venezuela qpq negative - hss 2013

8/13/2019 Venezuela QPQ Negative - HSS 2013

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Venezuela QPQ Negative — HSS 13Please note: in order to facilitate good debates over this affirmative , you shouldn‘t read the China SOI DA,Diplomatic Engagement PIC, or Ambassador CP as a set of affirmative answers have not been released.

http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/07/venezuela-and-iran-the-end-of-the-affair/http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-fraying-iran-venezuela-alliance-6603

"iran" "venezuela" "state department"

The United States federal government should- pressure Venezuela to implement election reforms by publicly and privately stating that attempts to

suppress or intimidate the opposition violates the Venezuelan constitution and Inter-American DemocraticCharter

- demand free, fair and verifiable Venezuelan elections-

work with regional partners including — but not limited to — Brazil, Canada, Colombia and Mexico toencourage Maduro‘s government

The United States federal government should offer full diplomatic relations towards Venezuela if and only ifVenezuela ends ties to international terrorist groups and rogue regimes, ensures future elections are held as defined

by Venezuela‘s constitution and the Inter -American Democratic Charter, and cooperates with the U.S. and regional partners to combat illicit narcotics trafficking in the Western Hemisphere.

http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/07/venezuela-and-iran-the-end-of-the-affair/




Off Case



Venezuelan Politics DA



1NC

Democratic Transition coming, but at crossroads. Any US involvement fails and empowersanti-US forces.Spetalnick ‗13 Matt Spetalnick – White House correspondent who has covered news on four continents for Reuters, from Latin American coups and drug wars – Reuter‘s – March 6 th, 2013 – ―Despite new hopes, U.S. treads cautiously after death of Venezuela's Chavez‖ – http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/uk-venezuela-chavez-usa-idUKBRE92504920130306

Washington's challenge will be to figure out how far to go in seizing the opening to engage withVenezuelan leaders as well as its political opposition without giving the impression of U.S. meddling following thesocialist president's death after a two-year battle with cancer. "We're not interested in having a confrontational relationship with Venezuela," asenior U.S. official told Reuters. "We're going to have to see how things evolve. It's a dynamic period." For Washington, a major test will bewhether Venezuela follows its own constitution - which has been widely interpreted to require a special election to pick Chavez's successor - andif such a vote is conducted in a free and fair way in "accordance with hemispheric norms," the official said. Washington had accused Chavez andhis allies of electoral abuses, such as intimidating foes and misusing state media during his 14-year rule. Chavez had created headaches forsuccessive U.S. administrations with his strong anti-American rhetoric and his alliances with some of Washington's main foes, including Cubaand Iran. The question now is whether his leftist "revolution" and incendiary foreign policy can live on without his dominant personality at thehelm. In a normally divided Washington, Chavez's death brought a rare moment of bipartisan agreement, with Republicans and Democrats alikeseeing it as a chance to turn a page after a long period of strained U.S.-Venezuelan ties. "Hugo Chavez was a destabilizing force in LatinAmerica, and an obstacle to progress in the region," said Mike Rogers, a Republican from Michigan and chairman of the U.S. House ofRepresentatives intelligence committee. "I hope his death provides an opportunity for a new chapter in U.S.-Venezuelan relations."

"Hopefully there will be a peaceful transition of power in Venezuela with real, meaningfuldemocratic reforms," U.S. Senator Bill Nelson, a Democrat from Florida, said in a message on Twitter. OBAMA'S NOT-SO-SUBTLE MESSAGE Obama called it a "challenging time" for Venezuela and - in a measured but not-so-subtle message to Vice President

Nicolas Maduro, Chavez's preferred successor - said the United States "remains committed to policies that promote democratic principles, therule of law and respect for human rights." Taking the chill off the relationship between Washington and Caracas will not be easy. Recent U.S.efforts to improve long-dormant cooperation in areas like drug interdiction and regional security were favourably received at first in Caracas butultimately failed to yield any real progress, the senior administration official said. And Washington was quick to reject Maduro's accusations,made just hours before his announcement of Chavez's death, that the United States had been engaged in a conspiracy against the president andVenezuela. "Their statements and actions today call into question their interest in having a functional and productive relationship with the UnitedStates," the official said. Chavez, who took on Cuban leader Fidel Castro's role as Latin America's most vocal critic of Washington, accused theUnited States of pursuing imperialist policies in the region as he used Venezuela's oil wealth to bolster leftist allies. As for whether Washingtonhoped to see Venezuela move away from its alliance with communist-ruled Cuba, the U.S. official said: "That's up to them to determine who their

partners are." But the official added that Washington has not hesitated to make known its displeasure when "there were relationships with actorsof concern." U.S. officials had contended that Chavez' rule eroded democratic freedoms in Venezuela and he went too far in concentrating power

in his own hands. But any overt U.S. effort to intervene in Venezuela's politics now would almostcertainly backfire, and possibly harm the anti-Chavez opposition. "It is a delicate time. I thinkthe United States needs to be very patient and not become a factor internally in a way that ...could become negative ," said Arturo Valenzuela, the U.S. State Department's top official for the Western Hemisphere from 2009 to2011.

Maduro stands on crossroads – his perceived political success is key to check narco-generals. That causes internal meltdown.

Noriega ‗13 Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He isa visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute – ―Venezuela elections may stir things up‖ ‖ – InterAmerica Security Watch – April 13th,2013 – http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/venezuela-elections-may-stir-things-up/

As I noted after Chávez‘s death last month, Venezuela is a country on the verge of a socioeconomicmeltdown. Street crime, power outages, and shortages of food and consumer goods trouble the lives of millions of citizens. The governmentis running a dangerous fiscal deficit; mismanaged social programs are unsustainable. State revenues are down dramatically because the state-runoil company – packed with political cronies and plundered by Chávez to fund pet projects – is producing far less oil than it was 15 years ago. Theregime has forfeited its legitimacy as senior officials are complicit with drug trafficking and terrorism. And the shameless intervention of Havana

to manage the chavista succession has stirred anger among nationalists in Venezuela‘s once -proud military. Confronting these



challenges without Chávez at the top of the ticket, the regime has exploited every unfair advantage toengineer a convincing victory. Although the chavista leadership has closed ranks aroundMaduro, their confidence has to have been shaken by his buffoonish performance – claiming to chat with Chávez

through a little bird circling over his head, for instance, or clumsily mimicking the antics of his charismatic predecessor. Even if thechavistas decide to steal an electoral victory for Maduro, after the election, the narcogenerals led

by National Assembly president and ruling party chief Diosdado Cabello will second-guess Maduro as he tries to run thecountry . Cabello considers himself a much more able administrator, and he has a bitter distrust of the Cubans who appear to be

micromanaging Maduro and his campaign.

If Venezuela slips into a narco-state, it turns each case advantage.

Noriega ‗12 Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He isa visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute – TESTIMONY ¶ OF ¶ AMBASSADOR ROGER F. NORIEGA ¶ BEFORE THE ¶ UNITEDSTATES ¶ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ¶ COMMITTEE ON ¶ FOREIGN AFFAIRS ¶ SUBCOMMITTEE ON ¶ TERRORISM, NON ¶ - ¶PROLIFERATION AND TRADE ¶ ― ¶ Hezbollah‘s Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat ¶ ‖ ¶ 1:30 PM, Wednesday, ¶ March 20 ¶ , 2012 – http://www.aei.org/files/2013/03/20/-hezbollahs-strategic-shift-a-global-terrorist-threat_134945797264.pdf

Some may assess this ¶ cooperation between ¶ ― ¶ narco ¶ s‖ and ¶ terrorist ¶ s ¶ as a marriage ¶ ofconvenience between different criminal elements or ¶ just ¶ another ¶ modus operandi ¶ of ¶ powerful international drug

syndicates ¶ that can be tackled by l ¶ aw enforcement ¶ . Instead, ¶ this criminal activity is the product ¶ of a ¶ consciousstrategy of ¶ rogue regimes in ¶ Iran and ¶ Venezuela to wage ¶ asymmetrical warfare ¶ against ¶ U.S.security, interests and allies ¶ close ¶ to the homeland ¶ . ¶ As such, it requires a much more robustanalysis and coordinated ¶ response ¶ – ¶ from exposing terrorist g ¶ roups working within Venezuela, identifying ¶ narcoterrorist activities inCentral America, ¶ imposing ¶ sanctions against state ¶ - ¶ ru ¶ n entities ¶ being used to conceal criminal transactions, ¶ to dismantl ¶ ing transnationalmoney ¶ laundering schemes. ¶ Under bipartisan legislation passed by Congress in December, the Department of ¶ State was given six months to

provide you with an analysis of and strategy for dealing ¶ with Iran‘s activities in the Americas. Until now, the State Depa rtment has earned a ¶ repu ¶ tation within the U.S. government of minimizing this ¶ threat ¶ . This Subcommittee will ¶ have to press the Department to conduct a thoroughand rigorous review of the Iranian ¶ and Hezbollah activities in our region and to expose the ¶ extraordinary ¶ role ¶ that is ¶ p ¶ layed ¶ by Venezue ¶ la

in this regard. U.S. diplomats will then have to inform our neighbors about ¶

this problem and lay the groundwork for a coordinated strategy fordealing with this ¶ phenomenon in our Hemisphere. ¶ Mr. Chairman , I fear that these narco ¶ terrorist activities will exactan increasingly terrible price from our neighbors and our nation ¶ until our national securityestablishment recognizes the nature of the threat and fashions an effective response .



2NC Link Uniqueness

( ) Maduro narrowly holding-off internal military challenges now –fidelity to Chavez‘santi-US cause will be key.

Metzker ‗13 (Internally quoting Michael Shifter, Adjunct Prof @ Gtown, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and

president of the Inter-American Dialogue. Jared Metzker – IPS Reporter, Washington DC - Inter Press Service – June 17, 2013 – lexis)

The new president's waffling may be a reflect ion of his tenuous grip on power . By many accounts, Madurolacks the political prowess and rabble-rousing charm of Chavez , who enjoyed military backing as well as ferventsupport from the lower classes. ¶ In addition to a strong anti-Chavista opposition that openly challenges the legitimacy of his narrowly won

election, Maduro has had to deal with a split within Chavez's own former political base. ¶ Shifter pointed out that among the military , which was once a source of significant strength for Chavez, more support isgiven to Diosdado Cabello, currently head of Venezuela's parliament and whose supporters believe he was the rightful heir to the

presidency. ¶ Maduro's legitimacy stems largely from his perceived ideological fidelity, the reason forhis selection by Chavez to lead in the first place. Shifter said this leads him to "emulate" his

predecessor and makes rapprochement with the United States less probable.



2NC AT: U.S. Engaging Now

( ) US moving cautiously now

Spetalnick ‗13 Matt Spetalnick – White House correspondent who has covered news on four continents for Reuters, from Latin American coups and drug wars – Reuter‘s – March 6 th, 2013 – ―Despite new hopes, U.S. treads cautiously after death of Venezuela's Chavez‖ – http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/uk-venezuela-chavez-usa-idUKBRE92504920130306

While the death of Venezuela's stridently anti-American President Hugo Chavez on Tuesday raised hopes in Washington for better U.S.-Venezuela relations , the Obama administration reacted cautiously as it weighed the prospects for a diplomatic thaw. President Barack Obama quickly reached out to Venezuelans, expressing an interest in a"constructive relationship" in the post-Chavez era. But analysts said it would be hard to make tangible progress when deep political uncertaintyrisks destabilizing the South American oil-producing nation. Washington's challenge will be to figure out how far to go in seizing the opening toengage with Venezuelan leaders as well as its political opposition without giving the impression of U.S. meddling following the socialist

president's death after a two-year battle with cancer. "We're not interested in having a confrontational relationship with Venezuela," a senior U.S.

official told Reuters. " We're going to have to see how things evolve. It's a dynamic period ."



China SOI DA



1NC

China is taking the lead in Venezuelan oil now – economically and politicallyDT 4/29 , ―China in Venezuela: loans for oil‖, 4/29/13, http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/ Dragon‘s Tail, blogabout Chinese international affairs, MollieDespite its frequent anti- american rhetoric (which should not stop with Maduro‘s election), Venezuela remainslargely financially dependant of the US . It does not brag about this and has been seeking throughoutthe Chavez years to escape the US sphere of influence. It is quite naturally that the socialist state ,since Chavez‘s election in 1998 , has been turning more and more towards China. Indeed, Chavez visitedChina 6 times in his 14 year rule in attempts to integrate its alternative world system. The energy-hungrydragon on the other hand has very clear objectives in Venezuela: securing through investmentand loans a fair share of the world‘s largest recoverable oil reserves. In the past decade but especiallyin the past 3 years , bilateral trade has soared more than exponentially from $500 million in 1999 to$7,5 billion in 2009 and over $20 billion in 2012 (PDVSA). China is now Venezuela‘s secondtrading partner after the US (Venezuelan trade ministry). In 2012, 65% of oil exports went to Venezuela‘straditional oil partner, the US, through its american subsidiary Citgo ; China was in second place with 20 %. Thesenumbers clearly show China‘s new interest in the world‘s 10th largest oil exporter (2012). Moreimportantly, according to the US Geological Survey and the OPEC, Venezuela holds the world‘s largest oildeposits in its Orinoco Oil Belt (although mostly heavy crude which needs important refining) and contractsare up for grabs. The oil industry, which accounts for 95% of the country‘s exports, is controlled by PDVSA(Petroles de Venezuela), a state owned company created in 1976. The process of nationalisation of oil resourcescontinued in 2007, when Chavez nationalised the Orinoco Belt projects, giving the state a minimum 60% ownershipin all joint ventures. In these difficult conditions for foreign investors, China has two greatadvantages compared to its Western counterparts which are independence from the US andmoney.

The plan kills china‘s peaceful riseHilton 2013 , ―China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?‖, Expert Analysis by Isabel Hilton, February 2013,Executive Summary,http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CD8QFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.peacebuilding.no%2Fvar%2Fezflow_site%2Fstorage%2Foriginal%2Fapplication%2F26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf&ei=hdzWUca8JILk4AOij4CoDw&usg=AFQjCNGHKw3VP72fVH4crRtY3_Llw-iu0g&sig2=ICkNV90oFC_0Mp3rvFM0Fg&bvm=bv.48705608,d.dmg Mollie

China has tried to foster good relations around the world to facilitate its smooth ascendancy togreat power status . In Latin America, this creates a delicate balance between national interestsand the desire to avoid prematurely antagonising the United States . China sees Asia as its ownsphere of influence , and the Obama administration‘s ―pivot‖ – a ―rebalancing‖ of U.S. foreign policytowards Asia – has raised hackles in Beijing. The PRC, until now, has been willing to treadcarefully in the U.S. backyard, promoting soft power but playing down specific political challengesto the U.S., including from its Latin American partners .Resource exports

Confrontation escalates to retaliatory warHilton 2013 , ―China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?‖, Expert Analysis by Isabel Hilton, February 2013,Executive Summary,

http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/


http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CD8QFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.peacebuilding.no%2Fvar%2Fezflow_site%2Fstorage%2Foriginal%2Fapplication%2F26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf&ei=hdzWUca8JILk4AOij4CoDw&usg=AFQjCNGHKw3VP72fVH4crRtY3_Llw-iu0g&sig2=ICkNV90oFC_0Mp3rvFM0Fg&bvm=bv.48705608,d.dmg











http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CD8QFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.peacebuilding.no%2Fvar%2Fezflow_site%2Fstorage%2Foriginal%2Fapplication%2F26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf&ei=hdzWUca8JILk4AOij4CoDw&usg=AFQjCNGHKw3VP72fVH4crRtY3_Llw-iu0g&sig2=ICkNV90oFC_0Mp3rvFM0Fg&bvm=bv.48705608,d.dmg Mollie

There are warnings within the U.S. security community about the potential implications of

Chinese involvement in Latin America in the future , and concerns about China‘s still modest militarysales to the region. Examples of these sales include Venezuela ‘s 2010 purchase of 18 K -8 fighters fromChina. Despite the concerns of the State Department, however, there has been lit tle response in senior policy circlesto the ―China threat‖. Regardless of whether there is any real ―threat‖ to the U.S., key decision -makers have notreacted. China‘s presence in Latin America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to affect itsregional partners for the foreseeable future. Although this undoubtedly entails a loss of U.S.influence in the region, both China and the U.S. have so far sought cooperation rather thanconfrontation . In the context of the Obama administration‘s ―pivot‖ to Asia, however, and the latent, long-term strategic competition between China and the United States, there is potential for increasingcompetition for influence in the future. An escalation of tensions between China and U.S. alliesin the South China or East China Sea could prompt China to raise retaliatory tensions in the U.S.

backyard . At that point, the traditional Latin American allies of the U.S. could face some uncomfortable choices.

Goes nuclear

Lowther ‗13 Note: when this card has a line that reads ―it says‖, it is referencing a 42 -page report by the Washington DC-basedCenter for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ask your lab leaders about the CSIS and the PONI (Project on

Nuclear Issues) – several of them have worked for that organization and will have unique insights. The study at handwas prepared by the CSIS‘ Project on Nuclear Issues. The Tapiei Time article was written by William Lowther, whois the Washington DC staff writer for that organization and he is citing a report by the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, 3-16- 2013, ―Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,‖ Taipei Times,http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211

―Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the

Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases formiscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs ofsuspicion ,‖ the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds ofactions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To make things worse, ― neitherside seems to believe the other ‘s declared policies and intentions , suggesting that escalationmanagement , already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,‖ it says. Although conflict ― mercifully‖seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that ―it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely i f we are unwise or unlucky.‖ The report says:

―With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals , such a conflictwould be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating .‖











2NC Impact

( ) A war with china is likely in the short term. Causes massive death tolls.

Goldstein ‗13 [Avery Goldstein is the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study ofContemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania,―First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability i n U.S.- China Relations,‖ International Security, Vol. 37, no 4, Spring, 2013, pp 49 -89]

Sino-American crises that could erupt in the near future, while China remains ¶ militarilyoutclassed by the United States, present distinctive dangers . The preceding ¶ analysis offers some reassurance thatthe interaction of conventional ¶ and nuclear capabilities would limit the degree of instability. Because it is so ¶ difficult to fully eliminate theadversary‘s ability to use military force to generate ¶ a shared risk of catastrophe, the incentives that can make striking first so ¶ tempting in a

conventional world are diminished. But because instability in a ¶ nuclear world could result in disaster, even asmall chance that the parties ¶ would initiate the use of force is troubling. During a crisis, thedesire to ¶ achieve a favorable outcome will provide incentives to manipulate risk and ¶ mayencourage the use of force if only to signal resolve as each side seeks the ¶ upper hand. This suggests

that the most worrisome possibility is a crisis in ¶ which the United States and China fail to graspeach other‘s view about the ¶ importance of its interests at stake. If one side believes that its stronger interests ¶ ensure that it will be more resolute, it could be tempted to signal resolve through the limited use of conventional force to manipulate risk. Becausethe ¶ risk being manipulated is ultimately the genuine risk of escalation to a nuclear ¶ exchange, this should be sufªcient reason for scholars to

provide policymakers ¶ with a better understanding of the current prospects for such dangerous instability ¶ in U.S.-China crises. ¶ Concerns raised by the possibility that China could one day grow strong ¶ enough to become a true peer competitor facing the United States have received ¶ muchattention. Although clearly important, that is a discussion about ¶ the distant future. In the meantime, greater attention needs to be paid to the ¶ immediate danger of instability in the kinds of crises that could ensnare ¶ the United States and China while China is still relatively weak.

Ironically, perhaps,¶ whatever new security challenges a much stronger China could one day¶ pose, the end of China‘s currently profound military weakness would at least¶ mitigate the keynear-term problem identified here — the potential for crisis instability¶ exacerbated by asymmetryin Sino-American power. But before any ¶ such major shift in power occurs, there is a real, iflimited , possibility that a ¶ mismanaged Sino-American crisis will render all speculation about thelong ¶ term tragically moot.

( ) US-China conflict escalates to Nuclear catastrophe

Goldstein ‗13 [Avery Goldstein is the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study ofContemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania,―First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S. -China Relations,‖ International Security, Vol. 37, no 4, Spring, 2013, pp 49-89]

In a crisis, the U.S. and Chinese interests at stake will be high, and either ¶ side could decide that

the risk of escalation introduced by conventional, space, ¶ or cyberattacks was worth running . Even

though no stake in a crisis would be ¶ high enough for either the United States or China to choose an unrestrained ¶ nuclear exchange, somestakes might be high enough for either one to choose ¶ to initiate military actions that elevate therisk of escalation to such a disastrous ¶ outcome .88 As discussed above, both China and the United States have ¶ important interestsover which they could find themselves locked in a warthreatening ¶ crisis in the Western Paciªc. The recent pattern of pointed Chinese ¶ and U.S.statements about the handling of persistent disputes in the South ¶ China Sea, for example, suggests that both sides attach a high and perhapsincreasing ¶ value to their stakes in this region. Whether that value is high enough ¶ to contribute to crisis instability is an empirical question that

cannot be answered ¶ in advance. The most worrisome source of instability , however, is ¶ clear — the temptation to



use nonnuclear strikes as a way to gain bargaining ¶ leverage, even if doing so generates an unknowablerisk of nuclear catastrophe ¶ that both China and the United States will have incentives tomanipulate .

( ) Recent cyber attacks indicate possibility of war is high

Feldman ‗13 [Noah Feldman, constitutional and international law professor at Harvard University, ―The Coming Cool War With China,‖ Bloomberg,6/02/2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-02/the-coming-cool-war-with-china.html]

Someone steals your most sensitive secrets. Then, planning a face-to- face meeting, he says he wants to develop ―a new type‖ of relationship with

you. At what point, exactly, would you start thinking he was planning to drink your milkshake? ¶ Ahead of the first summitmeeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping of China on June 7, thetwo nations are on the brink of geopolitical conflict . As its officials acknowledge, China is a classic rising

power, poised to challenge U.S. dominance . In historical terms, the sole global superpower never gives up without a fight. ¶ ―China‘s peaceful rise‖ was a useful slogan, while it lasted, for China‘s leaders. ―America‘s peaceful decline‖ will get no one elected, whetherDemocrat or Republican. Geopolitics is almost always a zero-sum game. If China can copy or work around U.S. missile defenses, fighter jets anddrones, the U.S.‘s global posit ion will be eroded -- and the gains will go directly to China. ¶ At the same time, trade between the two rivalsremains robust. Last week, Henan-based Shuanghui International Holdings Ltd. agreed to buy the U.S. pork-processing giant Smithfield FoodsInc. (SFD) for $4.7 billion. This could be the single-largest Chinese acquisition of a U.S. company, and it is reason for enthusiasm. Mutualownership of significant corporate assets across borders doesn‘t miraculously guarantee peace, nor can it make conflict d isappear overnight. Butit gives both sides the incentive to manage geopolitical conflict, and not let it overtake the tremendous mutual benefits created by trade. ¶

Entwined Economies ¶ The juxtaposition of rising tensions over cyber-attacks and the pork cooperation perfectly captures the paradoxical state of Chinese-U.S. relations -- and explains why officials on both sides are struggling to come up with a new conceptual framework to understand the change . Never before has a rising power been so economicall y interdependent with the nation challenging it. The ties go beyond the U.S.‘s 25 percentmarket share for Chinese exports or China‘s holdings of 8 percent of the outstanding U.S. national debt. They include about 2 00,000 Chinese

studying in the U.S. and perhaps 80,000 Americans living and working in China. ¶ The combination of geopoliticalcompetition and economic interdependence sets the terms for the struggle that won‘t be a newCold War so much as a Cool War . If the Soviet Union and the U.S. avoided all-out conflict because of mutually assured nuclear

destruction, the relations between China and the U.S. today could be defined by the threat of mutually assured economic destruction. Theeconomic costs of violent conflict would be incalculably large. ¶ As a practical matter, however, we mustn‘t assume thateconomic interdependence precludes the possibility of old-fashioned violence. On the positive side, Chinais urging North Korea to re-engage with the six-party talks and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula -- a sign that the government in Beijingrealizes that its unruly ally could do significant damage to regional stability. On the negative side, North Korea seems perfectly content to ignoreits mentor‘s directives. As we learned during the Cold War, proxies don‘t always behave the way their would -be masters want them to. It is farfrom clear that the Americans and the Soviets wanted their allies in the Middle East to go to war in 1967, 1973 or 1981.



2NC AT: Chavez Death

Maduro has furthered commitment to ChinaDT 4/29 , ―China in Venezuela: loans for oil‖, 4/29/13, http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/ Dragon‘s Tail, blogabout Chinese international affairs, MollieBeyond these difficulties, prospects are good for China- Venezuela relations, even after Chavez‘sdeath. Since his election, Maduro has already promised that his first trip abroad would be to China. He even said ―the best tribute that we could give to our Comandante Chavez is to deepen ourstrategic relationship with our beloved China‖ . China seems evermore poised to secure new deals inVenezuela‘s oil -economy and eventually buy stakes in debt-ridden PDVSA if it is denationalised. Talks have alsostarted in 2012 to establish a free trade agreement with Mercosur. The dragon‘s strategy of tied loans andloans-for-oil means it is at the same time securing resources and creating business through itsinvestmen t. Although not risk-free, it is clear that Venezuela will need Chinese funds in the future andshould respect the deals even in the case of a collpase of Maduro‘s government . It is alsoestablishing itself as the second power in the Caribbean region and in Latin America. China will have to becareful not to push the continent into a bipolar balance of power and not confront the US but

rather build partnerships with it, so as not to hinder its ―peaceful rise‖ global strategy.






2NC Link Uniqueness

China has carefully avoided confrontation in Venzeula oilDT 4/29 , ―China in Venezuela: loans for oil‖, 4/29/13, http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/ Dragon‘s Tail, blogabout Chinese international affairs, MollieIndeed, China is investing in Venezuela for energy security but also for business and profit. Beyondthe numerous bilateral benefits, it has two main negative aspects on China and its international relations with theUS, but also on Venezuela and its economy. For example, due to the transport distance (it takes about 40 days toship oil to China) and refining problems, Chinese state-owned companies sell up to a third ofVenezuelan oil locally for profit (there is a noticeable gap in between PDVSA export and Chinese importfigures ). China however wishes to conduct business in South America without raising tensionswith the US , either by enforcing Venezuela‘s anti -american rhetoric or by challenging their

presence in their ―back yard ‖. Thus, although mainly conducted by state -owned companies, China has to put great effort into separating its business from its politics contrarily to Venezuela. As forCaracas, one of the consequences of raised dependence on oil exports is the decrease of other

business due to the ―Dutch Disease‖. This effect takes place when important natural resources

export increase the value of a country‘s currency, thus making other exports more expensive andless competitive. A good example in Venezuela is in the textile industry, where it is becoming cheaper to importChinese textile than to produce it locally (which once again indirectly benefits China).






2NC Link

Now is the tipping point – peaceful rise is only possible if status quo investments are notincreasedDT 4/29 , ―China in Venezuela: loans for oil‖, 4/29/13, http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/ Dragon‘s Tail, blogabout Chinese international affairs, Mollie

Beyond these difficulties, prospects are good for China- Venezuela relations, even after Chavez‘s death. Since hiselection, Maduro has already promised that his first trip abroad would be to China. He even said ―the best tributethat we could give to our Comandante Chavez is to deepen our strategic relationship with our beloved China‖ . Chinaseems evermore poised to secure new deals i n Venezuela‘s oil -economy and eventually buy stakes in debt-riddenPDVSA if it is denationalised. Talks have also started in 2012 to establish a free trade agreement with Mercosur.The dragon‘s strategy of tied loans and loans -for-oil means it is at the same time securingresources and creating business through its investmen t. Although not risk-free, it is clear that Venezuelawill need Chinese funds in the future and should respect the deals even in the case of a collpaseof Maduro‘s government . It is also establishing itself as the second power in the Caribbean region and in LatinAmerica. China will have to be careful not to push the continent into a bipolar balance of powerand not confront the US but rather build partnerships with it, so as not to hinde r its ―peacefulrise‖ global strategy.






2NC Heg Impact

Failure to challenge China kills dollar diplomacy and hegemony – infrastructure and oilare keyHilton 2013 , ―China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?‖, Expert Analysis by Isabel Hilton, February 2 013,Executive Summary,http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CD8QFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.peacebuilding.no%2Fvar%2Fezflow_site%2Fstorage%2Foriginal%2Fapplication%2F26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf&ei=hdzWUca8JILk4AOij4CoDw&usg=AFQjCNGHKw3VP72fVH4crRtY3_Llw-iu0g&sig2=ICkNV90oFC_0Mp3rvFM0Fg&bvm=bv.48705608,d.dmg MollieThe United States is Latin America‘s traditional hegemon ic power, but China‘s influence in theregion is large and growing. How far does China‘s presence in the U.S. backyard represent a hegemonicchallenge? China is important in the region as a buyer of Latin American resources, primarily fromfour countries, an important investor and an exporter of manufactured goods. The impact of China‘s activities variesin degree from country to country. In several countries local manufacturing has suffered from cheaper Chineseimports; several countries have benefited from Chinese demand for resources, others from large investments, andChina is having an important impact on the region‘s infrastructure . The risks to the region includeresource curse, distorted development and environmental degradation due to a lowering of environmental andsocial standards. Despite its significant economic presence, China has been carefulto keep a low political and diplomatic profile to avoid antagonising the U.S. and to maintain a

benign environment for its economic activities. Chinese support, however, has been important for partners,such as Cuba and Venezuela, that do not enjoy good relations with the U.S. So far the two powers have soughtcooperation rather than confrontation, but rising tensions with U.S. allies Japan and Vietnamcould have repercussions in Latin America if China feels the U.S. is becoming too assertive in itsown East Asian backyard .

Introduction Ever sin ce President James Monroe‘s 1823 declaration that European powers must respect thewestern hemisphere as the U.S. sphere of influence, the United States has been the dominant economic,

political and military power in Latin America . As such, it has faced a series of challengers, from NaziGermany to the Soviet Union and Japan. In the last two decades, the rise of the People‘s Republic ofChina (PRC) has been reshaping the politics and economics of the region. How far has the PRC

become the new hegemonic challenger? China has not sought a strategic confrontation with the United States inLatin America, as the USSR did in the Cold War. However, against the background of U.S. – China rivalryand potential confrontation over such issues as Taiwan, this could change in the future. In themeantime, China‘s economic weight offers i ts Latin American partners a new freedom to defy U.S.interests, should they choose to. China plays three major roles in Latin America : as an insatiableconsumer of commodities ; as an exporter of cheap manufactured goods; and as a lender andinvestor . The region‘s importance to a rising China is underpinned by its resources : Latin America has theworld‘s largest reserves of silver, at 49% of the global total, copper, at 44%, and tin, at 33%. It also has at least 16%of the global oil reserves and the largest quantity of arable land in the world. China plays a flexible hand in differentcountries, within the framework of a regional strategy. Although China‘s policy papers treat LatinAmerica as a region, this does not get in the way of China‘s ability to work with local differencesin pursuit of its objectives: in Venezuela, for instance, China offers large loans in exchange foroil , whereas in Peru it favours direct investment in the mining sector.

<<heg bad impacts>>











Saudi Oil DA



Saudi Oil DA Link---1NC

Aff eliminates dependence on Saudi Oil- infrastructure investment is keyAlvarez and Hanson 09 (Cesar Alvarez and Stephanie Hanson. 2/9/09. "Venezuela's Oil-Based Economy". Councilon Foreign Relations". www.cfr.org/world/venezuelas-oil-based-economy/p12089

Venezuela's proven oil reserves are among the top ten in the world. Oil generates about 80 percent of thecountry‘s total export revenue, contributes about half of the central government‘s income, and is responsible for about one -third of the country‘sgross domestic product (GDP). Increases in world oil prices in recent years have allowed Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to expand social

program spending, bolster commercial ties with other countries, and boost his own international profile. Though Chavez has threatened to stopexporting Venezuelan oil and refined petroleum products to the United States, its biggest oil-trading partner, experts say a significant short-term

shift in oil relations between Venezuela and the United States is unlikely. The medium-term outlook for state oil companyPDVSA is questionable , however, and analysts draw links between PDVSA's profitability and the political stability of the country.Analysts say the recent global financial crisis and sudden drop in oil prices are adding to the oil company's financial turmoil. Share 1 0Venezuela's Economy under Chavez Hugo Chavez took office in 1999. Since then, Venezuela‘s economy has remained squarely cente red on oil

production. In 2006, Chavez announced a nationalization of oil fields managed by foreign companies, which resulted in an increase of thegovernment‘s shares in these projects from 40 percent to 60 percent. Government officials argue, however, that economic growt h efforts are notsolely focused on oil. Venezuela‘s ambassador to the United States, Bernardo Alvarez Herrera, wrote in a 2006 Foreign Affairs essay that thenon-oil sector, which includes mining, manufacturing, and agriculture, grew 10.6 percent in 2005, ―indicating an important divers ification of thecountry's econ omy.‖ Yet even if the country is working to diversify,―oil still predominates,‖ says Miguel Tinker -Salas, a professor of LatinAmerican history at Pomona College. In 2002, the Venezuelan economy experienced a significant downturn following a failed military coup to

overthrow Chavez and a two-month strike by the state-run oil company PDVSA. The response to the strike — the dismissal of more thanseventeen thousand PDVSA employees — resulted in a rapid drop in GDP between 2002 and 2003. In subsequent years, rising international oil prices helped the economy to recover. In 2007, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates, economic growth was 8.4 percent. Opinion isdivided over the effect of Chavez's policies on Venezuela's economy. Some economists say the tremendous rise in social spending under Chavezhas greatly reduced poverty and pushed unemployment below 10 percent, its lowest level in more than a decade. According to a February 2008report from the Washington-based Center for Economic and Policy Research, not only has unemployment dropped, formal employment hasincreased significantly (PDF) since Chavez took office. But other economists express concerns about the country's high inflation levels. The IMFhas forecast inflation of 25.7 percent in 2008 and 31.0 percent in 2009 — among the highest rates for any country in the world — and according tonews reports, the country is already experiencing food shortages of goods such as sugar and milk. Francisco Rodriguez, former chief economistof the Venezuelan National Assembly, writes in a 2008 Foreign Affairs article that income inequality has increased during Chavez's tenure, andfurther, Chavez's social programs have not had a significant impact on infant mortality rate or literacy rates among Venezuelans. PDVSA PDVSA(Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.), Venezuela‘s state -owned petroleum company, oversees the exploration, production, refinement, and export of oilas well as the exploration and production of natural gas. It is the world's third-largest oil company, behind Saudi Aramco and ExxonMobil.According to Tinker- Salas, after the nationalization of Venezuala‘s oil in 1976, PDVSA was very much like a ―state within a state.‖ It ―insulated itself from the government‖ and functioned largely as its own entity with control of the nation‘s wealth. In 1980, PDVSA acquired CITGO, aU.S.-based refinery, and it is now one of the world's largest refiners. Under Chavez, however, the company's mandate has drastically expanded.In 2002, Chavez redefined PDVSA‘s role to include the government‘s social priorities. PDVSA must now spend at least 10 percent of its annualinvestment budget on social programs. This money is funneled through the National Development Fund, or Fonden, an investment fund set up in2005 that is not included in the government's budget. Peter Hakim, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based center for

policy analysis, says that Chavez‘s gradual takeover of PDVSA has given him an enormous bankroll to pursue his political and economicambitions. Yet Chavez has also moved to expand PDVSA‘s role in Venezuela‘s oil ventures. In the 1990s, Venezuela opened its oil industry tolimited private investment and allowed foreign companies to manage specific oil fields. Such ―strategic associations‖ made up roughly 23 percentof total oil production as of 2006. In April 2006, Chavez announced the government would take a majority stake in such projects, increasing itsshare from 40 percent to 60 percent. Though this partial nationalization is expected to burden PDVSA with investment costs in the billions, in2007 the president created seven new subsidiaries of PDVSA, including services, agriculture, shipbuilding, construction and industry. The headof PDVSA, Rafael Ramirez, told the New Yorker in June 2008 that Chavez plans to use the oil company to transform Venezuela from an "oilsultanate to a productive society within a socialist framework." The financial crisis and oil price drop has had some impact on the oil company. In

particular, PDVSA lost a $5 billion line of credit in October 2008. In early 2009, Chavez signaled the government would be open to more foreigninvestment in its oil resources, but analysts say there is little trust (Bloomberg) contracts would be honored over the long term. "Chávez iscelebrating the demise of capitalism as this international crisis unfolds," Pedro Mario Burelli, a former board member of PDVSA, told theInternational Herald Tribune. "But the irony is that capitalism actually fed his system in times of plenty." Spending the Oil Money It is difficult todetermine how Venezuela has been spending its oil windfall, given the lack of government transparency (the country ranks 162 out of 179countries ranked on Transparency International's corruption index). However, from the few official figures the government has released and its

stated pledges of aid to foreign countries, it is possible to glean a picture of billions of dollars dispersed on activities not directly related toPDVSA's core business. Analysts express frustration that these reports lack detail, and efforts by news organization to obtain further informationfrom government agencies have been rebuffed (NYT). PDVSA has transferred billions of dollars to Fonden, the off-budget investment fund manyexperts say is financing Chavez's social projects. According to International Oil Daily, an energy trade publication, PDVSA spent $14.4 billion onsocial programs in 2007 (as compared to $6.9 billion in 2005). These programs include projects such as medical clinics providing free healthcare, discounted food and household goods centers in poor neighborhoods, indigenous land-titling, job creation programs outside of the oil

business, and university and education programs. Increased oil revenues have also given Chavez the ability to extend assistance programs outsideVenezuela‘s borders. For example, he provides oil at a preferential price to many countries in the Caribbean through the Petr ocaribe initiative. In2009, a Venezuela-backed home heating program to low-income households in the United States was briefly halted, a sign that low oil prices may

be forcing Chavez to reconsider (TIME) some of his social programs. In August 2007, the Associated Press calculated that Chavez had promised$8.8 billion in aid, financing, and energy funding to Latin America and the Caribbean between January and August 2007, a figure far higher thanthe $1.6 billion of U.S. assistance for the entire year. Though it is impossible to determine how much of that funding was actually dispersed, the



difference in aid is striking. Chavez is also suspected of funneling money to the FARC, a Colombian guerrilla group, as well as providing fundsto Argentine President Cristina Kirchner‘s election campaign in 2007— though he denies both charges. Military expenditures are also funded bythe government's flush coffers. Between 2004 and 2006, Venezuela spent roughly $4.3 billion on weapons, according to a January 2007 DefenseIntelligence Agency report. As part of deals signed with Russia in 2006, Venezuela purchased 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, twenty-four Sukhoi-30fighter planes, and fifty-three Russian helicopters. In March 2008, it hired Belarus to build an air defense system. Critics of Chavez think heshould be pouring money into infrastructure to ensure a sustainable oil industry rather than allocating so much for social and foreign policyinitiatives. According to the Wall Street Journal, PDVSA ―spent just $60 million on exploration in 2004, compared with $174 million in 2001.‖But Vicente Frepes-Cibils, the lead eco nomist for Venezuela at the World Bank, says ―investment is increasing‖ and Venezuela has an

accumulation of reserves including outside funds ranging from $10 billion to $15 billion that it is planning to use for oil infrastructure. PDVSA'sProduction Levels and Fiscal Health PDVSA has not filed financial statements with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission since 2004.As a result, its production levels and overall fiscal health are subject to debate among economists and industry analysts. A report (PDF) by theInternational Energy Agency examining Venezuela's extra- heavy crude oil production put PDVSA‘s 2005 production rate at 3.2 million barrels

per day but showed a decreased rate of 2.55 million in September 2006. Currently, OPEC, the U.S. government, and the International EnergyAgency agree that Venezuelan oil production amounts to roughly 2.4 million barrels per day. The Venezuelan government, however, saysPDVSA's production is about 3.3 million barrels per day. Either way, there are new signs t hat all isn‘t rosy at PDVSA. In 2008, Venezuela'senergy ministry released unaudited results documenting a 35 percent fall in profits by PDVSA the previous year. A few months later, auditedfigures were released that indicated profits increased 15 percent in 2007. The International Energy Agency, however, shows a $7.9 billion loss in2007. Oil prices, which were extraordinarily high through much of 2008, helped mask some of the company's financial woes. Since they began todrop dramatically PDVSA has struggled to keep up with its financial obligations, especially once it lost a $5 billion line of credit (CNBC) withthe Royal Bank of Scotland in October 2008. The company had about $7.9 billion in unsettled accounts (Latin Business Chronicle) betweenJanuary and September 2008, up from $5.7 billion during all of 2007, but analysts say so far the company is unlikely to default on its creditors.

