vanguard project - part 1: a neuroeconomic theory

8/14/2019 Vanguard Project - Part 1: A neuroeconomic theory

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Running Head: The Minds Eye

The Minds Eye

Chris Frueh

Rutgers University


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Abstract

The Purpose of this paper is to trace the process of situation-pattern-recognition

through the various function-modules of the brain in order to define a subconscious

neural framework for the problem-solving-by-analogy theory. I will present an

experimental procedure to highlight, via functional imagery, the subconscious pattern

recognition and resolution response to the brief exposure of a complex problem state. In

the second part of the paper, I will elaborate a framework to explain the possible results

in light of an expected utility function married to a computer-housed virtual recognition

protocol. This, I will fold this system into a model for a goal-oriented, intuition-

replicating artificial intelligence. To conclude, I will highlight future research possibilities

to further confirm or concretely refute the framework foundational to this paper, that of

the module theory of brain activity.


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Introduction

The branch of problem solving confronted herein is loosely defined as complex

problem solving by analogy requiring goal-oriented decision-making based on the brief

exposure to the subject of the situational characteristics and requiring a rapid response

informed by recollection of previously encountered scenarios of some similarity.

Problem Solving Through Hypotheticals

(Politser 14)

The above illustration details the traditional view of how a problem states

resolution is attained, namely through the mental projection of hypothetical outcomes and

the analysis thereof. I, however, would like to tweak this model somewhat as it is far too

slow (relying on System 2 type of rational thought) and is vague on the influence of

memory. Instead, I would postulate that the node marked Perception is the priming

effect that readies the access to similar scenarios (Kahnemann, 2003, p 452-3), that the

entire Hypothetical loop terminating in the actual decision is encapsulated in the

subconscious memory of previously successful action-outcome pairs and that the

successful analogy from the current to the remembered is a brief System 2 intrusion (at


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the Diagnosis node) into an exclusively System 1 task. This model would account for the

rapid-response type of intuition exhibited during a mutating ambiguous problem state

over an unbounded spatial area.

The second area that requires introduction is the field of neuroeconomics.

(Politser, 2007, p. 32) Put briefly, neuroeconomics is a neuroscientists examination of the

brain during economic activities. The particular application to this problem is an attempt

to rework the model of analogy-driven problem solving through the use of neural

imaging and optimization (similar to Bayesian inference). Within the experiment below,

the skeletal form of an expected utility function is the outline I assume, for the sake of

argument, the subject follows.

Experimental Procedure

The structure of the experiment will be the focused on the neurological response

to a brief exposure of a complex problem state during the subjects formulation of a

response to the problem. In particular, I will flash an image of a chessboard with the

pieces set up in a variation of the Sicilian Defense (or the Winawer variation of the

French defense) known as the Poisoned Pawn. The reason this particular problem was

chosen was because of the possibility of a favorable solution for either an aggressive1 or a

defensive response.2 The subject(s) will be one or more experienced chess players. This

condition is necessary to prevent the pattern recognition function to be engaged by a

novice player recognizing the pieces themselves instead of the pattern of placement.

1 http://www.chessgames.com/perl/chessgame?gid=10447282 http://www.chessgames.com/perl/chessgame?gid=1044724


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The Poisoned Pawn Variation of the Sicilian Defense

This experiment will take two parts. After establishing a baseline for the subjects

brain at rest, I will expose him or her to one of the two variations of the gambit while he

is attached to an fMRI. The readings will begin upon exposure of the stimulus and will

end when he or she verbalizes a response to the situation (i.e. aggress or retreat) This will,

in effect, calibrate the later readings to the particular layout of the subjects brain patterns

but without the time-sensitive readings that allow for a correlative hypothesis about the

path of the information. I will record the areas that showed above average blood flow

and, under the assumption that these areas played a role in the pattern recognition, will

focus a second repetition using more time-sensitive equipment in order to support this

assumption and the overall hypothesis.


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In the second part, I will repeat the previous protocols but with the subject

attached to an EEG machine instead of an fMRI and using the gambit variation that was

not used in the first part in order to keep the recognition based on playing experience

rather than short-term memory. Again, the recording will begin at exposure and end at

verbalization but, in interpreting the neural activity results, the response will be presumed

to have been given upon activation of the speech centers of the brain. This, I believe,

would provide a more concise time frame for the exercise.

