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Slovenian central storage facility Safety case report Revison 0

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October2014

Slovenian central storage facility Safety case report for CRAFT

REVISON 0

_________ARAO


Document: ARAO ________

Revison: 0

Date: October 2014

Document title:

Slovenian central storage facility Safety case report for CRAFT

Name and surname Signature

Prepared by: Sandi Viršek

Reviewed by: Simona Sučić

QA review::

Aproved by: doc. dr. Tomaž Žagar, direktor

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ABBREVIATIONS

ARAO – Sloveniana radwaste management company, operator of the Central storage facility;

CSF – Central storage facility for low and intermediate level institutional waste,

LILW – low and intermediate level waste;RW -;SSC -;

SNSA – Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration – Slovenian regulatory body;

IRPNSA - Ionising Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act ZVISJV-UPB2, Off. Gaz. of the RS 102/04.

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Table of contents1 SCOPE OF THE REPORT................................................................................................5

2 PREDISPOSAL WASTE MANAGEMENT IN SLOVENIA.................................................62.1 Legislation and regulations.........................................................................................7

2.2 Regulatory body.........................................................................................................82.3 National radioactive waste management policy and stategy......................................8

3 SAFETY CASE CONTEXT..............................................................................................103.1 Purpose of the Safety Case.....................................................................................10

3.2 Safety Case Scope...................................................................................................103.3 Demonstration of safety...........................................................................................10

3.4 Graded Approach.....................................................................................................114 SAFETY STRATEGY......................................................................................................12

5 DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY AND WASTE...................................................................135.1 Site Conditions.........................................................................................................13

5.2 Facilities and Activities.............................................................................................145.3 Inventory of Radioactive Waste in CSF....................................................................19

6 SAFETY ASSESSMENT.................................................................................................216.1 General.....................................................................................................................21

6.2 MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTIES....................................................................216.3 ITERATION & DESIGN OPTIMIZATION.................................................................21

6.4 INTEGRATION OF SAFETY ARGUMENTS............................................................216.5 INTERACTING PROCESSES..................................................................................21

6.6 RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT..............................................................226.6.1 ASSESSMENT CONTEXT................................................................................22

6.6.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY OR ACTIVITY AND THE WASTE............226.6.3 DEVELOPMENT AND JUSTIFICATION OF SCENARIOS..............................25

6.6.4 FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF MODELS................................266.6.5 PERFORMANCE OF CALCULATIONS AND ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS.27

6.6.6 ANALYSIS OF ASSESSMENT RESULTS.......................................................276.7 SPECIFIC ISSUES...................................................................................................27

6.8 DOCUMENTING AND USING THE SAFETY CASE...............................................287 REFERENCE...................................................................................................................29

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1 SCOPE OF THE REPORT

Slovenia joined the CRAFT project with the reason to implement the new IAEA requirements for the Safety case and Safety assessment for predisposal management of radioactive waste – GSG - 3 [ref] - SADRWMS methodology and to use SAFRAN tool for preparation of the safety case for the Central storage facility in Slovenia (CSF).

Slovenian Agency for Radwaste Management (ARAO) got the 10 years’ operating license for CSF in 2008. But because a lot of new documents were prepared for the facility, ARAO decided to update the Safety case. Updated Safety case includes also some minor changes and optimizations of the facility. The work started 2013 and will be finished in November 2014.

During the preparation of the new revision of the Safety case the philosophy of graded and step by step approach was used. We tried to use all up to date data to reduce the uncertainties. One of the “new thinks” was also the use of the SAFRAN tool as an assessment tool. We started to use it with the assumption that we would like to work in parallel, some “traditional” prepared safety assessment (usage of excel tables, different modeling tools…) with SAFRAN. The reason is that SAFRAN is a new and not very well known tool, (also our regulator - SNSA doesn’t use SAFRAN) and we need to justify its use.

The main scope of this report is to present the work done on Safety case preparation for CSF in Slovenia from 2013 to 2014.

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2 PREDISPOSAL WASTE MANAGEMENT IN SLOVENIA

Slovenia is a small country with very small nuclear program [Figure 1]. It has one operating nuclear power plant, one research reactor and one central storage facility for radioactive waste from small producers. In addition there is also a uranium mine and mill in the decommissioning stage at Žirovski vrh. The plant is owned by state-owned Slovenian and Croatian electrical power companies, GEN energija d.o.o. and Hrvatska Elektroprivreda d.d., respectively.