However, the company may need to make serious cutbacks or possibly even sell assets, analysts say. Venezuela has an estimated 78

billion barrels of proven conventional crude oil reserves and an additional estimated 235 billion barrels of

unconventional extra-heavy crude oil in the Orinoco Belt region located southeast of Caracas.

If development in theregion can turn this extra-heavy tar- like oil into a more marketable commodity, Venezuela‘s totalreserves could rival those of Saudi Arabia , reports the New York Times. Oxford Analytica notes, however, that PDVSA

will struggle to develop its heavy-oil reserves in a timely fashion given its lack of infrastructure investment and the ongoing oil nationalizations. Oil industry experts suggest that PDVSA needs to invest at least $3 billion annually into its existing fields

just to maintain current production levels.



Diplomatic Engagement PIC



1NC

The United States federal government should extend an offer to the Bolivarian Republic ofVenezuela to establish full diplomatic relations if and only if the Bolivarian Republic ofVenezuela agrees to end ties to international terrorist groups and rogue regimes, ensurefuture elections are held as defined by Venezuela‘s constitution and the Inter -AmericanDemocratic Charter, and cooperate with the U.S. and regional partners to combat illicitnarcotics trafficking in the Western Hemisphere.

The CP solves the case — offering diplomatic engagement successfully extracts VenezuelanconcessionsChristy 1AC Author 13 — served as Senior Policy Analyst for the Republican National Committee (RNC),focusing on energy, foreign affairs, and national security issues. Prior to joining the RNC, Patrick worked at the

National Republican Congressional Committee as an Analyst and as Clerk for the International practice of BarbourGriffith & Rogers, LLC. His writings on defense policy and foreign affairs have appeared in the The Commentator,The Diplomat, National Review Online, The Weekly Standard, and U.S. News.com. Patrick was named a ManfredWörner fellow by the German Marshall Fund in 2011 and a Publius Fellow by the Claremont Institute in 2012.Originally from San Diego, California, Patrick holds a BA from Vanderbilt University (Patrick Christy, ForeignPolicy Initiative, 04-19- 13, ―FPI Bulletin: Post-Chavez Venezuela‘s Uncertain Future‖,http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/files/2013-04-19-Bulletin-Venezuelan%20Elections_1.pdf, Accessed 07-02-2013 |AK)

For the United States, it should welcome that Capriles may be emerging as the voice o f the Venezuelan people and his supporte rs have already organized mass protests against t he election results.

The U nited S tates should stand with him and the growing Venezuelan opposition during these dangerous days . As

Senator Marco Rubio recently stated, ― The Venezuelan people should know that the democracies of the WesternHemisphere are watching the electoral review process closely and will seek to hold accountableany individual determined to have disrupted the peaceful conduct of free and fair elections . What‘s

more, Maduro ‘s dangerous behavior should be a wakeup call . For too long, Washington turned a blind eye to Venezuela ‘s attack on democracy and dangerous behavior . White House Press Secretary Jay Carney was right

to call for a ―100 percent audit of the [election] results.‖ Given the current distribution of power in Caracas (Chavez loyal ists dominate the election commission and Supreme Court),

policymakers in Washington will need to determine a policy response that is both pragmatic andin line with America‘s moral interests . The White House should also work with key democratic

partners in the hemisphere to ensure Venezuela‘s acting government refrain from using violenceagainst peaceful protestors . Moving forward, the Obama administration should make clear to whoever emerges in

Caracas that full diplomatic relations with the U nited S tates will be contingent upon Venezuela ending ties to

international terrorist groups and rogue regimes like Iran, taking meaningful steps to ensure future

elections are held as defined by Venezuela‘s constitution and the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and

cooperating with the U nited S tates and regional partners to combat illicit narcotics trafficking in the Western

Hemisphere . If Nicolas Maduro does hold on to presidential power, he will have a choice: he can replicate the dangerous —

and failed — policies of Hugo Chavez, or he can respect the will of the people . Sunday‘s disputed election shows the Venezuelan people

support the latter.

The CP‘s signal is key — it solves relations, terrorism, and soft power — the plan crushesresolve and turns the caseChristy 1AC Author 13 — served as Senior Policy Analyst for the Republican National Committee (RNC),focusing on energy, foreign affairs, and national security issues. Prior to joining the RNC, Patrick worked at the

National Republican Congressional Committee as an Analyst and as Clerk for the International practice of BarbourGriffith & Rogers, LLC. His writings on defense policy and foreign affairs have appeared in the The Commentator,The Diplomat, National Review Online, The Weekly Standard, and U.S. News.com. Patrick was named a Manfred

http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/files/2013-04-19-Bulletin-Venezuelan%20Elections_1.pdf

http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/files/2013-04-19-Bulletin-Venezuelan%20Elections_1.pdf



Wörner fellow by the German Marshall Fund in 2011 and a Publius Fellow by the Claremont Institute in 2012.Originally from San Diego, California, Patrick holds a BA from Vanderbilt University (Patrick Christy, U.S. News& World Report LP, 03-15- 13, ―Obama Must Stand Up for Democracy in Post- Chavez Venezuela‖,http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-must-encourage-democratic-venezuela, Accessed 07-01-2013 | AK)

Washington must realize that a strategy of engagement alone will not ensure a renewed and improvedpartnership with Caracas . Failure to realize this will not only undermine whatever influence America has in

the months ahead, but also send a troubling signal to Venezuela's increasingly united political opposition .

The Obama administration should instead pursue a more principled policy towards a post-Chavez Venezuela . In particular, it should : Pressure Caracas to implement key election reforms . Venezuela's

opposition faces formidable obstacles. Interim President Maduro will use the government's near-monopoly control of publicairwaves, its established networks of political patronage and last-minute public spending

programs to bolster his populist agenda . Washington should stress publicly and privately that anyattempts to suppress or intimidate the opposition runs contrary to Venezuela's constitution andthe principles defined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter , which was adopted by Venezuela in 2001. To this point, JoséCárdenas, a former USAID acting assistant administrator for Latin America, writes, T he Venezuelan opposition continues to ins ist that the constitut ion (which is of Chavez's own writing) befollowed and have drawn up a list of simple electoral reforms that would level t he playing field and better allow t he Venezuelan people to chart their own future free of chavista and foreign

interference. Demand free, fair and verifiable elections . Although Venezuela announced that a specialelection to replace Chavez will be held next month, it is important to remember that elections alone do not make ademocracy . Indeed, Chavez long embraced the rhetoric of democracy as he, in reality, consolidated executive power, undermined Venezuela's previously democratic political system

and altered the outcomes of election through corruption, fraud and intimidation. The Obama administration should make clear that freeand fair elections, properly monitored by respected international election observers, are essentialto Venezuela's future standing in the hemisphere and the world . Likewise, Secretary of State John Kerry shouldwork with regional partners — including (but not limited to) Brazil, Canada, Colombia and Mexico — to firmlyencourage Maduro's interim government . A unified regional voice would send a powerful signal toChavez's cronies in Caracas and longtime enablers in China, Iran and Russia .

http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-must-encourage-democratic-venezuela






Reinstate Ambassador/Recognize Maduro CP



1NC

Text: The United States federal government should reappoint a Venezuelan ambassadorand formally recognize Nicolas Maduro as the Venezuelan president.

Ambassador reinstatement is a prerequisite to normalized relations – only the counterplansolvesMeacham, 13 -- director of the CSIS Americas Program. He joined CSIS from the Senate Foreign Relations Co mmittee (SFRC), where he served on the professional staff for SenatorRichard Lugar (R-IN) for over a decade. He served as the senior adviser for Latin America and the Caribbean on the co mmittee, the most senior Republican Senate staff position for t his region.In that capacity, he travelled extensively to the region to work with foreign governments, private-sector organizations, and civil society groups. He was also responsible for managing thecommittee‘s relationship with the State Department regarding the Western Hemisphere and o verseeing its $2 billion budget. (Carl, June 21 st, ―The Kerry-Jaua Meeting: Resetting U.S.-VenezuelaRelations?,‖ CSIS , http://csis.org/publication/kerry-jaua-meeting-resetting-us-venezuela-relations, amils)

If the United States continues on this road, both countries will seek to appoint ambassadors as a step in normalizingrelations . Last week, the Washingto n Post published an editorial that suggested recent U.S. overtures to Venezuela are something of a lifeline, thrown while the Venezuelan governmentis struggling to maintain its legitimacy and when its neighbo rs, although having recognized the Maduro government, have recognized the need for an impartial audit of the e lection results. Many

believe it more appropriate for the United States to prioritize delicate issues such as human rights violations and antidrug policies before being willing to consider reinstating ambassadors.

Appointing ambassadors would certainly signal a real intention from both countries to forge a positive relationship. Having a U.S. ambassador in countries that have similar conditions to thoseof Venezuela is not something to be opposed across the board . In many situations, having a U.S.ambassador in a nondemocratic country serves as a symbol to advance our most cherished

beliefs . It also serves as proof o f the U.S. government‘s willingness to keep lines of communicationopen . But the timing of this appointment would imply that the Unites States would deny the opposition‘s claims of a fraudulent el ection, as well as the urg ency of the audit of the election

results. This also comes at a time when Venezuela is more divided than ever, politically and economically. So rather than serve as an example of a pragmatic posture, this maneuverwould be viewed by a critical mass of a very motivated Venezuelan opposition as U.S.government support for the Maduro In short, relations bet ween the United States and Venezuela have a rocky track record that recent headlines cannotobscure. And while there are undoubtedly members of t he Venezuelan government who want to improve relations, it‘s difficult to see their argument winning over the more hardline Chavistas inthe government, who would likely see any steps to building ties as betraying the cause. Venezuela has time and again proven to be unwilling to work with the United States, making it difficult for

the United States to gauge any real intentions of change. In order to move ahead and legitimize this new relationship, theUnited States must make a decision regarding Maduro‘s legitimacy: does the United Statesrecognize Ma duro‘s election sans a proper audit?

US refusal to recognize Maduro is perceived by Venezuela as belligerent action – killsrelationsBaverstock, 13 (Alasdair, May 17 th, ―Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition,‖ Christian Science M onitor,http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition, amils)

More than a month after Venezuela‘s contested presidential election , President Nicolás Maduro‘s narrow victory has yet to berecognized by the U nited States. Refusing to legitimize the new premier while a partial recount of thevote is underway, the US position has led to further political tensions in a relationshiphistorically stressed under the leadership of former President Hugo Chávez . Venezuela's Maduro victory upheld in audit - but opposition says

fight not over A handful of countries, including Chile, Peru, and the US, have expressed concern over

the democratic standards of the election , which Maduro won by a little more than 1 percent of the vot e. Venezuela‘s opposition party is calling for theresults to be annulled, citing over 3,000 instances of election fraud, ranging from alleged multiple-voting in chavista- strongholds to polling booth intimidation. ―Obviously, if there are hugeirregularities we are going to have serious questions about the v iability of that government,‖ said Secretary of State J ohn Kerry during a hearing of the US Foreign Affairs Committee following

the announcement of President Maduro‘s victory in April. While the US has pledged not to interfere with Venezuelan politics,the refusal to recognize Maduro's presidency has left many to question what message the US istrying to send, and how – if at all – it will impact Venezuela post-Chávez. ―[The US isn‘t]recognizing or failing to recognize ,‖ says David Smilde, professor of so ciology at the University of Georgia. ― They‘re just wait ing.But here in Venezuela that‘s seen as an act of belligerence.‖

http://csis.org/publication/kerry-jaua-meeting-resetting-us-venezuela-relations


http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition




2NC Solves Iran/Terror/Relations

Resotring ambassadors is a prerequisite to Venezuela compliance – your 1ac evidence.Revise 13 (Nicolas Revise, staffwriter for Arab News. January 13 2013. "US Eyes Better Relations with Venezuela in Post -Chavez Area". Arab News. www.arabnews.com/us-eyes-better-relations-venezuela-post-chavez-era)

―The prospect ofthe transition from Chavez to another leader opened up the possibility of resetting therelationship and putting it not necessarily on a friendly course, but on a correct course,‖ expert Cynthia Arnson said. The first essential step would be to

reinstate their ambassadors , said Arnson, director of the Latin American program at the WoodrowWilson International Center for Scholars. Caracas and Washington have been operatingembassies in each country without an ambassador since a diplomatic spat in 2010. Jacobson took the

opportunity to discuss issues of joint concern such as combating drug-trafficking, counter-terrorism and energycooperation . Venezuela is sitting on major oil reserves and accounts for some 10 percent of US oil imports. ―We have for some time made clear that we were willing and open totrying to improve our t ies with Venezuela,‖ State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told report ers this week. Washington had already proposed some ideas on how to improve ties step-

by-step, she added, refusing to go into specifics. ― If the Venezuelan people want to move forward with us, we think thereis a path that‘s possible. It‘s just going to take two to tango,‖ she said. But Chavez, who sinceassuming power in 1999 has long worked to forge an anti-US alliance among leftist leaders in

Latin America, ―was not really interested‖ in boosting ties, Arnson said.

Restoring ambassadors is the first step toward congressional oversight of Venezuala-Iranrelations and counter-narcotics/terrorism.Sullian, 13 Specialist in Latin American Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of Ho meland Security (Mark P. ―Hugo Chávez‘s Death: Implications for Venezuela a ndU.S. Relations,‖ Congressional Research Service , http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf, amils)

In the aftermath of the presidential election, there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelanrelations to get back on track . An important aspect of this could be restoring ambassadors in order to

augment engagement on critical bilateral issues, not only on anti-drug, terrorism, and democracyconcerns, but on trade, investment issues , and other commercial matters . With Chávez‘s death and an upco ming presidential

election, the 113th Congress is likely to maintain its strong oversight on the status of human rightsand democracy in Venezuela as well as drug trafficking and terrorism concerns, including theextent of Venezuela‘s relations with Iran.

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf





Instability NB

Lack of Maduro‘s recognition fosters regional violence and inst ability by legitimizing theopposition.Carlsen, 13 Foreign Policy In Focus columnist Laura Carlsen is director of the Americas Program for the Center forInternational Policy in Mexico City. (Laura, May 2 nd, ―U.S. Efforts to Block Democracy in Venezuela Harm Hemispheric Relations,‖ Foreign Policy in Focus,http://www.fpif.org/articles/us_efforts_to_block_democracy_in_venezuela_harm_relations_in_the_hemisphere, amils)

The U.S. government stands alone among major world governments in refusing to recognize theresults of the recent Venezuelan presidential election . The petulant position of the Obamaadministration harms U.S. relations across the entire hemisphere and feeds a scenario of violencein that Caribbean country. Nation after nation--including the last hold-out Spain and the Organization of American States — has recognized Nicolas Maduro, who tookoffice following his narrow win in the April 14 elections. The results ratified by the National Electo ral Council show Maduro with 50.78 p ercent to 48.95 percent for defeated conservativecandidate Henrique Capriles — a difference of 1.8 percent, or some 260,000 votes. There were no major anomalies on Election Day, which by all reports went remarkably smoothly. Following theelections, Capriles contested the results in fiery speeches and called on supporters to demonstrate, but curiously did not file a legal challenge. The Venezuelan electoral s ystem is highly tamper-

proof, as recognized by monitoring organizations like the Carter Center, which before the vote assessed the system as ―the best in the world.‖ Delegations from the Carter Center, the Union ofSouth American Countries, and other experts observed the e lections and proclaimed them clean and fair. Venezuelans vote electronically, then print out and double-check a paper ballot beforedepositing it as well. The Electoral Council carries out an audit at polls of 54.3 percent of the votes. Th ese reviews are signed by members of the po litical parties, including Capriles‘ DemocraticUnity Party. The Electoral Council has agreed to audit the remaining 46 percent of ballots, although the electronic vote is t he legal vote and the process for reviewing the paper backup after theon-site audit is unprecedented and logistically challenging, with almost no possibility of changing the result. Representatives of the conservative coalition announced instead that they plan togather alleged evidence of fraud to present to the Supreme Court. Capriles said from there he will at tempt to take the case to international courts, promising a drawn-out process that will feed

sharp divisions with the country. The opposition still has not presented the suit or the proofs for judicial review. Daniel Kovalik, a U.S. human rightslawyer who was among 170 international election observers from around the world, reported inthe Pittsburgh Post- Gazette, ―What we found was a transparent, reliable, well -run and thoroughlyaudite d electoral system.‖ Voter turnout was reportedly 79 percent — a major achievement that would be the envy o f more

mature democracies, including the United States. And still the U.S. State Department spokesperson Patrick Ventrell statedon April 24, 10 days a fter the elections, ―We do continue to believe that the ongoing CNErecount and a thorough review of alleged voting irregularities will…ensure that the Venezuelan

people feel that their democratic aspirations are being met and that they have greater confidencein the election outcome.‖ This, coming after recognizing in the same press conference that theMaduro government was making overtures to repair relations with the United States through theappointment of its new charge d‘affaires, dashed hopes of more cordial relations between the two

trade partners. The frame of concern for ―the Venezuelan people‖ rings hollow. In a democratic contest, especially in a society as polarized as Venezuela‘s, the losing side never

feels like its ―aspirations are being met‖ when they lose. And the insistence on a 100-percent recount after the ignominy of theBush-Gore election of 2000 and the immediate U.S. recognition of the conservative Mexican

president Felipe Calderon, despite evidence of voter fraud and a much narrower margin in 2006,is hypocritical at best. At worst, it is an example of U.S. external pressure that encourages a

break with the rule of law and violates the principle of self-determination that President BarackObama claims to uphold. This is the first time the U.S. government has refused to recognize aVenezuelan election result, as Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Political Research

points out. Weisbrot notes, ―Washington's efforts to de -legitimise the election mark a significantescalation of US efforts at regime change in Venezuela. Not since its involvement in the 2002 military coup has the US government donethis much to promote open co nflict in Venezuela.‖ The Obama administration is bending over backwards t o spur on an opposition movement that has no virtually legal leg to stand on in its desirefor new presidential elections. There are some indications that the strategy to refuse to accept defeat at the polls was cons idered even before the close vote. Although Capriles conceded rapidl yand gracefully to former President Hugo Chavez in the president ial elections last fall, it was a bad omen when he refused to s ign a pre-electoral pact to respect the results prior to this e lection.

Now violent opposition protests in the streets have led to the deaths of nine people. Maduro hasattended the funerals of his supporters killed in the disturbances with vows to defend his victoryand prosecute those inciting and participating in violent acts. Health clinics established byChavez have been frequent targets. It is highly unlikely that Capriles would stake his future on rejecting legal electoral institutions if he did not have thesupport of the U.S. go vernment. It is even more unlikely that he cou ld sustain a movement for non-recognition. Even many members of his own coalition w ill not go so far as to say they honestly

believe he won the April 14th elections. The other countries of the region recognized Maduro as the new presidentwithin hours of the results. Not only did the left-leaning governments provide their diplomaticwelcome, but also Colombia, Mexico, and other nations closely allied with the United States.

http://www.fpif.org/articles/us_efforts_to_block_democracy_in_venezuela_harm_relations_in_the_hemisphere

http://www.fpif.org/articles/us_efforts_to_block_democracy_in_venezuela_harm_relations_in_the_hemisphere



Capriles‘ actions and de facto U.S. support for prolonging post -electoral unrest not onlyendanger peace and stability in Venezuela, but also potentially the entire region. Venezuela is ageopolitical hub — for its oil, for its role in building south-south integration projects like ALBAand Unasur, for its solidarity trade pacts, and for its defiance of U.S. hegemony. To illegally disrupt theconstitutional order there will not be as easy as it was in Honduras, where even a broad opposition movement couldn‘t restore t he constitutionally elected president after a right-wing coup in

2009. Inevitably, nations across the hemisphere and the world will react with anger if the Obamaadministration decides to maintain this course, both in defense of their neighbor Venezuela andalso in what they see as a threat to their own sovereignty. Already former Brazilian presidentLula da Silva has warned that "Americans should take care of their own business a little and letus decide our own destiny." The longer the United States remains globally isolated in its refusalto accept Venezuela‘s election results, the longer the instability, uncertainty, and violence w illcontinue. Extending the conflict could very well end up unnecessarily costing more lives . TheObama administration should consider that its stubbornness about what it considers an adverseelection result in a foreign country is a direct cause of bloodshed . It harms relations with our hemispheric neighbors and partnersand sows the seeds of dist rust and enmity in a region where we have a good chance at building coo peration on issues of vital importance to all of our countries. Venezuela‘s elections must beaccepted at once to show that the United States will uphold democratic processes and the rule of law, even when its government is not particularly pleased with the results.

Opposition seeks support in Colombian – damages relations and increases regionalinstabilityCorrero del Ornico, 13 (June 11 th, ―Venezuela ―Destabilization Plan‖: Colombian Government Meets Venezuelan Opposition,‖ http://www.globalresearch.ca/venezuela-destabilization-plan-colombian-government-meets-venezuelan-opposition/5338592, amils) In what has become a new diplomatic crisis in the region, the Maduro administration continued to criticizeColombian ofcials this week for a meeting held between Venezuelan opposition leaderHenrique Capriles and President Juan Manuel Santos in Bogota on May 29th. The encounter, which has threatened the strong ties that have characterized Colombian-Venezuelan relations since2010, saw Santos receive Capriles, the right-wing governor of Miranda state and losing presidential candidate, for

private talks that the Maduro government has characterized as ―lamentable‖. ―I‘m very sorry that Santos is giving credence to the people who refuse to recognize Venezuela‘s legitimateauthority, and to the false idea that we can be overthrown, and the false ideas of the traitorous, fascist sectors of theVenezuelan right wing‖, the Venezuelan President said in response to the meeting. Capriles , who was beaten by Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela‘s Colombian government‘s meeting with Venezuelanopposition derails relations April 14th presidential elections, has failed to recognize his defeat, takinginstead the reins of an opposition movement that has attempted to challenge the legitimacy ofMaduro‘s victory and the country‘s electoral authorities. Capriles has said he is seekinginternational support to delegitimize Maduro‘s presidency .Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua called the reception of such a cont roversial gure by the Santos government―a knife in the back‖. ―We have done everything we can to help nd peace for the Colombian people. It‘s not rightthat in Colombia they are promoting and legitimizing someone who openly refuses to acknowledge the institutionsof the Venezuelan state‖, Jaua said. The Venezuelan Minister referred to Capriles‘ visit as part of adestabilization plan that involves mobilizing right-wing sectors of Colombian society to sow

violence and chaos in the OPEC member state.The s ame sentiment has been expressed by President Maduro, who has alleged that in Bogota ―a situation ofcomplete conspiracy‖ exists. ―We are neutralizing the plots against our country. It is well known that the principalconspiracies against our homeland have been hatched in Bogota. All of Venezuela knows thisand we‘ve given proof of it ‖, Maduro said. For its part, the Santos administration has called the row a ―misunderstanding‖ and has refused to comment on themeetings, calling for dialogue with the Venezu elan government instead of ―microphone diplomacy‖. But as of earlier this week, efforts to mend the impasse had yet to be made by Colombia‘s diplomatic corps.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/venezuela-destabilization-plan-colombian-government-meets-venezuelan-opposition/5338592









―We haven‘t had contact with [Foreign Minister Holguin] since Saturday. We are waiting for their communicationto express the ideas that President Nicolas Maduro has asked me to transmit to the Colombian government‖, Jauasaid. According to Venezuela‘s highest diplomat, these instructions include a complete revision of bilateral relations. ―Right nowwe are evaluating everything and all aspects of our relationship with Colombia until the Colombiangovernment claries the reach that those who fail to recognize the [Venezuelan state‘s] institutions have [in theircountry]‖, Minister Jaua afrmed. Last we ek‘s row comes after years of diplomatic work had successfully rebuilt bilateral relations following thetensions that marked the governments of former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe and the late Hugo Chavez ofVenezuela.Santos‘ replacement of Uribe as president in 2010 effectively began a new period in Venezuelan-Colombianrelations that witnessed a warming in diplomatic ties and the signing of new multi-faceted agreements between theneighboring states.The reception of Capriles by Santos, however, was a ―breaking of the rules of the game‖established between the two governments three years ago, President Maduro said.―The Colombians who live in Venezuela understand Chavez‘s democratic revolution andhopefully a way will be found so that truth and principles of respect can reconstruct the relations

between our two governments‖, the Venezuelan President stated.Peace Process At RiskPart of the political fallout that has accompanied the diplomatic breech has been the possibledeparture of Venezuela from the peace process underway in Cuba between Colombianauthorities and the country‘s FARC rebels. As part of the policies of former President Hugo Chavez , Venezuela has been a guiding force and active mediator inthe current talks taking place between the guerrillas and the government.―Nobody can doubt the important role that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has played and is playing in thesearch for peace in Colombia‖, FARC leadership wrote in a blog on Saturday. The statement additionally expressed the guerrilla group‘s apprehension ―over the acts which will without a doubtaffect the extraordinary atmosphere of peace that we have been able to build through dialogue in Havana‖. Representatives of the Colombian government have similarly articulated the importance of Venezuela to thedialogue.―The situation is very worrying… but I am hopeful that it will be overcome‖, said Humberto de la Calle, the Santosadministration‘s chief negotiator.

Just prior the diplomatic crisis, the talks had yielded their most signicant breakthrough in the past 6 months byoutlining the basis for an agreement that would restructure land tenancy laws in the South American nation.Meanwhile, the host nation of the peace process, Cuba, has expressed its complete support for the Maduroadministration‘s stance towards its neighbor. ―Cuba has had an unchanging position of solidarity with Venezuela and the recognition of i t‘s legitimategovernment headed by President Nicolas Maduro, whose decisive triumph on April 14th is an unquestionableexpression of the sovereign will of the Venezuelan people‖, said Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez. The Minister referred to the international campaign being carried out against Venezuelaninstitutions ―and any direct or indirect support for them‖ as ―damaging to the unity of LatinAmerican and the Caribbean. They undermine independence and hurt the efforts that Venezuelaand other states have made for peace



Politics Links



1NC

Engagement opponents control the debate on venezuelaHarper, 10 (liz, Senior Editor @ US Institute for Peace, adjunct fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,americasquarterly.org contributing blogger based in Washington DC, 12/21, http://americasquarterly.org/node/2058)

It's not clear whether some sought to use the QFR to strong arm the State Department to articulate or take tougher positions ,and thereby bolster Palmer's confirmation prospects and support on the heels of his " weak" hearing

performance. Alternatively, perhaps the QFR was publicized to thwart his prospects entirely. Who knows; at this stage, it's irrelevant.What's very relevant are the unfolding consequences of the QFR mishandling. First and foremost, Palmer got rolled. A dedicated Foreign Serviceofficer was not treated with due professionalism and respect. We will not know how great he would have been in Venezuela. Second, the State

Department on this matter appears naive, indecisive and disorganized. Third, critics who never wanted ANY ambassador —

and certainly NOT Palmer — in Caracas, succeeded . As did Chávez, for the short term. To take up the second point, the StateDepartment appears to have different and confused messages on Venezuela . The ostensible example of this

is the two messages of Larry Palmer's Senate testimony versus his answers to the QFR. What can be said publicly and on therecord regarding Venezuela? Beyond talking with a low voice on the safest matters, it is notclear . Is such timidity to Chávez' bluster necessary? The next step will be to see whether the State Department will go bold and call VenezuelanAmbassador to the U.S. Bernardo Alvarez a persona non grata, or take a softer approach and cancel his visa. Alvarez had been back home, andover the weekend, it was said he was not planning to return to Washington DC — already one move ahead of the anticipated reciprocation toPalmer's rejection. It was in Chávez‘s best interests to welcome Palmer, as he wanted to work with Venezuelans, and help ease the growingtensions between the two countries. But now, the State Department will have to rethink this, and find another person...most likely with a strongertrack record on human rights and democracy. Perhaps we should accept that playing nice and fair with an irrational actor like Chávez is not likely

to yield positive results. At the end of the day, we've been backed into a corner to put forward a tougher

ambassador , and not Palmer, who was our first pick. Does this mean likewise that our policy of engagementmust be altered ? Are we acting in response to Venezuela's moves? In this context, Chávez, and some conservative

critics here, are setting the terms of U.S. policy. This debacle also illustrates the express need for the State Department to

complete its review of Venezuela policy and clarify its positions. The QFR mishandling is a symptom of the biggerissue: uniting our various agencies to craft a coherent message and policy on Venezuela . What are the

"red lines" of what we'll tolerate from Venezuela? When one of our career diplomats goes on record saying that Venezuela's National Guard isinvolved in narcotrafficking, provides safe haven to terrorists like the FARC, imprisons judges for ruling against Chávez, why is the StateDepartment not publicizing those concerns? Until now, the State Department had been keeping its profile too low for anyone's good. Ostensiblythat of Ambassador Palmer. At this point, why is it a mistake to outline on record ways in which the Venezuelan government is breaking very

basic standards of human rights and hemispheric security? Just some open and disquieting questions. At the least, the State Department needs tofigure out what its basic message is, and then put it out there with a unified voice, loud and clear. This could go far to improve its public outreach

and image. But while silence continues , it seems that the Venezuelans have settled the U.S. debate: this kindof "engagement" will not get us where we want to be . Chávez is antithetical to our democratic values and securityconcerns. He is moving full steam down the field, while we sit on the sidelines. Time to play.

http://americasquarterly.org/node/2058




2NC Kerry Link

Cooperating with Venezuela is super unpopular — especially with KerryBlack Star News 4/23 (http://www.blackstarnews.com/global-politics/south-america/john-kerry-spits-on-maduros-hand-hostility-promotes-venezuela#sthash.FJk0MYmg.dpuf ›

JOHN KERRY SPITS ON MADURO'S HAND: HOSTILITY PROMOTES VENEZUELA INSTABILITY BLACK STAR EDITORIALAPRIL 23,2013 , nkj

So what's really behind the hostility towards Maduro 's election?

Is this punitive U.S. policy to get back at Chavez who never minced words when it came to the chilly relations withWashington? Is it opposition over the populist Chavez policies that empowered marginalized communities withexpansion of education and healthcare coverage and housing?Is it resentment over the financial support and oil concessions that Venezeula extended to countries such as Cuba,

Nicaragua, Bolivia, Haiti and others? Under Chavez, Venezuela provided tens of millions of do llars of heating oil even to low-income Americans.

Is it opposition to the new form of regional-cooperation, among South American countries that Venezeula has been promoting, that would in the long run reduce dependence on powers such as the United States?Whatever the real reasons are, Secretary Kerry must weigh his prono uncement and assess the possible consequences carefully.It's a testament to Chavez's legacy that t he country remained stable even while he was suffering from terminal cancer. Chavez was such an out-sized presence and no contemporary Venezuelan

politician will come close to matching his charisma and charm. He beat Capriles handily by 10% points before his health rapidly declined. Maduro may not be president today had Chavez not publicly endorsed him before his death. So in essence, Capriles lost a close vote to a man who had already departed this earth.

Venezuela needs peace, stability and reconciliation. The leadership sent signals of willingness to normalize relations with the U.S.Rather than work with the newly-elected leadership, John

Kerry decided to spit on Nicolas Maduro's extended hand.

Kerry hates the plan —doesn‘t even recognize maduro Politico 4/17 (http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/nicolas-maduro-venezuela-john-kerry-90208.html#ixzz2YgF49046 John Kerry won't recognize Nicolas Maduro yet, urges recountBy ASSOCIATED PRESS | 4/17/13 Read more: http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/nicolas-maduro-venezuela-john-kerry-90208.html#ixzz2YgFAriqs, nkj)

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration is refusing to recognize Venezuelan President-elect Nicolas Maduro and says a recount of this

week's election should occur.

Testifying before Congress, Secretary of State John Kerry backed the call by opposition leader Henrique Capriles for the vote count ofSunday's presidential election to be re-examined.Venezuela's National Electoral Council says Maduro won by 262,000 votes out of 14.9 million cast.But asked directly at a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing Tuesday if he recognized Maduro as the winner, Kerry wouldn't say yes or no.

http://www.blackstarnews.com/global-politics/south-america/john-kerry-spits-on-maduros-hand-hostility-promotes-venezuela#sthash.FJk0MYmg.dpuf


http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/nicolas-maduro-venezuela-john-kerry-90208.html#ixzz2YgF49046

http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/nicolas-maduro-venezuela-john-kerry-90208.html#ixzz2YgFAriqs

http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/nicolas-maduro-venezuela-john-kerry-90208.html#ixzz2YgFAriqs

http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/nicolas-maduro-venezuela-john-kerry-90208.html#ixzz2YgF49046




2NC Ros-Lehtinen Link

( ) Our Ros-Lehtinen Link

First – she‘s opposed to engaging Venezuela unless specific human rights conditions areattached.

Congressional Documents and Publications ‗13 (June 4, 2013 – lexis)

U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, made the followingstatement after meeting with Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado and writing a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry

asking for the immediate release of U.S. citizen Timothy Tracy, being held hostage in Venezuela .Statement by Ros-Lehtinen: ¶ "Today I had the honor of meeting with Venezuelan pro-democracy leader Maria Corina Machado, a stalwartchampion of democracy for Venezuela. I applaud her for her courage in continuing to boldly speak out against the Maduro regime, and join her inurging the U.S. and responsible nations to be on the side of the people of Venezuela and support them in calling out the illegitimate elections and

robbing the Venezuelan people of true democracy. ¶ "Under the Maduro regime, democracy is made a pathetic joke

and Venezuelans continue to be deprived of their human rights. It is also appalling that thisregime has unjustly detained Tim Tracy , a U.S. citizen who was simply exercising his freedom of speech in making a

documentary, but now finds himself sharing a prison with some of the worst criminals of Venezuela. This situation is unacceptable

and I urge the State Department to do all it can to secure Tracy's release and safe return to theUnited States unconditionally."

And – She hates Venezuela and brings in the Israel lobby

Madsen, 11Wayne Madsen, Investigative journalist, author and syndicated columnist. Has some twenty years experience in security issues.As a U.S. Naval Officer, he managed one of the first computer security programs for the U.S. Navy. He has been a frequent

political and national security commentator on ABC, NBC, CBS, PBS, CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, and MS-NBC. He has beeninvited to testify as a witness before the US House of Representatives, the UN Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and an terrorisminvestigation panel of the French government. A member of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) and the National PressClub., 6/20/11, http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2011/06/20/the-outsourcing-of-influence-peddling-to-the-israeli-lobby.html

The confluence of the Israel Lobby with pressure groups such as those that support the Saakashvili regime in Georgia

is not an isolated situation . Before the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) of Prime Minister RecepTayyip Erdogan in Turkey, Israel could rely on the support of successive Turkish governments. Turkey, in turn, established its own Washington-

based lobbying group, the American Turkish Council, which was modeled on the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). It wasrecently learned from Turkish government officials in Washington that the secret network of Turkish military officers, politicians, intelligenceofficers, profes sors, and journalists known as ―Ergenekon,‖ which plotted a series of coups against independent -minded Turkish governments,

was a construct of the CIA and Mossad. An in-depth investigation of the Ergenekon network conducted by the Turkish intelligence servicediscovered that many of the key players in Ergenekon were Dönme, the descendants of Turkish Jews who converted to Islam and, to varyingdegrees, now practice a combination of Kabbalah Judaism and Islamic Sufism while remaining secular and Turkish nationalist in the mold of

Turkish state founder Kemal Ataturk. Similarly, the Israel Lobby has made common cause with the right-wing Cuban exile

community in Florida, which has become as influential in the politics of south Florida as the many Jews and Israelis who livethere. The convergence of interests of pro-Israelis and Cuban Gusano exiles can best be seen in the current chair of the House Foreign Relations

Committee , Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen , who represents a congressional district in south Florida. Ros-Lehtinen, who is of

Cuban Jewish descent , is one of AIPAC‘s and the ADL‘s best friends in Congress . She is also a vociferousopponent of the governments of Venezuela and Nicaragua, both of which have severed diplomatic



relations with Israel and have recognized the independence of Abkhazia, to the dismay of Israel, AIPAC, and the ADL. While Ros-Lehtinen rattles sabers against Venezuela , Nicaragua, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and other LatinAmerican nations that have recognized Palestine within its 1967 borders, she supports continued U.S. military assistance to Colombia, Honduras,Costa Rica, and Panama, Israel‘s last four remaining allies in Latin America. Ros -Lehtinen, while decrying alleged human rights ―abuses‖ inVenezuela and Nicaragua, is silent on actual abuses in Colombia, where Israelis routinely supply weapons and advisers to the government in itsinhumane war with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), peasants, and labor unionists. The trial in New York of Russian air

cargo services owner Viktor Bout for allegedly trying to sell weapons to the FARC is one outcome of the strategic alliance between Israel, its U.S. Lobby, and the right-wing Latin American exiles and intelligence operatives who call

Miami their home. The conviction and imprisonment of former Yukos owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky, consider ed a major agent-of-influence

for Israel in Russia and a one-time potential President of Russia, has placed Russia in the same category as Venezuela, Nicaragua,

Abkhazia, Turkey, and other nations that have incurred the ire of the Israel Lobby either directly or via outsourcing deals made withstrategic allies such as the Georgians, Cuban exiles, or, now, in the case of Turkey, the Armenians. In the past, AIPAC always ensured that―Armenian genocide‖ resolutions failed in the U.S. Congress, a payback for Turkey‘s support for Israel. With Turkey adopting an independentforeign policy, AIPAC and the ADL are now strategically allied with the Armenian lobby to push for Armenian genocide resolutions inWashington and elsewhere.

