OSPREY·VANGUARD 46

Steven 1 Zaloga

Colour plates by Peter

VAI\GUARD SER IES

EDITOR : ~ •• IARTIN WJ~DROW

T ext by STEVEN J. ZALOGA

Colour plates by PETER SARSON

OSPREY PUBLlSHI:-IG LO~DON

Published in I gS8 by Osprey Publishing Ltd M ember company of the George Philip Group 12 14 Long Acre, London WC2E gLP © Copyright 19M Osprey Publishing Ltd

This book is copyrighted under the Berne Convention. All rights reserved. Apart hom any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, cri ticism or rcvicw, as permitted under the Copyright Act, 1956, no part of this publication may Ix· reproduced, stored in a re trieval system, or transmiw.·d in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, me<:hanical, optical, photocopying, ret:ording or otherwise, without the prior permisSion of the copyright owner. Enquiri es should be addressed to the Publishers.

British l.ibrary Calqloguing in Publicalion Dala

Zaloga, Steven J. The Renault FT Light tank. I. Armoured combat vehicles. Renault tanks, FT, to 1945 I. Title III. Series 623.74'752

I I. Sarson, Peter

Filmsct in Creat Britain Printed through Bookbuilders Ltd . Hong Kong

Author's Note The author would like to express his thanks to many friends who were instruillental in the preparation of this book. Osear Ikuna Royo was kind enough to

provide extensive details of the Spanish use of the FT tank. J anllsz I\-lagnuski provided details of the FT in Polish and Soviet service . .lust Probst suppl ied many rare photos, and information on the usc of the FT in the Baltic States. Pierre Touzin and George Halin provided a number of rare phows.

Artis t 's Note Readers may care to note that the origina l paintings from which the colour plates in this book were prepared are availablr for private sale. All reproduction copyright witatSQ('vcl" is retained by the publisher. All enquiries should be addre%Cd to:

Peter Sarson 27 Cobham Road J].ournmouth Dorset

Tht' publishers regn·t that they ("all eTHer into no correspondence upon this mallrr.

Background and Conception

The Renault I;T was the world's first modern tank. h pioneered lhe basic configuration that tanks have followed from 1917 to {oelay: the main gun was placed in a fully travcrsible turret, the driver in front, the turret in the centre and the engine to lhe rear. It was produced in larger numbers than any olhcTlankoftheGrcal War. Nlos! First World War tanks vanished and deservedly so after 1918. The Renault IT remained in service to form the seed afound which most of the world's largest tanks forces "ere built: in France, the United States, and the Soviet Union, as well as in many smaller armies. It was widely used in the colonial wars and civil warsof,hc inler-war years, and even saw combat on many of the fronts of the Second \Vorld \'\lar.

The Renault FT was the brainchild ofGen.Jean­Baptiste Estienne, the father of the French lank forct'. Estienne was a visionary , enamoured of new tt'cnnolog:ics. Before the war he pioneered the use of indirect fire tactics for french artillery, and was the inspiration for the usc of aeroplanes for artillery spotting, As a you ng colonel of the artillery in 19 t 5, Estiennc convinced the French Army that ar­moured tractors cou ld help solve the stal emate of

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trench warfare. ESlicnne was put in charge of a new branch of the French anillery, the arlillerie'd'assaul or artillerie speciale, He out lined the req uiremen ts for the first French tank, which resulted in the Schneider CA. I cliar d'assoul in 1916. The Schneider proved to be a biller disappointment for Estienne and the French Army.

Estienne had assumed that it would be a surprise weapon, and that it would face only Gcrman machint: guns and rifle fire. However, Britain had also been working on si mil ar armoured vehicles. There was lillie technical co-openllion between the Allies; and the Brili~ h tanks were employed in combat in September 19t6, months before the French were ready. I n response to their appearance the German Army began to develop coulller­measure~, notably by moving light artillery up into the forward trench lines when a tank attack seemed . . ImmInent.

The first use of the Schneider tanks at Berry-au-

The inidal production model of the Renault IT u~ed this lyl"' of cast turret, This venion is ,,180 distinguish"b~e by the c"st sUp<'rstructure front in the driver's are". Thill typ<' of turret could only mount the 8mm Hotchkiss "fodide '9'4 heavy machine gun, and wa~ quickly sUI"'rceded by the 'omnibu.' turret ",Wch could be lined with "ith"r gun or machine gun. This paMicular IT W"II one oflhose provided to the US Army, (Nation"l Archives)

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The p ... uoty .... of th .. R~Dauh FT differed from th., production v"hid"" ill "'any I ... all de,ail •. The lurnl c upola was inlrgral 10 the lurret C'OOlOting, Ilnd wall n.odified on Ih., production lI.nks to include .. mu"hroom cover ror beller ..... nl;Jlllion. (R ..... uh )

Rac on 16 17 April 1917 was a disaster. Of 121

tan ks taking part, 8 1 were len behind 011 the battlefield either broken down 01' damaged; of these, 57 were comp!t:: tely burnt out. The problems had been both technical and tactical. The Achilles heel of the Scluwidcr was its fuel tanks, which were located in the forward section of the tank. When hit by art illery, they were easily ruptured, spraying the inside of the lank with petrol which then quickly exploded. The fighting at Berry-au-Bac had also highlighted the lack of proper tank-infantry co­ordination, This was improved; but the Schneider char (/'assoul never became a decisive influence in the trench fighting due to its small numbers and technical deficiencies,

EsLienne's unorthodox methods in gaining approva I for the construction of the Sch neider led to a grea t deal of resentment in the halls of the

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miJitary-industri<l 1 bureaucracy in Paris, Esticnne'l rivals in Ihe Strvia Techniqlle Alliomobilt' decided 10

build a ' proper' tank. EsLienne's vehicle had a short 75mm howitzer: theirs would have a more powerful long-barrelled 751lun gun. Estiennc's had tv.o machine guns: theirs wou ld have four. On paper, the new char (/'assOIlt St Chamond was much mort imprcssiw than lhe smaller Scluwidcr. Il owe\"er, it had been designed by engineers with no apprt"Cia­lion of trench warfare. It suffered from scrioU! technica l problems, and was derisi vely referred 10 a! an 'elepbant 011 the legs of a gazelle'. Like thr Schneider, it served ill dwindling numbers through the bilter fighting in the su mmer of 1918. ,

The Light Tank Idea Following the construction of the first Sehneidl-rsin the spring of I 9 16, Estienne beg;:lIl considering long­term requirements lor the Artillerie Specialt. (''all'

struction of the Schneider had made ESlicnnc awarr oflhe indllslrial road-blocks in building a vast flert of armoured vehicles to overwhelm the German trenches. French military factories were in a

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(,4&0".,) The standard m.od,,1 of the Renault FT dispensed with tbe " ... , froDlliuperstructur" in favour of~ionpl"r riveted. armour plate_ This vehide is fined with the first type of omnibu. lorr .. !, tnade of flal armour plate_ It is a "h"r e .. no .. armed with the: PuteauI 37",m g.>n. (Nadoruo.l Archiv". )

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(Below ) Renaoll wanled 10 d.,vo:lop a round turrel for the IT honk, hoping 10 ","cur.. beUer balli"li" protec tion. This otnnibu!I turret, made of ca~ t and forged ",,,e) plate, waS the Ihird and final round turr,,' d ..... doped (or the Renault FT. II wu manufaclun:d by the Acie.-ie", Paul Girod in Ugine. (National Archiy"", )

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d~pcrate state; the mass mobilisation of skilled manpower in 19' I, and tht, horrendous loss oflife in the fiI'bt two year'! of the war, had left the fanories wi thout a skilled workforce. Armour plate was at a premium, as w('l'e high-powered engines. The Schneider facilities v.-ere overtaxed producing their first 400 tanks, which were nOI completed until 1918. What was needed was a small, cheap armoul'ed macilin(' gun vchicle, tailored to the limitations of the French wartime industries. I nJ lil y 1916, Estiennc raised the issue with thc aula manufacturer Louis Renault at a chance metting in the Hotel Chtridgt'. Renault had carlier refused 10

become involved in the medium lank programme, citing his firm's lack of cxperienc(' with trackt"<i vehicles and commitments to other programmcs. BUl Renauh \\as intrigued by the light tank idea, and agreed to begin design sludies of such a vehicle. The new vehicle , .. as called a char milrailltur

machjne gun "chick . . A wooden mock-up of the char milrailltur was

complcted in October 1916 and shown to ESlicnne. He cou ld not convince the Dircrtor of ~Iotor Services, Gen. 1 lourret, to authorise production; so on 27 ~o\'cmber 1916, he weill 0\,('1' his hcad to Gen. J offre, the commander-in-chief. J onre was an

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On", of Ih'" mOre di lll incI;"'" aspecl!! of.' ",nch lanJ.:.s du ring th", Gr",al W .. r _Ii Ih", U"'" of playing card 8ynlbol" to di8tingui8h • ub.unil.i Ih", .pad", o n a circl", Indical'" lankll of Ih", '51 Mctio.., ' . 1 Company. Th", ptnna nl on the cupola indical.,. Ih", tYJM' of tank, red for . elo ... e_"O" .nd blu", for. elo_ .. ... it .... ;/I" ... ·.

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Allhough the fT'" armour was proof apin.1 machine " ..... and Iin ... 11 a rl'U", hil l could knock ofT . p .. 1l on th", insid", of !.lit .. r.nour pial"''', A .. a r.,sult, IT Cr "wll wore th",,,,,, ung • ....,. prolectiv", ra« lIl a .. k!!, a. also u sed hy 8riti. h tank cn ...... (Natio...,.) Archi".,. )

old friend of l::stienne, and su pponcd his req uest for 1,000 of Ihcs(' \'ehicles. On 30 NO\'ember 1916 h( wrote to the Undcr-Secl'cu.lr) of State for War. Albert Thomas all this subject. Thomas was only willing to allow the construction of a si n~1t

prototype as he was not H'r) elllhused by th~

project; and, his obstruction over the next few months considerably delaYl'd the programme. Thomas authorised Ihe flr<;1 prototype on 1'1

December 1916 with the stipulation that it bt complcted by :\ Ia rch '917. Renault and Scrre had already been working on Ihe design as a personal prOJect.

On 30 December 1916 Renault showed a refined, full-sca le \'.'ooden mock-up to the Consultati\r Committee of the Assault Anillery. Gen. Mourret felt that the celllre of gravi ty was too fttl' to the rear and the tank too light; anOlher member suggcsted that ventilation was inadequate and would result in asphyxiation of the crew after ten minutes of firing . One young army officer complimented the elegance of the design but sarcastically referred to it as a

'tharmanl Joujou' - _Oa charming toy'----oflittlc comba t utilit)'. However, the remainder of the committee did not agr(Oe, and on the basis of a seven-to-three \'ote, the commiU('e accepted the design and approved the production of an init ial batch of 100

chars milraillrurs. This vehicle soon became labelled the Renault

fr. There is some confusion as to the origin of the designation IT for this tank . I t has been incorrectly dc-scribrd as an abbrevia tion for Jaible lOllI/age (light \\eight ) or jranchiJsfur de Iranchifs (trench crosser). In (,1.ct , however, it was simply a Renault product d('!;ignation given to seq uemial o rder to all Rcnault automobiles and vehicles like AG (the l\ larne Taxi ., EG (artillery tractor . FU (heavy lorry), etc. Officiall y, it became kno\\n as the char tiger Rmault

FT modlle '9'7, wh ieh has sometimes led to the unofficial abbreviation 'F'r· 1 7' .

The loo-tank order of December 19 t6 was amended in February 1917 to 150 tanks. The first char milrailieur prototype was completed at the end of J anuary 1917. and put through tests at the

Renault fac tory at Billancourt. ESlienne had the prototype scm to the Arlilime SplciaJe centre at Champlieu for further tests to correct any remaining problems; he was awa re tha t recent political changes could doom his project, and he was insistcnt that the ellar mitraiileur should be perfected before its official trial s in April.

Bureaucratic Delays In the wake of the horriblc blood-letting a round Verdun in 1916, Gen. J offre was sacked, to be replaced by Gen. Robert Nivelle. Estiellnc lost his protector, and Gen. Mourrct cominued to make known his lack of enthusiasm for the cheap little Renaull char milrailJeur. Nivclle, an arti llery officer like ESliennc, did not share his en thusiasm for the new branch of the artillery rorce . As a result of his

A pair of Am"rican Renault FT. a' Va r " nn"" durin" th" ArAonn" For"", figbtinA on . 2 O C:lober '9'8. The Americlln .. followed the Frnocb pan" rn of ph'r m ll Clrd markin"" bUI c;arried the m DO the Iurrel .. id.,..a .. d ~.r.add.i .. s ... lndi .. idual lurrel number. Thi .. lank i .. fiued with a n omrubu .. lu ...... 1 with 37m ... lIun. (Nation.a.l Arc:hh·.,.)

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A column led by" clUI" CanO" wilb Girod lurret of AS 337, '3· BeL, 505~ Rqt, w hile ,"upporting US Iroop. in ,he Argonn .. For""1 fiShl.ing n r ar MonlC"con on 10 OClobc:r '9,8. (National ArchiveI )

experiences around Verdun ~ivclle wished to place grca lcr emphasis on the production of tractors for lowing heavy artillery, and not on tanks. As a result Albert Thomas, as the t>. t inistcr of ArmamenLS, informed Renault thai priority was to be given to the completion oran existi ng contraCI for artillery tractors at the expense of the lank programme. Thomas was very unhappy with ESlicnne's proposal to build a thousand of the Renault char mitraifltllr, (<-'ding it wou ld completely disrupt the already overtaxed Frcnch wa r industry. However, the Consu l tauve Commil tcc of the Assa ult Artillery su pported ESlienne enthusiastically, and on 10

April voted for the production of 1,000 more Renaul t FT tanks. They even managed to win over Gen. Nivclle, who reversed his earlier decision on 13 April i9i 7, now giving priority to tank production.

