variation, shifting and identity in arabic
TRANSCRIPT
Dialectologia19(2017),1-21.ISSN:2013-2247
1
Received8September2015.
Accepted19December2015.
VARIATION,SHIFTINGANDIDENTITYINARABIC
HassanR.ABDEL-JAWAD
SultanQaboosUniversity(TheSultanateofOman)*∗
Abstract
Thispaperexaminesdifferentideologicalandidentityconstructionfunctionsoflinguisticvariation
and shifting in Arabic through the analysis of the existing literature on language, politics and national
identity, arguing that linguistic variation and shifting may be used for constructing/reconstructing,
locating/relocatingand/orshifting/abandoningidentity,anddivided/splitidentity.Afewmajorcaseswill
be surveyed to exemplify this. It is shown that variation and/or shifting in Arabicmay reflect different
levels of sociopolitical, ethnic, sectarian, and religious grouping/ divisions. In such contexts, language
and/orvarietiesoflanguageserveasmarkersofidentityandasboundary-settersbetweengroups.
Keywords
variation,shifting,identity,boundarysetting,nationalism
VARIACIÓN,CAMBIOYIDENTITADENÁRABE
Resumen
Este artículo examina diferentes funciones ideológicas y de construcción de la identidad de la
variación lingüística y de cambio en árabe a través del análisis de la bibliografía existente sobre el
lenguaje,lapolíticaylaidentidadnacional,argumentandoquelavariaciónlingüísticayelcambiopueden
ser utilizados para construir/reconstruir, localizar/relocalizar y/o cambiar/abandonar la identidad, y
dividir/escindir la identidad.Seencuestaránalgunoscasos importantesseencuestaránparaejemplificar
lo citado. Se demuestra que la variación y/o el cambio en árabe pueden reflejar diferentes niveles de
agrupaciones/divisionessociopolíticas,étnicas,sectariasyreligiosas.Entalescontextos,lalenguay/olas
variedadeslingüísticassirvencomomarcadoresdeidentidadycomocreadoresdefronterasentregrupos.
∗*DepartmentofEnglish,CollegeofArtsandSocialScience,SultanQaboosUniversity(SQU),Al-Khoudh,PC132,TheSultanateofOman.
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Palabrasclave
variación,cambio,identidad,creacióndefronteras,nacionalismo
1.Introduction
VariationstudiesofArabichavefrequentlyfocusedtheirattentiononstudyingthe
correlationbetweenlanguagevariationandthetraditionalsocio-economic,culturaland
stylisticvariables suchasage, sex,education,background,etc. In suchcasesusuallya
quantitativeanalysisofcollecteddataisperformedtoestablishthesecorrelations.Then
the results show patterns of sociolinguistic tendencies in the distribution of the
observedvariation.There isnodoubtthatsuchaprocess is thefirstandfundamental
step in discovering these patterns of variation in the linguistic behavior of speakers.
Without this it will be subjective and impressionistic to make any subsequent
conclusions or generalizations or to give any explanations. Having said this, we can
proceed to say that in explaining the findings, some form of qualitative analysis is
deemednecessarytoidentifythefactorsof,orforcesbehindthesedifferentpatternsof
observed variation, e.g. ideological, political, social, and cultural, etc. Accordingly, the
objective of this paper is to survey previous studies of variation in Arabic to offer a
qualitative analysis of the significance, meaning, and function of this variation, with
specialreferencetothefunctionoflocatingidentity.
Furthermore, this geographic area (the Arab world) has its own special
characteristics,where the political scene intersectswith the religious, cultural, social,
ethnic, andnational andall ofwhichexhibit themselves in the linguistic situationand
behaviorasourfriendYasirSuleiman(2006)referstothis inhischapter“Chartingthe
nation:Arabicandthepoliticsofidentity”.Thisareaisdifferentinthatpolitical,social,
religious,ethnic,andsectarianissues/classifications/demarcationsareimportantissues
astheyaredeepseatedintheconsciousnessandawarenessoftheindividualsaswellas
groups.Theyarespecialastheycausealotofpolarizationandpluralization.
In most, if not all Arab countries, the ruling powers starting from the imperial
colonizing ones to the regimes that took over from the colonizers carrying the same
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policyoftheirmasters:themainpolicybeing“dividetorule”andthustheyhavebeen
encouraging/fosteringthesedivisionsandsplitsandalltypesofconflictwhichareagain
linguistically realized in different ways. This has given rise to a set of terms such as
?iqliimiyya ‘regionalism’, jihawiyyia ‘localism’, Ta?ifiyya ‘sectarianism’, 3unSuriyya
‘racism’, 3ilmaaniyya ‘liberalism/secularism vs salafi/religious/theological’; pan-Arab
nationalism (Arab nation or Al watan Al-Arabi or al-Umma al-Arabiyya) vs State
nationalism(Omani,Egyptian,Jordanian,etc.).