Israel lobby key to agenda

Petras, 6(James Petras is a Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University, 4/6, http://petras.lahaine.org/?p=7)The problem of war and peace in the Middle East and the role of the Israel lobby is too serious to be marginalized as an after-thought. Even moreimportant the increasing censoring of free speech and erosion of our civil liberties, academic freedom by an aggressive lobby, with powerfullegislative and White House backers is a threat to our already limited democracy. It is incumbent therefore to examine the fourteen erroneoustheses of the highly respected Professor Chomsky in order to move ahead and confront the Lobby?s threats to peace abroad and civil liberties athome. Fourteen Theses Chomsky claims that the Lobby is just another lobby in Washington. Yet he fails to observe that the lobby hassecured the biggest Congressional majorities in favor of allocating three times the annual foreign aid designated to all of Africa, Asiaand Latin America to Israel (over 100 billion dollars over the past 40 years). The Lobby has 150 full time functionaries working forthe American-Israel Public Affairs Committee ( AIPAC), accompanied by an army of lobbyists from all the major Jewishorganizations (Anti-Defamation League, B?nai Brith, American Jewish Committee, etc) and the nation-wide, regional and localJewish Federations which hew closely to the line of the ‗majors‘ and are active in policy and local opinion on Israeland promote and finance legislative candidates on the basis of their adherence to the Lobby‘s party line. No other

lobby combines the wealth, grass roots networks, media access, legislative muscle and single-minded purpose of

the pro-Israel lobby . Chomsky fails to analyze the near unanimous congressional majorities which yearly support all the pro-Israel military, economic, immigration privileges and aid promoted by the Lobby . He fails to examine the list of over 100successful legislative initiatives publicized yearly by AIPAC even in years of budgetary crisis, disintegrating domestic healthservices and war induced military losses.

It‘s unique – she‘s currently on -board for immigration reform.

LeoGrande, 12William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist inLatin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequentadviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

But was Obama's success a harbinger of structural realignment in the Cuban-American community or merely a conjunctural product of Romney'sflawed candidacy? The Republican ticket had its shortcomings. In 2007, candidate Romney famously ended a speech to stunned Cuban-Americans with Fidel Castro's signature closing, "Patria o muerte! Venceremos!" (Homeland or death! We shall overcome!). Vice presidentialcandidate Paul Ryan had a record 8 of repeatedly voting in the House of Representatives to end the embargo against Cuba (on the libertariangrounds that the government should not impede free trade). "That did their ticket a lot of harm with Cubans, and allowed us to at least get ahearing with them about many other economic issues," an Obama campaign official said.9 Moreover, the Republican Party's anti-immigrant

posture, which hurt it with Latino voters nationwide, hurt it with Cuban-American voters as well. The state's most prominentnational Republican elected officials – Senator Marco Rubio, and Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Mario

Diaz-Balart , all distanced themselves from their Party's hardline on immigration reform . In 1996, when Bill



Clinton won 35% of the Cuban-American vote against Bob Dole, 10 the Republican Party was also hurt by its anti-immigration policy. That year,the Republican Platform supported making English the official language, advocated cutting off welfare for noncitizens, and deny citizenship tothe U.S.-born children of illegal aliens. Yet despite these 11 problems, there was growing evidence that Obama's gains might represent more than

just Romney's weakness. Polling by Florida International University since 1991 has chronicled gradual changes in the Cuban-Americancommunity in south Florida, both demographically and attitudinally – changes that, as they begin to manifest themselves in voting behavior, donot bode well for the Republican Party. The Cuban-American Electorate When FIU began polling Cuban-Americans south Florida in 1991, 87%favored continuation of the U.S. embargo. By 2011, support had fallen to 56%. In 1993, 75% of respondents opposed the sale of food to Cubaand 50% opposed the sale of medicine. By 2011, solid majorities (65% and 75% respectively) supported both. In 1991, 55% opposed unrestricted

travel to Cuba, whereas in 2011, 57% supported unrestricted travel for all Americans and 66% supported unrestricted travel for Cuban-Americans(Table 2). These changes in Cuban-American opinion were clearly linked to demographic changes in the community. Exiles who arrived in theUnited States in the 1960s and 1970s came as political refugees, motivated principally by their opposition to the socialist course of the revolution.Those who arrived in the Mariel exodus in 1980 and afterwards were more likely to have left for economic reasons. Recent arrivals, especiallythose who arrived in the post-cold war era, were far more likely to have maintained ties with family on the island. A 2007 poll of Cuban-Americans in south Florida found that 58.3% were sending remittances to Cuba, but fewer than half of those who arrived before 1985 weresending money, whereas three quarters of more recent arrivals were. The differences in age and experience among different waves of 12 migrants

produced sharply different opinions about relations with the island, with more recent arrivals being far more likely to favor policies that reduce bilateral tensions and barriers to family linkages, especially the ability to travel and send remittances (Table 3).



Appeasement Link

Perceived as weak appeasement – crushes Obama PC and means plan can never be a winMead, 10 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow Council Foreign Relations, Prof Foreign affairs @ Bard, 3/31,http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/03/31/kicked-by-the-great-white-north/ The policy of slapping friends seems not to be working very well; the policy of kissing up to the bad guys has been even less of a success. North

Korea, Cuba, Venezuela and Iran have blown off the administration‘s efforts to put bilateralrelationships on a friendlier basis . Not only is President Obama back to Bush‘s old policy of trying to get the UN to adopttougher sanctions on Iran, he‘s denouncing human rights crackdowns in Cuba. The biggest success to date, getting a new missil e treaty withRussia, is at lot less impressive than it looks. Russia needs to reduce the costs of its nuclear arsenal and wants the prestige that comes from armstalks with the US just like the Soviet Union used to have. I support the treaty and hope it gets ratified, but on the whole it‘s more a favor from usto Russia than the other way round. In many cases, the administration has good reasons for specific choices that it makes. Russia, for example, isnever going to be our best friend, but there is no point in not trying to pu t relations on a more businesslike basis. Britain‘s stand on the FalklandIslands, that there is ‗nothing to negotiate‘ where sovereignty is concerned, is a tricky one to support. It always looks bad to be against talks.Given global skepticism about US intentions after the poorly handled war in Iraq, it made sense for the Obama administration to bend over

backwards to show it was willing to reach a new relationship with Iran. Pressing Karzai to clean up the abysmal corruption that wastes Americanmoney and undermines the strength of his government is certainly the right thing to do. And by twice announcing controversial housing decisionsin Jerusalem during critical talks with the United States, the Israeli government was showing enough arrogance or incompetence that the WhiteHouse had to do something. But while many of steps the administration is taking make sense on their own terms, when you look at them all

together the picture isn‘t pretty. Beating up on your friends and kissing up to your enemies looks terrible , especially whenneither your friends nor your enemies show any respect. Slamming Honduras and pampering Russia might have both been good decisions ontheir own; but when you do them both you end up looking like a hypocrite who moralistically and didactically lectures the weak while fawning

on the strong. Nobody respects that kind of behavior, and nobody admires people who practice it. Ittastes weak, like blood in the water — and the sharks out there are paying attention . The emerging perception

of weakness is one reason the administration has had to fight Israel so hard over the Jerusalem issue. As Laura Rozen reports in a must read

article at Politico.com, administration sources say that the quarrel with Netanyahu is ―bigger than Jerusalem‖ because ― it‘s about thecredibility of the administration.‖ It‘s precisely because so many people have kicked so muchsand in the administration‘s face that it had to raise the stakes so high on this one. Forcing Netanyahu to

back down in Jerusalem may help the administration fight the perception of weakness abroad, but it isunlikely to help President Obama much at home . And he may not get the win he seeks . Canada and Brazil have

blown the administration off with no ill effects, and even the preternaturally accommodating Japanese are still defying the administration over the

unpopular American military base on Okinawa. If Netanyahu sticks to his guns on an issue where he has strong domestic support, he might stillforce Washington to compromise. Beating up on o ur few remaining friends isn‘t going to fix things. What the President reallyneeds is a victory over an adversary. He needs to get North Korea, Iran, Syria, Hamas, Venezuela or even

Cuba to take a step back — or he needs to charm one of them into behaving more nicely. Capturing bin Laden or otherwise achieving

something decisive in Afghanistan would also be a plus. Failing that, foreign policy will be a continuing weak spot for the administration, and sooner or later that will mean trouble .

anything short of big stick on Venezuela triggers intense congressional opponents and highmedia profileHarper, 10 (liz, Senior Editor @ US Institute for Peace, adjunct fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,americasquarterly.org contributing blogger based in Washington DC, 12/21, http://americasquarterly.org/node/2058)

I'm told that some sought to torpedo Palmer's nomination from the get-go, either preferring another candidate with

more credentials on human rights, or not wanting an ambassador in Venezuela at all . Critics doubted thatPalmer — despite his experience as President of the Inter- American Foundation and as the Chargé d‘Affaires in Ecuador during a time of

major internal crises — had the steel to tangle with Venezuela 's strongman. To many , his soft tone andcircumspect statements at his confirmation hearing reinforced this view. Because Palmer did notcome out swinging a big stick at his Senate confirmation hearing, Senator Richard Lugar sent the ambassador a setof "questions for the record " (QFRs), in attempt to strengthen support for his nomination. Palmer sat down with folks at





the State Department and answered them, discussing the low morale in Venezuela's military, the ties between members of Venezuela'sgovernment and Colombian guerrillas and allowing them refuge in Venezuelan territory, its role in narcotrafficking, Chávez' increasing controlover the judicial and legislative branches, steady erosion of checks and balances, and violations of human rights and freedom of the press.

Palmer's responses — which he thought would be closely held, according to several sources at the State Department, including the

ambassador-designate himself — were newsworthy , especially at a time of heightened tensions between Colombia and Venezuela. TheQFR ripped around town and the world, media reports picked up Palmer's statements , thereby setting

off the wildfire. So much for the State Department trying to keep a "low profile" on Venezuela and the sensitivesituation in the Andean region.

Spun as appeasement, soft on terrorism and national securityKouri, 11Jim Kouri, Law Enforcement ExaminerJim Kouri, CPP, the fifth Vice President and Public Information Officer of the National Association of Chiefs of Police, has served on the

National Drug Task Force and trained police and security officers throughout the country, Examiner.com, 6/26/11,http://www.examiner.com/article/obama-urged-to-place-venezuela-on-terrorist-sponsor-list

Obama urged to place Venezuela on "Terrorist Sponsor List " Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez, who is believed to be inCuba following emergency surgery, is in ''cr itical'' but stable condition, Miami's El Nuevo Herald has reported. The government has treated the President's departure

since June 10 as a state s ecret. Chavez's government so far has made no comment about Iran Hezbollah act ivities in their coun try. During Friday's hearing of the

House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, Chair man Connie Mack (R-14) again called on the ObamaAdministration to cease their delaying of placing Venezuela on the "State Sponsor of Terrorism List." Thehearing, "Venezuela's Sanction able Activity," was held to provide oversight of sanctionsavailable for the State Department and Treasury Department to dissuade illicit activity in the Western Hemisphere. To date, the ObamaAdministration has underutilized these tools allowing ruthless dictator Hugo Chavez to profit from the drug trade, sell fuel to the

Iranians, and transport terrorists around the wor ld. Congressman Mack stated, "The State Department said they would nameVenezuela a state sponsor of terrorism as well as enforce consequential sanctions on their state run oil company i fthey received proof that Venezuela is demonstrably sanctionable. That proof was again presentedto officials of the State and Treasury Depart ments and further delay by the Obama Administration is unacceptableand will only continue to coddle Hugo Chavez." Chairman Mack reiterated Venezuela's repeated support foracts of international terrorism; including the sale of refined fuel to Iran and the actions of Ghazi Nasr al Din, a

Venezuelan Diplomat, who was sanctioned by the Treasury Department for facilitating the transfer of funds to Hezbollah and escorted Hezbollahofficials to and from Venezuela. Iran, and its proxy group Hezbollah continue to expand their presence in Central and South

American taking advantage of their already close relationship with Venezuela 's despot Presidente Hugo Chavez,

according to Air Force General Douglas Fraser, commanding officer of the U.S. Southern Command ,Additionally, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) drew sanctions on several Venezuelan senior government officials, Hugo Carvajal Barrios, theDirector of Military Intelligence, and Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva, General-in-Chief of the Venezuelan Armed Services, for mater ially assisting and supporting drugtrafficking and terrorism activities by the revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Mack added: "If the Obama Administration continues to coddle HugoChavez and the threat he poses to our security, freedom loving Americans will take matters into their hands by not purchas ing oil and gas from PDVSA, the Chavez

run oil company which operates as CITGO in the U.S." In addition, last week Rep . Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chair man of theHouse Foreign Affairs Committee , said that no U.S. funds should be provided to t he newly-formed Hezbollah government in Lebanon, or to a

Palestinian Authority that includes Hamas. The congresswoman and other lawmakers are concerned that U.S. taxpayermoney may end up in the hands of terrorist groups claiming to be political organizations. ―For ye ars, members of Congress warned that it

was unwise to fund a Lebanese government i n which Hezbollah participated. It was clear that Hezbollah‘s influence was growing, and that theExecutive Branch had no long-term strategy to deal with that reality, and no contingency plan tostop U.S. aid from falling into the wrong hands ," she said .

Economic Engagement perceived by congressional critics as appeasement, soft on nationalsecurity, terrorism and iranGoodenough, 12

http://www.examiner.com/article/obama-urged-to-place-venezuela-on-terrorist-sponsor-list

http://www.examiner.com/article/obama-urged-to-place-venezuela-on-terrorist-sponsor-list



Patrick Goodenough, Patrick covered government and politics in South Africa and the Middle East before joining CNSNews.comin 1999. Since then he has launched foreign bureaus for CNSNews.com in Jerusalem, London and the Pacific Rim. From October2006 to July 2007, Patrick served as Managing Editor at the organization's world headquarters in Alexandria, Va. Now back inthe Pacific Rim, as International Editor he reports on politics, international relations, security, terrorism, ethics and religion, andoversees reporting by CNSNews.com's roster of international stringers, CNS News, 2/2/12, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/iran-venezuela-links-examined-amid-fresh-calls-terror-sponsor-designation

Iran-Venezuela Links Examined Amid Fresh Calls for Terror-Sponsor Designation U.S. lawmakerswill turn a spotlight Thursday on the deepening links between Iran and leftist regimes in Latin America, at a

meeting that will likely hear fresh calls for the administration to designate Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism. Three weeks afterIranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Venezuela , Cuba, Nicaragua and Ecuador, the U.S. House ForeignAffairs Committee will hold a hearing entitled ―Ahmadinejad‘s Tour of Tyrants and Iran‘s Agenda inthe Western Hemisphere .‖ ―Iran has been actively working for years to expand its ties and influence in the Western Hemisphere, and it

has found willing partners in the region‘s anti -American despots,‖ committee chair man Rep. Ileana

Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.) said in an earlier statement. The panel aims to review steps the U.S. should take toadvance American interests and counter Iran‘s activities in the region. Among experts scheduled to testify is Institut e for Global

Economic Growth president Norman Bailey, who formerly served on the National Security Council and in theOffice of the Director of Na tional Intelligence, where he was appointed in November 2006 as ―mission manager‖ for Cuba and Venezuela. In a

briefing paper published by the American Foreign Policy Council on Wednesday, Bailey explored the Hugo Chavez regime‘s―facilitationand encouragement of the penetration of the Western Hemisphere by the Islamic Republic of Iran. ‖ ―Since 2005,withVenezu ela‘s assistance, Iran has created an extensive regional network of economic, diplomatic, industrial and

commercial activities, with significant effect ,‖ he wrote, noting that Iran‘s interests have extended to other Latin American countries,

especially the leftist-governed Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua. Bailey noted that although the Iran-Venezuela partnership hadcaught the attention of U.S. policymakers in recent years, ―little by way of concrete responses has emerged to counter the

extensive web of illicit activity and strategic connections that Iran has made in Ven ezuela and throughout Latin America.‖ Among hisrecommendations – designation of Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism, for its collusion

both with Iran and the Iranian-backed Lebanese terrorist group, Hezbollah . Bailey said designation would potentially result in a boycott of Venezuelan oil to the U.S., but argued that the oil shipments ―could easily be made up with equivalent amounts re leased from the U.S.Strategic Petroleum Reserve.‖ ―By contrast, such a move would have a much more pronounced impact on the Venezuelan economy.‖ Links to

foreign terrorist organizations The U.S. currently lists Cuba, Syria, Iran and Sudan as state sponsors of terrorism, a designation that

carries sanctionsincluding a ban on arms-related exports and sales, controls over exports of dual-use items, prohibitions on

economic assistance, and various financial restrictions. Designation requires a determination by the secretary of state that acountry‘s government ―has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism,‖ for example through support for and links to ―forei gnterrorist organizations‖ (FTOs).

Congressional resolution passage proves congress perceives plan as appeasement – triggersbipartisan oppositionWalser, 10Ray Walser, Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division ofthe Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, 1/20/10,http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/01/state-sponsors-of-terrorism-time-to-add-venezuela-to-the-list

Since January 2009, the Obama Administration's attempts to improve relations with the stridently anti-America Chávez have yielded little more

than empty gestures. Although ambassadorial relations were restored in June 2009, Chávez has signaled renewed support for the narcoterrorismof the FARC, begun threatening and punishing Colombia for its defense cooperation agreement with the U.S., helped destabilize Honduras by backing former president Manuel Zelaya's illegal referendum, pushed ahead with major Russian arms acquisitions, and sealed ever closer ties,including joint nuclear ventures, with Iran. Venezuela plays an increasingly prominent role as a primary transit country for cocaine flowing from

Colombia to the U.S., Europe, and West Africa. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration, according to the President's National Security

Council adviser on Latin America, Dan Restrepo, does not consider Venezuela to be a challenge to U.S. nationalsecurity: President Obama "does not see Venezuela as a challenge to U.S. national security. There is no Cold War nor Hot War. Those things

belong to the past."[2] This view is not optimistic--it is dangerous. The Administration needs to, as arecent bipartisan congressional resolution urges , adopt a genuinely tough-minded approach to dealing

http://cnsnews.com/news/article/iran-venezuela-links-examined-amid-fresh-calls-terror-sponsor-designation


http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/01/state-sponsors-of-terrorism-time-to-add-venezuela-to-the-list

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/01/state-sponsors-of-terrorism-time-to-add-venezuela-to-the-list





with Chávez and Venezuela. The Administration needs to develop a public diplomacy strategy to counter Chavista disinformation and a

diplomatic strategy in the Americas that responds to growing threats of political destabilization. It also needs to recognize tha t under

Chávez, Venezuela has become terrorism's most prominent supporter in the Western Hemisphere.

The Obama Administration can begin to correct this policy of drift and inaction by placing Venezuela on the list of statesponsors of terrorism along with Iran.[3]

Powerful congressional and committee backlash – spun as appeasement and soft on terrorO‘Brien, ‗9 (Michael, The Hill, 10/28, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/65219-lawmakers-want-venezuela-named-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorismLawmakers want Venezuela named a state sponsor of terrorism A bipartisan pair of lawmakersintroduced a resolution on Wednesday to classify Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism. Rep. Ron

Klein (D-Fla.), a member of the Foreign Affairs committee, and Rep. Connie Mack (R-Fla.), the ranking

member of the Western Hemisphere subcommittee, joined together to float a bill calling on Secretary of

State Hillary Clinton to add Venezuela to the list of states which sponsor terrorism . The resolution,

H.Res.872, cites the Venezuelan government's ties to Iran, Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Columbia ( FARC) as examples of the South American nation's support for terrorism. "The evidence linking Venezuela ‘s HugoChavez to the FARC and Hezbollah – two of the most dangerous terrorist organizations, responsible for many bombings,

kidnappings, killings and drug trafficking – is overwhelming, " Mack said in a statement announcing the resolution. " NamingVenezuela a state sponsor of terrorism will strengthen the stability of the region," the FloridaRepublican, who has long been a vocal critic of Chavez, added. "The Administration must not turn a

blind eye to Chavez‘s dangerous aggression and must add Venezuela to the state sponsors ofterrorism list without delay.‖ "Venezuela‘s assistance to the FARC in Colombia destabilizes the region and places the Chavez regime

squarely outside the international community," Klein said. " This legislation seeks to stop Venezuela‘s facilitation ofterrorism now . The Uni ted States cannot and will not accept such actions taking place so close to home.‖

Especially because well documented terror ties – drives oppositionGoodenough, 12Patrick Goodenough, Patrick covered government and politics in South Africa and the Middle East before joining CNSNews.comin 1999. Since then he has launched foreign bureaus for CNSNews.com in Jerusalem, London and the Pacific Rim. From October2006 to July 2007, Patrick served as Managing Editor at the organization's world headquarters in Alexandria, Va. Now back inthe Pacific Rim, as International Editor he reports on politics, international relations, security, terrorism, ethics and religion, andoversees reporting by CNSNews.com's roster of international stringers, CNS News, 2/2/12, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/iran-venezuela-links-examined-amid-fresh-calls-terror-sponsor-designation

In its most recent annual report on international terrorism, published last August, the State Department in its section on state sponsors citesCuba‘s links with the Basque separatist group ETA and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) – both FTOs – as well as Iranian

and Syrian sponsorship of Hezbollah and Palestinian FTOs including Hamas. Yet Venezuela‘s links to Hezbollah are well-

documented (as early as June 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department charged that Chavez‘ government was

―employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and fundraisers‖) and he has also been accused ofties to FARC and to ETA . Caracas‘ cozy relationship with state sponsors of terror Cuba and Iran – including new concerns that Chavez could help Tehran to evade the latest Western sanctions against its banks and

oil exports – provide further reason, proponents say, for Venezuela itself to be designated. Rep. Connie

Mack (R-Fla.), chair man of the Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, has for several years

sponsored legislation urging action . The most recent bill , introduced in May 2011, calls for ―Venezuela to bedesignated a state sponsor of terrorism for its support of Iran, Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Armed

Forces of Colombia ( FARC ).‖ Mack introduced similar bills in October 2009 and in March 2008.







2NC AT: Doesn‘t Assume Maduro

Chavez‘s successor only magnifies the controversy Washington Post 13 (03/06, ―A misguided U.S. strategy for Venezuela,‖http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-06/opinions/37497866_1_nicolas-maduro-apartments-and-appliances-henrique-capriles)ANTICIPATING THE death of Hugo Chavez, the Obama administration began reaching outmonths ago to his designated successor, Nicolas Maduro, in the hope of bettering U.S.-Venezuelan relations. On Tuesday, that strategy absorbed a body blow : Hours before revealing thatMr. Chavez had died of cancer, Mr. Maduro tried to blame the United States for his illness, andhe expelled two U.S. military attaches on charges of ―proposing destabilizing plans‖ to the armedforces. So much for the ―reset‖ with Caracas. The ludicrous and crude propaganda launched byMr. Maduro was a sign that Mr. Chave z‘s successors will be more thuggish and less politically adept than he was — and, if anything, more inclined to scapegoat the United S tates and Venezuela‘sdemocratic opposition for the horrendous problems the caudillo leaves behind.

Nothing Changed – Ma duro pursuing ―all out Chavismo‖ Alic, 13Jen Alic of Oilprice.com, 4/21/13, http://www.mining.com/web/foreign-oil-and-gas-companies-look-to-status-quo-in-venezuela/

Foreign oil and gas companies look to status quo in Venezuela Now that Nicolas Maduro — the late Hugo Chavez‘s choice forsuccessor — has narrowly won Sunday‘s presidential elections in Venezuela, oil and gas investors can expect a

perpetuation of the status quo . In Sunday‘s voVte, Maduro won with a very narrow 50.7% and a vow to continue

with Chavez‘s ―revolution , ‖ which has seen the oil industry nationalized and the state-run PDVSA oil company

funding social programs and voraciously courting China and Russia. The narrow vote will not be without its challenges.Opposition rival candidate Henrique Capriles has refused to recognize the results and is demanding a recount, though the electoral commission is

standing firm on Maduro‘s victory. For for eign oil and gas companies, we can expect more of the same . There are noregulatory changes in the works, and an unattractive windfall tax system announced in January will likely be pushed forwardunder Maduro. What Maduro is inheriting, though, is a nightmare situation that will see him stuck between using PDVSA to fund expensivesocial programs that cost it $44 billion last year alone diverted from oil revenues, and cutting social spending or allowing a rise in the price offuel that could spark regime-threatening unrest. If Maduro feels compelled to reduce fuel subsidies, it could lead to riots as cheap fuel — which

cannot be sustained — is one of the most crucial social benefits for Venezuelans, who pay around 6 cents per gallon. Maduro has inherited a

―sinking ship‖ and does not appear to have the political capital to make any short-term changes in Venezuela‘s energy

policy, experts at Southern Pulse told Oilprice.com. ―The main energy issue for Venezuela is that oil production is struggling, down from a peak of about 3.2 million barrels per day in 1998 to less than 2.8 million bpd now. One would hope that fixing infrastructure, completing refineryrepairs and construction, and investing in exploration and new technology would be priorities but Maduro will not have funds to invest unless hemakes controversial cuts to social programs,‖ according to Southern Pulse , which does not believe that Maduro will attempt to cut fuel subsidiesany time soon. A top priority for Maduro will be boosting refining capacity, says Southern Pulse. Towards this end, Maduro may be willing tonegotiate if a partner steps forward to bui ld a new refinery, which is a goal Chavez failed to realize. ―If PDVSA fails to increase production,PDVSA President Rafael Ramirez may be replaced this year. One way for Maduro to keep his presidency afloat is to bring new proven wellsonline in the Orinoco Belt; but that will require major investment. PDVSA may need more than a minority-partner-with-a-service-contract atthose fields if they want to start pumping soon.‖ In the meantime, China‘s foothold in Venezuela remains on solid ground. Chi na is already privyto 600,000 bpd from Venezuela in return for $42 billion in loans. Maduro is not likely to rock this boat with Beijing, and according to the termsalready in place, Venezuelan exports are set to increase to one million bpd by 2015, though most of the loan money has already been spent.According to Southern Pulse, Maduro will likely seek new loans from China, but this will depend on the terms and stability in Venezuela. If thisdoesn‘t work, Maduro will have to look elsewhere— first to Russia and then perhaps to US Chevron or Spanish Repsol, the latter two having only

limited operations in the country. Overall, we should consider that Maduro will pursue all-out chavismo . ―As president, Maduro will govern as he thinks Chavez himself would have ruled . However, Maduro probably will not

http://www.mining.com/web/foreign-oil-and-gas-companies-look-to-status-quo-in-venezuela/






begin pandering to the most radical elements of his party, PSUV, because he has little to gain from that. Maduro is not blind to the myriad

problems facing the next president such as blackouts, food shortages and rampant cri minal violence,‖ according to Southern Pulse. While it‘sstatus quo for now for the oil and gas industry, it‘s clearly bad news for Maduro. ―Despite Chavez‘s immense popularity, his memorywill fade. And with time citizens who loved Chavez will blame Madur o for their struggles,‖ experts at Southern Pulse say. ―If Maduro survivesthat long, the next election in 2018 will involve a much deeper conversation about the direction of the country.‖ ―In fact, s ome think that onereason former military leader and current National Assembly Diosdado Cabello — a Chavez loyalist –did not dispute Maduro‘s succession is

precisely because of the precarious financial and political situation he would have inherited.‖

Chavez death changes nothingGoodman, 13 (Josh, Bloomberg reporter responsible for economic and political coverage inLatin America, 4/17,http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-17/venezuelan-leader-s-taunts-won-t-provoke-u-s-diplomat-says-2-.htmlThe U.S. is unlikely to adopt a more confrontational stance toward Venezuela even as President- elect Nicolas Maduro ratchets up hisrhetoric in the wake of his narrow victory, the State Department‘s top official for Latin America said. Echoing charges frequently lev ied byhis political mentor, the late President Hugo Chavez, Maduro yesterday accused the U.S. of trying to oust him by supporting opposition calls for a

recount of ballots in the April 14 election he won by about 270,000 votes. Today, he likened President Barack Obama‘s policytowards Venezue la to U.S. support for the overthrow of Chile‘s Salvador Allende in 1973. Roberta Jacobson,

assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, said such rhetoric has become more commonplace since

Maduro took control of Venezuela‘s troubled economy following Chavez‘s death from cancer last month. While thatmakes it harder for relations to improve , the U.S. is unlikely to respond in kind, she said. ―Idon‘t think there‘s

going to be a marked difference in the way we respond to Maduro versus the way we responded toChavez ,‖ Jacobson , a career diplomat, said in an interview from the State Department in Washington. ―It still doesn‘t make sense toget in, you‘ll excuse me, a pissing match with Nicolas Maduro any more than it did with Chavez.‖ While rela tions between the U.S. andVenezuela have long been strained -- the two countries have gone without ambassadors since 2010 -- former president George W. Bush in hissecond term adopted a more conciliatory tone toward Chavez, which Obama continued. Other Cheek At the heart of what Jacobson called a―turning of the cheek‖ approach are strong commercial ties -- Venezuela was the U.S.‘s fourth -biggest supplier of oil last year -- and a sense of

political realism. That means that while the U.S. won‘t back away f rom expressing its disappointment with the fairness of the election and thelack of a recount, that shouldn‘t lead relations to deteriorate further, she said. While Russia, China and most of Latin Amer ica has congratulatedMaduro for his win, the U.S. and European Union have held back support while seeking a recount to address opposition claims of irregularities.

―If Friday Maduro is sworn in as president, I don‘t think that‘s going to change very much from one day tothe next our positions, ‖ said Jacobson, who has served as the U.S.‘s top diplomat to Latin

America since 2011. ‗Rush to Judgment‘ Jacobson said the U.S. will continue to believe that the way the election results were handled represent a ―rush to judgment‖ that won‘t help Venezuela overcome deep political divisions. Still, Jacobson said she doesn‘t harbormuch hope that relations will improve either, even after what she described as Maduro‘s favorableresponse to a U.S. outreach a few months ago. In November, Jacobson said she called then-Foreign Minister Maduro to discuss howto get relations back on track in a likely post-Chavez government. High-level meetings between the two governments were also held, though theylost momentum as Chavez‘s worsening health came to dominate the nation‘s affairs, she said. Then, in the hours before Chavez‘s death,

Maduro suggested the U.S. may have poisoned the socialist leader. During the month-long campai gn hecontinued to ramp up ―exponentially‖ his anti -American rhetoric, ―making it much harder ‖ today tofind any common ground , Jacobson said. Long Harangue Jacobson‘s first encounter with Maduro , at the April 2012

Summit of the Americas in Colombia , was also marked by confrontation . In a private negotiating session attended by foreignministers, she said she wa s subjected to a ―long, long harangue‖ by Maduro, in which he accused the U.S. of imperialism and starving communistCuba with its half- century trade embargo. ―There were many around that table who were acutely uncomfortable with him yelling -- and he wasyelling at this point -- at a woman across the table,‖ she said. ―Closing the doors didn‘t seem to make a difference.‖ Then, less than two monthslater, at a meeting of the Organization of American States in Bolivia, the two traded pleasantries while posing side-by-side for a group photo.Maduro said he held no grudges against her or the U.S., according to Jacobson. ―It‘s very hard to read these signals,‖ she said. ― Every timewe get to the point of actually working on substantive stuff, we end up taking steps backwardwith accusations of everything from killing Chavez with cancer to coups.‖



2NC AT: Business Not Regime

Plan can‘t avoid accusations of supporting the regime – business and investment is cooptedToro, 13Fransisco Toro, Venezuelan journalist, political scientist, reported for the Washington Post, the New York Times and the Financial Times, andwas Editor of VenEconomy, Venezuela's leading bilingual business magazine. Since 2002, he has run Caracas Chronicles, the must-read English-language blog on all things Venezuelan He holds a BA from Reed College (1997), and MSc from the London School of Economics (1999) and iscurrently a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of Maastricht, in The Netherlands. New Republic, 3/5/13,http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112596/hugo-chavez-dead-cuba-defined-him-much-venezuela-did#

Chávez imported more than just personnel and advice; he imported the Cuban Revolution's eschatology virtuallywhole. Fidel's vision of revolution as a kind of cosmic morality play pitting unalloyed socialist "good" in an unending death struggle against

the ravages of " evil" American imperialism became the guiding principle of Venezuela's revolution.The use and abuse of anti-imperialist rhetoric as a mechanism for consolidating authoritarian control over society was the most valuable lessonChávez learned from Fidel. A superheated brand of unthinking anti-Americanism became the all-purpose excuse for any and every authoritarianexcess, stigmatizing any form of protests and casting a dark pall over any expression of discontent or dissent. The technique's infinite versatility

proved its central attraction: You could blame shadowy gringo infiltrator for neighborhood protests over chronic power shortages just as easily asyou could silence whistleblowers of government corruption by casting them as CIA fifth columns. In Cuba, considering the island's history as atarget for American imperialist meddling, anti-imperialism — however wantonly abused — rested on a bed of historic verisimilitude. But inVenezuela, a country with no history of direct American imperial aggression, this borrowed bit of rhetorical posturing served only to underlinechavismo's derivative status, its ideology a kind of fidelista hand-me-down lacking even the self-awareness to realize it was decades out of date

by the time it was born. Where Chávez was able to transcend the Cuban model, it was largely due to the advantages of life at the receiving end of

an unprecedented petrodollar flood. By some estimates, Venezuela sold over $1 trillion worth of oil during his tenure, and so his was

government by hyperconsumption, not rationing. The petroboom allowed Chávez to substitute the checkbook for the gulag ;

marginalizing his opponents via popular spending programs rather than rounding them up and throwing them in jail. Rather thandeclaring all out-war on business, he co-opted them. Rather than abolish civil society, he created a

parallel civil society , complete with pro-government unions, universities, radio stations and community councils. Suchenhancements were tried before by left-wing populists in Latin America, but always failed because they ran out ofmoney . Chávez avoided this pitfall thanks to the greatest of his innovations: He consciouslyavoided a complete break with the U.S. that Castro provoked in 1960. Instead, he railed against gringo

imperialism all morning, then spent all afternoon selling those same gringos oil. The irony is that this, hismost important innovation, will be the one least memorialized by his admirers. It was a gloriously incoherent posture, but one that fit the square

peg of revolutionary zeal into the round hole of an import-led petropopulism. Ironically, though, in its dependence on oil rents, the Chávez model

quietly undermined its own claim to represent a new alternative to dreaded Washington-sponsored neoliberalism. After all, if Venezuelacould afford to botch the nationalization of its own steel industry, it was because there were always

petrodollars around to import the steel that local industry was no longer producing. And if nationalizations up anddown the agro-food chain resulted in food shortages, money could always be found to import the

balance. As the Venezuelan State-Owned Enterprise sector grew, it looked more and more like theUSSR's — with a single profit-generating industry cross-subsidizing a bewildering array of loss-making

concerns. Chavenomics, as a development model, boiled down to little beyond extracting oil, selling it at high prices, and using the proceeds to paper over the rest of the system's cracks . How such a model is supposed to be relevant to countries thatdon't happen to float on top of hundreds of billions of barrels in oil reserves is anybody's guess. Still and all, petropopulism's attractions were all

too clear for Chávez. Those deep, oil-lined pockets allowed Chávez a luxury Fidel could only dream of: beingable to hold a long string of not-overtly-rigged elections without ever seriously endangering his

grip on power . It used to be that you could have either unchecked personal power or electoral legitimacy, but the petrodollarflood allowed Chávez to have both . Elected autocracy may sound like an oxymoron, but this is exactly what the Venezuelansynthesis of the Cuban experience yielded: a system that washed away the sins of its own aggressive contempt for dissidence and dissent through

continual recourse to the ballot box. What Hugo Chávez built was, in other words, a flawless autocracy.

http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112596/hugo-chavez-dead-cuba-defined-him-much-venezuela-did




Even if its not targeted at government – congressional Critics perceive Economicengagement and industry profits as appeasement that bolsters regime – not peopleGoodenough, 12Patrick Goodenough, Patrick covered government and politics in South Africa and the Middle East before joining CNSNews.comin 1999. Since then he has launched foreign bureaus for CNSNews.com in Jerusalem, London and the Pacific Rim. From October2006 to July 2007, Patrick served as Managing Editor at the organization's world headquarters in Alexandria, Va. Now back in

the Pacific Rim, as International Editor he reports on politics, international relations, security, terrorism, ethics and religion, andoversees reporting by CNSNews.com's roster of international stringers, CNS News, 2/2/12, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/iran-venezuela-links-examined-amid-fresh-calls-terror-sponsor-designation

Links to foreign terrorist organizations The U.S. currently lists Cuba, Syria, Iran and Sudan as state sponsors of terrorism , a

designation that carries sanctions including a ban on arms-related exports and sales, controls over exports of dual-use items,

prohibitions on economic assistance, and various financial restrictions. Designation requires a determination by thesecretary of state that a country‘s government ―has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism,‖ for example through supportfor and links to ―foreign terrorist organizations‖ (FTOs). In its most recent annual report on international terrorism, publi shed last August, theState Department in its section on state sponsors cites Cuba‘s links wi th the Basque separatist group ETA and the Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia (FARC) – both FTOs – as well as Iranian and Syrian sponsorship of Hezbollah and Palestinian FTOs including Hamas. YetVenezuela‘s links to Hezbollah are well -documented (as e arly as June 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department charged that Chavez‘ government was―employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and fundraisers‖) and he has also been accused of ties to FARC and to ETA.Caracas‘ cozy relationship with st ate sponsors of terror Cuba and Iran – including new concerns that Chavez could help Tehran to evade the latestWestern sanctions against its banks and oil exports – provide further reason, proponents say, for Venezuela itself to be designated. Rep. ConnieMack (R-Fla.), chairman of the Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, has for several years sponsored legislation urging

action. The most recent bill , introduced in May 2011, calls for ―Venezuela to be designated a state sponsorof terrorism for its support of Iran, Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).‖ Mack introduced similar bills

in October 2009 and in March 2008. In a white paper on the subject last summer, Mack argued that terror-sponsor designationwas not aimed at harming Venezuela‘s people but to pressure Chavez‘ government to end support for terrorism.