Figure 1: Slovenia has a small nuclear program

There are two storage facilities to store the waste before disposal. One is operated in NPP Krško and the waste from NPP operation is stored there. The second one Central storage fa-cility (CSF) is operated by ARAO and is located in Brinje near capital Ljubljana. It is intended for storage of low and intermediate level radioactive waste arising from medical, industrial and research applications. The construction of the facility started in 1984 and it was put into operation in 1986. In 1999, the responsibility for managing and operation of the storage was transferred from the Institut Josef Setefan to the Agency for Radwaste Management (ARAO). Following the refurbishment and two and a half years of trial operation, a new operating li-cense was issued in early 2008 and it is valid until 2018.

ARAO has the license to carry out a radiation practice. The license for carry out the radiation practice includes the following activities:

• Collection of radioactive waste at waste producers’ premises.

• Collection of radioactive waste on-site in the event of accidents.

• Collection of radioactive waste in the case where the waste producer is unknown.

• Dismantling of sealed sources at producers’ premises (less complex sources).

• The use of radioactive sources for calibration and testing of measuring devices.

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• The treatment and conditioning of radioactive waste in a hot cell facility for the pur-pose of storage.

• The transport of radioactive materials, and transportation of nuclear materials as a part of public service.

ARAO has Radioactive Waste Management Programme. The programme is an operational document for radwaste management in next two years. It contents information on an organi-zation and methods of carrying out activities, recording and reporting, definition of responsi-ble services and persons, information on documents forming the basis for carrying out activi-ties, information on packaging, information on radioactive waste, management procedures and methods, measures to minimize radioactive waste generation, clearance, capacities in place, consideration of interdependencies between all stages of management, alignment of the management procedures with operative programmes under the national program of ra-dioactive waste management.

The waste inventory in the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste has been charac-terized, treated and conditioned. ARAO has been performing treatment and conditioning of radioactive waste as a regular activity at nearby processing facility (hot cell facility) from 2012. ARAO staff is carrying out waste sorting, characterization, compressing, dismantling of unused ionizing smoke detectors and solidification of liquid radioactive waste. It is planned to implement dismantling of other sealed sources in next two years.

During the development of the WAC for storing the institutional radioactive waste in the Cen-tral Storage Facility, the ARAO considered the generic WAC for the planned LILW repository, the IAEA TECDOCs, Safety Standards, Safety Standards Series, Slovenian legislation and operators’ practices. The WAC for storage facility will be revised when the WAC for reposi-tory will be approved.

2.1 Legislation and regulations

The main Act of the Republic of Slovenia in this area is the Ionising Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act which regulates also radioactive waste and spent fuel management. The Act was amended in 2003, 2004 and 2011.

A system of licensing of spent fuel and radioactive waste management is provided in the 2002 Act, while the Rules on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Factors lay down details on the documentation which must be submitted in a particular phase of licensing. The prescribed li-censing process is of general nature, thus it is applicable to whole spectra of nuclear and ra-diation facilities.

The basic classification of facilities is provided by the Act itself, where in definition No. 22 of Article 3 it provides that a nuclear facility is "a facility for the processing or enrichment of nu-clear materials or the production of nuclear fuels, a nuclear reactor in critical or sub-critical assembly, a research reactor, a nuclear power plant and heating plant, a facility for storing, processing and disposal of nuclear fuel or high radioactive waste, a facility for storing, pro-cessing or disposal of low and intermediate radioactive waste". Therefore the entire spectrum of licensing requirements (for siting, construction, trial operation, operation, decommission-ing, and/or closure of the repository) has to be taken by the applicant (investor or operator of the facility) in accordance with provisions of the 2002 Act and of the Rules on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Factors.

In the licensing processes the investor/operator shall attach to the license application, in ad-dition to the design documentation, a Safety Analysis Report, and the opinion of an autho-rised radiation and nuclear safety expert (authorised by the SNSA) and other prescribed doc-umentation set by the Rules on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Factors.

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In the subsequent licensing processes (for approval of trial operation, operation, decommis-sioning or closure of the facility) the licensee has to submit the above described application containing an appropriately amended set of documents and opinions. The operating experi-ence and feedback, and modifications of the facility have to be clearly documented and de-scribed.