Thishasoftengivenrisefromtimetotimetodifferenttypesofmovements,such
as the call for the use of 3aammiyya (colloquial Arabic) rather than FusHa (standard
Arabic). Two clear cases can bementioned here: in the fisrt half of the 20th century
therewasEgyptianNationalMovement:callingforEgyptianizationoflanguageandone
inLebanoncallingforLebanonizationoflanguage.
Within the samestate:politicaldivisionsandconflictsareoccasionallyprovoked
causing differences, including linguistic signs, e.g. in Jordan: Jordanian vs. Palestinian.
And in Oman Zanzibaris vs. Native Omanis (Arabs). The linguistic boundaries in such
cases often coincide with political/power relations. Within the same community one
mayfinddividedtowns,villages,bordertownsordifferentreligionsgroupsand/orsects.
Insomecases,thesedividedtownsorregionsmayeither:
a. belong to two different political systems: Iskenderun (between Turkey and
Syria)orthecaseofmanyPalestinianvillageswheretheso-calledtrucelinein1948cut
them in the middle, thus dividing them into an Eastern part belonging to
Palestine/Arabs and a western part belonging to Israel; e.g. Jerusalem and Bart’a,
amongmany.
or
b. are divided between two or more different Arab countries; e.g. Rafah
betweenPalestineandEgypt,alburaimi/al3ain betweenUAEandOman…whereeach
oneadherestothevarietiesintheirrespectivecountries.
Theoverlapping cycles of identitymaydiffer in order: pan-Arabism, nationalism
withitstwoormoredimensions(thelocal/regionalvsthePan-Arab),religious,localism,
whichmakesitdifficulttoestablishthelinguisticboundariesastheyoftenoverlap.For
instance, there is both an overlap and a conflict between the so-called “Wider
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nationalismpan-Arabism”(alqawmiyya),andthenarrowernationalismreferringtothe
specific countries: Egyptian nationalism, Jordanian nationalism, etc. which require
different symbols of identity such as a national anthem, flag, currency, etc. Yet each
state considers itself as part of al?umma il 3arabiyya (Arab Umma), alwaTan alarbi
(ArabNation),and/oral?ummail?islamiyya(IslamicUmma).
Inthecasestobepresentedinthispaper, it ishopedtoshowthecomplexroles
linguistic/languagevariationplays in the formationof theoverlapping,conflicting,and
sometimesdividedidentitiesandloyaltiesamongitsspeakersintheArabworld.
Quite recently, there has been an emphasis on the role of identity with its
different types indetermining languageuse, variationand shifting (cf. Suleiman1994,
1996, 2004, 2006). Language with its different varieties has been used by groups to
identifywithonepolitical,social,ethnic,religious,national,etc.grouporanother.Itisa
common practice that Arab speakers use language features from several language
varieties in the same discourse in order to gain authority by tapping into specific
languageideologies(Stadlbauer2010:8).Thispaperexaminesdifferentideologicaland
identityconstructionfunctionsof linguisticvariationthroughadetailedanalysisof the
existing literature on language politics and national identity, arguing that linguistic
variation may be used for integration/disintegration, identity re-
construction/reconstruction, locating/relocating and/or shifting/losing identity, and
divided/splitidentitytogetherwiththedifferentoverlappingcyclesofidentity(national,
ethnic, religious, social, tribal, sectarian, etc.). Beside my own analysis, this study is
based on several individual studies done independently around the wide theme of
language and identity (see bibliography for a list of these studies). In the following
sections, patterns of variation and/or shifting corresponding to different forms of
identityformationwillbepresented.
2.Caseone:Diglossicvariation
Aside from the contextual domain distribution of the two polar varieties of
DiglossicArabicasoutlinedbyFerguson1959,andshowninmanysubsequentstudies
(Schmidt1974; Sallam1980;Husein1980;Abdel-Jawad1981; Ibrahim1986;Al-Khatib
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1988;Haeri1996;Habib2008,2010,2011tomentionjustasample),theuseofthese
varietiesmay also be determined by the patterns of identity and ideologies speakers
desire to associatewith each “Speakers use language features from several language
varieties in the same discourse in order to gain authority by tapping into specific
language ideologies” (Stadlbauer 2010: 8). In this regard,Holt (1996) states that “the
selectiveuseof languagefeaturesfromdifferentvarietiessignalsasmuch information
as thepropositional contentof themessage: choosing features fromonevarietyover
another is a significant marker indexing the position of the speaker in society, their
knowledgeofpoliticalandreligiousvalues,ortheiraspirationforsocialmobility.Arabic
isseenasanobviousandinevitablechoice[…]as it isthe languageoftheHolyQuran
andalltheArabStateshaveaMuslimandArabMajority”(Holt1996:11).
Howevereachofthetwopolarvarietiesstandsfordifferentsetsofvalues:
a)Hvarietyservesasaneutral,corrective/referenceandpan-Arabunifyingmodel,
aimingtotranscendtheboundariesof individualnation-states,whileatthesametime
standsforconflictingdrives:Religious,political,national,orethnic,whichdeterminethe
direction of change, patterns of variation and/or conflict. This is consistent with
“Standard Lang. Ideology” (Lipi-Green1997)which refers to a cluster of beliefs about
thevalueoflinguistichomogeneity.Holt(1996:11)writesthat“itisIslamwhosesacred
languagehasretaineditsoriginalformandstillbecomeanationalandofficiallanguage”.
