeingatraincontainingJewsheadingtoaconcentration-camphighlightsthisvilificationofcertaingroups:

Allofushadheardaboutconcentration-camps,butthegenerallyacceptedunderstandingwasthatonlyanti-socialandanti-Germanelements,likeCommunists,homosexuals,Jews,thieves,biblepunchers,gipsiesandsuchlikewerebeingkeptthereandforcedtodoadecentday’sworkforthefirsttimeintheirlives.(Metelmann,2001:31)

Coser(1969)arguesthatsocietyisawareofrolesandactionsthataredistasteful,yetsocietycondonestheactsthatarecompletedbyothers.Inotherwords,weallowotherstoactforusasagents.ThisIwouldarguewasthesituationintheWaffen-SS,thevastmajorityofsoldiersmusthavebeenawareofthegenocidalactionsthatweretakingplaceandassuchtacitlyapprovedofsuch.PreviousdiscussionshaveshownthatWaffen-SStroops“…weresomeofthemosthighlymotivatedontheGermanside.TheyhadallbeenthoroughlyindoctrinatedwithNaziracialsuperioritytheories.TothemembersoftheWaffen-SS,theirRussianenemieswereracialinferiorstobetreatedassubhumans”(Ripley,2004:58).ThisattitudetowardstheRussiansoldiersbeingseenasaprimitivesubhumancanbeseeninthepost-warcommentsofSSGeneralMaxSimon,whostatedthefollowingwhenwritingabouttheRussiansoldier:“TheRussianpeasant…hecannotthinkindependently,adeficiencynotfoundamongWestEuropeanpeasants…”(Simon,1949:9).SS-ObergruppenführerLotharDebesdescribedhowinfighting,“…cunning,crueltyandmaliceappeared…”amongtheRussianenemy(Debes,1947:34).ThiswasacommonviewheldoftheRussianopponent.

InanattempttoshiftblamemembersoftheWaffen-SShaveoftenfallenbackonthedefencethatonlyafewmencommittedatrocitieswhentheissueofresponsibilityforatrocitiesisraised.WhenquestionedabouttheissueofkillingprisonersatNuremberg,SSGeneralPaulHausserhadthefollowingtosayinregardstogroupresponsibility:

HAUSSER:Yes.Theseincidentsarenottheresultoftraining,butratherthefailureofindividuals,perhapsthegivingwayofnerveswhenindifficultsituationsdeepinenemyterritory.Buttheseaccusationsshouldnotbegeneralised.Eveniftherehadbeen10

insteadofonlytwocases,theratioasappliedtotheentiremembershipoftheWaffen-SSofonemillionmenwouldmeantherewouldbeonecasetoevery100,000men.Suchincidentsaretheresultsoftheintensificationofcombatonthegroundandinalongwar;incidentswhichhaveoccurredonbothsidesandwillalwayscontinuetooccur.YoucannotholdthebulkoftheWaffen-SSresponsible.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:367)

Evenifonlyahandfulwerecommittingatrocities,theknowledgeofthismusthavegravitatedoutinanever-expandingcircleofknowledge.ThiswasexactlythepropositionputtoSS-ObergruppenführerWolffduringthePohlTrial.

Q.Well,thecircleofpeoplewhoknewaboutthegassings,andthemassliquidationofpeople,certainlywasmorethanjustahandful,wasn’tit?Itwasnotjustafewpeopleyoutoldusaboutyesterday?A.Idon’tthinkthatIusedtheexpression“afewpeople”.Iwouldliketogiveyouaproportionalnumber,thenIwouldassumethatthepeoplewhohadknowledgeandwhoparticipatedintheplanningandexecutionofthesemonstrositiesweremerelytenthsofonepercent,andIwouldsaythatthisitselfisagoodpercentage,andtoanumberofonemillionmembersoftheWaffen-SS,ortheGeneralSS,thatitisaninfinitelysmallproportion.ForthemajorityoftheSSitisincomprehensiblethattheentiregroupcollectivelyweresentencedascriminals,althoughtheyneitherplayedanypartinthisnordidtheyhaveanyknowledge.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:775)

DuringWolff’strialforwarcrimes,fellowWaffen-SSGeneralBachZelewskigaveevidencethat“…hefoundithighlyimprobablethatanSSofficerofhisrankandpositionwouldknownothingaboutthecrimes”(VonLang,2005:184).ThisassumptioncouldsafelybeappliedtotheentireWaffen-SSleadershipontheevidencethathasbeendiscussedinthepreviouschapter.ItisofinterestthatWolffwasclearlyawareoftheactionsthatweretakingplace,aswereotherswhochosenottopursuethesubject.ThefollowingincidentduringtheRussiancampaign,recountedbyHitler’sLuftwaffeadjutant,NicolausVonBelow,illustratesthis.

DuringthestayatWinnizaayounglieutenantoftheFHQ64signalstraintoldmethathehadwitnessedaterriblemassacrenearby.Whileworkingoncommunicationsequipmenthehadcometoagorge,wherehediscoveredanSStroopshootingalargenumberofmenandwomen.Hewasverydistressedbywhathehadseenandthoughtthatheoughttoreportit.IspoketotheSSliaisonofficer,GruppenführerWolff,andaskedhimtoinvestigateandreportback.Afterafewdayshesuppliedmewithaveryambiguousanswerandhintedatsabotageintherearwardareas.Iwasrequestedtotakenofurtherstepsinthematter.Iwassatisfiedwiththeexplanationandforgottheincident…(VonBelow,1980:155)

VonLangcompletedanexhaustiveworkonWolff’scareerandhenotesthat“Attheveryleast,however,hemusthavediscoveredwhatwasreallyhappeningtotheJewsduringhisserviceforHitlerandHimmlerattheFührer’sheadquartersbetween1939and1943”(VonLang,2005:1).Theabovehighlightsanimportantpoint,thegenocidethatwasbeingcommittedmusthavebeenwidelyknowntothemembershipoftheWaffen-SS,especiallythecommandelements.

IwouldargueagainstthestatementsofHausserandWolffthatthebulkoftheWaffen-SScannotbeheldaccountableinthesenseofgroupresponsibility.Ibasethisargumentonthefollowing.Asapurelegalconceptthenotionofcollectiveguiltmayfail.Indeedithasbeendiscreditedasbeingunfairsincethewar.Ithasbeennotedthat“Collectivecriminalpunishmentisinprincipleopentothechargethatitviolatesfundamentalstandardsoffairnessbybeingoverinclusive:thecategoryofindividualsactuallystigmatisedorotherwisetreatedascriminalwouldincludesomewhocouldsuccessfullydefendthemselves”(Levinson,1973:374).TheresultoftheIMTdeclaringtheWaffen-SSasbeingcriminalhasbeencriticisedbecauseitwasa“…completelylopsidedapproach…intendedtoserveonlyonepurposeandthatwastobrandascriminalsuchorganisationastheSS”(Bassiouni,1999:384).Thisissupportedtosomedegreewhenoneconsidersthat:“Beingthememberofanidentitygroupdoesnotbyitselfconstituteacrime,andthelawabhorscollectiveresponsibility”(Barkan,2004:311).However,IwoulddrawupontheassociativenotionputforwardbyFletcher;IwouldarguethatmembersoftheWaffen-SSbearsomeresponsibilitybyvirtueofassociationwiththeorganisation.

Thisviewissupportedbythefollowingcomment:“Whilstindividualcriminalresponsibilitycanberegardedanemancipationfromcollectiveresponsibility,thisdoesnotmeanthatcollectiveresponsibilityhasbecomeobsoleteandirrelevanttomoderncriminallaw”(VanSleidregt,2006:81).AsBerglundstatedinhisarticlethereisgreatdifficultyinapproachingthenotionofcollectiveguilt:

…toagreeuponaresponsetotheNazicrimes,onewhichacknowledgedalinkbetweentheGermanpeopleandtheactsoftheirleaders,whilenotadmittingtocollectiveguilt,anticipatedthestrugglesthattheGermansandothernationshavehadwiththeirhistoriesofethnicviolence.Asthedebatesinpost-warGermanyhaveshown,thesearchforaconceptionofnationalresponsibilitythatdoesnotequatewithpunishablecollectiveguiltisprecarious…(Berglund,2000:239)

IfonelooksattheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)65initscurrentformitcanbeseenthatalthoughitslegislationisdesignedtodealwithindividualcriminality,ithastodealwithcrimesthatcanonlybecompletedbycollectiveco-operationbyindividuals.TheIMTandNMT,bothcourtswhichdealtwiththeWaffen-SS,werenodifferent.FletcheroutlinesthisnotionfurtherinrelationtotheICC:

ThefourcrimesoverwhichtheCourthasjurisdiction,aggression,crimesofwar,crimesagainsthumanity,andgenocidearedeedsthatbytheirverynaturearecommittedbygroupsandtypicallyagainstindividualsasmembersofgroups.Whateverthepretenceofliberalinternationallawyers,thecrimesofconcerntotheinternationalcommunityarecollectivecrimes.Itistruethatasaformalmatteronlyindividualsareprosecuted,buttheyareprosecutedforcrimescommittedbyandinthenameofthegroupstheyrepresent.Oncethecollectivenatureofthesecrimescomesintoproperfocus,onceweovercometheliberalbiasthathasprevailedsinceNuremberg,weshouldbeabletoseetheinfluenceofcollectiveactionindomesticlawaswell.Iarguebelowthattheinnovationofhate-crimelawsintheUnitedStatesreflectsasimilarturntowardscollectivistthinkinginthelaw…Mypointistoshowthatalthoughtheorthodoxviewstressesindividualresponsibility,theheartofinternationalcriminallawremainscollectivistinnature.(Fletcher,2002:1510)

Thisisoneofmykeyarguments.Althoughlegallytheindividualmaybethepreferable

unittodealwith,ontheissueofmoralresponsibilityitiscrucialtotakeagroupororganisationalstandpoint.InthiscaseIwouldsuggestthattheWaffen-SShasagroupororganisationalresponsibilitythatisdefinedandevidencedbythepreviousdiscussions.Thisresponsibilityhasamuchnarrowerfocusthanabroad-basednationalresponsibilityorguilt;theWaffen-SSwasamuchsmallerspecificgroupthathadspecificaimsandtasks.AssuchIwouldsuggestthattheWaffen-SSdoesbeargroupresponsibilityfortheactionsundertakenonthepartoftheorganisation.ThisresponsibilityisclearlydifferentiatedfromcollectiveguiltbySchaap:

…Attributionofcollectiveguiltisunjustbecauseitimputesblamewithoutregardtotheactionsandintentionsofindividualgroupmembers.Attributionofcollectiveresponsibilityontheotherhand,isjustsinceitrefersonlytoaliabilitypredicatedonthedutiesofcitizenship.(Schaap,2001:750)

Inthiscaseitisliabilitypredicatedonmembership;membershipoftheWaffen-SS.AsamoralconceptIseetheissueofgroupresponsibilitybeingacceptable.ThemembersoftheWaffen-SShadmuchmorethanjustpassingorinnocentknowledgeoftheevilactsbeingcommitted;theyhadintimateknowledge.Theywereresponsiblefortheconcentration-camps,theycontributedtotheEinsatzgruppen,andtheycontrolledtheanti-partisanconflict.Butmorethenjustmereknowledge,theycontributedasanorganisationtotheevilactionsundertaken.Indeed,groupresponsibilitybecomesmoreapplicableinsituationswheretheperpetratorsformasignificantpartofthedominantgroupandwherethevictimsarechosenforbelongingtoadifferentgroup(Radzik,2001).CertainlythisisthecasewiththeWaffenSS.TheywereseenasaneliteoftheNazistate,theirvictimswerepredominatelychosenonracialandideologicalgrounds.ThemembersoftheWaffen-SScouldhardlyarguethattheywerenotawareofitsracialandideologicalnature,especiallygiventhatintheearlyyearsofthewartheformationwasallvolunteerandthegroupmembersself-selectedthemselves.InthelateryearsofthewarwherethevolunteerconceptdiminishedandconscriptionwasintroducedtherewasstillalargehardcoreofcommittedidealistswithintheWaffen-SS.EveninthelateryearsofthewarthenewconscriptswerestillembracedintotheidealismoftheWaffen-SStosomedegree.AsoneveteranoftheTotenkopfDivisionrecalls:

WhentheformerLuftwaffemenjoinedusasreplacementstheyaskedwhatisthespiritoftheTotenkopfdivision.Theanswermusthavebeen–itwasjustsimpleandplain–steadfastinmodesty,thestubbornnessandunshakablebeliefinwhatwethoughtwasrightandwewerewillingtogiveourlivesfor.(Volkner,2004:150)

Formeroperationsofficerofthe12thSSHitlerjugendPanzerdivision,SS-ObersturmbannführerHubertMeyer,gavethefollowinginsightintothelate-warethosoftheWaffen-SS:

IntotheplaceofGermanvictoryhadmovedtheconvictionthatonecouldnotunconditionallysurrender,especiallynottotheenemyintheEast.Onthecontrary,itwasparamounttoguardthehomelandfromthatinparticular.Aboveall,thespiritofcomradeshipandespiritdecorpsheldthetroopstogether.Eventhereplacements,whichhadcomefromtheLuftwaffeandtheKriegsmarinebeforeandaftertheArdennesoffensive,were,inthemajority,caughtupinthatspirit.(Meyer,2001:383)

TheissueofgroupresponsibilityalsowouldseemtoapplywhenoneconsidersthattheWaffen-SSasawholewasabeneficiaryintermofgoodsandeconomicsupportfromthecampsystem;asystemofterrorinwhichmanyoftheWaffen-SShadworkedinandhadknowledgeof.ThisisdespitetheclaimsmadebyseniorofficerssuchasHausser.

HERRPELCKMANN:DoyouconsiderthattheWaffen-SS,initsmajority,participatedinthecrimeswhichindubitablywerecommitted?HAUSSER:No.TheProsecutionchainstheWaffen-SStothefateofHeinrichHimmlerandasmallcircleofcriminalsaroundhim.TheWaffen-SSistakingthisquitebitterlyforitbelievesthatinitsmajorityitfoughtdecentlyandfairly.Itisfarremovedfromthesecrimesandfromthemanwhoisresponsibleforthem.IshouldliketoasktheHighTribunaltopleaselistentotheaccountsandthejudgmentsofthefrontsoldiersonyourside.Ibelievethattheywillnotfailtoshowusrespect.Whereverspecificincidentsoccurredtheywereexceptions.TheWaffenSSconsidersitquiteunjustthatitisbeingtreateddifferentlyfromthemassoftheGermanArmedForcesanditdoesnotdeservetobeoutlawedasacriminalorganisation.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:370)

ManyoftheWaffen-SSworkedinthecampsystem;undeniablytheyhadknowledgeofitsworkings,yetnoneoftheseniorofficerseverprotestedagainstthem.Theywereawareofandcommittedatrocitiesincombatandduringanti-partisanoperations.TheywereanintegralpartoftheEinsatzgruppenandtheirgenocide.Yetneverdidtheseniorofficercorpsasagrouppreventtheirmenforservingintheseunitsorcommittingtheseatrocities.Neverdidtheyasanelitegroupbandtogethertostopthiscarnage.Infacttheonlytimecomplaintsweremadeinrelationtotheethniccleansingbeingconductedwaswhenitwasseenasnotassistingthewareffort.

ItwasnotthecasethattheseniorofficercorpsoftheWaffen-SScouldnothaveprotestedagainsttheactionsHitlerandHimmlerwereundertaking.Afterall,manyoftheseniorofficerswenttogreatlengthsafterthewartosaythatHimmlerwasinsignificantandthattheydidnotlistentohim.Infact,thisistheverypictureHausserattemptedtopaintatNuremberg.

HERRPELCKMANN:WhatinfluencedidHeinrichHimmleractuallyhaveonthemoralattitudeofthemembersoftheWaffen-SS?HAUSSER:HeinrichHimmlermostassuredlytriedinpeacetimetoexerthisinfluenceonthesmallVerfügungstruppe.Duringthewarthiswaspracticallyimpossible.HedidnotaddresstroopsoftheWaffen-SS.Onoccasionhedidtalktosomeofficersandcommandersofsomedivisionsinthefield.ItwasgenerallyknownthatHeinrichHimmler,whohaddoneonlyoneyear’smilitaryservice,hadnoconceptionofthemilitaryandunderestimatedthemilitarytasksandtheworkinvolved.Helikedtoplaytheroleofthestrongmanthroughexaggerationandthroughsuperlatives.Ifsomeonecomesalongwithbigwords,thesoldieronthefrontdoesnotpaymuchattention.Therefore,theinfluenceofHimmlerwasveryinsignificantduringthewar.Heworehisuniform,ofcourse,butthereputationoftheWaffen-SSwasestablishedbyitsofficers,bytheexampletheysetandbytheirdailywork.HERRPELCKMANN:WastheinfluenceofHimmleronthecommandersperhapsstrongerthanonthemassesofSSsoldiers?HAUSSER:Quitethecontrary.Thecommanders,ofcourse,wereunderhimsofarasmilitaryobediencewasconcerned.Buttheyhadtherighttocriticisethroughtheirownexperienceoflifeandoftheworld,andas

amatteroffactthiscriticismwasnecessaryinthefaceofHimmler’sextravagantandromanticideas.Thesemenhadenoughexperiencesothattheycouldtranslatehisstatementsintothelanguageandmannerofthoughtofthesoldier.ThecriticalattitudetowardHeinrichHimmlerincreasedcontinuallyduringthewar.Inmostcaseshebelievedthathecoulddispensewiththeadviceofanexperiencedsoldier.Objectionswerecutoffshortwiththewords,“Thisisthetypicalviewpointofageneral”-viewpointswhichheopposed.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:368)

Theydidnotchallengehimtostoptheatrocities.TheyobeyedorderstosendmentothecampsorEinsatzgruppen.Theyobeyedorderstoconductbrutalcleansingoperationsaspartoftheanti-partisaneffort.Theyobeyedorderstoacceptintotheirranksthosewhohadbeenpartoftheterrorapparatus.Itwasnotthecasethattheycouldnotchoosetodisobeyorders.In1943whenthe1stSSPanzerCorpswasthreatenedwithdestructionatKharkov,HausserdisobeyedadirectorderfromHitlertoholdthetown(Darman,2004;Nipeetal.,2002;Ripley,2000,,2004).Nothingwasdonetohim;infacthewaslaterawardedtheKnight’sCross.In1945SSObergruppenführerSteinerrefusedtocometoBerlintosaveHitler,againnothingwasdonetohim(Darman,2004;Read&Fisher,1992;Ryan,1994).Itseemsthatwhenmilitaryconsiderationsdictated,theWaffen-SScouldresistanddisobeyordersifitsuited.

Whythendidtheynotrevoltagainstthegenocideandmurderbeingcommitted?IwouldarguethatthiswasduetothefactthattheWaffen-SSheldanddisplayedacollectiveviewandattitudethatapprovedoftheactionsbeingcommitted.Ithasbeensuggestedthatunderlyingsuchattitudes“…veryoftenisaphilosophicaltheoryofcollectivevirtue,collectivespirit,collectivesignificance,thatpurportstoauthorisethedoingofgreatevilsbyindividuals”(Narveson,2002).IbelievethattheevidenceIhavepreviouslydiscussedshowsthattheWaffen-SSheldsuchacollectiveview.AssuchIwouldarguethattheWaffen-SS,should,asagroup,beheldmorallyresponsiblefortheactscommittedinitsname.

JustOrdinarySoldiers?TheWaffen-SSandDemonisation

WhilsttheWaffen-SSmaynothavejustbeenordinarysoldierslikeanyothers,theywereordinarypeople.IwouldargueagainstanynotionthattheWaffen-SSshouldbeviewedassomesortofgroupingofevilmenwhodidevilforthesakeofit.AsnotedbyMorton.

Theaveragereaderofthisbookisnotunimaginablydifferentfrommanyoftheperpetratorsofevildeeds,andalargeproportionoftheevilintheworldistheresultoftheactionsofpeoplewellwithintherangeofnormalroutinesofsociallife.(Morton,2004:4)

Mortoninhisreviewofevilclearlyenunciatesthatevilactionsdonotnecessarilymeanthatthereareevilpeople.Humanactionsareoftenunderstoodintermsoftheirexplanations.Theabilityofevilactstodefyrationalexplanationhasoftenledtothepowerofevilbeinginvokedinanattempttoexplaintheseactsastheresultofsomekindofpureorradicalforce,forinstancethepersondiditbecausetheyareevil.Whentalkingofgenocideandotheratrocities:

Itisprobablydifficulttoreadorhearaboutaccountsofgenocidewithoutatleast

fleetinglyconcludingthatthekillersweretwistedandevilhumanbeingswhobearverylittleresemblancetooneselforone’sfriends,neighboursandlovedones.(Newman,2002:43)

Therehasbeenatendencytoexplainawayatrociousbehaviourasbeingtheactionsofsomeoneoutsidethenorm,athemwhohavenoimplicationsfortherestofsociety.WhentryingtodealwithmassivehumanrightsviolationssuchasgenocideascommittedontheEasternFront,weoftenseethepeoplecommittingtheseactsasevil,anaberrationfromthenorm:

Thusthepreferenceforattributingparticipationinatrocitiestoanevil,hateful,orevenobedientnatureisentirelyconsistentwiththewayhumanbeingstypicallyexplainevents.Asaresult,peoplemaybepredisposedbytheircognitivemakeuptoendorsesuchpersonality-basedexplanationsevenwhenthereislittleevidencetosupportthem.(Kressel,2002:148)

AfterthewarthisprocesswasundertakenagainsttheSS.TheyweremadetoappeardifferenttoordinaryGermans,sointhiswayGermanycouldaccountforthecrimesthatwerecommitted.TheSSinfactbecamethealibiforGermany.IndeedafterthewarwhenlookingatthephenomenonoftheNazisitwasmorecomfortingtobelievethatnonormalorhealthypersonwouldbeabletoengageinsuchatrocitiesagainsthumanity.InregardstotheSSanoverlysimplisticviewwasheld.Itwascommonlyassumedthatthesepersonscompletelyidentifiedwiththeirrolesandinfactenjoyedthem.AsaconsequencetheSSareviewedasutterlyevilandsadistic,and,noallowanceforexplanationsotherthantheevilpersonalitywasmade.InthepastithasbeeneasytodismissevilactionsastheresultofevilpersonalitieshoweverasWallerpointsout;

MostoftheperpetratorsoftheHolocaustandothercasesofmasskillingandgenocidewereextraordinaryonlybywhattheydid,notbywhotheywere.Theycouldnotbeidentified,apriori,ashavingthepersonalitiesofkillers.Mostwerenotmentallyimpaired.Norweretheyidentifiedassadistsathomeorintheirsocialenvironment.Norweretheyvictimsofanabusivebackground.Theydefyeasydemographiccategorisation…Inshortthemajorityofperpetratorsofextraordinaryevilwerenotdistinguishedbybackground,personality,orpreviouspoliticalaffiliationorbehaviourashavingbeenmenorwomenunusuallylikelyorfittobegenocidalexecutioners.(Waller,2002:8)

ThelogicofthedemonicindividualdiminisheswhenoneconsidersthatthemajorityofWaffen-SSmembersshowedan“…exceedinglylowcrimerate”afterthewar(J.Steiner,1963:441).Inotherwords,whenplacedinthesituationofanideologicalwartheywerecapableofgreatcrimes,yetwhenreturnedtoanormalsocietalsituationtheybehavednormally.Theargumentonthedemonicindividualwoulddictatethatthesesoldiersshouldhavecontinuedtheirdepravedbehaviourintotheircivilianlives;buttheydidnot.Indeed,thevastmajorityofmenandwomenresponsiblefortheslaughteroftheirfellowhumanbeingshavenotbeensadisticorpsychopathic,rathertheyarejustordinarypeoplecapableofevilacts.Societyfindsthathardtoacceptaspeoplewantpsychologicaldistancefromtheperpetratorsofatrocities;“…theydidnotwanttobelievethatthepotentialtoactlikeaNazicouldexistinthemortheirneighbour”(Waller,2002:63).Publicperceptions“…requireourevildoerstobemajorfigures,withsomethingofthedemonicaboutthem,ratherthanpatheticfiguresinthegripofimpulse”(Darley,1992:202).Thisneedfor

demonisingoftheperpetratorcanleadtotheerroneousassumptionthatbehindanevilactmustlayanevilindividual.Thisassumptionhasbeenclearlyrejectedbyanumberofauthors;itisalsorejectedbythisstudy.

Donotbothertodemonisepeopleasbeinginherentlyevil.That’snothowitworks.Instead,weshouldviewevilasopportunistic,passinglikeanelectricalcurrentthroughtheworldandthroughpeople:orwanderinglikeaninfectionthattakesupresidenceinindividualsorculturesfromtimetotime.(Morrow,2003:17)

Thisneedtodemonisehasledtosomepeoplebeingclassifiedasbeingtheembodimentofevil,suchasHitlerorReichsführer-SSHeinrichHimmler(Berkowitz,1999).HimmlerwasoneofthemainarchitectsoftheHolocaustandothermassatrocitiesthatwerecommittedbytheSS;assuchitiseasytodemonisehimasanevilperson.

However,assoonaswepeeloffafewlayersfromthedemonisedimagewelaybarethefarsimplerfeaturesofaromanticallyeccentricpettybourgeoiswho,underthespecificconditionsofatotalitariansystemofgovernment,attainedexceptionalpowerandhencefoundhimselfinapositiontoputhispoliciesintobloodypractice.(Fest,1970:172)

Thisquoteencapsulatestwocoreargumentsofthisbook,firstthatevilisaninteractionbetweenpersonalityandsituation,andsecond,theevilpersondoesnotexist.IndeedthecaseofHimmlercanleadtoawholehostofquestions:

WasHeinrichHimmlermad,badorjustconfusedwhenhecomplimentedhisSSGeneralsin1943forremaining“decentfellows”whileoverseeingtheslaughteroftheJews?WhatconceptofdecencycouldtheSSReichsführerpossiblyhaveinmindhere?Howcouldhedescribethedeathsofthousandsofmen,womenandchildrenassimplyameansofcleansingthesoiltoallownewfruittogrow?(Scarre,1998:436)

HisactionsseemtodefyrationalunderstandingandthismakesiteasytousethelabelevilindealingwithHimmler.However,incontrasttothemainplayersintheNaziPartywehavethethousandsthatjoinedtheNaziParty;byallaccountsthewerenotcrazedbloodthirstymonsters.ThisviewcanbeseenafterWorldWarIIwhentheargumentwasraisedthatmanyoftheGermansoldierswerejustfollowingorderswhentheywereliquidatingtheJews.

Some,however,seemedtoderiveaspecificpleasurefromtheact.TheactionsofSS-OberführerDirlewangerintorturingtheyounggirlsaspreviouslymentionedwouldseemtoindicatethatDirlewangermightbepossessedofanevilpowergiventheextremepleasurehetookfromunnecessarilydemeaningtheJewishwomenpriortotheirexecution.Thetortureofthegirlswouldappeartoarationalpersontoservenopurpose;theyweregoingtobekilledveryshortlyanyway.Thiswouldhaveusbelievethatsomepeopleundertakeactionsfornootherpurposethantobeevil,orinotherwords,evilforthesakeofevil.Baumeister(1999)referstothisasthemythofpureevil.However,

Thedisturbingpsychologicaltruthisthatparticipationinmassmurderneednotrequireemotionsasextremeordemonicaswouldseemappropriateforsuchamalignantproject.Ortoputthematteranotherway,ordinarypeoplecancommitdemonicacts.(Lifton,2000:5)

DuringWorldWarII,GermansoldiersontheEasternFront“…engagedinheinousand

repugnantactsofslaughter….they(theGermansoldiers66)lookedperfectlynormal,butcommittedextraordinaryatrocities”(Bartov,1999:9).OneWaffen-SSveteranoftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerDivision,GerhardStiller,outlinedhowsomeofhisfellowsoldierscametobeabletocommithorrendousacts:“Afterafewyearstheybecamesodesensitisedthattheydidnotevennoticeanymore.Giventhattheywerecapableofjustbumpingsomeoneoffwithoutbattinganeyelid.Let’sjustsaytheywouldneedtodevelopalotoftheirhumanityagain”(Halliley,2003).ThisconceptofordinarinessorbanalityofperpetratorswastheconclusionreachedinArendt’s(1963)studyofSSbureaucratAdolfEichmann:Hewasjustannormalpersonwhocarriedoutextraordinaryactsofevil.

Theideaofapureorradicalevilpersonalityorpersonisrejectedbythisbook.ToillustratethispointletmereturntotheSSofficersoftheEinsatzgruppen,themobilekillinggroupsthatoperatedbehindthefrontlinesontheEasternFrontliquidatingJewsandothers.MacLean(1999b)identified30Waffen-SSofficers67whohadperformedserviceinthesedeathunits.Ananalysisofthedetailsprovidedbyhimshowsthefollowing.Ofthe28officersexaminedsome93percentwereagnosticwith7percentbeingofProtestantreligion.Asfarasoccupationswereconcerned31percentwerebusinessmen,20percentwerelawyers,11percentwereeachdoctorsorpolice.Otheroccupationsheldincludeduniversitystudentandprofessor,farmerandanengineer,withthreeofficersofunknownoccupationpriortojoiningtheEinsatzgruppen.Regardingeducation,57percenthadhighschoolorequivalent,14percenthadtertiary-levelqualificationsandsome29percentpossesseddoctorate-leveleducation.Asforpoliticalaffiliationsome89percentweremembersoftheNaziParty,therestwerenon-members.OftheNaziPartymembers,some52percentjoinedtheNaziPartypriortothemcomingtopowerin1933.Whatthisanalysisshowsisthatthisgroupofofficerswerediverseinoccupationandoverallwell-educated.Indeedmanycamefromoccupationswhereyoujustwouldnotthinkgenocidalkillerswouldcomefrom,suchasdoctors,policeofficersandlawyers.ThepoliticalaffiliationstotheNaziPartywouldappearstrong.However,ofnoteisthatonly46percentoftheofficersoverallcouldbeclassifiedasoldpartymembers(i.e.pre1933).Nothingstandsoutamongthisgroupofofficers:Theirbackgroundsdonotappearoutoftheordinary.Certainlythereisnothingtosuggestthattheywouldreadilybecomemassmurderers.