2.2 Regulatory body

Slovenian regulatory body Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA) is the organizational unit / body within the Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment (MAE). All other operators of the nuclear facilities are under other ministries and with this the needed level of independence and autonomy is established. That means that decisions adopted by the SNSA within its scope of competence are taken solely and exclusively by the SNSA and can not be dictated or imposed on the SNSA from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment, the Minister or any other body within the Ministry.

The SNSA performs specialised technical and developmental administrative tasks and tasks of inspection in the area of radiation and nuclear safety, radiation prac-tices and use of radiation sources (except in health and veterinary care), protec-tion of the environment against ionising radiation, physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and safe-guards of nuclear goods; the SNSA furthermore monitors radioactivity in the envi-ronment, third party liability, and transport, import and export of radioactive ma-terials.In the case of CSF the SNSA is responsible for:

- Licensing- Inspection- Enforcement of nuclear and radiation safety.

2.3 National radioactive waste management policy and stategy

On 6 March 2006 the Minister of the Environment and Spatial Planning adopted the Rules on Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management.On 1 February 2006 the Parliament of the Republic of Slovenia passed the Reso-lution on the 2006-2015 National Programme for Managing Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel (Official Gazette RS, No. 15/2006). The Programme for Managing Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel is a part of the National Environ-ment Protection Programme and sets goals and tasks in the field of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management. The resolution foresees general timelines and financing for activities related to radioactive waste and spent fuel management for all radiation and nuclear facili -ties.On 2 July 2013 the Parliament of the Republic of Slovenia passed the Resolution on the 2013-2023 Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Slovenia (Official Gazette RS, No. 56/2013). The Resolution, as a high level national policy paper, covers the fol-lowing chapters: The fundamental safety principles, description of nuclear and ra-

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diological activities in Slovenia, description of the international cooperation in the field of nuclear and radiation safety, description of the existing legislation (includ-ing binding international legal instruments, such as conventions and other rele-vant international instruments), description of the institutional framework, com-petence of professional support (research, education, training), objectives and measures to achieve them during the period up to 2023.

2.4 Short description of the CSF

Facility name: Central Storage Facility (CSF) for institutional RW Country: Slovenia Status: in operation Waste types: solid radioactive waste form medicine, industry, research and

education activities Waste streams:

o T1 (solid, compressible, combustable) o T2 (solid, compressible, non-combustable) o T3 (solid, non-compressible, combustable) o T4 (solid, non-compressible, non-combustable) o SRS (spent sealed sources) o M (mixed waste)

External packing: 210 l drums, 210 l drums with inner concrete shielding, 320 l drums, original containers of spent sealed sources, PE bags, PE or metal containers

Typical radionuclides: Co-60, Cs-137, Eu-152, Am-241, Ir-192, Kr-85, Sr-90, Am-241/Be, Eu-152/154, Ra-226, Pu-239, C-14, H-3, Se-75, U-238, Th-232

Facility Operations: accepting the waste packages, storing the waste pack-ages, manipulation of the waste packages, monitoring, export (for T&C or release)

Layout of Facility: Controlled area with: 10 storage sections, separated with concrete walls

Observation area: room for the staff, machinery room for ventilation sys-tem

Capacity: 115 m3 Systems: ventilation system with HEPA filters, fire protection system,

drainage system, for potential liquid release collection, physical protection system

Typical staffing: 6 persons

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3 SAFETY CASE CONTEXT

3.1 Purpose of the Safety Case

In the licensing processes in Slovenia the investor/operator shall attach to the license appli-cation, in addition to the design documentation, a Safety Analysis Report, and the opinion of an authorised radiation and nuclear safety expert (authorised by the SNSA) and other pre-scribed documentation set by the Rules on Radiation and Nuclear Safety Factors.

The first revision of the Safety Analysis Report for the CSF was prepared in 2007. In be-tween the definition of the Safety case was developed [ref] so Slovenia is trying to follow the good international practice and requirements and in the Safety strategy for CSF defined the Safety case as a collection of scientific, technical, administrative and managerial arguments and evidence in support of the safety of a CSF, following the definition in GSG – 3. So the Safety case for the CSF includes a number of documents and reports that are shortly pre-sented in the main document Safety case report.