―EachSST [ state sponsor of terrorism] is treated with a unique set of sanctions , and the designation does not prevent travel to and from Venezuela, stop legal remittances to Venezuelan families, or impact services at the US embassy.‖ M ack said

designation could target Venezuela‘s oil exports, affecting more than 33 percent of the government‘s revenues. ―Venezuelan oil profitshave not benefited the Venezuelan people for years : crime is out of control, social infrastructure is destroyed, and health and

education are ruined,‖ the paper said. ―Oil in Venezuela is used as a weapon against the people and against other,

friendly countries in the region .‖







2NC XT: Spillover

Venezuela Engagement policies spun as appeasement – triggers intense fight and derailsObama domestic agenda prioritiesDueck, 11Colin Dueck,professor at the Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University, October 1, 2011

policy review » no. 169, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/94006

Look at how Obama‘ s strategy of accommodation has played out in relation to four categories of foreigngovernments: 1) those essentially hostile to the United States, 2) those who pursue a mixture of strategic rivalry and cooperation, 3) genuine

American allies, and 4) Arab governments of varying allegiance. The first category, of regimes basically hostile to the U nited States ,includes the governments of Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela, to name only four of the most notable . Each of

these governments has literally defined itself at a fundamental level by violent opposition toAmerica . To think that a conciliatory tone, a preliminary concession, or a well-intentioned desire for better relations on the part of a U.S.

president by itself will transform that hostility is simply naïve. In the case of Cuba, for example, the Obama administration began by liftingcertain economic sanctions, in the hope of seeing some reciprocal concessions from the Castro brothers: political liberalization, an easing of anti-American hostility, anything at all of significance. No such concessions have been made. The case of Iran has already been discussed — Obama

reached out to Tehran with great fanfare in 2009, and has received in effect a slap in the face. Both Venezuela‘s Hugo Chavez and Nor th Korea‘sKim Jong Il are likewise just as hostile and provocative toward the United States today as they were when George W. Bush was America‘s president. This is because the fundamental barrier to friendly U.S. relations with those regimes was never George W. Bush. The fundamental

barrier to friendly relations with these regimes is the fact that they are bitterly hostile to the United States. The kinds of concessions that

Washington would have to offer to win their genuine accommodation would be so sweeping, massive, and unacceptable,from the point of view of any likely U.S. president that they will not be made — and certainlynot by Barack Obama . Any smaller concessions from Washington, therefore, are simply pocketed by a hostile regime, which continuesalong in its basic antipathy toward the United States. So who is supposed to be the target audience here? The true audience and for that matter theultimate source of these various conciliatory policy initiatives is essentially a small, transnational, North Atlantic class of bien pensant opinionwho already share Obama‘s core policy priorities in any case. They have rewarded him with their support, as well as with the Nobel Peace Prize.Others internationally are less impressed. And in the meantime, we may have lost something, in terms of the ability to seriously prepare forcertain looming security challenges. A primary and continuing emphasis on diplomatic engagement after Iran has repeatedly rebuffed the UnitedStates does not help us to prepare for the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran. A declared commitment to nuclear abolition does nothing toconvince other nuclear powers to abandon their own arsenals, and may even be counterproductive in the sense that it deludes important segmentsof opinion into believing that such declarations actually help to keep the peace. Obama has said from the beginning that the purpose of his moreconciliatory foreign policy approach was to bolster American standing in the world, but the definition of international standing has actually beenhighly self-referential in the direction of aforementioned transatlantic liberal opinion. In many cases overseas, from the perspective of other

governments, Obama‘s well -intentioned conciliatory gestures are read as a sign of weakness , and consequently undermine

rather than bolster American standing. In one way, however, Obama has already achieved much of what he desired with his strategy of

accommodation, and that is to re-orient American national resources and attention away from national security

concerns and toward the expansion of domestic progressive reforms . He appears to sincerely believe that these liberaldomestic initiatives in areas such as health care and finance will also bolster American economic power and competiveness. Actually they will dono such thing, since heavy-handed and constantly changing federal regulations tend to undermine investor confidence as well as long-term U.S.

economic growth. But either way, Obama‘s vision of a more expansive government role in American society is well onits way to being achieved, without from his point of view debilitating debates over major national security

concerns . In that sense, especially if he is reelected in 2012, several of his major strategic priorities will have

been accomplished . Any good strategy must incorporate the possibility of pushback or resistance from unexpected quarters. As they say in the U.S. military, the enemy gets a vote. So, for that matter, do other countries, whether friendly or not.When things do not go exactly according to plan, any decent strategy and any capable leader adapt. Indeed any decent foreign policy strategy

begins with the recognition for backup plans, since inevitably things will not go exactly according to plan. Other countries rarely respond to our

initial strategic moves in precisely the way we might wish. The question then becomes: What is plan B? Obama is tactically veryflexible , but at the level of grand strategy he seems to have no backup plan. There is simply no recognition of the possibility that world

politics might not operate on the post- Vietnam liberal assumptions he has imbibed and represented over the years. Obama‘s criti cs often describehim as providing no strong foreign policy leadership. They underestimate him. Actually he has a very definite idea of where he wants to take the

United States. His guiding foreign policy idea is that of international accommodation , sparked by Americanexample. He pursues that overarching concept with great tactical pliability but without any sign of ideological or basic revision since coming intooffice. Yet empirically, in one case after another, the strategy is not working. This is a kind of leadership, to be sure, but leadership in the wrong

http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/94006




direction. Obama believes that liberal domestic initiatives will bolster American economic powerand competitiveness. How can the Obama administration adapt and adjust to the failures of its strategy of accommodation? It canadmit that the attempted diplomatic engagement of Iran has failed, and shift toward a strategy of comprehensive pressure against that regime. Itcan make it abundantly clear to both the Taliban and al Qaeda that the United States will not walk away from Afghanistan, despite the beginningdrawdown. It can start treating Russia as a geopolitical rival, which it is, rather than simply as a diplomatic partner. It can strengthen U.S. missiledefenses as a form of insurance against nuclear proliferators. There is a long list of policy recommendations that can be made on specific regionaland functional matters, but the prior and most important point is the need for a change in mentality. President Obama needs to stop working on

the assumption that U.S. foreign policy concessions or gestures directed at the gallery of elite transatlantic opinion — whether on nuclear armscontrol, counterterrorism, or climate change — will somehow be reciprocated by specific foreign governments in the absence of some very hard bargaining. He needs to grasp that U.S. strategic disengagement from specific regional theaters, whether promised or underway, is taken as a signof weakness in those regions and not simply as a sign of benevolent restraint. He needs to recognize that America‘s international reputationconsists not only of working toward his own definition of the moral high ground, but also very much of a reputation for strength, and specificallyof a reputation for the willingness to use force. He needs to stop operating on the premise that past American foreign policy decisions are theultimate source of much violent discord in the world today. He needs to be willing to divide the international system conceptually andoperationally into friends and enem ies, as they actually exist, and to support America‘s friends while pressuring and opposing its enemiesrelentlessly. Finally, he needs to admit the limited effect of his own personal charisma on the foreign policies of other governments. The presidentof the United States is not an international community organizer. If the conceptual framework that underpins Obama‘s foreign pol icy strategy isaltered, then better policies will flow on a wide range of specific issues. Obama needs to be willing to support Am erica‘s friends while pressuringand opposing its enemies relentlessly. Admittedly, there is little chance that Obama will concede any of this. One of the things we know fromhistorical example is that presidents tend to keep operating on their own inbuilt foreign policy assumptions, even as contrary evidence piles up. Itusually takes either a dramatic external shock, or a new administration altogether, to bring about a major revaluation of existing assumptions.Curiously, this resistance to contrary evidence in foreign policy appears to be even truer of highly educated, self-confident, and intelligent people

with core ideological convictions — a description that certainly fits President Obama. Obama is malleable on tactics , and he takes

great care to project an aura of sensible calm, but in truth he is a conviction president powered by certain core ideological beliefs andvaulting policy ambitions . His characteristic response when these core beliefs and ambitions are truly tested by opponents or eventsis not to bend, but to bristle. He is therefore particularly unlikely to admit or even perceive that a foreign policy strategy based upon faultyassumptions of international accommodation is failing or has failed. Nor is it politically convenient for him to do so. More likely, he will continuealong his chosen path, offering nothing more than tactical adjustments, until some truly dramatic event occurs which brings his whole foreign

policy strategy into question — an Iranian nuclear test, for example.



2NC XT: Congress

sparks fierce congressional fight - extremists control Venezuela debate and anything shortof confrontation gets viewed as appeasementHarper, 10 (liz, Senior Editor @ US Institute for Peace, adjunct fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,americasquarterly.org contributing blogger based in Washington DC, 12/21, http://americasquarterly.org/node/2058)

Venezuela‘s Formal Rejection of Ambassador -Designate Larry Palmer The long-running debate over how to deal with the

irrational and impulsive strongman, Venezuela n President Hugo Chávez, has reached feverish pitch this winter. The latestcasualty in this war of words has become U.S. Ambassador Larry Palmer, the Obama administration's nomination as ambassador to Venezuela.Worse yet, Chávez ultimately got what he wanted out of this latest battle: his choice of who will not be our next Ambassador in Venezuela. OnMonday, Venezuela formally told the U.S. to not bother sending Larry Palmer as the next ambassador since he would be asked to return the

moment he landed in Caracas. How did this all go down? Like Cuba, any U.S. move regarding Venezuela involves egos,

politics and fortunately, some policy . Naturally, when Palmer went before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over the summer,the career diplomat — characterized by some at the U.S. Department of State as "not a Washington man" — he already faced an uphill slog. Our

domestic debate over Venezuela generally falls into two camps: engagement and confrontation . Thereare , of course, shades of gray and nuances between the two sides — though such voices are so oftenoverpowered by the more extreme views. On one side, you have those espousing "strategic

engagement," keeping in line with the Obama administration's stated foreign policy and national security objectives. In shortand broadly speaking, these proponents might argue, with an irrational state, you shouldn't turn your back. Look where that got us with NorthKorea, Iran and Syria. Instead you want a seat at the table to start a dialogue based on mutual respect and to build on areas of mutual interest. Youraise concerns discretely and express disapproval quietly or through third parties. As one person said, engagement should be ―subversive,"

because you seek to assert positive influence by being present and through cooperation on areas such as businessdevelopment, financial opportunities , or culture and sports. Indeed, Palmer was the right guy to carry out this mission. But,the engagement policy , as it is practiced with Venezuela, seems more like "appeasement ," say peopleclamoring for a tougher approach. After all , for years now, we have witnessed a democracy's death

by a thousand cuts . This past week, Hugo Chávez got one of his Christmas wishes with the approval of new decree powers, therebyfurther eroding the country's once well-established institutional checks and balances. Chávez threatens more than human rights and democratic

norms; the U.S. has legitimate national security concerns , such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism andnarcotrafficking . Yet, as Chávez runs roughshod over international norms, is the U.S. working to halt the downward spiral? Thoseare the broad brush strokes of the debate into which Palmer was tossed.

opposition to economic engagement in Venezuela is increasing – triggers fight in congressand Israel lobby hates itFarnsworth, 10Eric, contributing blogger to americasquarterly.org. He is Vice President of the Council of the Americas inWashington DC, 11/3/10, http://americasquarterly.org/node/1976

Now What? Elections and the Western Hemisphere Tuesday‘s election results were not unexpected. The question now is what will they mean

for U .S. policy in the Western Hemisphere. The outlines are already clear: expect a sharper toneacross the board of Congressional oversight and initiative toward the Administration in trying toimpact policy. Here are a few predictions for regional policy based on the midterm election results. The new chair of the House Foreign

Affairs Committee will be Ileana Ros-Lehtinen ; the chair of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee will be Connie Mack.Together with newly-elected Senator Marco Rubio, this troika of Florida Republicans may well seek toreverse the Obama Administration‘s slow motion liberalization of Cuba policy. Expect also a harder line coming

from Congress toward Venezuela and the possible renewal of an effort to sanction Venezuela as a state





sponsor of terror. As well, Chairman-To-Be Ros-Lehtinen has earned strong pro-Israel credentials and is a

strong supporter of Iran sanctions; further moves of Brazil or Venezuela toward Tehran could well prove to be apoint of friction between the Administration and Congress if the Administration is perceived asdownplaying their significance.

spun as appeasement – triggers intense fight and derails Obama domestic agenda prioritiesDueck, 11Colin Dueck,professor at the Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University, October 1, 2011

policy review » no. 169, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/94006

Look at how Obama‘s strategy of accommodation has played out in relation to four categories of foreigngovernments: 1) those essentially hostile to the United States, 2) those who pursue a mixture of strategic rivalry and cooperation, 3) genuine

American allies, and 4) Arab governments of varying allegiance. The first category, of regimes basically hostile to the U nited States ,includes the governments of Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela, to name only four of the most notable . Each of

these governments has literally defined itself at a fundamental level by violent opposition toAmerica . To think that a conciliatory tone, a preliminary concession, or a well-intentioned desire for better relations on the part of a U.S.

president by itself will transform that hostility is simply naïve. In the case of Cuba, for example, the Obama administration began by liftingcertain economic sanctions, in the hope of seeing some reciprocal concessions from the Castro brothers: political liberalization, an easing of anti-American hostility, anything at all of significance. No such concessions have been made. The case of Iran has already been discussed — Obamareached out to Tehran with great fanfare in 2009, and has received in effect a slap in the face. Both Venezuela‘s Hugo Chavez and North Korea‘sKim Jong Il are likewise just as ho stile and provocative toward the United States today as they were when George W. Bush was America‘s

president. This is because the fundamental barrier to friendly U.S. relations with those regimes was never George W. Bush. The fundamental

barrier to friendly relations with these regimes is the fact that they are bitterly hostile to the United States. The kinds of concessions that

Washington would have to offer to win their genuine accommodation would be so sweeping, massive, and unacceptable,from the point of view of any likely U.S. president that they will not be made — and certainlynot by Barack Obama . Any smaller concessions from Washington, therefore, are simply pocketed by a hostile regime, which continuesalong in its basic antipathy toward the United States. So who is supposed to be the target audience here? The true audience and for that matter theultimate source of these various conciliatory policy initiatives is essentially a small, transnational, North Atlantic class of bien pensant opinionwho already share Obama‘s core policy priorities in any case. They have rewarded him with their support, as well as with the Nobe l Peace Prize.Others internationally are less impressed. And in the meantime, we may have lost something, in terms of the ability to seriously prepare forcertain looming security challenges. A primary and continuing emphasis on diplomatic engagement after Iran has repeatedly rebuffed the UnitedStates does not help us to prepare for the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran. A declared commitment to nuclear abolition does nothing to

convince other nuclear powers to abandon their own arsenals, and may even be counterproductive in the sense that it deludes important segmentsof opinion into believing that such declarations actually help to keep the peace. Obama has said from the beginning that the purpose of his moreconciliatory foreign policy approach was to bolster American standing in the world, but the definition of international standing has actually beenhighly self-referential in the direction of aforementioned transatlantic liberal opinion. In many cases overseas, from the perspective of other

governments, Obama‘s well -intentioned conciliatory gestures are read as a sign of weakness , and consequently undermine

rather than bolster American standing. In one way, however, Obama has already achieved much of what he desired with his strategy of

accommodation, and that is to re-orient American national resources and attention away from national security

concerns and toward the expansion of domestic progressive reforms . He appears to sincerely believe that these liberaldomestic initiatives in areas such as health care and finance will also bolster American economic power and competiveness. Actually they will dono such thing, since heavy-handed and constantly changing federal regulations tend to undermine investor confidence as well as long-term U.S.

economic growth. But either way, Obama‘s vision of a more expansive government role in American society is well onits way to being achieved, without from his point of view debilitating debates over major national security

concerns . In that sense, especially if he is reelected in 2012, several of his major strategic priorities will have been accomplished . Any good strategy must incorporate the possibility of pushback or resistance from unexpected quarters. As they say in the U.S. military, the enemy gets a vote. So, for that matter, do other countries, whether friendly or not.When things do not go exactly according to plan, any decent strategy and any capable leader adapt. Indeed any decent foreign policy strategy

begins with the recognition for backup plans, since inevitably things will not go exactly according to plan. Other countries rarely respond to our

initial strategic moves in precisely the way we might wish. The question then becomes: What is plan B? Obama is tactically veryflexible , but at the level of grand strategy he seems to have no backup plan. There is simply no recognition of the possibility that world

politics might not operate on the post- Vietnam liberal assumptions he has imbibed and represented over the years. Obama‘s critics often describehim as providing no strong foreign policy leadership. They underestimate him. Actually he has a very definite idea of where he wants to take the

United States. His guiding foreign policy idea is that of international accommodation , sparked by American





example. He pursues that overarching concept with great tactical pliability but without any sign of ideological or basic revision since coming intooffice. Yet empirically, in one case after another, the strategy is not working. This is a kind of leadership, to be sure, but leadership in the wrong

direction. Obama believes that liberal domestic initiatives will bolster American economic powerand competitiveness. How can the Obama administration adapt and adjust to the failures of its strategy of accommodation? It canadmit that the attempted diplomatic engagement of Iran has failed, and shift toward a strategy of comprehensive pressure against that regime. Itcan make it abundantly clear to both the Taliban and al Qaeda that the United States will not walk away from Afghanistan, despite the beginningdrawdown. It can start treating Russia as a geopolitical rival, which it is, rather than simply as a diplomatic partner. It can strengthen U.S. missile

defenses as a form of insurance against nuclear proliferators. There is a long list of policy recommendations that can be made on specific regionaland functional matters, but the prior and most important point is the need for a change in mentality. President Obama needs to stop working onthe assumption that U.S. foreign policy concessions or gestures directed at the gallery of elite transatlantic opinion — whether on nuclear armscontrol, counterterrorism, or climate change — will somehow be reciprocated by specific foreign governments in the absence of some very hard

bargaining. He needs to grasp that U.S. strategic disengagement from specific regional theaters, whether promised or underway, is taken as a signof weakness in those regions and not simply as a sign of benevolent restraint. He needs to recognize tha t America‘s international reputationconsists not only of working toward his own definition of the moral high ground, but also very much of a reputation for strength, and specificallyof a reputation for the willingness to use force. He needs to stop operating on the premise that past American foreign policy decisions are theultimate source of much violent discord in the world today. He needs to be willing to divide the international system conceptually andoperationally into friends and enemies, as they a ctually exist, and to support America‘s friends while pressuring and opposing its enemiesrelentlessly. Finally, he needs to admit the limited effect of his own personal charisma on the foreign policies of other governments. The presidentof the United Sta tes is not an international community organizer. If the conceptual framework that underpins Obama‘s foreign policy strategy i saltered, then better policies will flow on a wide range of specific issues. Obama needs to be willing to support America‘s fr iends while pressuringand opposing its enemies relentlessly. Admittedly, there is little chance that Obama will concede any of this. One of the things we know fromhistorical example is that presidents tend to keep operating on their own inbuilt foreign policy assumptions, even as contrary evidence piles up. Itusually takes either a dramatic external shock, or a new administration altogether, to bring about a major revaluation of existing assumptions.Curiously, this resistance to contrary evidence in foreign policy appears to be even truer of highly educated, self-confident, and intelligent people

with core ideological convictions — a description that certainly fits President Obama. Obama is malleable on tactics , and he takes

great care to project an aura of sensible calm, but in truth he is a conviction president powered by certain core ideological beliefs and

vaulting policy ambitions . His characteristic response when these core beliefs and ambitions are truly tested by opponents or eventsis not to bend, but to bristle. He is therefore particularly unlikely to admit or even perceive that a foreign policy strategy based upon faultyassumptions of international accommodation is failing or has failed. Nor is it politically convenient for him to do so. More likely, he will continuealong his chosen path, offering nothing more than tactical adjustments, until some truly dramatic event occurs which brings his whole foreign

policy strategy into question — an Iranian nuclear test, for example.



2NC XT: Cuba Lobby

Venezuala and Cuba policies inherently tied – even after chavezToro, 13Fransisco Toro, Venezuelan journalist, political scientist, reported for the Washington Post, the New York Times and the Financial Times, andwas Editor of VenEconomy, Venezuela's leading bilingual business magazine. Since 2002, he has run Caracas Chronicles, the must-read English-language blog on all things Venezuelan He holds a BA from Reed College (1997), and MSc from the London School of Economics (1999) and iscurrently a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of Maastricht, in The Netherlands. New Republic, 3/5/13,http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112596/hugo-chavez-dead-cuba-defined-him-much-venezuela-did#

What Fidel Taught Hugo Cuba defined Chávez's career as much as Venezuela did Hugo Chávez died today in Venezuela at the age of 58, but his battle with a never-specified form of cancer was waged largely in a Cuban hospital — a telling detail, as Cuba loomed just as large in his politicalimagination as his native country. It's a point that my gringo friends up north always struggle with. The Cuban Revolution's immense influenceon the region has been constantly underestimated and misunderstood from day one. It's only a slight exaggeration to suggest that everything ofnote that's happened south of the Rio Grande since 1959 has been an attempt either to emulate, prevent, or transcend the Cuban experience.Chávez will be remembered as the most successful of Fidel Castro's emulators, the man who breathed new life into the old revolutionary dream.Starting in the 1960s, guerrilla movements throughout the hemisphere tried to replicate the Sierra Maestra rebels' road to power, to no avail. Inthe '70s, Chile's Salvador Allende tried the electoral route, but he didn't have a clear majority. In the '80s, Nicaragua's Sandinistas had themajority and rode it to power, but took over a state too bankrupt to implement the social reforms they'd always championed. Chávez had all

three — power, votes, and money — plus charisma to boot. His was the last, best shot at reinventing Caribbean Communism for the 21st century.At the root of the extraordinarily close alliance Chávez built with Cuba was a deep, paternal bond between twomen. A fiercely independent figure, the messianic Chávez was never seen to kowtow to anyone. But there were special rules for Fidel. Chávez'sextraordinary devotion sprung from Castro's status as the mythical Hero-Founder of Latin America's post-war hard left. Chávez loved to brag ofhis frequent, spur-of-the-moment trips to Havana to seek Castro counsel. When he was diagnosed with the cancer that ultimately killed him,Chavez got invites from high-tech medical centers in Brazil and in Spain, but it was never in doubt where he would seek treatment. Cháveztrusted Fidel, literally, with his life. There's no comparable relationship between two leaders in contemporary world politics, and it had its

political consequences — especially for Chávez. In a Cold War throwback, his government welcomed tens of thousands ofCuban doctors, trainers, and "advisors" — including, por supuesto, an unknowable number of spies — to Venezuela . And tens of

billions of petrodollars flowed in the opposite direction, a resource stream that propped up the last

bastion of totalitarianism in the Western Hemisphere long past its sell-by date. For Fidel, who had had his eyes onVenezuela's oil riches since the 1960s, Chávez's election was an unbelievable stroke of luck. Much has been written about the way Venezuelastepped in to fill the fiscal and strategic void the collapse of the Soviet Union left in Cuba, but the reality is much stranger than that. As theunquestionably senior member of their Cold War alliance, the Soviets treated Cuba as just another satellite state; Fidel's subjugation to a cold war

superpower was always something of an embarrassment to him. In the Caracas-Havana axis , by contrast, the paymasterdoubled up as the vassal. Venezuela effectively wrote a fat petrocheck month after month for the

privilege of being tutelaged by a poorer, weaker foreign power. The extent of this reverse colonization was startling. Cubanflags eventually came to flutter above Venezuelan military bases and Venezuelans witnessed the surreal spectacle of

a democratically elected president telling them that Venezuela and Cuba share "a single government "and that Venezuela "has two presidents ." Cuban military advisors kept watch over Venezuela's

entire security apparatus , and had exclusive control over Chávez's personal security detail. Through most of his 20-month battle with

cancer, the Castros had better information about the president's condition than even his inner circle back home, and they maneuveredsuccessfully to ensure a pro-Havana diehard , Nicolás Maduro, won the tough battle for succession.

Economic support for venezuala is key factor in Cuba policy – Maduro changes nothingPonce, 13Dr. Carlos Ponce, general coordinator of the Latin American and Caribbean Network for Democracy, co-editor ofthe political magazi ne ―Nueva Politica‖, lecturer in several U.S. and Latin American Universities and member of theSteering Committee of the World Movement for Democracy and the ISC of the Community of Democracies,1/12/13, http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2013/01/venezuelas-coup-made-in-cuba.html

Hugo Chávez was aware of the potential complications of this new surgery and he clearly said that in case he became unable to take

oath on January 10th, or in case of his death, his chosen one to run for president was Nicolás Maduro. And the Constitution in


http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2013/01/venezuelas-coup-made-in-cuba.html

http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2013/01/venezuelas-coup-made-in-cuba.html




Venezuela is clear: the mandate began on January 10th, 2007 and ends January 10th, 2013, and if the elected president can‘t t ake the oath that day

the Assembly‘s President assumes power temporarily and calls for new elections within a maximum of 30 days. But for Cuba , which

receives more than $10 billion a year plus other benefits from Venezuela , this is not acceptable . Fideland Raúl Castro have been close friends and supporters of Chávez's regime for economicreasons. Thanks to Hugo Chávez and his fake revolution, the Cuban dictatorial regime has been able tosurvive this past decade. For Castro‘s regime, the future of Chávez will also mark Cuba‘s future .

The Castro brothers have become the conciliators and advisors of the two most powerful acolytesof Chávez as well as of some fractions from the military . Castro has been coordinating the meetingsamong Diosdado Cabello, the president of Venezuelan National Assembly , Vice President Maduro, Chávez‘sfamily and some sectors of the military.

GOP and Cuba lobby HATE Venezuela and spin plan as appeasementBoothroyd, 12Rachel Boothroyd, journalist in Caracas, Venezuela. She contributes to Venezuelanalysis, Pulsamerica and Correodel Orinoco International, and has had pieces published on other sites such as the Latin American Bureau, GreenLeft Weekly, Znet and Global Research.9/25/12, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7283Republicans Vow to Halt ―Policy of Appeasement‖ in Venezuela Caracas, September 23 2012

(Venezuelanalysis.com) – Republican nominee for Vice-President of theU.S., Paul Ryan, has vowed that a Romney administration would get―tough on Castro, tough on Chavez ‖ and to end what he described as a ―policy of appeasement‖ applied by the

Obama administration towards both Cuba and Venezuela. Ryan made the comments from the Versailles Restaurant in

Miami, Florida last Saturday, where he was accompanied by staunch members of the anti-Castro lobby , includingRepublican Representative , Ileana Ros-Lehtinen . Ros-Lehtinen is a member of the Cuban-American Lobby and theCongressional Cuban Democracy Caucus; organisations which claim to be aimed at speeding up Cuba‘s ―transition to democracy‖. "In a Mitt

Romney administration, we will not keep practising this policy of appeasement, we will be tough on this brutal dictator (Castro).

All it has done is reward more despotism ... We will help those pro-democracy groups. We will be tough on Castro,

tough on Chavez . And it's because we know that's the right policy for our country,‖ said Ryan . The nominee hadreportedly travelled to Florida in a bid to win over the majority Latino vote two months ahead of the US elections. Florida is currently thought to

be a ―swing state‖ and could prove a determining vote for the overall election results. Results of a recent voter intention p oll in the state carriedout by NBC news show that Obama currently has a 5% lead over Romney, with a voting intention of 49% to 44%. ‗I learned from t hese friends,from Mario (Diaz-Balart), from Lincoln (Diaz-Balart), from Ileana (Ros-Lehtinen), just how brutal the Castro regime is, just how this president's

policy of appeasement is not working. They've given me a great education, lots of us in Congress, about how we need to clamp down on the

Castro regime,‖ said Ryan. According to Ros- Lehtinen, Ryan is now a ―loyal friend‖ to those whocampaign on Cuba-related political issues . Ryan's statements have caused some Democrats to accuse him of hypocrisy afterhe appears to have dramatically changed his stance on Cuba-US relations. Prior to 2007, the Republican had ca lled for ―free trade‖ between allnations, which included voting to lift the trade embargo on Cuba. "To paraphrase President Clinton, it takes real brass to vote three times againsteconomic sanctions on the Cuban regime and then come to Little Havana and ask Cuban-Americans for their vote," said Giancarlo Sopo, aCuban-American supporter who told the US' Sun Sentinel that he would vote for Obama. "It's one thing to have a genuine disagreement withsomeone on a policy. It's something else to change your pos ition from one day to the next just to pander in order to win votes,‖ added Sopo.

Recently leaked footage of a meeting between Romney and party donors also showed the presidential hopeful lambasting Obama for believing that ―his magnetism and his charm, an d his persuasiveness is so compelling that he can sit down with people like Putin and

Chávez and Ahmadinejad, and that they'll find that we're such wonderful people that they'll go on with us, and they'll stop doing bad

things‖. The leaked recording also s hows Romney referring to Iranian President Ahmadinejad as a ―crazed fanatic‖ and Iranian mullahs as―crazy people‖. He also commented that, in his view, the Palestinian people have ―no interest whatsoever in establishing peace‖. With the

presidential elections now drawing near, the Republican party is beginning to increasingly outline its prospective domestic and

foreign policy , which Romney has said would be principally based on an attempt to implement a neo- liberal ―Reagan economic zone‖ in

Latin America and other regions, such as the Middle East. The Republican presidential candidate has been outspoken in his

criticism of the ―anti-American‖ views purported by the governments of Venezuela, Cuba and Iran

and has described them as one of the biggest threats to the United States today. Earlier in July, Romney

branded the Venezuelan government as a ―threat to national security‖ and accused the country's

http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7283

http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7283



president, Hugo Chavez, of ―spreading dictatorships and tyranny throughout Latin America‖. The R epublican National

Committee also circulated a video of Obama shaking hands with Chavez at the OAS ―Summit of the

Americas‖ in Trinidad and Tobago 2009 at the same time. Romney has often claimed that the leader of Venezuela 's Bolivarian

revolution has links to ―terrorist‖ organisations such as Hezbollah and has access to weapons thatcould ―harm the US‖. He has never presented any evidence in support of these accusations.

Powerful cuba lobby hates Venezuela economic engagement – even under maduroKozloff, 13 (Nikolas, doctorate in Latin American history from Oxford University, author ofHugo Chavez: Oil, Politics and the Challenge to the U.S. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),Revolution! South America and the Rise of the New Left (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), No Rainin the Amazon: How South America's Climate Change Affects the Entire Planet (PalgraveMacmilan, 2010), Huffington Post, 4/14, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nikolas-kozloff/maduro-elections-venezuela_b_3078387.html )

Déjà Vu? Washington's War on Cuba and Venezuela : From the Kissinger Files to 'Cable Gate' If the polls are to be believed,

Hugo Chávez's successor Nicolás Maduro will probably defeat the political opposition in Sunday's presidential

election, thus securing and solidifying Cuban-Venezuelan ties yet further . Such an outcome will come as asevere disappointment to Washington , which has spent the better part of 40 years trying to preventsuch a diplomatic alliance from developing in the first place. For evidence of U.S. paranoia over Cuba ,one need only consult the so-called "Kissinger files," sensitive State Department cables recently made accessible by

whistle-blowing outfit WikiLeaks. The correspondence , which dates between 1973 and 1976, underscores Henry Kissinger's

single-minded obsession with quarantining Cuba lest Castro's influence be felt far afield. In late 1973,

U.S. diplomats expressed concern about Venezuelan moves to end Cuba's diplomatic isolation , andwere particularly worried that Caracas might "put together Organization of American States [OAS] majority in support resolution permittingreestablishment relations with Cuba." Washington was also perturbed by reports that Venezuelan Navy vessels had departed for Cuba in order to

load up on large shipments of sugar, and diplomats contemplated a possible cutoff of aid to Caracas in retaliation. Not only had the State Department grown alarmed about such developments, but rightist anti-Castroexiles were becoming restive as well . According to the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, the exiles were "appalled " at the

prospect that COPEI, the current party in power, might renew relations with Cuba. In an ominous move, the exiles planned to publish full pagenewspaper ads against the COPEI administration. Hoping to punish COPEI at the polls, exiles threw their support to opposing party Acción

Democrática (or AD) in the 1973 presidential election. Ultimately, the Americans noted, such support proved critical and " highlyinfluential Cuban-Venezuelan entrepreneurs, backed by Cuban money from Miami" helped AD

candidate Carlos Andrés Pérez secure an electoral victory . The Rise of CAP If Kissinger or the Cuban exile community howeverhoped that Pérez, sometimes known simply as "CAP," would prove amenable to their designs they would be sorely disappointed. History has not

been kind to CAP, largely due to the latter's second and disastrous presidency which lasted from 1989 to 1993, during which time the veteran politician followed the diktats of the International Monetary Fund and nearly drove Venezuela to the point of social collapse. Nevertheless,during his first incarnation in the 1970s CAP was regarded as a nationalist and something of a galvanizing figure on the Third World circuit.From 1974 to 1979, during his first presidency, CAP nationalized U.S. oil companies and oversaw a program of massive social spending. Writing

to Kissinger in Washington, the U.S. ambassador in Caracas fretted that Venezuela now had "theeconomic strength and political leadership in president Pérez to make her will felt beyond her borders ."

Indeed, the diplomat added, "the energy crisis and president Carlos Andrés Pérez's electoral victory in December 1973 coincided and togetherhave changed Venezuela's perception of herself and her world role." Just like Chávez some 20 years later, CAP was "rapidly emerging as ahemisphere figure." Taking advantage of windfall oil prices, CAP had turned Venezuela into a large international donor of developmentassistance. Personally, the ambassador feared that CAP had grown too large for his britches as the youthful firebrand politician was fast becoming"a Latin American spokesman for the developing third world countries vis-a-vis the developed nations, especially the Unites States." Reading

through the Kissinger files, one is possessed with an incredible sense of déjà vu. Combing through paranoid U.S.

telegrams, it's easy to imagine that diplomats might have been referring not to CAP but to charismatic Hugo Chávez. Indeed, if anythingthe correspondence underscores just how hostile Washington has been to any nationalist politician

emerging in Venezuela , particularly if such a figure threatened U.S. priorities in the Caribbean.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nikolas-kozloff/maduro-elections-venezuela_b_3078387.html








Specifically, U.S. diplomats and anti-Castro exiles worried that CAP might use his newfounddiplomatic clout to edge closer to Fidel.

Congress and GOP backlash and media spin ensure perceived as appeasement, weak onsecurity and soft on Castro – also a flip flop -Robertson, 12Ewan Robertson, 4/11/12, Latin America Bureau analyst @ Venezuala Analysis, http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6916

As both countries head toward important presidential elections this year, the United States has been intensifying its interventionist pol icy

in Venezuela. However, US attempts to influence Venezuela ‘s domestic politics while casting it a ―rogue state‖ on aninternational level, is leaving the Obama administration increasingly out-of- sync with Latin America‘s new political reality. US Intervention in Venezuela Since theelection of President Hugo Chávez in 1998, US policy has aimed at removing the Venezuelan president from power and ending the Bolivarian Revolution which heleads. This policy has included support by the Bush presidency for the short-lived Apr il 2002 coup in Venezuela, which failed after mass protests returned Chávez to

power. Since then the US has focused on nurturing Venezuela‘s conservative opposition, channelling over US$100 million to gro ups opposed to Chávez since 2002.

Meanwhile Washington and US corporate mass media have attempted to de-legitimise his governmentinternationally in a propaganda campaign, portraying Venezuela as a threat to the US and its president as a ―dangerous dictator‖ who

has trampled upon democracy and human rights. Any hopes that the Obama administration would usher a new era of respect for Venezuelan sovereignty havelong been dashed, with intervention intensifying as Venezuela‘s October 7th presidential election draws closer and Chavez see ks his third term in office. In the last

twelve months the US government has imposed sanctions on Venezuela‘s state oil company PDVSA for trading with Iran,

expelled the Venezuelan consul in Miami based on a suspect documentary implicating the Venezuelan diplomat in plotting a cyber- attack against the US, and publicly criticised the appointment of Venezuela‘snew Defence Minister Henry Rangel Silva. While direct US actions have maintained a constant rhythm of

pressure against Venezuela , Washington‘s hopes of removing Chá vez from power undoubtedly lie in the possibilit y of the conservative DemocraticUnity Table (MUD) opposition coalition de feating Chávez in this year‘s presidential el ection. According to investigative jour nalist Eva Golinger, the US is providingthe opposition in Venezuela with political advice and financial support to the tune of US$20 million $20 million this year. This funding for anti-Chávez groups comesfrom the US national budget, State Department-linked agencies, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and USAID, along with the US Embassy in Caracas.A curious detail suggests that the US Embassy has become a key conduit for the dist ribution of this money. While the Embassy currently only maintains a ChargeD‘Affairs responsible for diplomatic oper ations, and overall staff levels remain unchanged, the Embassy budget jumped from almost $16 million in 2011 to over $24million for 2012, an unexplained increase of over $8 million. Washington has long worked to see the development of a united Venezuelan opposition capable ofdefeating Chávez. With the current MUD coalition disp laying relative unity behind opposition presidential candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski, and the s till popularChávez currently undergoing treatment for cancer, the US is likely h oping 2012 is the year to see an end to Chávez‘s administration. Indeed, the make -up ofVenezuela‘s opposition reads like a ―who‘s who‖ of figures who have received advice and financial support from US sources ove r the previous decade. Several ofthose who ran in the opposition‘s February primary elections to elect the MUD presidential candidate have ties with US financial aid, i ncluding the winner Radonski.His political party Primero Justicia has been a key recipient of funding and political tr aining since its founding in 1999, which has helped it to grow into a nationalforce. US funding has also followed fellow primaries candidate Leopoldo López throughout his political career, first in Primero Justicia, then in Un Nuevo Tiempo

from 2002, before receiving NED and USAID funding to support his own organisation Voluntad Popular. MUD Nat ional Assembly deputy and primaries candidateMaria Machado Corina has also received heavy US financial support, as well as holding a private meeting with George W Bush in 2004. Machado has recently beenappointed as a coordinator for Radonski‘s ―Tricolour Command‖ pres idential election campaign, while Leopoldo López is now a member of t he Radonski campaign‘sselect Political Strategic Command. The Polit ical Strategic Command is headed by experienced opposition figure Professor Ramón Guillermo Aveledo, who with hisclose political colleagues ―assists US sponsors in pouring money into the MUD,‖ according to analyst Nil Nikandrov. The impor tance of US funding in helping toshape the current Venezuelan opposition should not be underestimated. I ndeed, according to US Embassy cables released by Wikileaks, in 2009 US Embassy chargéd‘affaires John Caulfield argued for increased US funding of opposition groups, as ―without our continued assistance, it is possibl e that the organizations we helped

create ... could be forced to close...Our funding will provide those organizations a much- needed lifeline‖. Another aspect of Washington‘s approachto Venezuela moving into 2012 has been the increase of aggressive rhetoric designed to de-legitimise thegovernment and open the possibility of more direct intervention. At a special Organisation of American States (OAS) session held in Washington in March,

Democrat Congressman Eliot E ngel said Venezue lan democracy was being ―trampled ‖ by the Chávez

administration and advocated a ―robust‖ OAS mission be sent to the country to monitor the October presidential elections. Not to beoutdone by their Democratic counterparts, Republicans have continued to wind up the rhetorical

dial on Venezuela . In a presidential nomination debate i n Florida this January, Mitt Romney made a commitment to ―punishthose who are following ‖ Hugo Chávez and his ally Fidel Castro, ex-president of Cuba. He claims that Obama has

―failed to respond with resolve‖ to Chávez‘s growing international influence, arguing in his October 2011 foreign policy white paper foreign

policy white paper that he would ―chart a different course‖ in US policy toward Venezuela and other leftistgovernments in Latin America. Of course, US foreign policy has nothing to do with concern for democracy nor fabrications t hat Venezuela isinvolved in plotting an attack against the US.