The official trials of Ihe prototype wcrc conducted at Ma rly on '2 1 -'2'2 April 1917. The

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Renault vehicle was judged clearly su perior 10 tIr ex isting Schneider and St. Chamond tanh Esticnnc suggested that somc of the tanks might br fitted with a small 37mm gun derived from the 37mm modN~ 16 TR infalllry gun. This wouk require redesign of the turret. Several cOmmillef members felt tha t the accommodation for tIr machine gunner was too small and cra mped, au! would lead to asphyxiation: it would be difficult kI a soldier over Sflfi in. ta ll 10 operate in the tuntl On '29 April 1917 Albert Thomas received nCI'<~1j some of thc criticisms of the Renault rr frOll! disgru ntled opponents of the projcn. and used this as an excuse to suspend the p!annl'd production yet again. He claimed concern that a singk soldifr cou ld not operate the (Urret weapon; but lit suggestion tha t another matt be added to the tuntl implied prolonged delays while the tank "'. comple tely redesigned. He had also heard that sonr observers wanted the tank to ca rry [0,000 rounds« machine gun ammunition instead of the [.8:10 a llowed in the current design!

Estienne and R enaul t- who was already geariIf up 10 produce the tank- were furious o\'er tbt

deci~ion . During the eourse of the trials the Nivclle oifcnsin' had been launched on the Chemin des Dames, and it was an uttcr failure. Esticnnc was even more convinced ofthc nct.-d for masscs of light tanks to overcome the trench war stalemate. Thomas, a prominent socialist and a correspondent for I.'J/umaniti, was invitl'CI to Russia to celebrate the overthrow of the T s.1. r and the accession to power of Kcrcnsky's socialist Provisional Govern­ment. While Thomas was out of France, Esticnnc ~ta~('d another series of trials for the bencfit of a number of officers who had fought on the Chemin des Dames during the first French tank actions on 16 April 1917. Their enthusiastic reaction to the Renault FT collvinct::d cvcn Gen. i\ lourrct that it had reached a sufficient stage of dcvelopment for production , and Thomas's orders wcre again revoked. [t was also dccided that of the J , 150 ta nks on order, 650 would be armed with the new 37mm gun and 500 wilh the 8mm Hotchkiss machine gun.

~ d . ar .'KN,,1 TSF _to a ra dio tank ",.r .. ion o r th ,. R ...... ul t rr, fi u rd with a £",t"r radio in a fi" t:d 8u pt: r l truc tu r... 11>,.,. Wt . e no, o"uiy popula r wi,h the t . oop .. due ' 0 ,h e d ,. lica. ,. u ,,,.,. or th,. rad io, a nd .he prop"ns i ty or ,h,. a ntenna (n ut litted here) . n b..com ,. ro uled in roliage. T hia p arlicular ",.h id,. it .. Am trican-b uih e><a.mple on th ,. Sil<.Ton Tank ch as .. is.

By th(' time that Thomas returned to France, repercus.sions from the Nivellc offensive prevellled further interference in the Renault J-~r tank programme.

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Enter Petain

On 16 April 19'7 the French Army launched lhe ill­fated i'\ivclle offensive on the Chemin des Dames. As mentioned earlier, this battle also marked the first use of French tanks ncar Bcrry-au-l3ac. The German Army had learned the k"SSOns from their original encounters with British tanks, and the French chllrs were as unsuccessful as the offen~i\'e itself. But the battle had far more profound effects on the French Army than on its infant lank force. The scluandcring of another 120,000 casualties so soon after the conclusion of the bloody Verdun fighting was too much for the average poilu to bear: his fighting spirit had finally been sa pPl'CI . The failure of the Nivelle offensive triggered a series of disturbances in the ranks oflhe army, culminating in the great mutiny of 3 May.

I n the wake of the crisi~, command of the army

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fell toGell . Philippe Petain on ' 5 ~t ay '917. Petain was of a vcry different sort from prcvious commanders-in -chief. Unlike most !',·cnch officers of the limc, he \\-as no disciple of Grandmaison and his obscssion "ith offensive tactics and the mythical lfan lJitaftofthe French soldier. H is tourofeommand during the Verdun fighting had convinccd him of the bankruptcy of Grandmaison 's influences, epitomised by the mindless slogan ' L 'll1l(/(lrt, tal/dace, loujours I'audact'. To retain, a more appropriate slogan for the nature of tactics in the age of the machine gun was 'firepower kills'. Appalled by the caliousll(.'SS • of many staff officers towards tht· massive losses of infantrymen, he searched for Ile\\ tactics to overcome the dominance of defensive machine gun and artillery fire. As a result of the mutiny, Petain limited lhe activit) of the French Army to a se ries of small local aclions while trying La

rebuild moral e during the summcr and autumn of ' 9' 7 . Tan ks were used on a small scale in several of these operations.

LI.CoI. Geor s" s. P allonJr . comma nded t h .. ,wo Am .. r ic:a.n FT ballalio n. in ,h .. S .. td before being w01loded. lI .. i ....... 0 h .. re in fron' of .. cll.r c . .. o .. with Girod turr'" a l Ih .. Langr u lank c .. ntre in Ih .. l urnm .. r o f ' 9' 8. (Na t iona l Arch iv ... )

Petain quickl y appreciated tha t the new lank-I, even if t hey did not Ii\·c up 10 I he extravagant daioo of their ad\'ocatt·~ like Estienlle, wcrc \e~

importan t morale-boosters for the disheartcned infantry. As the French :\ finister of t\ lunitions latn quipp('cJ: 'There a re t \VO ~inds of infantry; men who have gone into action with tanks, and men who havt' not ; and the formcr never wallt to go lntr. action withollt tanks again.' Phain was not o\'erh concerned with Estienne's promises that tan~

would provide the key breakthrough weapon: he viewed them as the glue to hold loget her hi.-. d ishea rtened troops, and a means to help rcvivt their fighting spirit.

P~ tain listened \\ ilh int('r(·st to Estienne's /lew

idt·as, like the ' bee theory'. Estienne argued that the loss of surpri se after the British usc of tanks in 1916 mean t I hat Ian ks would incvi labl y be confronted by artillery, The Schneider and SI. Chamond tanks were too thinl y annaured and too big lo survi\'c ina duel with artillery: no tank could be constructed whieh would resist the standard German n mm field gun . I nstcad of confronting German defenct'S with impregna ble armou r, they could be con' fronted \\ ilh mass. Fiw little Renault I,~ rs could be built for every heav), tank fin' little 'bee' Lanks with five machine guns or carmon \\ ere hett er than

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IA"N) A elo ... 6,",r ... l TSF of AS 337. '3' BCL, 505" RAS, during 1M "P" .... tions in th~ Argon .. e For ... , On ,0 OClObcr '9.8. The PI ....... all' be ."",n "",.ending from .. moundns on the '4lilll"U"'1I", to an aUachm",nl on .he tail. Only Ihrft AJim"'1 ",",,"-ioftl IheK vehiclea before the war endHi. IN ....... Archi" ... )

(Bdow) The Char IT 758S "nillc:ry la .. k WI .. ' fined with .. 7smm Biockhaul Schneider 'pdo;,./I:' howitzc:r'. It .1110 had auachmeni points lind other fu:turellO JH:rmit the ua" of a .. Or.hlieb (our-melre bridg" for Inneh cro."mp;. II wa. planned to add on .. Oar fT 7585 10 .. ach tank ."e'ion, briugi,,! it up 10 II;" la .. k ... bu. they • ...-f'fll'oo ..... e in the war '0 hav .. mllch ",THO"

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a single big Sl. Chamond with one gun and five machi ne guns, and far less vulnerable. The FTs would be much more difficult targets due to their small size, and 'bee swa rm ' of ITs would overcome the small number of German gUlls by wt'ight of numbers. Pctain heartily endorsed this notion, and on 20 J une decided to inc rease the number of ITs ordered from 1,150 to 3,500 at the expense of proposed new medium tanks; he viewed thi s as an essentia l factor in his e!forts to restore the French Army. He madt· his troops a promise: there would be no major offemive Llntil the Americans and the new tanks ~arri V('d. The new Renault IT tanks would be held back until enough were ready for a massive offensive in the spring of 1915.

Into Produ ction The many delays a nd bureaucratic obstructions were reduced by PCtain 's arrival as commander-in­chief. After further debatcs with I)ctain , Albert Thomas was reli('ved as ~ I inister of Armaments on 12 September 1917, and his place taken by Louis Loucheur. There were still formidable ind ustrial problems, however. Renault proved unable to cope

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with the expanding number of orders, and so Loui, Renault agreed to waive any produclion patcnll and encouraged the ~ Ii nislry to extend production to ot her factories. T hese eventually included Beriict, Schneider's SOJ\ IUA facility and Delaunay-Bcllcvillc. In <\ddi lion, it was proposed 10

include American 'and la ter Italian) factorin. Pl ans and a single tank were dispatched to the L"Sin September 1917 with the aim of producing 1,200 more Renault IT tanks for the French Army as \'iNI as sufficicnt tanks fo r the liS Arm)'. As or I

Decembcr 1917, lhe total production order wa' expanded to 3, 100 tanks with the omnibus !Urrt\

( 1,950 37mm gun, 1,150 machine gun ); 700 tanh with a 75mm BS short howitzer; and 200 TSF radiI) tanks. On 17 FebrualJ 1915 the totals were a1{ain shifted, to 1,000 machine gu n tanks, 1,830 37mm gun tanks, 200 TSV radio tanks, and 970 tanks wi th 75mm BS howitzer or o ther types to be decided. B~

October 1915 the total orders had oo'n raised lOan

The Gennanll "'ph,red a n,unber or R", .. auh FTa; lbi._ a ppears to ha"e had a rat_turret added. So far all ' 11 kIlO"'''. Gf,rDtan ...... k u .. its .cll".II),,,!Oed "'p ... rr:d fT. duriag l1Ie ....... (Nalional Arc hi".,.)

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astounding 7,8:20 tanks in France alone. The factory breakdown was as fo llows (October 1918 orders in parentheses): 1,850 (3,940) tanks li·om Renault, 800 (1,995) from Bcrlict, 600 (1,135) from SO:-.t UA, and 280 (750) from Delaunay-Bellcville.

Oneoflhc main design problems was the turret. The new, second-model cast turret with a mu~hroom cover for vcmi lalion was suitable only for machi ne gun armament , and proved very difficult to manufacture. A small number of these "'ere completed in 19' 7 before pnxlunioll shifted to a simpler polygonal turret made of sheet armour plate, called the omnibus turret. Thc advantage of the polygonal omnibus turret was that it could be adapted to moun! dlher the 37mm Plltcaux gun, or the 8rum Hotchkiss machine gun. In 1917 Renault produced only 84 wnks, which wat; considerably behind schedule. Eventually a new, round omnibus turret was also developed. The Aci/ ritS Paul Cirod in 19ine, which manufactured the cupolas for Renault , produced this turret. Two experimental round omnibus turrels were developed as one-piece castings, but the standard production type was fabricated from cast and forged pieces. Girod began

Th .. An""riCil" "'''I"$ion of the R e ... ult IT wU callt!d the Si..o:_ Ton Tank M .19' 7. It h.d a numb..r of d .. tail difT .. ren«s from the Fr .... c.b "ehid...., ~uo::h.s the e"haulIl mum .. ron the I .. r. s ide and the shape oflh .. co" .. r ror th .. machine gun. The Amerinn ..... chine gun tanks were fil"$l fiut!d wilh .30 cal. Marlin machine g uns, and s uhsequ e ntly with I.h .. Modd '9'9 8rowning. (Nat;onal A...,hi" ... )

producing fOund omnibus turreL'I in 19[8, and the tanks built at Renault in 1918 used both types of Illrr("[s. Girod also supplied the rollnd turret to the other FT manufacturers.

Deliveries of the first Renault F'r char Ug« (light tank) were funhel" delayed by problems ill the supply of armour plate, some of which came from Britain , and in the supply of armament, especially the new 37mm gun. Nearly three-quarters of the first tanks were found to have serious defecls; often, tl1( .. '8(, had to be returned to tht' factory for correction. There was a serious shortage of spare parts, especially at unit level. Manyofthc first units were hobbled due to two seemingly minor problems, the poor quality of the fue l filters and the fan-bells. For example, inJuly 19[5ten per cen t of the tanks in the 503' Regiment were immobiliscd due to brokt'n ran-belts. Both problems continued

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ne fint Sovi", tank .. ..,e ..... Dumber of Renault IT. c:aplUred rrom the F .... nch unit AS:J03 .. .,. .. Od"" ... in ' 9 ' ''' Th.i";$ on" of the R"'nault . of the Special PUrpol" Armoured Troop, . Ions"ide" P ""rlelili armou rO'd car in Kh"rkov in '9 ' 9-

to plague the Renault tank until the Armistice, ameliorated only sLightly by greater availability of spare parts in the laler months of the war.

By February 1918 there wen.' still only 108 Rcnauhs at the main training ground at Champ­lieu , and none had armament. By the beginning of April some 4-53 tanks had been delin:rcd from thc factories, of which 43 were combat-ready, 122 were unarmed and being used for training and 248 were silting at Chalais-Mcudon waiting for army acceptance testing. The first light lank battalion, the I~ BeL (Ballalion dts chars Ugm) was formcd, without complete equipment, on 18 February 1918. On 21 March it receivt.-d a full complemcnt of 7S tanks, but without armament. Two morc compan­ies were formed in March , but without tanks.