Indeed,asBartovnoted“…agreatdealhasbeensaid,andsomewritten,onthepotentialofeveryonetobecomeaserialkillerundercertaincircumstances,aswellasthepotentialofallhumansocietiestodevelopgenocidaltrends”(Bartov,2003b:82).Certainlysocialpsychologistsbyandlargedonotseeevilactionsastheresultofevilpersonalities(Berkowitz,1999).ThereisagreementwithBaumeister’sdismissalofthemythofpureevilandthepropositionthatpeopleexistforpureevilperse.Rather,

Whenoneprobesbehindevilactionsonenormallyfinds,notanevilindividualviciouslyforwardingdiabolicalschemes,butinsteadordinaryindividualswhohavedoneactsofevilbecausetheywerecaughtupincomplexsocialevents.(Darley,1992:204)

Theabovequoteraisesthequestionwhydoonlysomeordinaryindividualsactinthisway?Istheresomethingabouttheirpersonalityortheparticulardynamicsofthecomplexsocialeventsthattheyfoundthemselvesinthatcausesthemtoactthisway?Tobesure,manywritershavecommentedonthefactthatmanyofthemostnotoriousevilactshave

notbeencommittedbydemonicindividuals,butratherbyordinaryhumanbeings(Arendt,1963;Browning,1998).Ithasbeensuggestedthattorelyonaconceptofevilbeingderivedfromsomekindofsatanicmetaphysicalforceisaakinto“…anintellectualhangoverfromareligiouspast”(Garrard,2002:326).Thiscommentreinforcestheviewthatoftenitisindeedordinarypeoplewhocarryoutactsofevilforquitemundanereasons.Ithasbeenarguedthatordinarypeople,simplydoingtheirjobsandwithoutanyparticularhostilityontheirpart,canbecomeagentsinaterribledestructiveprocess.Infact,anumberofstudieshaveshownthatordinaryhumanbeingshavethecapacitytokillotherhumanbeingsandexperiencetheeventasbeingnothingextraordinary(Lifton,2000).

Takethefollowingforexample.Anti-partisanoperationswerecommonduringthewarontheEasternFront,asalargenumberofciviliansandRussiansoldierstrappedbehindthefrontlinestookuparmsagainsttheGermaninvaders.ItwasawaroftenfoughtwithlittlepityoneithersideasseenbytheexperienceofoneWaffen-SSsoldier:

Ourlinesofcommunicationwereoverextendedandhadtobekeptopentosupplythegreatarmiesatthefront…allwecoulddowasmounttheoccasionalsweepwithwhatmenwehad…Weletflywithgrenadesandwentinfiringandseveralmenandthreewomenthrewouttheirgunsandsurrendered.Theyweresearchedandmarchedoffoutofthewood,takenbacktobaseandinterrogated.Allwereroughlyhandledandthenshot.(Blandford,1994:95-96)

InthiscasetheshootingofthesurrenderedpartisanswasseenasnecessarytoenabletheGermanwarefforttobesuccessful,asmallevilforagreatergood.Itisoftenthecasethatthefactorscausingthecommissionofactsthatareevilarequiteordinaryandarecommittedbyordinarypeople,notdemonicmonsters.Indeedweneedtolookbeyondtheexplanationofdemonisationtofindtherealreasonswhyordinarypeople,suchsoldiersoftheWaffen-SS,werecapableofcommittingextraordinarilyevilacts.

InsummaryIwouldarguethatthenotionofanevilindividualisnotconducivetounderstandinghumanbehaviourinthelightofevilacts.Thesenseofevilnessshouldattachtotheactandnottheactor.Toputforwardtheconceptofanevilindividualmayimpingeonourunderstandingandattemptstofindrationalcausesforthebehaviourofpeoplewhocommitevilacts.ItiswiththisinmindthatIshallattempttoshowwhytheWaffenSSwerecapableofcommittingtheevilcrimestheydid.

7.AnexaminationofWaffen-SSactions

ThepurposeofthischapteristoexaminetheactionsoftheWaffen-SSandtrytodeterminethecausativefactorsoftheirsactions.Thisisimportantfortworeasons;firstitallowsustoobjectivelydiscountanydefencesthattheWaffen-SSapologistsmayraisetojustifytheactscommitted.SeconditallowsustofullyanalysetheactionsoftheWaffen-SS.

AshasbeennotedthereisnoevidencetosuggestthatactionsundertakenbytheWaffen-SScanbeattributedsolelyto“…pathologicalpersonalitiesorgrouppsychosesamongSSpersonnel”(Krenetal.,1976:96).ItwillbemyargumentthataninteractiveapproachofbothpersonalityandsituationwillbestexplainwhytheWaffen-SScommittedactsIwouldconsidertobeevil.Iwouldarguethatthecrimestheycommittedwerecausedbythefollowingfactors;First,thesituationalinfluenceofaregimethatlegitimisedcriminalordersandactivelydevaluedthetargetgroupsthatweretobethevictimsofgenocide.SecondtherewasareadyacceptancebyWaffen-SSsoldiersofthisvictimdevaluation.Third,thesituationalcontextofabsoluteobediencebyWaffen-SSsoldiersandthepreparednessofthesesoldierstoblindlyobeyordersthatwouldappeartobeobviouslycriminalintheirnaturecontributedtotheWaffen-SScommittingwarcrimes.FourththementalityordispositionoftheWaffen-SS,inparticulartheaspectof“hardness”bothonthemselvesandtowardsenemiesoftheReichmadethemmorepreparedtocarryoutatrocities.AndlastlythebrutalisingeffectthatdifficultlifeconditionsontheEasternFronthadontheWaffen-SS,bothinrelationtotheclimaticeventsandthenatureofthefightingmadetheWaffen-SSsoldierbrutalintheextreme.

Inanygenocidalactionhoweverthereareanumberofcommonfactorsthatareusuallypresent.Thereisabureaucracy/regimethatispreparedtoundertakeevilacts.InthiscaseitwastheSS,andlatertheWaffen-SS.Thereareindividualspresentinsocietywhoarepreparedtosurrendertheirmoralresponsibilitytocommittheseactions.TheearlyandevenlaterrecruitsintotheWaffen-SSexhibitedthiswillingness,butmoreimportantlyperhapswasthatthecommandandcontrolelementsoftheWaffenSSwereclearlypreparedtodotheabove.Thefollowingofthesedirectionsfromtheregimewaspartofthecreationofdistancebetweentheperpetratorandthevictim.ThisisshownbythepreparednessoftheWaffen-SStodowhatwasnecessaryfortheNazistatesoastoensureitssurvival.Theperpetratordoesnothavetobeconcernedwiththemoralimplicationsoftheactbecausethismoralrolehasbeenassumedbytheregime.TheradicalviewsheldbytheWaffen-SSinregardstoJewsandothersubhumanelementsreflectedthismoraldischargeofresponsibilitytothestate.Thereisusuallysomekindofdifficultlifeconditionspresentinsocietythatmakesocietymoresusceptibletothistypeofaction.InthiscasetheeconomichardshipoftheGreatDepression,andthesenseofbetrayalandlossfollowingthehumiliatingconditionsimposedbythevictorsafterWorldWarI.WiththeseconditionsinplacethescenewassetfortheWaffen-SStoengageinanorgyofmurderandmayhem.

Learningtohate:Seeingtheevilenemy

…everymanshouldbetrainedtobeafanaticalhater…Itdoesn’tmatterwhichfrontour

divisionsengageincombat,theunyieldinghatetowardseveryopponent,Englishmen,American,JeworBolshevik,mustmakeeveryoneofourmencapableofthehighestdeeds.(Wegner,1990:207)

ThesewerethewordsusedbySS-BrigadeführerTreuenfeldtodescribetheconductexpectedofthetroopsofthe9thSSPanzerDivisionHohenstaufenin1943.Thetermhighestdeedsissuggestiveofusingwhatevermeansarenecessarytoachievethemilitaryaim.ThecommentsofthisWaffen-SSgeneralwouldseemtoflyinthefaceofpropositionsbyapologistssuchasTheilewhoarguethat,“Ideologynever,orrarely,playedaroleonthebattlefield”(Theile,1997:125).First-handaccountsfromWaffen-SSsoldierswouldalsoseemtosuggestotherwise.ForinstanceoneveteranoftheDasReichDivisiondescribedthehateofoneofhisfellowtroopers,avolunteerfromSwitzerland;“HehatedBolshevismfromthedepthsofhissoul,andthishatehaddrivenhimtoourforces”(Gunther,2004:116).AsnotedbyWilliamson:“CertainlynoeffortseemstohavebeensparedtobuildupahatredforBolshevism,andsoitmaybeassumedthatahatredoftheideologicalenemywouldplayapartintheattitudesofsomeWaffen-SSmenduringthecampaignintheEast.”(Williamson,2003:213).Thishatredoftheopponent’spoliticalsystemisreflectedintheoathofallegianceswornbyforeigntroopsintheWaffen-SS,suchastheLatvian15thSSGrenadierDivision:

IswearbyGodthisholyoath,thatinthestruggleagainstBolshevismIwillgivetheC-in-CoftheGermanArmedForces,AdolfHitler,absoluteobedienceandasafearlesssoldierifitbehiswillIwillalwaysbepreparedtolaydownmylifeforthisoath.(Benderetal.,1975:70)

Himmleremphasisedthisinapamphletcalled“DieSchutzstaffelalsantibolschewisticheKampforganisation”orSSDefenderagainstBolshevism.Inthisheoutlinedhow,“ManyevenbelievethatBolshevism–thisJewishorganisedandledstruggleofsubhumanity,istotallynewinworldhistory.Webelieveitisimportanttoestablishthataslongastherehasbeenmenonearth,thestrugglebetweenhumansandsubhumanshasbeenthehistoricalrule”(PruessPublishing,2001:7).

Inmostgenocidalactionsthereisaprogressionalongacontinuumofdestructionthatbeginswithsmallactionsthatprogresstothefinalactofexterminationofthetargetgroup.ThispropositioncanbelikenedtotheconceptofmomentumbuildingasputforwardbyMilgram.ThemenoftheEinsatzgruppenareagoodexampleofkillingbecomingprogressivelyeasierandmoreefficientovertime.Zukier(1994:435)referstoasimilarprocesstermedmurderbyinstalmentsinwhichthereisapivotalencounterwithevil,thefirstunlawfulact.Afterthisthepersonthenprogressivelyincreasestheirinvolvement,andthisprogressionisfacilitatedbytheovercomingofinternalandexternalobstaclesandtheillusionofminimalchangeinactions“…thenextstepisamereadjustment,notthatdifferentfromitspredecessor”(Zukier,1994:435).

Toachievethismomentumtargetgroupsareoftendevalued,whichcanleadtothevictimsbeingexcludedfromthebenefitofnormalmoralconsiderations.Thisdevaluationcanoccurthroughtwoprocesses,firstbydehumanisingthevictimsandsecondbyblamingthevictimsfortheperceivedsufferingsofsociety.AnexampleofthiscanbefoundinaspeechthatReichsführer-SSHeinrichHimmlergavetorecruitsoftheWaffen-SSonJuly13th,1941astheywerepreparingtogototheEasternFront:

Thisisanideologicalbattleandastruggleofraces…ontheothersidestandsapopulationof180million,amixtureofraceswhoseverynamesareunpronounceable,andwhosephysiqueissuchthatonecanshootthemdownwithoutpityandcompassion.(Stein,1966:126)

Itisalsoimportantthatthetargetgroupsorvictimsareclearlyidentifiedanddevaluedsothattheprocessofcuringtheperceivedillsofthenationcanbeundertaken.Thisnecessitatesthatthecauseistotallyremoved.Moralconsiderationsofthevictimsarereplacedbyhigheridealsthatareaimedatprotectingtheneedsofthemajority.Infact,aspartoftheirvictimdevaluationtheGermansmadegooduseoflingualmanipulationtoportrayandstereotypetheJewsasvariousdiseasesordiseasecarrierstotheextentthatitassistedinthefacilitationofthegenocideagainstthem.Thepsychologyofgenocidehasbeenlikenedtoasocietysufferingfromanillness,andtheantidoteorcuretothisillnessistheactionthatresultsingenocide.

InhishistoryoftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler,Weingartner(1974)arguesthatbythetimeoftheRussianconflictwarhadbecomeastruggleofmoralabsolutes.Inthistypeofwar“…theenemybecamethefaceless,dehumanisedembodimentofevilwithwhomnocompromisewaspossible.Evilhadtobeannihilatedsothatgoodmighttriumph”(Weingartner,1974:165).Thisallowsbehaviourthatwouldotherwisebeconsideredasunacceptabletobecomeacceptabletoattainthesehigherideals.ThefollowingexampleshowshowthegenocideofEuropeanJewswasideologicallydrivenandcarefullythoughtout.DuringdinnerinFebruary,1942HitlerexplainedtoReichsführer-SSHeinrichHimmlerandaSS-Sturmbannführerofthe5thWaffen-SSPanzerDivisionWikinghisviewandsolutionoftheJewishproblem:

ThediscoveryoftheJewishvirusisoneofthegreatestrevolutionsthathavetakenplaceintheworld.ThebattleinwhichweareengagedtodayisthesamesortofbattlewagedduringthelastcenturybyPasteurandKoch.HowmanydiseaseshavetheoriginintheirJewishvirus…WeshallregainourhealthonlybyeliminatingtheJew.Everythinghasacause,nothingcomesbychance.(Trevor-Roper,2000:332)

Theissueofvictimdevaluationflowsontotheactionsofasoldierincombat.Wararousespsychologicaltraitswithinthehumanpsyche.Certainlyithasbeenseenasessentialtohavesoldiershateanddespisetheenemy,forthisreason“…allmodernnationshaveattemptedinonewayoranothertoinstilintheirsoldiersapictureoftheenemysufficientlyrepugnantoreviltoinspirethishatred”(Stein,1966:127).Waffen-SSveteranGisbergPohljustifiedhisinvolvementinsuppressingtheWarsawGhettouprisinginthefollowingway;“Beingayoungmanoneeasilymadetoomuchofit.WehadafterallgonetoRussia,wewantedtheretodestroysubhumanity–thatis,Iwasstronglyconvincedofmytask,thatIwasright”(Bartov,2003a:29).

Waralsobringsforwardtheneedtodepictyourenemyasevil.Toseeone’senemyasevilallowstheaveragesoldiertojustifytheiraggressionandtheactsthisaggressioncanleadto.Thisperceptionoftheenemyastheotherbydemonisingordehumanisingtheenemycangenerateafearthatresultsincompletecommitmenttothestatethatengagesintotalwaranditsconsequences.Anexampleofthisistheuseofeuphemismsindescribinginnocentciviliansorraciallyunacceptablegroupsaspartisansorbanditswhowerekilled

incounterinsurgencyoperationsinRussia.ForWaffen-SSsoldiersundertakinganti-partisandutiesthishadthebenefitthat“…aslongasthemenbelievedthattheywereeliminatingalegitimateandviablethreat,thechanceofanynegativepsychologicalandmoraleproblemswaslessened”(Heaton,2001:127).Indeedbyportrayingtargetgroupsaspotentialpartisans,“…thisconceptualintegrationofJewsandpartisanswasquicklyinternalisedbyareceptiveSSandbyGermanArmysoldiersandprovidedthemassmurderoftheJewswiththelegitimisationofawaragainstthepartisans”(Buchler,1986:14).

ThesoldiersoftheWaffen-SS3rdPanzerCorpsreceivedindoctrinationintheformofapaper“…inwhichitwasstatedthattheRussianwasamixtureofanimalandman,andthatextremecautionshouldbeshowntowardsRussianprisoners.Thereasonforthiswasthattheywerecapableofcommittingeverypossiblecruelty”(Smithetal.,1999:88).Itisthisabilitytodepicttheenemyasevilthatoftenallowstroopstofreethemselvesofnormalconstraintsandtopursuetheconflictasanideologicalcrusadeonbehalfoftheregime.ThewaroftheEasternFrontduringWorldWarIIwasawarofideologiesofpoliticalandracialorigins.InthiscontextitwasnecessarytohavetheWaffen-SSsoldierseetheRussiansasuntermenschenorsubhumans.TheNaziswerehighlysuccessfulindepictingtheRussiansasevil:

DuringthewarinRussiatheprocessofdehumanisationoftheenemywasprobablymoresuccessfulthaninanyotherwarinmodernhistory–theRussians,Slavs,Jews,Mongols,allhadlostanyrelationshiptothehumanrace,andwerenothingmorethatsatanicmonsterstryinginvaintoappearhuman,impostorswhoseidentityhadtobeexposedandwhoseexistenceendangeredeverythingwhichcivilisedmenhelddear.(Bartov,2001:83)

Thisdehumanisationoftheenemyworksbestwithanobviouslyforeignorphysicallydifferentenemy(Bourke,1999).Itisarguedthat:Thisalmostobligatorydehumanisationoftheenemyisparticularlypronouncedwhenthereareradicalideologicaldifferencesbetweentheopponents,differenceswhich…mayportraytheenemyasthefoeofcivilisationandtheenemyofprogress…(Holmes,1985:366)

Culturalandracialdifferencesraiseobstaclesthatmakeitdifficultforsoldierstointeractwiththeenemywithanyaffection.ThiswasshownbytheabilityofAmericansoldierstomorereadilyidentifywiththeirGermanopponentsascomparedtotheJapanese(Stoufferetal.,1949;Weingartner,1996).Theenemycanbedepictedasevil,byportrayingthemasbeingsubhumanandpreternaturallybrutal(Weingartner,1996).Itisrecognisedthat“…combatintheatreswheretheenemywasofadifferentrace,wasportrayedasdifferent,wasparticularlyhatefulandliabletoinvolveatrocities”(Bourke,1999:143).

Whatthisdepictionofevilallowsisanusversusthemmentality,inwhichtheenemyisseenasbeingsometypeofforeignbeing.Itisthisusandthemthinkingthatisoftenaprecursortogenocidalactions.Thisthinkingcanleadtoadistinctionbetweenus(theinternalgroup)andthem(theexternalgroup),andwiththiscomesarelatedseparationofinternalandexternalmoralsthatareappliedtoeachparty.Hitlermadethefollowingspeechtohisgeneralson30thofMarch1941,priortotheinvasionofRussia:

…ourtasksinRussia:destroythearmedforces,dissolvethestate…Wemustdistanceourselvesfromthestandpointofsoldierlycomradery.TheCommunistwasnotafellow

soldierbeforecaptivity;neitherwillhebeoneafterward.Thisisabattleofannihilation…ThisstrugglewillbeverydifferentfromthebattleintheWest.IntheEast,harshnessisgentlenessforthefuture.(Bartov,1999:30)

FromthespeechaboveonecanseethatHitlerwasalreadyattemptingtoshowtheRussiansoldierasbeingoutsideoftheuniverseofmoralobligationandthereforenotdeservingofcompassionatetreatmentwhichinturnhelpstoremovethenormalrestraintsthatindividualshaveagainstaggression.IthasbeenarguedthattheGermanofficersandmenhad;“…internalisedaviewofhumanitythatcategoriseditnotonlyraciallyintoSlavandJewishuntermenschenandAryansuperman…deprivingthemoftherighttolive”(Bartov,1997:332).Indeedthecommanderinchiefofthearmy,Field-MarshalVonBrauchitsch,instructedseniorofficersthatthecomingconflictontheEasternFrontwouldbe“…astrugglebetweentwodifferentraces,requiringthetroopstoactwithallnecessaryharshness”(Forster,1985:308).

Anevilenemyisseenasnotbeingdeservingoftheprotectionofthenormalrulesofconflict.TheideologicalviewsofHitlerandtheNazisfoundtheirwaydowntothelowerranksoftheWaffen-SSwheremanysoldiersacceptedandagreedwiththeideathatthewaragainsttheSovietUnionwastobepursuedunderdifferentconditionsandusingdifferentmethodsfromthoseofanormalwar.Asoldierofthe1stPanzerDivisionLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerwrotealettertohisparentsshortlybeforetheinvasion,wherehetalkedoftheLeibstandarteanditscomingrole:

…ButintheLeibstandartewethinkourselvesacutabovetherest.Wearetheonlyones.TheFührer’sowntodowithashewill.Thisisourcreed,thatwewillgoforwardoveraprecipicetodeathifneedbe,butwithoutquestion.Itisagloriousfeelingtobereadytogetattheenemy,tobashhisbrainsoutonhisownfilthyfloor…itwillbeallright.Wemustdefeatthesubhuman.(Wykes,1974:117)

SosuccessfulweretheNazisintheirindoctrinationthattheWaffen-SSsoldiers’perceptionofwarandsocietywasquitepossiblyadistortionofreality.AftertheinvasionofRussiaideologicalindoctrinationwasusedintheWaffen-SSinanattempttoincreasethecombateffectivenessofthetroops(Wegner,1990).Anincreaseinindoctrinationin1943wasalsocoupledwith“Hitler’sdeclarationoftotalwar…toreinforcethemotivationoffront-linetroopstofighttheSlavandJewishsubhumansintheEast…theywerelockedinalifeordeathstrugglewiththeirenemies”(Ripley,2003:272;Wegner,1990).Membersofthe10thSSPanzerDivisionFrundsbergwereinstructedonbeingmembersoftheGermanVolkwhowereinvolvedinacontinuingstruggleagainstinternal(theJews)andexternalenemies(theRussians)inanefforttoallowtheFührerto“…achievethehistoricunityofallGermans”(Wegner,1990:206).

OfimportancehereisthattheideologicalinstructiongiventothesoldiersincludedbothinternalandexternalenemiesoftheReich.TheSSnewspaper,theDasSchwarzeKorps,regularlyranstoriesthatraciallyvilifiedtheJewsandotherundesirables;“…itlabelssuchJews,degeneratesubhumans.AnotherarticleclassifiedtheJewsinPolishghettosasdirtylousyEasternJewsandcommentedabouttheirskinnylegsandpimpledfaces”(Combs,1986:130).IntheirstudyoftheWaffen-SSKrenandRappoportfoundthattheWaffen-SSsoldierstypicallybelievedtheideologicalmessagesthatweregiventothemwiththeresultthattheyhad“…nodifficultyinperformingactsthatwouldberegardedas

barbaricandatrociousbyregulararmies”(Krenetal.,1976:95).AsoneDanishvolunteerintheWaffen-SSsaidinalettertohome;“Yes,we’lleradicatetheseJewsfromthesurfaceoftheearth,becausewhilethereareJews,thereisalsowar.Now,IcanimaginetherearesomewhowouldsaythattheJewsarehumanstoo.Myanswerwouldbethatratsarealsoanimals”(Christensenetal.,2003:22).ThisletterservestoillustratetheattitudeheldbymanyintheWaffen-SS.

Inthisconflictthemilitaryactionsofgainingadditionallivingspaceandthepoliceandpoliticalactionsresultingintheexterminationofracialinferiorswereseenasdifferentaspectsofthesamewar.Thisexterminationwasmadepossiblebytheideologythatwasheldandbelievedatthetime.Thepost-warcommentsofaveteranofthe5thWaffen-SSPanzerDivisionWikingshowhowtheproblemwasBolshevismandthecausewastheJew.ThiswasaconnectionacceptedbymanyGermansoldiers:

JewishBolshevism,yousee,thatwasthebigenemy…andthesewerethepeopletofightagainstbecausetheymeantathreattoEurope,accordingtotheviewatthetime…andtheJewsweresimplyregardedastheleadershipclassorasthosewhowerefirmlyincontroloverthereintheSovietUnion(Rees,1999:51)

ThisviewisonethatcanbeattributedtotheworldviewheldingeneralbySSmenwhoattributed“…atleastfourtypicalcharacteristicstotheirJewishvictims.Theywereseenascommunists,dangerous,spreadersofdiseaseandinsolent”(Lozowick,1987:230).EvenwhengivingevidenceintheEinsatzgruppentrial,SSofficerOttoOhlendorfattemptedtoarguethatJewsandcommunistsweresynonymouswitheachother.OhlendorfwasalawyerwhowasplacedinchargeofEinsatzgruppeD,whichwasattachedtotheGerman11thArmyinRussia:

ItwasobviousthatthenumberofJewsinthegeneralpopulationinRussia,inrelationtotheirnumberinthehigheradministration,wasvery,verysmall.TheprosecutionhassubmittedareportfrommyEinsatzgruppetothearmy.InthisreportinenclosureNo.2itexplainedthesituationofJewryintheCrimea.Unfortunately,thisenclosurewasnotavailable.ItwouldhaveshownthatintheCrimea,forexample,upto90percentoftheadministrativeandleadingauthoritativepositionswereoccupiedbyJews…ForusitwasobviousthatJewryinBolshevistRussiaactuallyplayedadisproportionatelyimportantrole.ThreetimesIwaspresentduringexecutions.EverytimeIfoundthesamefactswhichIconsideredwithgreatrespect,thattheJewswhowereexecutedwenttotheirdeathsingingthe“International”andhailingStalin.ThattheCommunistfunctionariesandtheactiveleadersoftheCommunistsintheoccupiedareaofRussiaposedanactualcontinuousdangerfortheGermanoccupationthedocumentsoftheprosecutionhaveshown.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:248)

SonotonlyweretheJewsinvolvedinBolshevism,theyweretheleadershipclassofitaccordingtotheSSmentality.ThismentalitywasreflectedinanSSpamphlettitled“Bolshevism–JewishSubhumanity”,whichwasmadeavailabletoSSofficersItstated,“Themaskisoff.Behinditvisibletoall,standstheeternalJew.RightlyonedoesnotviewBolshevismasamanifestationofthemodernperiod.ItisinsteadtheproductofJewishthought…”(PruessPublishing,2005:12).

JustpriortotheinvasionofRussiamenoftheSSWikingdivisionwereissuedaninstructionwhich:…warnedthesoldiersthatfightingintheEastwasdifferent,andthatallkindsofundercoverattacksandhostilitiescouldbeexpectedfromenemyciviliansandPOW.Thereforecautionandquickandruthlessuseofweaponswasthebestwayofpreventingsuchevents.(Smithetal.,1999:87)

ThisclearlyimpliedthattheexecutionofPOWsandsuspectcivilianswouldbetoleratedandinfactencouraged.Certainly,ashaspreviouslybeendiscussed,theNaziswereverysuccessfulinportrayingtheRussiansasanenemytobedespised.InparticularHitlerwasadeptatentwininghisantiJewishandanti-communistidealsaspartofjustifiedmilitarymeasures.TheSSnewspaperDasSchwarzeKorpslinkeditsanti-SemitismandantiBolshevismsocloselythatthetwothemesbecamenearlyinseparable.TheJewsandcommunistswereportrayedasthebackboneofthepartisanactivitybehindthefrontlinesinRussia,whichmeantthatitdidnotrequireNazifiedzealots,merelyconscientiousandpoliticallyobtuseprofessionalsoldierstocarrythemout.

TheRussiansoldierwasdepictedasbeinganevilindividualwhorapedwomenanddestroyedcivilisedsociety.Thiskindofideologicaltrainingorpropagandaallowedsoldierstobe“…reassuredthattheenemywastooeviltowarrantsurvival”(Bourke,1999:217).ManyGermansoldiersbelievedthistypeofpropaganda.TheWaffen-SSsoldierswerefedacontinualdietofindoctrinationinrelationtotheRussiansthroughtheformoftraining,leafletsandregularpublications.Theresultofthisbeingthat;“Whentheenemyisregardedasarepulsiveandevilanimal,anuntermensch,asubhuman,theresultisanunmatchedbrutalisationofwarfare,forthesoldierisgenerallysetfreefromfeelingsofguiltorremorseforhisgrislydeeds”(Stein,1966:128).WhenBach-Zelewski,Waffen-SSGeneralandformanyyearsamemberoftheNaziParty,wasaskedtoexplainthephenomenonoftheEinsatzgruppenkillings,hereplied“Iamoftheopinionthatwhen,foryears,decades,thedoctrineispreachedthattheSlavraceisaninferiorrace,andJewsnotevenhuman,thensuchanoutcomeisinevitable.”(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:474).SosuccessfulwasthisindoctrinationthattheaverageGermansoldiercontinuedtofightvigorouslyupuntiltheendofthewarinaneffortto“…defendhearthandhomeagainstthebarbariansfromtheEast”,eventhoughallhopeofvictorywasgone(Strachan,2000:356).Bartov(1997)andotherauthorsalsocommentontheremarkableabilityoftheGermanforcestokeepfightingtotheend.ThemenoftheWaffen-SSweretenaciousinthedefenceoftheReichtotheenddueinnosmallparttothefactthattheyhadbeentaughtandbelievedthattheRussiansoldierswerelittlemorethansubhuman.

ThefactthatGermanforces,inparticulartheOstheer,68wereabletomaintaincohesiontotheveryendhasbeenattributedto“…theviewsharedbyalargenumberofofficersandsoldiersregardingtheirownmissioninthewar,thecharacteroftheenemyconfrontingthem…”(Bartov,1997:333).Inhisexaminationofthe1stSSPanzerCorps,ReynoldsarguesthattheWaffen-SSsoldiersfoughthardontheEasternFrontduetoanumberofreasons,whichincluded:

TheirexperiencesontheEasternFronthadstrengthenedtheresolveoftheGermanmilitarytoprotecttheirhomelandforaslongaspossibleandatwhatevercost.Stories

circulatingatthetimeconcerningthefateofGermanciviliansintheterritoriescapturedbytheRussianswereofcourseexploitedbyJosephGoebbelsanddidmuchtostrengthentheresolveofboththosewhohadexperiencedtheEasternFrontandtheyoungermembersoftheCorpswhohadyettoseebattle.(Reynolds,1999:39)

WheninterviewedafterthewarGermanGeneralTippelskirchobservedthat,“OurinfantrylosttheirfearoftheRussianinfantryin1941,buttheyremainedfearfulofbeingtakenprisoner–andsenttoSiberiaorworse.Thisfearhelpedtostiffentheirresistance…”(LiddellHart,1975:221).