Nationalized industries and trade ties ensure economic engagement can‘t avoi d backlash assoft on Venezuela regime, national security, Cuba and terrorismRobertson, 12Ewan Robertson, 4/11/12, Latin America Bureau analyst @ Venezuala Analysis, http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6916

Venezuela is one of the region‘s most vibrant democracies, witnessing a huge increase in political participation in the previ ous decade, both in internationally-

certified free and fair elections and i n new grassroots forms, such as the thousands o f communal councils which have sprung up around t he country. Figures inWashington routinely ignore the facts and the evidence regarding Venezuela , for example never mentioning the Chilean-

based Latinobarometro regional poll in which Venezuelan citizens regularly demonstrate they have one of the highest levels of support for democracy, and satisfaction

with how their democracy works in practice, in Latin America. Rather, the issue for policy makers in Washington is that since the arrival

of Chávez Venezuela has refused to play its designated role within US imperial strategy. That is, to offer a reliable supply of cheap oilcontrolled by US companies, to act as a market for US-based private foreign investment, and to conduct itself as a submissive all y in US diplomacy. It is the Chávez

administration‘s policies of national control over oil and using the resource to fund social p rogrammes, nationalisingstrategically important industries, and vocally opposing US foreign policy while pursuing regional integration on

principles contrary to ―free trade‖ that have made Venezuela a ―problem‖ for US foreign policy. The Regional Dynamic

One of the Chávez‘s administration‘s key regional integration initiatives is the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America

(ALBA), established by Cuba and Venezuela in 2004 as an alternative to US free trade agreements by

emphasising mutual solidarity and joint development between member states. The group now contains e ight members in Latin

America and the Caribbean. Venezuela has also reached out to the Caribbean with the Petrocaribe initiative, in which Venezuela sells oi l at preferential rates to

participating nations to support their development, with 18 Caribbean states now participating. The US has responded by trying to isolate

Venezuela and discredit the ALBA. Romney has described it as a ― virulently anti-American ‗Bolivarian‘ movementacross Latin America that seeks to undermine institutions of democratic governance and economic opportunity‖.

Meanwhile, Council of Foreign Relations analyst Joe Hirst rather fancifully tried to paint the organisation ‘s inclusion of

social movements as a mechanism for promoting international terrorism , using information from the long-discredited Farc laptops .

The US has also applied diplomatic pressure to discourage other states from strengthening ties withVenezuela. These have included using intimidation and diplo matic manoeuvres to try to prevent an alliance between Nicaragua and Venezuela after the 2006election of leftist Daniel Ort ega to the Nicaraguan presidency, and using threats and pressure against Haiti in 2006- 7 to scupper the Préval government‘s plan to j oinPetrocaribe. This strategy failed, with N icaragua joining the ALBA at Ortega‘s inauguration in early 2007 and the first Petro caribe oil shipment reaching Haiti i nMarch 2008.

Cuba fears drive US politics on Venezuela policy and opposition to the planKozloff, 13 (Nikolas, doctorate in Latin American history from Oxford University, author of Hugo Chavez: Oil,Politics and the Challenge to the U.S. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), Revolution! South America and the Rise of the

New Left (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), No Rain in the Amazon: How South America's Climate Change Affects theEntire Planet (Palgrave Macmilan, 2010), Huffington Post, 4/14, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nikolas-kozloff/maduro-elections-venezuela_b_3078387.html)

Ratcheting up Pressure on Cuba In May, 1974 the U.S. ambassador in Caracas confronted the Venezuelan

Foreign Minister with reports claiming that Venezuela sought to import sugar from Cuba . The ambassadorexplained that he would be "glad to explore ways and means of trying to find additional sugar for Venezuela from countries other than Cuba."Defiantly, CAP shot back that "he intended to go ahead with trade exchanges, including the sale of Venezuelan rice for Cuban sugar." Sure

enough, in early 1975 the U.S. Embassy noted that a Cuban vessel had loaded up on Venezuelan rice at a local port. Even moreseriously, the Americans fretted that CAP might be tempted to ship oil to Cuba in the event that OASsanctions were removed. Already, the Soviets were interested in decreasing Cuban dependence on oil transported from the USSR, and indeedPérez reportedly related in private that Moscow had "been pressing him" to ship oil to the Communist island nation. In late 1976, CAP followedup by traveling to the U.S.S.R. where he inked a deal to export oil to Cuba. On the diplomatic front meanwhile, CAP angered the Americans byresuming relations with Cuba. In Caracas, the Cubans opened a new embassy and staff reportedly included five known intelligence officers.

Cuban news agency Prensa Latina meanwhile expanded its activities greatly in Venezuela. In Washington , Kissinger grew alarmedthat Venezuela and other sympathetic nations might move to end the sanctions regime on Cuba , and the Secretarytherefore instructed his staff to delay any such vote at the OAS. Hardly deterred, CAP went ahead and organized an OAS conference in Quito in

November, 1974. However, when CAP failed to obtain the necessary votes, the Venezuelan took out his frustrations on the Americans, remarkingindignantly that Washington had bullied certain nations from either abstaining or voting against the OAS initiative. CAP Reacts to Posada Attack

Naively perhaps, CAP told U.S. diplomats that he was interested in becoming a kind of "bridge" between Washington and unfriendly Latingovernments. Privately, American officials wrote that Venezuela, a major oil supplier to the U.S., was "far too important to allow us to drift into







an adversary relationship." "If we choose openly to combat greater Latin American unity," the U.S. ambassador wrote, "the U.S. risks harming itshighly important interests in Venezuela and exacerbating its relations with the hemisphere." Whatever the feelings over at the State Department,

however, the CIA might have had other ideas in mind. Still smarting from CAP's betrayal, anti-Castro Cubans plotted

against the island nation. One such figure was Cuban-born Luis Posada Carriles, a longtime CIA asset . During the 1970s Posada

moved to Venezuela where he oversaw U.S. intelligence operations. He is thought to be responsible for the worst terrorist attack in thehemisphere at the time, a hit on Cubana flight 455 which departed Caracas en route to Cuba in October, 1976. After a brief stopover in Barbados,the plane exploded in midair, killing all 73 passengers aboard. Officially, Posada was no longer in the employ of the CIA at the time of the

bombing, having left the agency in July. There's no evidence that the CIA directly orchestrated the plot, though records show that Posada mayhave notified the agency in advance that was a bomb was set to go off. In Caracas meanwhile, the government began to suspect that the U.S. wasengaged in foul play. Dismissing Cuban claims of U.S. destabilization as propaganda, American diplomats assured the Venezuelans, ratherunconvincingly, that there was "no conspiracy underway to destabilize anything." Ironic Coda Though his administration was dogged byallegations of corruption, CAP still had enough credibility to run for a second term in office in 1988. Campaigning again with the AD on anationalist platform, CAP was elected to the presidency once more but promptly reversed course and adopted more pro-U.S. policies favorable tothe International Monetary Fund. In 1992, CAP faced down a military coup orchestrated by none other than Hugo Chávez and others. ThoughChávez was imprisoned, the paratrooper later ran successfully for president. In 1998, Chávez was democratically elected and split apart thecorrupt two party AD-COPEI system. Ironically, even though Chávez spent the better part of his career deploring CAP's excesses, the formermilitary officer carried out a very similar foreign policy predicated on opening up relations with Cuba and rhetorically challenging the U.S. Ifanything, Washington made things worse at this point by seeking to unseat Chávez, and drove Venezuela to pursue even closer links with Cuba.That, at least, is the impression one gets from reading yet another batch of sensitive U.S. correspondence released by WikiLeaks and known as"Cable-Gate." From CAP to Chávez Carrying on from CAP's earlier opening in the 1970s, Chávez opened up regular commercial and militaryflights between Cuba and Venezuela. In a further blow, Cuba extended its influence at Venezuelan ports. Perhaps even more seriously, Chávezwas apparently so taken with the Castro brothers that he consulted directly with Cuban intelligence officers without even bothering to vet thereporting through his own intelligence services. Even as diplomatic relations improved with Cuba, daily dealings with the U.S. Embassy in

Caracas took a complete nosedive, as I explain in a recent al-Jazeera column. WikiLeaks cables also illuminate a scheme which led to theexchange of discounted Venezuelan oil for Cuban assistance in the health sector. In an echo meanwhile of earlier press openings under CAP,Venezuela and Cuba now provide joint support for a hemispheric-wide news channel, Telesur. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly in light ofSunday's presidential election, the Americans suspected that Cuba provided key expertise to Chávez on how to expand Venezuela's nationalelectoral registry. It is a fitting irony that to this day, the Posada case continues to fester and, if anything, has only served to bring Cuba andVenezuela closer together. Indeed, both countries have sought to extradite Posada, who currently resides openly in Miami. During the recent

presidential campaign, Chávez heir Maduro even claimed that Posada was linked to a group of mercenaries who are intent on assassinating him.

Assessing Kissinger Files and Cable-Gate Looking back upon Washington's 40-year campaign to roll back an

incipient Cuban-Venezuelan alliance , one is struck by a sense of profound political and diplomatic waste,not to mention the State Department's skewed moral compass. From the Kissinger files to Cable-Gate, America's counter-productive campaignonly served to inflame public opinion and, if anything, made Venezuela even more nationalistic by the time of Chávez's arrival on the scene in the

1990s. If Maduro wins on Sunday, as expected, Chávez's heir apparent will probably deepen Cuba ties even further, thusdemonstrating once again the complete and utter bankruptcy of U.S. foreign policy.



2NC XT: Laundry List

Our GOP, Appeasement, Cuba Lobby, Committee and Rubio LinksMazzei, 12Patricia, and Erika Bolstad, Miami Herald, 7/11/12, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/07/11/v-fullstory/2891728/republicans-attack-obama-for-chavez.html

Mitt Romney, GOP howl over President Barack Obama‘s remark about Hugo Chávez Republicans criticize President

Obama for saying Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has not threatened U.S. national security. The

region‘s experts, however, side with Ob ama. Republicans, led by Mitt Romney and Florida Sen. Marco Rubio, pounced

on President Barack Obama on Wednesday after he told a Miami TV anchor that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez

does not pose a ―serious‖ national security threat to the United States. Republicans wasted no time infiring up a key South Florida constituency coveted by both Romney and Obama: Cuban-Americanvoters who hate Chávez for his close ties to the Castro regime in Cuba . ―PresidentObama hasn‘t been

paying attention if he thinks that Hugo Chávez, with buddies like the regimes in Cuba, Iran, andSyria, drug cartels, arms traffickers, and extremist groups, is not a threat to the U nited States,‖ saidRep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Miami, chair woman of the House Foreign Affairs committee and co- chair of Romney‘s

National Hispanic Steering Committee. ― I am deeply disappointed that this administration continues to bury itshead in the sand about threats to U.S. security , our interests, and our allies.‖ Rubio said Obama ―has been

living under a rock ‖ when it comes to Chávez, and said the president ―continues to display an alarminglynaïve understanding of the challenges and opportunities we face in the western hemisphere.‖Other Cuban-American lawmakers issued statements in the same critical vein , and Senate candidate Connie Mack, a

Republican congressman from Fort Myers, tied his opponent Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., to the president‘sremarks. Experts in the region, though, called Obama‘s comments reasonable. Chávez is ―certifiable,‖ with a tremendous ego fueled by t he

power that comes from sitting on vast oil reserves — but he‘s not as dangerous as the leaders of other less friendly regimes, sa id Riordan Roett,

the director of Latin American Studies Program at the School of Advanced International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University.TheRepublican criticism is ―just pure electoral politics, ‖ Roett said. ―He poses no security threat to the Un ited States or anyone

else,‖ Roett said. ―Hugo Chávez is not going to attack us, he‘s not going to occupy our embassy, he‘s not going to bomb U.S. planes arriving inCaracas at Maiquetía Airport. He is a loudmouth who enjoys listening to himself, and has built up on the basis of oil revenue, a very, very

populist, dependent regime that can‘t deliver on basic services, on goods and commodities to his own people.‖ Here‘s what Oba ma told OscarHaza, a Spanish-language broadcast journalist and anchor in an interview with Obama that aired Tuesday night on A Mano Limpia (whichroughly translates to ―The Gloves Are Off‖), Haza‘s nightly show on WJAN -Channel 41: ―We‘re always concerned about Iran engaging indestabilizing activity around the globe,‖ Obama said. ―But overall my sense is that what Mr. Chávez has done over the last several years has nothad a serious national security impact on us. We have to be vigilant. My main concern when it comes to Venezuela is having the Venezuelan

people have a voice in their af fairs, and that you end up ultimately having fair and free elections, which we don‘t always see.‖ Romneycalled Obama‘s comment ―stunning and shocking‖ and said i n statement it‘s a sign of ―a pattern of

weakness‖ in the president‘s foreign policy . ―It is disturbing to see him downplaying the threat posed to U.S. interests by a regime that openly wishes us ill,‖ Romney said . ―Hugo Chávez has providedsafe haven to drug kingpins, encouraged regional terrorist organizations that threaten our allies like Colombia, has strengthened military ties with

Iran and helped it evade sanctions, and has allowed a Hezbollah presence within his country‘s borders.‖ White House press sec retary Jay Carneydeclined to answer questions about the president‘s remarks. The president‘s campaign spokesman, Ben LaBolt, said Romney is only ―playing intothe hands of Chávez‖ and his ―outdated rhetoric‖ by giving him any attention. ―Because of President Obama‘s leadership, our p osition in theAmericas is much stronger today than before he took office,‖ LaBolt said. ―At the same time, Hugo Chávez has become increasinglymarginalized and his influence has waned. It‘s baffling that Mitt Romney is so scared of a leader like Chávez whose power is fading, while

Romney continues to remain silent about how to confront al- Qaeda or how to bring our troops home from Afghanistan.‖ Michael Shifter, president of the Washington D.C.-based think tank Inter- American Dialogue, cautioned that it‘s up to the president to judge in an election year whether it‘s politically smart to talk about Chávez in a way that draws

http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/07/11/v-fullstory/2891728/republicans-attack-obama-for-chavez.html






such heated Republican response in South Florida — especially considering how valuable the swing state‘s votes are to Obama‘s prospects.



2NC XT: Israel Lobby

Triggers intense opposition from both Israel and Cuba lobbies and their CongressionalalliesMadsen, 11Wayne Madsen, Investigative journalist, author and syndicated columnist. Has some twenty years experience in security issues.As a U.S. Naval Officer, he managed one of the first computer security programs for the U.S. Navy. He has been a frequent

political and national security commentator on ABC, NBC, CBS, PBS, CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, and MS-NBC. He has beeninvited to testify as a witness before the US House of Representatives, the UN Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and an terrorisminvestigation panel of the French government. A member of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) and the National PressClub., 6/20/11, http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2011/06/20/the-outsourcing-of-influence-peddling-to-the-israeli-lobby.html

The confluence of the Israel Lobby with pressure groups such as those that support t he Saakashvili regime in Georgia is notan isolated situation . Before the rise to power of t he Justice and Development Party (AK P arty) of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey,Israel could rely on the support of successive Turkish governments. Turkey, in turn, established its own Washington-based lobbying group, the American TurkishCouncil, which was modeled on the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). It was recently learned from Turkish government officials in Washingtonthat the secret network of Turkish military officers, politicians, intelligence officers, professors, and journalists known a s ―Ergenekon,‖ which plotted a series of coups

against independent-minded Turkish governments, was a construct of t he CIA and Mossad. An in-depth investigation of the Ergenekon network conducted by theTurkish intelligence service discovered that many of the key players in Ergenekon were Dönme, t he descendants of Turkish Jews who converted to Is lam and, tovarying degrees, now practice a combination of Kabbalah Judaism and Is lamic Sufism while remaining secular and Turkish nationalist in the mold of Turkish state

founder Kemal Ataturk. Similarly, the Israel Lobby has made common cause with the right-wing Cuban exilecommunity in Florida, which has become as influential in the politics of south Florida as themany Jews and Israelis who live there. The convergence of interests of pro-Israelis and Cuban

Gusano exiles can best be seen in the current chair of the House Foreign Relations Committee,Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen , who represents a congressional district in south Florida. Ros-Lehtinen , who is of CubanJewish descent, is one of AIPAC‘s and the ADL‘s best friends in Congress . She is also a vociferous

opponent of the governments of Venezuela and Nicaragua, both of which have severed diplomatic relationswith Israel and have recognized the independence of Abkhazia, to the dismay of Israel, AIPAC , and the ADL. While Ros-

Lehtinen rattles sabers against Venezuela , Nicaragua, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and other LatinAmerican nations that have recognized Palestine within i ts 1967 borders, she supports continued U.S. military assistance to Colombia, Honduras, Costa

Rica, and Panama, Israel‘s last four remaining allies in Latin America. Ros -Lehtinen, while decrying alleged human rights ―abuses‖ inVenezuela and Nicaragua, is silent on actual abuses in Colombia, where Israel is routinely supply weapons and advisers to the government in its inhumane warwith the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), peasants, and labor unionists. The trial in New York of Russian air cargo services owner Viktor Bout forallegedly trying to sell weapons to the FARC is one outcome of the strategic alliance between Israel, its U.S. Lobby, and the right-wing Latin American exiles andintelligence operatives who call Miami t heir home. The conviction and imprisonment of for mer Yukos owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky, considered a major agent-of-

influence for Israel in Russia and a one-time potential President of Russ ia, has placed Russia in the same category as Venezuela , Nicaragua, Abkhazia, Turkey,

and other nations that have incurred the ire of the Israel Lobby either directly or via outsourcing deals made

with strategic allies such as the Georgians, Cuban exiles , or, now, in the case of Turkey, the Armenians. In the past, AIPAC always ensured that

―Armenian genocide‖ resolutions failed in the U.S. Congress, a payback for Turkey‘s support for Israel. With Turkey adopting an independent foreign policy, A IPACand the ADL are now strategically allied with the Armenian lobby to push for Armenian genocide resolutions in Washington and elsewhere.

Triggers Israel lobby and congressional backlash to economic involvement in venezuelaCole, 12Juan, Richard P. Mitchell Professor of History and the director of the Center for South AsianStudies at the University of Michigan, 1/11,http://www.guernicamag.com/daily/juan_cole_ahmadinejad_in_latin/

http://www.guernicamag.com/daily/juan_cole_ahmadinejad_in_latin/





Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has begun a four-nation tour in Latin America that will include Nicaragua,

Cuba, Venezuela and Ecuador. In part, the trip is for propaganda purposes. With the European Union joining in an Israeli-inspired U.S. boycott of Iran‘s Central Bank, which in essence translates into a boycott of buying Iranian petroleum, Tehran is despe rate to underline that it still

has friends in the world. Most of these are in Asia, but Latin America still does have regimes that will defy the U.S. attemptto isolate Iran . In one sense, these are not important countries geopolitically or economically. But an embargo strategy of the sort

that the U.S. is pursuing depends heavily on there being no significant leaks . Venezuela has $4 billion

worth of joint projects with Iran . (This article stresses a military dimension, with Revolutionary guards posted to the Iranian embassyin Caracas and a comparison to Soviet policies in Latin America, which led to the Cuban missile crisis. I see these Iranian moves more as an aid

to espionage than being military in character.) Venezuela is also significant because in 2009 it established a joint bank with Iran, which allows Iranian financial institutions to interface with other banks via Caracas.

Some in the Israel lobbies in the U.S. Congress have urged financial sanctions on Venezuela in order to close thisloophole. But that step would make it difficult for the U.S. to pay for Venezuelan petroleum, a significant source of America ‘s oil imports. As itis, the U.S. Government won‘t accept c ontracts from the Venezuela state petroleum company because the latter helps Iran with gasoline

production. I doubt the U.S. government itself did much business with the company so it sounds to me like another symbolic sanction. I doubt

Brasilia much likes the idea of a U.S.-Europe financial and energy boycott of a country of the global South. T he U.S. just expelledthe Venezuelan consul in Miami over a Univision investigative report alleging a Cuban-Venezuelan-Iranian plotto hack U.S. nuclear facilities. (Note to the Cuba and Israel lobbies: This story is not very plausible and you wouldn‘t want one of its members to

be in the U.S. — hackers can be anywhere and like anonymity.)

Jew Hating is explicit Venezuela policy – sparks lobby demands for isolationSamuels, 10Shimon Samuels is Director for International Relations of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre, which holds consultativestatus at the Organisation of American States and the Latin American Parliament, 3/25/10,http://www.thejc.com/news/world-news/29926/analysis-in-venezuela-antisemitism-state-policy

A new report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has criticised the Venezuelangovernment for encroaching on the civil and political rights of its people, and particularly those of itsJewish community. The report expressed particular concern about the rising number of antisemitic incidents,and noted that the government-controlled media "contributed to creating an atmosphere of intimidationand violence against the Jewish community in Venezuela". This is cause for serious alarm . However,

it is hardly surprising . Since Hugo Chavez took power, antisemitic expression has grown exponentially: ingovernment media ; in the dissemination of the Protocols of Zion; in the accusation that "Semitic banks" are sabotaging the economy; inthe fact that the Caracas Jewish school was raided twice by armed forces "searching for Mossad-supplied arms caches"; in the desecration of twosynagogues; and in the closing of the Israeli Embassy. The Venezuelan ambassador to Moscow even alleged that Jewish citizens implicated in a2002 anti-Chavez coup were "Mossad agents". The origins of Mr Chavez's attitude can be traced to the influence wielded over him by hisArgentine, pro-Nazi, Holocaust-denying school companion, the late Norberto Ceresole, who - in his 1998 book on Mr Chavez's election victory -warned of the Venezuelan "Jewish mafia". In a 2004 Christmas Eve message, Mr Chavez claimed that "the descendants of those who crucifiedChrist, the descendants of those who expelled Bolivar and crucified him in their own way… took possession of the riches of th e world. Aminority appropriated the world's gold, the silver, the minerals, the water, the good lands, the oil and has concentrated the riches in a fewhands…" Here he was mixing the motifs of the Jews as Christ -killers and of Marxism. The next year, Mr Chavez compared the Spanish conquestof the Indians to the situation of the Palestinians and, a year after that, tolerated the appearance of "Hizbollah Venezuela", an indigenous Wayuu

Indian tribe that has embraced Shiah Islam and is essentially a jihadi transplant into the region. Much, too, has been made of the burgeoning Venezuela-Iran strategic alliance. This is primarily anti-American, but itsantisemitic/anti-Zionist quotient is an added binding factor. A weekly Caracas-Tehran flight was inaugurated in

November 2004 by Mr Chavez, who arrived in Iran at the very moment his Special Forces raided the Caracas Jewish School. Mr Chavez isundoubtedly obsessed with a world Jewish conspiracy represented by the less than 12,000 Jews remaining in Venezuela. They are

becoming the scapegoat for his dysfunctional administration and the economic crisis that is engulfing a country blessed with oil,

coffee and sugar. One third of the Jewish community has fled, fearing Soviet-style state antisemitism . Indeed ,such a policy has all the appearances of having already begun. A pro-Chavez television show named VenezuelanJewish leaders as anti-Venezuelan conspirators, and called on other Jews "not involved in the conspiracy" to publicly denounce theircoreligionists. A Chavista newspaper editorial questioned whether "we will ha ve to expel them from our country… as other nations have done."The Wiesenthal Centre's 2009 appeal to the Organisation of American States to conduct an enquiry into Venezuelan government – inspired

antisemitism has resulted in its associated Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report. Within this catalogue of

http://www.thejc.com/news/world-news/29926/analysis-in-venezuela-antisemitism-state-policy

http://www.thejc.com/news/world-news/29926/analysis-in-venezuela-antisemitism-state-policy



Caracas's violations of fundamental rights, it unambiguously documents the government'sincitement to Jew-hatred as a policy of state . For as long as this autocratic regime strategically endangersthe Western hemisphere and targets the classic scapegoat, pro-democracy activists will surely

lobby for its isolation from the international community.



Case



Terror



1NC

Venezuela doesn‘t sponsor dangerous Hezbollah activity – that‘s a myth. Tegel ‗13 Simeon Tegel is a British journalist based in Peru and is GlobalPost's senior correspondent for South America. He writes about a broad range of

themes across Latin America – ―American conservatives warn of militant Islam's spread in Latin America. But their claims are hard to prove‖ – Salon.com – Jan 8, 2013 – http://www.salon.com/2013/01/08/is_venezuela_harboring_hezbollah/

American conservatives warn of militant Islam's spread in Latin America . But their claims arehard to prove Is Venezuela providing operational support to Islamic terrorists? That deadly seriousquestion is increasingly troubling foreign policy and security experts as the South American country and Iran — which funds Hezbollah — moveever closer. Despite deep cultural differences, a shared antagonism toward the US has drawn Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his Iraniancounterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, into an unlikely political friendship in recent years. ―Iran is an example of struggle, resistance, dignity,revolution, strong faith,‖ Chavez said during one early visit to Tehran. ―We are two powerful countries. Iran is a power and Venezuela is

becoming one. We want to create a bipolar world. We don‘t want a single power [i.e., the US].‖ Beyond the rhetoric lies a strategic alliance thathas seen Caracas, along with Damascus and Havana, vote against United Nations sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, and increasing

Iranian investment in the Venezuelan economy, now worth more than $5 billion. All of that is very public. But, according to critics such

as veteran US Republican Latin Americanist Roger Noriega, Venezuela is also providing operational support toHezbollah , the Lebanese-based organization classified as terrorist by the US, UK and other allies. It even came up in November‘s US

elections, with the Republicans claiming in their official online party platform: ―Venezuela has become a narco -terrorist state, turning it into anIranian outp ost in the Western hemisphere.‖ ―The current regime issues Venezuelan passports or visas to thousands of Middle Eastern terrorists

offering safe haven to Hezbollah trainers, operatives, recruiters and fundraisers.‖ The GOP did not respond to GlobalPost ‘s requests for

comment. But its claim was questioned — and even ridiculed — by several security experts in Israel and

South America contacted by GlobalPost. ―That is exaggerated . Generally, this kind of activity [terrorism] isconducted by small units. It is political rhetoric, ‖ said Ely Karmon, one of Israel‘s top independent counter -terrorism

experts. Nicholas Watson, a senior analyst at British firm Control Risks, who specializes in South America, agreed, describing itas ―unhelpful.‖ He added: ―That kind of rhetoric , the blatant accusations, doesn‘t help the US‘ position in theregion . It actually plays into Chavez‘s hands and strengthens him within Venezuela.‖ That Hezbollah has been active in Latin America ishardly news. Argentine investigators have linked the group to two deadly bombings in Buenos Aires in the 1990s. Together, the attacks on theIsraeli Embassy and a Jewish cultural center killed 114 people. One of five Iranians wanted by Interpol over the second bombing, Ahmad Vahidi,is now Iran‘s defense minister. Last year, he had to make a rapid departure during a state visit to Bolivia when Argentine prosecutors requestedBolivian police arrest him. Meanwhile, according to the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a Washington, DC, nonpr ofit research group, there‘sgrowing evidence that Hezbollah is infiltrating other parts of Latin America, taking advantage of widespread corruption and drug trafficking toraise funds for its activities in the Middle East. The Buenos Aires attacks took place years before Chavez, now cancer-stricken but recently re-elected, came to power in Venezuela. He was even in jail, awaiting trial for his role in a failed coup, at the time of the first bombing, on the Israeliembassy. Nevertheless, a jigsaw of data, put together by everyone from Karmon to Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau, paints adisturbing picture of apparent bilateral cooperation in areas such as Iran‘s outlawed nuclear ambitions and the Venezuelan military‘s adoption ofTehran‘s defense doctrine of ―asymmetrical‖ warfare; in other words, guerrilla resistance to a potential US invasion. Now canceled, there wasalso a secretive weekly flight from Caracas to Tehran, with a stopover in Damascus, operated jointly by Iran Air and Conviasa, the state airlinesin Iran and Venezuela respectively. Karmon and others say the passengers did not pass through customs. Meanwhile, Venezuela‘s Lebanese -

born Interior Minister Tareck El Aissami — who was previously in charge of the country‘s passpor t office, fueling the Republican claim of papers being given to Islamic terrorists — makes no secret of his sympathies. ―I‘m also the son of Arabs, I‘m Palestinian, I‘m Iraqi, and todaywe are the resistance force,‖ he said at a 2009 event in support of Palestinians in Gaza. ―There are Hezbollah supporters in the Venezuelangovernment. They have been neither investigated nor fired. They have been kept in their jobs,‖ said Roman D. Ortiz, director of Bogota-basedsecurity consultancy Decisive Point. But does that translate into the Chavez government arming or providing training facilities or other logistical

support to Hezbollah? ―The existence of a Lebanese community [in Venezuela] plus a left-wing populist

government plus the anti-American rhetoric does not equal terrorism ,‖ says Control Risks‘ Watson. ― That

is speculation .‖

The status quo is no longer threatening — sponsoring terrorism was a Chávez-led doctrine — that dies out with MaduroGhitis 13 — independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor (FridaGhitis, World Politics Review , 01-10- 13, ―World Citizen: Will Venezuela -Iran Links Survive Chávez?‖,http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12615/world-citizen-will-venezuela-iran-links-survive-chavez, Accessed 06-30-2013 | AK)

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12615/world-citizen-will-venezuela-iran-links-survive-chavez

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12615/world-citizen-will-venezuela-iran-links-survive-chavez



During almost 14 years in o ffice, Chávez made anti-Americanism the cornerstone of his foreign policy, working at

every step to antagonize U.S. goals and undermine Washington‘s influence . Perhaps the greatest irritant ofall was the close relationship he forged with Iran , a country the U.S. and its allies believe is trying to develop nuclear weapons and sponsoring

international terrorism. As the U.S. spearheaded efforts to pass United Nations sanctions to stop Iran‘s nuclear enrichment, Chávez traveled to Tehran and , along

with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, provocatively announced the creation of what they called an ―Axis of

Unity‖ against the U.S. The two countries work tog ether in a number of areas. Of particular interest to t he U.S. is Venezuela‘s help to Iran in circu mventing internationalsanctions. The question for Washington now is how to maximize the chances that once Chávez leaves the scene, theties linking Caracas and Tehran , more than 7,000 miles away, will fade . Just before the end o f the year, President Barack Obama signedinto law the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act, which instructs the StateDepartment to develop a strategy to ―address Iran‘s growing hostile presence and activity‖ inLatin America , and directs the Department of Homeland Security to take measures to protect U.S. b orders with Mexico and Canada to keep o ut ―operatives from Iran . . . Hezbollah

or any other terrorist organizations.‖ For Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah, Chávez‘s worsening condition could not come at a worse

time . Their closest and most crucial ally, Syrian President Bashar al- Assad, is engulfed in a brutal civil war, likely to put an end to his regime and possibly destroy Syria‘s ties with Iran and

Hezbollah. The headwinds they face in Latin America recently came up in a speech by none other t han Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Speaking a couple of da ys after the start of the year, Nasrallah said 2013 would bring a ―very dangerous phase‖ for his organization, citing efforts to add the group to the European Union‘s terrorist list and to restrict i ts movements in Latin America

as specific challenges. Before traveling to Cuba for his most recent cancer surgery, Chávez dramatically acknowledged he may not be ableto remain in power and anointed Vice President Nicolas Maduro as his chosen successor . Washington has already taken t entativesteps, seeking to reach out t o Maduro -- as has Tehran. It is not exactly clear what the American strategy is, but there is no indication that the first moves were ef fective or well-received. The U.S.said that a telephone conversation between Maduro and a top State Department official, Roberta Jacobson, was aimed at improving relations, and there have been report s of other bilateralcontacts. However, Maduro lashed out at reports t hat relations with Washington would impro ve after Chávez dies, calling it a distortion and manipulation by Washingto n. At about the same time,Iranian media reported a telephone call between Maduro and Ahmadinejad. The t wo are already friends. Maduro has strong connect ions with Tehran, having met in person with top officials onmany occasions during visits t o Iran and having served as their host when they traveled to Venezuela. Maduro is a favorite to succeed Chávez in both Tehran and Havana, not to mention Caracas.The Venezuelan constitution says if the president dies or cannot take office, the head of the National Assembly would take power temporarily. That position is held by another Chávez loyalist,Diosdado Cabello. After 30 days, a new election would take place. Cabello and Maduro are just two of several Chávez supporters who would vie for power in the factional po wer struggles tosucceed the iconic president. Chávez‘s unqualified blessing means that for now Maduro is the count ry‘s most powerful man. He would benefit from an initial surge of support. And there is noquestion he and the Chavista forces have a firm grip on all the institutions of power. Chávez‘s entrenched United Socialist P arty of Venezuela (PSUV) will not crumble without its leader. And

yet, there is no denying that Chavismo thrived because of Chávez . There is no guarantee it will survivewithout him in the long term , especially in the face of daunting economic problems, beginning with a budget deficit that stands at an astonishing 20 percent of GDP.For Washington, this means that forging ties with Maduro risks strengthening him against his rivals, helping him quash internal rivals and legitimize his rule at a time when it is unclear just howclosely he and other Chavistas plan to follow the constitution. Infighting within th e ruling party‘s ranks, and the lack of a candidate with strong perso nal appeal, could open the way for theopposition. Opposition leader Henrique Capriles, who mounted a strong campaign against Chávez in last October‘s presidential election, is on record saying he would bring a dramatic change inforeign policy, ending arms purchases from Russia, pu lling away from China, reviewing oil deals that strengthen other authoritarian regimes in Latin America -- and rethinking contro versial linkswith Iran. Washington would do well to keep conversations at the lowest possible volume, whether with the opposition or other would-be Chávez successors, while openly urging Venezuela toabide by democratic norms. If, in the event Chávez is unable to serve his t erm for whatever reason, a fair contest is allowed and enough time passes to loo sen the emotional power of grief, the

Venezuelan people may wake up to the dis mal state of their economy, and discover there are bett er ways to decrease poverty and build lasting prosperity than Chavismo. A closerelationship between Iran and Venezuela has always been a geographic and diplomatic oddity,one made possible only because of Chávez ‘s own worldview . Chávez‘s immediate successor willseek to maintain it, but the intensity and impact will be difficult to preserve for long in a post-Chávez

Venezuela .

Hezbollah not a threat to the US and Noriega is wrong.Willans ‗13 Pierce Willans is currently pursuing a degree in political science at Seton Hall University – ―Venezuela News: Hezbollah is in Venezuela, ButThere's No Threat to U.S. Security‖ – Policymic – March – http://www.policymic.com/articles/29303/venezuela-news-hezbollah-is-in-venezuela-

but-there-s-no-threat-to-u-s-security

Is Hezbollah in Venezuela? Probably. A more interesting question is: Does it matter , and if so, how much ? American

foreign policy hawks have been sounding the alarm on this for years , claiming Hezbollah‘s

activities in South America, which they often refer to as "America‘s backyard," are a threat to national security. The U.S. StateDepartment labels Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and Iranian proxy. The origins of Hezbollah are murky, but it first emerged as a force inthe early 1980s, in reaction to Israel‘s occupation of Southern Lebanon. Dur ing this period, the group quickly gained infamy in the United Stateswhen it blew up the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing over 200 Marines, only months after it had blown up the U.S. Embassy there. That

being said, attacks on American targets have been the exception, rather than the rule. Throughout its history,

the majority of Hezbollah‘s energies have been directed towards Israel. In the decades since its creation,Hezbollah has evolved and expanded its activities, operating as a political party in Lebanon while simultaneously maintaining its separatecriminal and military activities. Sometime in the 1980s they are believed to have established a foothold in South America, probably to raise fundsfrom the large Lebanese community there. It has been established that the group is engaged in narcotrafficking and money laundering, no doubtspurred in part by Iran‘s declining support due to the crushing international sanctions against it. Though their activities i n Latin America appearto be primarily a imed at raising money, fears of Hezbollah‘s capacity for violence in the region are not without basis; Hezbollah is widely bl amed



for bombing the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and then again that city‘s Jewish Community Center in the early 90s, killing over 100 people.

The fears of a Venezuelan-Hezbollah axis seem to be spurred in large part by the highly visible personal friendship between the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This unlikely alliance between two men ofsuch different cultural backgrounds appears to be a product of their respective governments‘ isolation and shared antagonism towards the UnitedStates. In the UN, Venezuela has voted against international sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program. Iran has billions of dollars invested in

Venezuela. There is, however, nothing particularly treacherous about that. The claims of a more sinister relationship have been most prominently voiced by Roger Noriega. Mr. Noriega is currently a visiting fellow at conservativethink tank the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Noriega is no stranger to murky Iran-LatinAmerican intrigue ; while at the U.S. Agency for International Development, he was implicated in the Iran-Contra Scandal during theReagan administration. He subsequently served in high-level diplomatic posts under President George W. Bush, including as Ambassador to theOrganization of American States, where he supported the abortive coup against Hugo Chavez in 2002. More recently, he has publicly accusedVenezuela of having a secret nuclear program. In his July 2011 testimony before Congress, Mr. Noriega further stoked the fires by claiming thatVenezuela actually supports Hezbollah and allows it and drug cartel members to operate in its territory, though he offered no proof. He also

hinted darkly that the federal government knows more than it is willing to say publicly on the subject. Noriega clearly knows howto get attention in Washington, but that is not the same as offering well-informed advice . In this post-9/11 foreign

policy environment, his efforts seem to be aimed at reinforcing conservatives‘ penchant for conflating agroup‘s stated anti -American sentiments with an unstated intention to actually do us harm . In manyways, Hezbollah ‘s activities in Latin America are similar to those of other drug cartels, which are rightly viewed as a problem. But their a ctiviesare a law enforcement problem, and needs to be confronted without the hysteria that seems to accompany any statement containing "Hezbollah"and "America‘s backyard" in the same breath.

Iran prolif not inevitable – prefer expert reporters.Hibbs ‗13 (Mark Hibbs is a former journalist who has been covering nuclear proliferation issues for more than 30 years. In 2006, The Atlantic's WilliamLangewiesche wrote that Hibbs "must rank as one of the greatest reporters at work in the world today." Hibbs is now a Bonn-based seniorassociate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – This article is an interview of Hobbs by The Atlantic – ―Is a Nuclear IranInevitable ?‖ – The Atlantic – April 12 th – http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/is-a-nuclear-iran-inevitable/274924/)

You mention that there are countries like Iran that don't necessarily pursue the path to the bomb in terms of months or years -- they pursue it in

terms of slow progress that reaches a kind of momentum where it's almost irreversible. Do you think that we've reached the point with Iran where they've slowly built their capability to the point that it's inevitable that they get the bomb ,

unless there's something major like war, an attack or some sort of internal social breakdown that prevents them from getting there? ¶ No, I

don't believe that . I think that most analysts would conclude that between the period of around the middle of the 1980s and today,there have been forces in Iran that have led certain people in the decision-making structure to try to have a nuclearweapons capability . There are probably others in the system who didn't want that. Iran is by nomeans a monolithic country. ¶ ...Iran right now has a decision to make. It has acquired considerable nuclear capability which have

brought them very far along down a path towards obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. There's no question about that in my mind. But right

now it's up to Iran to decide whether it's going to draw a red line there, or whether it's going to cross it. And I think there'sno consensus right now about which direction Iran's going to move in.