Unit Organisation The tank battalions consisted of threc tank companies and numbered 75 tanks at full st rength. The original plans called for a battalion to be made

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up of 30 37mm gUll tanks, 4' machine gun lanks and 4 TSF radio tanks; this mixture was seldom matched in practice. The TSF radio tanks did nOI begill arriving untilJuly, and there was a shorta~j' of machine gun tanks. The tallk compa nies had a headquarters (one TSF tank in theory, a 37mmgun lank in practice ); three sec tions with live tanh (three 37mm gun tanks, two machine guntanks:;a rcs('f\"(' ('Chelon with, five replaeem(,nt tanks; a supply and recovcry section with thrce tanks 1110

gun, one machine gun ); a company workshop, and a transpon detachment. This accounts for 7'1 oftht 75 tanks in the battalion; the remainder were in baualion HQor rcserve. Later, the companies \leer issucd no reserve tanks, and a battalion reserve <i about 25 tanks was rctained under central comru; tlwsc Wl're sometimes used 10 form a provisional company during thc figilling. The nominal organisation of the tank units quickly fell apan ia combat due to the high level of attrition. It was 001

unusual for a unit to lose half its strength in a sin~ day of fighting (mainly due to mechanical breakdowns and ditching), and its strength am equipment would vary wildly as tanks werr rtTov('rcd and bmught back into action over Ihr

( Abo~) The While Run;.. foren .... d"r (dn. I>flllk",n ... ced ~ ... " ... I R ....... h n-., lik", thi. knocked ..... , enom.ple. ~ Wfl"e appanndy I"f, .yer from. th., ilI.r,ned Fn .. "b oped'tOon to Od ..... in '9'g. UUln P .... bst )

--

-

(BdoHl) ln '9'9 Brilain JM'""Il.ded Finland to loan Ih""" new R"n.uh FT. 10 d • ., Whit" Run;.n fore ....... d"r Ge ... V .. denie • fighting toward. P",,, ... burs_ However, th"y woo", nol uM!d in the 6gh,;n8 and wert! """, .. ,uaUy relurned to FiAlalld. Uust P .... bst )

• I

"

-following days. In May IgrBilwasdccidcd torarm larger units, the RAS (Regiments d 'Artillerie Speciale) which consisted of three battalions plus support units, The first orthe new regiments was the 50" RAS, consiSling orthe ,',2< and 3' BeL. Tank companies were numbered sequentially, e.g. AS 301, 302 and 303 being the companies of lhe [' BeL.

Into Combat

I t had been the dream of all the ta nk advocates, both British and French, to be able to hoard their tanks for one grand onslaught against the German lines. Esticnne had prevailed on retain to build lip a la l'ge fo rce of Rcnauhs before pUlling them into action. Petain had planned to wait un til a st rike force of I 2 balta lions (864 tanks) was buill up before committ ing the Rena ult FT to action; however, wi th all the delays, the expectations were whiltJed down to six battalions, lotalli ng 432 tanks, for I

~ t ay 19 18. This was not to be. On 2 1 M a rch 1918 the German Army launched its grea t Ludendorff ;pcacc offensive' on Ihe \Vestern Front , and, the

,6

•

T h .. Polis h ' SI Tank R .. gim .. n t lIOa w conIi M .. rabl .. com/iI "g"inll l BoI~hev;k (o r cn in ' 9110 . Du .. 10 th .. ir prolonged . with li.tl .. . .. .,hoi .,,,1 " uppor t, lhe r e w ere rreque n. b rnkdowt C r .. w" h a d .0 beeom .. adept a t improvi"ed recov .. ry,. vehicl .. i llO boeing u s ed 10 low a n o ther IT.

(Abo .... ".(11,) A Po lish Re ... uil .T -.ned A. ida, pbotOS¥ a ('er th .. ' 9"" 6 g htinS' 11", P oli llh ' 01' T a nk R '"l!;m_ •• b."ed On the Fr .. nc h S05~ RAS, and waOl orisinall )' a ..... fran .,o-Poli ~h unit. Uanun. M aJil nus ki )

(BdoUl ri.fll l) The Poli llh C WS Central Truck Wo rks hop . 2,5 . ... iDin", ,ank" u llinS Re n " .. " ooompone nt., but .. ordinary non-armo .. r Ii . H I pia, ... Th .. y w ...... ni .... " ·· b hu ... · .. k ('iron-plat .. ' ) h y th .. ., .... w ... Uan .. u. M agn .... ki '

Germans wcre soon on the doorstep of lhe ITIi

French lan k base at Champlieu. The first 3im guns wen: nQt delivered to the ,< and 2 ' BCL llIJ

the night of 23/24 March. The German offenst forced the abandonment Champlieu, and se\'eJ1I disruptc.-d the process of organising and training ~ firs t 1"1' uni ts. The mOllth of April was spenl tl)' to get the first three battalions fu ll y equipped;q ready for combat.

The firs t uni t committed to a ction was the 51 Regiment, numbering about 200 Renault tanks. The regiment was committed 10 suppon actions of Gen. Mangin's six infantry divisions in attempt to stave a ll' Germa n attacks towards

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During the RifWar in Mo.....,co, 'he Fr~nch made ext.,tuliv", .... ., of light armour for eoavor KCOrt, guard dUly .Dd inf."try support. lI"r", IT tanks of the 6::z~ RCC form .. ni!lhlotimf! ' •• lIer in the AII.~ Mountain. du .. in!!: the pacification campaign. of thO! urly '93<"" in the c",nlr .... Fo .... igo ~iDn Berli .. 1 VUDB annoured In .. 'liporter can j ... , be flee ... (Naliolla' Arc h.ivu)

Foret de Rctz 011 the approaches to Paris. The three baltalions wefe broken up into small groups of 30 tanks or so to support specific infantry allacks. On 31 ~Iay 1918 the first Rcnaults emcred combat alongside Moroccan infantry around Ploissy· Chazcl lc. For the next two weeks the Rcnauits were used in a series of small local attacks and COulltcr­

atlacks, sometimes in lhe dense underbrush of the forest itself

The Renaults proved their wOI·th immediately. Their smaller size and the revolving gun turret permitted their usc in forested areas where lhe French medium tanks or British rhomboids would have been nearly uscless. The forested areas were traversed by narrow tracks which would have stopped vehicles any larger. The tanks' presence stiffened the French infan try, even if co-operation

,8

between tanks and foot-soldiers was "hoo uniformly poor. I n more open tcrrain, the tJ

were usually able to overcome initial GCnTli"

machine gun nC5ts and install the poilus in the !VI

positions. But there were never enough Renau nor did the French infantry hold terrain the \I'

they did in 19'5 or 1916. The small Renault um quickly becamc exhausted in both men machines due to the clamour fO I· their su pport .

. The Renault tank had proven ilself from technical standpoinl. I t was highly regarded b)" troops, and its performance in sustained operau. with minimal technical su pport was miraculous Grea l War sta ndards. liS impact on the COUIY

the bailie was minimised however, by its use in \ small numbers with infantry unaccustomed wOI·king alongside lanks.

On 18 J lily 1918 the French Army began oflensive near Soissons, which saw one of the la commi tments of French armour to date, indu 245 Renaults, 100 St. Chamollds and Schneiders. The little Rcnaults were the vang of the attack. After passing the first wa\"

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infantry, it was often the Renaults which provided the impetus for the advance. They were the critical ingredient in determining how far and how fast local attacks would penetrate. The advances were often halted only by the lack offrcsh infantry to hold on to the terrain seized by the tanks, or to continue to press the attack forward.

But the real problem was the conunued lack 01 sufficient tank-infantry training. The tank units had trouble enough bringing their units lip to fu ll strength, and there was never enough lime or tnough tanks to practice tank-infantry co­opera t~on. Evcry single operational tank was hoarded for comba t usc, since training ted to their rapid mechanica l deterioration. The tanks were ~ood for only a few hundred hours of operation before thcy I'cquired a complete overhaul. T ank· infantry training usua ll y on ly occurred on the baulcfield itself. Few infantry units showed any skill in operating with tanks until their second battle. An

AItn' the G r n l W. r , the Fr ... n c h Army eXp"rintnJlOi!'d with. modified Kekreue 5u 5...,., . io ", wi th .. ubber tAd .. _ m e:tim e:" ~ tbe Mod~IO! ~, 2J. Tank Con.pa o y AS ;08 u...,d thue npuimrftla lly d ur'n& th e Rif War in 19:150 but th e: lrack ll prOVfd .... lOui t.bl .. fo r 'U'" ;n lIu ch rough l e ...... i.o. (Na tional

ArclU""1

~ ,~ • •

American officer later wrotc of thc Renault tank units: 'Givcn seasoned divisions trained with and assisted by tanks, nothing can stop them ' .

The growing effectiveness and numbers of the French lank units in the summer 1918 fight.ing led to a number of German attempts to develop tact.ical improvements to dea l with them. The appearance oflarge numbcrsofRenaults in the summcr fighting heralded the end of the hegemony of the machine gun on the batt lefield. In carlier French operations there were nevcr cnough tanks to challenge machine gun nests except in narrow sectors. Xow, the German tactica l response was to begin to fonify machine guns in small concrete pill·boxes. These began to appear in large numbers in the late summer of 1918. They did make it more difficult and costly for the Renaults to overcome the machine guns, since it was usually necessary for a gun-armed IT to approach close enough to fire directly into Ihe gun slit. At such close ranges, the German machine gunners were lrained to fire at the vision slits on the Renault; the bullets would not penelrate lhe Renault's thick frontal ar'mour, but spall knocked off ncar the point of impact on the inside of the tank could injure or blind lhe crew.

•

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'9

20

The pillboxes were an inadequate response to the 'l'rowing number of Renaults, since the more fluid conditions of the ba ttlefield in the autumn of 1918 made it more difficult to establish elaborate sta tic defence lines. The German Army began to

appreciate that a more satisfactory response woul d be the ficldingofa counterpan to the Renault to act as a mobile, protected machine nest. However, the German LK 1 light tank was not read y for mass production in 19 18.

Ficld guns remained the principal threat to tanks: of the 44-0 Renaults lost during the war, 356 \len: lost to artillery. French tactics streSS<.-d the need for artillery· fired smoke rounds to prevent

Anti·tank rifles did not prove to be a major threat to the Renault, although they could cause penet ration at close ranges. I t was generall y found that the polygon turret was less vulnerable to the AT rifles than the round Girod turrets as lhe integrity of the fiat armour plate was higher. Mines were a serious problem ror the small Renaults and could easil y blow a tank apart. They were usually or an improvised nature, and not used in large enough numbers to have much effect on tank combal, dcstroying on ly [3 Renaults during the war. As far as is known, during the [918 fighting the Renault never encountered a German armoured vchicle in combat.

enemy gunners from engaging the tanks at long The o ther main enemy of the Renault tank was ranges. However, close co--opera tion with the the anti·tank trench; far more Renaults were put French artillery was difficult to achieve. The main out of action (temporarily) by trenches than by any advantage that the Renau lts had enjoyed over enemy weapon. The Renaults were simply too earlier French or British tanks was their small size small to cross the wider ditches. Large shell holes and greater numbers. They were much more a lso posed a real problem. The French tried to difficult targets to hit, and were fas ter than either overcome this by both tactical and technical the SI. Chamond or Schneider. The German solutions. Renault units were not supposed to be artillery was seldom available in large enough committed to overcome a trench system without numbers, and so si ngle gun si tes could be attacked supporting engineer troops or specially trained by scveral tanks at once. A German soldier wrote of infantry . The infantry or sappers were su pposed to his unit 's encounter with American Renaults ncar break down the t rench walls with shovels at a few 51. ~ I i hiel: ' Fleets of small tanks, each armed wi th a points to permit passage, but, this seldom worked in l.ingle gun or machine gun, appea red with the practice . The technica l solution was to field rapidity ofweascls in and behind our gun positions bridging tanks. In the la ter months of the war, the with this weird rabble spewing up like the spawn of R enault units were scheduled to receive a special hell'. In the early autumn or 1918 some Gcrman support version of the Renault tank, armed with a units began inu-cxlucing tactical changes which 75mm BS 'petoirt' short howitzer. T his su ppon tank stressed the need to mass anti-ta nk equipment into was also fittl.-d with a ttachment points to p<:rmit it to d&mivc: clusters, the aim being to prevent the carry a small bridge on the front which could be laid larger number of tanks from picking off isolated gun over anti·tan k ditchcs. The war ended berore this !itcs one·by·one. This practice never became programme could be put into action, \\'idcspread enough to have much effect. Instead, . Mechanical problems stoRl)cd more Rcnaults the light tanks became more numerous and than any other cause but trenches. The f.'ln·bclts dangerous. were a constant headache right up to the end of the

,<460 .... ) I" '9"7 tbe us M. rl"e Corp!! Ligbt Tank PI.toon, Easl eo. .. Expedilio ... ry Force, wa" d.i "p.tcbed 10 Cbi .... duri..,; * turmoil in Sbangt" •. ;. II w •• "'Iuipped with SiJI:·Ton Tank., IftII here being broug ht ... ho r e. t .. the '9"011, Ihe " .... n .... llet . thue t ... I .. w •• modified by incorpor.ting •• hield in front . d.e l un cover. (N.tio ... . 1 Ard,jvn)

"10 .. ) A .. umber of R e ..... 1t &-T. we..., .cquired by the ..... Iord Ch.og Tao-LiD in the . g-:rotI.ad .... rved iD hi . pri .... le )iaaUuri ... Army .pi ... ! other warlord •. Al"ter hi . . ....... i. MriO" by ,be j . pa"""', hi •• 0" permiued. Ibe iDcorponoo" of doe I ........ intO Cha", KAi •• hek '. N.tio .... t Revotution.ry ,""y. He..., they .re .., ... n in openlion around '9"19 in northe ..... 0,; ••• (N. tio n. t Arc hi ... .,. )

war. I n one action, an American Renault IT company used up more than one new fan· belt per lank in less than a day. The problems were caused both by the poor quality of the belts and by driver inexperience; the belts could be broken ifthc engine was suddenly revved up too fast, or could snap after a cold start. After prolonged use, they tended to

swell and begin to sli p. This was an a ll·to-frequent occurrence which led to evcn more serious problems: if it went unnoticed by the driver, the

engine overheated, the engine cylinders jammed or broke the piston rod , and eventually the crank case could be split. No technical solution for the problem was found during the war aside from careful driver training and frequent belt replacement. The dire consequences of this seemingly minor problem high ligh t the basic immaturity of the aUlomouve technology on which the early tank was based, as well as the exhausted stale of the French war industries.