NotalloftheWaffen-SSsoldierswerehappytodiethehero’sdeath,however.InNovember1944reportsfromthe18thSSHorstWesselDivisiondescribemanyoftheconscriptedsoldiersfleeingorsurrenderingtotheRussians,withthedivisionhavinglittlecombatvalue.OtherSSDivisionsalsoshowedsignsofdisintegration.ThecommanderoftheGermanArmyGroupSouth,Colonel-GeneralFriessner,hadthistosay;“Inthe4thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionsomecommandershaveshotthemselvesbecausetheirsoldiershadrunaway.The18thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionhasbeenatotalfailure”(Ungvary,2005:18).ThisillustratesthefactthatbytheendofthewarsomeoftheSSDivisionhadverylimitedcombatcapabilities,perhapsinpartduetothedilutionoftheelitequalitiesthattheypossessedatthebeginningofthewar.WhileunitssuchastheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerkeptthecohesionandcombatabilitytotheend,someoftheWaffenSSunitsformedtowardstheendofthewarwereoflittleifanycombatvalue,especiallywhenitisconsideredthatmanyofthepersonnelfortheseunitshadbeenconscriptedintotheranks.

None-the-less,manyoftheSSDivisionscontinuedtofightinacompetentmannerandcommitatrocitiesuptotheveryendandpastthepointwhenitshouldhavebeenobvioustoallinvolvedthattheconflictcouldnotpossiblybewonbyGermany.ThecohesionoftheWaffen-SScanbeseentorelyontwomainfactors.ThefirstfactorbeingthefaithintheHitlerasaleaderwhowouldleadGermanytovictorydespitetheoddsthatGermanyfaced.IndeedafterthewarwhenspeakingtoWaffen-SSveterans,Steinerclaimedthatonlyahandfuloutofsome300claimednottobeaffectedbythecharismaofHitler(J.Steiner,1963).AslateasMarch1945one-thirdofGermanprisonerstakenstillmaintainedconfidenceintheabilitiesofHitler(Shills&Janowitz,1948).

ManyseniorWaffen-SScommandersoutlinedhowthemoraleofthemenwasgoodevenintheclosingstagesofthewar.Waffen-SSColonel,SS-StandartenführerAdolfAxcommandedthe32ndSSGrenadierDivisionJanuarandwasalsothechiefofstaffofthe16thSSCorps(A.Munoz,2001;Westwood,2001).Axhadthefollowingtosayaboutthe15thSSLatvianGrenadierDivisioninearly1945:“Thepersonnelofthedivisionwasofexcellentcalibre.Healthwasgenerallygood,moralewashigh…”(Ax,1947:8).SS-GruppenführerKarlBrenner,commanderofthe6thSSMountainDivisionNord,describedhismenasfollowsinlate1944;“Moraleandfightingspiritswereoutstanding,causedbythesuccessfulbattlesagainsttheRussiansandtheFinns”(Brenner,1947a:5).

ThecommentsofWaffen-SSsoldier,JanMunk,duringtheformationofthe38thWaffen-SSDivisionNibelungeninApril1945givesinsightintohowsoldiersstillbelievedintheultimatevictorydespitethesituationtheyfoundthemselvesin:“IwasgivenacompanyofVolkssturm69personnel–boysandoldmen–whowerethentrainedmostlyintheuseof

thenewpanzerfaust70…Wehadnomaterialsandmoraleintherankswaspoor.Iwas,however,stillconvincedthatGermanywouldwinthewar”(Williamson,1995:124).ThisfanaticismandbeliefintheleaderandthefinalvictoryallowedSSsoldiersofthisdivisiontojustifyactsliketheexecutionof16GermansoldierswhohaddesertedtheirpostsinMarch194571(Ruteretal.,2004:Vol4).ThistypeofblindbeliefisechoedbyWilhelmTieke,aWaffen-SSofficerwhointhelastdaysofthewarservedinSSPanzerBrigadeWestfalen.Hehadthistosayastowhyhekeptfighting:

Itwasacombinationofyouthfulidealism,ofblindtrustintheleadership,asenseofduty,theexecutionofanoath,thefearofdraconianpunishmentandabeliefinfinalvictorythroughtheintroductionofnewweapons,whichwerealwayspartofconversation.(Tieke,2004)

InfactGermangeneralsafterthewarwhenaskedaboutthemoraleoftheGermansoldierstatedthat“…theyhadandkeptsuchextraordinaryconfidenceinHitlerthattheyremainedconfidentofvictoryinthefaceofallthefacts”(LiddellHart,1975:257).SSGeneralBach-ZelewskiwaspresentatamilitaryconferenceafterthefailedArdennesoffensive72inearly1945whereHitlerberatedhisgenerals.Herecalledthat“FieldMarshalVonRundstedtthankedhim(Hitler73)forhishardbutjustcriticismandpromisedinthenameofallgeneralspresenttotakeHitler’sinstructionstohearttodohisutmostinthecomingbattles”(Bach-Zelewski,1946:8).

Therewas,however,somecriticismofHitlerfromWaffen-SSofficers.Forexample,duringthesiegeofBudapestinwhichtwoWaffen-SSDivisionsandvariousarmyunitsweresurroundedanddestroyed.OneWaffenSSofficerhadthefollowingtosayinrelationtoHitler’srefusaltoallowthemtobreakoutoftheencirclementandreachtheGermanlines;“NowIknowthatourmenaremeanttobesenttotheslaughterinBudapest”(Ungvary,2005:172).OfnoteisthatdespitethecriticismtheWaffen-SSsoldiersfollowedHitler’sorderstodefendBudapestuntilitwasbeyondallhope,eithertoholdthetown,orberelievedbyotherGermanforces.

ThesecondreasonthattheWaffen-SSfoughtonuntiltheendoftheconflictwas“…extremedehumanisationanddemonisationoftheenemy,aprocesswhichterrorisedthetroopstosuchanextentthatanything,includingdeath,seemedtothembetterthenfallingintoSoviethands”(Bartov,1997:336).Indeedafterthehardwinterof1941-42andtheshockofthefirstRussiancounter-offensive,themoraleofGermantroopstookabattering.However,desertionandsurrenderwerenotviableoptions“…sinceeithermightleadtounspeakabletortureatthehandsofaseeminglyinhumanfoe”(Glantz&House,1995:105).TherealityofthesituationwasthatastheWaffen-SShadembarkedonanideologicalwarthattheywerenowlosing,thisinitselfcreatedafearofwhatthevictorsmightdotothem.

AsthefollowingaccountsillustratetherewasaninordinatefearamongtheWaffen-SSinfallingintothehandsoftheRussians.SS-OberscharführerSollhammeroftheSSLeibstandarteDivisionrecalls:“TheRussiantanksdividedintotwogroups,surroundedusonbothsides,andthenadvancedonourcolumnfromtherear.Withthatwewerehopelesslysurrounded…IsawOberscharführerGratz,OberscharführerBurgstallerandOberscharführerGantiolashootthemselveswiththeirpistols”(Lehmann,1990:310).

Sollhammerlaterheardshots,whichheclaimedtobetheRussiansoldiersshootingsurrenderedWaffen-SSsoldiersinthebackoftheneck.

SS-BrigadeführerOskarHock,chiefmedicalofficerofthe2ndSSPanzerCorps,outlinedhowWaffen-SSwoundedcouldnotbeleftbehind:“WecouldnotriskcapturebytheRussians,knowingtheirtotaldisregardfortheRedCross.ItwasbettertotransporteventhosecasualtiesthatwerenotinaconditiontobetransportedandhavethemdieenroutethantohavethemkilledbytheRussians”(Hock,1947:10).EduardJahnke,oftheDasReichDivision,outlinedtheattitudeheldbysoldiersoftheWaffen-SS:“Wecountedonthefact,especiallywefromtheWaffen-SS,thattheywouldn’ttakeanyprisoners.Thattheywouldstandusupagainstthewall,andsowefoughtuntilthelastbullet”(Halliley,2003).ThisisperhapsbestevidencedbymydiscussioninthepreviouschapterswhereanoticeablenumberofWaffen-SSseniorofficerscommittedsuicide.LargenumbersofWaffen-SSsoldiersinfactchosetocommitsuicideratherthenfallintoRussianhandsduringthesiegeofBudapestin1944(Ungvary,2005).

Thiswasafighttothedeath;surrenderwasnotanoption.ThisfearwassupportedtosomedegreebythediscoveryofmutilatedcorpsesofbothWehrmachtandWaffen-SSsoldiersearlyinthecampaigninRussia,photosofwhichweremadeavailabletothetroops.MembersoftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlercameacrossmurderedGermansoldiersearlyintheconflictonthe3rdofJuly1941:

KurtMeyercameacrossthegruesomesceneofmurderedGermansoldiersforthefirsttime.Theirhandshadbeentiedandtheywereallnaked.Theofficerswhowerenearbyhadalsobeentrampledonanddismembered.TheLAH’sofficialhistorystatedthatDietrichstrictlyforbadeanyreprisals.(Mooney,2004:63)

SS-BrigadeführerOskarHockrecalledeventsin1941:“TheRussianshadgainedcontroloftheonlysupplylineandevacuationroute…theRussiansattackedsmallgroupsofvehiclesinparticular.Evensingleambulanceswithwoundedwereforcedtostopafterdriverandassistantwereshot.Attimesthewoundedwereshotandsometimesleftlyingontheroad”(Hock,1947:6).ThisfearoftheenemywasnotlimitedtotheGermanside.AveteranoftheartilleryregimentoftheSSLeibstandartedivisionrecallshowuponwipingouttheRussian962ndrifleregiment,“…theregimentalcommanderandmostoftheofficershadshotthemselvesalready”(Fischer,2004:51).MaxSimon,SS-GruppenführerandofficerintheTotenkopfDivision,hadthistosayastothefinalityoftheconflict:

…theRussianinfantrymanalwaysfightstothelast,eachmaninhisfoxhole.Tankcrewswhosetankswereburningcontinuedfiringwitheveryavailablegunaslongastherewaslifeinthem.Oursuccesswasneversecureuntilwecouldbesurethatnolivingenemywasleftintheposition.Evenwoundedwhohadlostconsciousnesspickeduptheirweaponsagainassoonastheyrecoveredtheirsenses.(Simon,1949:15)

IwouldarguethatthefactorsthatenabledthesekillingsbytheWaffenSSincludethedemandsofauthority,thatbeingthecommandelementsoftheWaffen-SS.Thepredispositionofthekiller,thatbeingthesoldiersoftheWaffen-SS.Thedistancefromvictim,targetattractivenessofvictimandgroupabsolutionattainedbythedevaluingofthetargetgroups.Theissueofdistanceplaysagreaterroleinconflictsofthiscenturygiventheadvancessocietyhasmadeinthetechnicalandmechanicalwayinwhichthe

slaughterofsoldiersandcivilianscanbeconductedsomuchmoreefficiently.DuringhisevidenceatNuremberg,EinsatzgruppenCommanderOhlendorfmadecommentoftheimportanceofdistanceincarryingoutevilacts:

OHLENDORF:Someoftheunitleadersdidnotcarryouttheliquidationinthemilitarymanner,butkilledthevictimssinglybyshootingtheminthebackoftheneck.COL.AMEN:Andyouobjectedtothatprocedure?OHLENDORF:Iwasagainstthatprocedure,yes.COL.AMEN:Forwhatreason?OHLENDORF:Becausebothforthevictimsandforthosewhocarriedouttheexecutions,itwas,psychologically,animmenseburdentobear.(TheUnitedNationsWarCrimeCommission,1946:Vol4:320)

Thisperceptionofdistancecanberelatedtobothphysicaldistanceandpsychologicaldistancefromtheenemy.Theconceptofvictimdevaluationasdiscussedpreviouslyensuresadegreeofpsychologicaldistancebetweentheperpetratorandtheiractsofevildoing.Psychologicaldistanceisreferringtotheabilityofthesoldiertoidentifyorempathisewiththeenemy;thegreaterthisconnectionthelessableisthesoldiertohate.Theconverseofcourseistrue;thelessoneseesareflectionoftheselfthemoreoneisreadilyabletocommitactsofevilwithoutassociatedfeelingsofguilt.Thislinksinwiththepreviousdiscussionthatdifferencesinrace,appearanceandculturemakethisconnectionmoredifficultbetweencombatants.Itisthisabilitytoseeanevilenemythatallowssoldierstojustifyandfollowcriminalorders.

Loyaltyismyhonour:Obediencetoevil

Manyatrocitiesarecrimesofobedience,butmanymorearecrimesofagreementandeveninitiative.(Kressel,2002:169)

Theabovequotewouldindicatethatthecommittingofevilactsisinteractional.Thesoldierisnotonlysubjecttothesituation,whichrequiresobedience,buttheyarealsosubjecttotheirownactions.Obedienceisakeyfactorinanydiscussionofevilactscommittedduringwarwherewearedealingwithgroupsofindividuals.TheWaffen-SS,especiallythoseledbyoldpartycomradeslikeJosefSeppDietrich,commanderoftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler,couldbereliedupontodotheirduty,whenarmyunitsmaynothaveprovedasreliable.

Itisperhapsthewillingnessoftheindividualtosubmittothewillofthestateratherthanmoderneffectsofweaponrythathasledtotheexperiencesoftotalwarinthe20thcentury.CertainlyasarguedbyHuffman“…manyWaffen-SStroopsjettisonedtheirhumanity,severingtheiraccountabilityandmorality”(Huffman,2005:23).Guiltwasonlysomethingthatisfeltlater,andoftenthisguiltwasdirectedtowardstheircomrades(i.e.aperceptionofhavingletthemdown,ofafriendgettingkilledandnotthem),ratherthanaguiltforactionstakenagainsttheenemy.ThesoldiersoftheWaffen-SShadinfactbecomemorallyanonymous.This,particularlyinmilitarysituations,cancreatepotentialforpeopletocommitevilacts.

Thewholestructureofmilitaryorganisationsleadstoadiffusionofresponsibilityforevilactionsthatareundertaken.Ordersaregivenandfollowed.Thereareanumberoflinksin

themilitarychainofcommand,eachofwhichfragmentsresponsibilityforthehumanact.Thisresultsinthedilemmathat“…noonemandecidestocarryouttheevilactandisconfrontedwithitsconsequences”(Milgram,1974:11).Baumeistercitesfourprinciplesthatcomeintoplaywhentalkingaboutgroupresponsibilityandthelackofindividualguiltandresponsibility.Theyincludediffusionofresponsibility,deindividuation,anddivisionoflabourandseparationofthedecision-makersfromthosewhocarryouttheacts(Baumeister,1999:325).

ItwasthisdeindividuationalludedtobyBaumeisterthatallowedtheSSsoldiertoreducetheirmoralprohibitiontocommittingevilactsbyrelyingonthegroupmembershipoftheSStorelievethemofthisresponsibility.WhenreferringtotheabilityofthesoldiertohatetheenemyandobeythestateitisimportantforthepurposeofthiscasestudytorememberthattheGermansoldierwasinfluencednotjustbyGermananti-SemitismorNaziindoctrination,butalsothetraditionsofobedienceandidentificationwiththestate,whichcharacterisedGermancultureatleastsincethelate19thcentury.

AhighlevelofobedienceandfanaticismweredemandedbytheSS,andthosethatdidnotmeettheacceptedstandardswereeithernotadmittedoreasedoutoftheorganisation(Staub,1989;J.Steiner,1963).Indeed,inapamphlettitledSS“DefenderagainstBolshevism”,bothloyaltyandobediencearesingledoutasimportantvirtuesfortheSSman(PruessPublishing,2001).TheSSnotonlydemandedstrictobedience,butalsopresentedthesecurityandrefugefoundinsubmergingoneselfinastrongin-group.Thisobediencewasneeded“…becausewithoutit,therewasnoguaranteethatonewouldhavethenecessarydisciplineorthewilltostruggletofulfilthecommandsoftheFühreranddictatesofNationalSocialism”(Hatheway,1999:38).Itwasseenthattheobediencewastobeunconditional“…notuponofficialmatters,butonideologicalmatters”(Krausnicketal.,1965:367).ItwasforthisreasonthatHimmlercouldboastthattheSSman“…hesitatesnotforasingleinstantbutexecutesunquestioninglyanyordercomingfromtheFührer”(Ziegler,1989:4).Theindividualwasfreedofresponsibilityforhimself,theSSmansawhimselfasjustfollowingorders.HebecameatooloftheNaziregime,notonlycarryingouthisorders,butanticipatingthem,byvirtueoftheirsharedideology.

OnJune14th1941SS-ObergruppenführerTheodoreEicke,commanderofthe3rdSSPanzerDivisionTotenkopf,outlinedtohisofficersthattheconflictintheEasthadtobe“…foughtasanideologicalconflict,alifeanddeathstrugglebetweenNationalSocialismandJewish-Bolshevism–afactthatwoulddemandthemostruthlessanduncompromisingconduct”(Sydnor,1990:153).ThesecriminalorderswereusedasabasisformakingitcleartoGermansoldiersthat“Thecommunistwastobeannihilatedusingallmeans–i.e.particularlyillegalones”(Schroder,1997:321).Indeed“…theseriesofdirectiveswhichsurfacedviaOKW,OKHandSScircles…”beforeandshortlyaftertheinvasionleftlittledoubtastotheideologicalnatureofthecomingconflict(Headland,1989:402).

ItwasaresultoftheseordersthatcertainsectionsoftheRussiansocietysuchasCommissarsandJewsweresingledoutfordestructioninordersissuedbyHitlerandtheHighCommand.SS-ObergruppenführerEickeinstructedhisregimentalandbattalioncommandersthatthe“…principalcarriersoftheenemyideology,thepoliticalcommissarsattachedtoRedArmyunits,weretobekilledimmediatelyaftertheircaptureofsurrender,regardlessofthecircumstances”inaccordancewithinstructionsfromthe

Führer(Sydnor,1990:153).AveteranofanSSCalvaryRegimentoutlinedhowtheseillegalorderswererationalised:

WeknewthatBolshevismwastheworldenemynumberone…andweweretoldthattheaim(ofBolshevism)74wastooverrunGermanyandFranceandthewholeofEurope…that’swhywehadtofight…whenwecaughtanyofthem(i.e.Commissars)75theyjusthadtobekilled.(Rees,1999:51).

IndeedtheSSwasheldtogetherbyamouldingofthepersonalityandacommunalsharingofacertainmentaloutlookandacertainmodeoflife.SS-BrigadeführerOttoKummhadthistosayontheattitudeandloyaltyofthesoldiersoftheWaffen-SSandtheircommitmentwhenengagedincombat;“Thisiswhereyouhavebeenplaced,andthisiswhereyouaretostandandifneedbedie.Therewasnomercy”(Halliley,2003).

HissentimentisechoedbySS-StandartenführerLeonDegrellewhoclaimsthat:“RightthroughthewartheWaffen-SSneverretreated.Theywouldratherdiethenretreat”(Degrelle,1983:32).InrealitytheWaffen-SSdidretreat.WhenwholeGermanarmiesweresmashedbytheRussianstheWaffen-SSdivisionshadlittlechoicebuttoretirewiththeGermanArmyunits.WhatthesecommentsdohighlightisthefanaticalzealwithwhichsomeWaffen-SScommanderswerepreparedtofightfortheNazicause.IndeedasoneauthorpointsoutthatforDanishmembersoftheWaffen-SSwhofelt“…moreorlessimprisonedasvolunteers,thementallyeasiestwayofcopingwiththesituationwasafteralltoidentifythemselveswiththecausetheywerefightingfor”(Smithetal.,1999:89).StaubalsoidentifiedthistypeofbehaviourwithSSsoldierswhoprogressivelyidentifiedwiththesystemtheywerein:

SS-BrigadeführerKumm

TheevolutionoftheSSintoasystemdevotedtomassmurderinthecontextofchangesinthelargersystemofGermany,andlearningthoughparticipation,thepsychologicalconditionofmanySSmemberscametofittheroletheyweretofulfil.(Staub,1989:137)

UndeniablyithasbeenrecognisedthattheSSobeyedtheordersgiventothembytheNazibureaucracy:…becausetheirdeedsdidnotviolateanydeeppersonalvaluesandbecausetheyhadmergedpsychologicallyandsociallywiththeorganisation.Largenumbers,too,identifiedwiththegoalsoftheNaziPartyandmoreimportantthepersonofAdolfHitler.Allprobablyfeltsomeinclinationtoobeyauthoritiesthattheywronglyacceptedaslegitimate.(Kressel,2002:164)

Thereasonforthisobediencecanbeseenthat“…whentheNSDAPandtheSSasitspraetorianguardcametopower,theheretodeviant,butpoliticallysuccessful,newsocialmethodswerelegitimisedandinstitutionalised”(J.Steiner,1963:429).

Onepointworthdiscussingisthatideologybyitselfmaynotbethesoleormaincausewhyasoldierchoosestofightorcommitatrocities(Kellett,1987;Peppers,1974).Ratheraninteractionalapproachisbestusedtoexplainwhyordinarysoldierssuchastheabovecouldcommittheatrocitiesthattheydid.Thesituationalaspectoftheideologicalindoctrinationinconcertwithothersituationalforces(i.e.obediencetoauthority,difficultlifeconditions)andpersonaldispositions(i.e.anti-Semitism,sadism,greed)combinedtoallowactionssuchastheabovetooccur.ThetrainingprogramsoftheSSJunkerschulenweredesignedtoensurethattheWaffen-SSofficercorpswouldbecapableofcarryingout

whateverordersweregiventoit:

Himmler’sarmedSSsoughttoprojecttheimageofadisciplined,highlytrainedracialFührerkorpsofaNewOrder…WithinthiscontextitwasessentialthattheleadershipcorpsofthearmedSSconsistofprofessionallytrainedSSofficerswhowouldhavethephysical,mentalandmoralcouragenecessarytocarryoutwhateverneededtobeaccomplishedinordertofurtherthegoalsoftheNationalSocialistRevolution.(Hatheway,1999:10)

ItwasforthisreasonthatofteninSSreportsciviliansandJewswerereferredtoasbandits,partisans,criminals,etc;itallowedthesoldierstobelievethattheywerekillinglegitimatetargetsthatwereaviablethreattothemwiththeassociatedbenefitsoflesseninganynegativepsychologicalandmoraleIthasbeensuggestedthatsoldierscanoftenovercomefeelingsofpersonalguiltforcombatactionsbycentringtheseactionsonthepremisethattheywereobeyingordersfromalegitimateauthority.Theargumenthasbeenraisedthatperhapsratherthanbeingseenascommittingactsofevil,thesesoldierswereinfactjustfollowingorders.Afterall,generallytheentirecodeoftheGermanmilitary,andespeciallytheSS,emphasisedcomplete,unquestioningobedience.ItwasthisunquestioningobediencethatmanyWaffen-SSveteranswouldarguedictatedthattheyhadtofollowcriminalorders.

Justfollowingorders

Thejustificationforbarbarityinconflictshasoftenbeenthattheissueisresolvedswiftlyanddecisivelyandthisinitselfisamorehumaneact.Thisisoftentheevillogicuponwhichtotalwarsarebasedupon.Somewouldarguethatevilisanecessarypartofwarfare.Butdoesthispropositionentailthattoensurevictoryoneneedstoembraceevilandembarkuponwarfarewithoutrestraint?Doesoneneedtounquestioninglyfollowordersthatareobviouslyevil?Ifonecommonthemecomesoutoftheepisodesofhistoryitistheconceptoftotalwar,whichsoofteninrecentdecadeshasledtothecommittingofevilactsinthenameofwar.

Thistargetingofcivilianscontravenesacceptedwarconventionsandmovestheconflictintotheboundsofevilacts.JudgeParkerhighlightedthislinkbetweenwarcrimesandtotalwarinhisjudgmentofthemajorwarcriminalsbeforetheIMT:

Thetruthremainsthatwarcrimeswerecommittedonavastscale…byeveryconceivablecircumstanceofcrueltyandhorror.TherecanbenodoubtthatthemajorityofthemarosefromtheNaziconceptionof“totalwar”,withwhichtheaggressivewarswerewaged.Forinthisconceptionof“totalwar”,themoralideasunderlyingtheconventionswhichseektomakewarmorehumanearenolongerregardedashavingforceorvalidity.Everythingismadesubordinatetotheovermasteringdictatesofwar.Rules,regulations,assurancesandtreatiesallalikeareofnomoment,andso,freedfromtherestraininginfluenceofinternationallaw,theaggressivewarisconductedbytheNazileadersinthemostbarbaricway.Accordingly,warcrimeswerecommittedwhenandwherevertheFührerandhiscloseassociatesthoughtthemtobeadvantageous.Theywereforthemostparttheresultofcoldandcriminalcalculation.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol1:227)

Intotalwartheciviliannationisexposedtoattack.Asaresultofthisthewholenationis

mobilisedforwarfare.Forexample,duringtheconflictontheEasternFronttheRussians’abilitytouseciviliangroupstoformpartisangroupsbecameaseriousproblemfortheGermanforces.Asaresultmopping-upoperationswereconductedtoeradicatesuspectedpartisangroups.ThisnotionofpartisangroupsorbanditswasaloosedefinitionthatincludedunwantedelementsofsocietysuchasJewsandintellectualsandgavetheGermanstheexcusetotargetciviliansaswellasthemilitaryduringtheconflict.

IntheareaofthePripetMarshesthe1stand2ndSSCalvaryRegiments76conductedmopping-uporpacificationoperations(Wilson,2000).TheseregimentswerecombinedtoformtheSSCavalryBrigadeinAugust1941andanswereddirectlytoHimmler’sstaff(Benderetal.,1972;Buchler,1986;Trang,2000).ThebrigadecameunderthecontrolofWaffen-SSGeneral,SS-GruppenführerHermannFegelein,wholatermarriedGretlBraun(sisterofHitler’smistressEvaBraun).Inthelastdaysofthewarin1945HitlerhadFegeleinarrestedandshotasascapegoatforHimmler’sdisloyalconduct.Onthe12thofAugust1941SS-SturmbannführerMagillofthe2ndregimentreportedthat:

Jewishmarauderswereshot.OnlyafewmanuallabourersemployedbytheWehrmachtrepairshopswerespared.Drivingthewomenandchildrentowardsthemarshesdidnothavethedesiredeffectasthemarsheswerenotdeepenoughtoensuredrowning…ThetotalnumberofmaraudersandothersshotbythereitendeAbteilungstandsat6526men.About10prisonersweretakenaway…Overall,theoperationmaybedescribedasasuccess.(Trang,2000:32).

SS-GruppenführerFegelein

Magillwentontoserveinthe14thGaliciaGrenadierDivision(Westwood,2001).HewaslaterconvictedbyaGermancourt77ofthemassshootingofthousandsofJewsinthePripetarea,amongthematleast4500JewsfromthePinskghetto(Ruteretal.,2004).Hewassentencedtofiveyears’imprisonmentwiththreeotherSSsoldiers.

ItwasperhapsominousthatoverdinnerinAugust1942HitlerlikenedthefightagainstthepartisansinRussiatotheAmericanIndianconflict;“Thestrugglewearewaging

againstthepartisansisverymuchlikethestruggleinNorthAmericaagainsttheRedIndians.Victorywillgotothestrong,andstrengthisonourside.Atallcostswewillestablishlawandorderthere”(Trevor-Roper,2000:621).Whenoneconsidersthisitisclearthattheendinanyconflictisvictory.Doesthisthenjustifythecontentionthatvictorymustbeachievedbyanymeans?ThiswasthelogicusedbytheGermanArmyontheEasternFront.ItsCommanderinChief,VonBrauchitsch,arguedthatinthefightagainstpartisangroups“…theessentialrapidpacificationofthecountrycanbeachievedonlyifeverythreatonthepartofthehostilecivilianpopulationisdealtwithruthlessly.Allpityandsoftnessareweaknessandconstituteadanger”(Forster,1985:313).Theaboveexamplesgiverisetotheclaimofmilitarynecessity.Militarynecessitybeingthepursuitofstrategicortacticaladvantage/disadvantagethatcanallow“…destructiveintereststocometotheforetothedetrimentofindividualprotection”(Streim,1997:305).Theproblemofjustificationrethemilitaryactionariseswhentheuseofsuchtactics,ifcarriedtoanextreme,aredisproportionatetothemilitaryresultsobtained.Strictlyspeakingtheprincipleofmilitarynecessityoutlawsuselessviolence.ThejudgmentoftheNurembergTrialsmadeitclearthat“…egregiouslyharmfulactionsthatarenotjustifiedbymilitarynecessity…”weretobeseenaswarcrimes(Wilkins,2001:51).

DuringtheconflictontheEasternFronttheGermanforcesresortedtobrutaltactics,whichweremorethanameanstoanends,butrathertheonlywaytoconductthestruggle.Afterall,giventheimpressiveearlyvictoriesoftheGermansusingtheirtraditionalmilitarydoctrines,itwashardlyanecessarymilitarymeasureforthemtokillRussianprisonersorallowtheEinsatzgruppentorampagebehindthefrontlines.ThistypeofactionwasnotnecessaryforsuccessintheWesterncampaign,sowhyweretheyintheEasterncampaign?IntheEasttheaimoftheconflictwasthetotaldestructionoftheenemy.

WhenHitlerinvadedRussiahewasnotofamindtoonlygosofarthenseekpoliticalfinalisationtotheconflict.Thismighthaveleftthecommunistregimeintact.Rather,hewasintentonthedestructionofthecommunistsystemofgovernmentandtheperceivedcauseofthissystem,theJews,andanationthatwasraciallyabhorrenttohim.HitlerclearlyoutlinedwhatheexpectedfromtheconflictintheEast:

St.Petersburgmustthereforedisappearutterlyfromtheearth’ssurface.Moscowtoo…ItisnotbytakingoverthemiserableRussianhovelsthatweshallestablishourselvesasmastersintheEast…Asfortheridiculous100millionSlavs,wewillmouldthebestofthemtotheshapethatsuitsusandwewillisolatetherestofthemintheirpigsties;andanyonewhotalksaboutcherishingthelocalinhabitantandcivilisinghim,goesstraightoffintoaconcentration-camp.(Trevor-Roper,2000:617)

Thisquotereinforcesthecontentionthatthetotalwarconceptnotonlyappliestotheapplicationofforcetotheenemy,butalsotothenotionofblindobedienceofthecitizensofthenationconductingthewar.IndeedHitlerwaswellawarethatthewarontheEasternFrontwouldentailthemassslaughterofJewsandCommunists:moreover,hewasnottheonlyGermanwhoknewit.