A series of new documents related to the facility and revisions of existing documents has been produced in last three years: training program for staff relevant to nuclear and radiation safety, facility decommissioning plan, radioactive waste management program, physical pro-tection plan, working procedures and manuals etc. The changes in the legislation in the field of physical protection of nuclear facilities came into force in 2013. The upgrades were planned in 2013 and first part of the changes was already implemented in 2014. In 2013, ARAO started with new revision of Safety Case for storage facility. The new revision is re-quired because of changes in the facility and with plan to implement IAEA GSG – 3 [ref] methodology and use and test the SAFRAN [ref[ tool.

The main purposes to prepare a new revision of the Safety case are:

- Periodic reassessment

- Demonstration of the safety of the facility and

- To apply some changes as optimization of the facility design.

3.2 Safety Case Scope

Scope of the safety case is just the operation of the CSF with the activities that run inside the facility. All other activities (collection, treatment, source dismantling and transportation) presented above are not the scope of the license for CSF and are covered with different licenses.

3.3 Demonstration of safety

Provide an overview of the criteria that the safety case is aiming to meet. This can be a specific aspect; it does not have to be a synopsis of the whole. The text should explain why items are included/or excluded.

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3.4 Graded Approach

Explain why the scope was sufficient for the case being developed.

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4 SAFETY STRATEGY

Using the flowcharts in Annex D explain the strategies applied to the examples.

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5 DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY AND WASTE

5.1 Site Conditions

CSF lies inside the premises of the Research reactor center Josef Stefan, on the plane in north – west direction from Ljubljana. Research reactor lies just a couple of tenth meters dfrom the storage facility. Approximately 1 km South from the site flows river Sava and 0.5 km to the north-east flows small river Pšata.

Figure 2: CSF site

In the next table the data with the number of inhabitants inside the circle with the different diameter and the center in CSF are presented.

Radius [km]

Number of inhabitants

0,5 62

1 776

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2 3633

3 7122

4 19379

5 42579

6 85227

7 140078

8 177450

9 221005

10 271780

In the first zone live just 62 persons and mainly they use the land around the facility mainly for farming. Nobody permanently lives inside the Josef Institute premises but every day around 150 people work there.

ARAO follows the meteorological conditions and collect data of the site with the meteorological station, that is situated 250 m west from the facility. The site lies in the area with moderate continental climate, with low winter temperatures, frequent temperature inversion, relatively high summer temperatures, a lot of precipitations and frequent fog.

Figure 3: Meteorological station near the CSF

5.2 Facilities and Activities

CSF was constructed in 1986. It lies inside the area of Research rector center Josef Stefan in Brinje.

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Figure 4: CSF

It is constructed with the purpose to store LILW from the medicine, industry and research activities in Slovenia. The storage facility is a near-surface concrete building (seismic resistant) with the roof covered with a soil layer. The storage concept of the facility is, that different barriers (reinforced concrete walls, cover, doors, additional shielding) perform additional protection against the radiation.

The building is subdivided by concrete walls into nine storage sections and an entrance area. The ground plan of the facility is 10.6 m x 25.7 m with a height of 3.6 m. A small area is in -tended for checkpoint between radiological controlled and supervised area, space for loading and unloading the waste and for internal transport. The storage section at the back end of the building is deeper relative to the level of the other sections.

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Figure 5: CSP layout [the figure need to be translated]

The facility is equipped with a ventilation system for reducing radon concentration and air contamination in the storage facility. To obtain relatively low and constant humidity it is equipped with the air drying system. The water and sewage collecting system is designed as a closed system to retain all liquids from the storage facility in the sump. Liquids are dis-charged after the measurements of radioactive contamination, which has to be below the lim-

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itation in the regulation. The electricity supply system is used for illumination of the storage facility and for the powering of ventilation. The storage facility is physically and technically protected against fire, acts of violence, burglary, sabotage and similar events.Considering the Slovenian legislation and also article 4.53 in GSG-3 we identified the safety functions and associated structures, systems and components (SSC). All the SSCs were classified in 4 different classes considering Slovenian regulations and their importance for the safety of the facility. These classes go from I. to IV. where class I. means that termination of this SSC and their functions significantly reduce the defence in depth of the facility and raise the risk considerably.The safety functions that were identified for the storage facility are:

- Containment (C) of the radioactivity – radionuclides stay during the operation of the facility limited inside the waste packages and storage facility respectively,

- Shielding (S) from the radiation that arises from the radwaste,- Protection (P) of the waste – physical and technical security of the waste- Supporting (Su) function – this is not “real” function but support implementation of

the other safety function.In the table below all the SSCs are listed with their classification and safety functions they are performing.