Similarly, Haeri (2003: 43) states that this H “socializes people into rituals of Islam,
affirmstheiridentityasMuslimsandconnectsthemtotherealmofpurity,morality,and
God”andthereforeattributesofthisvarietyareequatedwiththemoralvirtuesofthe
user.
Furthermore,HisTriballyneutral.InaTRIBALArabworld,wherethetribeisavery
strongsocialandpoliticalunit,thisHvarietyhasbeenneutralanduniversalandhasno
associationwithtribesortribalviewpoints.Somembershiptoitisopentoallequally.
SoArabiccarries“notribalconnotations”(Holt1996:13).
b) Diachronically speaking, SA is neutral as it is not based on any of the local
dialectsthus itstandsatequaldistancefromallArabs.Holt (1996:21)arguesthat“In
theArabworldonecouldarguethatallareequallydistantfromthestandardandthat
on-onethereforebenefitsfromalinguisticadvantage”.
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Holt (1996),Haeri (2003)Suleiman (2004)andStadlbauer (2010),amongothers,
haveshownthatideologicalforcesgaverisetolinguisticconflictswhichreflectidentity
conflicts,suchas:
Religious conservatives, who are often referred to as “purists”, argue for the
purity, supremacyandsacrednessofHvarietyand thereforecall for themaintenance
anduseofthisvarietyasasymbolofMuslimArabhistory,morality,andidentityasan
MuslimUmma(Nation).
In contrast, pan-Arab nationalists call for a reformed modified modern and
(religiously neutral) formoftheHvarietyofArabicasaunitedArabiclanguage,widely
referred to asModern Standard Arabic (MSA) to be the neutral unifying force of all
Arabic-speakingpeople in theArabworldofallbackgrounds, religiousdenominations,
andaffiliations.
Furthermore,modernists at this era of IT and globalization, tend to advocate
increasinguseofEnglishinmanysocialdomainsinordertoconnecttotheinternational
community.TheybelievethattheHvarietyisacarrieroftraditionandreligiousmorals
buthasnotbeenable to reflect scientificandeconomicprogresssoEnglishhas tobe
usedassymboliccapitallinktothe“prosperity”andmodernityoftheWest(Stadlbauer
2010).
At theotherextreme, stand theNationalists (statenationalism)whocall for the
useofnationalformsofArabicfordifferentArabcountriesthustheyseemaspromoting
separatism.Twoclearcaseswereactiveinthefirsthalfofthe20thcentury:oneinEgypt
(Egyptian National Movement: Egyptinization of language) and one in Lebanon.
(LebaneseChristianideas:Lebanonizationoflanguage).
c)Powermaintenance:Furthermore,SAhasoftenbeenusedbytheolderformsof
power represented in the ruling families to maintain their power. Holt (1996: 20)
explainsthatsuchfamilieshaveseen“it intheir intereststoappealtothemassesina
languagewithgreatsymbolic functionandwhichgives themgreater legitimacy rather
thanpromotingavernacularpopulism”.Tothem,“theemotionalandsymbolicappeal
of religion would be more successful than appealing to the masses on the basis of
nationality” (Holt 1996: 20) which may be served by upgrading local varieties into
standard ones. This is evident in recent years and events as major political parties,
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especially religious-oriented ones, promote the use of standard not as a national
language but a pan-language with wider appeal where religious affiliation is seen as
moreappropriatethattribalorlocal/nationalaffiliation.
d)Prestige:All inall,SAhasanovertprestigewhilethenon-standardoneshave
covertprestige.
e)Religiousvs.political:ItisinterestingtonoteherethatSAcanstandforatleast
twomajorvalues/drives…:Religiousandpolitical.Ifseenfromareligiouspointofview,
itisacceptablebyallArabsandnon-Arabsandevenminorities/ethnicgroupswithinthe
ArabcountriesacceptitasamarkerofMuslimidentity(asinthecaseofKurds,Berbers,
etc.).However,whenitisseenasapoliticalsymbolasmarkerofnational(Arabidentity)
soitisusedastheofficiallanguageinthesecountries,thenitislookedatlikeanyother
languageandisresistedsoKurdscallfortheuseoftheirnativelanguageastheofficial
oneintheirareasandsodotheBerbers,etc.(processofinclusionvs.exclusion).
StandardArabic(H)hasservedanationalfunctionduringcolonization.Holt(1996:
17) writes that “the symbolic function of written Arabic and developing it along
nationalist lines during the nahda…”. It was a symbol of identity in the face of
COLONIZATION…asareactionanddefensestrategy.
f) On the other hand, all the L (non-standard) varieties stand for local, regional
blocs,sub-national,andstatevaluesandidentities.Atthestatelevel,eachcountrysees
itselfasanationstatehavingwhatmaybe referred toasSub-nationalvarieties:Each
countryhasitsownformof“ARABIC”(thoughit includesmanydifferentdialects),e.g.