ManysoldiersoftheWaffen-SSreliedontheclaimthattheywerejustfollowingordersandassuchshouldnotbeheldliablefortheiractions.Foranydefenceofsuperiororderstosucceedthedefendantmustprovetwoparts;firstthattheorderswereactedonunder

duress,andsecondthatthepersoncarryingouttheorderwasignorantoftheirillegality.ThatmembersoftheWaffen-SSwereawareoftheillegalityoftheorderstheywerefollowingwouldseemtobeconfirmedbythecommentsofWikingDivisionveteran,HendrikVerton,whoclaimed:

ThetenpledgesinthepaybookofeveryGermansoldiergaveverystrictguidelinesoverourtreatmentofprisoners.Forinstancenumber3.Itisanoffencetokillprisonerswhohavesurrendered,includingpartisansorspies.4.Prisonersarenottobeabusedormishandled.6.Woundedprisonersaretobehumanelytreated.(Verton,2007:111)

TheillegalityofmanyoftheordersthattheWaffen-SSexecutedwouldseemtobebeyondargument,soitisworthexaminingtheissueofduressandfollowingsuperiororders.AtNuremberg,ChiefSSJudgeGuntherReineckeclaimedthattherewasnolatitudeformembersoftheWaffen-SStoavoidthetaskstheyundertookwhenquestionedbythedefencecounselfortheSS.

HERRPELCKMAN:WasitpossibleformembersoftheWaffen-SStoleavetheWaffen-SSiftheydidnotagreewiththetaskswhichtheyweregivenortheorderswhichwereissued?REINECKE:Apossibilityofthissortdidnotexistatall.ServiceintheWaffen-SSwasmilitaryservice,legallyestablishedandlegallyrecognised.EvenmembersoftheWaffen-SSwhohadjoinedasvolunteerswerelatersubjecttogeneralconscriptionandboundbycompulsorymilitaryservice.ItwasthereforepossibletoleavetheWaffen-SSonlybymeansofdesertion,andthenthedeserterwouldhavehadtoexpectthefullconsequencesofthelaw.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol20:445)

SS-GruppenführerOttoOhlendorfputthissamepropositionforwardduringtheEinsatzgruppentrial:Iwouldliketosaythefollowing:Themenofmygroupwhoareunderindictmentherewereundermymilitarycommand.Iftheyhadnotexecutedtheorderswhichtheyweregiven,theywouldhavebeenorderedbymetoexecutethem.Iftheyhadrefusedtoexecutetheorderstheywouldhavehadtobecalledtoaccountforitbyme.Therecouldbenodoubtaboutit.Whoeverrefusedanythinginthefrontlineswouldhavemetimmediatedeath.Iftherefusalwouldhavecomeaboutinanyotherway,acourtmartialoftheHigherSSandPoliceLeaderwouldhavebroughtaboutthesameconsequences.Thejurisdictionofcourtsmartialwasgreat,butthesentencesoftheSSweregruesome.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:249)

WhenaskedagainabouttheissueoffollowingordersOhlendorfstatedthefollowing:DR.ASCHENAUER.TheconcludingquestionconcerningthesetofquestionsconcerningRussia—Whatwasyourpowerofdecisionconcerningexecutionorders?OHLENDORF.IdonotthinkIhavetorepeatthis.Astotheordersforexecution,evenifapplyingtheharsheststandard,Ihadnopossibilitywhatevertocircumventthem.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:267)

Onthefaceofitthepropositionthatsoldierswerejustfollowingordersmayappearavalidargument,yetthisisexactlythetypeofcontentionthatthesubjectsinMilgram’sexperimentreliedupon.Thatbeingthattheyweremerelyfollowingthedirectionsofa

legitimateauthority(theexperimentsupervisor)tojustifytheundertakingofwrongfulacts.Theyreliedonthefalseclaimthattheyhadnochoicebuttoactasdirectedbytheexperimenter.TheexceptionhereisthatthosewhojoinedtheWaffen-SS,intheearlyyearsatleast,didsoinavoluntarycapacity.AsnotedbyKressel“…unliketheMilgramsubjects,manyNazissoughtouttheirdestructiveroles,enteringtheparty,attendingralliesandjoiningtheSS”(Kressel,2002:162).MembersoftheSSwereineffectinvolvedinself-selection,withapreferenceformilitaryactivitiesandabeliefinNaziideology(Staub,2002).

Thereiscriticismoftheprincipleofobediencetoordersabsolvingthemenfollowingthem.Gewirth(2001)suggeststhatthosewhogivetheordersareguiltyofprimarycriminality,whilethosewhoobeyordersthattheyknowtobewrongfulhaveasecondaryguiltattachedtothem.OntheEasternFronttheGermansoldierswerenotmerevictimsoftheirownmilitarytradition.TherelationshipbetweentheWaffen-SSandHitlerwithregardtotheSovietUnionwasdeterminedinlargemeasurebyaconsensusonbothideologicalmattersandGermany’sroleinEuropeandworldpolitics.Inotherwords,wehavetheinteractionbetweenthesoldier’sdispositionandthesituationoftheideologicalconflict.

Theargumenthasbeenraisedthatthefailuretofollowordersmayresultinsomeworsepunishmentfortheindividualinvolved.AsthisbookisexaminingtheWaffen-SSasitscasestudyitwillconcentrateonthissituationasitappliesinthiscontextofGermansoldiersduringWorldWarII.TheexampleofthesoldiersinWaffen-SSclearlyrefutesthisthinking.TheywereinvolvedinactualcleansingoperationsontheEasternFront,yetofthosefewwhorefused,nonewereshotoutofhand.WolfgangFiloroftheDasReichDivisionrecountshowhewasorderedtoshootafellowSSsoldierbutrefused:

Today,whensomeonefortheSSsays:“IfIhadn’tdoneit,I’dhavebeenshot”,Isay:that’ssimplynottrue,orelsehehadasuperiorofficerwithnohumanityorcomradeship.Forexample,inOctober1942inStralsund,IwasorderedtotakepartintheexecutionofanNCOintheSS.Iwenttomysuperiorofficerandsaid:“Ivolunteeredtofightatthefront.Idon’twanttoexecuteanyone.”Heaskedme,“Areyourefusingtoobeyanorder?”butheletmego.TwentyothersdidvolunteerthenextdaybecausetheygotabottleofwineandthenextdayweregivenapasstowalkaroundStralsund.(Knopp,2002:253)

ThestoriesoftheSSwouldhaveusbelievethatFilorwouldhavebeenhauledoffandshotforhisrefusal,buthewasnot.EvenEinsatzgruppenofficerOttoOhlendorfwasforcedinhislatertestimonytoadmitunderquestioningfromtheprosecutionthathehadsuccessfullyrefusedordersfromsecuritychiefReinhardHeydrich.

Q.YouwereorderedthreetimestojointheEinsatzgruppen,wereyounot?A.Yes.Q.Andtwiceyourefused?A.Yes.Q.TheorderinthefirstinstancecamefromHeydrich?A.Yes.Q.ThesecondorderforyoutobecomeamemberoftheEinsatzgruppecamefromHeydrich?A.Yes.Q.Yourefusedboththefirstandthesecondorder?A.Yes.

(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:276)

Itisclearthatfew,ifany,Germansoldierswereshotforfailingtoobeyorderstoshootcivilians.InvestigationsbytheCentralOfficeoftheGermanLanderJusticeDepartmentafterthewarshowedthat“…thereisnoknowncasewhererefusaltoshoottheJewsresultedindamagetolifeandlimb”(Birn,1997:283).Whengivingevidenceatvariouspost-warGermantrialsexpert,HansGunterSeraphim,declaredthatthe“…closestscrutinyofallavailableSSrecordsdoesnotrevealonesingleinstancewheresomeobjectortofollowingcriminalordershadendangeredhisownlife”(Wolfson,1965:568).

InhisgraphicaccountoftheHolocaustKlee(Kleeetal.,1988)givesvoicetomanyveteranswhoseaccountsshowthatthedisobedienceofcriminalordersdidnotandwouldnotresultinanykindofdraconianpunishment.Thefollowingarejustsomeoftheresponsesinrelationtotheargumentthatfailuretoobeycriminalorderswouldhaveresultedinterriblepunishment.“IcarriedouttheordersnotbecauseIwasafraidIwouldbepunishedbydeathifIdidn’t…mychancesofpromotionwouldbespoiltorIwouldnotbepromotedatall”(Kleeetal.,1988:79).WhenareservistfromaPolicebattalionrefusedtoshootinnocentvictims,hiscommander;“…calledmeacowardandsissyandthelike…Finallyhesaid‘Heisnotevenworthyofthatkindofduty’,bywhichhewantedtoemphasisemyuselessnessfor‘toughaction”(Kleeetal.,1988:79).WhenaskedaboutwhatdisciplinaryactionwouldbetakenagainstthosewhorefusedtotakepartinthemassexecutionsanSSofficerremarked“Notalot.Ineverknewofsuchacase…”(Kleeetal.,1988:79).

Atop-secretdocumentpreparedfortheSSandPolicecourtsshowedthatbetween1939and1944onlysome1000SSmenwereshotaspunishmentforvariousinfractions(Wolfson,1965).Whenoneconsidersthatupto900,000menservedintheWaffen-SS,thenumberofexecutionsindicatethatlessthan0.1%wereexecutedbytheSScourts.Furthertothis,theSSStatisticalAnnualgavethefiguresinrelationtodischargesfromtheSS.In1938alonesome8033SSmembersweredischargedoutoftheSS.Ofthesesome5104obtainedanhonourabledischargeattheirownrequest(Wolfson,1965).WhatthisshowsisthatitwasentirelypossibletoachieveexitfromtheSSiftheindividualwantedsuch.Some14SSmenweredischargedforrefusaltoobeyorders,theywerenotexecuted.ThesefiguresstronglyrebutthecontentionofthoseSSmemberswhohavearguedthatreleasefromtheSSwouldhaveinvolvedpunishments,reprisalsandpossiblydeath.Indeed,manyoftheWestEuropeanvolunteersfortheSSwereallowedtoreturntotheirhomecountriesattheendoftheirenlistmentperiod,theywerenotforcedtostayintheWaffen-SS.

EvensomeoftheSSdoctorsinvolvedintheeuthanasiaofpatientsinGermanmentalinstitutionswereabletoquittheirhorribletaskwithnomentionofpunishment.Thesalientpointraised,however,isthatmanyofthesoldiersbelievedorclaimedtobelievethattheycouldbeshotandhereliesthejustificationfortheiractions.Eventodaythesameclaimismade,asoneWaffen-SSveteranstatedinarecentdocumentary:

WegrewupasNazis,HitlerYouthofcourse…Iwasenthusiastic,therewasnoopportunityforemployment,butatthattimeIcouldnotseetheconnections.TodayofcourseIcanseeitdifferently.Imustsayweareguilty,veryguilty.Excepttheindividualsoldier,assuchhejustdidhisduty.Andifwehadsaid,“Wedon’twanttodoitanymore”

wewouldhavebeenshotimmediately,theydidthatoftenenough.(Carruthers,2001)

Thisbeliefcanperhapsbeequatedtothesoldiersclaimingthattheyperceivedtheyhadnochoicebuttoconductobjectionableacts.Thisbeliefledmanyofthekillerstotryandmountadefenceundertheguiseofduress.

Forthisdefencetosucceedthesoldiermustbeabletoshowthatthethreattotheirwellbeingmustbeimminent,realandinevitable.Manykillersarguedthattheyheldasincerebeliefandactedinaccordanceofthisbeliefthattofailtoobeyanorderwouldleadtodeath.Thisthinkingfallsintodifficulty,however,ifoneconsidersthatwhile:

…suchfearsunderthetotalitarianNaziregimemightsoundlogical,thereisevidencetoshowthatseveralpolicemendidrefusetoobeysuchrepugnantordersandthattheysufferednopunishment.Indeed,someweresubsequentlypromoted,showingthatneithertheirlivesnortheircareerswerethreatened.Onceitbecameclearthatnoillbefellthosewhorefusedsimilarorders,therewaslittleornoexcuseforthosewhodidobeyandtookpartinthemassacreofinnocentcivilians.(Williamson&Vuksic,2002:14)

ThetestimonyofSS-GruppenführerOttoOhlendorfatNurembergisagoodexampleofthistypeofthinking.Whenquestionedastowhyorderstokillinnocentcivilianswerefollowedhegavethefollowingresponses:

HERRBABEL:Youpersonallywerenotconcernedwiththeexecutionoftheseorders?OHLENDORF:IledtheEinsatzgruppe,andthereforeIhadthetaskofseeinghowtheEinsatzkommandosexecutedtheordersreceived.HERRBABEL:Butdidyouhavenoscruplesinregardtotheexecutionoftheseorders?OHLENDORF:Yes,ofcourse.HERRBABEL:Andhowisitthattheywerecarriedoutregardlessofthesescruples?OHLENDORF:Becausetomeitisinconceivablethatasubordinateleadershouldnotcarryoutordersgivenbytheleadersofthestate.HERRBABEL:Thisisyourownopinion.Butthismusthavebeennotonlyyourpointofview,butalsothepointofviewofthemajorityofthepeopleinvolved.Didn’tsomeofthemenappointedtoexecutetheseordersaskyoutoberelievedofsuchtasks?OHLENDORF:Icannotrememberanyoneconcretecase.IexcludedsomewhomIdidnotconsideremotionallysuitableforexecutingthesetasksandIsentsomeofthemhome.HERRBABEL:Wasthelegalityoftheordersexplainedtothesepeopleunderfalsepretences?OHLENDORF:Idonotunderstandyourquestion;sincetheorderwasissuedbythesuperiorauthorities,thequestionoflegalitycouldnotariseinthemindsoftheseindividuals,fortheyhadswornobediencetothepeoplewhohadissuedtheorders.HERRBABEL:Couldanyindividualexpecttosucceedinevadingtheexecutionoftheseorders?OHLENDORF:No,theresultwouldhavebeenacourtmartialwithacorrespondingsentence.(TheUnitedNationsWarCrimeCommission,1946:Vol4:353)

Thisargumentcanbesoundlyrejected.Ohlendorf’sowntestimonyrefutesthepropositionthatonecoulddonothingbutobeyordersgiven.IthasbeencontendedthatmanyoftheGermanexecutionerswerefullyawarethattheydidnothavetoconductthe

killingsasordered,themensimplyknewthattheydidnothavetokill.Infact“…eveninthearmy,enlistedsoldiersandhighofficersoftencouldavoidparticipationinthemurderofunarmedcivilians”(Zukier,1994:429).Thispropositionissupportedbytestimonyfromkillersthemselvesandalsovariousstudiesofunitsinvolvedinthekillingprocesses(Browning,1998;Goldhagen,1997;Krausnicketal.,1965;Williamsonetal.,2002).Browning(1998)goesontoarguethatthereisaclearlackofevidenceinanyofthepost-wartrialsthatindicatesthatsoldierswereshotforrefusingtoobeyorderstokillunarmedcivilians.

Indeed,formerFederalGermanSeniorChiefStateProsecutorAlfredSpiessconductedadetailedstudyofSSandPolicecrimes.Heoutlinesonecaseinwhichapolicereservistrefusedtocarryouttheshootingsofcivilians;nopunishmentwasgiventothesoldier.SpiesswascuriousaboutthisandspoketoanumberofSSjudgestoseewhyinsituationssuchasthisthesoldierswerenotcourtmartialled.TheSSjudgesstatedthefollowingtohim:

Theexplanationisverysimple.IfthesepeoplehadbeenbroughtbeforeanSSandPolicecourt,itwouldhavetoestablishwhichorderhadbeendisobeyed.Whatsortoforderwasit?InonecaseitwouldhavebeenanorderforthemassmurderofJews,andinanothertheshootingofwomenandchildren.Butthesewerebothcriminalorders,andaccordingtotheMilitaryPenalCode,paragraph47,clause3,whichwasstillvalidinthosedays,asoldierwasnotobligedtocarryoutacriminalorder.Yousee,thatmeantthatthisMilitaryPenalCodewasalsoapplicabletotheSSandPolice,andsowhenamanisbroughtbeforeacourt,thecourthastoascertainiftheorderwascriminalandwhogavetheorder.OnewouldhavefoundthechainofcommandendingupwithHitlerhimself-andthatwassimplyoutofthequestion,wasn’tit?(Mollo,1982:68)

Paragraph47oftheGermanManualofMilitaryLawlimitedthenotionofunconditionalobediencewithtwomoraljustifications.First,thattheorder“…mustbeconfinedtothepursuitofsomemilitaryobjective…”andsecond,“…pursuitofthemilitaryobjectiveisonlyjustifiedifitservessomehighernationalpurposeandifthemilitaryorganisationasawholeformsanintegralpartofawiderstateorganisation.Ifamilitarycommandrunscountertothegeneralstatesystemithasneitherpurposenorjustification…”(Krausnicketal.,1965:306).Thisraisestwoimportantpoints,first,manyoftheordersgivenandobeyedbytheWaffen-SSservednomilitarypurposeandsecond,theWaffen-SSwasnotpartofthegeneralstateapparatus.Itwasdesignedtoserveideologicalandextra-statepoliticalpurposes.

IfoneexaminesOhlendorf’sresponsescarefullyhehimselfadmitsthatheallowedsoldierswhofoundthetaskunsuitableorwhowereincapableofperformingthetasktoreturnhome,withnomentionofanyformofpunishment.ThejudgesoftheEinsatzgruppencasealsonotedthisfactandintheirjudgementstated:

OnemayaccusetheNazimilitaryhierarchyofcruelty,evensadismifonewill.Butitmaynotbelightlychargedwithinefficiency.IfanyoftheseKommandoleadershadstatedthattheywereconstitutionallyunabletoperformthiscold-bloodedslaughterofhumanbeings,itisnotunreasonabletoassumethattheywouldhavebeenassignedtootherduties,notoutofsympathyorforhumanitarianreasons,butforefficiency’ssakealone.InfactOhlendorfhimselfdeclaredonthisverysubject—“IntwoandahalfyearsIhad

sufficientoccasiontoseehowmanyofmyGruppe[group]didnotagreetothisorderintheirinneropinion.Thus,Iforbadetheparticipationintheseexecutionsonthepartofsomeofthesemen,andIsentsomebacktoGermany.”Ohlendorfhimselfcouldhavegotoutofhisexecutionassignmentbyrefusingcooperationwiththearmy.HetestifiedthattheChiefofStaffinthefieldsaidtohimthatifhe,Ohlendorf,didnotcooperate,hewouldaskforhisdismissalinBerlin.(TheUnitedNationsWarCrimeCommission,1946:Vol4:481)

ThejudgesrejectedtheSSdefencepropositionthatthesoldierswerefollowingsuperiorordersunderduress.

DuringakillingactionundertakeninoccupiedRussiain1941anumberofOrderPolice“…droppedoutbecausetheypersonallyknewsomeofthe201victimsorcouldnotstandthementalpressure”(Matthaus,1996:136).Nomentionismadeofanyofthesesoldiersbeingdisciplinedorshotforfailuretoparticipateintheshootings.FieldMarshalVonRundstedtandGeneralBlaskowitz,bothseniorcommandersoftheWehrmacht,refusedtoalloworcriticisedthecleansingoperationsbeingundertakeninPoland,yetneitherweremarchedoffandshot(Zukier,1994).DuringtheinitialoccupationofPoland,VonRundstedtforbadeEinsatzgruppentooperateinhisareaofcontrol.Himmlergaveintothisstandagainsthiscleansingactions.BlaskowitzwentsofarastoprepareawrittenlistofatrocitiescommittedbytheSSinPolandandsentsuchtotheFührerdemandingthatactionbetaken.By18November1939theBlaskowitzmemorandumwasonHitler’sdesk.Partofthememorandumrequestedthatexecutionsonlybecarriedoutafterapropercourthaddeliveredasentence.Hitlerrejectedthisnotionoutrightaschildishideasonbehalfofsuchgenerals(Hohne,1969:306).Blaskowitzwasnotdrummedoutthedoorandshot,ratherhewasshortlymovedtotheWesternFront,andPolandwasputunderthecontrolofmorereliablepartyandSSelements.ThisclearlyshowsthatseniorofficersdidandcouldhaveprotestedagainstthecleansingactionsundertakenontheEasternFront,anddonesowithoutthethreatofbeingshot.

Somesoldiersinthe101stPoliceBattalionrefusedtocommitthekillings.Nonewerepunishedforthis(althoughtheywereostracised).OneofficerinfactwastransferredtoasaferassignmentinGermany(Browning,1998).SomemembersoftheOrderPolicewheninvolvedinkillingactionsinoccupiedRussiain1941later“…amongthemselves,raiseddoubtsaboutthelegalityoftheexecution”(Matthaus,1996:136).MatthauscitesanexampleofasmallGendarmedetachmentstationedinoccupiedRussiawhoseactionswereobservedbyaJewishinterpreter.TheGendarmeriewerepartoftheGermanOrderPoliceandisbestdescribedasbeingtheequivalenttoavillagepoliceman.InoccupiedEasternEuropeGendarmeriepersonnelwereusedtosuperviseandcontrolstaticlocalnativepoliceunits.TheunitreferredtobyMatthauswascommandedbyanindividualwhodislikedcarryingoutkillingactionsagainstJews.Assuchhismen“…wereabletoabstainfromparticipatingintheshooting,iftheysodesired”(Matthaus,1996:141).

Thisraisestheissueofinitiative.Initiativetodoornotdotheevilact,thiswasclearlyachoicethatwasavailabletomenoftheWaffen-SSontheEasternFront.ThedistancesweresimplytoovastforthetopNazibureaucratstopersonallyenforcetheirexterminationpolicies.Theyhadtorelyontheirsubordinatestothisontheirowninitiativeonreceiptofgeneralordersinthisregard.SS-GruppenführerOdiloGlobocnikforinstancedecidedto

killalltheJewsinhisarea.LaterhepresentedthisproposaltoHimmlerforapproval(Lower,2002).ThistypeofbehaviourcanbetermedasanticipatoryobedienceThisexampleleadsusbacktotheinteractionalapproachtotheexplanationofevilacts.Intheabovecaseitisclearthatdespitetheirbeingasituationthatwasconducivetoevilactsbeingconducted(thestatehavingauthorisedkillingactionsoftheJews),muchstilldependedontheindividual’sdispositionastohowandiftheactionwasundertaken.IndeedinmilitarytermsonecouldframethepoliciesofHimmlerasastrategicevil(thesituation)andtheactionsofthesubordinatesastacticalevil(thedispositionsandactionsoftheindividual).

ThetestimonyofSS-BrigadeführerFranzSixshowsthattherewasclearscopeforsoldiersoftheWaffen-SStoquestionandtakeresponsibilityevenwheninvolvedinsomeoftheworstactivitiesontheEasternFront.Sixwasconvictedin1948andsentencedto20years’imprisonment,whichwaslatercommutedto10years.Hewasreleasedin1952.SS-BrigadeführerSix,aformeruniversityprofessor,wasattachedtoEinsatzgruppeBascommanderoftheVorkommandoMoscow,whichoperatedaspartofArmyGroupCentrein1941-1942.Sixservedinthe2ndWaffen-SSPanzerDivisionDasReich.HewaslatertransferredtotheForeignOfficeandwentontobecomeheadoftheinformationdepartmentthere(Kleeetal.,1988;MacLean,1999b).HeputspaidtothemyththatmenoftheEinsatzgruppenwerevictimsoftheirsituationswithnochoicebuttoobeyorders:

DuringthewarapersoncouldatleasttrytohavehimselftransferredfromanEinsatzgruppe.Imyselfmanagedtodothissuccessfully…therewerewithoutdoubtcaseswherepeoplewhoweretransferredfromanEinsatzgruppesuffereddisadvantage.Icannolongerrecallanyindividualcases.Nonetheless,asfarasIknow,nobodywasshotasaresult.OnecouldapplytotheRSHA78foratransfertothefrontortobereleasedforserviceinanotherfield.(Kleeetal.,1988:83)

ThetestimonywouldseemtorendertheclaimofReineckeandotherWaffen-SSapologistsofhavingnochoicebuttocommitevilactsasnotbeingtrue.Furthertothis,SS–ObersturmbannführerAlbertHartl,aformerCatholicpriestanduniversitygraduate,wasanofficerattachedtoEinsatzkommandoCgaveevidenceofhowitwaspossibletoavoidcommittingtheseatrocities.ThejudgesintheEinsatzgruppencasemadespecificreferencetoit:

ThewitnessHartltestifiedthatThomas,ChiefofEinsatzgruppeB,declaredthatallthosewhocouldnotreconciletheirconsciencetotheFührerOrder,thatis,peoplewhoweretoosoft,ashesaid,wouldbesentbacktoGermanyorassignedtoothertasks,andthat,infact,hedidsendanumberofpeopleincludingcommandersbacktotheReich.(TheUnitedNationsWarCrimeCommission,1946:Vol4:482)

Thereisacapacitytoquestionordersthatappeartobeimmoral.Howdoesoneshowthattheindividualsoldierdoesindeedbearmoralresponsibilityfortheiractions?Doestheneedtoobeysuperiorordersjustifytheindividualsoldierinsurrenderingorrestrictingtheirpersonalmoraljudgementsandresponsibilities?Thisstudywouldargueno.AclearindicationofhowbankrupttheaboveargumentiscanbeseeninArticle33oftheRomeStatute79:

Superiorordersandprescriptionoflaw1.Thefactthatacrimewithinthejurisdictionof

theCourthasbeencommittedbyapersonpursuanttoanorderofaGovernmentorofasuperior,whethermilitaryorcivilian,shallnotrelievethatpersonofcriminalresponsibility80unless:(a)ThepersonwasunderalegalobligationtoobeyordersoftheGovernmentorthesuperiorinquestion;(b)Thepersondidnotknowthattheorderwasunlawful;and(c)Theorderwasnotmanifestlyunlawful.2.Forthepurposesofthisarticle,orderstocommitgenocideorcrimesagainsthumanityaremanifestlyunlawful.

Thisisunmistakableproofthattheinternationalcommunityexpectssoldierstoexercisemoralresponsibilityandjudgementwheninvolvedincombatduties.WhiletheRomeStatutemaybearelativelynewlegalinstrumentoftheUnitedNations,onecanfindthesameprinciplesoutlinedinmorerelevantlawsofthetime.TakeforexampleArticles43and46oftheHagueConferenceof1907,LawsandCustomsofWaronLand(HagueIV);October18,1907,whichoutlinethedutiesofanoccupyingforce:

Article43.Theauthorityofthelegitimatepowerhavinginfactpassedintothehandsoftheoccupant,thelattershalltakeallthemeasuresinhispowertorestore,andensure,asfaraspossible,publicorderandsafety81,whilerespecting,unlessabsolutelyprevented,thelawsinforceinthecountry.Article46.Familyhonourandrights,thelivesofpersons,andprivateproperty,aswellasreligiousconvictionsandpractice,mustberespected.82

Thepreambletothisconventionclearlyoutlinestheobjectivessoughtbytheconference:…Theseprovisions,thewordingofwhichhasbeeninspiredbythedesiretodiminishtheevilsofwar83,asfarasmilitaryrequirementspermit,areintendedtoserveasageneralruleofconductforthebelligerentsintheirmutualrelationsandintheirrelationswiththeinhabitants.

TheGenevaConventionof1929alsosetouttoensurethatwarfarewasconductedinanorderlymannerandresultedinhumanetreatmentofcombatantsandciviliansalike.AnexampleofthisisArticle2thatdealtwiththetreatmentofprisonersofwar:

Article2.PrisonersofwarareinthepowerofthehostilePower,butnotoftheindividualsorcorpswhohavecapturedthem.Theymustatalltimesbehumanelytreatedandprotected,particularlyagainstactsofviolence,insultsandpubliccuriosity.Measuresofreprisalagainstthemareprohibited.

OfnoteisthatGermanywassignatorytoboththeHagueandGenevaConventionsastotheconductofwarandthelawsandcustomsofwaronland,yetwhenitsuitedthemtheGermansignoredthesetreatiesatwill.TheformationoftheNurembergTrialsattheconclusionofWorldWarIIdemonstratedadecisionbytheAlliesthatindividualofficialsbearpersonalresponsibilityforoutrageousconducttowardstheirowncitizensandforeignersduringwartime.Tostepoutsidetheboundariesofwhatisacceptablemilitaryconductplacesblamefortheactclearlyontheshouldersoftheindividualcommittingtheact.Therecanbenorelianceontheclaimthattheywerejustcarryingoutamilitaryactivitywithnoroomforindividualmoraljudgements.IndeedthewarcrimecategoriesoutlinedatNurembergshowedthatsocietyrequiresindividualobediencetohighermoralprinciplesthanthatofjustfollowingorders.

TheIMTCharteratNurembergdenouncedthedefencesundertheheadsofsuperiororders,commandoflawandactscommittedinthenameofthestate.Theseprincipleswereadoptedbylaterwar-crimetrials(Peppers,1974;Ratner&Abrams,1997).ThejudgesintheEinsatzgruppencasemadethefollowingcommentintheirjudgement:

TheEinsatzbattalionswerenotbeingcalledupontofaceshotandshell.Theywerenotorderedtochargeintothemouthsofcannon.Theywerecalledupontoshootunarmedciviliansstandingovertheirgraves.Nosoldierwouldbedisgracedinaskingtobeexcusedfromsoone-sidedabattle.Nosoldiercouldbeaccusedofcowardiceinseekingrelieffromadutywhichwas,afterall,notasoldier’sduty.Nosoldierorofficerattemptingescapefromsuchataskwouldbepleadingavoidanceofamilitaryobligation.Hewouldsimplyberequestingnottobemadeanassassin.AndiftheleadersoftheEinsatzgruppenhadallindicatedtheirunwillingnesstoplaytheassassin’spart,thisblackpageinGermanhistorywouldnothavebeenwritten.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol4:484)

Perhapsthemostdamningevidencethatthosecommittingatrocitiesknewwhattheyweredoingwaswrongisintheirownreactionstotheactstheyperformed.Perpetratorsofevilactsoftensufferbothphysicallyandmentallyasaresultoftheactionstheyundertake.Itisofinterestthatdespiteclaimsbysomeperpetratorsofatrocitiesthattheyweremerelyfollowingorders,theysufferedenormousside-effectsfromthetraumaofwhattheydid.This,itcouldbeargued,isclearevidencethatdespitewhattheperpetratorsstate,onecanperhapsinfertheirtruestateofmindbytheunconsciousphysicalandpsychologicalreactionstheyhadtotheactstheywerecommitting.Itisofinterestthatofthesome105Waffen-SSarmy,corpsanddivisionalcommandersstudiedbyYerger,some11percentcommittedsuicideattheendofthewar(Yerger,1997,,1999).AnotherfivepercentwereexecutedforwarcrimesontheEasternFront(Yerger,1997,,1999).84Thishighsuicideratecouldperhapsbearguedasaside-effectoftheenormouscrimesthattheWaffen-SScommanderswererequiredtoundertake.