SSC Safety function

Safety classification

Comments [translation needed]

Storage building C,S VK-3

SSK ima funkcijo ščitenja – prehajanja radioaktivnega sevanja iz odpadkov, v primeru izrednega dogodka (npr. raztros, požar) pa tudi funkcijo zadrževanja radionuklidov v samem skladišču.

Horizontal sewerage C VK-3

SSK ima zadrževalno funkcijo v primeru izrednih dogodkov (npr. potencialno razlitje ali vdor vode v skladišče).

Underground tank C VK-3SSK ima funkcijo zadrževanja morebitne kontaminirane vode.

Sewerage to collect precipitations C VK-3V primeru izrednega dogodka na ploščadi objekta iz….

Ventilation system C, Su VK-3

Prezračevalne naprave, poleg razvlaževanja opravljajo tudi funkcijo filtriranja zraka v skladišču, sistem tako zadrži veliko večino radionuklidov in zmanjšuje njihovo izhajanje v okolico.

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Vodovodna napeljava in vertikalna kanalizacija / VK-4 SSK nima nobene

varnostne funkcije.

Electricity supplying Su VK-3

SSK nima nobene varnostne funkcije, podpira samo izvedbo varnostne funkcije prezračevanja, požarne varnosti, varnostne razsvetljave, napajanje tehničnega varovanja.

Safety lighting Su VK-4 Pri izrednih dogodkih zagotavlja evakuacijo.

installation for telecommunication Su VK-3Izvajanje obveščanja v primeru izrednih dogodkov.

Lighting rods Su VK-4SSK podporno funkcijo, npr. posredno ščitenje pred požarom.

Active fire protection C VK-3

SSK opravlja funkcijo zadrževanja radionuklidov v primeru požara.

Passive fire protection Su VK-4SSK je podporna funkcija funkciji aktivne požarne zaščite.

Physical and technical security P VK-3SSK izvaja funkcijo tehničnega in fizičnega varovanja objekta.

Radwaste packages C,S VK-3SSK ima tako zadrževalno funkcijo kot funkcijo ščitenja.

Pallets Su VK-4

SSK ima podporno funkcijo za ustrezno izvedbo skladiščenja in izvajanje funkcije zadrževanja in ščitenja, ki izhaja iz SSK Paket.

Transportation system inside the storage facility Su VK-4

SSK ima podporno funkcijo za ustrezno izvedbo skladiščenja in izvajanje funkcije zadrževanja in ščitenja, ki izhaja iz SSK Paket.

Radiological monitoring Su VK-4

SSK ima podporno funkcijo izvajanja kontrole in določitve vpliva CSRAO na okolico.

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Hydrological monitoring Su VK-4 SSK ima podporno funkcijo.

Meteorological monitoring Su VK-4 SSK ima podporno funkcijo.

For all the SSCs that were classified as a class 3 the special procedures for maintaining and inspection were prepared.

5.3 Inventory of Radioactive Waste in CSF

All the data about the waste stored in CSF is in the databased, managed by ARAO.

At the end of 2013 92.4 m3 of radioactive waste was kept in the storage facility with total mass of 50 tons. The storage is filled already around 80 % of its capacity, and consequently the operator takes actions of volume reduction. The total volume was reduced in the last years due to several campaigns of waste repacking and exemption of emptied and cleared containers. Annually there are approximately 50 receipts of waste from small producers. The waste forms are:

Waste is packed in drums, in original containers of spent sealed sources, plastic or metal boxes and plastic bags. The drums contain mostly contaminated material such as paper, glass and plastic material with induced radioactivity caused by neutron exposure in the research reactor. Disused sealed sources are stored in the original shielding containers or are repacked in lead containers placed in the standard drums fitted with concrete shielding.From year 2012 ARAO has been carried out dismantling of ionizing smoke detec-tors as a regular activity. The reduction factor of this treatment is significant and despite of constantly new waste collected at waste producers the volume of stored radioactive waste in the storage facilityhas been very slightly increasing.