Rejuvenation of the Assault Artillery By the late summer of 1918 the Renauh 1=-1' was fi nally becoming available in large numbers. By Augus t over '2,000 had been delivered, and the pace of product ion was increasing. Two more regiments were fO l'llled in June, and one eaeh in July and August. By September there were 21 French and two American FT battalions. The American

22

battalions were supposed to be equipped with GS­manufactured light tanks; however, these were nOl yet available, and so the French Army agreed to provide equipment for three light tank battalions. The initia l commander of the US tank battalions was Ll. Col. George S. Patton. ( I nlereslingl~ cnough, the commander of the tank training centlt in the United States was another officer who would become famous in the Second \ VorId War Lt. Col Dwight Eisenhower.) The Rcnaults were ilwoh-ed in ten batt les after the Soissons ont:nsive, usually in company or battalion strength. Thc next major employmcnt camc on 28 August 1918, when seven battalions from the 50'2' , 503' and 505< Regimenu

J a pan acquired a nun.ber of R .. na ult NC '1.7 .. xport ta ..... ., which were a mode rni",ed v .. u ion of the ~,. In J apanttc j; .. rvice the y we r e known a s I.h .. T ype 119 E t8u 8 , a nd a n ..... h .. NI during I.he fig hting near Sha n g ha i, China, in 193" (National An:hiv.,.)

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.. • • .. • • •

were used to suppon the French Tenth Army around Crccy-a u-MoIll /Crouy during live savage days of fighting. Coinciding with British actions in Flanders, the fighting pushed the Germans back from the last scra ps of territory won during the LudcndortT offensive.

\\'hat was significam about Ihe summer fighting 'ftas not so much the terri tory regained as the changing tactics. The stalemate of the trenches was finally ending. Machine gun nests could be readily eliminated by the tanks, permilling the infantry [0

advance relatively unhindered fo r distances that would have been unimaginable in Ig l6 or 19[7. The attacks were not necessarily preceded by heavy artillery bombardment, since the resulting craters hindered the passage of tanks.

The American Renaults The American 344th and 345th Battalio ns were first blooded in the fighting ncar SI. Mihiel on 12

Srptembcr 1918. Their real trial-by-fire came later in the month during the Meuse-Argonne Forest battles which began on 26 September and dragged on through 1 November '918. The Amcrican tank battalions were supported by three French bat-

Lithuania purchalJed 12 FTa in '9230 armi ... , ch~m with a Ma.im mac hine-s;u ... Tb~a~ tank" a~r ... ed io th~ tank bact.tion at Radviliaki. in tb~ '92011. UUllt Prob •• )

IaJiom, making this operation one of the largest involving the Renault IT during the war. Throughout the fighting, only French-built tanks were used .

The US Army received 5 14 Renault .. ~rs during the · cou rse of lhe war. The American tank production programme never had any impact on the fighting due to persistent delays. Fo ur Renaults and a set of plans were shipped 10 the US in 1917, bUI the plans had to be convened from their metric measurements in o rder to use US machine tools. In addition , the early versions of the Renau lts shipped to the US were virtually hand-built, with many sma ll va riations in design. Not a ll of the bugs had been worked out on the Renault , a nd so there was a cons tant strea m of changes coming from the French r.'l.clOrics. The American-built Rena ul t, codenamed the 'Six-Ton Special Tractor,' differed in many small details from the French original. A bulkhead was added between the engine and crew compart­men t, and a self-sta rter was added to the engi ne.

23

, )

The RenaulL IBCV engine proved impossible for US firms, and so a Suda engine was adopted in its place.

The US government ordered 4.440 'Six-Ton Tanks Model 19 [7' from three assembly plants: the Van Darn Iron Works, Maxwell Motor Company and C. L. Best Tractor Company. The first lank was not completed at the Van Dorn Iron Works until October '9 r 8, and 64 were finished by the end of the war. Ten had been shipped lO France and arrived before the Armistice, bUI not in time to see any fighting. By the end of 1918, 'log had been completed, and it was decided to finish a total 0[950 tanks based on the supply of finished parts and other malerial on hand when the war ended. These were completed in '9[9 and formed the bulk of the US Army's lank force wel l into the [9305 along with 213 Renault I;,)s brought back from France.

Italy had received three FTs in June 1915, but the French proved unwilling to provide enough to form combat units. Plans to build the Renault FT in

The Soviet" built the MS.. lisht taJilt-lat .. r called th .. T.,""'" '9,,8-3 ' , bued On the R .... ault fT desi", . Unlik .. the FT'" w .. re armed with both a 37mm ca .. non and a ... parat .. mad';. sun. Some w .. r .... till in ~erv;ce in '94" (Nation.al Arch.i~fl·

Italy were cut short by the war. After the war hal! embarked on its own light tank, the Fiat 3001 which was derived from the IT.

The Final Offensive On 26 September 1915 seven Renault batlali(ll began operations in Flanders and Champagne part of the final Allied offensive. The Seplcmbtt October fighting was marked by wretched weatlw: and determined German resistance from hea\ fortified positions. Nevertheless, machine guns artillery alone could no longer stop a detcrminr, infantry attaek if bolstered by tanks. Three rno: regiments, totalling a further nine banalions, WCl

committed later in the month on olher fronts asp!l of the general offensive. The actions of the Frerr

•

s , • , , • j

d , , 1

h

I: Henault FT Char Canon, 'Le Tigre': 2nd Co., 1st Section of unidentified regiment; Westen!. Front, 1918

2: Henau1l FT Char Canon, 'LouJou', ofunidentltied unit; We.tern Front, 1918

s: Renault FT Char Canon. 'Le Nain Jaune ', otunidentified unit: Western Front, 1918

A

B

I: Renault FT. 'Passe Pal' Tout'; 1st Co .. 2nd Section. 2nd Un.. 1st Polish Tank Itegt.; Lodz. 1920

3: Knt8noye SorDlOvo M Tank, 7th Tank Unit; Red Army, Moscow, 1927

2: Renault FT 'Freedom Fighter Comrade Lenin'; Red Army. M08COW, 1919

• •

•

•

!: RelUlult FT Char Canon, Co. C, mlh Tank Un., 1st US Tank Bde.; St. Mihlel, Sept. 1918

SiI·Ton Tank. USMC Light Tank Platoon; East Coast EJ;peditionary Force, Tientsin, China.1m

,

•

, •

Rear bull marking

c

1: Renau1t F"l'{mod). 3n1 Co .. Lithuanian Tank Dn.; Had viliaki8, 1926

INfANTFRIA, N'I

Starboard side

INf-'NlrRIA N'1

D

2: Renau1tFTTSFradiotank. Spanish Anny; Spanish Morocco,

'920

•

Starboard side

•

Manc.hukuo Army insignia

1: Renault FT. Tank Co., I&t Cbine8e Cavalry Ode .. National Revolutionary Army; Manchuria. 1929

Unidentified NRA turret iNlign1a

2: Renault FT, I8t Tank Co., Brazilian Army; lUo de Janeiro, 1924

E

I: Renault IT Char Canon, French Air Force, 1940

F

•

2: Rena.ult IT Char Canon, 6S"BCC; Aleppo, Syria., 1940

•

1: RenaultFT CharCanon, Autonomous Tank Co.; Port Lyautey, Morocco. Nov. 1942

2: PU<pfw 730(0. Luftwaffe airfield security unit; Occupied France,

'944

•

G

1: French A88au1tArtUleryman, 1918

H

Beret insignia

2: French Tank Crewman, 1937

3: French Tank Crewman. UMO

tank banalions have aHracted lillie historical attention. In the 19200 and [930S, the advocates of mechanisation ignored these encounters as mere examples of primi tive infantry su pport tactics. They did not fit into the grand dream of sweeping ollcnsives by massed formations of tanks \\ ilh deep breakthroughs.

Judged by Ihe high standards of the tank enthusiasts like Esticnne and his British counter­pans, the French tank actions in 1915 \\ierc not particularly impressive. But the dreams of the tank pioneers were unrea listic given the primitive sta te of Ihe equ~pment available in [9IS. The litt le Renaults were not really capable of any prolonged operations; after a few days of fighting, they were mcchanicaJly exhausted. Few units had more than half their strength aner a couple of days of hard fighting and, inevitably, a fair perceillage of tanks were stuck in trenches and shell craters. The Renaults had a maximum range of on ly about 25 miles before refuelling, and refuelling was a very cumbersome adventure in heavily shelled areas since lorries could not reach the tanks. Fuel had to be brought up on sledges towed behind tanks.

Judged by more realistic standards, the Renault units had accomplished their task. The French Army, which had been nearly as badly broken in the spring of 19'7 as had the Russian Army, was rejuvenated and returned to the fight. While the credit for this can hardly be pinned to the Renault alone, the availability of large numbers or light tanks was an enormous morale booster for the weary infantry: the poilus no longer faced the machine guns a lone. Instead, they could advance behind the cover oft he little tanks, watch ing as thcir ncmesis, the machine gun nest, was smashed and ovcrrun by the tank. There were no grand drives in 1918 for the Renaults, only a monotonous string of brutish liuJe engagements between Renaults and Germa n defensive positions. These skirmishes may not have represented the birth of b1i1zkn'eg, bu I they certainly heralded the end of trench warfare.

A total of 3, I 77 Renault r·- rs were built during the war, of which about 1,950 came from Renault. \fter the war Renault comple ted over 570 tanks, and total production was over 3,Soo ranks or all models (not counting American production ). The Renault proved to be a staple of French a rms rxports after the war. It also saw more combat usc

in the inter-war years than any other tank. I ts small size made it ideally suitable ror shipment to distant lands, and its simple construction served it well even in primitive conditions.

The Renault FT Tank 1919-1939

The Great War may have ended the fighting in Western Europe, bUI in other areas hostilities continued. V,,'ith the collapse of the Tsarist Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires a dozen small wars broke out over the spoi ls. Frcnch tank units werc scnt into Central Europe and the Balkans to keep the peace. The end of the war also saw ferment in some of the colonies and imperial holdings in Africa a nd Asia. The Renault F'T saw combat in a surprising number of these wars. The Renault was small enough to be transported easi ly bysea or rail, and was the hi-tech weapon Mits day; many an emerging army sought Renault tanks as much for prestige as utility, much as jct fighters are acquirc..'<i today by Third World States.

Russia In the autumn of 1915 the 3' Cie. of AS 303 was secretly transferred to Romani~l via Salonika in an attempt to buttress Romanian plans to re-enter the war on lhe Allied side. The tanks wcre landed 011 4 October [gI8, but did not sec any fighting due to the confused si tuation at the time. They were reloaded on ships, and SCI onTor another adventure, this lime in revolutionary Russia. The company was commanded by Gen. Esticnne's nephew, Capt. Gayet. J t landed at the Black Sea port of Odessa on IS December 19 18.

Odessa was a pretty rough town eV('n in peacetime, a seedy and more provincial version or ports like Marsei ll es. Under Ihe conditions of' civil war, it had degenerated into a particularly pestilent hole. The tank company sum~red from the same morale problems as the troops of the two French and two Greek divisions in the area. They were not en thusiastic about risking their necks to sort out Russian problems now that the Great War had ended. To add further cosmopolitan Aavour, there

33

was a Polish division stationed in the city, formed from former draftees of the old T sarisl Army plus a rag-tag assortnH.'nt of half-hearted R ussian units. The tanks \\'(.' n ' first used on 7 February '9 19 in conjullction with a While Russian armoured train 10 sUpJXJrt a Polish infantry attack near TirasJXJI. T he company laler su pported Greek troops ncar Bcrezovka, where the firsl lank was abandoned due to mechanical problems after it had been burnt. T his became the first SO\'iet tank. I t was refurbished and scm to f\ loscow as a gift to Lenin, and later served as tht· pattern for Ihe KS tank.

On 11 1'I larch 19'9 a further five tanks were lost in an inauspicious encounter \\ ith a Bolshevik armoured train during actions against the Bol­shevik 1St Zadn ieprovskiy Division; this was probably the first engagement in which the FT had

Italy had ori5 ina lly planned 10 n,anufacrure th e Renauh • .,., bUllbu e p lao a ne~er ".a te ri a li s ed. lns lead , produ.:lio n be,;an in '9'9 of a locally improved ve rs ion, the Fial !JOOO. Thi. Fiat 3<MK)Mod.,.., w ilh 37 401lun, ia id",nlific:d b y ila markin5a ... th ", mount oflh", compa n y eomma nd",r (while di lle). 2nd Co., 4th 8...., ' a t T ..... R~im"'nl .