Thereareproblemsassociatedwithcallinguponindividualstoperformevilactions.Thecommittingofatrocitiescanplacethosewhowereinvolvedundermassivepsychologicalstress.ToavoidthisSSofficerOhlendorfofEinsatzgruppenDgaveorders“…forseveralpeopletoshootsimultaneously,inordertoavoidanyindividualhavingtotakedirect,personalresponsibility”(Kleeetal.,1988:60).Indeedthesearchformoreefficientkillingprocedureswasdrivenbytheneedtoincreasethecleansingofthetargetgroupsandalsolessenthepsychologicalimpactonthemendoingthekillings(Lifton,2000;Rhodes,2002).TheconductofthekillingactionsinoccupiedRussiarequiredtheperpetratorstohaveahighlevelofcontactwiththevictimspriortoandwhilethekillingstookplace.Thispsychologicalstrainplacedontheperpetratorswasthusextraordinaryandofanaltogetherdifferentkindthaninsituationsofmilitarycombat.

Evenoneofthemainarchitectsoftheslaughterfounditdifficulttodealwith.InAugust1941HimmlervisitedMinskontheEasternFront,andthererequestedthatmembersofEinsatzgruppenBconductacleansingactionsothathecouldwitnesstheexecutions.Asaresultsome100prisonersweretakentotheoutskirtsofthecityandshot.SS-ObergruppenführerKarlWolff,ageneralonHimmler’sstaff,waspresentandgavethisaccountoftheincidentafterthewar:

ItwasofcourseinevitablethatHimmlerhadalook,andfromtheseshots,shotstothehead,bitsofbrainsspurtedoutandsplatteredinahigharcontohiscoat.Hetrembled,didn’the?Ofcoursehewasnauseatedbywhathesaw.Thenhebegantostaggerandreel.(Halliley,2003)

Himmler’sdoctorwascalledtoattendhim.SodisturbedwashebywhathehadseenthatHimmlersoughtabetterwaytokillthatwouldinvolvelessstressontheperpetratorsandalsobemoreefficient.Theuseofthegaschamberswasseenasonewayofdepersonalisingthekillingsandintroducingtheconceptofdistancebetweenvictimandperpetrator(Lifton,2000;Zukier,1994).Inmoderntimestheincreaseinthetypesofweaponryavailablehaveallowedsoldierstokillfromaconsiderabledistance,thusmakingtheactofkillingquiteimpersonal(Jones,2000).Thishasallowedgovernmentstoutilisethisadvanceintechnology.

TheGermanstookfulladvantageofthisforthepurposeofgenocideintheWorldWarII,althoughthemassbombingofGermancitiesbytheAlliesandtheuseoftheatomicbombsinJapan–ifnotgenocide–atleastdemonstratedawillingnesstoengageinmassslaughterforthepurposeof‘good’against‘evil’.(Jones,2000:83)

Intheconcentration-campsindividualsexperiencedintheperformanceofevilactswereinapositiontosocialiseoradjustnewcomerstothesituationtheyfoundthemselvesin(Darley,1992).However,evenafterthissocialisationprocesshadtakenplacemanyindividualsstillfoundtheactsextremelystressful.BoththeSSdoctorsandthemenofthe101stPoliceBattalionutilisedalcoholasameanstodealwiththestresssuffered(Browning,1998;Lifton,2000).AWehrmachtneuropsychiatristwhotreatedlargenumbersofEinsatzgruppenpersonnelfound“…that20percentofthosedoingtheactualkillingexperiencedthesesymptomsofpsychologicaldecompensation”(Lifton,2000:15).Atapost-wartrialitwasdescribedhowsomemembersoftheEinsatzgruppenrefusedtoobeyorders,becamedrunkandsufferedpsychologicalillnesses.EventheHSSPFforanti-partisanwarfare,Waffen-SSGeneralSS-ObergruppenführerBach-Zelewski,washospitalisedforstress-relatedissuesasaresultoftheexecutionsofJewsthathehaddirected,whileanumberofotherhighSSleadersalsosufferedfrommentalproblems(Headland,1992;Milleretal.,2006;Zukier,1994).HewashospitalisedfromJanuarytoApril1941,whenaskedbyhistreatingdoctorDr.ErnstGrawitzwhyhewasundersuchstrainBach-Zelewskireplied“ThankGodI’mthroughwithit.Don’tyouknowwhat’shappeninginRussia?TheentireJewishpeopleisbeingexterminatedthere!”(Milleretal.,2006:43)

SS-ObersturmbannführerHartlgaveevidenceathispost-wartrialthatmanyofthesoldiersinthekillingunitssufferedarangeofpsychologicalrepercussionsrangingfromimpotencetomentalderangement(MacLean,1999b;Rhodes,2002).Thisevidenceofmentalconflictcanofitselfbeusedtoarguethatmembersofthekillingorganisationswerewellawarethatalthoughtheiractionswereofficiallysanctioned,theywerenotmorallyjustifiable.Indeed,asWallersurmises,“…thisperpetration-inducedtraumaticstressisconsistentwithhowweexpectordinary,psychologicallynormalpeopletoreacttotraumaticeventsoutsidetherealmofordinaryexperience”(Waller,2002:69).Inconclusionitisthecasethatobediencetoordersthat,embodyorcauseevilactstobecommittedisanactoffaith,thatleavestheindividualaccountableandliableforthe

actionscommitted.

TheSSmentality

ThecampaignintheEasthadbegunwithunspeakableharshness.Wewereallfirmlyconvincedofthenecessityofthebattle,allbelievedinourleadersandinourownstrength,andwewereinnodoubtthatwewouldemergevictoriousfromthisconfrontation.(Weidinger,1998:71)

ThesewordsofSS-BrigadeführerOttoKummgivesomeinsightintothementalityoftheWaffen-SSupontheirentryintoRussia.ItshowsthebeliefthatthesoldiersoftheWaffen-SShadintheirownjustificationforthebattle,theanticipatedoutcomeofsuch,andtheirfaithintheNazileadership.Thisviewisreinforcedbythecommentsofasoldierofthe3rdSSTotenkopfPanzerDivision,GeorgKurpiers“WefoughtinthebeliefoftheFührer,VolkandVaterland”(Huffman,2005:30)..Infact,oftheSSmembersstudiedsincethewar,manyhavedisplayedapreferenceformonarchicalordictatorialformsofgovernment,prideintheirmilitaryachievements,andahighvaluationofloyaltyattheexpenseofjusticeorhonour(Dicks,1972;Kressel,2002;Staub,2002;J.Steiner,2000).InterviewswithSSconcentration-campofficersafterthewarshowedthattheywere“…enthusiasticabouttheirroleincreatinganewworldorderandgladtodowhateverwasnecessary…”toachievesuch(Staub,1989:132).ThisisalsoreflectedinastudyofWaffen-SSsoldiers,whichrevealedthatafterthewarthemajorityofthosestudied“…thoughtoftheirmilitarypastwithsatisfaction…”(J.Steiner,1963:442).AsoneveteranoftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerDivisionstated:“Backthenwehadn’ttheslightestdoubtabouttherightnessofourcauseofthecertaintyoftheultimatevictory.Thatwaswhatwegrewupwith–athome,intheschool,andintheHitlerYouth”(Bartov,1992:113).ThisishowmanyoftheSSsoldiersjustifythecommissionofatrocities;theywereanelitewhowerecapableofcarryingoutthesecrimesforthegoodofGermany.

Inessencetheendjustifiedthemeans;thisishowHimmlerconsecratedtheactionstakenbytheSS,eveniftheyinvolvedcriminality.Steinerhadthefollowingtosayofhissubjects,“…evenifthecostshadbeenknownforplayingtheseroles,themajorityoftheWaffen-SS,themilitarybranchoftheSS,wouldhavestillparticipatedandhadnoregrets”(J.Steiner,1963:442).TheWaffen-SSmoralitywasbasedonloyaltytothegroup,thatbeingtheusgroup.Forthoseoutsidethisgroup,thethemgroup,contemptwasheldfortheirrightsandprivileges.Thisloyaltytothegroupcanbereferredbacktomypreviousdiscussionaboutthedevaluingofthevictimandobediencetoorders.

TheWaffen-SSfosteredanespritdecorpsamongtheirtroopsthatenhancedboththeirobediencetoauthorityandalsotheirfightingability.IndeedtheespritdecorpsfosteredbytheWaffen-SSallowedthesoldiertoseehimselfasasoldieroftheFührer.Inapost-warstudyitwasnotedthatthe“…eliteSSdivisions…hadalargerhardcorethatotherdivisionsofthearmy,solargeastoembracealmosttheentiregroupmembership

StandardoftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler

duringmostofthewar–accountedfortheirgreaterfightingeffectiveness”(Shillsetal.,1948:286).Thishardcorebeingpolitically,raciallyandideologicallycommittedtotheNazicause.Tofurtherstrengthenthiscore,officercandidateshadtoservetwoyearsintheenlistedranksbeforeenteringtheJunkerschulen.Thishelpedtomouldabondbetweenenlistedpersonnelandofficers.Thestrengthofthecoreofthesedivisionsallowedthemagainandagaintobeusedwherethefightingwasfiercestwithlittleworryofthemfailingtocarryoutorders.Italsoallowedthedivisionstoberebuilttimeaftertimewhentheyweredestroyedinbattle.AccordingtooneWaffen-SSveterantheformationofthe9thand10thSSPanzerDivisionsinlate1943dependedonthefactthat“…theyoungsoldierswatchedtheirUnterführerandofficersandlistenedtothem,forthese,mostlyoldsoldiersoftheEasternFront,knewRussiaand,withtheirwarexperience,formedthesteelframeworkofthedivisions”(Tieke,1999:19).

NipearguesthattheWaffen-SSwerenotpoliticallymotivatedbutratherfoughtfortheir“…commanderandtheircomrades,politicalidealshavingscarcepracticalvalueinthedailylifeofthesoldier…”(Nipe,1996:268).IndeedithasbeensuggestedthatmanyvolunteersfortheWaffen-SSmaynothavebeendrivenbyaburningideologicalneed,butrathersimplywantedtousetheWaffen-SSforanalternativepathtothemilitary(J.Steiner,1963;Weingartner,1974).ManyveteranssuchasGerdRommel(10thSSPanzerDivisionFrundsberg,alsothesonofFieldMarshalErwinRommel),EduardJanke(11th

PanzergrenadierDivisionNordland),ErwinBartman(1stSSPanzerDivisionLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler)andFreidrich-KarlWacker(16thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionReichsführer-SS)claimtheyjoinedtheWaffen-SSbecauseofitsstatusandfavourableimpressionstheyhadformedbyitspre-warparades,etc(Williamson,1995).

Inapost-warinterviewSS-ObergruppenführerKarlWolff,Himmler’sadjutant,statedthatwhenhejoinedtheSShewastoldthat“WelljustastherewasaneliteguardintheKaiser’stimethereisaneliteguardnowinthenewmovementandthatistheSS,youshouldjointheSS”(Bloomberg,2000).Tosupportthisviewthereisconsiderableevidencethat“SSmemberssawthemselvesasanelite…”(Staub,1989:130).WernerBusse,aveteranoftheFrundsbergDivision,statedthat“Ichoosetovolunteerforthe

Waffen-SSbecauseitwasknowntohaveagreateratmosphereofcomradeshipandalsobecauseitwasaneliteforce,morededicatedtoGermany’scause”(Williamson,1995:22).

WolfgangFilor,aveteranoftheDasReichDivision,sawitasagreathonourtojointheWaffen-SSduetothestringentselectionproceduresinplaceintheearlydaysoftheorganisation.Inessenceonlythebesthumanmaterialwasaccepted(Halliley,2003).Somevolunteers,suchasJohannVoss,recountedhowonhearingoftheWaffen-SSanditsearlywarexploitsandthesupposedpan-EuropeannatureoftheforcefromayoungWaffenSSfriendofhishefelt“…carriedawaybyhisenthusiasmanxioustohearmore…this…versionoftheWaffen-SSanditspan-Europeandimensionhadanewandstrongattraction”(Voss,2002:27).

AtthebeginningofitslifetheSSwasextremelyselectiveaboutwhowasallowedtoenter,withstringentscreeninginplaceinrespecttophysicalabilityandracialbackground(Birn,1991;Keegan,1970;Reitlinger,1957;Wegner,1990;Williamson,1995).Ashasbeenpreviouslynoted,thosejoiningtheWaffen-SScouldscarcelyarguethattheydidnotknowtheywerejoininganorganisationthatwasbasedonracial,ideologicalandpoliticalideals.AsnotedbyStein:

Elitemilitaryformationswithhighstandardsofphysicalselection,aggressiveleadership,andanespritdecorpssuppliedbyeithertraditionorideologicalindoctrinationmakeextremelyformidableadversaries.TheearlySSdivisionspossessedallofthesequalitiesinabundance,andthisfactisthekeytoanunderstandingoftheircombatperformance.(Stein,1966:59).

ThisloyaltymanifesteditselfinthefactthatWaffen-SSsoldierssawthemselvesasaneliteandhadastrongattachmenttotheirunit.ItisofinterestthenthatoneSSveterangivesthefollowinginsightintohowtheywereabletocommitatrocities,“Comradeshipwaseverything.Itgaveusthementalandphysicalstrengthtodowhatothersweretooweaktodo”(Staub,1989:130).SS-ObergruppenführerFelixSteiner,commandedofthe5thWikingDivision,3rdSSPanzerCorps,andattheendofthewarthe11thSSArmy.HegavethisreasoningforthecamaraderieamongtheWaffenSS:

Anextensiveinterestinthewelfareofthetroops,andthecultivationofthefeelingofcomradeshipincreasedthealreadyclosefeelingofunitbetweenalltheranks,andstrengthenedthespiritualunityofthetroops,andtheconfidencebetweenofficersandmen.(F.Steiner,1947:9)

ThisloyaltywasconvertedintoblindobediencetothecriminaldirectivesandordersissuedbyHitlerandexecutedbytheWaffen-SS.Thisloyaltytotheinnergroupisstillreflectedinmemoirswrittentoday.SS-SturmbannführerRalfTiemann,whoservedaschiefoperationsofficerinboththeSSLeibstandarteandDasReichDivisions,hadthistosayoncomradeshipintheWaffen-SS:“Thischronicleshouldservetoquellanydoubtthattothisveryday,despiteallofthedisappointment,demonisationanddefamationofourgreatexperience,thatthereisonethingthatactivelyremainedinus,thecamaraderie.”(Tiemann,1998:7).

TheWaffen-SSwasseenasanelite.TothisendHimmlerandtheSSwenttogreatlengthstopromotethesuccessesoftheWaffen-SSandidolisedthosesoldierswhodisplayedthequalitiesvaluedbytheSSinthefaceoftheenemy.SS-UnterscharführerFritzChristen

wasjustoneofthemenputforwardasanexampleoftheWaffen-SSfightingspirit.Onthe24thofSeptember1941ChristenwasattachedtotheantitankdetachmentoftheTotenkopfDivision,whichwasfightinginRussiaaspartofArmyGroupNorth.Christenwascutofffromhisdivisionandallofhiscomradeswerekilled.Despitethis,whenconfrontedby15enemytanksChristencontinuedtofirehiscannonanddestroyedsixoftheattackingtanks.ChristencontinuedtofighttheRussianskillingsome100Russiansanddestroying13enemytanksoveratwo-dayperiod.HewasawardedtheKnight’sCrossforthisactionandatthatstageofthewarwasthefirstenlistedmanandtheyoungestrecipientoftheawardintheWaffen-SS(Schneider,1993;Simpson,1990).

TheimagepromulgatedbytheWaffen-SSwasthattheywereanelitewhohadtobehardonthosewhostoodinthewayoftheirobjectives,buttheyalsohadtobeharderonthemselves.ForthisreasonHimmleroftenwenttogreatlengthstoemphasisthesacrificethattheSSmenweremakingbycommittingvariousatrocities.InaspeechtoagatheringofSSgeneralsatPosenonthe4thofOctober1943HimmlerhadthistosayabouttheexterminationoftheJews:

ImeantheclearingoutoftheJews,theexterminationoftheJewishrace…Notoneofallthosewhotalkthiswayhaswitnessedit,notoneofthemhasbeenthroughit.Mostofyoumustknowwhatitmeanswhen100corpsesarelyingsidebyside,or500,ora1000.Tohavestuckitoutandatthesametime—apartfromexceptionscausedbyhumanweakness—tohaveremaineddecentfellows,thatiswhathasmadeushard.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:251)

Himmlerattemptedtofortifyhimselfandthosecalledupontoconductthesekillingsbyarguingthatthiswasanonerousdutythatonlythemostloyalanddedicatedcouldbetrustedtoconduct.HowsuccessfulHimmlerwasinthisrespectcanbeseeninthecommentsofanSSsergeantastowhyheengagedinmassexecutions:

ThereasonIdidnotsaytoLeideritz(hiscommander)85thatIcouldnottakepartinthesethingswasthatIwasafraidthatLeideritzandotherswouldthinkthatIwasacoward…IdidnotwantLeideritzorotherpeopletogettheimpressionthatIwasnotashardasanSS-Manoughttohavebeen.(Kleeetal.,1988:78)

In1943soldiersofthe9thSSPanzerDivisionHohenstaufenweretoldtoconductthemselvestothefollowingideals;“Theinneraffirmationofstruggle,alsounderthemostdifficultconditions.Thecouragetofaceuptoeveryeventualitywithoutflinching.Determinationinthefaceofallreverses”(Wegner,1990:207).Amemberofthe4thSSPanzergrenadierPolizeiDivisionwroteinaletterhomedescribingthisdetermination:

Withusnowarethenewreplacementsthathavearrived.Theyareallsplendidyouths.Withdoublethezealweenternowonthetraining.Ifthenthetimeforusiscomingwewillwithfreshstrengthandtheoldfightingspiritsetouttoournewaction.OntheEasternFrontthehardbattleofdestinyragesfurther…weremainhardandkeepunshakablyerectinandthroughthistimeandIamproudaswelltobeanSSofficer.Forusthereisonlyonething:Tofightandtowin.(Huffman,2005:80)

ItwasthisdeterminationandtoughnessthatallowedtheWaffen-SStobesoresilienttotheendofthewar.SS-ObergruppenführerEickeimbuedintheTotenkopfDivisionwith

“…apotentmixtureofintensecommitmenttothepoliticalgoalsofGermany,highunitmoraleandahealthydoseofprideintheirtoughness,whichwascarefullydevelopedinthemenoftheoriginalWaffen-SSdivisions”(Nipe,1996:126).Inanordertothisdivision,SS-ObergruppenführerEickesuccinctlyoutlinedthehardnessthatheexpectedhistroopstodisplayontheEasternFront:

…Officers,NCOsandmen!Youhavehadrichopportunitiesinhardhourstoprovecharacteristicsandphysicalhardness.Icallonyourhearts.Guardthebeliefandthecorpsspirit.Beliefandspiritmovesmountains.Ifyouinthenextweeksfindthingshardtohandle,thenthinkofit,thatthishardnesshasbeenbroughtaboutbywar.Hardnesssavesbloodandeducatestheinnerpsychologicaldiscipline.Butbehindthehardnessbeatsawarmsympatheticheart.Therelivesthecomradeship.Iaskforthefullemploymentofyourstrength,ruthlessnessinpersonandcleareyesforthepoliticalnecessities.WearepoliticalsoldiersoftheFührer.WehavethepassionatebeliefintheFührerandtheunshakablewillfortheFührer.Ifcalledforwearepreparedtogivethehighestsacrifice.Withthisattitudewewillwin.Hunton!(Huffman,2005:93)

SS-ObergruppenführerLotharDebesinstructedthe6thSSDivisionNordtodisplaythefollowingtraitsregardingleadership;“Leadershipandformationsmustbyalltrainingnotonlybeeducatedincombattechniquesandhardship,butalsoincrisistobeversatile”(Debes,1947:36).WikingveteranHendrikVertonrecalledhow:

Becauseofourmilitaryeducationandidealswecouldnotaffordtoweaken,whenconfrontedwithanextremesituationincombat.Wewerenotthreatenedwithacourtmartial.Thecombustionwhichdroveustoselfsacrificewaspsychological.Wetoldourselves“wemustdoitorallislost”.ThatmotivationstoodforemostwithusintheWaffen-SS.(Verton,2007:99)

ThiswasthemuchvauntedhardnessthattheSSplacedsomuchemphasison.Indeed,Himmlerwouldoftenpraisethevirtuesoftoughnessandhardnessindealingwithsubhumansandtherepugnantactsthisinvolvedforthesoldiers.AseriesofSSpamphletsdiscussedSScultureandonewastitled“BeHard!”(PruessPublishing,2004b).AnSScorrespondenthadthistosayinrelationtothemilitaryconflictintheEast;“Therealisationthatonlyahardnessandruthlessnesstowardsone’sownpersonshakenbynothingsolvesthemilitarytask,thisrealisationistheprincipleofthiswar.Wemustbecomeevenharder”(PruessPublishing,2004b:37).TheseidealsreflectedthethinkingofHitlerhimself,hisjustificationforatrocitiesbeing“…shrinkingfromviolenceshowedmoralweakness,whilewillingnesstodestroyshowedmoralstrength”(Victor,1998:91).AfterwitnessingamassexecutionWolffrecallsthatHimmlergavethecommandersoftheexecutionsquadsthefollowingspeech:

Hecouldnotrelievethemofthisduty,hecouldnotsparethemintheinterestsoftheReich,inthisplanned1000yearReich,initsfirstdecisivegreatwarsincethetakeoverofpower.Theymustdotheirduty.(Bloomberg,2000)

IncorrespondencetoWaffen-SSGeneralGottlobBerger,chiefrecruitingofficeroftheWaffen-SS,Himmlerstated,“TheoccupiedterritorieswillbeclearedofJews.TheFührerhaschargedmewithcarryingoutthisverydifficulttask.No-onecanrelievemeoftheresponsibility.Icannotallowmyselftheluxuryofdiscussingit”(Krausnicketal.,

1965:69).SSsoldierswereextolledinSSpamphletsthat“Bolshevismitselfhastaughtusthelessonthattherecanbenohalfmeasuresinthisconflict.Wehavebecomesteelhard…Weknowthatfateisinourhandsandwewillmasterit”(PruessPublishing,2001:40).IndeedSSbureaucrats“…expressedthefeelingthattheyhaddoneanecessarywartimejobwithgreatconscientiousnessandself-sacrifice”(Koehl,1959:123).ThisneedforhardnesscanbeseentospringfromthefactthattheWaffen-SSwerepoliticalsoldiers.Assuchtheywereinvolvedinaneternalstruggle,whichrequiredconstantvigilancetoprotectGermany.Thisvigilancewasnecessarybecausetheenemywasnotclearlydefinedlikethatofapurelymilitarysoldier,theenemycouldbeexternalorinternal.ThedistinctionbetweenpeaceandwarwasagreyoneandcivilianlifeallbutdisappearedfortheSSsoldier.ThiseternalstrugglewouldtakeaharshphysicalformintheconflictinRussia.

Difficultlifeconditions

TheclaimhasbeenmadethatGermanywasmerelyrespondingtothethreatofaRussianinvasion.Hitler’sLuftwaffeadjutant,VonBelow,recalledHitlerstatingthat“HethoughtitwaslikelythatRussiawouldattackfromtheautumnof1941onwards…HitlerstatedthathisdecisiontoinvadetheSovietUnioninthespringof1941wasfinal”(VonBelow,1980:69).SomeWaffen-SSveteransstillclaimtheabove.Forexample,inthepost-warhistoryofthe1stCompanyLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerthisargumentiscontinued;“Canoneattributepeace-lovingintentionstotheSovietUnionwhenithadalreadytransferred100divisionstoitswesternfrontiersinautumn1940,whileontheGermansidetherewereonly35?”(Quassowksi,1999:143).SS-BrigadeführerKarlHerrmannexplainedhowtheinvasionofRussiacametohisknowledge;“Peaceandtranquillity,andthegeneroushospitalityoftheEastPrussianpopulationweresuddenlyandrudelyshatteredbythewell-knownFührerproclamationof21June1941,withitHitleropenedoureyestothenecessityforthiscampaign”(Herrmann,1947:1).

Thistypeofthinkingisimportant.ItclearlyallowedthesoldiersoftheWaffen-SStoseetheRussiansastheaggressorswhiletheycouldenvisagethemselvesastheprotectorsanddefendersoftheReich.ThisinturnallowedthemtoblamethedifficultlifeconditionstheyfacedduringtheconflictontheRussians.ThejudgesoftheIMTrejectedthisargumentofRussianaggression:

ItwascontendedforthedefendantsthattheattackupontheU.S.S.R.,wasjustifiedbecausetheSovietUnionwascontemplatinganattackuponGermanyandmakingpreparationstothatend.Itisimpossibletobelievethatthisviewwaseverhonestlyentertained.(TheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol1:215)

AmeetingbetweentopGermangenerals,HalderandBrauchitsch,beforetheinvasionconcludedthatGermanywouldbebetteroffmaintainingafriendshipwithRussiaandthat“Russianintentions…posednothreat”(Megargee,2000:103).IndeedtheopinionofseniorgeneralssuchasFieldMarshalVonRundstedtwheninterviewedafterthewarwasthattherewasnothreatofoffensiveactionfromRussiaandcertainlyhesawnoevidenceofitashisforcespushedintoRussia(LiddellHart,1975).AstensionsbetweenthetwocountriesincreasedStalinresistedtheurgesofhismilitarychiefstoadoptplansforapre-

emptivestrikeagainstthebuild-upofGermanforces.TheanalysisofColonel-GeneralHalder,chiefofstaffoftheGermanArmy(OKH)86in1941wouldmakeanythreatofattackseemunlikelyas;

SovietpolicyuptothenledHaldertoconsideralargescaleoffensivebytheRedArmyatthebeginningofJune1941tobe“mostimprobable”andheregardedthedeployments(oftheRedArmy)asdefensivemeasures…AsnoaggressiveintentionshadbeenattributedtoStalin,HitlerandhismilitaryleaderswerenotdisturbedbytheabilityoftheRedArmytofightawar.(Forster,1997:128).

ItisgenerallyacceptedbymilitaryhistoriansthatthewarontheEasternFrontwasthesceneoftheworstatrocitiesthatwereseenduringWorldWarII.Itwasawarthatunleashedbarbarityforavarietyofreasonsincluding:

…physicalsurvivalandmentalattrition,casualtiesandcohesion,draconiandisciplineandbrutality,indoctrinationandcriminalpoliciessimultaneouslyconstitutedapartoftheindividualsoldier’sdailyfront-lineexperience,mouldedhisviewsanddirectedhisactions.(Bartov,1997:327)

Theissueofdifficultlifeconditionscanproducetheclimateinwhichmassatrocitiessuchasgenocidearemorelikelytodevelopandtakeplace.Forthisreasonitisnecessarytoseewhatimpactthephysicalfightingconditionsthemselveshadonthepropensityofsoldierstocommitatrocities.Bartov(1997)describesthedemodernisationoftheGermanArmyastheconflictprogressed,wherethearmedforcesbegantosufferfromalackofeffectiveweaponsandamanpowershortage.TodealwiththislackofreplacementsGermaninfantrydivisionswerereducedfromninebattalionstosixbattalions.Theinfantrydivisionin1939hadanominalstrengthof17,734men,whilein1943thenominalstrengthwas12,772men(Healy,1993).Thislackofreplacementsincreasedthestressesoncombatsoldiersas;

…Thesupplysystemreachedbreakingpoint.Themenatthefronthadtomakedowithinadequateclothing,insufficientfoodprovisionsandextremelywretchedaccommodationfacilitiesforlongperiodsoftimeintheheightoftheRussianwinter.Allthesefactorscombinedtocreateanacutesenseofcrisis.Bothphysicalandmentalattritionwerehighlyprevalent,andtheincidenceofillnessandnervousbreakdownsgreatlyincreased.(Bartov,1997:327)

SSGeneralMaxSimonsuccinctlyoutlinedthemanpowerproblemafterthewar,“ItwasabsolutelyimpossibletoreplaceadequatelythecasualtiesoftheEasterncampaign.ThecadresofefficientNCOsofwhomtherehadbeentoofewfromtheoutset,weredecimatedafewmonthsafterthestartofthecampaign,therewasalackofofficersinallcompaniesandbattalions”(Simon,1949:11).Anexampleoftheattritionsufferedisthatinthefirst12monthsofthewarthe4thWaffen-SSPolizeiDivisionlostoverhalfofits14,588men(Pierik,2001).

FromtheveryfirstmonthsinthecampaigntheGermanforcessufferedfromalackofmanpower.BycomparisontheRussians,althoughsorelydepletedafterthelossesof1941,wereabletomobiliseahugereserveofmanpowerandindustrialresources.Indeedthefortunesoftherespectivearmieswerealmosttheconverseofeachother,evenastheGermanArmybeganitsnumericalandqualitativedecline,theSovietArmywasevolving

intoanorganisationtotallyunlikethatofevenayearbefore.Thisdisparitybetweenthetwoforceswasevidencedbythefactthat:

TheRussianarmouredformationswereconstantlyimprovingintermsofthequalityofleadershipandtheuseofarmourinbattle.Germancombatqualitybegantodeclineaftermid1943,duetounreplaceablelossesintrainedandexperiencedmenandofficers,andtheinabilityofGermanytoproducesufficientnumbersoftanksandassaultguns.(Nipe,1996:328).