Omani, Jordanian, Egyptian or Tunisian etc. Arabic. These are not geographical but
territorial, political and therefore territorial Identitymarkers. Linguistically, theremay
beanoverlapand similarityamong them,e.g.northernareas in Jordanare similar to
thoseinthesouthernpartsofSyria,NorthernPalestinianisclosertosouthernLebanon
thanitistoJerusalemone…buttheyarereferredtoasJordanian,Palestinian,Syrian,or
LebaneseArabic.SAisnotusuallyusedforlocal/regionalidentificationbecauseithasno
native speakers as it is seen as a pan-Arab variety. It is interesting to add that even
namesofsuchcountriesmayindicatethekindofidentitytheydesiretoemphasize.E.g.
SyrianArabRepublic,KingdomofSaudiArabia,orHashemiteKingdomof Jordan,This
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divisioncanbeataregionalgeographiclevel(blocs)asintheGulf(Gulfcouncilcountries
vs.non-Gulforal-itti7aadalmagharibi(Magrhribi(western)union).
An examination the names given to countries, papers and other entities in the
Arabworld shows these tendencies to relocate identity.Egyptwascalled, ‘theUnited
Arab Republic’ during Naser’s period to refer to a larger Arab entity but it was later
changedto‘EgyptArabRepublic’limitingittoanarrowerdomain,indicatingdeparting
the unity dream. Similarly, the terms and names of newspapers, media, etc. are
symbolicand indicateawiderscopeof identification:al-sharqal-awsatPaper (Middle
East Paper),Al-Quds al-Arabipaper (Arab Jerusalempaper), The voice ofArabs (radio
EgyptduringNaser’speriod),Al-Jazeerachannel,andsoon.
Inconclusion,IwouldliketociteHolt(1996)whomaintainsthatthe
linguistic identity in the Arab world is divided between 2 forms which are
both independentof identitywiththestate…..Fushawithallwhat itstandsfor...
pan-Arabidentityand3ammiyya,althoughpossessingavitalityanddynamismnot
echoedinFusha,leadstoanidentitywhichrunsdeepandisregionallybased,and
yetpoliticallyandhistoricallymarginalized(Holt1996:23).
Shiftingfromonevarietytotheotherservesthesedifferentidentitiesandvalues.
ShiftingtoSAisashifttoformalityanddistancewhileashifttonon-standardvarietyisa
shift to informality, solidarity, in-group membership: sub-national vs. national
(pan)culture. This seems to echo Labov (1966) who maintains that the use of non-
standardfeaturesiscontrolledbythenormsofvernacularsubculture,whilsttheuseof
standardfeaturesiscontrolledbytheovertnormsofthemainstreamcultureinsociety.
3.Casetwo:dividedloyalty-politicaldislocation
Language is politically significant and is often used as a tool of penetration,
participating, legitimacy, identity construction, and integration. Politically divided
communitiessuchasthecaseofmanyboundarytowns:e.g.severalPalestiniantowns
(Barta3a),Buraimi/Ala3ainbetweenOmanandUAE,Rafah(EgyptandGaza)mayexhibit
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this political division linguistically. Such political boundaries may set the linguistic
boundarieswithinthesamecommunity:
a)Rafahwhichwasoriginallyonetownisnowdividedpolitically:theEasternside
iswithGazawhiletheWesternsideiswithEgypt.Thispoliticaldivisionseemstoreflect
linguisticallywhere in theEasternpartspeakers tendtousea localPalestinianvariety
while in theWestern side they speak an Egyptian variety and often adopt a regional
Egyptianvarietyastheirsocialstandard.
b)Alburaimi isanOmanibordertownsharingafront linewith itscorresponding
UAEtownofAl3ainwhichwereoriginallyone townwith thesame families.However,
theOmanisinAlburaimibelieve(atleastpsychologically)thattheyuseaOmanivariety
tomark themselvesasOmanis,whileon theUAE side, speakers tend toadoptaUAE
variety to identify themselves as UAE. However, in case of social identification, the
OmanisinAlburaimitendtoadoptlinguisticfeaturesfromAl3ainvarietyastheybelieve
thatitismoresociallyprestigious.
c)Thethirdcase(ThecaseofBarta3a)deservesmoreattentionasitsetsamore
relevantexample
InasociolinguisticstudyofthesituationinadividedPalestinianVillage(Barta’a),
(Amara& Spolsky 1996) presented evidence of a “growing double identity” reflecting
socioeconomic,politicalandreligiousfactors.
Barta3aisaPalestinianvillagewhichwasdividedfollowingthe1948Israelitaking
over of Palestine where they set the border line in the middle of the village, thus
dividing it into theWesternpart, annexed to Israel, andEasternpart, annexed to the
West Bank of Jordan at the time. Accordingly, the two parts started developing
economically, socially, politically and probably linguistically differently: one reflecting
theIsraelisystemwhiletheothertheJordanianArabsystem.Whatdeepenedthesplitis
thetotalpoliticalblockadewhereinhabitantsofthetwoparts,inmanycasesmembers
ofdivided families,wherenotallowedanycontactofany sortand theywerebanned
fromestablishinganylinksunderlegalpunishment,i.e.therehadbeengeographicand
familialproximitybuttotalseparationandchangeofdirections.In1967,followingthe6-
daywar,theWestBankfellunderIsraelioccupation.Theofficialboundarybetweenthe
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twopartswasremovedandmemberswereallowedtoreunite.Yet, thetwopartsare
stillundertwodifferentjurisdictions.
d)Questionstoberaisedhere:
-Whatistheimpactofdividingthevillagefor20years?