US won‘t respond with nuclear lash-out.Washington Post ‗7 (Thursday, August 2, 2007 – ―Obama says no nuclear weapons to fight terror‖ – http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/02/AR2007080201375_pf.html)

Presidential hopeful Barack Obama said Thursday he would not use nuclear weapons "in any circumstance" tofight terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawing criticism from Hillary Rodham Clinton and other Democratic rivals." I think it would bea profound mistake for us to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance ," Obama said, with a pause, "involving

civilians." Then he quickly added, "Let me scratch that. There's been no discussion of nuclear weapons. That's not on thetable."

No nuclear terrorism – tech barriers.



Chapman ‗12 (Stephen, editorial wr iter for Chicago Tribune, ―CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,‖ May 22, http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman -87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)A layperson may figure it‘s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard‘s Graham Allison, in his book ―NuclearTerrorism,‖ concludes, ―On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.‖ But remember: After Sept. 11 , 2001, we all thoughtmore attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike.Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it‘sreasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious . Far from being plausible, arguedOhio State University profe ssor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, ― the likelihood that a terrorist groupwill come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small .‖ The events required to make that happencomprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material , perhapsfrom Russia‘s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing . Besides, thosedevices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls ―radioactivescrap metal .‖ If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codesand other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to anally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp . Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individualsinside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes t he task of building a bomb. It‘s notsomething you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, asafe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to diefor the cause . Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas , they would have to deliver the weapon onto American

soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure orextortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who knowwhat‘s going on , multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up . That has heartening implications. Ifal-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probablywon‘t bother . None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terroristcommunications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is onethat will never happen.

Terrorist will use Conventional Weapons instead.Hashmi ‗12 (Muhammad, author of ―Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Myth of Reality,‖ and expert in defense and strategic studies, ―Difficulties For TerroristsTo Fabricate Nuclear RDD/IND Weapons – Analysis,‖ Jan 30, http://www.eurasiareview.com/30012012 -difficulties-for-terrorists-to-fabricate-nuclear-rddind-weapons-analysis/) Many believe that these threats of nuclear terrorism are inflated and have been overstated because technicalhurdles still prevent terrorists from acquiring or building a nuclear device. Brain McNair argues that the threats ofnuclear terrorism have been exaggerated by the world. As the matter stands today, the possibility of nuclear terrorism remains more a fantasy thanfact. Furthermore, Shireen Mazari argues that Nuclear weapons would not be a weapon of choice for terrorists. Instead, sheclaims that ―terrorists already have access to enough destructive capabilities with in conventional means, so theirneed for nuclear weapons is simply not there .‖ Analysts have endorsed the assessment that the threat ofnuclear action by terrorists appears to be exaggerated . Similarly, religious cults and left-wing terrorists with their beliefsof certain prohibitions against mass murder are less likely by many estimates to use WMDs in a terroristactivity , even though there is not any guarantee that terrorists will use WMDs. It has also been witnessed that no terrorist group is known tohave developed or deployed a nuclear explosive device, and the severity of the threat of nuclear terrorism remains disputed amongst internationalscholars. So it becomes too early to conclude that how grave the threats of nuclear terrorism are. James kitfield concludes in an interview fromsecurity expert that: Seven years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, experts and presidential candidates continue to put nuclearterrorism atop their lists of the gravest threats to the United States. Yet Brian Michael Jenkins, a longtime terrorism expert with the Rand Corp.,says that the threat lies more in the realms of Hollywood dramas and terrorist dreams than in reality. There hasnever been an act of nuclear terrorism, he notes, yet the threat is so potentially catastrophic that it incites fear — and that fear fulfills

a terrorist‘s primary goal. In nutshell, we can say that it takes much more than knowledge of the workings of nuclearweapons and access to fissile material to successfully manufacture a usable weapon. Current safety andsecurity systems help ensure that the successful use of a stolen weapon would be very unlikely . Meaning, itremains, thankfully, an incredibly challenging task for terrorists to practice their idea in a successful way to meet their objectives.

No impact to Iranian proliferation — their evidence reflects a fundamentalmisunderstanding of IRWaltz 12 — Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies (Kenneth N. Waltz,Council on Foreign Relations, July/August 2012, ―Why Iran Should Get the Bomb‖,



http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/pt- br/file/CAD/LXII%20CAD/Pol%C3%ADtica/Why%20Iran%20Should%20Get%20the%20Bomb.pdf, Accessed 07-04-2013 | AK)

The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As t he argument has raged, the United States hastightened its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the

United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table, a palpable sense of crisis still looms . It should not . Most U.S.,

European, and Israeli commentators and policymakers warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be the worst possibleoutcome of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely torestore stability to the Middle East . POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED The crisis over Iran's nuclear pro gram could end in three different ways. First,diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent onacquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so . Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexor ably derail its nuclear program. Take North Korea, whichsucceeded in building its weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons,sanctions are unlikely to change its mind. In fact, adding st ill more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of t he ultimatedeterrent. The second possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly. Iran would not bethe first country to acquire a sophisticated nuclear program without building an actual bomb. Japan, for instance, maintains a vast civilian nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe that it could

produce a nuclear weapon on short notice. Such a breakout capability might satisfy the domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hardliners that they can enjoy all the benefits of havinga bomb (such as greater security) without t he downsides (such as international isolation and condemnation). The problem is that a breakout capability might not work as intended. The UnitedStates and its European allies are pr imarily concerned with weaponization, so they might accept a scenario in which Iran stop s short of a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has made it clear that itviews a significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an u nacceptable threat. It is possible, then, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon could appease major Western

powers but leave the Israelis unsatisfied. Israel would be less intimidated by a virtual nuclear weapon than it would be by an actual one and therefore would likely continue its risky efforts atsubverting Iran's nuclear program through sabotage and assassinat ion -- which could lead Iran to conclude that a breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only

weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks. The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues itscurrent course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon . U.S. and Israeli officials have

declared that outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existentialthreat . Such language is typical of major powers, which have historically gotten riled upwhenever another country has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own . Yet so far, every timeanother country has managed to shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members havealways changed tack and decided to live with it . In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, newnuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less . Israel's regional nuclear monopoly,

which has proved remarkably durable for the p ast four decades, has long fueled instabilit y in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear stat e exist. It is

Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisi s. Power , after all, begs to be balanced . What is surprising about the Israelicase is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge. Of course, it is easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to useforce to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to its nuclear monopoly. It did the sa me to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar act ion against Iran. But thevery acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term have prolonged an imbalance that is unsusta inable in the long term. Israel's pr oven ability to strike potential

nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the current tensions are bestviewed not as the early st ages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of a decades-long Middle East

nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored. UNFOUNDED FEARS One reason the danger of anuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it has been distorted bymisplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international

system . The first prominent concern , which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innatelyirrational . Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by "madmullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders .

Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no propensityfor self-destruction . It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United St ates and Israel to assumeotherwise . Yet that is precisely w hat many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed themto argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic . If Iranacquired a nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike againstIsrael, even though doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the

Iranian regime holds dear . Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desiresnuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security , not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy

itself). Iran may be intransigent at the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure itsown preservation . Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its

planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move.

Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime isrational still worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it , providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more

http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/pt-br/file/CAD/LXII%20CAD/Pol%C3%ADtica/Why%20Iran%20Should%20Get%20the%20Bomb.pdf






aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists withnuclear arms . The problem with these concerns is that they contradict the record of every other

nuclear weapons state going back to 1945 . History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, theyfeel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a

potential target in the eyes of major po wers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and

aggressive action . Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, and India and Pakist an have both become more cautious

since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would break this mold . As for the risk of a h andoff to terrorists, nocountry could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk of being found out . U.S.

surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States' impressive andgrowing ability to identify the source of fissile material . Moreover, countries can never entirely controlor even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor . Once a country such as Iran acquires a nuclear capability, it

will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal . After all, building a bomb is costly anddangerous . It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties thatcannot be trusted or managed . Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, otherstates in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East . But thenuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to be

unfounded . Properly defined, the term "proliferation" means a rap id and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like t hat has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has been a marked slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states . There is no reason to expect that this

pattern will change now . Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it

would hardly signal the start of a landslide . When Israel acquired the bomb in t he 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were

a much bigger threat to the Arab wo rld than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is noreason a nuclear Iran should now . REST ASSURED In 1991, the histo rical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclearfacilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear det errent was the instability produced by ch allenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high t ensions and risky

provocations, the two countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran willdeter each other, as nuclear powers always have . There has never been a full-scale war betweentwo nuclear-armed states . Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply , even if the Iranian

arsenal is relatively small. No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear

capability , and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today. For that reason, the United States and its allies need not take such pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because open lines of communication will make the Westerncountries feel better able to live w ith a nuclear Iran. But the current sanctions o n Iran can be dropped: they primarily harm o rdinary Iranians, with little purpo se. Most important, policymakers

and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history hasshown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability . When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, moremay be better.

The plan won‘t change Maduro ‘s tune — engagement entrenches the regime and stiflesdemocratic oppositionChristy 1AC Author 13 — served as Senior Policy Analyst for the Republican National Committee (RNC),focusing on energy, foreign affairs, and national security issues. Prior to joining the RNC, Patrick worked at the

National Republican Congressional Committee as an Analyst and as Clerk for the International practice of BarbourGriffith & Rogers, LLC. His writings on defense policy and foreign affairs have appeared in the The Commentator,

The Diplomat, National Review Online, The Weekly Standard, and U.S. News.com. Patrick was named a ManfredWörner fellow by the German Marshall Fund in 2011 and a Publius Fellow by the Claremont Institute in 2012.Originally from San Diego, California, Patrick holds a BA from Vanderbilt University (Patrick Christy, U.S. News& World Report, 06-13- 13, ―U.S. Overtures to Maduro Hurt Venezuela‘s Democratic Opposition‖,http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/06/13/us-overtures-to-chavez-successor-maduro-hurt-venezuelas-opposition, Accessed 07-04-2013 | AK)

On the margins of a multilateral summit in Guatemala last week, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign Min ister Elias Jose Jaua, marking the Obamaadministration's latest attempt to reset relations with t he South American nation. What's worrisome is that Secretary Kerry's enthusiasm to find , in his words, a

http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/06/13/us-overtures-to-chavez-successor-maduro-hurt-venezuelas-opposition






"new way forward" with Venezuela could end up legitimizing Chavez-successor Nicolas Maduro's

quest for power and undermining the country's democratic opposition and state institutions . Since the death of

Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez in March, Maduro's actions have more resembled those of a Cuban strongman thana democratically-elected official . Indeed, he has taken drastic moves to preserve his power anddiscredit his critics in recent months. First, the Maduro regime is refusing to allow a full audit of the

fraudulent April 13th presidential elections , as opposition presidential candidate Henrique Capriles had requested. As t he Associated Press notes a fullaudit "would have included not just comparing votes electronically registered by machines with the paper ballot receipts they emitted, but also comparing those with the poll station registries thatcontain voter signatures and with digitally recorded fingerprints." However, because Chavez-era appointees loyal t o the current government dominate Venezuela's National Election Council and

Supreme Court – the two government institutions able to challenge election results – it is unlikely either will accept the opposition's demands for a full election recount. Second,Maduro's government is taking steps to dominate radio and television coverage of the regime . Lastmonth, Globovision, one o f Venezuela's last remaining independent news channels, was so ld to a group of investors with close ties to Maduro. Under Chavez, the independent broadcastingstation faced years of pressure as government authorities frequently threatened to arrest the group's owners and journalists. To no one's surprise, t he company's new ownership has banned live

video coverage of opposition leader Henrique Capriles and many of the station's prominent journalists have been fired or have resigned. Third, the regime and itsallies are using fear and intimidation to silence the opposition . On April 30th, pro-Maduro lawmakers physically att acked oppositionlegislators on the floor o f Venezuela's National Assembly. Days prior, the regime arrested a former military general who was critical of Cuba's gro wing influence on Venezuela's armed forces.

More recently, Maduro even called for the creation of "Bolivarian Militias of Workers" to "defend thesovereignty of the homeland ." In light of all this, it remains unclear why the Obamaadministration seeks , in Secretary Kerry's words, " an ongoing, continuing dialogue at a high level between the State

Department and the [Venezuelan] Foreign Ministry" – let alone believe that such engagement will lead to any substantive change in

Maduro's behavior . To be sure, Caracas's recent release of jailed American filmmaker Timothy Tracy is welco me and long overdue. However, it is clear t hat the bogus charges

of espionage against Tracy were used as leverage in talks with the United St ates, a shameful move reminiscent of Fidel Castro's playbook. While Secretary Kerry said that his meeting with hisVenezuelan counterpart included discussion of human rights and democracy issues, the Obama administration's overall track reco rd in the region gives reason for concern. President Obama failedto mention Venezuela or Chavez's abuse of power during his weeklong trip to t he region in 2011. And while Obama refused at first to acknowledge the April election results, the StateDepartment has since sent very different signals. Indeed, Secretary Kerry declined even to mention Venezuela directly during his near 30-minute address to the plenary sess ion of the

Organization of American States in Guatemala last week. For Venezuela's opposition, the Obama administration's eagernessto revive relations with Maduro is a punch to the gut . Pro-Maduro legislators in the National Ass embly have banned opposition lawmakersfrom committee hearings and speaking on the assembly floo r. Other outspoken critics of the regime face criminal charges, and government officials repeatedly vilify and slander Capriles. What's

worse, if the United States grants or is perceived to grant legitimacy to the Maduro government, that could

give further cover to the regime as it systematically undermines Venezuela's remaining institutions .

The Obama administration's overtures to Maduro's go vernment come as the region is increasingly skeptical of t he Chavez successor's reign. Last month, Capriles met with Colombian PresidentJuan Manuel Santos in Bogota. Chile's Senate unanimously passed a resolution urging a total audit of all po lling stations. And in recent weeks, opposition lawmakers led by María CorinaMachado, a representative from the National Assembly of Venezuela, have held meetings in capitals around the region to educate foreign leaders about Maduro's illegitimate hold on power.Rather than accept Maduro's strongman tactics, the Obama administration should t ake a firm stand and make clear to Caracas that any steps to undermine the country's co nstitution or threaten theopposition will be detrimental to bilateral ties with the United States. The fact is that Washington holds all the cards. Venezuela's economy is in a free-fall, Maduro's popularity is plummeting,

and various public scandals – especially those related to institutional corruption – could further erode public confidence in t he current government. By resetting relationswith the Maduro government now, the United States risks legitimizing the Chavez protégé's ill-gotten hold on power and undercutting the Venezuelan democratic opposition efforts to sustainand expand its popular support . It's time the Obama administration rethink this hasty reset with Maduro.

No impact to Iran-Venezuela ties — international outreach and status quo sanctions havehalted regional influenceGoodman 6-26 — staff writer for the Bloomberg News (Joshua Goodman, Bloomberg News, 06-26- 13, ―Iran‘sInfluence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says‖, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says, Accessed 07-05-2013 | AK)

Iran isn‘t actively supporting terrorist cells in Latin America and its influence is waning in theregion after almost a decade of promises to increase investment , according to a State Department report. While Iran‘s interest in Latin

America is a ―concern,‖ sanctions have undermined efforts by the Islamic republic to expand its economicand political toehold in the region , according to the unclassified su mmary of yesterday‘s report. ― As a result of diplomaticoutreach, strengthening of allies‘ capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strongsanctions policy, and Iran‘s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean is waning ,‖ according to the report. The findings disappointed some Republican lawmakers who say President Barack Obama‘sadministration is underestimating the threat from Iran. The report comes as the U.S. takes a wait-and-see approach to President-elect Hassan Rohani, who has vowed to seek more dialog with t heU.S. ―I believe the Administration has failed to consider the seriousness of Iran‘s presence here at home,‖ said Congressman Jeff Duncan, a Republican from South Carolina who wrote the

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says







legislation requiring the State Department report. ―I question the methodology that was used in developing this report.‖ Chav ez Alliance The U.S. stepped up itsmonitoring of Iran‘s presence in Lat in America in a bid to isolate the country over its nuclear

program and after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad forged closer ties with anti-American allies of the late

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez . While Iran‘s outreach bears watching, claims about more sinister activities are

unproven , said Christopher Sabatini, senior po licy director at the Council of the Americas.

Iran-Venezuela ties are no longer a threat — the relationship is deadLansberg-Rodriguez and Zonis 7-4 — fellow at The Comparative Constitutions Project and a columnistfor the Venezuelan newspaper El Universal AND *Professor Emeritus at Booth School of Business (DanielLansberg-Rodriguez and Marvin Zonis, EconoMonitor, 07-04- 13, ―Venezuela and Iran: The End of The Affair?‖,http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/07/venezuela-and-iran-the-end-of-the-affair/, Accessed 07-06-2013 | AK)

Yet now, given that they never did get around to ending the Empire, does this alliance still have a future? The answer to this question will be of no small

consequence to the world as a whole. It will extend beyond their role as a self-proclaimed rhetorical international disestablishment: an Axis of Insults. The alliance between these two

countries has generated concerns beyond the rhetoric . They have provided financial benefits to poorer neighbors and generated security risks to a great

many others. Some commentators , more than a few of them Republican congressmen, have publically surmised that Iran might

have been using Caracas as a staging ground for terrorist plots throughout the Westernhemisphere , although a State Department report released last week would seem to belie that fact .

Others believe that Iran‘s true interest‘s lies in accessing Latin America‘s largely undevelopeduranium reserves , in hopes of advancing its ambitions towards the st atus of a nuclear power. What cannot be denied is that there are, at pres ent, numerous Iranian agents active inLatin America operating at various official levels. T he Iranian security apparatus has been instrumental in teaching Chavista security forces to more efficiently repress dissent among their o wn

people. (The Venezuelan Jewish community, once among the largest in Latin America, has been a particular target.) So what happens next? Venezuela‘s new president,

Nicolas Maduro, has announced that he will meet soon with Iran‘s new president -elect, Hassan Rowhani. And while neither country has provided any details, if Rowhani is themoderate he is touted to be, he may well seek better relations with Europe and the United States,advanced economies capable of engaging with Iran on more than a rhetorical level . Meanwhile, barring someunforeseen crisis precipitating the collapse o f regime in Caracas, the Venezuelan government seems unlikely to do likewise. Under fire from accusations of having st olen the recent election,

Maduro‘s domestic legitimacy is predicated primarily on his having been fing ered by Chávezhimself as successor, rather than on any personal charisma or qualifications . Under these circumstances,

seeking rapprochement with ―The Empire ,‖ so often vilified by his hallowed predecessor, would be a dangerous game . In

geopolitics, much as in interpersonal relationships, countries sometimes outgrow each other . For an Iran that might finally becoming of age, maintaining close ties with declining, unpopular Venezuela, would be no great

benefit, and might hold back a more fruitful potential dalliance with the West .





2NC Iran Not Interested in LA

Irans influence in latin america is fading - new iranian leader isnt focused thereGoodman 6/26/13 - (Joshua, reporter for Bloomberg News in Rio de Janeiro, "Iran Influence in Latin America Waning, U.S. Report Says"

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-influence-in-latin-america-waning-u-s-report-says.html ) Iran isn‘t actively supportingterrorist cells in Latin America and its influence is waning in the region after almost a decade of promises to increaseinvestment, according to a State Department report. While Iran‘s interest in Latin America is a ―concern,‖sanctions have underminedefforts by the Islamic republic to expand its economic and political toehold in the region , according to the unclassifiedsummary of yesterday‘s report. ― As a result of diplomatic outreach, strengthening of allies‘ c apacity, internationalnonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Iran‘s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranianinfluence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning ,‖ according to the report. The findings disappointed some Republ icanlawmakers who say President Barack Obama ‘s administration is underestimating the threat from Iran. The report comes as the U.S. takes a wait -and-see approach to President-elect Hassan Rohani, w ho has vowed to seek more dialog with the U.S. ―I believe the Administration has failed toconsider the seriousness of Iran‘s presence here at home,‖ said Congressman Jeff Duncan, a Republican from South Carolina who wrote thelegislation requiring the Sta te Department report. ―I question the methodology that was used in developing this report.‖ Chavez Alliance TheU.S. stepped up its monitoring of Iran‘s presence in Latin America in a bid to isolate the country over its nuclear

program and after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad forged closer ties with anti-American allies of the late Venezuelan President HugoChavez . While Iran‘s outreach b ears watching, claims about more sinister activities are unproven, said Christopher Sabatini, senior policydirector at the Council of the Americas. ―It‘s a shame that in such a dynamic hemi sphere in which we have so many diplomatic initiatives that forsome -- especially Congress -- attention to the region has boiled down to mostly spurious charges about Iranian infiltration,‖ Sabatini said via e -mail. Ahmadinejad made repeated trips to Lati n America after taking office in 2005, most recently to Caracas to attend Chavez‘s funeral inMarch and the inauguration of his successor, Nicolas Maduro, a month later. By contrast, Rohani has said little about the region sincehis surprise victory earlier this month . Instead, he said one of his main foreign policy priorities will be seeking ―constructive dialog‖with the U.S. and U.K., two nations with which the country has traditionally been at odds. ‗Good Relations‘ ―We‘ll seek to have goodrelations with all nations , including Latin American states,‖ Rohani said during his first post -election press conference June 17, in responseto a question about the attention he‘ll devote to Latin America . Under Ahmadinejad‘s watch, Iran added embassies in Latin America and morethan doubled trade with Brazil, the region‘s biggest economy. With Chavez, Ahmadinejad signed more than 100 accords to supp ort everythingfrom a campaign to build homes in Venezuela to a joint venture to manufacture bicycles, which Chavez jokingly referred to as ―atomic‖ two -wheelers. The two countries also established in Caracas the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, which together with its main Iranian shareholder,Bank Saderat, is accused by the U.S. of being a vehicle for the Ahmadinejad government‘s f unding of the Middle Eastern terrorist groupHezbollah. Yet with Iran‘s economy crippled by sanctions, many of the projects haven‘t gotten off the ground . Forexample, pledges from 2007 and 2008 to help build a $350 million deep- water port off Nicaragua‘s Atlantic coast and an oil refinery in Ecuadorhave yet to materialize. Nor has it built what former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned would be a ―huge‖ embassy in Managua. Thathasn‘t prevented the Obama administration from trying to curb Iran‘s influence. In 2011, it imposed sanctions on state -owned oil companyPetroleos de Venezuela SA for defying sanctions on Iran. It also implicated an Iranian man working out of Mexico in a plot to kill Saudi Arabia‘sambassador to Washington.

Iran is on its way out — Venezuela is no longer its regional gatewayBerman ‘13 ―Ilan Berman Testimony: Iran‘s Extending Influence in the Western Hemisphere.‖ June 10, 2013. InterAmerican Security Watch.http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/ilan-berman-testimony-threat-to-the-homeland-irans-extending-influence-in-the-western-hemisphere/)

In Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro , Hugo Chavez‘s hand -picked successor as president, is now presiding over anall-out implosion of the national economy, complete with shortages of commodities such as toilet

paper, sugar and flour .[28] As a result, even though Maduro — who as foreign minister presided over hisgovernment‘s contacts with Iran—is likely to mimic Chavez‘ sympathetic attitude toward theIslamic Republic, it is far from clear that his regime will have either the political stability or

economic solvency to serve as Iran‘s regional gateway in coming years.In Iran

, too,there is asignificant degree of uncertainty relating to the region. It is unclear, at least at this stage, whether incoming Iranian president

Hassan Rowhani —who handily won the Islamic Republic‘s June 14th election—will enjoy similarly close bonds with the ―Bolivarian‖ regimes of Latin America.

More significantly, Iran‘s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has not yet given a clear indication that the regionremains a key regime interest . This is salient given that Iran‘s extensive involvement in theSyrian civil war over the past two years has sapped the regime‘s economic resources and

political capital, diminishing its activism beyond the Middle East in the process. (Iranian officials have taken pains to reaffirm their government‘s commitment to the region, however; in early July, Ahmadinejad met in Moscow with Bolivia n president Evo Morales and assured

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http://topics.bloomberg.com/hugo-chavez/



http://topics.bloomberg.com/christopher-sabatini/

http://topics.bloomberg.com/nicolas-maduro/

http://topics.bloomberg.com/latin-america/



http://topics.bloomberg.com/venezuela/

http://www.bid.com.ve/indexsp.htm

http://topics.bloomberg.com/oil-refinery/

http://topics.bloomberg.com/ecuador/

http://topics.bloomberg.com/hillary-clinton/

http://topics.bloomberg.com/washington/

http://topics.bloomberg.com/washington/

http://topics.bloomberg.com/hillary-clinton/

http://topics.bloomberg.com/ecuador/

http://topics.bloomberg.com/oil-refinery/

http://www.bid.com.ve/indexsp.htm

http://topics.bloomberg.com/venezuela/


http://topics.bloomberg.com/nicolas-maduro/

http://topics.bloomberg.com/christopher-sabatini/



http://topics.bloomberg.com/mahmoud-ahmadinejad/





him that Iran‘s outreach to L atin America is unwavering, and wi ll be sustained by his successor.[29]) As a result, it is possible to envision thatIran‘s footprint in the region could erode over time.

No Venezuelan-Iranian military alliance — Iran is more focused on the Middle EastSul livan and Beittel ‘13 (―Latin America: Terrorism Issues.‖ Mark P. Sullivan --Specialist in Latin AmericanAffairs & June S. Beittel --Analyst in Latin American Affairs. April 5, 2013. Congressional Research Service.http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2063&context=key_workplace)

No matter the scope of Iran‘s involvement in Latin America, Iran‘s key foreign policy focus remainsits immediate region . It is in the Middle East and South and Central Asia where Iran perceivesthat threats to its survival may emanate, and in which Iran has, for ideological, religious, and

political motives, tried to alter political outcomes in its favor. Whatever efforts Iran is making to engage

like-minded leaders in Latin America , these efforts pale by comparison to its level of involvement incountries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, or Lebanon, in which Iran‘s Islamic RevolutionaryGuard Corps — Qods Force personnel are on the ground consistently, funneling arms and funds to

pro-Iranian movements and parties . Interactions with national leaders and faction leaders in Middle Eastern and South andCentral Asian countries such as these are frequent. 66 Concerns about Iran‘s Military and Potential Terrorist Activities An A pril 2010unclassified Departme nt of Defense report to Congress on Iran‘s military power (required by Section 1245 of the National Defense AuthorizationAct for FY2010, P.L. 111- 84) maintained that Iran‘s Qods Force, which maintains operational capabilities around the world, had increas ed its

presence in Latin America in recent years, particularly in Venezuela.67 At the same time, however, then commander of the U.S.Southern Command, General Douglas Fraser, maintained that the focus of Iran in the region wasdiplomatic and commercial, an d that he had not seen an increase in Iran‘s military presence inthe region .68 In July 2012, General Fraser maintained in a press interview that Iran‘s relationship withVenezuela was primarily diplomatic and economic and that Iran‘s ties with Venezuela d id notamount to a military alliance.



2NC Iran Not Aggressive

Iran doesn‘t have sinister activities in Venezuela Goodman ‗13 Internally citing a report from the US State Department – Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America forBloomberg News – ―Iran‘s Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says‖ – Bloomberg News – June 26 th – http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says

The U.S. stepped up its mon itoring of Iran‘s presence in Latin America in a bid to isolate the country over its

nuclear program and after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad forged closer ties with anti-American allies of the late

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez . While Iran‘ s outreach bears watching, claims about more sinister activities

are unproven, said Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director at the Council of the Americas. ¶

―It‘s a shame that in such a dynamic hemisphere in which we have so many diplomatic initiatives that for some -- especially Congress --

attention to the region has boiled down to mostly spurious charges about Iranian infiltration ,‖Sabatini said via e-mail. ¶ Ahmadinejad made repeated trips to Latin America after taking office in 2005, most recently to Caracas to attendChavez‘s funeral in March and the inauguration of his successor, Nicolas Maduro, a month later.

Iran‘s activities in Venezuela aren‘t profitable or dangero us.Goodman ‗13 Internally citing a report from the US State Department – Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America forBloomberg News – ―Iran‘s Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says‖ – Bloomberg News – June 26 th – http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says

Under Ahmadinejad‘s watch, Iran added embassies in Latin America and more than doubled trade with Brazil,

the region‘s biggest economy. With Chavez, Ahmadinejad signed more than 100 accords to supporteverything from a campaign to build homes in Venezuela to a joint venture to manufacture bicycles, which Chavez jokingly referred to as

―atomic‖ two-wheelers. ¶ The two countries also established in Caracas the Banco Internacional de

Desarrollo, which together with its main Iranian shareholder, Bank Saderat, is accused by the U.S. of being a vehiclefor the Ahmadinejad government‘s funding of the Middle Eastern terrorist group Hezbollah. ¶ Yet with Iran‘s economycrippled by sanctions, many of the projects haven‘t gotten off the ground . For example, pledges from 2007and 2008 to help build a $350 million deep- water port off Nicaragua‘s Atlantic coast and an oil refinery in Ecuador have yet to materi alize. Norhas it built what former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned would be a ―huge‖ embassy in Managua. ¶ That hasn‘t prevented the Obamaadministration from trying to curb Iran‘s influence. In 2011, it imposed sanctions on state -owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA fordefying sanctions on Iran. It also implicated an Iranian man working out of Mexico in a plot to kill Saudi Arabia‘s ambassado r to Washington.

Iran‘s influence in Latin America decreasing and not supporting terror. Goodman ‗13 Internally citing a report from the US State Department – Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America forBloomberg News – ―Iran‘s Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says‖ – Bloomberg News – June 26 th – http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says

Iran isn‘t actively supporting terrorist cells in Latin America and its influence is waning in the regionafter almost a decade of promises to increase investment, according to a State Department report. ¶ While Iran‘s interest in Latin America is a

―concern,‖sanctions have undermined efforts by the Islamic republic to expand its economic and political

toehold in the region , according to the uncl assified summary of yesterday‘s report. ¶ ―As a result of diplomatic outreach,

strengthening of allies‘ capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Iran‘s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean iswaning,‖ according to the report.



2NC No Prolif

Iran Prolif not dangerous and wouldn‘t cascade. Hobbs& Moran ‗12 Dr Christopher Hobbs is a Leverhulme Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies within the Department of War Studies at

King's College London. Matthew Moran is a Research Associate at the Centre for Science and Security Studies within the Department of WarStudies at King's College London. He is currently working on a MacArthur-funded postdoctoral project that explores the relationship betweennuclear, nationalism and identity and how these issues impact on policy- making. Guardian: Julian Borger‘s Security Blog – 12-19-12 – http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2012/dec/19/iran-nuclear-middle-east-arms-race

Inevitably, Iran's nuclear defiance has provided ammunition for the war-mongerers advocating a pre-emptive attack on Iran. Prominent

commentators such as Matthew Kroenig, claim that, at the very least, a nuclear-armed Iran would prompt a'proliferation cascade' in the Mid dle East. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons – whatever form that scenario may take - its

regional rivals will follow suit. The argument here is seductive; it is easier to assume the worst than to hope for the best. The problem is, wefind that the counter-argument is more compelling. ¶ The idea that 'proliferation begets proliferation' is not new. Direforecasts on the seemingly inevitable increase in the number of nuclear weapon states have been made since the dawn of the nuclear age. In 1963,for example, US President JF Kennedy predicted that there might be up to twenty-five nuclear weapons powers within the next decade. However,

proliferation has proven to be historically rare, with the number of nuclear weapons states expanding only slightly from five in 1964 to nine in

2006 following North Korea's nuclear test. ¶ The flawed logic of 'proliferation begets proliferation' is clearlydemonstrated in North East Asia where North Korea's nuclear weapons have not provoked Japan orSouth Korea , countries with advanced civil nuclear programmes, to follow suit despite a long history of regional conflict and volatilerelations. In this case, strong security alliances with the United States incorporating extended nuclear deterrence have played an important role in

dissuading these countries from going nuclear. ¶ Ironically, the Middle East itself offers further evidence that nuclear prolif eration is not inevitable . Noted for its policy of nuclear opacity (neither confirming nor denying its nuclear arsenal), Israelacquired nuclear weapons in the late 1960s and over four decades later still remains the only nuclear power inthe region. ¶ Now the threat posed by Iran to its neighbours is arguably greater given Tehran's aggressive posturing and regional ambitions.However our research finds that those states deemed most likely to go nuclear due to their proximity to Iran and their suspected past interest inacquiring nuclear weapons (namely Turkey, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia), would have little to gain and much to lose by embarking down such

a route. ¶ Take Saudi Arabia, for example. Iran has long been at political and ideological odds with the kingdom across the Gulf. And at firstsight, it seems likely that Saudi Arabia would follow Iran down the nuclear path. In February, Saudiofficials were reported as claiming that Riyadh would launch a "twin-track nuclear weapons programme" in the event of a successful Iraniannuclear test. An article published in the London Times in February [£] described a scenario whereby Saudi Arabia would attempt to purchase

warheads from abroad while also adding a military dimension to its planned civil nuclear programme at home. ¶ Look more closely,however, and there is a much stronger case to be made against Saudi nuclearisation. Beyond the

Kingdom's primitive nuclear infrastructure – the country lacks sufficient experience and expertise in practically all areas of the

nuclear fuel cycle – Saudi Arabia's political and strategic context does not favour the acquisition of nuclear weapons. ¶ From a security perspective, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States has held firm since the 1940s, despite a number ofchallenges – most notably the participation of a number of Saudi nationals in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The relationship barters Saudi oil for USconventional arms and an implicit commitment to Saudi's defence. ¶ In recent years, the role of Washington as the silent guarantor of Riyadh'ssecurity has grown apace with the structural changes in the Middle East. The fall of the pro-Saudi Mubarak regime in Egypt; protests andinstability in Bahrain and Yemen; the collapse of the pro-Saudi government in Lebanon; and civil war in Syria have upended the establishedregional order and made Riyadh's position less secure. ¶ In this context, and given the determination of the United States to prevent nuclear

proliferation in the region, a move by Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons holds few positives for Riyadh's security calculus. ¶ From andeconomic perspective, Saudi Arabia's policy outlook exemplifies Etel Solingen's seminal theory on the relationship between economic liberalismand nuclear restraint. Solingen argues that political coalitions favouring the reduction of state control over markets and increased privatisation andforeign investment – are less likely to adopt a nuclear posture that would endanger their economic interests. ¶ In this regard, Saudi Arabia's

emphasis on facilitating the growth of foreign investment is significant. Riyadh has cultivated extensive trade relations with most international powers, keen to attract foreign investment as a means of reducing over-reliance on oil and gas, increasing employment opportunities for the local population (population growth of almost two percent equates to a need for some 200,000 new jobs per year), and reinvigorating the Saudi privatesector. ¶ The acquisition of nuclear weapons would have far-reaching consequences, stalling progress and bringing progressive economicisolation, thus drastically changing the nature of the kingdom's international trade relations. Saudi's interests are best served by nuclear restraint. ¶ In an article published in the latest issue of The International Spectator, we argue that there are strong arguments for nuclear restraint in the casesof other regional players as well. From security guarantees and the provision of advanced conventional weapons - in December 2011, followingthe United States agreed a $1.7 billion deal to upgrade Saudi Arabia's Patriot missile defence system, for example – to facilitating increased

integration into the international economy, there are a range of measures that can persuade a state to forgo nuclear weapons. ¶ Ultimately, manysee a domino-effect as the logical response to Iranian nuclearisation . But when the stakes are this high, it is



important to look at all sides of the debate. From another perspective, there is substantial evidence to suggest thatregional proliferation is not a very likely outcome at all.

Iran Prolif not dangerous – wouldn‘t cause instability or domino effect. Keck ‗12 (Zachary Keck is deputy editor of e-International Relations and an editorial assistant at The Diplomat. His commentary has appeared at ForeignAffairs, Foreign Policy, World Politics Review and Small Wars Journal – ―False Prophets of Nuclear Proliferation‖ – National Interest – April 5 th

– http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/false-prophets-nuclear-proliferation-6725)

Even as other issues surrounding Iran‘s nuclear program are debated, there is a wide-ranging consensus in the West that anIranian bomb would precipitate a regional nuclear-arms race , if not a global one. Senators Lindsay Graham (R-SC),Robert Casey (D-PA) and Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) said as much in the pages of the Wall Street Journal in March. Similarly, British foreignsecretary William Hague worries that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, ―the most serious round of nuclear proliferation‖ to date wouldcommence. And recently in the New York Times, Ari Shavit of Haaretz stated matter-of- factly that ―an Iranian bomb will bring about universal

nuclear proliferation.‖ ¶ Fortunately for mankind‘s sake, there is no evidence to support these apocalyptic prophecies .