ThisnumericaladvantageenjoyedbytheRussiansisclearlyevidencedinthemannerinwhichtroopsweresometimesdeployedtoattack.TheRussianmilitarymadeconsiderableuseofthehuman-waveattack,inwhichwavesofsoldierswouldchargetowardstheenemyline.Suchtacticswhilesuccessfulonsomeoccasions,werecallousintheextreme–crueltotheextentthatindividualhumanlivesbecameworthless.Soldiersofthe3rdSSPanzerDivisionTotenkopfwereamazedduringtheinitialfightinginJune1941bythe“…Russianinfantry’scontinuedsuicidalcharges…”(Sydnor,1990:160).Formercommanderofthedivision,MaxSimon,recountedthat“Ifthefirstattackisrepelleditisdefinitelycertainthatasecondwillfollowandathird,fourthandsoon,withouttheslightestchangeinthemethodofattack.Humanlivesplaynorole…”(Simon,1953:11).SS-BrigadeführerKarlHerrmanncommentedontheRussiansoldier;“TheRussiansoldier’sclothingisscanty,andhispersonalequipmentimmaterial.Novalueisplacedonhislife.SincethecasualtyrateisconsideredimmaterialtheRussiansoldierisdrivenwithoutmercyintotheheaviestfire.Oncehehasgivenhislifeheissimplydumpedinahole”(Herrmann,1947:4).

ThedisparitybetweenthetwosidesonlyincreasedastheGermanssufferedareductioninit’slevelofequipmentwhiletheRussians,withhelpfromAmericaandBritainincreaseditsmechanisation(Healy,1993;Jukes,2003).ThissupporthelpedtounderlineathemeespousedbymanyGermansoldiersincludingthoseoftheWaffen-SS.Thethemeessentiallybeingthattheywereengagedinanunequalstruggleagainstabarbaricfoethatwassupportedineverywaybytheotherallynations.AsoneWaffen-SSveteranstated:

Butthewavefromtheeastroseandrose,andcameimplacablycloser.ItwasthrownforwardontensofthousandsofAmericantrucks,andwasfedbymanymillionsoftonsofAmericansupplies.IthadalreadycrushedtheouterbastionsofWesterncivilisationagainsttheEast,anditsculturalmonuments.ThefruitsofNordic-Germaniccolonisers,afterthousandsofyearsofhardwork,andaftersteadfaststruggleagainstthebarbaric,ravagingexpeditionsoftheAsianhordes,hadnowbeendestroyed.(Hillblad,2002:29).

ThislackofmanpowerforcedtheGermanstoutilisetheircombatunitsforlongperiodsinthefrontlineswithoutrest.Thishaddireresults.TheaccountofnumerousGermansoldiershighlightsthattheysufferedcontinuouslyfrom“…nevergettingenoughsleep”(Schroder,1997:314).VeteranoftheSSLeibstandarteDivision,RalfTiemann,describestheeffectofthistypeofcombatinaletterhomefromtheRussianfrontinJuly1943:

Hardweeksliebehindmycompany.Sohard,likeIneverexperiencedbeforeinthiswar…Fordayswewereontheedgeinenemyfirefromeveryweapon.Forfourdaysandfournightswedidn’tleavetheconfinesofourpanzer.Wehadtostayawakethewholetime.(Tiemann,1998:61).

Inotherwords,theWaffen-SSsoldiersontheEasternfrontwerefacingdifficultlifeconditionsanditwasalltooeasytoblametheRussiansforthedifficultiestheyfaced.Ithasbeennotedthatsleepdeprivationcanhavebothpsychologicalandphysicaleffectsonsoldiersthatcanimpairtheirperformancebothmentallyandphysically(Haslam&Abraham,1987).ThissituationwasalsorecognisedbytheGermancommand.Inapost-warinterviewGeneralRohrichtstatedthat“OntheEasternFrontthedivisionsnevergotarest,andthatbecameadebilitatingfactor”(LiddellHart,1975:257).Ithasbeennotedthatconstantexposuretocombatwithoutrestcanleadtoanincreaseinstressandadecreaseincombatperformance.DasReichveteranHans-JoachimLindowdescribeshowafterthefirstwinterin1941andtheRussiancounter-attacksbeforethegatesofMoscowthestressofcombatandretreatbegantotell:

Thetermretreatwasdishonourable,itjustwasn’tdone.Andthereforeforusitwasifwehadmadeamessofit,asifwehaddonesomethingwrong.Wewerefinished,absolutelydonefor,rightatrockbottombothpsychologicallyandphysically.(Halliley,2003)

Studieshaveshownthataftersome30daysincombatthereisanoticeabledeclineincombateffectiveness.Aftersome100daysofintermittentcombatnon-effectivebehaviourbecamefrequent(Manton,Wilson,&Braithwaite,2000).Indeed“…physicalfatigueisoneofthemostevidenthardshipsofcampaigning…”andcancausesoldierstobecomecareless,takemorerisksandlowertheirperformanceandmorale(Haslametal.,1987:221).AmedicalconsultantfortheGermanArmystatedthatstressandotherpsychiatricsymptomsweretheresultoflivinginterror,havinglittlesleepandlivingindirtyandwetconditions(Haslametal.,1987).DuringthefightingintheDemyanskpocketin1942anumberofGermandivisionsweretrapped,includingtheSSTotenkopfDivision.AfteranumberofweeksofbitterfightinginatrociousconditionstheactingcommanderoftheSSdivision,MaxSimon,wrotetotheauthoritiesinBerlinandstated“…thatforthefirsttimesincethebeginningofthewarhehadlosthope.ThehardshipsoftheRussiancampaign,andtheunbelievablesufferingandsacrificesofthemen…hadsimplybecomemorethenhecouldbear”(Sydnor,1990:244).

ThequalityofthefightingtroopshadalsobeeninsteadydeclineasaresultoftheenormouscasualtiesbeinginflictedontheWaffen-SS.TheTotenkopfdivisionwasinvolvedin10months’continuouscombatuntilitwastakenoutofthefrontlineinOctober1942withonlysome6000survivors(Nipe,1996).When281soldiersfromthedivisionwerelatermedicallyexamined,anSSdoctorfoundthat“…about30percentwerenotfitforfurthermilitaryserviceandresembledtheconcentration-campinmatesthathehadbecomefamiliarwithduringatourofdutyinthecamps”(Nipe,1996:126).SS-Brigadeführer,Dr.OskarHock,statedthat“Thefightingpowerofthetroopswasnaturallyloweredbecauseofthemeagrefare.Whilenomarkedepidemicsresulted,manysoldierssufferedfromskindiseases.Thiswascontributednotonlytopoornutrition,butalsotothenecessityofspendingalotoftimeinfilthyfieldfortifications”(Hock,1947:19).

DuringtherecaptureofKharkovin1943theLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerDivisionenduredthreemonthsofcontinuousfighting.Inhispostwarhistoryofthedivision,operationsofficerofthedivisionSS-ObersturmbannführerRudolfLehmannnotedthatattheendofthisperiodthedivisionhadsufferedsome167officersand4373menas

casualties,or44percentofthedivision’sstrength,(Lehmann,1990:194).The2ndWaffenSSPanzerDivisionDasReichfoughtitswaytowithin16kmsoftheKremlinandenteredthesuburbofLeninoduringtheGermandriveonMoscowduring1941.Butthehumancostofachievingthiswashigh,withsome60percentcasualtiesor7000menbeinglost,lossesthatGermanywasalreadystrugglingtoreplace(Sharpe&Davis,2003;Williamson&Andrew,2004a).Thisisclearevidenceoftheenormousphysicalcostofthecampaignandthedevastatingeffectitwouldhavehadonthesurvivors.

Thiscontinuouslackof,andturnoverin,troopsduetocasualties,reducedthecombateffectivenessofthosetroopsavailable.TheWaffen-SStroopsfaceddifficultlifeconditionsintheformoftheclimate,theongoingcombatwithoutrest,thesheerdistancesinvolved,andperhapsmostimportantly,therealisationthattheywerenotinvolvedinashortcampaignasintheWest.Rathertheywerenowinvolvedinalongandbitterideologicalstruggleinaforeigncountry.AsoneveteranoftheDasReichDivisionstated,“NowitwascleartoeveryoneofusthatthisRussiawouldbeaveryhardnuttocrack”(Gunther,2004:101).

ThenatureoftheterrainandfightingcausedmembersoftheWaffenSStorealisethatthewarintheEastsetnewanddifferentstandardsthanhadbeenknownpreviously.TodealwiththesedifficultconditionsthesoldiersturnedmoretotheNaziideologytoseekreassurancethattheywerefightingajustandnecessarycauseandproviderationalefortheirsuffering.TheGermansoldiersfounditdifficultifnotimpossibletoaccepttheclimaticconditionsanddistancestheyfoundforceduponthemduringtheRussiancampaign.ThesoldiersoftheWaffen-SSfacedabhorrentweatherconditionsfromfreezingwinterstoscorchingsummersduringtheircombatontheEasternFrontasevidencedbyanumberofunithistories(Husemann,2003;Lehmann,1990;Ullrich,2002;Weidinger,2002).SS-ObergruppenführerLotharDebesservedinthe6thand10thSSDivisionsbeforebecomingtheWaffen-SScommanderinItaly(A.Munoz,2001;Westwood,2001).HeofferedthefollowinginsightintotheconditionsfacedbythemenonthenorthernRussianfront:

OperationsinthePolarregionareinfluencedbythelong20-hourdaydarknessinwinterandthe23-houradaydaylightinsummer,alsobytheclimaticconditionsoftheparticulararea,whichinthenorthisarticincharacterwithareasoftundraandfurthersouthpassoverintodenseforestsinterspersedwithlakesandswamps;thesearefactorswhichrequirediametricallyoppositecombatmethodsinwinterandsummer.(Debes,1947:1)

Waffen-SSdoctorOskarHockoutlinedthedangersfacedbytheWaffen-SSsoldiersintheharshwinterclimate:

ThetroopswereingeneralpoorlyequippedforwinterwarfareinRussia.Therewasanoutrightwantofwinterclothing,andespeciallyfeltboots.Therewerehardlyenoughfurcoatsavailabletosupplythesentries.Thereforefrostbiteoccurredinincreasingmeasure,handsandfeetbeingespeciallysusceptibletoit.(Hock,1947:12)

KurtSametreiter,amemberoftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler,recountedthewinterconditionsduringthecampaigninRussia,“Minus46degrees,minusfortysixdegreesandnoovercoat,morefrozetodeaththanwerewounded…Ioftencriedoutformymother”(Halliley,2003).ThislackofwinterequipmentledmembersoftheWaffen-SStoobtain

winterequipmentfromanysourceavailable.HeinzMaeger,amemberoftheLeibstandarteDivision,outlinesthelengthssomewouldgoto;“WhenRussiansfellwerushedtogettheiruniformsoffasquicklyaspossiblebeforetheygotcold,sothatwehadsomethingwarmtoputon”(Halliley,2003).DasReichveteranHans-JoachimLindowrecallssoldiers’earsfallingoffinthefreezingwinterconditions(Halliley,2003).OthersoldiersoftheWaffen-SSrelate,however,thatitwasnotonlythecoldthatmadelifedifficult.

Almosteverydaywehadtodealwithgrotesquesituations.Hereisoneofmanyexamples.Ourmarchinggroupisenvelopedinswirlingdustclouds.Theencirclingdust,whichconstantlyinfiltrateseverycutandgapinouruniforms,downtoourboots,withafinelayer,envelopstheentirecolumnconcealingly.(Fischer,2004:68)

JanDeWilde,oftheSSVolunteerLegionFlandern,recalledhowitwassocoldthatthegroundfroze:Weneededexplosivesandgrenadestodiggravesforourfallencomrades.Also,incertainpositionsalongthelineswewouldpilethedeadbodiesofRussiansoldiersontopofeachotherandcoverthemwithsnowsothatwecouldlayinsomekindofprotectionsincewecouldn’tdigtrenches.(Brandt,1998:51).

ThefightingitselfwasdifferenttothatwhichtheGermansoldierhadencounteredduringtheWesterncampaign.Oneveterandescribedthefightingasbeing“…notjusttough,butbrutalintheextreme,itwasarelapseintocompletebarbarity”(Schroder,1997:317).Thegaugeofhowbrutalthefightingwascanbedeterminedthatduringtwoweeksofnon-stopattacksbyRussiansoldiersagainstsoldiersoftheSSTotenkopfdivisiontrappedintheDemyanskpocketinFebruary1942lessthen100prisonerswerereportedtaken(Sydnor,1990:220).Theharshnessofthefightingsoonbecameapparenttothoseinvolved.AtGusinearLeningradonthenorthernendofthefront,theWaffen-SSFreiwilligenLegionNederland.87whichwascomprisedofDutchvolunteers,wasgettingitsfirsttasteofthisbarbarity.AconvoywasambushedbyRussiansoldiersand,

Sixofthelegionnairescutofffromtherestofthegroupwereallshotdown.Afterwards,atthesoundofmoaning,theRussiansappeared.AcoupleoftheDutchmendiedinstantlyfromtheheadwoundstheysustained,thosethatdidnotwerefinishedoffwithbayonetsandriflebuttblows…TheseconfrontationsreallysummeduptheproblemsurroundingtheideologicalwarethicontheEasternFront.Therewasnoroomforromanticnotionsaboutthewarandtherewasnoreprieve.(Pierik,2001:95)

ItismycontentionthattheseharshphysicalconditionsonlyaddedtothesituationalinfluencesthatallowedtheWaffen-SStocommitatrocities.ItisclearthattheactionsoftheWaffen-SSderivedfromacombinationofsituationthesoldiersfoundthemselvesinandthedispositionoftheindividualsoldiersthemselves.Toarguethateitheronecauseortheotherisresponsiblesolelyfortheatrocitiescommitteddoesnotseemaplausibleexplanation.Ratheraninteractiveapproachoftheactscommittedprovidesthemostrobustexplanationforunderstandinghowordinarymencouldcommitsuchterribleatrocities.

Conclusion:

AsIstatedfromtheoutsetthisbookisanexplorationoftheWaffenSS,andbynecessityevil.ThepreviouschaptershaveshownhowtheWaffen-SSactionscameaboutfrominteractivecausation,inthatbothsituationalanddispositionalinfluencesplayedarole.WehaveseenthattheatrocitiescommittedbytheWaffen-SScannotbeisolatedtoeithertheinfluenceofthesituationortheeffectofthepersonalityoftheperpetrator.Aspreviouslydiscussed,onecouldframethepoliciesofHimmlerandtheWaffen-SScommandasastrategicevil(thesituation)andtheactionsofthesubordinatesastacticalevil(thedispositionsandactionsoftheindividual).Thiscanbeenseenbythefactthatnotonlywereatrocitiesimplementedfromthehighcommand,buttheywerealsoinstigatedfromthelowerranksontheirowninitiative.ThisisclearlyevidencedbycommentsmadebyWaffen-SSGeneral,SS-ObergruppenführerErichBach-Zelewski,inhisreferencetowildactionsbysubordinatesanddifficultiesincontrollingthem.IhaveshownthattheconditionsontheEasternFrontwereconduciveforatrocitiestooccurfromthebottomupandtopdown.Thiscanbeseenbythegeneralnatureofthecriminalordersgivenandthespecificcriminalactionstakeninresponsetothem.

Thisbookbynecessityisalsoofconcernedwiththeactsofevilthatmankindissocapableofcommitting.SotheobviousquestionthatbegsansweringisweretheactionsoftheWaffen-SSevil?Toanswerthisquestionletmefirstsaythatitisobviouslynotpossibletoexamineeachandeveryindividualatrocityandapplythedefinitiontosuch.Rather,abroadorganisationalapproachhasbeenappliedthroughoutthisbook.Secondlyitisnoteasytodefinewhatonemeansbyevil,andIdonotintendtodiscussitatlength.IhavehoweverreadwidelyonthesubjectandfromthesewritingIhavedistilledthefollowingdefinitionofevilacts.

Anobjectiveassessment88needstobecarriedoutbylookingforthefollowingelements:anevilactcanbesaidtoconsistof:Aseriousintentionalactoromission;Whichcausesseverementalorphysicalharm;andThisharmisunnecessaryordisproportionatetoanyinstigationorprovocation.

ClearlyitcanbeseenthattheactionsoftheWaffen-SSwereinfactintentional.Thatwouldseembeyondargument.Thattheseactionscausedseriousharmisalsobeyondcontentionasevidencedbythemillionsofinnocentpeoplekilledandtheevidenceofvictimsandperpetratorsthemselves.Perhapsthemostcontentiousaspectoftheapplicationofthedefinitionisinrelationtothethirdpart,thattheharmwasunnecessaryordisproportionatetoanyinstigationorprovocation.TheapologistsfortheWaffen-SSarguethattheWaffen-SSwasjustpartofGermany’sarmedresponsetotheloomingmilitarythreatoftheSovietUnion.Thisallowsthemtoarguethattheconflictwasapreventativeactiontoavoidagreaterthreat,thatbeingtheinvasionofGermanybyRussia.IwouldarguethatIhaveshowedlucidevidencethatthiswasnotthecasein1941.

CertainlyinabroadcontextIwouldarguethatthebrutalmilitarycampaignundertakenbytheWaffen-SSwasnotinresponsetoanyprovocationorinstigationthatwouldhavejustifiedsuch.RatherIwoulddescribetheiractionsasintentional.Theiractionsservednolegitimatemilitarygoal,butratheranideologicalone.Thisbecomesevenclearerwhen

oneconsiderstheanti-partisanandEinsatzgruppenactionsbehindthefrontlines.Hereitwouldseemobviousthattheslaughterthatwasundertakenwasatworstnothinglessthanthesimplemurderofinnocents,atbestitcouldbedescribedasdisproportionatetothemilitarythreatfacingtheWaffen-SS.Certainlythejudgesofthepost-wartrialssawtheGermanresponseasdisproportionateandunwarranted.Whenonemovesontotheactionsundertakenintheconcentration-campsitwouldseemthatanydefenceofWaffen-SSactionstherewouldseemtofail.Thepreviousresearchhasshownthattherewouldbedifficultyinraisinganyclaimofprovocationornecessityforthegenocidethattookplacewithinthissystem.

TheobjectiveassessmentrevealsthattheactionsoftheWaffen-SSintotalitymeettherequirementsofmydefinitionofevil.HoweverIseethisassessmentasonlythefirststepindeterminingifanactoractsareevil.Thereareotherfactorsthatcontributetoanactbeingseenasevil.Thesefactorscanbecalledthethreeemotiveagents.Theyincludetheperceivedsenselessnessoftheact,theperceivedinnocenceofthevictimoftheact,theuniquenessoftheact.Thereisaneedtoexpanduponwhytheseemotiveagentscanassistusinclassifyingwhyanactisevil.

Whenreferringtothesenselessnessoftheactwearesuggestingthattheevilnessliesintheabilityoftheacttodefyimaginationandreason.InhisdiscussionofprimordialevilKatz(1988:288)examinesanumberof“cold-blooded”killersandsuggests,“…thesenselessnatureoftheirkillingscreatesacrisisofunderstanding”.EvileventssuchastheholocaustandtherecenttribalmassacresinRwandainstilasenseofthecrimebeingincomprehensible.Thejustification,provocationorinstigationofanactcanprovideuswithsomeabilitytounderstandtherationaleorreasonfortheact.Thisallowsustoplacesuchactswithintheconfinesofeverydaylife,thuswedonotperceivetheactsasevil.Wecanperhapsrationalisetosomedegreethemurderofaprisonerbyasoldierinafitofrage.Wefindithardtorationalisethebrutalmurderofyoungbabyataconcentrationcamp.

Wealsotakeaccountoftheinnocenceofthevictim.Itisthisfactorofinnocenceandthevictim’slackofcapacitytohavecausedjustification,provocationorinstigationfortheactthatcanprovideuswithgroundsforclassifyingactsasevil.Traditionallycrimesthathaveinvolvedinnocentorvulnerablevictimssuchastheyoungoroldhaveraisedwidespreadcondemnation.Crimecommittedagainstvictimssuchasthisstrikesomekindofchordinsocietythatdemandsourattentionandraisesfeelingsinusthatthesetypesofcrimesareabovetheordinary.PerhapsthiscanbeexplainedbytheinsightgivenbyauthorLanceMorrow:

WhenIhaveaskedAmericansandEuropeanstotellmethemostevilacttheycouldimagineanyonecommitting,theyhavealmostalwaysspokenofactsagainstchildren–torture,rape,andmurder.Itwouldbedifficult,intheirreading,tosurpassinevilafatherwhoafewyearsagosetfiretohiseight-year-oldson,notkillinghimbutdisfiguringhimhorribly.(Morrow,2003:49)

Thissenseofevilcanrelatebacktotheinnocenceofthevictim.TheICC(inRule145)hasalsorecognisedthatthecircumstancesofthevictim(i.e.beingdefenceless)areinfluentialwhenitcomestojudgingthegravityandpunishmentofacrime.ThecrimesoftheSSagainstchildrenwouldseemtoeasilyfallintowhatwewouldtermevilactions.

Evidencewasgivenbyacampinmateastotheirtreatmentuponarrivalattheconcentration-camps:

Allwecouldhearwerethescreamsandwecouldseethepileofsmokecomingoutofthechimneyofthecrematoriums,andwealsousedsomesortofacamouflage—thatwasin1944;thatwaswhentheHungarianJewsarrived—weusedamusiccamouflage.Atthetimethechildrenwereburnedonbigpilesofwood.Thecrematoriumscouldnotworkatthetime,andtherefore,thepeoplewerejustburnedinopenfieldswiththosegrills,andalsochildrenwereburnedamongthem.Childrenwerecryinghelplesslyandthatiswhycampadministrationorderedthatanorchestrabemadebyahundredinmatesandshouldplay.Theyplayedveryloudallthetime…Withouttheorchestratheywouldhaveheardthescreamsofhorror;theywouldhavebeenhorriblescreams.Thepeopletwokilometresfromtherecouldevenhearthosescreams,namely,thatcamefromthetransportsofchildren.Thechildrenwereseparatedfromtheirparents,andthentheywereputtosectionIIIcamp.Maybethenumberofchildrenwasseveralthousand.Andthen,ononespecialdaytheystartedburningthemtodeath.Thegaschambersatthetimewereoutoforder,atleastoneofthemwasoutoforder,namely,theonenearthecrematorium;itwasdestroyedbymutinyinaspecialcommandoinAugust1944.Theotherthreegaschamberswerefulloftheadultsandthereforethechildrenwerenotgassed,butjustburnedalive.WhenoneoftheSSpeoplesortofhadpitywiththechildren,hetookthechildandbeattheheadagainstastonefirstbeforeputtingitonthepileoffireandwood,sothatthechildlostconsciousness.However,theregularwaytheydiditwasbyjustthrowingthechildrenontothepile.(NurembergMilitaryTribunal,1946:Vol5:663)

Theaspectofuniquenessallowsustoputactsthatareaboveandbeyondordinarydailyeventsintothehighercategoryofwrongfulness.ThejudgesatNurembergacknowledgedthatuniquenessoftheactsoftheHolocaustwasoneofthemainfactorsinthecreationofthecategoryofcrimesagainsthumanity.Thissenseofthecrimebeingunusualcandisplayitselfinthesadismoftheactorthecallouswayinwhichtheactiscarriedout.Itshouldbenotedherethatwhiletheactmaynotbeuniqueorrareinabsoluteterms(e.g.Genocideorserialkillers);theuniquenessoftheactliesintheevilnessoftheact.ByuniquenessIamreferringtotheabilityofaneventtocreateasenseofnoveltyandcreateaneedtoexplaintherareorunexpected.Inessence,theactcancausepsychologicalshockupheavalorconfusioninbystandersastohowsuchanactcouldbecommitted.Ourmoralconscienceisshocked.Asasocietywetendtoreadilycategoriseaseviluniqueorexpressiveviolence,asagainstinstrumentalviolence.Aspreviouslymentioned,Rule145oftheElementsofCrimeoftheRomeStatutespecificallysinglesoutcrimesthatinvolveaparticularcruelty.Iinterpretthisasuniqueactionsaboveandbeyondnormalcrimes.

WecanseeallthreeoftheseagentspresentintheactionsofWaffen-SSColonel,SS-StandartenführerFranzZiereis.ZiereiswasasoldierwhowasacceptedintotheWaffen-SSasatrainingofficerandlaterrosetobecampcommandantoftheMauthausenConcentration-camp(MacLean,1999a;Waller,2002)89.UponarrivalofnewprisonerstothecampZiereis“…wouldsometimesstandonaconvenientvantagepointfromwhichtoviewanewlyreceivedtransportandselectrandomprisonersastargetsforhisownshootingpractice”(Waller,2002:7).Theseactionsstrikeoneassenselessinthattheactionsresultedinthedeathofhumanbeingsformeretargetpractice,theinnocenceofthe

victimsishighlightedbythearbitrarymannerinwhichtheywereselectedfornoapparentvalidreasonandlasttheverymethodofthecrimemakesituniqueinnature.Inshort,thepresenceoftheemotiveagentsallowsustomorereadilyaccepthisactionsasevil.Whilenotalloftheseagentsarepresentineveryevilact,itisusuallythecasethatatleastoneormoreoftheagentsispresent.Thepresenceofoneoftheseagentsisthereleaserthatallowsustoplacetheactinthecategoryofevil,asabovejustbeingbad.Thegreaterthedegreeoneoranyoftheseagentsispresentthenthemorepreparedarewetolabeltheactasevil.

IwouldarguethatallthreeoftheemotiveagentsarepresentintheactionsoftheWaffen-SS.Theactsweresenselessinthatthevastmajorityoftheatrocitiesorevilactscommittedservednovalidmilitarypurpose.TheydidnotassisttheWaffen-SSinachievingthemilitarygoalstheyhadset.InfactthereisclearevidencethattheatrocitiescommittedincreasedtheresistancetotheWaffen-SS.Theactionswerenotbasedonbeingafunctionalpartofthecampaigntoachieveagoal;ratherIwouldsuggesttheywereintentionalactscommittedtoexpressandservetheracialandideologicalgoalsoftheWaffen-SS,andtoalargeextenttheNazis.Inamilitarysensetheyweresenseless,infacttheactionsdiscussedonlymakesensewhenconsideredinthecontextofagenocidalcampaign.

TherecanbenodenyingthatthevastmajorityofvictimsoftheWaffen-SSwereinnocentofanymilitaryjustificationfortheactionstakenagainstthem.TheWaffen-SSuponentryintoRussiaquicklyengagedinanorgyofmurderandslaughterofracialandideologicaltargets.Thattheyknewthesepeoplewereinnocentisfurtherreinforcedwhenoneconsidershowtheyattemptedtoconcealtheseactsbehindtheuseofeuphemismsthatwouldbringtheseracialandideologicaltargetsintothesphereofmilitarytargets.ThishasbeenclearlyprovedbyavarietyofevidencethatIreferredtointhepreviouschapters.WhiletheWaffen-SSmayhaveattemptedtoportraytheirvictimsasbeingdeservingoftheirpunishment,thefactsdonotsupportthis.QuitesimplythemagnitudeandsystematicwayinwhichtheWaffenSSparticipatedintheoverallsystemoftheterrorthatwastheSSmakestheevilactscommittedbythemunique.ThefactthattheSSsystemcouldkillmillionsofpeoplecontributestoitsuniqueness.ThatthekillingundertakenbytheWaffen-SSwasspreadfromthefrontlinestohundredsofmilesbehindthemshowstheenormityoftheundertaking.TheWaffen-SSwasinvolvednotonlyinthemilitaryaspectsoftheSSstate,butitwasalsoheavilyinvolvedintheeconomicpillagingthattheSSundertook.ItwasfurtherimplicatedinthedepravedfeaturesoftheSSsystemsuchasthemedicalexperiments.IwouldarguethatthesystematicactionsundertakenbytheWaffen-SSontheEasternFrontshouldbeconsideredevilacts.

Thisbookwasguidedbytwomainquestions.ThefirstmajorquestionconcernedtheWaffen-SS.WastheWaffen-SSanorganisationthatcommittedevilactsorsimplyjustinnocentsoldiersdoingtheirduty?ThisbookhasfilledalargevoidinrelationtoexaminationsoftheWaffen-SSandthehorrendousactstheyperformed.TherecanbenodoubtthatfromanorganisationalstandpointtheWaffen-SSwasattheforefrontofcommittingwhatIhavedefinedasevilactsinthenameoftheNazistate.Thesecondquestionwashowandwhydoordinarypeoplecommitactsofevil?TheinteractionalcausationmodelthatIhaveproposedwouldseemthemostcomprehensivewaytoexplain

howevilactionscanoccur.Thedichotomyofsituationandpersonalitybeingresponsibleforevilactionsisafalseone;thisbookhasshownthatthevastmajorityofevilactsareacombinationofboththesituationandpersonality.

Thisbookhasattemptedtoconfrontgenocide,thecrimeofcrimes,bydescribinganddocumentingtheevilactsthattheWaffen-SScommitted,andthenanalysingandexplainingwhytheyhappenedbyusingtheconceptofevil.Therewillalwaysbeactscommittedbyordinaryhumansagainstotherhumansthatseeminhumaneintheextreme.ThesearetheactsthatIbelievesocietyasawholeneedstoclassifyasevil.Withoutthisclassificationitwouldseemthattruehorrorofwhatmankindiscapablecannotbefullycomprehended.TheWaffen-SSwerewithoutdoubtaremarkablefightingformationandintheannualsofhistorywillberememberedforthemilitaryprowesstheydisplayed.Theyshouldalsoberememberedbyhistoryfortheunspeakablecrimestheycommittedandroletheyplayedinthegenocideofmillions.Whilsttheymayhavebeenordinarymen,theywerenotordinarysoldiers.

RussiansoldiersholdingthecapturedbattlestandardoftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler.