-What is the impact of reunifying the village after the removal of the official
boundary?
Does this result in the removalof social andpolitical divisionsbetween the two
halvesofthevillageandsothe“linguisticfrontier”resultingfromparallelsocial,political
andculturaldifferences”continuesbetweenthem.
What is the impact of rising political, religious, etc. movements such as the
Intifada, feelingofabandonment,changingofattitudeswith theresurgenceof Islamic
movements.
e)Howdoesthisreflectlinguistically?DothePoliticalandeconomicdislocation
resultinLinguisticvariation?
Accordingto(Amara&Spolsky1996)thereseemstobeanumberofProcessesOF
IDENTITYatwork:
Israelization: associated with modernization, urbanization and official authority.
AretheArabsinIsraelundergoingaprocessofIsraelization?(integratingornot).
Palestinianization: associated with the local, national, and cultural values and
heritage:dotheystillidentifywithPalestinians(Palestinianization?).
Islamization: associated with religious values and the resurgence of Islamic
movements.Accordingly, a third trendof identity is competingwith the first two: i.e.
Islamization.
Alienation/exclusion:recently,therehasbeenchanginginpoliticalattitudesand
intentionswheretherehavebeencallstomaintain“aPureJewishState”thusexcluding
allothers,includingNativePalestineArabswhostartrethinkingtheirpoliticalidentities.
Change of attitudes and alternating identities: Attitudes after 1967, and after
Intifadas,theWesternpart,likeallPalestinianswestofthegreenline,werelookedatas
moremodern,richer,andhavemoremovementfreedomastheyareconsideredIsraeli
citizens who have freedom of movement unlike West Bank Palestinians who have
alwaysbeenunderseveremobilityrestrictions.
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It was found that linguistic features distinguish each part of the village: lexical
variationasmanylexicalitemshavebeenborrowedfromHebrewinthewesternpartof
thevillage.Aswellastheexternallinguisticinfluencesmayshapethelocalvernaculars
ofthetwoparts:(Arabic,English,and/orHebrew?).Amara&Spolsky(1996) identifya
largeamountoflinguisticvariationbetweenthetwohalves.
f)FortheWesternpartArabicisthenationalnativelanguagebutisnotthemajor
officialonesinceHebrewis.BothArabicandHebrewareformallytaughtinschoolsand
areinformallyusedindailyinteraction.Hebrewbeingasecondlanguagewherealmost
everyonespeaks,readsandwritesHebrew.
g)IntheEasternpart,ArabicistheonlyofficialandformallanguagewithEnglish
taught as a foreign language… but Hebrew was rarely taught or spoken pre1967.
However after 1967, Hebrew stared to be used informally (spoken) by a growing
numberoflaborers,prisonersandthosewhoworkwithgovt.officeswhohavebecome
fluentinspeakingHebrew.
Theauthorshighlightedseveralidentitiesbyposingthefollowingquestiontotheir
informants:Howdoyoudefineyourself,i.e.whoareyouintermsof:
• Tribal(Hamula)
• Villagers(Rural)
• Palestinian(national)
• Israeli(political)
• Arab(pan-Arabic)
• Muslim(religious)
Accordingly,theyestablishedthefollowingtrends:olderpeople,esp.bornbefore
1967,showstrongernationalArabism(pan-Arab),butthePalestinianidentitybecomes
stronger after 1967 (also following the separation from Jordan andmore specifically
following the disengagement in 1987 and the establishment of the Palestinian
authority)… so in the light of the developing political factors, a lot of locating and
dislocatingidentitieshavetakenplace…DisappointmentwiththeArabsinrecentyears
has ledtorethinkingofPan-Arabism.Whenonegroupfeelsabandoned,marginalized,
threatened, likePalestinians inGazatheytendtoturnofftheiralliancewiththeother
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groups. Nowadays the Islamic identity is growing, esp. in light of seeing thatMuslim
countries like Iran and Turkey support them more than the Arabs… Following their
disappointmentwiththeirArabcompatriotsandthesecularPLOleadershiptheyshifted
towardsIslamicmovements…
Conclusion: Political changes lead to changing of identities and loyalties…
Sociolinguisticvariation(micro)mayoftenreflectthis.Theseidentitiesintersect:which
comes first andwhy?Changing identities dependingonpolitical andmaybe religious
associations/considerations.
4.Casethree:In-groupvs.out-group
Local/internal Dialects may be in conflict: the case of Palestinian Vs. Jordanian
groups in Jordanwhich shows that “language serves as amarker of identity and as a
boundary-setter between the in-group (ourselves) and the out-group (others)”
(Suleiman2004:7).