34

engaged an enemy armoured vehick. FOUl' ofthCSt' were salvaged by the Bolsheviks , and were sent to the Kharkov Locomotive Factory (KhPZ ) ror rebuilding. The) \\ere used to form the Special Purpose Armoured Troop, \\ hich consisted of two sec tions of armoured cars and the section of four 'Reno' tanks. Tht, t;lIlk troop first sa w combat in support of an attack by the SO\'iet 14th Army near Novomosko\'sk against the White Russian forc('!; <i Denikcn. Tht·rt· is some mystery about the fatt' <i this unit, which is largely ignored in SO\iet histories. The 2nd Tank L'nit, equipped with three captured British ~1k. \ ' tanks, is usually credited as the first Soviet tank unit to see combat even though it did not ~cc its first fighting against the Poles until2July 1920. Probably, the Reno troop lost all its tanks to the Denikcn forces. This could explain iu disbandment in Moscow in September [919, and the official amnesia about its embarrassing role in Soviet tank history.

Equally mysterious is lhe use of Renault fT tan~ by Deniken 's forct'S in soulhern Russia. The French apparently left behind the remainder of tile AS 30'j

Renauhs when the} abandOll('d Odessa in April 1919, amounting to about len tanks. Photos show Renaults in servic(' with the White Russian forces, but there arc no mentions of them in tank unit accounts. Like most White Russian tanks, they cn'lltually fell into Bolshevik hands. The Bolsheviks ma) also have acquired the seven ITs losl by the Poles in the 'g!W fighting; and there are some indications that a small number ofFTs werc sent to White Russian troops in Vladi"ostok which may have e\-entually ended up in Soviet hands. The French coaxed thc Finns into ' loaning' three

• Renault FTs to support tile actions of White Russian units in northern Russia ncar Petrograd; these tanks c\-,('nlually rcturned to Finland.

In ,gig, the Bolshcviks decided to atlempt to manufaClllrc a copy of the 'Reno' at the Sormovo Admiralty Factory in Nizhni Novgorod. The project began in Octobcr [gIg under thc direction of ~. I. Khrulev and the first vehicle, named 'Freroom Fighter Lenin ', was ready for tests in August '920. It cntercd Red Army service in December 1920, and was allegedly followed by 14 more in 1921. The new tank was variollsly called the '~ I ' type (1\1 molf.y: small ); the Russkiy-Rcno; or the KS tank, after the Krasnoye Sormo\"o Factory where it was built. What makes the Soviet claim so dubious is that they were virtually identical IOtheoriginal Frcnch Rcnau lts. Even the American Six-Ton Tanks, built from Rcnault plans with Renault help, had signi ricant dctai l diflerenccs from the original French designs. I tis morc likely that the KS tanks wcrc simply rebuilds of heavily battlc­damaged tanks recovered from Poland and $()uthcnt Russia. Thc Russkiy-Renos, whatever their origins, became a popular fixture at Red

t Square parades in the early [g20S in the service of the 7th Tank Unit. In Ig27 Prof. V. Zaslavskiy led an effort to develop an improved Renault FT using nc\\ licence-produced Italian Fiat enb';ncs. This C'\cnlually resulted in the T-18 light tank, of which nne 960 wert' built from Ig28 to 1931 , making it mr mOSl numerous tank type of lhe 1920S. About 400 modernised 1'-,8Ms were still in Soviet scn/iee when war broke out with Germany in 19 .. I.

Pc had Tht largest single combat usc of Rcnau lts after the Grtat War took place in the ('astern borderlands of

Poland. t\o Renault regimcnt sa .... as much fighting ovcr such a prolonged period of lime as the French 505' Regiment/poli sh 151 Tank Regiment. French actions to support the nl'\vly independent Poland included cxlensi\(' help in equipping its army. In Iglg, France agr~d to Polish requ('sts for tanks by offering to gradually transfer a French tank unit. The 50S' Regiment under l\-Iaj. J. Marc was something of an ' international unit', having been uscd to support ,\merican trool>5 during the 1918 fighting. It was decided to US(' portions of this unit to form a joinl Franco-Polish regiment , with the Poles eventually taking over the unit once they were sufficiently trained. The unit was transferred from the Vosges region to Lodz in western Poland in May June Iglg, becoming designated the [st Polish Tank Regiment ( / Pui* C?olgow PQhkich ). A total of 120 tanks were sen t, consisting of 72 gun tanks and 48 machine gun tanks.

Thc 2nd Tank Company was the first to sec action , ncar &bruisk in August '919. Two tanks were 1051 , one in an engagement with the Bolshevik armoured train UP NO.4. On their return to Warsa.w after the fighting, most of the French crews finally departed , though French ofTicers remained as adviscrs. The I${ Battalion ( iSt and 2nd Companies) was sent to support operations in north-west I>oland oppositc B}'elorussia and Lith­uania , and the ~md Battalion (3rd and 4th Companies) was dispatched to the Ukraine.

The Polish Army had advanced deep into the Ukraine in the spring of 1920, but in May lhe RI.:d Army's cavalry began counter-attacks which eventually threw the Poles back west. The two companies had the thankkss task of acting as a rearguard to co\'('1" the Polish I'c treat rrom the vaunted Budyonny 1st II ol'5e Army. Mechanical problemsol'ten threatened to incapacitate the units. One method to avoid wearing down the tanks while still retaining their fighting value was to mount them on rail mad flatcars, which could then be prorx'lled arOllnd as mini-<lI'moured trains. The fighting in the spring of 1920 involved a series of frustrali ng retreats with little or no infantry support and the tanks were often len behind to fight their way out. The performann' of the scattered crews was exemplary, and the isolated companies usually managed to extricate themselves from the most hopeless situations. There werc occasional en-

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counters with Bolshevik armour, with the 2nd Ballalion knocking out at least two armoured cars. ~Iost of the tank companies were brought back to cent raJ Poland in the summer for rebuilding their worn-out tanks.

With the Red Army rapidly approaching Warsaw in mid-August, the French advisers were insistent that the tanks be grouped together for the defence of the capital. By the time that three companies were eventually gathered and formed into a special armoured group undn Maj. Nowicki a lon~ with three armoured trains, the Polish Army was ready to go over to the offensive. On 17 August the group sllccessfully cleared the main route IOwards Mimk Mazowiecki, \\-·itb the trains blasting tlwir way through the stations leading to

the objective, whi le the tanks on the wings cleaned out neighbouring woods and villages. Many of the tanks were completely broken down, so five from the battered 2nd Company were mounted on nat cars. They were a~signed to cut off the retreating Soviet cavalry by a drive towards Ntlawa on 20 August, and overran the 18th Infantry Division, capturing the headquarters. The armoured group mon·d into position to block the re treal of Gai's Horse Corps, which had been the main Bolshevi k strike fo rce of the atlack on \V arsaw. M aj. I\' owicki, on board the armoured train Dumda, was ki lled by artillery fire when the train found itsclfin the midst of the retreating Bolshevik c,lvalry on the misty morning of 23 August; but the rest of the arilloured group helped form the final trap which forced the Horse Corps to retreat into neutral East Prussia.

The fighting in Poland was remarkable in a number of respects. I ( subjected the Renau lts to sustained, mobile operations totally un li ke any seen on the \Vestern Front in the Creat War. Only [2 tanks were knocked out, mainly by artillery fire,

(AboN) R ...... .. II FT. wn ..... nt to th .. Levant, fira t to fi 5 ht lh .. Tulr., in '9au, a nd th .. n 10 put d o wn a O ..... "e r evolt in Sy .... in ' I'S- M""rward., they became a re~lar part oft.he prri.mn in S,ri. The ... R .. na .. h5 on parade i .. Sy ria i .. the mid-193011 are • doe modnni....t Iyf"" with the: Ilf/e.3' Lebet m achine pn In ... in place of tbe: c umbersome o ld Ho tchk.i .. Ilf/e. '4. (Noottoaal Archives)

,"Io",! The Renauh FT wall the backbone of th .. Fr .. n ch tank Iefte_til the la tter halfofthe '93 .... ;t belfl'n to be replaced b y _R ........ 1t R-35 in '937. He r e, a pair of Re .... ult. are tleeD on •• ___ v ..... in the m.id-'93011. The la nk 10 the: le ft ia a el,.,. ...-. while Ihe vebide 10 the right i. a modnni.ed clo."",. ... ilni/uN,. with tbe M/e.J ' Lebel mac hine 5"n. (National Atdo..i.· ... )

and only seven were left behind to the Bolsheviks. This can be attributed in part to the durability of the Renault , but a lso to the stubborness of the Polish crews and their skill at improvisation in the mOSt primitive of conditions. The heroic actions of this regiment resulted in the award of 34 Virtuti Militari , the highest Polish military award, to the tank crews of the unit.

The Poles acquirt.'d a small number of new FTs after the war to make good losses, including the TSF radio tank. To reduce tank wear, the Central Truck Workshop (CWS) built 25 '.(tloQliak' training tanks, using non-armour steel pla te and some surplus F'r componellLS like engines and clutches. The Poles also conducted an active programme to modemisc the I;-r including the use of a new track, developed by S. Kardaszewicz, on about 65 tanks. One of the morc unusual effons was the development of a special rail-carriage stemming from the 1920 experiences. Thc (7r could be driven on to this carriage, .. nd propel itself a long by its own power. These were used in conjunction with armoured trains to act as rail-scouts." By the mid 19305 Poland's inventory stood at 174 Renaults (including about 10 NC-I and other Renault derivatives).

European Exports The FT was the lank of choice in the Baltic states. Finland purchased 32 in 19 [9 (14 gun, [8 machine gun types) of which three were loaned to the White R ussians, as mentioned earlier. Neighbouring Estonia bought t 2 Renaults in 1924 (four gun, eight machine gun ) which fonned two companies in its Auto-tank Regiment alongside four British Mk. V tanks. Li thuania purchased 12 Renaults in 1923, but armed them with 7.92mm Maxim heavy machi ne guns instead of the usual Hotch kiss. La tvia \\las the only COUIllI)' in the region not to acquire RenaulLS, but in the 19305 obmined six Fiat 3000 tanks instead. The Czechoslovak Army bough t seven Renaults, mainly for training and tactical tria ls. Yugoslavia accluired a mixture of 48 Renault FTs and M 27!2& in the 19205, and these remained in service until the war in '940.

France also exported modest numbers ofRenau l1 FTs to armies in western Europe. Belgium acquired 54 in [9[9, which served in a tank regiment until [934; subsequently they served in Gmdamurit

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"Iobilr Groups, but were all scrapped by 193B. Switzerland bought two for trials in 1922 and gal three more in 1939. The Netherlands acquired a single tank for trials, and Sweden bough t a single NC 27. The one major custolller outside Europe was Bra.dl , which obtained a company of Renault FTs in 1921, the first tanks in Sou th A merica . This company was stationed in Rio de J anicro, and was latcr joined by two more compa nies, eventuall y totalling 40 Renau llS.

The Balkans and Middle East By tht., tin'le that the troops of AS 303 relurned from their ill.fated mission to Russia , two more companies, AS 30 I and AS 302, had bccn St'nl (Q

the Balkans. AS go I was assigned to lead the attack against the communist government of Bela Kun in H ungary, but he was ousted before the unit arrived. It was sen t to Constantinople as part orthe French occupation forces in Turkey. I n i\larch 1920 the tanks or both the AS 301 and AS 302 were turned over to the new Romanian Ann)'. whe re they formed its first tank unit. In the 1920S, more t~rs

wcre acquired, bringing the tOlal to 74; these formed the Rrximm/ I carr dt fup/a. The FT~

remained in Romanian service through most ofthr Second Wodd War being retained in a G HQtank batta lion for rear area security duties.

France originally supported Greece in the figh ting with the remnants oflhe Ottoman Empire. There have been repons that this aid included a company of Renault FTs, wh ich later fell into Turkish hands during the fighting in Anatolia in 1921. The Frcnc h 5th Tank Battalion \'\:B

dispatched to Ihe Levant late in 19 l9, and it became involved in border figh ti ng against Turki~h forces around the C ilician Ca tes and the Syrian frontier lasting from l\lay 1920 untill\ larch 1921.

when a peace treaty was signed . By 1921 French policy was shifting in favour of the insurgent Turki sh forces under Kernal Ataturk ; that aUlUmn

The Poti.h UII T.nk Regi ... enl orcen put ,.nk. on rail fl"'tca~ dunnl th" '9- .... r ..,;.,h the BoI.hevik. 10 COn."rve Lh_ met:hani.:ally. Arler th" war Ibey d eveloped the d .. .,:ryu p"ne",.., ... R ... hieh h.d • po ... .,r lak""OfT allo ... iol Ihe ,ank w prOJW-t ilulr alonl Ihe rail .... y tw.,. Th,," w ere .. ~ as nil II':OU, ,, ah".d or armoured , ..... ins. Uanun. M"'gnullki )

France.' reached a secret agreement with Ataturk , and as a resuit the third company orthe 5th Tank Battalion was turned over to the Turkish Army. It was used during the ultimately successful \\ar with Creece. France also su pJXlrted the ('fforts of Iranian nationalists under Reza Khan , su pplying them with a company of Renauits in [924.

War in the Desert A small detachment of Renault FTs was sent to the ill-defined borderlands between Morocco and southern Algeria in [g[g 10 help guard French posts."' twas rdieved in Ig20 by AS 327, which took part in the fighting agai nst raiding tribesmen at Kassamt and EI-Khcmis in 'g2'. I n the wake of the di~astcr that befell Spanish troops at the hands of Abd-el-Krim's Berbers at Anoual in Spanish Morocco in 1921, the French agreed 10 sell Rcnaults to Spain. Twelve tanks were purchased in January 1922, forming the CQn1ptlllia Renault dt CarrOl dt Asalto dt InJanlnia. Following brief training in Spain, the unit was dispatched to North Africa, and took part in fighting against Rif positions near

4 ..

Ambar and Tungunz on 13 tl.lareh [922. During thc bitler fighting se\·cral crews were killed and two tanks burned. Over thc ncxt fcw ycal1J thc tanks were used for convoy escort. guard duty and occasional attacks. In '925 six more tanks were acquired to replace destroyt.'d or worn-out vehicles.