GlossaryofTerms:

TermMeaningAbteilungAbwehr

ArmeeArmeekorpsArmeeoberkommandoBarbarossaFreikorps

FührerFührerbefehlFührererlassGebirgsHeerHeeresgruppe

KampfgruppeLandwehrLebensraumLegion

LuftwaffeOberkommandodesHeeres

(OKH)OberKommandoDesWehrmacht(OKW)OstlandReichsarbeitsdienst(RAD)Reichsgesetzblatt(RGBl)ReichswehrRitterkreuzSturmabteilung(SA)Volksdeutsche

WehrmachtSectionordetachment,usuallyusedtodescribeapanzerdetachmentsmallerthanregimentalsize,roughlyequaltoabattalion.IntelligenceserviceoftheGermanarmedforces;takenoverbytheSSin1944AnarmyorfieldformationofatleasttwocorpsAnarmycorpsorfieldformationofatleasttwodivisionsArmyheadquartersorheadquartersstaffCodenameforinvasionofUSSRFreecorps;illegalmilitaryformationscomposedlargelyofWWIveterans,activeinpost-warGermanyIngeneral,leaderorofficer;specificallyHitlerOrderissuedbyHitlerDecreeoredictissuedbyHitlerMountain(i.e.division)TheArmyArmygroup,fieldformationusuallycomposedofatleasttwoarmiesBattlegroupMilitaryreserveofmenbetween35and45LivingspaceLegion,militaryformationcomposedofforeignersservingintheGermanarmedforcesGermanAirForceArmyHighCommand

ArmedForcesHighCommand

BalticStatesandWhiteRussiaReichLaborServiceReichLegalGazetteGermanArmedForcesfrom1920-1935.Knight’sCrossStormTroops;brownshirtedmilitiaoftheNaziPartyEthnicorracialGermans;personsofGermanbloodbutofnon-Germancitizenship,consideredbytheNaziPartyasapartoftheGerman“race”orVolkTheGermanarmedforces(Army,NavyandAirForce)

SSandWaffen-SSTerms

AllgemeineSSEinsatzgruppe

EinsatzkommandoFreiwilligenGEheimeSTaatsPOlizeiHitlerjugendKommandostabRFSSKonzentrationslager(KZ)Kriminalpolizei(Kripo)NationaliSozialistischeDeutsche

ArbeiterPartei(NSDAP)Ordnungspolizei(Orpo)

PanzergrenadierReichsfuhrerSS(RFSS)Reichskommissariatfurdie

FestigungDeutschenVolkstrums(RKFDV)

Reichssicherheitshauptamt(RSHA)SchutzStaffel(SS)

Sicherheitsdienst(SD)Sicherheitspolizei(Sipo)StandarteTotenkopfstandarten

Totenkopfverbände(SSTV)TotenkopfwachsturmbannerVerfügungstruppe(SSVT)Waffen-SSWirtschafts-und

Verwaltungshauptamt(WVHA)GeneralSS;mainbodyofpre-warSS,composedofpart-timevolunteersActiongroup;specialSS/SDexecutionteamresponsibleforthemassacreofpersonsdictatedbyNaziracialandpoliticalpoliciesSmallercomponentofanEinsatzgruppeVolunteersGestapo,secretstatepolice,abranchoftheSSHitlerYouthHeadquartersoftheReichsfuhrerSSwhileinthefieldConcentration-campCriminalPolice;partoftheSSorganisation

NationalSocialistGermanWorkersParty(NaziParty)OrderPolice;regularuniformedpolice,incorporatedintotheSSorganisationMechanisedinfantryReichLeaderoftheSS,specificallyHimmlerSSagencyforthe“strengtheningofGermanism”;primarilyconcernedwithethnicGermans

MainOfficeofReichSecurity;SSagencyheadedbyHeydrich,laterKaltenbrunnerProtectionSquad,DefenceCorps;originallyelitecorpsoftheNSDAP,laterall-inclusivedesignationforthecomponentsofthecomplexorganisationheadedbyHimmlerSecurityandintelligenceserviceoftheSSSecurityPolice;componentoftheSSorganisationSSorSAformationequivalenttoaregimentDeath’sHeadRegiments;armedSSformationscreatedatthebeginningofthewartohandlespecialtasksofapolicenature;disbandedin1941,andpersonnelabsorbedintotheWaffen-SSDeathHeadformations;armedfull-timecomponentoftheSSduringpre-warperiod,taskedwithguardingconcentrationcampsandpoliticalprisonsDesignationfortheDeath’sHeadguardbattalionsoftheWaffen-SS,whichguardedconcentrationandexterminationcampsduringthewarMilitarisedcomponentoftheSSinthepre-warperiod;directpredecessoroftheWaffen-SSArmedSSSSMainEconomicalandAdministrationOffice;afterMarch1942responsibleforoperationofconcentration-camps

DramatisPersonae:

SoldiersoftheTotenkopfDivision

ErichBach-Zelewski

BorninPomeraniaonthe1stofMarch1899,Bach-ZelewskiservedintheGermanArmyduringWorldWarI.HejoinedtheNaziPartyin1930.In1941hewaspromotedtoSS-ObergruppenführerintheWaffen-SS.BachZelewskiwasplacedincommandofanti-partisanoperationsontheEasternFrontfrom1942-1944andwasHimmler’sspecialdeputyforanti-partisanwarfare.

Bach-Zelewskisufferedfromsomepsychologicalillnessasaresultoftheeffectsofhavingtocarryoutordersassociatedwiththeexterminationpoliciescarriedoutintheeast.HewasresponsibleforthebrutalsuppressionoftheWarsawuprisingin1944.HeledvariousSSCorpsuntiltheendofthewar.Bach-ZelewskigaveevidenceattheNurembergtrialsinregardstoSSactivitiesontheEasternFront.Hereceiveda10-yearsentence;thissentencewaslatersuspendedhowever,hewasarrestedonotherchargesrelatingtooffencespriortothewar.Bach-Zelewskidiedinprisonwhileservingalifesentence.

GottlobBerger

Bornonthe16thofJuly,1896atGerstetten,Württemberg,BergerservedasHimmler’smainrecruitingofficerin1939andbecameheadoftheSSCentralOfficein1940,butthisonlyaddeddutiesofoverseeingideologicaltraining.Hisorganisationalabilities

contributedtotheamazingexpansionoftheWaffen-SSinWorldWarII,buthealsobecameensnaredintypicalinternecinefightingamongtheSShierarchy.

BergervolunteeredforarmyserviceattheoutsetofWorldWarIandrosetotherankoffirstlieutenantintheinfantrybythetimeofhisdischargein1919,havingreceivedseveralwoundsanddecorationsoftheIronCrossfirstandsecondclass.JoiningtheNaziPartyin1922,hebecameamemberoftheSAandenteredSSservicein1936.Trainingwiththearmybroughthimtherankofmajorinthereserveby1938,buthisinitialrankuponenteringtheSSwascolonel,baseduponhisSAservicethrough1933.HisvariousdutiesontheSSstaffcentredonsportorganisationandtraining.Afterthewar,theNurembergTribunalsentencedhimto25years’imprisonment,ofwhichheserved10years,beingreleasedin1951.Heworkedonthestaffoftheright-wingjournalNationEuropa(Coberg),anddiedJanuary5,1975inhiscityofbirth.

WilhelmBittrich

Bornonthe26thofFebruary1894BittrichservedinWorldWarIwiththearmybeforebecomingapilot.Heendedthewarwithseveraldecorations.Bittrichservedinthepost-wararmyandtrainedGermanpilotsintheSovietUnionfrom1930to1932.

In1932hejoinedtheNaziPartyandtheSS.DuringtheearlyyearsofthewarhewasincommandoftheDeutschlandregimentandwontheKnight’sCrossontheEasternFrontwhileholdingthiscommand.Helatertookcommandofthe9thSSPanzerDivisionHohenstaufenandleditduringthebattlesontheEasternFrontandinNormandy.PromotedtoSSGruppenführer,Bittrichwasincontrolofthe2ndSSPanzerCorpsatArnhemwherehedecimatedtheAlliedforces.BittrichwaspraisedforthecompassionheshowedtotheparatroopersatArnhem.HewasalsopreparedtoconfrontHimmlerbyallowingchurchservicestobeheldinhiscommandindefianceofstandingorders.TheFrenchimprisonedhimuntil1954.

Josef“Sepp”Dietrich

Bornonthe28thofMay1892,DietrichinitiallyworkedasatractordriverbeforeWorldWarI.DuringWorldWarIDietrichservedinvariousartilleryformationsbeforeendingthewarasanNCOinoneoftheearlytankformations.HewasawardedtheIronCrossandseveralotherawards.

DietrichwascommissionedintheGermanpolicewhileatthesametimebeingpoliticallyactive.HejoinedtheNaziPartyin1928andinmatterofdaysjoinedtheSS.DietrichdevelopedclosetiestoHitlerbybeinghispersonalbodyguardandlatercommandingtheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitler,themostfamousWaffen-SSdivision.

DietrichwaspromotedtoSS-Oberstgruppenführerandeventuallycommandedthe6thSSPanzerarmyduringtheBattleoftheBulge.HewastriedatNurembergandfoundguiltyandsentencedtoaperiodofimprisonmentforthemassacreofAmericanprisoners.

OscarDirlewanger

Bornon26thofSeptember1895DirlewangerhadanoutstandingcareerasamilitaryofficerinWorldWarIandwaswoundedseveraltimesandreceivedseveralawards.Hefinishedthewarasajuniorofficerinaninfantrydivision.

HejoinedtheNaziPartyin1922andaboutthistimereceivedaDoctoratedegreefromtheUniversityofFrankfurtineconomics.DirlewangerlaterservedinthevolunteerCondorLegionduringtheSpanishcivilwar.HelaterreturnedtoGermanyandjoinedtheWaffen-SSin1940afterinitiallybeingpreventedbyanumberofcriminalallegationsbeinglevelledathimformoralcrimes.

DirlewangerwasresponsiblefortheformationandcommandoftheDirlewangerSonderkommando,whichprincipallyoperatedasasecurityforceontheEasternFrontduringWorldWarII.Itconsistedmainlyofpoachers,concentration-campinmates,Waffen-SSandArmypenaltroops.TheSonderkommandowasresponsiblefornumerousatrocitiesandinFebruary1945wasformedintothe36thWaffen-SSGrenadierDivision.ItisthoughtthatDirlewangerdiedin1945;howeversomeuncertaintysurroundsthecircumstancesofhisdeath.

TheodorEicke

Bornonthe17thOctober1892,EickeservedininfantryunitsthroughouttheWorldWarI,earningtheIronCrossandseveralotherawardsandendingthewarasanNCO.

AfterthewarEickespentsometimeattechnicalcollegeandinthepoliceuntilhispoliticalviewscausedhimtobeousted.EickejoinedtheSStogiveexpressiontohisradicalviewsin1928.EickewasthenplacedincontroloftheSSguardsoftheconcentration-campsystemanddevelopedthemintoanefficientfightingforcethatwaseventuallythe3rdWaffen-SSTotenkopfPanzerDivision.OntheNightoftheLongKnivesEickewasresponsiblefortheshootingofSAchiefErnstRohm.

DuringthewarSS-ObergruppenführerEickewasplacedincommandoftheTotenkopfDivisionoftheWaffen-SSuntilhisdeathontheRussianfrontin1943afterhisobservationplanewasshotdownbyRussiantroops.

HermannFegelein

Bornonthe30thofOctober1906FegeleinspentsomebrieftimeinaGermanArmyCalvaryregimentin1925andlaterwentontojointheBavarianLandPolice.HejoinedtheGeneralSSin1933andheprogressedthroughtheranksintheCalvaryunitsoftheSS.

In1940hewasacceptedintotheWaffen-SS.HecommandedtheSSCalvarybrigadeontheEasternFrontduring1941/42whereittookpartinanumberofmoppingupoperationsandcommittedvariousatrocities.HereachedtherankofSS-GruppenführerandcommandedtheWaffen-SS8thCalvaryDivisionFlorianGeyerforatime.HewasappointedasHitler’sliaisonofficerfortheWaffen-SSwherehemarriedGretlBraun(sisterofHitler’smistress).Onthe26thofApril1945FegeleindesertedtheFührerbunkerinBerlinastheendofthewardrewnear.HitlerhowevernotedhisdisappearanceandhadFegeleinlocatedandarrestedathishousebytheSS.UponlearningofHimmler’sattempts

tomakepeacewiththeAlliesHitlersoughtascapegoatandhadtheSSexecuteFegelein.

OdiloGlobocnik

Bornonthe21stofApril1904,hejoinedtheAustrianNaziPartyin1931andbecameamemberoftheSSin1934.Between1933and1935hewasarrestedfourtimesbyAustrianauthoritiesforhisactivitiesintheillegalNSDAPandforhightreason.Altogetherhespent11monthsinjail.

GlobocniksoonvolunteeredfortheWaffen-SSandservedasanon-commissionedofficerwiththeSS-StandarteGermaniafromMarchuntilNovember1939,servingwithdistinctionintheGermaninvasionofPoland.

Reichsführer-SSHeinrichHimmlerhadnotforgottenoneofhismostobedientservants:surprisinglyenough,onNovember9,1939,GlobocnikwasappointedSSandPoliceLeaderintheLublindistrictoftheGeneralGovernment.Afteradisappointingpartycareer,GlobocniknowhadasecondchanceintheranksoftheSSandthepolice.Thefollowingyearsprovedwhathewascapableof.

OnOctober13,1941,GlobocnikreceivedaverbalorderfromHeinrichHimmlertostartimmediateconstructionworkonBelzec,thefirstexterminationcampintheGeneralGovernment.Theconstructionoftwomoreexterminationcamps,SobiborandTreblinka,followedin1942.AllinallGlobocnikwasresponsibleforkillingmorethan1.5millionPolish,Slovak,Czech,Dutch,French,Russian,German,andAustrianJewsinthedeathcampsofOperationReinhard,whichheorganisedandsupervised.HeexploitedJewsasslavelabourersinhisownforced-labourcampsandseizedthepropertiesandvaluablesofmurderedJews.

AfterMussolini’sdownfall,GlobocnikwastransferredfromtheGeneralGovernmenttoFriuli-VeneziaGiuliaintheGerman-occupiedportionofItalyinSeptember1943andwasstationedinhishometownofTrieste.HewasappointedHigherSSandPoliceLeaderoftheOperationZoneofAdriaticCoastalRegion.Hismaintasktherewascombatingpartisans,butagain,heplayedaleadingroleinthepersecutionofItalianJews.WiththeadvanceofAlliedtroops,GlobocnikretreatedintoAustrianCarinthiaandfinallywentintohidinghighinthemountainsinanalpinehutnearWeissensee,stillincompanyofhiscloseststaffmembers.TrackeddownandcapturedbytheBritishonMay31,1945,hecommittedsuicidethesamedayinPaternionbybitingonhiscapsuleofcyanide.

PaulHausser

Bornonthe7thofOctober1880HausserservedinvariousunitsincludingtheinfantryandtheImperialNavyasanobserver.LaterduringtheFirstWorldWarHausserservedontheGeneralStaffandonotherstaffunits.HewasawardedtheIronCrossandnumerousotherawards.AttheconclusionofWorldWarIHausserremainedwiththepost-wararmyuntilheleftthearmyin1932withtherankofLeutnant-General.

HelaterjoinedtheSAandashorttimelaterwasrecruitedbyHitlertoassistinsolving

trainingissuesoftheWaffen-SS.HausserdevelopedthetrainingcurriculumfortheSSofficerschools.HewaslaterresponsiblefortheformationofthefirstWaffen-SSdivisionduringthewarin1939.Thisdivisionwaslatertobecomethe2ndWaffen-SSDasReichPanzerDivision.Hewasplacedinchargeofthe1stSSPanzerkorps.DuringthebattleofKharkovin1943hedisobeyedadirectorderfromHitlerbyretreatinginordertosavehismen.HewaspromotedtotherankofSS-Oberstgruppenführerandwentontobrieflycommandvariousarmygroups.HewasawitnessatNurembergandastrongadvocateforformerWaffen-SSsoldiers.

ReinhartHeydrich

BornonMarch7,1904,HeydrichwasanSS-ObergruppenführerintheSS.HewasnicknamedTheButcherofPrague,TheBlondBeastandDerHenker(Germanforthehangman).

HeydrichparticipatedintheFreikorpswhenhewasyoung.In1922hejoinedthenavy;however,hewaslaterdismissedforimproperbehaviour.Hisbehaviourincourtwasapparentlysodisdainfulthatthecourtalsorebukedhimforinsubordination.Heydrichwasleftwithnocareerprospects.However,heremainedengagedtovonOsten,whomhemarriedin1931.

1931wastobeaturningpointforHeydrichinanother,farmoreimportantway.Himmlerwishedtosetupacounter-intelligencedivisionoftheSS.Actingonafriend’sadvice,heinterviewedHeydrich,andaftera20minutetestwherebyHeydrichhadtooutlineplansforthenewdivision,Himmlerhiredhimonthespot.IndoingsoHimmleralsoeffectivelyrecruitedHeydrichintotheNaziParty.

Heydrichsoonbuiltupafearsomereputationwithintheparty,andinJuly1932hisdivisiontookonthetitleofSicherheitsdienst(SD).LaterhebecamethebossoftheReichssicherheitshauptamt(RSHA)ofwhichtheSD,theGestapoandtheEinsatzgruppenwereparts.HeydrichbecameoneofthemainarchitectsoftheHolocaustduringthefirstyearsofWorldWarIIandchairedtheWannseeconferenceatwhichplansforthedeportationoftheJewstoexterminationcampswerediscussed.InSeptember1941hewasappointedProtectorofBohemiaandMoravia,replacingKonstantinvonNeurathwhomHitlerconsideredinsufficientlyharsh.DuringhisroleasdefactodictatorofBohemiaandMoravia,Heydrichoftendrovearoundaloneinacarwithanopenroof-ashowofconfidenceintheoccupationalforcesandtheirrepressivemeasuresinsubduingthepopulation.

OnMay27,1942hewasassassinatedbyateamofBritish-trainedagentsoftheCzechoslovakGovernmentinexileinLondon.DespiteHimmlersendinghisbestdoctors,HeydrichdiedinagonyinaPraguehospitalat4:30amonJune4attheageof38.TheretaliationfromtheNaziswassavage;astarkwarningtopotentialcopycats.OnJune10allmalesovertheageof16inthevillageofLidice,22kmnorth-westofPrague,weremurderedadayafterthetownwasburnt.Heydrich’seventualreplacementwasErnstKaltenbrunner.

AfterHeydrich’sdeath,thefirstthree“trial”deathcampswereconstructedandputintooperationatTreblinka,SobiborandBelzec.TheprojectwasnamedOperationReinhardin

Heydrich’shonour.

HeinrichHimmler

BornonOctober7,1900HimmlerwasthecommanderoftheSSandoneofthemostpowerfulmeninNaziGermany.AsReichsführer-SS,heledtheSS,andallofitscombinedoffices,andwasoneofthekeyfiguresintheorganisationoftheHolocaust.BornnearMunich,Bavaria,Germanyintoamiddle-classfamily,hewasthesonofaBavarianschoolmasterandattendedLandshutHighSchool.Aftergraduation,HimmlerwasappointedanOfficerCadetin1918andjoinedthe11thBavarianRegimentforserviceinWorldWarI.ShortlybeforeHimmlerwasdueforcommissioningasanofficer,however,thewarendedandHimmlerwasdischargedfromthemilitarywithouteverhavingseenanycombat.

In1919,ayearafterWorldWarIhadended;HimmlerbeganstudyingagricultureatatechnicalcollegeinMunich.Atthesametime,hebecameactiveintheFreikorps,privatearmiesofright-wingex-GermanArmymenresentfulofGermany’slossoftheWorldWarI.Himmlerin1923,appliedtojointheNaziParty,whichwasrecruitingFreikorpsmembersaspotentialmembersofthenewNazistormtrooperunits,knownastheSA.

Between1927and1929,HimmlerdevotedhimselfincreasinglytohisdutiesasDeputy-Reichsführer-SS.UpontheresignationofSSCommanderErhardHeiden,HimmlerwasappointedasthenewReichsführer-SSinJanuary1929.AtthetimeHimmlerwasappointedtoleadtheSS,itnumberedonly280members,andwasconsideredamerebattalionofthemuchlargerSA.Himmler,himself,wasonlyconsideredasanSA-Oberführer,butafter1929HimmlersimplyreferredtohimselfastheReichsführer-SS.

By1933,whentheNaziPartyrosetopowerinGermany,Himmler’sSSnumbered52,000membersandtheorganisationhaddevelopedstrictmembershiprequirements,ensuringthatallmemberswereofHitler’sAryan“Herrenvolk”(i.e.masterrace).NowaGruppenführerintheSA,HimmlernextbeganamassiveefforttoseparatetheSSfromSAcontrolandintroducedblackSSuniforms,toreplacetheSAbrownshirts,inthefallof1933.Shortlythereafter,hewaspromotedtoSS-ObergruppenführerundReichsführer-SS.

BothHimmler,andanotherofHitler’srighthandmen,HermannGoring,agreedthattheSAanditsleader,ErnstRöhmwerebeginningtoposeathreattotheGermanArmyandthewholeNazileadershipofGermanyitself.RöhmhadstrongsocialistviewsandbelievedthatalthoughHitlerhadsuccessfullygainedpowerinGermany,therealrevolutionhadnotyetbegun,leavingsomeNazileaderswiththebeliefthatRöhmwasintentonusingtheSAtoadministeracoup.

WithsomepersuasionfromHimmlerandGoring,Hitlerbegantofeelthreatenedbythisprospect,andagreedthatRöhmmustdie.HitlerdelegatedthetaskofadministeringRohm’sdemisetoHimmlerandGoring,who,alongwithReinhardHeydrich,KurtDaluegeandWalterSchellenberg,carriedouttheexecutionofRöhmandnumerousotherseniorSAofficials,inwhatbecameknownasTheNightoftheLongKnivesonJune30,1934.Theverynextday,Himmler’stitleofReichsführer-SSbecameanactualrankandhewasappointedtothepositionwhiletheSSbecameanindependentorganisationoftheNaziParty.

In1936HimmlerhadgainedfurtherauthorityastheSSabsorbedallofGermany’slocallawenforcementagenciesintothenewOrdnungspolizei,consideredaheadquartersbranchoftheSS.Germany’ssecretpoliceforceswerealsounderHimmler’sauthorityinthepresenceoftheSicherheitspolizeiwhichwould,in1939,expandintothemuchlargerReichsicherheitshauptamt.TheSSwasalsodevelopingitsmilitarybranch,knownastheSS-Verfügungstruppe,whichwouldlaterbecomeknownastheWaffenSS.AftertheNightoftheLongKnives,theSS-TotenkopfverbändehadbeengiventhetaskoforganisingandadministeringGermany’sregimeofconcentration-campsand,after1941,theexterminationcampsofPoland.TheSS,throughitsintelligencearmtheSicherheitsdienst(SD),waschargedwithfindingJews,Roma,homosexualsandcommunistsandanyothercultureorracedeemedbytheNazistobeeitherUntermenschen(subhuman)orinoppositiontohisregime,andplacingtheminconcentrationcamps.HimmlernowbecameoneofthemainarchitectsoftheHolocaust,usingelementsofmysticismandafanaticalbeliefintheracistNaziideologytojustifythemassmurderandgenocideofmillionsofvictims.

In1944,HimmlerwasgrantedstillfurtherpowerastheresultofabitterrivalrybetweentheSicherheitsDienst(SD)andtheAbwehr,theintelligencearmoftheWehrmacht.

TheinvolvementintheJuly20,1944plotagainstHitlerofmanyoftheAbwehrleaders,includingitshead,AdmiralCanaris,promptedHitlertodisbandtheAbwehrandmaketheSDthesoleintelligenceserviceoftheThirdReich.ThisincreasedHimmler’salreadyconsiderablepersonalpower.Inlate1944,HimmlerbecamecommanderofarmygroupOberrhein(UpperRhine),whichwasfightingtheoncomingUnitedStates7thArmyandFrench1stArmyintheAlsaceregiononthewestbankoftheRhine.

Himmlerheldthispostuntilearly1945,whenhewasswitchedtocommandanarmygroupfacingtheRedArmytotheEast.AsHimmlerhadnopracticalmilitaryexperienceasafieldcommander,hewasquicklyrelievedofhisfieldcommandsandappointedasCommanderoftheHomeArmy.Atthesametime,hewasappointedastheGermanInteriorMinisterandwasconsidered,bymany,tobeacandidatetosucceedHitlerastheFührerofGermany.

Bythespringof1945HimmlerhadlostfaithinGermanvictory,andcametotherealisationthatiftheNaziregimewastohaveanychanceofsurvival,itwouldneedtoseekpeacewithBritainandtheUnitedStates.Towardsthisend,hecontactedCountFolkeBernadotteofSwedenatLübeck,neartheDanishborderandbegannegotiationstosurrenderintheWest.HimmlerhopedthattheBritishandAmericanswouldfighttheirRussianallieswiththeremainsoftheWehrmacht.WhenHitlerdiscoveredthis,Himmlerwasdeclaredatraitorandstrippedofallhistitlesandranks.AtthetimeofHimmler’sdenouncement,heheldthepositionsofReichLeader-SS,ChiefoftheGermanPolice,ReichCommissionerofGermanNationhood,ReichMinisteroftheInterior,SupremeCommanderoftheVolksturm,andSupremeCommanderoftheHomeArmy.HimmlernextturnedtotheAmericansasadefector,contactingtheheadquartersofDwightEisenhowerandproclaiminghewouldsurrenderallofGermanytotheAlliesifHimmlerwassparedfromprosecutionasaNazileader.InafinalexampleofHimmler’smentalstateatthispoint,hesentapersonalapplicationtoGeneralEisenhowerstatingthathewishedtoapplyforthepositionasMinisterofPoliceinthepost-wargovernmentof

Germany.Eisenhower,however,refusedtohaveanythingtodowithHimmler,andHimmlerwassubsequentlydeclaredamajorwarcriminal.

Attemptingtoevadearrest,HimmlerdisguisedhimselfasamemberoftheGendarmerie,butwasrecognisedandcapturedonthe22ndofMay1945inBremen,Germany,byaBritishArmyunit.HimmlerwasscheduledtostandtrialwithotherGermanleadersasamajorwarcriminalatNuremberg,butcommittedsuicideinLüneburgbyswallowingacyanidecapsulebeforeinterrogationcouldbegin.Fearedbymany,butrespectedbyfew,manyhistorianshavearguedthatHimmlerwasmoremadebythosewhoworkedunderhimratherthanbyhisowndesigns.HewassurvivedbyhiswifeanddaughterGudrun,whostilllivesinGermanytothisday.

AdolfHitler

Bornonthe20thofApril,1889,HitlerwastheFührer(leader)oftheNationalSocialistGermanWorkersParty(NaziParty)andofNaziGermanyfrom1933to1945.InthatcapacityhewasChancellorofGermany,headofgovernment,andheadofstate,rulingasadictator.

Ahighlyanimated,charismaticandgiftedorator,Hitlerisregardedasoneofthemostsignificantleadersofworldhistory.Themilitary-industrialcomplexhefosteredpulledGermanyoutofthepost-WorldWarIeconomiccrisisand,atitsheight,controlledthegreaterpartofEurope.

Hitler’sattemptstocreateaGreaterGermany,specificallytheannexationofAustriaandtheinvasionsofCzechoslovakiaandPoland,wereoneoftheprimaryfactorsleadingtotheoutbreakofWorldWarIIin1939.TheembraceoftotalwarbothbytheAxisandAlliedpowersduringthistimeledtothedestructionofmuchofEurope.HitlerisalmostuniversallyheldresponsiblefortheracialpolicyofNaziGermany,theHolocaust,andthedeathanddisplacementofmillionsoccurringduringhisleadership.

Hopingtobethefounderofathousand-yearReich,hecommittedsuicideinhisbunkerbeneathBerlinwithmuchofEurope,andespeciallyGermany,inruinsaroundhimandtheRedArmyclosingin1945.

OttoKumm

BorninHamburgonthe1stofOctober1909OttoKummbeganacareerasatypesetterinhisearlyyears.HejoinedtheSAin1930andthenjoinedtheSSin1931.

HeservedintheDerFührerregimentintheearlyyearsofthewar,beforegoingontobecomeitscommanderin1941.AfterworkinginacorpsstaffpositionKummwasgivencommandofthe7thSSMountainDivisionPrinzEugenin1944.HesurrenderedtoUSforcesattheendofthewar.

OttoOhlendorf

Bornonthe4thofFebruary1907Ohlendorfinitiallypursuedacareerasaneconomistand

alawyer.HejoinedtheSSin28thofMay1925androsetotherankofSS-Gruppenführer.In1936heacceptedapositionintheRSHAundertheleadershipofHimmler.

WhenHimmlerorganisedthe4EinsatzgruppenhegavecommandofgroupDtoOhlendorf,whichconductedoperationsintheUkrainewhileattachedtothe11ththmonthperioditisestimatedthatthegroupliquidated90,000people.AfterthewarOhlendorfwaschargedatNurembergandwaspartoftheEinsatzgruppencase.Hewasfoundguiltyandexecutedonthe7thofJune1951.

JochenPieper

Bornin1915PieperjoinedtheSS-VTasameansofobtainingacareerinthearmedforces.Hismarksforschoolprecludedhimfrombecominganofficerinthearmy.HewasacceptedintotheLeibstandarte-SSAdolfHitlerandwasacceptedforofficercandidateschool.

HewentontocommandvariousformationswithintheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerandrosetotherankofSS-Standartenführercommandingthe1stPanzerregimentoftheLeibstandarte-SSAdolfHitler.HewastheyoungestregimentalcolonelintheWaffen-SS.HeisrememberedforhisroleinthemassacreofAmericanSoldiersatMalmedy.Hewasbroughttotrialafterthewarandsentencedtohang.Thiswassubsequentlycommutedandhewasreleasedfromprisonin1956.HelaterwenttoliveinFrancewherein1976hishousewasburntdownandhewasmurdered.

OswaldPohl

Pohlwasbornonthe30thofJune1892,inDuisburg-Ruhrortasthesonofablacksmith.In1920hewasacceptedintotheWeimarRepublic’snewnavy,theReichsmarine.PohlwastransferredtoSwinemündeinPolandin1924.

Oneyearlater,in1925,PohlbecameamemberoftheSA,andthenfinallyjoinedthere-foundedNSDAP.HewasappointedchiefoftheadministrationdepartmentinthestaffoftheReichsführer-SSandgiventherankofSS-StandartenführeronFebruary1,1934,andbegantoinfluencetheadministrationoftheconcentration-camps.