The recorded results will be, simply, where activation occurred during both

exposures and when it occurred as measured during the second exposure. I expect initial

firings to be in the occipital cortex as the subject views the situation. From there, I expect

information to be sent to the parietal cortex as the various visual-spatial coordinates of

the pieces are catalogued. Next, I expect firings to occur in the temporal lobe as the

similarity of the situation acts like a priming stimulus to bring to mind the previously

encountered scenarios from the subjects experience. This should be rapid and

subconscious, fitting with Kahnemanns (2003) placement of similarity firmly within the

bounds of System 1 thought processes. (p. 453) As the situation is recalled, I expect

activity in the anterior cingulate cortex as goals are analyzed in relation to previous

problem states. Simultaneously, there may also be activity in the various portions of the

brain that evaluate hypothetical outcomes (comparing the hypothetical outcomes with

previously encountered outcomes) such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex which has

strong ties to predictive utility. This pattern comparison is also subconscious as postulated

by Rosenblatt and Thickstun. (Rosenblatt, 1993, pg. 700) As this problem solving

function begins to move towards production of a response, I expect significant activity in


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the orbitofrontal cortex or the amygdala as the subject weighs the salience of uncertainty

or ambiguity. While the effect of risk aversion will not alter the hypothesis, it is important

to note the role of the neural structures that house the risk-aversion functions and the

time-specific point of their impact on the decision-making process. Lastly, I expect the

firings to converge on the frontal cortexs executive decision center before a response is

vocalized.

Conclusion

While the primary benefit of this experiment would be confirmation or denial of

the theory of brain function localization, a significant secondary benefit would be a

framework on which cognition-mimicking software might be based. For example, pattern

comparison and organization is a task computers have been handling since the turn of the

century, but, if this framework is valid, AI programmers might adapt these sorts of

functions for use in a pattern-recognition-based machine capable of learning from

previous scenarios (as the visual-spatial coordinates that the parietal cortex analyzes are

written into the memory as a new situation able to be remembered). The priming effect

would be simulated by a pattern comparison formula and the analogy-inferring process

might be replicated by an organization or optimization formula. This, however, is

contingent upon the modular theory of brain functionality and, more inhibiting, a coding

structure capable of self-referential or self-modifying coding.

Further research that might be done to examine the possibility of the theories

hypothesized herein might be done by dissecting brain matter. Following in the footsteps

of Wernicke, if the recognition function is localized to these specific brain structures,


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there will probably be bundles of neurons between these areas similar to the path

between Wernickes and Brocas areas. (Cognition, Brain, and Consciousness, 2007, pg,

6) This could expand the ability of neuropathologists to understand brain damage: if

damage is not localized to a specific structure but, rather, is between two structures, one

might draw conclusions about the role of the previously connected structures from the

symptoms in evidence after the damage.


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Works Cited

Chen, S. (2008, November). Software-Agent Designs in Economics: An Interdisciplinary

Framework.IEEE COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MAGAZINE, 18-22.

Foxall, G. R. (2008). Reward, emotion and consumer choice: from neuroeconomics to

neurophilosophy.Journal of Consumer Behaviour, 7, 368-396.

Gill, T. G. (2008). A Psychologically Plausible Goal-Based Utility Function.Informing

Science: the International Journal of an Emerging Transdiscipline, 11, 227-252.

Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded

rationality..Am Psychol, 58(9), 697-720.

Politser, P. (2007).Neurorationality: A Neuroeconomic Approach to Mental Health and

Good Sense. New York: Oxford University Press, USA.

Rosenblatt, A., & Thickstun, T. (1993). Intuition and Consciousness.Psychoanalytic

Quarterly, 63, 696-714.

Rustichini, A. (2008). Dual or unitary system? Two alternative models of decision

making. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 8(4), 355-362.

(2007). Cognition, Brain, and Consciousness: Introduction to Cognitive Neuroscience.

Toronto: Academic Press.

(1995). Complex Problem Solving: The European Perspective. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence

Erlbaum.

vanguard project - part 1: a neuroeconomic theory

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