The year 1925 marked a turning JXlint in the Rif War. France and Spain began mi~or efforts to overcome Ihe Berber rebel army and the [st Moroccan Tank Battalion (517' ReC) was dispatched to tl.lorocco to bolster french attacks starting in tl.lay, followed by a second battalion in July. The tanks were used mainl y in an infantry support role. The SoS' Compagnie was cxpcrimcn. taJly equipped with the modified Renault M27/28 tank with rubber tracks, but the rocky terrain quickly shredded the track and brought lhe experimcnt to an end. In the autumn of [925, a conccrtl-d French-Spanish oITcnsivc began. One of

Durin. the Spani.h CivU War, both lIidu inherited a IImall number of Renault tTIl. I .. '937 the Republic:aD1l ma ..... ed 10 acquire. further " i.n a secret arm5 deal with- Poland. They were used mainly in the Madrid a",",. (Nationa l Arc hi,,")

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A Poli ~h d,.uY"''' p .. ne ........ R , ""plured b y th .. G .. rma n ll d ur ing Ihe fi gh ti nS in '939. In ' 9391h .. Pol .,~ opc:r a led llbou l 3:1 ohhe,.e 10 s u pport th ei r ...... oured Irain., •• we ll •• th r .. e companiu o f con vention . 1 R .. nauh IT la n ks. Uanun M asn uski )

the more intcrcsting aspects of the offcnsivc was the Spanish usc of landing craft to disembark the Rcnaults at Alhucemas on 8 September 1925, thc first wartime amphibious tank landing. With the successful conclusion of the fighting in 1926 the surviving Spanish Renaults returned home, but the 517' RCC remained in Morocco, renamed the 62' RCC. It saw action again in thc French pacification campaign in thc Atlas Mountains from April 1930 to OClober 1933.

France dispatched the 5< Cie of 521 < RCC 10

Syria in Seph:mbcr 1925 10 help put down the Oruze revolt in her mandate territory . II took part in the fighting in Damascus, and later supported French infantry and legionnairc .. -s in the bitter fighting of 1926. The utility of the Renaults in the fighting in Morocco and Syria led to the French Army slaLioning a number of tank units in the colonies during the 193os.

40

Chjna Station France had dispatched a small number of Renault FTs to Vladivostok in 1919, and these were later passed on to the Manchurian Army under Chang T so·Lin. The continuing bordcr wars between Bolshevik , White Russian, Chinese and bandit forccs 11..'"(1 the Soviets to deploy most of thcir small inventory of refurbished I-~rs on the rvlanchurian border in the mid-192OS. The Manchurian Arm~· purchased 14 more Renaults in 1924 "25, and thest were used in the fighting with Ihe warlord Wu Pei· fu in 1926. In 1929, the RenaullS were nominalJ} attached 10 the 1st Cavalry Brigade of the Chinest National Revolutionary Army. During the fightinl! with Ihe Soviets over the Chinese Eastern Railw3\ in the autumn of 1929 the Soviets broughl up a company of MS·I (T-IS) light tanks to counter t~ Rcnaults, but a tank·vs·tank confrontation neWf matcrialised. The Japancse Army seized nearly all of Chinese/Manchurian Renaults in 1931 when Ibey occupied Manchuria, adding to a smaU inventory of" Renault FTs and NC 275 they had purchased in 1922. In Japanesc service, they werr

known as the Type 79 Ko-Gata. The Renault FTs and N"C 27s were used to form two tank companies in 1925. In 1931, a seclion of Rcnau lts was sent to

~'I anchuria to operate alongside the Armoured Car Platoon of the Kwangtung Army.

In the 19205, two sections of Rcnaults were stationed in French Indochina , one in Saigon and the other in the citadel at Hanoi. During the China crisis of 1927 the Saigon company was sent to

Shanghai to protect the French concessions. It was joined later in the year by the US Marine Corps Light T a nk Platoon, equipped with the Six-Ton Tank:The ~ I arine tanks were used to guard the rail line between Shanghai and Tientsi n; and in 1928 two more French FT tank sections a lTived to serve in Tientsin . Japan dispatched some of its Renault FTs and NCs to Shanghai in the sa me role. The Americans depaned in 1929, but the French and Japanese remained. The Japanese NC 27s, called Type 8g EtSu B, were used during tht.· Shanghai incident of '931. The Japanese seized the three

sections of the French China Light Tank Company in the late 19305; they were later turned over to the puppet Manchoukuoan Arm y which used them into the '940s. The section in Hanoi remained there unti l '945, and fought against thcJapant:sc in that year when they occupied the citadel.

Spain T he Spanish Civil War was a precursor of the fighting thaI would engulf Europe in 1939. The Spanish Army had ten Renault!> still running. The Republicans inherited Infantry Light Tank Rcgi­mCIll No. I in ~ I adrid; and Infantry Light Tank Regimelll NO.2 in Saragossa was taken over by the .'Jationalists. Tank Regiment No.2 was USl'" brieRy in the fighting on the H ucsca frolll , but their poor mechanical state soon rendered them inoperable. The Republicans llsed their FTs in the defence or

A pair o f Re na ult FTI of the 11.9" Bee rel t in the wood. durinfl; the dro/~ d • .fu~rr~ in ' 940. The 1I.g

e Bee, under Cmd t. Bernier , ~u ... ed w ith the , rd Army in the ' 940 "5htin5' (ECP Arln",)

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Madrid. These were reinforced in 1937 when Poland sold orr 16 of its RenaullS 'to Uruguay', the F'Ts cnding up with the Republican forces in Spain.

The Renault in the

Second W orld War At the outbreak of war in 1939, thc Polish Anny still had about 70 RenaullS opcrational with the Illth , 112th and 113th Independent Tank Companies (15 16 tanks each ). A further 32 were in use with armoured train units on the 'dU.?J1W

pat/CfflW R'. The Illth Tank Co. saw some fighting around Lukow, and the other two ncar the fortress ci ty of BI-Lese. They were mainly used as static defcncc points sincc their mechanical state was so parlous. The Renaults used with armoured train units were mostly ('mploycd as rail-scouts, and saw fighting from the outset of the war. The Germans

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captured some Polish ITs, but lhese werc probably scrapped.

France began replacing the Renault FT in infantr) tank units with the Renault R-35. The first battalion to be converted was the 9~ Bee in June 1937. This process was not completed by the time the war broke out, alld there werc still eight battalions and three companies of Renault ITs operational , totalling 536 tanks. The Frenth Air Force operated a number of FTs for airfield security. There were a further 54 with thc 63~ Bee in Syria, and 244 with units in ~orth Aflica. In addition to the opcr-dtional tanks, there were about a thousa nd derelict Renau hs at a large depot at Gicn . In the latc 19305 Renault FTs with tht.' 37mm gun had their armament removed for rdilling on

The Yugoli tav Artn)' fo o:o tdo:od a tnix~ b a lla lio n or R ,,-a aull FT and M II8,1 119""""fhe I BAtA/jO" bo .... ;/o ",· .. /..-during the *!HI catnpaign apinli t t h e Genna n in vad erliL. Thi ll Re a a uil M~8., appear. 10 h ave lih ed a track a nd li ufTered a n eap .. b ro:oakdown h<:"fore h<:"ing aband o oed 10 tbe Gennans. (Nlllioaa! Arch ives)

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the !lew Renault R-35, and most of the Olhers were mechanically worn-out. The French high com­mand was ",ell a\",arc of the decrepit state of the Renault FT, .and so these battalions were mainly held in rescn'c. With a few cxceptions, the) did not see very much fighting. I>robably the most famous action in\'ohing the FT look place at Chateau Thierry. Thc French f.colt dn CJwrs formed an improvised battalion, induding a company of Renault I'Ts. The Company held positions along the south side ofthl.' ~ I arne River, and a key bridge was occupied by an FT under the command of Cadet de Rouge. On 10 June 1940 a German motorised column cscorted by two armoured cars attempted to fight their way over the river. The cadet managed to knock out about len German trucks and vehicles before he was killed by Gcrman fire. Kc\'cnhc1css, the improvis('d company man­aged to hold the Germans to the other river bank.

Although the figilling was over for Renault units in metropolitan France, units in the colonies saw action later. Thc 6' and t RCA in Syria had been entire!) reequipped with 90 R-35s after the 1940 fighting, and the Renault F"Ts werl' put in rescn·e. During the battles in June-July 1941 between the \'ich) French garrison and British and AlIkd troops the Renaults were used on a sma ll scale. A si milar situation prevailed in North Africa. Following the 1940 armistice the Vich), French forces were reorganised and most of the Renault F'fs were replaced by more modern equipment. However, the sheer number of FTs available led to many being retained for local static defence, especially the defence of airfields. At the time of Operation 'Torch' in :"I"ovembcr '942 the Renault ITs did see some fighting against American troops, for example supporting infantry in the initial defence of the beachheads at Port Lyautey in :\'Ioro<:<:o.

By 1939, Finland's small force of Renault FTs lias worn ou\. Following the Soviet invilliion , they lIere used mainly as static pillboxes. The Greek Army was provided with II Renault ITs in '940 fOr its war with the I talians. Yugos lavia still had an entire battalion the I BafaiJon bornih kola o()Crational when lhe Cermans invaded in the ~prillgof 194-1, a nd these \\ere used in the fighting.

1'0110\\ ing the '9.10 French campaign, the ~i ... ans s..'llvagl.'Ci 1,704 Renault FTs, the majority of which were inoperable. Some were

reconditioned and employed on security duty in Franee and the Channcllslands. The major uscr of Renault FTs appears to have been the Luftwaffe, which used them for airfield security. During the construction oflhe Atlantic Wall a small number of FT turrets were used on pafl.?asltllu1Ig pillboxes, but the AI>X-R tut'ret from R·35S or H-39S was preferred due to its thicker armour. In some cases the whole Renault F"'r tank was simpl y dug in, and at least one of these was encountered by ljS troops at l\"ormandy in 1944. ROll1.ania continued to use the Renault FT for security duties right until the end of the war. In '940 the US supplied 329 Six­Ton Tanks to Canada and 2 12 to Great Britain for training purposes. Probably the last comba t usc of Renault FTs took place in 1945. when the independent tank section with the French garrison at the Hanoi citadcl was overrun by the Japanese.

The Plates Fren ch Great Wa r Camouflage and Markings Information on French wartime camouflage and markings is scan t) . The Rcnault 1;-1' tank was normally camouflage-paintcd at the factory. The painting was done by hand, and the patterns seem to vary considerably from factory to factory, and on the whim of the individual painter. The usual colours were a palc sand, medium brown and dark green. On some occasions, black was used to border the colours. Duc to the great haste in rorming FT units, some tanks were sent from the ractory in the base coat of verI amlie (dark army green ) without camouflage. These were somelimcs camouflage· paillled by army camouflage units.

Renault FTs usually ca rried one or two sets of serial numbers. Thc Renault-built vehicles some­limes had a Renault six -digit production mafn'cuit painted in white on the suspension side. These began in the 66000 series to the 73000 block (with many blocks reserved for ot her Renault vch icles). This maln'cult was sometimes also painted on the hull front below the twO front driver hatches. Besides this number, each vehicle also received a sequential production number. These were applied at the factory in white on the hull sides. and it is not

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dcar if they were issued by the Frcnch Army, or if ('ach of the four factories sequentiall y numbered their own \"Chicles. \ Vhcn tanks wcre camou Ragc­painted, these numbers wen~ ortcn o\'crpainled. In some cases a reduccd- visi bility vcrsion was ap plicd in black outlinc, but in many cases the number was obscured entirely. Since unit records uscd this number fo r accounting, many units cha lkcd thc number on the side of the turret or hull, or inside.' the front driver's door, to help in keeping unit records.

Tht, French Assau lt Artillery em ployed a distinctive system of unit markings in Ig 18. The three battalions in a regiment were each assigned a colour: blue ( 1St); red (2nd ); yellow (3rd ). Each compan)" in the ballalion had a geometric shape painted on the rcar hull sides: a 35cl11 circle for 1St Co., a 30cnl square for 2nd Co. and a 45cm-high triangle for 3rd Co. Each seclion then had a card symbol paintcd on the white company insignia in the battalion colour: a spade for 1st Scction, heart for 2nd, diamond for 3rd and club for 4 th St.'Ction. So a tank ofthe 502" RAS with a red club on a white triangle would be identifiable as a lank of tht, 4th Section -AS 3 15 (third company of s< BeL) 5' BeL (second battalion of 502' RAS). Machine gun tanks often flew a blucJaflion, while the gun tanks Hcw a red pennant.

AI: Rmault FT Char Callofl, • Th~ Tiger', :md Company, IJt Sution,- Western Front 1918

This tank is in a fairly typical scheme, with black ffiging to the usual three- tone camounage scheme. The ins.ignia on the rear indicates the 1St Section, md Com pany of the 2nd Battalion of an unidentified tank regiment. This particular com­panyadded vehicle names under the un it insignia , in this case ' Le Tigre' in white.