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In year 2013 ARAO collected 202 litters of liquid waste form medicine (research institute). Prior to their acceptance to the storage facility these liquid waste has been solidified. The total activity of the waste at the end of 2013 was 3,2 TBq. In last three years the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste receives approximately 2.5 m3 of solid radioactive waste annually.

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6 SAFETY ASSESSMENT

6.1 General

This section provides the background to and an overview of the safety assessments, on this basis highlight any specific considerations for operator and regulator on:

Radiological impact assessment Site and engineering aspects

Engineering Analysis Passive Safety Defence in Depth Scientific and Technical / Engineering Principles Quality of the Site Characterization

Operational safety aspects Non-radiological environmental impact Management Systems

6.2 MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTIES

Highlight how the example has handled any uncertainties.

6.3 ITERATION & DESIGN OPTIMIZATION

Highlight how the example has been optimised.

o Identification of Safety MeasuresHighlight the key safety measures for the example.

o Limits, Controls and ConditionsHighlight the key Limits, Controls and Conditions for the example.

6.4 INTEGRATION OF SAFETY ARGUMENTS

o Comparison against safety criteriaDetail the criteria the example was being measured against, whether or not these were met and the response of the regulator.

o Plans for addressing unresolved issuesProvide an overview of how issues were addressed.

6.5 INTERACTING PROCESSES

Provide an overview of the interacting processes including involvement of interested parties, independent review and management systems.

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6.6 RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

6.6.1 ASSESSMENT CONTEXT

For the examples provide details of; the assessment purpose, the assessment philosophy, the regulatory framework, the assessment endpoints and the assessment time frame. In addition the following should also be included:

Assessment Philosophy and Approaches Use of Different Assessment Approaches Probabilistic and Deterministic Approaches Conservative and Realistic Assessments

Assessment Endpoints Receptors

6.6.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY OR ACTIVITY AND THE WASTE

The storage facility in and the inventory are described in previous chapters. For the purpose of the safety assessment done by SAFRAN the facility was presented as on facility with ten rooms. These rooms are not really completely separated (see photo bellow), they are just separated with the walls in-between.

The reason to do this is that in different Compartments is stored waste with different properties and because of this the dose field in neighboring compartments is different. (See figure 8)

Figure 6: Different compartments (rooms in SAFRAN language) in the storage facility

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Figure 7: Rooms defined in SAFRAN

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P rekat 0

Prekat 2

Prekat 4

Prekat 6

Prekat 8

Pre

kat 7

Pre

kat 9

Pre

kat 3

Pre

kat 5

Pre

kat 1

2 4 6 8 10

5

10

15

20

25

2.8

10.5

12.5

9

9

8

18.3

8.4

8.1

11.5

11.3

8.3

17.1

16.2

4.4

4.4

4.2

6.3

2.1

1.65

2

0.1

0

0

0

0

2.7

8.9

11.5

13

20

13.5

15.7

13.9

12.4

12.2

8.9

10.6

23.8

34.3

15.4

8.4

12.2

14.7

4.1

3.9

4.3

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

2.9

3.8

6.2

7.6

43

16

14.4

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16.9

9.6

7.8

8.5

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38.4

24

13

22

16.2

3.2

5.2

5

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

2

2.2

3.7

5.6

8

6.9

13.5

13

9.5

8.7

7.3

8.6

12.4

16.8

12.3

8.7

8

4.3

2

3.3

3.8

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

1.5

2.3

1.7

1.3

2

3.8

6.8

9.5

9.3

8.9

9

8.2

8

7.6

6.7

4.3

5.6

4.8

2.3

0.9

1.2

1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

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2

2

2

5.4

5.6

8.7

9.5

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10 .3

7.2

6.4

6.9

7.7

6.1

3.4

2.2

1.4

1.3

0.55

0.6

0.15

0.1

0.1

0.1

1.4

1.3

2.7

3.5

2.3

2.7

3.7

5.1

7.9

11.4

13.3

7.4

8.6

8.9

7.6

6.6

1.6

1.3

0.7

0.8

0.7

0.4

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

1.4

1.7

2.8

5.3

4.5

4.2

12.1

18.3

21.3

25.3

21.4

9.7

15.1

15.6

9.6

6.2

0.4

0.5

0.4

0.5

0.8

0.3

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

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2.2

8.2

13 .6

12 .5

15

42 .8

40 .5

36 .8

35 .2

30 .5

14 .3

19 .8

17 .1

16 .1

6.7

0.2

0.5

0.4

0.8

0.38

0.18

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

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1.8

9.6

18.5

23.5

47.5

40.4

45.2

47.5

48.9

29.3

24.7

25.4

20.1

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6.8

0.2

0.3

0.6

0.3

0.35

0.22

0.13

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0.8

1.4

2.9

12.4

19.2

17.5

40.1

51.4

62

54.7

33.2

15.6

18.2

26.2

11.4

10

0.3

0.2

0.65

0.2

0.26

0.3

0.2

0.16

0.1

0.1

Hitrost doze [Sv/h ]