There is always “Interaction between language and national/ethnic identity in
situationsof intra-and intergroupconflict” (Suleiman2004:8). InJordan, like inmany
othercommunities,therearepatternsofvariationotherthandiglossic:i.e.Jordanianvs.
Palestinianlinguisticmarkers.
ThreeprinciplesgovernthispatternaccordingtoSuleiman(2004):
First, “the power-language relationship is an important aspect of ideological
contestation, and of identity assertion and negotiation in inter-and-intra-group
interaction”(p.13).
Second,languageisamarkerofidentity”(p.13).
Third, bothoneand twooperate at the communicative and symbolic levels” (p.
14).
WhatistheInteractionbetweenlinguisticchoicesandpoliticalevents/situations?
Language situation in Jordan is closely related to the political situation and
politicaldivision:acaseofethno-politicalsituation.
Linguisticdivision/boundariesrepresentgroupdivisions:togofromonegroupto
anotheryouhavetocrossovertheselinguisticboundariessovariationorshiftinghere
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indicatesdividedpoliticalloyalty…(considersomePalestinianfamiliesresidinginJordan
earlyinthe20thcenturyandhowtheyseethemselvesasJordaniansorPalestiniansand
howthisismarkedlinguistically).
This showshowconflict in theMiddleEast (whether internal, regional,or...) can
alterthelinguisticmapofacountryandthedynamicsofthesociopoliticalevaluation…
Powerandconflictareimportantfactors inshapingthelinguisticsituation(same
patternappliestoBahrain(Cf.Holes1980,1983a1983b,1986aand1986b).
Theuseof(Q)variantshasbeenparticularlymotivatedby/ormotivatetheuseof
ethnolinguisticlabels(beljiki)“(usedtorefertoaPalestinianinJordan)asaboundary
setting label”which is similar toethnic group labels suchasBellushis, Zadjalis,Druze,
Alawaites,etc.regardlessoftheirbackgroundorigintodistinguishthemfromtherest.
Suchtermshavebecome“identityladenlabels”(Suleiman2004)whichmarkInsidersvs.
outsiders, power imbalance, not equal share of power and employment, dominant
groupvs.dominatedgrouporsuperordinategroupvs.subordinateone
Thisisoftenaccompaniedbyothersymbols/artifactsofidentity:Red-checkedvs.
black-checkedheaddress(Kufiyyavs.Hatta).
Inmanycases,thisvariationmaydistinguishthepopulation inthesamecountry
as “nationals vs. naturalized”whichhas also given rise to anumberof dividing terms
suchas“asli(original)vs.“naqli”(notoriginal…borrowingtermsusedtodescribespare
parts), “mulHaq (annexed)” or even using electrical terms such 220 vs. 110 (220
referring to originals while 110 referring to incoming groups (naturalized)”. This
sociopolitical pattern of VARIATION corresponds to social stratification: first-class
citizen,second-classwithwhateverlinguisticandculturalmarkersassociatedwithit.
Insuchcommunities (multi-ethnic) linguistic/culturalaccommodationmustbeat
play:itrelatesvariationtoethnic/nationalidentityinintergrouprelations.Atleastthree
trendscanbeidentifiedinthisregard,whichreflectpatternsofidentityaswell:
a. Convergence:approvaloftheinterlocutorandmaybeforgainingsocialand/or
politicalacceptance(whereoutsidersconvergetotheinsiders’norms,thushidingtheir
originalidentityandadoptingtheso-calledinsiders).
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b. Divergence: exaggeration of the difference (where the so-called outsiders
maintaintheirmarkinglinguisticaswellculturalnormsandevenexaggerateusingthem
toemphasizetheirgroupidentityandchallengetheothers).
c. Maintenance: (no-convergence)eachsidemaintains itsownfeatures(without
any challenge or exaggeration involved) where tolerance governs the situation (as in
Omanwheregroupsarefreetousetheirvarietiesorlanguagetoleratingeachotherbut
allmustidentifywithOmanasacoveringumbrella).
In Jordan, the [g] variant (of the voiceless uvula stop (q)) in Jordan has been
establishedasthenormofthein-group,rulingandpoliticallypowerfulgroupwhichhas
the full control,andso it isasymbolofPOWERandSTATUS.Switching to thisvariant
maybeintegralorinstrumental.Switchingto[g]isconsideredbySuleiman(2004:131)
as related “to the formation of nation-state in Jordan”. Jordanizing Jordan and de-
Palestinization of Jordan This has been officially marked as Late king Hussein used a
dividingterm(withhistoricalreligioussignificance)todescribethePalestinian-Jordanian
duality:Muhajiriin(immigrants…outsiders)vs.Ansaar(hostinggroup).