.42: RnIOUlt FT Char Canon, lVesttrn Front 1918 ~ aming tanks was popu lar in IT units, in this case

lMow) After th., . nni. tiee in '940 most Frenc h ta n" unit . in Mlnll Africa we~ reorgani. ed with more modern equipm.,nt. 'nIo R ...... uh FT" were r etained mainly for airfield S.,curity _Oilier sec:ondary ro l."., ThiH lank. ruun.ed ' L~ C" .... pag.u'. _ ~.,... near 110., Port Lya ut .,y airport On the oul" kirt . of c p7I W . .. ca after the Ame rican inva"inn o f Morocco in lfo"Ewher ' !H2' (US Navy)

I .... ) Duriag thE 6 ghling oa Sic ily in '943> th~ Ita liaa Army _Mill " . u.g Iwo .,ompan''''' o(old fi. t 30'00 I. n .... Oa e dUll!: in ..... tic defence and the Olhe r for .jrfidd • .,.,uril y. Thi. Fial ,.. Mod.2 ' wa . caplured b y th., US Army. (US Army)

'Lou lou' . This tank docs not have the usual insignia. The Renault mainellie is painted in white on the suspension side (66g5??), whi le the vehicle serial numbe r, 'I 73', is chal ked on the forward turret side.

A3: RenauLt FT Char Carwn, Western Front 1918 This tank is finished in ovCrall lJerl armle, a very dark green. It is named ' /1 ,,:""'ain ]oun~' ('The Yellow Dwarr I. On thc hull fronl is the Renault molr/cule in whi te (73530).

81 : RenGuli FT. lsi Po/ish Tank Regiment; Lod-t, Po/and, 1920

This was the first tank turned over from the 50S" RAS 10 the new Polish 1st Tank Regiment, becoming a tan k of the 2nd Section, 1st Company, 2nd Tank Battalion. I t was named 'Passe Par Tout' whic h was painted in white with black shadow on the turret. T he vehicle serial number '470' is on the hu ll side in black outl ine.

82: Renault FT, ' For Freedom Fighter Comrade unin',-Red Anny , 1919

The first tank captured from AS 303 was rcfurbished in Kharkov a nd shipped to Moscow as a gift to Lenin . It had painted on the side ' /Joryets-ta Svobodu Tov. 11 nin' (' ''·recdom Fighter Comrade Lenin' ), and was fin ished in overa ll olive drab.

83: h'ras,w)'e Somwvo M Tank, 7tlt Tank Unit; Moscow, 1927

The fi rst Krasnoye SOl'movo tank had an additional Hotchkiss machine gun fi lted in the right turret side, whieh muSI have made the turret virtuall y uninhabitable. When attached to the 7th Tank Unit in Moscow in the mid-192os, it was painted with the usual Ig2s-pattern insignia , The colour indica ted the number of the unit: red for 1St, whitc for 2nd and black for3rd. The triangle indicat ed the battal ion; the circlc the squadron; and the sq uare the troop. The individual veh icle number was painted in white in the centre. This vehicle is thus nominally 1st Battalion , 2nd Squadron, 3rd Troop, 1St Vehiclc----though th e 7th T ank Unit was in fac t si mpl y a propaganda unit, with less than a third the tanks nccdt:d fo r a battalion!

45

CI: Re1lfw/l FT Char Canon, Co. C,327th Tank BII. , 1St US Tank Brigade; St. Milliel, September 1918

The US 1St Tank Brigade followed French marking practices with some variauons. This is tank '2367', but the number 011 the hull side is complctcly obscured. I t was the 1St tank, 2nd Section, Co. C of the 3271h (345th ) Tank Battalion. The US tank units painted the unit insignia on the turret sides, and used a diamond for Co. C. T hey also added the vehicle number in white to the upper left of the unit design. As the 327th (345Ih) Bn. was the second battalion in the unit, it used red symbols. The camouOage pat tern is the normal dark green over sand.

C2: Six- Ton Tank, US Man"ne Corl)s Light Tallk Platoon, East Coast Axpeditionary Poru; Tientsin, China, '927

The US MC tanks had the j\llarine Corps globe­and-anchor insignia painted on the bow in full colours. On the suspension sides 'US l\ IAR IXES' was painted in black. On the rear hull sides the vehicle number was painted in black , in this case .3', with an unofficial 'S-SaJl' insignia added. Like US Army tan ks of the period, it is painted in o live drab, a very dark brownish green.

DI: Rerwult FT (mod), 3rd Co., Lilllll(mian Tank Ba/la/ioll; Radviliskis, Lilliuallia , '925

The Lithuanian tank battalion used the national heraldic device, the fylis knight in white on a red shicld. Each of the tanks was named: Audra, Kooos, Pagiu .. a and J~lkoul;s wi th the 1St Co .. ; Drasutis, Grianstinas, Korl,Ygis and Smugis in the 2nd Co.; and GaJiullos, Kmtas and Slibilllls (here) in the 3rd Company. They were all painted in ovcrall dark green.

D2: ReTUlII/l FT TSF Radio Tallk , Remlllil CompollY rif "ifantry Assaull TallKs, Spanish Am!)'; Moroc(o, 1925

Spanish Renauits were painted in a medium grey colour after delivery rrom France. When sent to Morocco d uring the R.ifWar, a m(.-di um olive-green colour was applied over the veh icles in rolling bands .. Each tank in the company had a black n .. -ctangle with white outline painted on the side, with ' ''rlall/rria' and lhe vehicle number in white. T he vehicle number was usually repeated on the suspension side as well. This information was kindly

46

provided by Senor Oscar Bruna Royo ..

E/. .. Rerwult FT, Tallk Company, 1St Chinese Comlry Dde .. , National Rel'olutio1lary Amy.'; Ma1/churia, f!r'9

"fhe Manchurian Renaults when fiTSt used. carried no markings, only the us~al French sa nd and green camoLlnagc. When they wen:: attached 10 the Chinese NRA's 1St Cavalry Brigade they had a variety of white geometric shapes painted on as unit insignia, according to J apanese sources: the mcaning of these markings is not known. The insct drawings here show these insignia, as well as the red insignia of the Manchoukuoan Army, which received most of the captured Frcnch and Chinese l-~rs in the "He 193°S and carly '9.1°S.

£'2: Rmaliit FT, lSI Tank CompallY, IJra?.i/iml Arm); Rio de ](lllitro, '.924

This was South America's first tank. It was painted in overall dark green, and carries the Brazilian national insignia a constellation in a white cirel on the turret sides ..

• . '

• •

G.:rrna n (orc", in Franc" u .. "d Ih" R " n .... h IT i .. I maU n .. mber. (or ."c .. rit y d .. ty, a nd in Born .. ca", ... du, ill •• pillboa .... Th .. Lullwa rr .. also us~ • number for a irfidd protection. US A rmy Iroup . look over a n .. bandon .... IT ;,. '9+1. (US Army)

FI: Rnl(lIlll F7 CllOr CanOIl, Frellch Ai" Force; France,

19·10 In '940, the French Air ForceoperatL--d a numberof ITs for airfield securi ty . They had the usual French cacard, insignia on the turret sides and hull fronl. The FTs \\("re repa inted in the late '9305 with the French scheme typical of that period , an ochre colour some'''' hat darker than the Creat \Var shade, with rcd-bro\\ n and dark green horizomal bands.

F2: Rt1Iauit FT Char Calloll, 6]' BeC; Aleppo. Syria,

'!No The 63' Bee was finished in the same scheme as metropolitan lank uniu such as Plate F" except that some black 'squiggles' were added to the panel'll. On the suspension side is the white mat"icult, and the white ' flaming bomb' with black 'I'. When 63< Bee was rc-equipped, the FTs were !limed over to autonomous companies which used them (in the same markings) during the fighting against Commonwealth forces in '94"

G/: Rtnault FTChnr Canoll, Autonomous CompallY; Port L)'lJultY, .~ /oracco, Not'tmber 1942

This tank is finished in the same late 19305 pattern as Plates FI and F2. The vehicle number '2165' is crudely chalked on the hull side. It has been named 'U Champagll" in elaborate white scri pt on the turret side; and carries the white malricule, French Amly flaming bomb, and the unexplained ' !-Ie' in ",hite on the suspension side.

G2: Pdlpfw 73o(f), Luftwaffe airfirld Steuri!>, Imil; Ouupitd Ff(JlIu, 19#

The Germans reconditioned some FTs for usc wilh !e(Uril y forces. They were painted in overall Panzer grey, with a white outline balkenkrtu{" and a yellow \'ehidc number here '7', on the turret side. The

Luftwaffe vehicles carried li cence plates on the hull front and on Ihe rear sides.

HI.' Frtllch Assault ArtilleIJ'man, 1918 During the Great War, the uniform of the French tanker was utilitarian. A black leather jacket with black doth collar facings was one of the distinctive elemcn ts of the dress of automotive and armoured units, along with the blad: beret. Although Schneider and SI. Chamond crews often wore the normal infantry helmet, in 1918 the casqut modifii 19/8 appeared for usc in the I;-r: il was paillled either horizon blue or olive drab. The other clements of the uniform were common to other branches of the army. Regimental numbers on the collar tab were in green on artillery black, and in white on the black leather jacket.

fi2: F"mel, Tank CrtWmml, 1935 In '9'9, the French Army developed a standard­ised tanker's helmet , the clliqlle modHe 1919 which e10sely resembled the imerim wartime type; in peacetime service it was usually paillled horizon bluc. In the 192os, a new black leather coal was adopted that was very similar in cu t to the wartime jacket but dim'ring in small details. Collar lab numbers werc now green on hOri7-Oil blue on the tunic, white all the leather jacket.

113: Frtllch Ta"k Crro:man, 1fH/J

In lhe mid-I 93OS, the French Army began a switch from the horizon blue of the Greal War to khaki. The tanker's black leather jacket eventually gave way 10 a brown equivalent, worn over olive overalls. A new helmet , the mit. 35, was adopted, painted in olive drab with a thicker brown leather front pad. Regimental collar tab numbers disap­peared from the field dress for sec urity reasons.

47

Notes fiiur les planches en couleur A. Ca'<>oulta~~ tollram. ""ml""~," .. ,, d~ {UIlI.un ... 1Ik. brun ct ,'orl. a,e<: ;.,; d .. bordu",", .""rn. I;II"'K"~' Uri<' ·Urt .. d.- FlO', idrnlifi< La. ,lTr s..clion .dom Ir ,,.,,,1,,,, n, k I~l""'" .m.c (;on'I"'-K"'c ,:urr~l. JIId I\,ua.l\oon cot.Ikur 10k .... du 1"'1''''' 'I ... J 'if"" nl 1",.,'IIom ,nd,n.! .. ..! <k cr chr. A~ It """",rod<' muric .. ", ,I.. I """ ..... ' I"''''' "or I.a. .... , .. , ........ 1r ",,,,1/"0 d ...... i .. du d .... 'I n' n, "'''''1 ..... I" .. ralc 'lOr ta ,,, .. r.ll<-. A3 Parfui. des <I"' ..... poin .. 100al<-"",,,, en ,orr, ar ........ ~''''rm ""'0')"" d'l'«len"," ;. Iru .. un;I';'. ' I ", ",,,ill J aune' porte It- n,,,,new.- '73) I'" rn llIa...- .. 1" .. , all' <k Lo <"'lll<". La cha" C<jUIp<s <k COl""" .... b""';",,, <ko I~",,_ ..,.....,.. «'U~ a""'" <k min ail ... ' .... <In (o .. ions "..~

B. Lc prrn ....... lIar Mcnall!! rm,lS I~r If- ~.j<1t1c Il;\S i. .. 11 n,;,,,"'" poIoo",". ~'mu r .... <k la ........ """'-,.on. Ie", ( ;omP"I!"I(' •• nd """ .. Ik>n. 'p_ P~r T .,..t-pona;, It n ....... ro <k ... rir '47<" Bt I.., p,'"';''' chat pns a r.'\S 'J03 pa' In I\okh"'"i<j...,. or """,man 'Comh.>t1an. pour la 111: ...... 1". C; .. nuM~ I ... ni ..... _ B:J OO ... "IInnt", In mu'l ..... ,ndiq ... ", , .... ch~T. 1""1t T I't>IJI'" (a..., noir • lnn<"

F....-Mrort (rnk bLa ..... , , .... "'"a,11on rnan~1r n>u~ ...:"' .... la m"""IIc""" <k '0Il1'd1" .upp/Mno'n,.i,. our Ir cOl, dro"

C. I. ... rna"! ..... l'~ Na'",llW:mbiabl." (orIl ... (\,. I'am, ... f'ano;ai><". ,,"0'"'''' I""n.<s OUr la ."" .... 11<'. a ...... un di~m~'" p"". I~ t:uo"IMknie (; e. un "um<ro ,oo,,-wit ... 1 d~ , ..... ~" ........... " • Ra",ho- doN 0) mbolc:s dr I' """ ... I~i k , ... d ...... ,e"",, .!ttuon. n~nl'"jl:niO' C Ir '\'17rme <"m"",, I .. ""-,,lid ba,.ull"n tic I~ brilladc ",iii",,;' drs .\mbo-,," en ""',11;" c.. I ... "" ..... '" d, d,a. 3 rt un ·I\·lbll' non 1'<l\1c","n.aire .... n, 1""."'''''' In <i,' .... de I~ ""'I"" ~ I'arne ... , i""I1'''' llSMC a,tt 'OU'es ... COtllru", ll' a ,~,,, dt la (a_, ·U~ MARI/'. L \ .u. la ""p""'OR.