M eriln i inštrum ent: Autom ess AD 6s sondo Tele tektor A D-t M eritev na v išin i 1 m nad sod iM erilna m reža: 1x1 mEnota : [Sv/h ]

M eritev opravljena dne: 10.9 .2014M eritve opravil: SV S AR AO

Projekt: 09-01-001

0

2

6

14

22

30

38

46

54

62

70

78

86

94

102

110

Figure 8: The dose rate inside the CSF[transaltion]

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6.6.3 WASTE MANAGEMENT PROCESS DEFINITION IN SAFRAN

Simple process, that describe the work going on in CSF, was defined in SAFRAN with the reason to use the activities and connect them with rooms and waste components defined in SAFRAN. The following activities were defined:

- Unloading from transport container- Control measurement- Packaging- Storage 0 … up to Storage 9 (represent the storage in different compartment)

Figure 9: Presentation of the Process in SAFRAN

6.6.4 DEVELOPMENT AND JUSTIFICATION OF SCENARIOS

Scenarios for the CSF were developed in two parallel ways with the reason two benchmarking two different methods proposed in GSG-3.

For the first method we used the HAZOP (Hazards and operability analysis) method. The group of experts was nominated, who know the CSF very well with different fields of the activities (safety assessment, radiation protection, operation of the facility, civil engineering, environment protection, geology, hydrology, meteorology…). At first the normal operation scenario was developed and then, using HAZOP method the hazards for the CSF were identified and then screened on the base of hazard risk.

Hazard risk wad defined as a function of severity and likelihood (see the table below) and if the hazard risk was bellow or equal 9 the accidental scenario was prepared any analyzed inside the safety assessment.

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Severity

↓Likelihood

→ 1 2 3 4 5

1 1 3 3 4 5

2 2 4 6 8 10

3 3 6 9 12 15

4 4 8 12 16 20

Table 1: Hazard risk is the function of severity and likelihood

For the second method the SAFRAN was used.

Figure 10: Screening of the PIE in the SAFRAN

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Figure 11: Relevant accidental scenarios

Potential Hazard Identification Hazards screening Identification of Scenarios

Scenarios for normal operation Scenarios for anticipated operational occurrences and design basis accidents Scenarios for beyond design basis accidents Beyond Design Basis Accidents

6.6.5 FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF MODELS

Provide examples of how models were formulated and implemented in the example safety cases being discussed.

6.6.6 PERFORMANCE OF CALCULATIONS AND ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS

Provide examples of the calculations and analysis used in the example safety cases being discussed. The examples should include:

Management of Uncertainties Sources of Uncertainty

Model uncertainty Data/parameter uncertainty

- Waste characteristics

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- Waste package characteristics - Process characteristics - Measurement procedures - Receptor characteristics

Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses Treatment of Model and Data/Parameter Uncertainties

6.6.7 ANALYSIS OF ASSESSMENT RESULTS

For the example safety cases being discussed give details of the comparison against criteria, this can be cross referenced to the early text on the criteria to be met. The examples should include details of any review and modification of the assessment models.

6.7 SPECIFIC ISSUES

If the examples used demonstrate any of the specific issues discussed in section 6, discussion should be included in the text. The areas to be considered are:

Evolution of the safety case Concept and Design Development Construction Commissioning Operations Shutdown and Decommissioning Review of the safety assessment

The graded approach; Defence in depth; Reliability; Facility and Activity Lifetimes; Long Term Storage;

Timeframe Passive Safety Retrievability Management Systems

Waste acceptance criteria and interdependencies; Comparison of options.

6.8 DOCUMENTING AND USING THE SAFETY CASE

Use this section to cross reference against the text used in the examples to identify any discrepancies.

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7 REFERENCE

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