With these political and group divisions, one has to consider Vitality (ethno
linguisticvalidity)inthiscontextwherevariablescanbe
a. Statusvariables
b. Demographicvariables
c. Institutionally-supportedvariables
In such communities, in any political tension, each group resorts to its identity
markers (linguistic and otherwise): East Jordanian sees himself as themajority, host,
employer, ruling, while the Palestinian is a guest, annexed and not original. This has
givenrisetoanumberofpolitical linguisticsloganssuch:Jordaniansofallorigins(min
shattail-manaabitiwal-?uSool),JordanFirst(Al-?urdu?awwalan),JordanforJordanians
(unity slogan) (al-?urdun lil-?uroniyyiin) and soon. Thusone can refer to covert/overt
policiesofinclusionvs.exclusionasshowninthefollowingpoints:
a. Political demographic classification which is linguistically realized (though all
wereundersamejurisdictionupto1987).
b. PureJordanianswhohavefullcitizenshipswithallitentails(national#).
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c. Jordanian of Palestinian origin which make up two groups: those who hold
Israeli/PalestinianID(believedtohavetwoIdentities)whohavefullrightsexceptavery
fewtechnicalones.ThisgroupismarkedbybeinggivenspecialyellowCards(referredto
asBridgestatisticalcard).
d. The third group is pure Palestinianwho are seen now as foreigners butwith
someJordanianlinksandsotheyaregivenaspecialpassport(withnonationalnumber)
and theirbridge cardsaregreennot yellow,whileablue card is given toPalestinians
fromJerusalem.
e. Inthiscontext,identitycontroversialquestionssuchas:WhoistheJordanian?
Howtodistinguishoneselfaccordingly?Areoftenraised.
f. Furthermore, such complicated context also causes what may be termed as
“identityconflict”.Forinstance,howdotheearlysettlersofJordanofPalestinianorigin
(movedtoEastJordanearly inthe20thcentury)theyseeor identifythemselves?How
dotheyuselg.toidentifywiththissideorthatsideandwhataccommodationprocesses
theyfollow?
g. JordanianwomenwholiveinbigcitieslikeAmmanandIrbidnormallyusethe
urbanvariety(whichisbelievedtohavePalestinianorigins)butswitchtopureJordanian
varietyincaseoftension…(dividedloyalty:covertprestigevs.overtprestige).
Conclusion:ThisisaclearcaseofSOCIOPOLITICALPATTERNOFVARIATIONwhere
linguisticvariationservesasamarkerofidentityandasaboundary-setterbetweenthe
“in-group(ourselves)andtheout-group(others)”(Suleiman2004:7).
5.Religiousidentificationanddivision:thecaseofBethlehem
Different religious groups may use language variation or shifting as a way to
changeidentityandaffiliation. InastudydonebyAmara(2005),hefoundthatamong
ChristiansinthecityofBethlehemwhousedtobethedominantgroup:
Younger women and some Christian men are tending to adopt an urban
pronunciationlikethatofnearbyEastJerusalem,atthesametimeasthespeechof
younger educated Muslims is showing the growing influence of the standard
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variety, of Arabic. By relating the use of linguistic variants to changes in identity,
thisstudyshowsthatBethlehemisatownintransition,beingtransformedfromits
previous status as a Christian Arab town into an important Palestinian and
dominantlyMuslimcity(Amara2005:Abstract).
“Byrelatingtheuseoflinguisticvariantstochangesinidentity,thisstudyshows
thatBethlehemisatownintransition,beingtransformedfromitspreviousstatusasa
ChristiantownintoaMuslimone”(Amara2005:Abstract).Bethlehemhadbeenwidely
seen as a Christian town but now there is a transition into a Muslim town. Here,
linguistic variation is shown to have produced new distinctions. A case of a town in
transition,beingtransformedfromitspreviousstatusasaChristianArabtownintoan
importantPalestiniananddominantlyMuslimcity.Thisalsoprovidesauniquecasefor
testing shiftingof social identities:non-urban tourban. It illustrateshowurbanization
andmigration are reflected in the sociolinguistic changes of theArabic spoken in the
town.Oneofthemostsalientlinguisticfeaturesofthisistheuseofthevariantsof(q).
Whereas most residents formerly used the common (k) Palestinian variety for the
standard /q/, similar to that spoken inPalestinianvillages, youngerwomenand some
ChristianmentendtoadoptanurbanpronunciationlikethatofnearbyEastJerusalem,
while, at the same time, the speech of younger educated Muslims is showing the
growinginfluenceofthestandardvarietyofArabic.Thislinguisticbehaviormaybeseen
asasymbolofreligiousidentificationwhichmaybetracedinotherArabcommunitiesas
well(cf.Blanc1964;Holes1983a).
6. The case of returning-immigrants variation: relocating identity; e.g. Zanzibaris in
Oman
ManyArabOmanisandOmanifamiliesimmigratedtoZanzibaroveralongperiod
of time in the last fewcenturieswhere theyestablished themselvesas the rulingand
upper class. Then in the 60s of last Century they were forced to leave the country
following a local revolution by the native Africans. Few of these (returnees/re-
immigrants)identifywithwhattheyconsiderasnativecountry;yetmanystillfacewhat
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maybeseenas“identityconflict”or“dividedloyalty”:whethertheyseethemselvesas
OmanisreturninghomeorZanzibariOmanisimmigratingtohostingOman?Thisisalso
linguisticallymarkedthroughthevariantuseofEnglish-ArabicandSwahili.