O. ~"'rz I'cml~ .. mr na."~\al, k cMnJi" \ ) .i. ~ I' a'''"'I'''', unlui comm. in"l(T" de I>;o .aill"" I ... Ii"r tin non .. d ... <han d. (h;o<>"lIr d ... .-olllIMKtlio"" oom><-< dan. ta Iq.ndr tn a"~la;1 0.: I',;"" .n ~,il ~P'''' li>-r ~i"",,, ·arm;'" ... paKnolr. I .. chan. 'Retl,,,h .. pa~'1Oh (""""rll' "" um""H"gr dt tmndC4 'ertC! (lOU', lc Ma ,o<. I ... " I ... rh,.", l'".-ta'rll! I. 1,I,"lur rn tI"" r,l~all" "" .... 1. 11 , ""m",o ;"d'vid"r!. rtpi'.f K,"frn lrm .. ". ,n, , ''''I,..n,;''''. II. La ";gnifiution d., ,) "'h'~" hi,,," 'u, k& d",,, K ~",,,, I ' d .. n~'inn~Ii.,,", ,-h,,~ n· .. l 1'''' w~"Wt. I. ... )'",I~~~ mUK' 'rlt ,·",,,,,,,,,hr·, ,," cdui de la Mal"'hou,... qui ' .... ul In d,~. '~pt"' ... , f," dn ."" ..... " 11" d"b,,, d ... an""'" '9-40. E.a '" prcmi~' rhar Oltd·arni' .... a", IM>",il l'.mIJ·kmc " •• i. ",.,1 b,nil;<It. ut'" ""mldt,."",,,

F. eoulcun dr I' O .. IIN' fra<M;'"'''' " I .. I", dn ani ....... "1:1" t' <""ani", <k I' ann;'" dr I'air rran<;3-ilC pon ..... I'"' un rbar a.u,,""lta ,"",Ut;,t du Ie"''''' d-."i .. ,;.,,, Fa Drs log""" noo"'" "m ... t aJO<"('n i. la """I~"ai",,, d", ...... Ir .. n ''''Ilrm."",i,,,,,_ Ln chan Rtn;lult ,Ir I_ 6,...,1(' II{:C: a,a ... ", ~,~ rrm" 1 <Irt roml"'gn;", aut<)llol)rtlCi m~ ....... '''nu'';.,m ;i I'orln u" <oolr .... el rna"!",,, I"'todanl leo combo .. ""', ... In .\11,... .... ''14"-G. , .... combona,,,,,,, dt ooul<' ...... , ""ml~ahlr 4 ~"'Ir dr la pLan<hc r; numern ·2.6,'j· i ..... n' ~ b Hllir .. or Ir "':..~ dr la " ... "'" IU"""'" '1 ... lJtamP"-l(' '''' .u, ... (ou ... lI<, ..... tn.-ulr, .. mbolt dr la ·.l""tudc· <II' l'artTlr<O 1Tll,I(aior rl un 'I IC don, ru]>!in"" .. n· .... ~ ..... t"' .... , .... to. ''''1''''''''''' Gt !'etnlUre In", I'a" ...... noi~ .... tionDrot a ... "''' blanc. nurni'm ,00,,1<1 .... 1 Jaul1l' dr 'ouKIIr .... ~~uo d'inumllfICula""n dr la Lur. .. ~fIr 4 l'.,~", de Lo (oc ..... e(.Ut leo nann;\ I al""re dr crt ... drnun-c.

II. \' "' .. <k tui,. lM.re a ..... col <k ,,~Ir. I ........ ' lM"r. '-'''''Iu" dr '9.8 d'nj"'pc de pI<'tt <k clu.r M .. umtroO 'l'1li"''''''';'''''' 'OIl' k col <k I. lunK] .... e" 'crt· chan " ... nai. 'uuU.crie Ib I . .'on f>CU' ,ogjt dr ~cr", d,H~rr .......... , la ,..." .. <k nU'. not.-.-;

""-"lu" d .. ''I' 'I' In num"'" n1I"""''''.'''' ...stt .. , hlan ... 'U' Ia , ....... malO it, .".., main' ..... '" en 'rn .u, bleu hori .. ", 'Ut k<',~ dO' I ... unique, 113 Oo:: .... i. I. mi~nI des an"....,. t 91". I'Untfo<mc dr, "" kalo .... ma"teau de tui. broil ., k ~"-'<l"" <i, '9'J.'i pci", e" hh l.n .... ..-.." '''lti'''r'''~'rn de ""I ... 'n" .ut hlo di'IM'U""', pour <la n.,,,,. dr ...... un.t.

Farbtafeln A. Sta"<lanl·l'~r,,loth.n ~aOO. II""" "nt! (""!,,,. I"n ",il .. h"" ..... I::"lfa .. ",,~c". 0 ... ~f""lhrtn,·I"",d,.." l "k ,d~"ti< ... " , \h'~,lun~., 1("",1"'''''' \· ........ k ",id I. ""la,lI"'t I',k ,n III." I~ "(""lrt" "od .. idutli<1 l'~nu",;om<'. A2]);" Matrit"I,,"""'n<" ah \\",k "",,rd .. aut d", .\\lI .... n~ gtmalt. ",id II ... 1'." ..... ,... ..... m'Umt ..... "71' mil K, ... lIr aul d," fu,,,, AJ ~brlCh,n.1 .... nk" I'a" ... .- K"' ... h In <In '1 ~.,,14,1,.. I'"w :1-.. d"ck. lu <It. f~nhr-i(~n ,· ..... 00, I~ .\ ... J.III h., d~ \lalrI('U'" '7'I.\}(I' in W ...... , <II! \'<;>rd.cn.ntr. 1'"-,,,,,,, rrul K~,w",." "'~lrn rotI' I\'unpcl. I'anur .. ' M""'hin<'"g~" .. h.-.-" I~.t ... \\ ,ml"'l.

B. Iln- .. m, ".., y,,,,'IlAS <I.n I· ..... " ,,1 ....... ll('nr l'an ... , l!in~ a .. dir .\hl<:-il",'~ .• "omf'o''''''_~' ]I.."a,II .. ". /' .. ,,,, I' .. 7* ""'lie di<' ""ricnm"' ..... ',17"'· 82 [) ... r"'~ ,,,II d.n II ..... hf"'krn ''<In \S .,.'l .... ho-U ••• f I'an, ... ", 10 ·FmhM"~'mpf ... (....-..- I"'ni,,' gtn;l",,' B:J 1).,0.,. 011"",1",,, \b.u.-run, _ kenn ... "b,..., ,. I'~"".·n·",hm,. I ~h ....... l.. I'roppr ... h" .. rza \·.......-k I. \ch"~n'" , .. " ..... " ..... , l. lLa,aJlkon 'rot .... l>rntd \"' .... ,_,do<:!l M.>><hi,ltnge",.h, ,,,,h ... ,,, lu,"".

C. l'~\ l a'k'eru"gen "Ue" drn rr:>"lf ..... """ .h"l",h. all ... auf <kn T~ II"'mah. nul n ...... li.~m··F"",, Ii" " '''''1M''''' c. ........ "-.' .... n l-'~n •• t·rnum_ da''' .... ' und .ink, ,.-on, I.lnhr-i.",hu;rhf" IlioN i" <la., ~'aht""'K. 2, . \ b.rnu"J K,,"'l'a ..... C, ~h I. Ib ,.ilk", in dr. Iln~o.dr h .. ""u .. l·a ....... lb.a,I~ ... 311"" AhzrKh~". c.. !'A" .... , r.;", 3 ,,' ro"h~,u an drn ""'orn ...... "''''''n mi. dno i.-....lf""cllen '8 &'11' au!~ ... nah; d~. LS\I( •. \I", ... ('h.", "oJlfa,biK, an do; \'",<k",,"~; ·U~ MAKI~I~')' allf <kr Aulh~n!(u,,~

O. Si.h .. "a'K~,~I ... \\'aI'I"''' 'fro \')" ... K,,,r,. h .... "I. Ibl~iJIono;at,...;.. .... , .. ",,~,ld<l. I'~,,,,,,,,~m(''' lu, ).-.1< " ,)fIII",-",r .. rnIr" "" ~"~l"hd .. pra<. 1l, ldtcx' '''IICjlcl><". 0.: \1'~'lJ.d,r Rt-"~,,lll "u,d .. " ,,~<h lI"r. bMrru".. .~panirn g.-au gnlrid"" unt! rrl'icltrll ~.un~ I """"I'.;I~". rh.";r nach ~b",llo. ~ .. br .. d" "tmlrn. ,\11,' I'.u",·, "·.~t·,, di~ "h,,·.r ... ~ ..... 'hfd mil ;hra:! i,"ji,id"r llrn N""" .... rrt. ""i" "irdnl'"lt a"r ,Irr Aufh""MU"!I;,

£. I)' , Ik-<k", ""g rl~r "t';",'n ,\ 1I,.i( hrn an lI. ~nauh·l'a" .. ftI der ,,~(ioo~ld';' "",i",b." 1\n" .... ~, ""I",hll"'. n, .. ,ule . \I""i, h .. " h.-.lr,"c' di~ M .. ",Lot·hum "" di~ ~rb,",,"<'t, 11. .. 11."1,, I,ml. dt< 'I"" ,,,,d AIlId"~ tI ... ~"'" J ah", hinkM ..... IA Ik.- .r\.'r .uda"'."'~u", .. ht· 1',"",,, 'r'~( dati 't;lll",,~Jc 1..-•. "loalll.<I" K 0",'~11. ,jo" .. I"" I~rm.

F. (lit fr."."."" h.." t ~" .. I ... ",~ .. ," drn ' I"""" :I".r J~h .. n. u,id d'e (.MY ....... f .... n....nch'" ' ."Il".H~ .n M .... m \\ocho-p .. ,,,el rur ~1Ul(]>!~lle. r. n. S .... ld .. ,-d·,\n>,nd,It I .. m .. "'Ult'" du",h If h .. ~r ... LIn .. n <T~"ru: •. Do. &{B('C Krnauh, ""nI .. " au".""""n "(>t"I'"""''' ul ... "I~bc", U\l~" "ber immrt 0<.dI d;""'" F .. bo-n ",id .\\a,l,r"'''J!<'n. ai, .... "I.' K"V" di<' ,\ lIiirrt<n .; ...... .­,""unkn_

G. I)boclbe I' • .-h."h,,,,,, " ... ~ur _\hbldunll I . ,\1" Krridr I....-hrin·· /Sum"' .... 'ltb,'j an ,iI'. :VOtt: fit. SI""', ...... I~ C...,..,('k": \I..nr. ·Gr.ona .. n·.Slmb<~ <In r"'" ...... hrn A, ....... und "" ung<kb"", IIC' ao Aufh.o.nglln~. G2 I'~"u'l!ra ..... ,\n>ln<:ht(ho-...... "" .. umn......., rYlio ' K ........... 11"11> .. [.",,,,,htum,,, ... m ']'Utm, l."f ... ·a ..... 'ummrrn.afeln "" , S~"en '0<,,,, uOO hin.tn .

H. Srh .. af'?t 1....J .. fJack~ mil ~toll1r:>1('''' ... h,,~ ..... \lU'7t. l'aJl:ttrhctm~ .... und K~rnm .... umm,m til (;'Ull P~" .... r ~urSth" ... n. Antlknc aut_ K ... ~M1 drr III ...... Ih K .... ,'" l'nlrnfhk'dr ~"""""n dtn «h"'a ....... j ...... M'od "'~~" .. Il.; .. _ Il el .. , ,"'" ''l''~ Rtj('m('nh .. urnmnn bIr,be auf <In Jdr .. M", abM- G,"" ~"r llIau am "r:>~ .. " dn lliuOf. 113 """ Mille <kr 'J"'" J&hr. , .. n Khalo· l · "ilO.-m,,". ",",u,,,,,, l.~d .. m' .. ntd ",od khdlif~rbr .... n 1I,Im ":0" Au. Si~""""'''lIIt1''JI>dr'' \'Or ... h" ... .,drn Ii ... k <1l;i",.nl .. t;CU .. Ofll am li..-a,: . • ('rull a"f "h~k;

OSPREY· VANGUARD

A o;eri('!o of books describing key units and weapons systems of 20th n'IHl") \\anare, prepared by leading military experts for Iht" cllthmiaSI and moodier, and illustrating authentic details of armour and supporling vchicles, camouflage, markings, uniforms, insignia and wcajX>IlS.

Avec anootationl en rna.ncail liIur lei planche. en couleuT

Mit AuCzeichnungen auf deutsch uber die Farbtsreln

(3) US lSI Infantry Division 1939 45 (6) The Lee/Grant Tanks in British Service (8) US 1St Marme Division 1941 45

(13) The Churchill Tank ( IS) The Sherman Tank in British Service

1912 45 (16) The Panzerkampfwagen m (17) The Stuart Light Tank Series (18) The Pa nzukampr-agen IV (19) Annour of the Middle East Wars 19t8-?8 (20) The Tiger Tanks (21) The PzKpfw V Panther (n ) The Centurion Tank in Bartle (23) British Tanks in N. Africa 1940 42 (24) Soviet Heavy Tanks (25) German Armoured Cars and Recce Half-

Tracks 1939 45 (26) The Sherma.n Tank in US and Allied Service (27) Annour Qf the Korean War 1950 S3 (28) The 6th p a nzer Division 1937 45

STEVEN J. ZALOCA was born in 1952, receivt:d his SA in history from Union College, and his MA from Columbia University. He has published over twenty books and numerous aniclcs dealing with modern military technology. especiall y armoured

(29) The M17 &t M18 Patton Tanh (30) Polish ArD'lour 193!}-45 (31) US Half-Tracks of World War 0 (32) The SdKfz 251 Half-Track (33) German Light Panzers 1932 42 (34) MU3 Series (35) Armour of the Paci6c War (36) Long Range Desert Group (37) Modern Soviet Combat Tanks (38) Mechanised Infantry (39) US Armour Camouflage and Markings

191' 15 (40) US Light Tanks 1944 8.t; M20f Chaffee, M41

Walker Bulldog and M551 Sheridan (41 ) The MI Abrams Battle Tank (42) Armour of the Vietnam Wars (43) The M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (11) Anti-Tank Helicopters (15) Arntracs: US Amphibious Assault Vehicles (46) The Renault IT Light Tank

vehicle developmenl. His main area of interest is military affairs in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in lhe Second World War, and he has written as well on American armoured forces. Steven Zaloga lives in Connecticut .

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