Although some precautionary actions might be prudent, neither history nor contemporary circumstances indicatethat an Iranian atomic weapon would be a nuclear catalyst . ¶ Historical Precedents ¶ To begin with, fears of animpending nuclear tipping point have been a regular feature of the nuclear age. The CIA is a case in point. Whereas in 1957 the agency predictedten countries could go nuclear within a decade, by 1975 it concluded that ―logically‖ nuclear proliferation would only subside when ―all politic alactors, state and non- state, are equipped with nuclear armaments.‖ A quarter century and one nuclear power later (both South Africa and Pakistanacquired a nuclear-weapons capability during this time, but South Africa dismantled all its nuclear weapons by 1991), CIA director George Tenetannounced in 2003 that we had entered ―a new world of proliferation‖ and warned ―the ‗domino theory‘ of the twenty -first century may well benuclear.‖ ¶ The 1960s were equally remarkable. As a presidential candidate in 19 60, for example, John F. Kennedy foresaw ―ten, fifteen, or twentynations‖ acquiring a nuclear capability by the 1964 election. The following year, the Kennedy administration was so certain a Chinese nucleartest would trigger a global wave of nuclear prol iferation that it considered simply giving Beijing‘s neighbors ―defensive nuclear weapons.‖Although not a single additional nuclear power emerged by 1963, President Kennedy remained ―haunted by the feeling‖ that ther e would befifteen or twenty of them by 1975 and possibly twenty-five by the end of that decade. ¶ And yet nearly half a century after the Cuban missile crisisthere are only nine nuclear-weapon states, five more than when Kennedy was elected and two of which already had advanced nuclear weapon

programs during his presidency. During the same time interval, four states have voluntarily given up their nuclear arsenals and an estimated fortynations have not built them despite possessing the technical capability to do so. ¶ Still, just because nuclear forbearance has been the norm thus fardoesn‘t necessarily mean this will continue into the future. In fact, according to Shavit, an Iranian bomb would ―force Saudi Arabia, Turkey andEgypt to acquire their own.‖ Similarly, President Barack Obama is ―almost certain‖ that if Iran gets nuclear weapons, its neighbors will be

―compelled‖ to do the same. ¶ Once again, there‘s not much evidence to support these assertions. Although a few countries have

built nuclear weapons because a rival acquired them, these are the exceptions to the general rule.Of the quantitative studies done on reactive proliferation, none have found a nuclear-armed rivalmakes a state more likely to even initiate a nuclear-weapons program, much less succeed .Furthermore, as the political scientist Jacques Hymans documents in a forthcoming book, despite the diffusion of technology, nuclear aspirantshave become increasingly inefficient and unsuccessful over time. ¶ It‘s therefore not surprising that in -depth case studies of Turkey‘s, Egypt‘s andSaudi Arabia's nuclear prospects have found no cause for concern. Turkey is the most capable of building nuclear weapons but already has anuclear deterrent in the form of an estimated ninety nuclear warheads hosted on its territory for the United States. This is far more than what it iscapable of producing indigenously. Additionally, it‘s hard to square Turkey‘s supposed nuclear ambitions with the recent remo val of its entirestockpile of highly enriched uranium. ¶ Egypt is far less capable of building a bomb than Turkey. Indeed, it already had a dysfunctional nuclear

program during the 1960s that was abandoned despite Israel, its archenemy at the time, acquiring a nuclear capability. Even before the onset ofthe Arab Spring, proliferation analyst Jim Walsh argued it was ―not likely that Egypt will seek, let alone acquire, nuclear weapons.‖ In theaftermath of Mubarak‘s overthrow, any government in Cairo will be preoccupied with improving the lot of its people, lest it t oo wind up on trial.Achieving economic growth will require sustained access to foreign capital, markets and financial assistance, none of which would beforthcoming if Cairo initiated a nuclear-weapons program. ¶ Given its long-standing rivalry with Tehran, Saudi Arabia is certainly the mostalarmed by the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. Moreover, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, former head of intelligence and ambassador to theUnited States and the United Kingdom, has repeatedly warned that if Iran is allowed to get nuclear weapons, the kingdom may well do the same.Of course, this might be what a nation would say if it wanted Washington to ―cut off the head of the snake‖ in Tehran. ¶ In fact, as Nuclear ThreatInitiative concludes, ―no convincing evidence exists . . . that Saudi Arabia is attempting to develop, or has the motivation to develop, a nuclearweapons program.‖ Similarly, in his comprehensive study that included fieldwork inside the kingdom, Ibrahim Al -Marashi found ―little evidence. . . that Saudi Arabia would seek to engage di rectly in a regional nuclear arms race.‖ ¶ If Saudi Arabia did pursue nuclear weapons, however, itwould be almost certain to fail. Even those most concerned about a Saudi bomb don‘t claim it can build one itself. Rather, th ey contend Riyadhwill buy a ready- made nuclear deterrent from Pakistan. Pakistan‘s willingness to take this unprecedented action is based on pure speculation, pastSaudi aid to Pakistan and a host of unsubstantiated claims, most notably those made by Mohammed al-Khilewi, a Saudi diplomat at the UN whodefected in 1994. In seeking to gain asylum into the United States, al-Khilewi told U.S. authorities that in exchange for financial aid, Pakistan hadagreed to provide Riyadh with a nuclear deterrent should the need ever arise. ¶ Besides al-K hilewi‘s obvious motives for fabricating this story, it‘sdoubtful Islamabad would uphold its end of the alleged bargain. After all, in the wake of 9/11 Washington gave Islamabad $22 billion to fightterrorism and later found Osama bin Laden living amongst Pakistan‘s military cadets. Furthermore, Pakistani leaders are exceedingly paranoidtheir nuclear arsenal would not withstand an Indian or U.S. first strike. It‘s therefore difficult to imagine them willingly parting with any nuclear



warheads. ¶ Even if Is lamabad did have some to spare, Riyadh would be an unlikely recipient. Given the world‘s dependence on Saudi crude,Pakistan would be the target of exceptionally harsh and unrelenting international condemnation, including from its ―all -weather friend‖ Chin a,which has recently been getting 20 percent of its oil supplies from Riyadh. Iran would also be outraged and almost certain to respond by aligningitself squarely with India. Pakistani leaders have gone to great lengths to avoid this outcome, and they wo uldn‘t suddenly invite it just to keep a

promise their predecessors might have made. ¶ If Iran does acquire nuclear weapons, there‘s no reason to think aregional nuclear-arms race would follow. Washington and its allies have avoided this outcome inthe past, and nothing suggests this time would be different .

No impact to Iranian proliferation — multiple warrants — their evidence reflects a fundamentalmisunderstanding of IRWaltz 12 — Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies (Kenneth N. Waltz,Council on Foreign Relations, July/August 2012, ―Why Iran Should Get the Bomb‖,http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/pt-

br/file/CAD/LXII%20CAD/Pol%C3%ADtica/Why%20Iran%20Should%20Get%20the%20Bomb.pdf, Accessed 07-04-2013 | AK)

The past several months have witnessed a h eated debate over the best way for the United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As t he argument has raged, the United States hastightened its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the

United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table, a palpable sense of crisis still looms . It should not . Most U.S.,

European, and Israeli commentators and policymakers warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be the worst possible

outcome of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely torestore stability to the Middle East . POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED The crisis over Iran's nuclear pro gram could end in three different ways. First,diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent onacquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so. Punishing a state t hrough economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take No rth Korea, whichsucceeded in building its weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons,sanctions are unlikely to change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimatedeterrent. The second possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly. Iran would not bethe first country to acquire a sophisticated nuclear program without building an actual bomb. Japan, for instance, maintains a vast civilian nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe that it could

produce a nuclear weapon on short notice. Such a breakout capability might satisfy the domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hardliners that they can enjoy all the benefits of havinga bomb (such as greater security) without the downsides (such as international isolation and condemnation). The problem is that a breakout capability might not work as intended. The UnitedStates and its European allies are pr imarily concerned with weaponization, so they might accept a scenario in which Iran stop s short of a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has made it clear that itviews a significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an unacceptable threat. It is possible, t hen, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon co uld appease major Western

powers but leave the Israelis unsatisfied. Israel would be less intimidated by a virtual nuclear weapon than it would be by an actual one and therefore would likely continue its risky efforts atsubverting Iran's nuclear program through sabotage and assassination -- which could lead Iran to conclude that a breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only

weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks. The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues itscurrent course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon . U.S. and Israeli officials havedeclared that outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential

threat . Such language is typical of major powers, which have historically gotten riled upwhenever another country has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own . Yet so far, every timeanother country has managed to shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members havealways changed tack and decided to live with it . In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, newnuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less . Israel's regional nuclear monopoly,

which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled instability in the Middle East. In no ot her region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is

Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis. Power , after all, begs to be balanced . What is surprising about the Israelicase is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge. Of course, it is easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to useforce to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran. But thevery acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short t erm have prolonged an imbalance that is unsusta inable in the long term. Israel's proven abilit y to strike potential

nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the current tensions are bestviewed not as the early st ages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of a decades-long Middle Eastnuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored. UNFOUNDED FEARS One reason the danger of a

nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it has been distorted bymisplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international

system . The first prominent concern , which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innatelyirrational . Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by "madmullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders .

Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no propensityfor self-destruction . It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United St ates and Israel to assume







otherwise . Yet that is precisely w hat many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed themto argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic . If Iranacquired a nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike againstIsrael, even though doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the

Iranian regime holds dear . Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires

nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security , not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroyitself). Iran may be intransigent at the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure itsown preservation . Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait o f Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings t hat they might do so after the EU announced its

planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move.

Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime isrational still worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it , providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more

aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists withnuclear arms . The problem with these concerns is that they contradict the record of every other

nuclear weapons state going back to 1945 . History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, theyfeel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a

potential target in the eyes of major po wers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold andaggressive action . Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious

since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would break this mold . As for the risk of a h andoff to terrorists, nocountry could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk of being found out . U.S.

surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States' impressive andgrowing ability to identify the source of fissile material . Moreover, countries can never entirely controlor even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor . Once a country such as Iran acquires a nuclear capability, it

will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal . After all, building a bomb is costly anddangerous . It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties thatcannot be trusted or managed . Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, otherstates in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East . But thenuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to beunfounded . Properly defined, the term "proliferation" means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has

been a marked slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states . There is no reason to expect that this

pattern will change now . Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it

would hardly signal the start of a landslide . When Israel acquired the bomb in t he 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were

a much bigger threat to the Arab wo rld than Iran's program is to day. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is noreason a nuclear Iran should now . REST ASSURED In 1991, the histo rical rivals India and Pakistan signed a tr eaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclearfacilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear det errent was the instability produced by challenges t o it. S ince then, even in the face of high t ensions and risky

provocations, the two countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran willdeter each other, as nuclear powers always have . There has never been a full-scale war betweentwo nuclear-armed states . Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply , even if the Iranian

arsenal is relatively small. No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclearcapability , and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today. For that reason, the United States and its allies need not take such

pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because open lines of communication will make the Westerncountries feel better able to live w ith a nuclear Iran. But the current sanctions o n Iran can be dropped: they primarily harm o rdinary Iranians, with little purpo se. Most important, policymakers

and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history hasshown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability . When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, moremay be better.



2NC Noriega Indict

Noriega wrong and alarmistSigger ‗10 Jason Sigger – Jason Sigger is a defense policy analyst and the proprietor of the blog Armchair Generalist – ―Neocon Invents Venezuela Nuke

Threat‖ – Crooks and Liars – October 6, 2010 – http://crooksandliars.com/node/40459/print

On the one hand, it's admirable that the Foreign Policy website offers views from both the right and the

left on controversial public policy issues. On the other hand, it would be nice if they added some kind of warninglabel. I don't know, something like " actual reality may differ from author's perspective. " I have this inmind as Roger Noriega (former Bush political appointee, current AEI fellow) warns us of Hugo Chavez' s supposed plansto develop nuclear weapons with Iran's help. ¶ Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez admitted last week that his government is "carrying out thefirst studies" of a nuclear program. He attempted to portray it as an innocuous program designed solely for peaceful purposes. ¶ -------- ¶ Chávez'ssuggestion that he is merely studying the idea of a nuclear energy program is misleading. In fact, in November 2008, Iranian and Venezuelanofficials signed a secret "science and technology" agreement formalizing cooperation "in the field of nuclear technology." (The text of theagreement, available in Farsi and Spanish, is available here.) The week after the agreement was signed, Venezuela's Ministry of Energy andPetroleum prepared a presentation for the International Atomic Energy Agency documenting the establishment of a "nuclear power programme"in Venezuela. That presentation, obtained from sources within the Venezuelan government, reveals that an "Atomic Energy Committee" has beenmanaging the nuclear program since 2007. ¶ All countries have the right to a peaceful nuclear energy program under the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty, of which Venezuela is a signatory. However, Chávez's decision to rely on one of the world's worst proliferators to helpdevelop his country's capabilities in this sensitive technology sets alarm bells ringing. And his recent public declarations understating the natureof his nuclear program raise more questions than they answer. ¶ Just for the sake of accuracy, I'd note that China, Pakistan, and North Korea are

far more busy in weapons proliferation than Iran, particularly with high-tech equipment and materials. But this kind of language isn'tnew for Noriega. He is a particular hard-liner against Cuba and Venezuela, with a long history ofalarmist speeches and attacks against those governments. So it's not surprising to see this language, and it'seasier to shoot holes into his argument.



2NC No Retaliation

Obama won‘t retaliate with nuclear weapons Crowley ‗10 (Michael Crowley, Senior Editor the New Republic, ―Obama and Nuclear Deterrence‖, Ja n 10 th – http://www.tnr.com/node/72263)

The Los Angeles Times ran an important story yesterday about the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review,which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons . Apparently there's a debate inside theadministration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of

possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. A core issue under debate , officials said, is whether the U nited States shouldshed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certaincircumstances , in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nucleararms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a

biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it wouldnever use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts don't place much weight onhow our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally . And the realityis that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case . But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the

underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The questions are particularlyvexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we , for instance, actually nukePyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist,

but I actually doubt that a President Obama--or any president , for that matter-- would go through with it.

Nuclear retaliation won‘t happen. Bremmer ‗ 4(Ian Bremmer is the president of Eurasia Group, the leading global political risk research and consulting firm. Bremmer has a PhD in politicalscience from Stanford University (1994), and was the youngest-ever national fellow at the Hoover Institution. He presently teaches at ColumbiaUniversity, and has held faculty positions at the EastWest Institute and the World Policy Institute, 9-13- 2004, New Statesman, ―Suppose a new9/11 hit America‖)

What would happen if there were a new terrorist attack inside the United States on 11 September 2004 ? How would it affect the presidential election campaign? The conventional wisdom is that Americans - their patriotic defiance aroused - wouldrally to President George W Bush and make him an all but certain winner in November. But consider the differences between the context of the

original 9/11 and that of any attack which might occur this autumn. In 2001, the public reaction was one of disbelief and incomprehension. ManyAmericans realised for the first time that large-scale terrorist attacks on US soil were not only conceivable; they were, perhaps, inevitable. Amajority focused for the first time on the threat from al-Qaeda, on the Taliban and on the extent to which Saudis were involved in terrorism. Thistime, the public response would move much more quickly from shock to anger; debate over how America should respond would begin

immediately. Yet it is difficult to imagine how the Bush administration could focus its response on anexternal enemy. Should the US send 50,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistani border to intensify the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and 'step up'efforts to attack the heart of al-Qaeda? Many would wonder if that wasn't what the administration pledged to do after the attacks three years ago.The president would face intensified criticism from those who have argued all along that Iraq was a distraction from 'the real war on

terror'. And what if a significant number of the terrorists responsible for the pre-election attack were again Saudis? The Bush administration

could hardly take military action against the Saudi government at a time when crude- oil prices are already more than $45

a barrel and global supply is stretched to the limit. While the Saudi royal family might support a co-ordinated attack againstterrorist camps, real or imagined, near the Yemeni border - where recent searches for al-Qaeda have concentrated - that would seem like a trivial,insufficient retaliation for an attack on the US mainland. Remember how the Republicans criticised Bill Clinton's administration for ineffectually'bouncing the rubble' in Afghanistan after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990s. So what kind ofresponse might be credible? Washington's concerns about Iran are rising. The 9/11 commission report noted evidence of co-operation betweenIran and al-Qaeda operatives, if not direct Iranian advance knowledge of the 9/11 hijacking plot. Over the past few weeks, US officials have beenmore explicit, too, in declaring Iran's nuclear programme 'unacceptable'. However, in the absence of an official Iranian claim of responsibility forthis hypothetical terrorist attack, the domestic opposition to such a war and the international outcry it would provoke wouldmake quick action against Iran unthinkable. In short, a decisive response from Bush could not be external. It wouldhave to be domestic. Instead of Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, leading a war effort abroad, Tom Ridge, the homeland securitysecretary, and John Ashcroft, the attorney general, would pursue an anti-terror campaign at home. Forced to use legal tools more controversialthan those provided by the Patriot Act, Americans would experience stepped-up domestic surveillance and border controls, much tighter securityin public places and the detention of a large number of suspects. Many Americans would undoubtedly support such moves. But concern for civilliberties and personal freedom would ensure that the government would have nowhere near the public support it enjoyed for the invasion ofAfghanistan.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-na-obama-nuclear4-2010jan04,0,2198537,full.story

http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-na-obama-nuclear4-2010jan04,0,2198537,full.story



The U.S. won‘t retaliate with n uclear weapons — it makes no senseSpring ‗1(Baker, Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation, Heritage Backgrounder 1477, Sept 20,http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1477.cfm)

Nuclear retaliation is not appropriate for every kind of attack against America . Some opponents of missiledefense believe that the United States has an effective nuclear deterrent that, if necessary, could be used to respond to attacks on the homeland.

But no responsible U.S. official is suggesting that the U nited States consider the use of nuclearweapons in response to the horrific September 11 attacks. In most cases of attack on the U nited S tates,

the nuclear option would not be appropriate , but a defense response will almost always be appropriate. The United Statesneeds to be able to resort to defensive options.



2NC No Nuke Terror

No nuclear terror – counter to the goals of terror groups.Kapur ‗8 (S. Paul; Associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, The Long Shadow: Nuclear

Weapons and Security in 21st

Century Asia. pg. 32)Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes toengage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter 2004; U.S.Government 2002). However, it is not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear devices .Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity (Laqeuer I999: 4-5), extensive empiricalevidence indicates that terrorist groups in fact behave rationally , adopting strategies designed to achieve particular ends(Crenshaw I995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on whether doing so is likely to furthertheir goals. Under what circumstances could nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? For certain types of terroristobjectives, nuclear weapons could be too destructive. Large-scale devastation could negatively influenceaudiences important to the terrorist groups. Terrorists often rely on populations sympathetic to their causefor political, financial, and military support. The horrific destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienatesegments of this audience . People who otherwise would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that inusing a nuclear device terrorists had gone too far and were no longer deserving of support . The catastrophic effectsof nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, if a terrorist orga-

nization were struggling with another group for control of their common homeland, the use of nuclearweapons against the enemy group would devastate the terrorists' own home territory. Using nuclear weapons would

be extremely counterproductive for the terrorists in this scenario.

No miscalc impact – US-Russian safety systems check conflict.Morrison ‗7(James Morrison, formerly served as an assistant foreign editor for the Washington Times. Mr. Morrison returned to the Foreign Desk in 1993 tolaunch the Embassy Row column, a diplomatic news column primarily focusing on foreign ambassadors in the United States and U.S.ambassadors abroad. The column is the only one of its kind in U.S. journalism. The Washington Times, September 25, 2007, Sentinels on Guard,lexis)

Despite growing foreign-policy disputes, Moscow and Washington have prevented an accidentalnuclear disaster with extensive communication links through Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs), Russian Ambassador Yuri Us hakov said in a review of 20 years of t he program established under President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

"The NRRCs have proved their efficiency as an instrument of transparency and confidence- building ," he said in a speech last week at the State Department. "Moreover, they have become a reliable mechanism designed todiminish and eliminate the very potential threat of an accidental nuclear disaster."

No nuclear terror – they‘ll choose conventional weapo ns.Mueller ‗8 John Mueller, political science professor at Ohio State University, ―The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood‖ Jan. 1http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDFMeanwhile, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all (thus far, at least) haverelied on conventional destructive methods --there hasn't even been the occasional gas bomb. In effect the terrorists seem to beheeding the advice found in a memo on an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available...rather than waste

valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach" (Whitlock 2007). That is: Keep it simple, stupid. In fact, it seemsto be a general historical regularity that terrorists tend to prefer weapons that they know and understand,not new, exotic ones (Rapoport 1999, 51; Gilmore 1999, 37; Schneier 2003, 236). Indeed, the truly notable innovation forterrorists over the last few decades has not been in qualitative improvements in ordnance at all , but ratherin a more effective method for delivering it: the suicide bomber (Pape 2005, Bloom 2005).

No Nuclear terror – too many tech bariersSchwartz & Falk ‗3



(Yaron Schwartz, US office director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, and Ophir Falk, Vice President of AdvancedSecurity Integration Ltd., 2003‖Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Terrorism‖ 5 -13-2003http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=487)

For a terrorist group to obtain a nuclear weapon , two principal channels exist: build a device from scratch or somehow procureor steal a ready-made one or its key components. Neither of these is likely . Of all the possibilities , constructing a bomb from scratch,without state assistance, is the most unlikely. ―So remote,‖ in the words of a senior nuclear scientist at the Los

Alamos National Laboratory, ―that it can be essentially ruled out.‖ The chief obstacle lies not only in producing the nuclear fuel — either bomb-grade uranium or plutonium — but also the requirements for testing and securing safe havens for the terrorists.[16] Unlike uranium, amuch smaller quantity of plutonium is required to form a critical mass. Yet to make enough of it for a workable bomb, a reactor is needed. Couldterrorists buy one? Where would they build it? Could such a structure go undetected by satellites and other intelligence tools? That is all veryimplausible indeed. If making nuclear-bomb fuel is out of the question, why not just steal it, or buy it on the black market? Consider plutonium:if terrorists did manage to procure some weapon-grade plutonium, would their problems be over? Far fromit: plutonium works only in an ―implosion‖ -type bomb, which is about ten times more difficult to build thanthe more simple uranium bomb used at Hiroshima. Among a litany of specialized requirements is an experienced designer, anumber of other specialists and a testing program. Hence, the terrorist‘s chances of getting an implosion bomb to work are ve ry low. Analternative to stealing plutonium is bomb-grade uranium. The problem with buying bomb-grade uranium is that one wouldneed a great deal of it — around 50kg for a gun-type bomb — and nothing near that amount has turned up inthe black market. [17] Even when considering a country like Pakistan, the only possibility for terrorists to laytheir hands on that country‘s uranium would be if its government fell under the control of sympathizers.Given that Pakistan‘s army is by far the most effective and stable organ ization in the country, there is not

much chance of that happening. Russia, again, is the terrorists‘ best bet and therefore a potential target. It has tons of bomb -gradeuranium left over from the cold war and, in addition to bombs, has used this material to fuel nuclear submarines and research reactors. With areported history of smuggling attempts, there are definite prospects in Russia. If terrorists could strike themain deposit and get enough uranium for a bomb, they would be on their way. But it wou ld still be a long

journey: designing and building the bomb is anything but a trivial undertaking, as is recruiting the suitablyskilled technician/s for the task. The main risk for terrorists is getting caught . Finding an isolated location for minimalrisk of detection also would not be easy. Stealing or buying a complete bomb would circumvent theaforementioned obstacles. But this option presents other pitfalls which are even greater: all countries,including Russia and Pakistan (with US assistance ), make ever greater efforts to safeguard their warheads andmaterials, and even rogue states — if they should get the bomb (as North Korea appears to staunchly pursue) — would be highly likelyto do the same. Countries employ security measures specifically designed to prevent theft. Warheads aretypically stored in highly restricted bunkers. Terrorists would have a very hard time trying to take over oneof these and even if successful, it would be much harder to leave with the contents in hand .[18]

Nuclear terror risk exaggerated – tech barriers block the process.Mueller ‗10 John Mueller is Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University and the author of "The Remnants of War. Foreign Policy – JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 – http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/think_again_nuclear_weapons?page=0,2

"Fabricating a Bomb Is 'Child's Play.'" Hardly. An editorialist in Nature, the esteemed scientific journal, did apply thatcharacterization to the manufacture of uranium bombs, as opposed to plutonium bombs, last January, but even that seems an absurd exaggeration.Younger, the former Los Alamos research director, has expressed his amazement at how "self-declared'nuclear weapons experts,' many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon," continue to "hold forth onhow easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive." Uranium is "exceptionally difficult to machine," hepoints out, and "plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basicproperties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed." Special technology is required, and even the simplestweapons require precise tolerances. Information on the general idea for building a bomb is available online,but none of it, Younger says, is detailed enough to "enable the confident assembly of a real nuclearexplosive." A failure to appreciate the costs and difficulties of a nuclear program has led to massive

overestimations of the ability to fabricate nuclear weapons. As the 2005 Silberman-Robb commission, set up to investigate

the intelligence failures that led to the Iraq war, pointed out, it is "a fundamental analytical error" to equate "procurementactivity with weapons system capability." That is, "simply because a state can buy the parts does not mean itcan put them together and make them work." For example, after three decades of labor and well over $100million in expenditures, Libya was unable to make any progress whatsoever toward an atomic bomb. Indeed,



much of the country's nuclear material, surrendered after it abandoned its program, was still in the originalboxes.

non- State actors can‘t pull it off. Mueller ‗ 8(John, political science professor at Ohio State University, ―The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood‖ Jan. 1http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF)

More than a decade ago Allison boldly insisted that it would be "easy" for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissilematerial (Allison et al. 1996, 12).13 Atomic scientists, perhaps laboring under the concern, in Langewiesche's words, that "a declaration of safetycan at any time be proved spectacularly wrong" (2007, 49), have been comparatively restrained in cataloguing the difficulties terrorists wouldface in constructing a bomb. But physicists Wirz and Egger have published a paper that does so, and it concludes that the task "couldhardly be accomplished by a subnational group" (2005, 501). They point out that precise blueprints are required,not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint they "would most certainly be forcedto redesign" (2005, 499-500). The process could take months or even a year or more (Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 62), and in distinctcontrast with Allison, they stress that the work , far from being "easy," is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, andthat the technical requirements "in several fields verge on the unfeasible." They conclude that "it takes muchmore than knowledge of the workings of nuclear weapons and access to fissile material to successfullymanufacture a usable weapon" (2005, 501-2).



FDI



1NC

Econ resilientE.I.U. ‗11 (Economist Intelligence Unit – Global Forecasting Service, 11/16/‘11 (http://gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?articleType=gef&articleId=668596451&secID=7)

The US economy , by any standard, remains weak, and consumer and business sentiment are close to 2009 lows. That said, the economy

has been surprisingly resilient in the face of so many shocks. US real GDP expanded by a relatively robust2.5% in the third quarter of 2011, twice the rate of the previous quarter. Consumer spending rose by 2.4%, which is

impressive given that real incomes dropped during the quarter (the savings rate fell, which helps to explain the anomaly.)

Historically, US consumers have been willing to spend even in difficult times. Before the 2008-09 slump,

personal spending rose in every quarter between 1992 and 2007. That resilience is again in evidence: retail sales in Septemberwere at a seven-month high , and sales at chain stores have been strong. Business investment has been even more

buoyant : it expanded in the third quarter by an impressive 16.3% at an annual rate, and spending by companies in September on

conventional capital goods (that is, excluding defence and aircraft) grew by the most since March. This has beenmade possible , in part, by strong corporate profits. According to data compiled by Bloomberg, earnings for US companies in

the S&P 500 rose by 24% year on year in the third quarter. All of this has occurred despite a debilitating fiscal debate inWashington, a sovereign debt downgrade by a major ratings agency and exceptional volatility in capitalmarkets. This reinforces our view that the US economy , although weak, is not in danger of falling into arecession (absent a shock from the euro zone). US growth will, however, continue to be held back by a weak labour market — theunemployment rate has been at or above 9% for 28 of the last 30 months — and by a moribund housing market.

No diversionary theory – it‘ll be small scale if it happensHarrison ‗11 (Mark, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, HooverInstitution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, ―Capitalism at War‖ Oct 19http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/harrison/papers/capitalism.pdf)

Diversionary wars In the concept of diversionary wars, political leaders seek and exploit conflict with externaladversaries in order to rally domestic support . The idea is well est ablished in the literature, perhaps because the t heoretical case is quiteintuitive, and narrative support is not hard to find. In fact, it may be too easy; as Jack Levy (1989) pointed out, few wars have not been attributed to political leaders‘

desire to improve domestic standing. The idea of diversionary wars is directly relevant to a discussion of capitalismonly if it can be shown that capitalist polities are more likely to exploit foreign adventures. One reason might be

advanced from a Marxist perspective: perhaps capitalist societies , being class-divided, are more likely to give rise to warsintended to divert the workers from the cause of socialism . A longstanding interpretation of t he origins of World War I in domestic

German politics conveys exactly this message (Berghahn 1973). This view does not sit well with the equally traditional idea thata class-divided society is less able to go to war. The official Soviet histories of World War II used toclaim that, under capitalism, divided class interests made the working people reluctant to fight for the nation.

Because of this, the workers could be motivated to take part only by ―demagogy, deception, bribery, andforce ‖ (Grechko et al., eds 1982, vol. 12, p. 38; Pospelov et a l., eds 1965, vol. 6, pp. 80-82). Quantitative empirical work has lent little support to the idea (Levy

1989). Exceptions include studies of the use of force by U.S. and British postwar governments by Morgan and Bickers (1992) and Morgan and Anderson (1999). Theyconclude that the use of force is more likely when government approval is high but the government‘s supportingcoalition is suffering erosion . They also suggest that force is unlikely to be used at high intensities under suchcircumstances ( because likely costs are high, eroding political support) or when domestic conflict is high(because conflict would then be polarizing rather than consolidate support). Another line of research suggests that new orincompletely established democracies are particularly vulnerable to risky adventures in nation-building (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). One inspiration for this viewwas the record of the new democracies born out o f the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. More recently, Georgia seems to have provided out-of-sample

confirmation. Suppose diversionary wars exist. Is capitalism somehow more internally conflicted than other societies,

and so disproportionately likely to externalize conflict? As a comparator, the case of fascism seems



straightforward . Fascism did not produce diversionary wars because, for fascists, war was not a diversion ;

it was the Schwerpunkt. The more interesting case is that of communism. Communists do not seem to have pursued diversionary wars. But the domestic legitimacy of Soviet rule visibly relied on the image of anexternal enemy, and thrived on tension short of military conflict . Soviet leaders used external tension to

justify internal controls on movement, culture, and expression, and the associated apparatus of s ecrecy, censorship, and surveillance. When theytolerated trends towards détente in the 1970s, they subverted their own controls . An East German Stasi officer told his

boss, repeating it later to Garton Ash (1997, p. 159): ―How can you expect me to prevent [defections and revelations], when we‘ve signed all these internationalagreements for improved relations with the West, working conditions for journalists, freedom of movement, respect for human r ights?‖ If Soviet foreign policy wassometimes expansionist, it sought expansion only up to the point where the desired level of tension was assured. Bolsheviks of the 1917 generation knew well that toomuch too much conflict abroad encouraged defeatist and counter-revolutionary sentiments at home. Oleg Khlevniuk (1995, p. 174) noted: ―The complex relationship

between war and revolution, which had almost seen the tsarist regime toppled in 1905 and which finally brought its demise in 1917, was a relationship of which Stalinwas acutely aware. The lessons of history had to be learnt lest history repeat itself.‖ Stalin did all he could to avoid war with Germany in 1941 (Gorodetsky 1999).Postwar Soviet leaders risked war by proxy, but avoided direct conflict with the ―main adversary.‖ Faced with unfavourable od ds, they tended to withdraw (from

Cuba) or do nothing (in Poland) or accepted them with great reluctance (in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan). Diversionary tension mustfall short of diversionary war. From this follows an acceptance that capitalism, because of its tendency togive rise to democratic structures and political competition, has been more open to diversionary wars than

other systems. But the empirical research and analysis that underpin this conclusion also imply that such warswould generally be small scale and short lived , and the circumstances that give rise to them would beexceptional or transient . We should place this in the wider context of the ―democratic peace .‖ As Levy (1988)

wrote: ―Liberal or democratic states do not fight each other … This absence of wa r between democracies

comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations .‖ Since all liberaldemocracies have also been capitalist on any definition, it is a finding of deep relevance.

Decline doesn‘t cause war Barnett ‗ 9 (Thomas P.M Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/2 5/‘9 – ―The NewRules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,‖ Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, http://www.aprodex.com/the -new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of , and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depressionleading to world war , as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China

and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize howglobalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the internationalsecurity landscape. ¶ None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity .org can

be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas andFatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year , and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the lastcentury. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly,

the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the openingceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign)

for that sudden spike in a n almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. ¶ Lookingover the various databases , then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies,and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential

state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran)

are both

tied to one side acquiring a

nuclear weapon capacity -

- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. ¶ And with the U nited States effectively tied down by its two

ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest , both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis : e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts

in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere elsewe find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese --

unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training localforces.



2NC Resilient

US econ resilientJohnson ‗13 (Robert , CFA, director of economic analysis with Morningstar, Morningstar.com, ―U.S. Economy Not So Fragile After All‖ – 1/19 –

http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=581616)

No, the U.S. Economy Has Not Been Fragile After All ¶ Although most economists got at least some things right

about the U.S. economy over the past two years, the one nearly universal error was the expectation that the economywas fragile. The U.S. economy has proven to be anything but fragile . ¶ I believe this to be the single biggest

error that economists have made over the last two years. During that time, the U.S. has survived the fallout from a majordebt crisis in Europe, a divisive election , temporarily going over the fiscal cliff , gasoline prices thathave been on a yo-yo, a tsunami in Japan, and Hurricane Sandy, which shut down New York andeven the stock exchanges for a couple of days. These are not signs of a fragile economy.

Econ resilient – fundamentals growingStewart ‗13 (Hale Stewart spent 5 years as a bond broker in the late 1990s before returning to law school in the early 2000s. He is currently a tax lawyer inHouston, Texas. He has an LLM from the Thomas Jefferson School of Law in domestic and international taxation where he graduated MagnaCum Laude, seeking alpha, ―Is The U.S. Economy Moving Into A Higher Growth Phase? Part 1 - The Positive‖ – Feb 5 th – http://seekingalpha.com/article/1158011-is-the-u-s-economy-moving-into-a-higher-growth-phase-part-1-the-positive?source=google_news)

All three of the above sectors -- housing, autos and manufacturing -- are bedrock components of the economy. If

all three are doing fairly well , the worst that can happen is slow growth. There is simply too much of a

multiplier effect of the combined total for a recession to occur with the above three expanding. However, this is

before we get to the latest and upcoming fiscal follies from the people in Washington. We'll touch on that in Part 2.

Recovery from 2008 proves economy resilientDrezner ‗12 (Daniel, Professor International Politics Tufts University, October, ―The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked‖ Councilon Foreign Relations International Institutions and Global Governance)

In looking at outcomes, the obvious question is how well the global economy has recovered from the2008 crisis . The current literature on economic downturns suggests two factors that impose significant barriers to a strong recovery from the

Great Recession: it was triggered by a financial crisis and it was global in scope . Whether measuring output, per

capita income, or employment, financial crashes trigger downturns that last longer and have far weaker recoveries than

standard business cycle downturns.10 Furthermore, the global nature of the crisis makes it extremely difficult forcountries to export their way out of the problem . Countries that have experienced severe banking crises since World War

II have usually done so when the global economy was largely unaffected. That was not the case for the Great Recession. The globaleconomy has rebounded much better than during the Great Depression . Economists Barry Eichengreen andKevin O‘Rourke have compi led data to compare global economic performance from the start of the crises (see Figures 1 and 2).11 Two facts

stand out in their comparisons. First, the percentage drop in global industrial output and world trade levels atthe start of the 2008 financial crisis was more precipitous than the falloffs following the October1929 stock market crash . The drop in industrial output was greater in 2008 nine months into the crisis than it was eighty years earlierafter the same amount of time. The drop in trade flows was more than twice as large. Second, the post-2008 rebound has been far more robust.