Kharusi (2012: 13) explains that “language choice among Swahili-speaking
Zanzibaris isverymuch influencedbythe individual’sperceptionand interpretationof
the label Zanzibaris, which in turn determines their acceptance or rejection of it”.
Accordingly, Kharusi identified three different subgroups of Zanzibaris: those who
continue using Swahili in both public and private domains; those who use it only in
privatedomains; and thosewhodonotuseor refuse touseSwahili ineitherdomain
andeventheypretendtheydonotknowthelanguage.
Thisexplainsthedifferentpatternsoflanguageshiftinganduseamongthem:the
firstgroupcontinuetouseSwahili to theexclusionofArabic, thesecondgroup is still
usingSwahilipredominantlywithaweakerversionofArabicthoughtheyhavebeenin
thecountryformostoftheirlives,whilethethirdgrouphasshiftedtoArabicwiththe
exclusionofSwahili.Thispatternof linguisticvariation isclosely tiedwith the issueof
identityforthem.ManyseethemselvesaspureOmanisdescendingfromOmanitribes
whichmaintaintheirexistenceinOmanandsotheyhaveintegratedwiththesetribes;
others feel that they have lost their tribal roots as a result of population mix and
intermarriagessotheyhavenotfullyintegratedwithintherest.
Psychologically, they have developed different attitudes. When they started
returning to the country back in the last century, theywerenotwell receivedby the
people and theywere even looked down on. Then at later stageswhen they started
taking higher jobs because they were more educated and have more command of
English,theystartedtofeelsuperiortotheothers. Itcanbeassumedinthiscasethat
theirlanguagebehaviorisonewayofdistinguishingthemselvesfromtherest:i.e.away
ofdistinctionandprobably superiority (changingofattitudes).Psychologically,Kharusi
(2012)explains thissayingthat the firstgroup,whichbelongs to theupperclass,uses
Swahilipredominantlyastheydonotfeelthattheiridentityisthreated.However,
[m]embersof the secondsubgroup,whoseuseof the language isdomain
dependent, associate themselves with the label only when they perceive the
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context in which it is used as being unthreatening to their ‘Arabness’. Among
other Zinjibaris, individuals in the second subgroup readily identify themselves
with the group, for it is within this context that they interpret the term to
represent shared positive cultural values and a means of fostering solidarity.
However, in the presence of non-Zinjibaris, they are concerned that the label
mightbeusedasachallengetotheirArabidentityand,consequently,theymight
bedisinclinedtouseSwahiliinpublic(Kharusi2012:13-14).
Asforthethirdgroup,membersofthisgrouprejecttobeidentifiedasZanzibaris
and accordingly they totally shift to Arabic and abandon Swahili which they see as a
marker of “inferiority”. This group division according to Kharusi (2012: 16) “this
collocates with social boundaries too: higher class, middle class and lower class
respectively”.
At all levels, the language issue is still at the center of this identity conflict for
thesereturningorimmigratinggroups.
7.Conclusion
It is evident from these case studies that variation and shifting in Arabic in its
differentformsandmanifestationsfulfillsdifferentideologicalandidentityconstruction
functions. Itmay be used for constructing/reconstructing, locating/ relocating and/or
shifting/losingidentity,anddivided/splitidentity.Atthediglossiclevel,eachofthetwo
polar varieties stands fordifferent setsof values: SA can stand forat least twomajor
values/drivesandidentitiespoliticalandreligious.Itstandsatanequaldistancefromall
non-standardvarieties,actingasacorrectiveand—referencemodel—umbrella.Non-
standardvarietiesontheotherhandstandforSub-national,territorial,politicalidentity
markers. It may serve, on the one hand, to express unity, pan-Arabism, nationhood
(umma),and Islam,andon theotherhand, itmaymark localism, regionalism,or sub-
nationalism.
Withineach state, variationmay reflectdifferent levelsof sociopolitical, ethnic,
sectarian, and religious grouping/ divisions. In such contexts, Language serves as a
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markerof identityandasa“boundary-setterbetweengroups”(thecaseofJordanians
and Palestinians) where linguistic boundaries correspond to political divisions.
Accordingly, with any political tension or conflict, each group resorts to its identity
markers, including language,where in somecases languagevariationcansaveor cost
life.Ultimately,politicalchangesleadtochangingofidentitiesandloyalties.Religiously,
DifferentreligiousgroupsmayuseLanguagevariationasawaytorelocateidentity(the
case of Bethlehem). Linguistic variation may also reflect political and economic
dislocationanddividedloyalties.Politicallydividedcommunitiesmaypresentevidence
of “growing double identities” which correspond to linguistic divisions. Yet, further
complicationsofthepicturewillultimatelyleadtostartreconstructingofnewpolitical
identities(thecaseofBarta3a).Finallythecaseof“TheReturning-Immigrantsvariation”
shows“identityconflict”or“dividedloyalty”.
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