InJune1939,PohlbecamechiefofboththeHauptamtVerwaltungundWirtschaft(mainbureau[for]administrationandeconomy,partoftheSS)andtheHauptamtHaushaltundBauten(mainbureau[for]budgetandconstruction,partoftheReich’sministryfortheinterior).OnFebruary1,1942,bothinstitutionswerecombinedintotheSS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt(SS-WVHA,SSmainbureauforeconomicadministration)withPohlincharge;amongotherthings,theSS-WVHAwasinchargeoftheorganisationoftheconcentration-camps,decidingonthedistributionofdetaineestothevariouscampsandtherentalofdetaineesforforcedlabouruntil1944.

PohlwasmadeSS-ObergruppenführerandgeneraloftheWaffenSSonApril20,1942.In1944,Pohlwasputoutofchargeoftheconcentration-camps,withtheRüstungsministerium(ministryofarmament)overtaking;atthesametime,theresponsibilityforconstructionwasalsotakenawayfromtheSS-WVHA.However,Pohl

remainedinchargeoftheadministrationoftheWaffen-SSfortheremainderofthewar.

AftertheendofWorldWarII,in1945,PohlfirsthidinUpperBavaria,thennearBremen;nevertheless,hewascapturedbyBritishtroopsonMay27,1946.HewassentencedtodeathonNovember3,1947,byanAmericanmilitarytribunalaftertheNurembergtrialsforcrimesagainsthumanity,warcrimesandmembershipinacriminalorganisation,aswellasformassmurdersandcrimescommittedintheconcentration-campsadministeredbytheSS-WVHAhewasinchargeof.However,Pohlwasnotexecutedrightaway.In1950,Pohl’sbook,Credo.MeinWegzuGott,(Credo.MywaytoGod)waspublishedwithpermissionfromtheCatholicchurchthatPohlbecameamemberofagain.PohlwashungatLandsbergPrisononJune7,1951,buthemaintainedhewasinnocenttotheend,claimingthathewasonlyasimplefunctionary.

MaxSimon

Bornonthe6thofJanuary1899SimonservedasacorporalinLeibKürassier-Regiment.In1919hewasamemberoftheFreikorpsserviceinSilesiaagainstthePoles.BetweenthewarsheservedasasergeantintheReichswehrinCavalryRegiment16.Onthe1stofMay1933hejoinedtheSS.In1934hewasassignedtotheConcentration-campInspectorate.Onthe9thofNovember1934hewasappointedcommanderoftheSSguardunitatSachsenburgconcentration-camp.

Onthe10thofJuly1937hewasappointedcommanderofSS-TotenkopfStandarte1Oberbayern.Simon’sunitwasusedforpoliceduties(i.e.,roundingupPolishArmystragglersandmurderingpoliticalleaders,priests,intellectualsandJews)duringtheinvasionofPolandintherearareaoftheadvancingGermanArmy.In1943hewasthecommanderofSS-TotenkopfInfantryRegiment1oftheSS-TotenkopfDivision,wherehesawcombatintheWesternCampaignof1940andinRussiafromJune1941.HethencommandedtheTotenkopfDivisionforsometimeontheEasternFront.During1943-44hewascommanderof16thSS-PanzerGrenadierDivisionReichsführer-SSinItalyandHungary.HefinishedthewarasthecommandingGeneral,13thSS-ArmyCorpsontheWesternandSouth-westernFronts.

Aveteranofthepre-warconcentration-campsystem,MaxSimon’snamebecamelinkedtowarcrimesasearlyas1943.InNovemberofthatyear,aRussianmilitarytribunalsentencedhimtodeathinabsentiaforhisallegedroleinthekillingof10,000RussianciviliansinthevicinityofKharkovinthesummerof1943.Afterthewar,theBritishindictedSimonasawarcriminalforhiscomplicityintheSeptember1944massacreofItalianciviliansatMarzabotta(estimatesrangedfrom300toover2,000dead)inreprisalforpartisanactivity.FollowinghisinterrogationintheUnitedKingdom,SimonreturnedtoItalywhereaBritishmilitarytribunalsentencedhimtodeath.Thesentence,however,waslatercommuted,andSimonwasreleasedin1954fromWerlprisoninGermany.

InOctober1955,aGermancourtinAnsbachtriedSimonforanincidentthatoccurredintheGermantownofBrettheimon7April1945.Onthatdate,SimonorderedthecourtmartialandhangingofthreecitizensofthetownwhohaddisarmedsomelocalHitlerYouthmemberstokeepthemfromfightingU.S.troops.Twiceacquittedofthecharge(the

courtruledhehadbeenfollowingalegalorder),Simondiedbeforethestartofathirdtrial.

FranzSix

FranzSixstudiedattheRealschule,graduatedfromtheclassicalhighschoolatMannheimin1930andthenmatriculatedattheUniversityofHeidelbergwherehespecialisedinsociologyandpoliticalscience,receivingthedegreeofdoctorofphilosophyin1934.HethentaughtattheUniversityatKoenigsberg(wherehealsotookupthepositionofPressDirectoroftheGermanStudents’Association).In1936hereceivedthedoctoratefromtheUniversityofHeidelberg,andbecameDozentinthefacultyoflawandpoliticalscienceatKoenigsberg;later,hepassedexaminationsfortheVeniaLegendiattheUniversityofLeipzig.By1938hewasProfessorattheUniversityofKoenigsberg,andby1939,hehadobtainedthechairforForeignPoliticalScienceattheUniversityofBerlinandwasitsfirstDeanofthefacultyforForeignCountries.

SixbecameamemberoftheSAin1932andoftheSSandSDin1935.InSSheattainedthegradeofSS-Brigadeführer.OnJune20,1941hewasappointedChiefofVorkommandoMoscow.AccordingtoSix,thetaskofthisKommandowastosecurethearchivesandfilesofRussiandocumentsinMoscowwhentheGermantroopsshouldarrivethere.HearrivedinSmolenskonJuly25,1941andremainedthereuntilthelatterpartofAugustwhenhereturnedtoBerlin.TheVorkommandoMoscowwasusedinliquidatingoperationswhileunderthecommandofSix.Further,thattheseizingofdocumentsinRussiawasdonenotforeconomicandculturalpurposes,butwiththeobjectofobtaininglistsofCommunistfunctionarieswhohadthemselvesbecomecandidatesforliquidation.SixwastriedandconvictedatNuremberg.Sentencedto20yearsimprisonmentin1948,hewasreleasedin1952.

FelixSteiner

BorninPrussiaonthe23rdofMay1896SteinerservedinvariousinfantryunitsduringtheWorldWarIandrosetotherankofOberleutnant.Hereceivedanumberofawardsandservedinthepost-warReichswehr.

HejoinedtheNaziPartyandtheSAin1934andlaterjoinedtheSSin1935.Hewentontocommandthe5thWaffen-SSWikingdivisionin1940.Hewaslatergivencommandofthe3rdSSPanzerkorps.HewentontocommandvariousarmygroupswiththerankofSS-Obergruppenführer.

HewasgivencommandofArmygroupSteinerinwhichHitlerplacedhishopesforalast-minuterespitefromtheRussianoffensiveonBerlinin1945.Steinerrefusedtocommithismentosuchafutileoffensive.HewasawitnessatNuremberg.SteineriscreditedwithdevelopingtheassaulttacticsandrelianceonheavyinfantryfirepowerutilisedbytheWaffen-SSinsmallunitengagements.

JurgenStroop

Bornonthe26thofSeptember1895.StroopasaSS-BrigadeführerwasplacedinchargeofthesuppressionoftheWarsawGhettouprisingbytheJewsin1943.HewasaSSandHigherPoliceleaderandalsoamemberoftheWaffen-SS.ThisactionresultedintheannihilationoftheJewishpopulationafterafightlastingsome28days.HewasfoundguiltybyanAmericanWartribunalandsentencedtodeath.HewasexecutedinWarsawonthe8thofSeptember1951.

KarlWolff

Bornonthe13thofMay1900KarlWolffservedasalieutenantinWorldWarI.Betweenthewarsheheldvariousbusinessposts.

HejoinedtheNaziPartyandtheSSin1931.InJuly1933hewasappointedadjutanttoHimmler.HewaspromotedtoSS-ObergruppenführerintheWaffen-SS.WolffassistedinthedeportationofJewstotheTreblinkaexterminationcamp.HewasmadeHSSPFforItalyandsurrenderedtoUSforcestherein1945.

AfterthewarhewasinitiallytriedbyaGermancourtandsentencedtofouryearsimprisonment,butservedonlyaweekofhissentence.In1962hewasagainarrestedandchargedwiththemurderof300,000JewsatTreblinka.In1964hewasfoundguiltyandsentencedto15yearsjail.Hewasagainreleasedearlyafterservingonlysevenyears.

Appendix1:Waffen-SSRankStructure

Waffen-SSGermanArmyBritishArmy

Reichsführer-SSSS-OberstgruppenführerSS-ObergruppenführerSS-GruppenführerSS-BrigadeführerSS-OberführerSS-StandartenführerSS-ObersturmbannführerSS-SturmbannführerSS-HauptsturmführerSS-ObersturmführerSS-UntersturmführerGeneralfeldmarschallGeneraloberstGeneralGeneralleutnantGeneralmajorNilOberstOberstleutnantMajorHauptmannOberleutnantLeutnantField-MarshalGeneralLieutenant-GeneralMajor-GeneralBrigadierNilColonelLieutenant-ColonelMajorCaptain1stLieutenant2ndLieutenant

Appendix2:FeaturesofWaffen-SSOfficers

LevelofEducationofSeniorOfficers(%)

LevelofEducationObergruppenführer-OberführerandTotal%toBrigadeführerStandartenführer

ElementarySchoolingMiddleSchoolingQualifiedtoenterUniversityTertiaryQualifications6.627.521.3

35.529.731.438.218.724.419.724.222.9

Note:SourcedfromWegner1990.

DenominationsofSeniorWaffen-SSofficers(%)

RankProtestantCatholic

Obergruppenführer–Brigadeführer/Oberführer79.520.5Standartenführer82.917.1Obersturmbannführer76.123.9Sturmbannführer77.222.8Totals66.733.3

Note:SourcedfromWegner1990.Thesefiguresarenotindicativeoflatercancellationsofchurchmembershipandthetotalsdonotincludethosecaseswheredenominationscouldnotbedetermined.

ProfessionsofSeniorOfficersoftheWaffen-SS(%)

ProfessionObergruppenführer-ObersturmbannführertoStandartenführerandSturmbannführer

ArmyOfficers23.81.9ArmyNCOs8.78.8PoliceOfficials14.711.4OtherCivilServants6.44.1AcademicProfessions21.93.8Workers/Clerks7.911.4Farmers3.45.0Businessmen15.818.0Craftsmen9.827.1Noprofessiongivenorunemployed4.520.2

Note:SourcedfromWegner1990.ThesefiguresweregainedfromCV’sofSSOfficersandoftenmorethanoneoccupationwasgiven,hencethefactthatindividualmilitarygroupingswillexceed100%.

Appendix3:OrderofBattleoftheWaffen-SS

Waffen-SSDivisionsatthecloseofWWIINo.NameofDivisionTypeofUnitNationalityofUnit1stSSPanzerDivisionLeibstandarte

SSAdolfHitlerSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment1SS-PanzergrenadierRegiment2SS-PanzerRegiment1SS-ArtilleryRegiment1

PanzerGerman

2ndSSPanzerDivisionDasReichSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment3DeutschlandSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment4DerFührerSS-PanzerRegiment2SS-ArtilleryRegiment2

PanzerGerman

3rdSSPanzerDivisionTotenkopfSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment5ThuleSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment6TheodoreEickeSS-PanzerRegiment3SS-ArtilleryRegiment3

4thPanzerGerman

SSPanzergrenadierDivisionSS-PolizeiSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment7SS-PanzergrenadierRegiment8SS-Sturmgeschutzbattalion4SS-ArtilleryRegiment4

PanzergrenadierGerman

5thSSPanzerDivisionWikingSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment9GermaniaSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment10WestlandSS-PanzerRegiment5SS-ArtilleryRegiment5

PanzerGerman/Dutch/Norwegian/Danish

6thSSGebirgsDivisionNordSS-GebirgsjagerRegiment11ReinhardHeydrichSS-GebirgsjagerRegiment12MichaelGaissmairSS-Sturmgeschutzbattery6SS-ArtilleryRegiment6

MountainTroopsGerman/Hungarian/Romanian

7thSSFreiwilligen-GerbirgsDivisionPrinzEugenSS-GebirgsjagerRegiment13ArthurPhelpsSS-GebirgsjagerRegiment14SkanderbegSS-Sturmgeschutzbattalion7MountainTroops

GermanVolunteersWaffen-SSDivisionsatthecloseofWWIINo.NameofDivisionTypeofUnitNationalityofUnit

8thSSKavallerieDivisionFlorianGeyerSS-KavallerieRegiment15SS-KavallerieRegiment16SS-KavallerieRegiment18SS-Panzerjagerbattalion8SS-ArtilleryRegiment8

CavalryGerman

9thSSPanzerDivisionHohenstaufenSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment19SS-PanzergrenadierRegiment20SS-PanzerRegiment9SS-ArtilleryRegiment9

PanzerGerman

10thSSPanzerDivisionFrundsbergSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment21SS-PanzergrenadierRegiment22SS-PanzerRegiment10SS-ArtilleryRegiment10

PanzerGerman

11thSSFreiwilligen-PanzergrenadierDivisionNordlandPanzergrenadierSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment23NorgeSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment24DanmarkSS-PanzerBattalion11HermannVonSalzaSS-ArtilleryRegiment11VariousNationalitiesVolunteers

12thSSPanzerDivisionHitlerjugendSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment25SS-PanzergrenadierRegiment26SS-PanzerRegiment12SS-ArtilleryRegiment12

PanzerGerman13thWaffen-GebirgsDivisionDerSS(KroatischeNR1)

HandscharSS-WaffenGebirgsjagerRegiment27SS-WaffenGebirgsjagerRegiment28SS-PanzerjagerBattalion13SS-ArtilleryRegiment13

MountainTroopsBosnianMoslems

14thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(UkrainischeNR1)Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS29Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS30Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS31SS-ArtilleryRegiment14

GrenadierUkrainians

15thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(LettischeNR1)GrenadierWaffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS32Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS33Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS34Latvians

Waffen-SSDivisionsatthecloseofWWIINo.NameofDivisionTypeofUnitNationalityofUnit

16thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionReichsführer-SSSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment35SS-PanzergrenadierRegiment36SS-PanzerBattalion16SS-ArtilleryRegiment16

PanzergrenadierGerman17thSSPanzergrenadierDivision

GotzVonBerlichingenSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment37SS-PanzergrenadierRegiment38SS-PanzerBattalion17SS-ArtilleryRegiment17

PanzergrenadierGerman18thSSFreiwilligen-PanzergrenadierDivision

HorstWesselSS-PanzergrenadierRegiment39SS-PanzergrenadierRegiment40SS-PanzerjagerBattalion18SS-ArtilleryRegiment18German/HungarianVolunteersPanzergrenadier

19thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(LettischesNR2)

Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS42VoldemarsVeissWaffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS43HeinrichSchuldtWaffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS44SS-ArtilleryRegiment19

GrenadierLatvian

20thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(EstnischeNR1)Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS45Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS46Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS47SS-ArtilleryRegiment20

GrenadierEstonian

21stWaffen-GebirgsDivisionDerSS(AlbanischeNR1)SkanderbergWaffen-GebirgsRegimentDerSS50Waffen-GebirgsRegimentDerSS51SS-ArtilleryRegiment21

MountainTroopsAlbanian22ndFreiwilligen-KavallerieDivisionDerSS

MariaTheresiaFreiwilligen-KavallerieRegimentDerSS52Freiwilligen-KavallerieRegimentDerSS53Freiwilligen-KavallerieRegimentderSS54SS-ArtilleryRegiment22

CalvaryHungarianVolunteers

23rdWaffen-GebirgsDivisionDerSSKamalatertobecomeDivisionNederlandWaffen-GebirgsjagerRegimentDerSS56Waffen-GebirgsjagerRegimentDerSS57Waffen-GebirgsjagerRegimentDerSS58Waffen-GebirgsjagerArtilleryRegimentDerSS23Thisdivisionwasdisbandedin1944andrenamed

the23rdPanzergrenadierDivisionNederlandMountainTroopsBosnianMoslems/laterDutchWaffen-SSDivisionsatthecloseofWWIINo.NameofDivisionTypeofUnitNationalityofUnit

24thSSGebirgsDivisionKarstjagerWaffen-GebirgsjagerRegimentDerSS59Waffen-GebirgsjagerRegimentDerSS60Waffen-GebirgsjagerArtilleryRegimentDerSS24VariousSlavicNationalitiesMountainTroops

25thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(UngarischeNR1)HunyadiWaffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS61Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS62Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS63SS-ArtilleryRegiment25

GrenadierHungarian

26thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSS(UngarischeNR2)HungariaWaffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS64Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS65Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS85SS-ArtilleryRegiment26Thisdivisionneverreachedfulldivisionalstatus.

HungarianGrenadier

27thSSFreiwilligen-PanzergrenadierDivision(FlamischeNR1)LangemarckSS-FreiwilligenGrenadierRegiment66SS-FreiwilligenGrenadierRegiment67SS-FreiwilligenGrenadierRegiment68SS-ArtilleryRegiment27Thisdivisionwasregimentalstrengthonly.

PanzergrenadierFlemish28thSSFreiwilligen-PanzergrenadierDivision

WallonienSS-FreiwilligenGrenadierRegiment69SS-FreiwilligenGrenadierRegiment70SS-FreiwilligenGrenadierRegiment71SS-ArtilleryRegiment28Thisdivisionwasregimentalstrengthonly.

PanzergrenadierFlemish

29thSSWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDer(RussischeNR1)latertobecomethe(ItalienischeNR1)

Thisdivisionwasregimentalstrengthonlyandwasinexistenceforonlyashorttimeduetotheunreliabilityofitspersonnel.

Russian/ItalianGrenadier

30thSSWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDer(WeissruthenscheNR1)Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS75Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS76Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS77SS-ArtilleryRegiment30

GrenadierBelorussians

31stSSFreiwilligen-GrenadierDivisionSS-FreiwilligenGrenadierRegiment78SS-FreiwilligenGrenadierRegiment79SS-FreiwilligenGrenadierRegiment80

GrenadierGerman/HungarianWaffen-SSDivisionsatthecloseofWWIINo.NameofDivisionTypeofUnitNationalityofUnit

32ndSSFreiwilligen-GrenadierDivision30JanuarSS-FreiwilligenGrenadierRegiment86SchillSS-Freiwilligen

GrenadierRegiment87KurmarkSS-FreiwilligenGrenadierRegiment88SS-ArtilleryRegiment32GrenadierGerman

33rdWaffen-KavallerieDivisionDerSS(UngarischeNR3)latertobecomeWaffenGrenadierDivisionDerSS(FranzosischeNR1)Charlemagne

Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS57Waffen-GrenadierRegimentDerSS58SS-Artillerybattalion33GrenadierFrench

34thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSSLandstorm

NederlandSS-FreiwilligenGrenadierRegiment83SS-FreiwilligenGrenadierRegiment84SS-ArtilleryRegimentGrenadierDutch

35thSSPolizeiGrenadierDivisionSS-PoliceGrenadierRegiment89SS-PoliceGrenadierRegiment90SS-PoliceGrenadierRegiment91SS-PoliceArtilleryRegiment35Thisunitneverreacheddivisionalstrength.GrenadierGerman

36thWaffen-GrenadierDivisionDerSSFormedfromtheDirlewangerSonderKommando,thisunitneverreacheddivisionalstrength.GrenadierMixed

37thFreiwilligen-KavallerieDivisionLutzowSS-FreiwilligenKavallerieRegiment92SS-FreiwilligenKavallerieRegiment93SS-ArtilleryBattalion37GrenadierGerman

38thSSGrenadierDivisionNibelungen

ConsistedofinstructorsandcadetsfromtheBadTolzofficertrainingschool,thisunitneverexceededregimentalstrengthandwasinexistenceforaboutamonth.GrenadierGerman

Note:BytheendofthewarmanyoftheseunitsdidnotrepresentthenominalstrengthofanormalWaffen-SSDivision,whichwasusuallybetween15,000to20,000men.Thenumberingofexactregiments,etcmaybeincorrectasduringthewarthenumberingofvariousunitswaschangedregularly.ItshouldbenotedthattowardstheendofthewarmanyoftheWaffen-SSdivisionsweredivisionsinnameonlyandtheiractualstrengthwasfarbelowthetheoreticalstrengthofthetypicaldivision.Thenationalityoftheunitsrepresentsonlythemaincountryoforiginofmeninthatunit.InmostcasestheofficersandNCOsoftheunitwereofGermanextraction.

Appendix4:StrengthoftheWaffen-SS

DateWaffen-SSOfficerCorps

31stDecember193716,90231stDecember193822,7181stMay194090,6381stDecember194223,609931stDecember1943501,04930thJune1944594,443

Note:SourcedfromWegner1990757120324539558

Unknown15,722

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Endnotes

1ThetermWaffenmeantfightingorarmedSS.ThetermSSwasderivedfromtheformationofprotectionsquadsorSchutzstaffeln.TheSchutzstaffelnwereprotectionsquadssetupbytheNaziPartyinthe1930sfortheprotectionofHitlerandotherleadingNazis.2AlthoughthestudyofSteinwouldappeartobedated,itisstillconsideredoneofthemostimportantstudiestoeverexaminetheWaffenSS.3NameforthecombinedGermanArmy,AirForceandNavyduringWorldWarII.4Mobilekillinggroupsthatfollowedthecombatforcesandoperatedbehindthefrontlinescarryingout“cleansing”operations.5DuringtheinvasionofRussiacodenamedOperation“Barbarossa”therewereinitiallythreemainGermanArmyGroupscalledNorth,SouthandCentre.6Thesemanuscriptswillbereferencedinthebibliographyundertheindividualofficer’sname,e.g.MaxSimonC-058.7ThetermSAisreferringtoSturmAbteilungorstormtroopersorganisedbytheNaziPartyforprotectionagainstattacksbyrivalpoliticalgroups.ThesetrooperswerealsoknownastheBrownShirts.8NotethatthereisdisagreementbetweenresearchersastothestrengthoftheWaffen-SSattheconclusionofthewar.Sufficetosaythattheestimatesofthestrengthvarybetween500,000to900,000soldiers.9MilitarisedcomponentoftheSSinthepre-warperiod;directpredecessoroftheWaffen-SS.10Itshouldbenotedthatsomeofthesedivisionswereonlyofregimentalstrength,whileothersexistedforonlyshortperiodsoftime.Thisisespeciallytrueofthedivisionsformedtowardstheendofthewar.11Myitalicsandaddition.ClearlyhereHitleriscomparingtheWaffen-SStotheregularGermanarmedforces.12TheseformationsincludedthepremierorclassicdivisionsoftheWaffen-SSsuchastheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerandtheDasReichDivisions.13ThemaindifferencebeingthataPanzerDivisionhadaPanzerRegimentonitsestablishmentwhilstaPanzergrenadieronlyhadaBattaliononitsestablishment.14Thisarmyconsistedofthe1stSS,2ndSS,9thSS,12thSSDivisionsandotherarmyunitsasatthe5thMarch1945.15EliteunitsoftheGermanArmedForcesinWorldWarIIworearmbandsbandsontheiruniformsdenotingthenameoftheirunit.ForexamplethemenoftheLeibstandarteSSAdolfHitlerDivisionworeaarmbandontheleftarmwiththewords“AdolfHitler”wovenintotheband.

16Thusmakingthem“oldpartyfighters”andseeminglymorealignedtothepoliticalandideologicalideasoftheNaziParty.17TheBerghofwasHitler’sresidenceandheadquarterssituatedintheBavarianAlps.18HitlerYouth–Divisionformedfromyouthsfromthismovement.19HitlerissuedtheCommissarDecreetothetopmilitarycommandoftheGermanarmedforcesin1941statingthatallpoliticalcommissarsoftheRussianArmywhowerecapturedweretobeeliminated.HitlerfurtherstatedthatanysoldierwhoundertooktheseactionswouldbepardonedforbreakinginternationallawandthattheRussiansoldierwasnotentitledtotheprotectionofTheHagueConventionasRussiahadnottakenpartinit.20The1stSSInfantryBrigade(Motorised)waslaterusedtoformtheWaffen-SS18thSSPanzergrenadierDivisionHorstWessel.21Milgram’sresearchinvolvedsubmittingagroupofstudentstoanexperimentinwhichthesupervisorwouldrequirethemtoadministerelectricshockstoanunknownperson.Inrealitytheshockswerenotdeliveredbutthevictimsactedasiftheywere.Milgramfoundthatmostofhisstudentswerepreparedtodelivertheshockstoquitehighlevelsifinstructedtodosobythesupervisor.22FRcase491.23Ungvarygivesthestrengthofthegarrisonassome44,000(includingsome11,000wounded)atthetimeofthebreakoutandcitessome700GermansoldiersreachedtheGermanlines.HedoesnotstipulatehowmanyofthesewerefromtheWaffen-SS.24Steinputsthefigureclaimedat20,000.25GDRcase1083.26RussianStateSecurityservice.27FRcase428.28FRcase486.29FRcase062.30FRcase428.31NotethatWestwoodhasadifferentspellingforthisofficer’sname.HehasitasWilhelmBreimaler,whowascommanderoftheIIIbattalion,1stSSMountainRegimentPrinzEugenfromthe31July1943.32WaldemarFegeleinwasaSS-HauptsturmführerinthebrigadeandthebrotheroftheBrigadeandlaterdivisionalcommanderHermannFegelein.33NotetheWilliamsonlistsonly22awardsforthisdivision.34Myitalicsandinsertion.35TheforbeareroftheWaffen-SSFlorianGeyerCalvaryDivision.36ThetermusedtodescribetheGeneralSS.37Dalmatiaisamountainousstripofland,insouth-easternEurope,lyingalmostentirelywithinCroatia.38ThisfiguredoesnotincludetemporaryorsubstituteHSSPFleaders.

39Thisunitwouldlaterformthe24thRegimentofthe11thPanzergrenadierDivisionNordland.40NotethesefiguresdifferfromthefiguresquotedbyYerger,butthebasicargumentisunchanged.41ThisunitwasusedinJuly1943toformSSPanzergrenadierRegimentNorgeofthe11th

SSPanzergrenadierDivisionNordland.42OfnoteisthatothersourcessuchasYergerandBenderandTaylordonotlistFitzthumasbeingincommandofanyWaffen-SSunits.43Myitalicsandinsertion.44CasenumberIX,knownastheEinsatzgruppencase.45Thisfigureisnotexactasthereissomedifficultyinarrivingataprecisenumberofvictimslistedinthereports,however,mostsourcesstatethatatleast500,000peoplehadbeenmurdered.46ExactservicedetailswereunavailablefortwoWaffen-SSofficers,sototalequals28.47Notethatfiguresforthetotalofthosekilledvary.Theaccuracyofthefinalfigureisnottheissuehere,rathertheapproximatefigureservestoillustratethescaleofthecrime,whichistheimportantpoint.48Bochwasinvestigated,butfoundnottohavecommittedanycrimes.493rdSSTotenkopfDivision.50TheVolksdeutscheMittelstelleorVOMI,theorganisationthatensuredtheprivilegesofethnicGermanslivingoutsidethebordersoftheGermanReich.51Sonderatkionindicationmassexecutions.52CaseIVbeforetheNurembergMilitaryTribunal,commonlyreferredtoasthePohlcase.53SchulzechangedhisnameafterthewartoSchulze-Kossens.54Death’sHeadformations,armedfull-timecomponentoftheSSduringpre-warperiod,taskedwithguardingconcentration-campsandpoliticalprisons.55FRcase223.56NotethatMacleanlistsnoWaffen-SSserviceforKremer.57Casenumber1beforetheNurembergMilitaryTribunal,alsoknownastheMedicalCase.58CaseNumber37,VolumeVII.59FRcase223.60FRcase247.61FRcase111.62FRcase649.63ThemassacrebyWaffen-SStroopsataFrenchvillagethatoccurredin1944.64Führerheadquarters.

65InternationalCriminalCourt,putinplacebytheUnitedNationstocombatcrimesagainsthumanity,genocideetc.66Myitalicsandinsertion.67Ofthese,twoWaffen-SSofficerswereidentified,butnoaccuraterecordsretheirWaffen-SSservicecouldbelocated.Asaresulttheyhavenotbeenincludedinthisanalysis.Thereforethetotalfortheanalysisis28officers.68OstheerwasthetermgiventotheGermanforcesfightingontheEasternFront.69TheGermanequivalentofahomeguardorpeople’sarmy.70Amass-producedantitankweaponintheformofahollowchargegrenadelauncherthatcouldbecarriedbyoneman.71GDRcase1156.72CommonlyreferredtoastheBattleoftheBulge,whichtookplaceinDecember1944andwasthelasteffortbytheGermanstowinontheWesternFront.73Myinsertionanditalics.74Myinsertionanditalics.75Myinsertionanditalics.76Thisregimentwouldlaterformpartofthe8thWaffen-SSCalvaryDivisionFlorianGeyer.77FRcase570refers.78TheReichSecurityHeadOffice,whichincludedtheGestapo,SecurityPoliceandCriminalPolice.TheRSHAwasresponsibleforthedirectordersfortheEinsatzgruppen.79TheRomeStatuteisthelegislationgoverningtheoperationsoftheICC.80Myitalics.81Myitalics.82Myitalics.83Myitalics.84TwelveofficerscommittedsuicideandfivewereexecutedafterRussiansandYugoslavwarcrimetrails.85Myinsertionanditalics.86OberkommandodesHeeres(OKH)orArmyHighCommand.87Thislegionwouldgoontoformthe23rdWaffen-SSFreiwilligenPanzerGrenadierDivisionNederland.88ThisobjectiveassessmentisbasedontherulesofacceptablebehaviourthatcanbedeterminedbythereadingofsuchinternationalagreementsastheGenevaConventions,TheHagueConventionsandeventhemoremodernstatutesoftheICC.89NotethatMacleaninhisstudyofcampofficersdoesnotindicatethatZiereiscompletedanyactivemilitaryservicewiththeWaffen-SS.