Four years after the onset of the Great Recession, global industrial output is 10 percent higher than when therecession began . In contrast, four years after the 1929 stock market crash, industrial output was atonly two-thirds of precrisis levels. A similar story can be told with aggregate economic growth. According to World Bank

figures, global economic output rebounded in 2010 with 2.3 percent growth , followed up in 2011 with 4.2 percent growth. The global growth rate in 2011 was 44 percent higher than the average of the previous decade. Even more intriguing, the growthcontinued to be poverty reducing.12 The World Bank‘s latest figures suggest that despite the 2008 financial crisis, extreme poverty continued to



decline across all the major regions of the globe. And the developing world achieved its first Millennium Development Goal of halving the 1990

levels of extreme poverty.13 An important reason for the quick return to positive economic growth is that cross-border flows did notdry up after the 2008 crisis . Again, compared to the Great Depression, trade flows have rebounded extremelywell .14 Four years after the 1929 stock market crash, trade flows were off by 25 percent compared to precrisis levels. Current trade flows, incontrast, are more than 5 percent higher than in 2008. Even compared to other postwar recessions, the current period has seen robust crossborder

exchange. Indeed, as a report from CFR‘s Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies concluded in May 2012, ― The growth in

world trade since the start of the [current] recovery exceeds even the best of the prior postwarexperiences .‖15 Other cross -border flows have also rebounded from 2008 – 2009 lows. Global foreign direct investment (FDI) has returnedto robust levels. FDI inflows rose by 17 percent in 2011 alone. This put annual FDI levels at $1.5 trillion, surpassing the three-year precrisisaverage, though still approximately 25 percent below the 2007 peak. More generally, global foreign investment assets reached $96 trillion, a 5

percent increase from precrisis highs. Remittances from migrant workers have become an increasingly important revenue stream to thedeveloping world — and the 2008 financial crisis did not dampen that income stream. Cross-border remittances to developing countries quicklyrebounded to precrisis levels and then rose to an estimated all-time high of $372 billion in 2011, with growth rates in 2011 that exceeded those in2010. Total cross-border remittances were more than $501 billion last year, and are estimated to reach $615 billion by 2014.16 Another salient

outcome is mass public attitudes about the global economy. A general assumption in public opinion research is that during adownturn, demand for greater economic closure should spike, as individuals scapegoatforeigners for domestic woes . The global nature of the 2008 crisis, combined with anxiety aboutthe shifting distribution of power, should have triggered a fall in support for an open globaleconomy . Somewhat surprisingly, however, the reverse is true . Pew‘s Global Attitudes Project has surveyed a wide spectrum

of countries since 2002, asking people about their opinions on both international trade and the free market more generally.17 The resultsshow resilient support for expanding trade and business ties with other countries . Twenty-four countrieswere surveyed both in 2007 and at least one year after 2008, including a majority of the G20 economies. Overall, eighteen of those twenty-fourcountries showed equal or greater support for trade in 2009 than two years earlier. By 2011, twenty of twenty-four countries showed greater orequal support for trade compared to 2007. Indeed, between 2007 and 2012, the unweighted average support for more trade in these countriesincreased from 78.5 percent to 83.6 percent. Contrary to expectation, there has been no mass public rejection of the open global economy. Indeed,

public support for the open trading system has strengthened, despite softening public support for free-market economics more generally.18 Thefinal outcome addresses a dog that hasn‘t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on crossborderconflict and violence . During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisiswould lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power .19 Whether throughgreater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great powerconflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to anincrease in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy

movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests otherwise , however. A fundamental

conclusion from a recen t report by the Institute for Economics and Peace is that ― the average level of peacefulness in 2012is approximately the same as it was in 2007.‖ 20 Interstate violence in particular has declined sincethe start of the financial crisis — as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great

Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict ; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of theCold War has not been reversed.21



2NC US Not Key

( ) US not key — global economies decoupling

Caryl ‗10 [Christian Caryl is a Editor at Foreign Policy and Newsweek and a Senior Fellow of the CSIS at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,―Crisis? What Crisis?‖ 4/5/10 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/ 2010/04/05/crisis_what_crisis?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]We went through a terrifying moment back in the fall of 2008. The financial system in the United States was imploding . It wasimpossible to predict how the effects would ripple through the rest of the world, but one outcome seemed inevitable: Developing economies weregoing to take a terrible hit. There was just no way they could escape the maelstrom without seeing millions of their citizens impoverished. Manyemerging-market countries did experience sharp drops in GDP. Their capital markets tanked. Dominique Strauss-Kahn , managing director ofthe International Monetary Fund (IMF), sounded downright apocalyptic: "All this will affect dramatically unemployment, and

beyond unemployment for many countries it will be at the roots of social unrest, some threat to democracy, and maybe for some cases it canalso end in war ." The Economist recently noted, "The Institute of International Finance (IIF), a think-tank in Washington, DC, forecast thatnet private capital flows into poor countries in 2009 would be 72% lower than at their peak in 2007, an unprecedented shrinkage." Virtuallyeveryone expected to see the countries that had benefited so dramatically from growth in the years leading up to the crisis to sufferdisproportionately in its wake. An entirely rational assumption -- except it hasn't turned out that way at all. To be sure, there were fartoo many poor people in the world before the crisis, and that still remains the case . Some 3 billion people still live on lessthan $2.50 a day. But the global economic crisis hasn't added appreciably to their ranks . Just take China, India, andIndonesia, Asia's three biggest emerging markets. Although growth in all three slowed, it never went into reverse .China's robust growth through the crisis has been much publicized -- but Indonesia's, much less conspicuously. Those countries, as well asBrazil and Russia, have rebounded dramatically . The Institute of International Finance -- the same people who gave that dramaticallyskepticism-inducing estimate earlier -- now says that net private capital flows to developing countries could reach $672 billion this year (doublethe 2009 amount). That's less than the high point of 2007, to be sure. But it still seems remarkable in light of the dire predictions . Inshort, the countries that have worked the hardest to join the global marketplace are showing remarkable resilience . Itwasn't always this way. Recall what happened back in 1997 and 1998, when the Thai government's devaluation of its currency triggered theAsian financial crisis. Rioting across Indonesia brought down the Suharto government. The administration of Filipino President Joseph Estradacollapsed. The turbulence echoed throughout the region and into the wider world, culminating in the Russian government default and August1998 ruble devaluation. Brazil and Argentina trembled. The IMF was everywhere, dispensing advice and dictating conditions. It was theemerging markets that bore the brunt of that crisis. So what's different this time around? The answers differ from place to place, butthere are some common denominators. Many of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) learned vital lessons from the trauma ofthe late 1990s, hence the IMF's relatively low-key profile this time around . (The fund has been most active in Africa, wherethey still need the help -- unless you count Greece, of course.) Many emerging economies entered the 2008-2009 crisis withhealthy balance sheets. In most cases governments reacted quickly and flexibly, rolling out stimulus programs or

even expanding poverty-reduction programs . Increasingly, the same countries that have embraced globalization andmarkets are starting to build social safety nets . And there's another factor: Trade is becoming more evenly distributedthroughout the world. China is now a bigger market for Asian exporters than the United States . Some economists aretalking about "emerging market decoupling." Jonathan Anderson, an emerging-markets economist at the Swiss bank UBS, showed inone recent report how car sales in emerging markets have actually been rising during this latest bout of turmoil -- powerfulevidence that emerging economies no longer have to sneeze when America catches a cold . Aphitchaya Nguanbanchong, aconsultant for the British-based aid organization Oxfam, has studied the crisis's effects on Southeast Asian economies. "The research so far showsthat the result of the crisis isn't as bad as we were expecting," she says. Indonesia is a case in point: " People in this region and at the

policy level learned a lot from the past crisis." Healthy domestic demand cushioned the shock when the crisis hitexport-oriented industries ; the government weighed in immediately with hefty stimulus measures. Nguanbanchong says that she has beensurprised by the extent to which families throughout the region have kept spending money on education even as incomes have declined for some.And that , she says, reinforces a major lesson that emerging-market governments can take away from the crisis:"Governments should focus more on social policy , on health, education, and services. They shouldn't be intervening so muchdirectly in the economy itself." This ought to be a big story. But you won't have much luck finding it in the newspapers -- perhaps because it runsso contrary to our habitual thinking about the world economy. The U.N. Development Programme and the Asian Development Bank recently

published a report that attempts to assess what effect the crisis will have on the world's progress toward the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, benchmarks that are supposed to be achieved by 2015. At first glance the report's predictions are daunting: It states that 21 million people in thedeveloping world are "at risk" of slipping into extreme poverty and warns that the goals are unlikely to be met. Many experts wonder, of course,whether the V-shaped crisis we've witnessed so far is going to turn into a W, with another sharp downturn still to come. Some argue that theGreat Recession's real damage has yet to be felt. Yet the report also contains some interesting indications that this might not be the case. "Theglobal economic crisis has been widely predicted to affect international migration and remittances adversely," it notes. "But as the crisis unfolds,it is becoming clear that the patterns of migration and remittances may be more complex than was previously imagined." In other words, theseinterconnections are proving to be much more resilient than anyone might have predicted earlier . As the report notes,receipts of remittances have so far actually increased in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, and Sri Lanka. Perhapsmigrant workers -- those global experts in entrepreneurship and risk-taking -- know something that a lot of the rest of us don't. So why should we



care? Anirudh Krishna, a Duke University political scientist who studies poverty reduction, says that there's a moral to the story: " Certainlycutting countries and people off from markets is no longer a sensible thing to do. Expanding those connections, bringing in alarger part of a talent pool into the high-growth sector -- that is what would make most countries grow faster and more individuals climb out of

poverty." Echoing Nguanbanchong, he argues that governments are well-advised to concentrate on providing their citizens with education andhealth care -- the great enablers in the fight for social betterment. Microfinance and income subsidy programs can fill important gaps -- as long asthey aim to empower future entrepreneurs, not create cultures of entitlement. This is not to say the outlook is bright on every front, of course. Asthe Economist noted, the number of people facing hunger recently topped 1 billion, the highest since 1970. The reason for that has more to dowith the 2007-2008 spike in food prices than with the financial crisis. (Remember how the price of rice shot up?) We are still a long way fromconquering poverty. There is still a huge -- and in some cases growing -- gap between the world's rich and poor. Yet how remarkable itwould be if we could one day look back on the 2008-2009 crisis as the beginning of a more equitable globaleconomy .

( ) The U.S is not key – Asia fill-in and decoupling

Xinbo ‗10(Wu, a professor and deputy director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, and a member of TWQ‘s editorial

board―Understanding the Geopolitical Implications of the Global Financial Crisis‖ The Washington Quarterly – 33:4 pp. – 155163http://www.twq.com/10october/docs/10oct_Xinbo.pdf)

While China suffered moderately from the crisis economically, it has gained remarkably in politico-economicterms. For one thing, the Chinese model of development _ featured by a strong role of the state in economic development,

stress on the real rather than the virtual economy, a high savings rate, measured financial market liberalization, etc._has empoweredChina to better resist the financial storm and minimize the losses associated with it. As a developing country,

China‘s experience appears more applicable to the developing world. For instance, as Alex Perry of Timemagazine observed, ‗‗African governments look at Western economic instability over the past two years and find a better model in Asia‘sextraordinary growth.‘‘8 In the post— ColdWar era, the U.S. model used to be hailed as the only way to economic prosperity. Now, the Chinesemodel seems to provide an alternative. To be sure, the Chinese model is not perfect and is actually confronted with many challenges such as awidening income gap, serious environment pollution, and rampant corruption. Yet, the record of tiding over two financial crises (the 1998 — 1999Asian financial crisis and the 2008 — 2009 global financial crisis) and securing three decades of a high economic growth rate testifies to its

strength. Unlike Washington, Beijing does not like to boast of its model and impose it on others, but theincreased appeal of the Chinese experience will certainly enhance Beijing‘s international status and augment its

influence among developing countries. Even before the recent crisis, there was already discussion of decoupling Asianeconomies from the United States, given growing intra-Asian economic activities .9 The reality that China has

already become the largest trading partner to some major regional economies , such as Japan, South Korea, and

Taiwan, provided an

additionalincentive to further East Asian

regionaleconomic cooperation

. Even in Japan,where the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) rose to power during the crisis in August 2009, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama noted that: [T]herecent financial crisis has suggested to many people that the era of American unilateralism may come to an end. It has also made people harbordoubts about the permanence of the dollar as the key global currency. I also feel that as a result of the failure of the Iraq war and the financialcrisis, the era of US-led globalism is coming to an end and that we are moving away from a unipolar world toward an era of multipolarity.10

Hatoyama continued that, ‗‗ Current developments show clearly that China , which has by far the world‘s largest population,

will become one of the world‘s leading economic nations , while also continuing to expand its military power.‘‘11 He pledged to strengthen relations with Asian countries, particularly China, and work to build an East Asian Community. Behind this lies arecognition of China‘s growing importance to Japan‘s economic future. South Korea also expressed enthusiasm for forging a fre e trade agreementwith China as early as possible. Taiwan signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with mainland China in June 2009,marking a major step forward in relations across the Taiwan Strait. The agreement, focusing on tariff concession and easier market access, willremove tariffs within two years on 539 Taiwan export items to the mainland worth $13.84 billion, as well as 267 mainland export items toTaiwan valued at $2.86 billion. The pact will also give Taiwan firms access to 11 service sectors on the mainland including banking, accounting,

insurance, and hospitals.12 The financial crisis also prompted Beijing to boost its domestic consumption .As the great potential of its internal market is further released, it will serve both to thicken China‘s economic ties with r egional partners and to

strengthen its role as an East Asian economic hub. In a nutshell, the financial and economic turmoil underscored China‘s position as the engine of the Asian regional economy and even the global economy as well . In international politics,

political and economic relations always follow each other. AfterWorldWar II, many regional members developed close economic ties with the

United States, following tight political and security arrangements with Washington. By the same token, today and in the future, China‘sdeepening economic connections with its regional partners promise to expand its political cloutin East Asia . Given China‘s growing economic size and its excellent performance during the crisis, it is no surprise that the financial

turmoil served to raise China‘s status in global economic governance. The G-20 emerged from the crisis a s the premier forumfor international economic cooperation, shadowing the traditional role of the G-8 in world economy. China , as the world‘s



third largest economy and the largest foreign reserve holder, ascended to center stage within the G-20 . The idea of a G-2,consisting of Beijing and Washington governing the world economy or managing international geopolitics, was tossed around among U.S.

scholars and former government officials (although not endorsed by either Beijing or Washington), reflecting a recognition ofChina‘s newly -accrued economic and geopolitical weight . In April 2010, the World Bank decided to increaseChina‘s voting rights, making it the third largest voter in the institution. The IMF is also expected to raise China‘s representation in its current

round of reconstruction endeavors. All in all, the financial crisis benefited China by quickening the pace of the

global economic and financial power transition , turning China from a peripheral member into a key player. Last but notleast, the crisis gave credit to China‘s currency Renminbi (RMB) for its strength and stability . Even before the

crisis, the RMB was already used in some of China‘s neighboring countries for settling accounts in border

trade. The financial storm revealed the volatility of the U.S. dollar and highlighted the strength of the Chineseyuan. Although the RMB is not yet freely convertible, some of China‘s major trading partners saw thedesirability of increasing its holding as the U.S. dollar has been getting weaker , arousing concerns that anunstable dollar would lead to increased costs and risks for traders. Since the onset of the crisis, China has signed bilateral currency swapagreements with Argentina, Belarus, Iceland, Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea, with a total amount of 803.5 billion

yuan (about $118.1 billion). Some countries also moved to take the RMB as one of its reserve currencies.It was the crisis that caused Beijing to think seriously about the regionalization of the RMB . Toenhance that goal, the Chinese government undertook to push the RMB settlement pilots in the trade between China‘s two most i mportantexporting regions, Guangdong and the Yangtze River Delta, with Hong Kong and Macao, and between two Chinese provinces borderingSoutheast Asia, Gaungxi and Yunnan, with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In early 2009, Beijing alsoapproved Shanghai‘s ambitious goal of turning itself into an international financial center by 2020, matching China‘s economic influence and theyuan‘s international position. It will be a long journey for theRMBto become a major international reserve currency, but it s eems that theglobal financial crisis has turned out to be its starting point.



2NC AT: Diversionary Theory

Diversionary war theory is falseBoehmer ‗7 (Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, ―The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, andState Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict‖) This article examines the contemporaneous effect of low economic growth and domestic instability on the threat of regime change and/ or

involvement in external militarized conflicts. Many studies of diversionary conflict argue that lower rates of economic

growth should heighten the risk of international conflict . Yet we know that militarized interstate conflicts, andespecially wars, are generally rare events whereas lower rates of growth are not. Additionally, a growing body of literature shows that regimechanges are also associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or

regime change, is the most likely to occur with domestic discord and lower rates of economic growth? Diversionary theory claimsthat leaders seek to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy or politicalscandals, or to garner increased support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize discontented domestic sentiments onto othernations, sometimes as scapegoats based on the similar in-group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Coser (1956) and Simmel (1955),where foreign countries are blamed for domestic problems. This process is said to involve a ―rally -round-the- flag‖ effect, where a leader canexpect a short-term boost in popularity with the threat or use of force (Blechman, Kaplan, and Hall 1978; Mueller 1973). Scholarship ondiversionary conflict has focused most often on the American case1 but recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in othercountries.2 The Falklands War is often a popular example of diversionary conflict (Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina was reeling fromhyperinflation and rampant unemployment associated with the Latin American debt crisis. It is plausible that a success in the Falklands War mayhave helped to rally support for the governing Galtieri regime, although Argentina lost the war and the ruling regime lost power. How many otherattempts to use diversionary tactics, if they indeed occur, can be seen to generate a similar outcome? The goal of this article is to provide an

assessment of the extent to which diversionary strategy is a threat to peace. Is this a colorful theory kept alive byacademics that has little bearing upon real events , or is this a real problem that policy makers should be concerned with?If it is a strategy readily available to leaders, then it is important to know what domestic factors trigger this gambit. Moreover, to know that

requires an understanding of the context in external conflict, which occurs relative to regime changes. Theories of diversionaryconflict usually emphasize the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equalattention to the prospective costs associated with such behavior. It is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain

in office. However, whether they can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic

unpopularity through their states‘ participation in foreign militarized conflicts — especially outside of the American case — is a question

open for debate . Furthermore, there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic

conflict and regime change. Lower rates of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internalconflicts) as well as regime changes (Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if leaders do , in fact, undertake diversionaryconflicts, many may still be thrown from the seat of power — especially if the outcome is defeat to aforeign enemy. Diversionary conflict would thus seem to be a risky gambit (Smith 1996). Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988)

have nevertheless questioned the validity of the diversionary thesis . As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarelyformulated as a cohesive and comprehensive theory , and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not

necessarily build on past studies and the discrepancies between inquiries are often difficult to unravel. ― Studies have used a varietyof research designs , different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation

techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different states‖ (Bennett an d Nordstrom 2000, 39). To these problems, we should add a lack of theoretical precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring tothe linkages between economic conditions and domestic strife that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently,extant studies are to a degree incommensurate; they offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations andtests of economic growth and interstate conflict. Yet a few studies have attempted to provide deductive explanations about when and how

diversionary tactics might be employed. Using a Bayesian updating game, Richards and others (1993) theorize that while the use of force wouldappear to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity, a poorly performing economy acts as a signal to a leader‘s constituents about his or her

competence. Hence, attempts to use diversion are likely to fail either because incompetent leaders willlikewise fail in foreign policy or people will recognize the gambit for what it is . Instead, these two modelsconclude that diversion is likely to be undertaken particularly by risk-acceptant leaders. This stress on a heightened risk of removal from office isalso apparent in the work of Bueno de Mesquita and others (1999), and Downs and Rocke (1994), where leaders may ―gamble for resurrection,‖although the diversionary scenario in the former study is only a partial extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leadersurvival. Again, how often do leaders fail in the process or are removed from positions of power before they can even initiate diversionarytactics? A few studies focusing on leader tenure have examined the removal of leaders following war, although almost no study in thediversionary literature has looked at the effects of domestic problems on the relative risks of regime change, interstate conflict, or both eventsoccurring in the same year.3



Low growth makes politicians cautious —they don‘t want to risk war because it makesthem vulnerableBoehmer ‗7 (Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, ―The Effects of Economic Crisis, D omestic Discord, and

State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict‖) Economic Growth and Fatal MIDs The theory presented earlier predicts that lower rates of growth suppress participationin foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. Tosustain combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second front when theyare already fighting , or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelledthe Soviet Union from their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern

Alliance insurrection. Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However, considering thatthere are many reasons why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially inregard to the risk of participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may besafe to make and may be made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end mayremain mere cheap talk that does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b)found that secure leaders were more likely to become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here.

We should find that leaders who face domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shyaway from situations that could escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability toretain power .



2NC Decline Doesn‘t Cause War

Economic decline doesn ‘t cause war Jervis ,‘11 (Robert, Professor PolSci Columbia, December, ―Force in Our Times‖ Survival, Vol 25 No 4, p 403 -425)

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peacefulworld generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one

example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties ,

which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor

economic policies . While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough tolead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other . It is not so much that economicinterdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen

internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade andeconomic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexistinghigh level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that theircountries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others . Is it possible that problems will not only

become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does

not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that wehave seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is thesolution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make warthinkable .

Multipolarity makes your arguments untrue —economic decline doesn‘t cause warThirlwell ‗10

— MPhil in economics from Oxford U, po stgraduate qualifications in applied finance from Macquarie U, program director in International Econo my for the Lowy Instit ute for InternationalPolicy (Mark, September 2010, ―The Return of Geo -economics: Globalisation and National Security‖, Lowy Instit ute for International Policy, google scholar,) Summing up the evidence, then, I would judge that while empirical support for the Pax Mercatoria is not conclusive, nevertheless it‘s stillstrongly supportive of the general idea that international integration is good for peace, all else equal. Since there is also even stronger evidence

that peace is good for trade, this raises the possibility of a nice virtuous circle : globalisation (trade) promotes peace ,

which in turn promotes more globalisation. In this kind of world, we should not worry too much about the big power shifts described in the previous section, since they are taking place against a backdrop of greater economic integration whichshould help smooth the whole process. ¶ Instead of ending this section on that optimistic note, however, it‘s worth thinking about some reasons

why the Pax Mercatoria might nevertheless turn out to be a poor , or at least overly optimistic, guide to our future . ¶ The first is captured by that all important get-out-of-gaol- free card, ‗all else equal‘. It‘s quite possible that the peace -promoting effects ofinternational commerce will end up being swamped by other factors, just as they were in 1914. ¶ Second, perhaps the theory itself is wrong.Certainly, a realist like John Mearsheimer would seem to have little time for the optimistic consequences of the rise of new powers implied by thetheory. Here‘s Mearsheimer on how the US should view China‘s economic progress, for example: ¶ ‗ . . . the United S tates has a profound interestin seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead . . . A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressivestate determined to achieve regional hegemony.‘ 62 ¶ Such pessimistic (or are they tragic?) views of the world would also seem to run the risk of

being self-fulfilling prophecies if they end up guiding actual policy. ¶ Finally, there is the risk that the shift to a multipolar worldmight indirectly undermine some of the supports needed to deliver globalisation. Here I am thinking about some simple

variant on the idea of hegemonic stability theory (HST) – the proposition that the global economy needs a leader (or ‗ hegemon ‘)

that is both able and willing to provide the sorts of international public goods that are required for its smoothfunctioning : open markets (liberal or ‗free‘ trade), a smoothly functioning monetary regime , liberal capital flows,

and a lender of last resort function. 63 Charles Kindleberger argued that ‗ the 1929 depression was so wide, so deep, and

so long because the international economic system was rendered unstable by British inability and US

unwillingness to assume responsibility for stabilizing it‘, drawing on the failures of the Great Depression to make the original case for

HST: ¶ ‗ . . . the international economic and monetary system needs leadership , a country that is prepared . . .

to set standards of conduct for other countries and to seek to get others to follow them , to take on an undue share of the burdens of the system, and in particular to take on its support in adversity...‘ 64 ¶ Kindleberger‘s assessment appears to capture a rough empirical

regularity: As Findlay and O‘Rourke remind us, ‗ periods of sustained expansion in world trade have tended to coincide d with



the infrastructure of law and order necessary to keep trade routes open being provided by a dominant ―hegemon ‖ or imperial power‘. 65

Thus periods of globalisation have typically been associated with periods of hegemonic or imperial power ,such as the Pax Mongolica, the Pax Britannica and, most recently, the Pax Americana (Figure 9). ¶ The risk, then, is that by reducing theeconomic clout of the U nited States, it is possible that the shift to a multipolar world economy mightundermine either the willingness or the ability (or both) of Washington to continue to supply the international

public goods needed to sustain a (relatively) smoothly functioning world economy. 66 That in turn couldundermine the potential virtuous circle identified above.



Solvency



1NC

Maduro must say ―no‖. The upside of plan gets outweighed by domestic politics. If heaccepts, he‘ll get destroyed politically. Shifter ‗13 Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Councilon Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter- American Dialogue. ―A BolivarianDream Deferred‖ – Foreign Policy, June 24, 2013 – http://thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3338

It makes sense for Venezuela to reach out to the United States, but at least in the short term , Madurowill have a tough time holding back on his strident, anti-American rhetoric . For political survival, heneeds to prove his Chavista bona fides to the base that brought him to the presidency . Whatever

happens abroad, Maduro will be increasingly consumed by Venezuela's staggering problems at home. Chávez left a

country devoid of institutions. Instead, he bequeathed cronies like Maduro who has so far been able to fend off criticism from

his neighbors but is hardly in a position to lead the kind of broad ideological movement that Chávez was

able to cobble together in his glory days.

Snowden affair confirms US has no leverage over Venezuela.Sanchez ‗13 W. Alex Sanchez, Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs – ―Asylum for Snowden? Why are Venezuela, Nicaragua, others in LatinAmerica doing this?‖ – Matisak Blog – July 7th – http://matisak.wordpress.com/2013/07/07/asylum-for-snowden-why-are-venezuela-nicaragua-others-in-latin-america-doing-this/

It wouldn‘t be outrageous to assume that if Venezuela or Nicaragua accept Snowden, Washingtonmay want to apply soft power/soft pressure as some kind of ―punishment,‖ this may mean calling backambassadors and diplomatic staff (though at this point I‘m amazed there are any U.S. diplomats in Venezuela after the Chavez era), expelling

diplomatic staff from these nations from the U.S., or maybe Washington could cancel some trade deals or impose some

kind of trade embargo . For example Ecuador withdrew from the ATPDEA treaty at the same time that it was considering to acceptSnowden. But that treaty was going to expire soon anyways and it seemed unlikely that the U.S. would want to renew it (especially if the Quito

had accepted Snowden). When it comes to Venezuela, it seems clear that Maduro has little interest in

strengthening trade or diplomatic relations with the U.S. , so any kind of ―punishment‖ from Washington. With that said, I amslightly surprised about Nicaragua. Certainly, Ortega was no friend of the U.S. during the Cold War, but modern-day Nicaragua-U.S. relations arenot particularly bad, or as bad as U.S.-Venezuela relations at least. Recently, SOUTHCOM donated parachutes and some other military

equipment to Nica ragua‘s special forces (this happened in late June), so some military cooperation between the two governments does exist. Ithink Nicaragua potentially stands to lose a lot if Snowden does touch Nicaraguan soil, ascompared if the American ends up in Venezuela.

QPQ Negotiations can‘t work. Too much tension, too little mutual respect O‘Reilly ‗13 Andrew O'Reilly – Writer/Producer for @FoxNewsLatino. ―U.S. -Venezuelan Relations Remain Tense Under Maduro, Experts Claim‖ – Fox

News Latino – April 17 – http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/04/17/us-venezuelan-relations-remain-tense-under-maduro-experts-claim/#ixzz2YYYnvrAl

While the ultimate impact of the Venezuelan presidential election remains to be seen, what's for sure is that relations between theUnited States and the administration of President-elect Nicolás Maduro will continue to be as tense as under thelate Hugo Chávez, experts said. After voting on Sunday in a Caracas slum, Maduro said that while he would like to reestablish relationswith the U.S. ―in terms of equality and respect,‖ Washington will always try to undermine his rule. These words followed a steady rhetoric onthe campaign trail of Maduro accusing the U.S. of conspiring against him and causing disruptions in Venezuela to unseat his rule, including



working with opposition labor unions and causing electric power blackouts. Experts argue that given Maduro‘s anti -Americansentiments leading up to the election , as well as the controversy surrounding his victory and the

polarization in Venezuela, there is little hope for a change in relations between the countries. ―It‘s hard to see[Maduro] backing off his rhetoric in the aftermath of the election ,‖ Eric Hershberg, the director of American

University‘s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, told Fox News Latino. ― Americans will insist on a level of respect

that he is not going to give them .‖



2NC Snowden Proves

Maduro‘s making political calculations with Snowden – proves say noGrand 7/6 /10, ―Edward Snowden Asylum: Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is Trolling the U.S.‖, GabeGrand is an editorialist for PolicyMic and an avid scholar of Latin American affairs,http://www.policymic.com/articles/53099/edward-snowden-asylum-venezuelan-president-nicolas-maduro-is-trolling-the-u-s Mollie

On Friday, Venezuela's recently elected President Nicolás Maduro offered asylum to Edward Snowden, makingVenezuela the first country to open its arms to the rogue intelligence contractor. Before a military parade markingVenezuela's independence day, July 5, Maduro announced, "I have decided to offer humanitarianasylum to Edward Snowden so that he can come and live in the homeland of Bolivar andChavez, away from the persecution of North American imperialism." "He is a young man who hastold the truth, in the spirit of rebellion, about the United States spying on the whole world." While Maduro'sasylum offer may have answered several pressing questions about Snowden's immediate future, it leaves us towonder about the motivation behind Maduro's decision. Why, after watching dozens of countries reject

Snowden's asylum applications, did Maduro decide to take the whistleblower in ? What political implicationsdoes this move have for the Maduro presidency, both in Venezuela and in its diplomatic relations with the UnitedStates? And why now? It's important to keep in mind that Maduro is far from secure in his office as Venezuelanpresident. In the wake of the death of Hugo Chávez in March, Maduro rode a wave of pro-Chávez support intooffice and has been striving to fill his mentor's shoes ever since . Having pledged to continue the policies ofChávismo , Maduro has yet to distinguish himself from his predecessor before the Venezuelan people or theinternational public. Granting asylum to Edward Snowden on the anniversary of Venezuela's independencefrom Spain is a politically genius move that was designed to stick the middle finger to Washington and gainMaduro recognition before the greater Latin American community. Need proof ? Just take a look at therhetoric that Maduro employed in his speech. "I'd like to announce something in the name of the dignity ofLatin America, " he began. He went on to explain that he had conferred with other Latin American presidents the

previous day, and that "Several Latin American governments have expressed their willingness to assume the stancethat I am about to announce." Nicolás Maduro's decision to extend asylum to Edward Snowden has , in fact, verylittle to do with Edward Snowden himself. It is a symbolic move calculated to invoke Latin American unityand solidarity in the face of what many Latin Americans perceive as the impending threat of imperialism. Anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America is starting to boil , and Maduro's timing couldn't be better. Hisannouncement comes just days after the United States bullied France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal into obstructing the

jet of Bolivian President Evo Morales on the suspicion that Snowden was on board.

Sets the tone for Maduro‘s policiesGrand 7/6 /10, ―Edward Snowden Asylum: Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is Trolling the U.S.‖, GabeGrand is an editorialist for PolicyMic and an avid scholar of Latin American affairs,http://www.policymic.com/articles/53099/edward-snowden-asylum-venezuelan-president-nicolas-maduro-is-trolling-the-u-s Mollie

Whether or not Snowden will end up in Venezuela remains to be seen . Even if he decides to accept Maduro'soffer, he will have to figure out a way to get there from Moscow's Sheremedevo International Airport, where he has

been stuck without a valid passport for nearly two weeks. Regardless, Nicolás Maduro's decision to extendasylum to Snowden provides us with the first clear signal of what Venezuelan foreign policy willlook like during the Maduro presidency . It demonstrates a lack of faith in Washington's ability to cooperateequally with Latin America that stems from a history of political and economic exploitation.

http://www.policymic.com/articles/53099/edward-snowden-asylum-venezuelan-president-nicolas-maduro-is-trolling-the-u-s










Snowden will go to Venezuela – relations are officially irreparable and Maduro will say noForero and Englund 7/8 /13, Juan Forero and Will Englund, Juan Forero is based in Bogota, Colombia, forThe Washington Post and is responsible for covering South America. Before joining The Post in September 2006, hewas the Bogota bureau chief for the New York Times, covering the Andean region for six years. A native of Bogota,he has also been a staff writer at the Star-Ledger of Newark, N.J., New York Newsday, the San Diego Union-Tribune and other papers. He has also reported from Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua and other countries., A Pulitzer Prize

winner, Will Englund is on his third tour as a Moscow correspondent -- along with his wife, Kathy Lally. In the1990s he did two stints in Russia for the Baltimore Sun. He was also co-author of a project on shipbreaking that wonthe Pulitzer for investigative reporting as well as an Overseas Press Club award and a George Polk award. He joinedthe Post in October 2010. ―With Snowden offer, Venezuela‘s Maduro is on world stage‖,http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/with-snowden-offer-venezuelas-maduro-is-on-world-stage/2013/07/08/35d83f42-e812-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_story.html MollieBOGOTA, Colombia — American fugitive Edward Snowden‘s diminishing possibilities of remaining free tocontinue releasing information about secret U.S. surveillance programs increasingly appear to hinge onVenezuela , which awaited word Monday on whether the former National Security Agency contractor would acceptits offer of asylum and fly to the oil-rich country. Bolivia and Nicaragua also say they could give refuge toSnowden, who is on the run from American officials and is thought to be marooned in the vast transit zone ofMoscow‘s Sheremetyevo International Airport. And the president of communist Cuba, Raúl Castro, on Sundayexpressed support for Latin American allies that might take in the 30-year-old computer expert, opening the

possibility that Snowden could fly through Havana as a first leg on his flight to asylum. Among those offeringsanctuary to Snowden, anti-imperialist Venezuela stands out: a country with an intense antipathy toward theUnited States and just enough muscle to make his escape from American law enforcement a possibility. It alsoappears that Russian officials, eager to end the diplomatic fallout of having Snowden in Moscow, see theirclose ally, Venezuela, as offering the clearest solution. ―The situation wi th Snowden is creating additionaltension in relations with Washington that are complex as they are, ‖ Alexei Pushkov, head of the foreign affairscommittee of the lower house of the Russian parliament, told the newspaper Kommersant on Monday.Pushkov,whose comments dependably reflect the Kremlin‘s position on foreign affairs, said the Snowden saga needed to besettled before President Obama arrives in September to meet with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. ―And

judging by the way things are unfoldin g,‖ Pushkov told the newspaper, ―this is how it‘s going to be.‖Over theweekend, Pushkov had also said that giving asylum to Snowden in Venezuela could not damage VenezuelanPresident Nicolás Maduro, because his government‘s relations with Washington are a lready in tatters. ―Itcan‘t get worse,‖ Pushkov said in a Twitter message. Late Tuesday afternoon, Pushkov said on Twitter thatSnowden, ―as expected,‖ had accepted Maduro‘s offer of asylum, but he didn‘t address the question of howSnowden might get to Caracas. Shortly afterward, the tweet was deleted. Pushkov then tweeted again, claiming hehad heard the news about Snowden on Russian television. ―Direct all your questions to them,‖ he wrote. By Tuesdayevening, Pushkov had issued yet a third tweet: ―Acco rding to News 24 [a TV news program], with reference toMaduro, Snowden accepted his offer of asylum. If so, he has found that to be the safest option.‖ Newly elected andfacing staggering economic problems at home despite the country‘s oil wealth, Maduro appears to have madea high-pitched, openly hostile position against the Obama administration a cornerstone of his government‘sforeign policy . He took his most provocative stand Friday in announcing that Venezuela would take in Snowden.On Monday, Maduro said that a letter from Snowden requesting asylum had been received and that the youngAmerican would simply have to decide when to fly to Caracas.

Snowden affair means the US-side will breakdown Venezuelan negotiations.

Negroponte ‗13 Diana Villiers Negroponte is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, specializing in Latin America. She previously worked at theU.S. Institute of Peace. She travels frequently to Latin America. ―Consequences for Venezuela if Maduro Offers Asylum to Edward Snowden‖ – Brookings Blogs – July 2 nd – http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/07/02-snowden-venezuela-asylum-negroponte

Within these relations, Secretary of State Kerry met with Foreign Minister Elías Jaua on the margins of the recent OAS meeting in Guatemala.The report of the meeting indicated that Kerry was firm and insisted that improvements had to be made in specific areas before diplomaticrelations at the Ambassadorial level could resume. Among those areas of collaboration was Venezuelan permission for Drug Enforcement Agentsto carry out counter-narcotics investigations and improvement of airport security. Without serious progress in these areas, relations withWashington would not improve. More recently, the State Department has sent the message to Jaua through his Charge d‘Affaire in Washington,Calixto Ortega, that the grant of asylum to Snowden would jeopardize all bilateral projects. In appointing Ortega to Washington, bilateralrelations had begun to improve . ―Ortega has a lot of knowledge of U.S. society, and we know that he will contribute a lot towards increasing

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/with-snowden-offer-venezuelas-maduro-is-on-world-stage/2013/07/08/35d83f42-e812-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_story.html






dialogue…We want to have the best ties with all the world‘s governments, and the U.S. government, but on the basis of respect . There can be nothreats,‖ said Maduro in his April 24th statement reported by www.venezuelanalysis.com. ―I have decided to name Calixto Ortega so thatdialogue with U.S. society can increase, with the universities, the academic world, the social and union world, the Afro-American community, the

Latino community, Congress, senators, representatives, the economic, trade and energy sectors.‖ Ortega, the former Venezuelanminister to the Latin American parliament was well received at the State Department and hope exists inWashington that bilateral relations can improve on a steady and pragmatic basis. However,

flying Snowden to Venezuela and granting him asylum will blow apart the prospects for improvedrelations . The recently formed Continental Coalition of Social Movements in support of the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) may rejoice that

Snowden can operate and speak freely in Venezuela, but the prospects of dialogue with U.S. economic, trade andenergy sectors will fizzle out . Without U.S. support, few nations will step in to he lp meet Venezuela‘s rising debt repayments andfalling foreign reserves. In deciding whether to give Snowden a way out of Moscow, Maduro must balance the economic wellbeing of Venezuelaagainst the short term notoriety of saving Snowden.

US-Venezuelan relations are tanked and Venezuela will refuse to cooperate — tensions overSnowdenGlobal Post ‘13 (Global Post- community of international news correspondents and journalists. July 6, 2013. ―Venezuela, Nicaragua OfferAsylum To NSA Whistleblower Snowden.‖ h ttp://www.mintpressnews.com/venezuela-nicaragua-offer-asylum-to-nsa-whistleblower-snowden/164898/)

Leaders of Venezuela and Nicaragua said Friday they would grant asylum to US intelligenceleaker Edward Snowden, the first countries to offer shelter to the whistleblower wanted forleaking details about widespread U.S. surveillance programs . ―I have decided to offer humanitarian asylum toEdward Snowden … to protect this young man from the persecution unleashed by the world‘s most powerful empire,‖ Venezuelan President

Nicolas Maduro said during an event marking Venezuela‘s independence day, according to Argentina‘s La Nacion news website. Venezuela‘sclose ally Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega made a similar offer. ―We have the sovereign right to help a per son who felt remorse after findingout how the United States was using technology to spy on the whole world, and especially its European allies,‖ Ortega said, a ccording to TheAssociated Press. The gestures came after Latin American leaders expressed outra ge following the rerouting of the Bolivian president‘s planewhen rumors swirled in Europe that he had spirited Snowden away from Russia. Many suspect the US government was behind the rumor. Theformer U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor is stil l believed to be holed up in Moscow‘s airport, facing charges of Espionage Actcrimes and, if caught, possibly decades in prison. The Snowden saga has already hit China and Russia, and angered U.S. allies in Europe. But

Friday‘s asylum offers put the issue squarely in Latin America, where many distrust Washingtonand root for whistleblowers who appear to confirm their suspicions of its wrongdoing. Theremarks by Venezuela‘s leader, the chosen successor of President Hugo Chavez, signal thecountry‘s U.S. rel ations remain very rocky even after the death of the longtime ruler in March.U.S. lawmakers in recent years have voiced concern about Iran‘s coziness with countries such asVenezuela and Nicaragua. If either country welcomes a wanted super-leaker like Snowden itwould likely put further strain on Washington‘s tense relations in the region.



2NC XT: Say No

Maduro hates Obama —he won‘t take any benefits from him France-Presse 5/5 (Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro blasts ‗devil‘ Obama By Agence France-Presse Sunday, May 5, 2013

http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/05/05/venezuelan-president-nicolas-maduro-blasts-devil-obama/ nkj)

Maduro , however, begs to differ. He charged the United States with financially backing the Venezuelan opposition.―It isObama himself — as the puppet of the imperial power — who is behind the financing in dollars of this rightwing that is seeking to destroy Venezuela‘s democracy,‖ Maduro alleged. Tensions have been running high since the election to replace the larger-than-life Chavez.The government says nine people died in protests in the days after the election.

Opposition and pro-government lawmakers exchanged punches and kicks in a spectacular brawl at the NationalAssembly on Tuesday. Maduro said this was ―planned‖ ahead of Obama‘s trip to Mexico and Central America. Each side held dueling May Day marches on Wednesday, with Maduro calling Capriles a ―crybaby‖ who could no t accept defeat.

Venezuela defends iran - relations strong - will say noAP 6/18/13 - (Associated press, "Venezuela's Maduro to meet Iran's new president-elect Hassan Rowhani, further

strengthen ties"http://www.canada.com/business/Venezuelas+Maduro+meet+Irans+presidentelect+Hassan+Rowhani+further/8542358/story.html)CARACAS, Venezuela - Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro says he'll meet soon with Iran's President-electHassan Rowhani to further strengthen already close relations.Maduro announced plans for a meeting through Twitter on Tuesday, saying that he recently spoke with Rowhaniand they agreed to meet. He did not offer details.Venezuela deepened trade with Iran under the leadership of the late president Hugo Chavez. Iranian companies wereenlisted to help build public housing in the South American country.Iran and Venezuela also launched joint ventures including a tractor factory and dairy plants, and the two countrieshave been united in their opposition to what they say is Washington's hegemony in international affairs.Venezuela defends Iran's nuclear energy program. The West suspects Iran intends to build nuclear weapons, acharge Iran denies.

Maduro will say ―no‖ – domestic politics dictates that he must.Forero ‗13 Juan Forero is The Washington Post's correspondent for Colombia and Venezuela, having previously been The New York Times' Bogotá bureauchief. He joined the Post in September 2006. ―With Snowden offer, Venezuela‘s Maduro is on world stage‖ – Washington Post – July 8 th – http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/with-snowden-offer-venezuelas-maduro-is-on-world-stage/2013/07/08/35d83f42-e812-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_story.html

The Snowden saga — a young American revealing secrets the U.S. government wants to contain — provided the perfectopportunity for Maduro to take on the Obama administration, said Eduardo Semtei, a former Venezuelangovernment official. ―To figure internationally, to show that he is a player among big powers, he offered asylumto Snowden ,‖ said Semtei, who had been close to Chávez‘s brother, Adán, a leading ideologue in the late president‘s radical moveme nt.

―This grabs headlines, and it shows that he‘s a strong president, one with character, and that he‘s capable of challengingthe United States .‖ Maduro and Venezuela came late to the Snowden saga, as tiny Ecuador, an ally also committed to opposingAmerican initiatives, heaped praise on Snowden and expressed a willingness to help him after he had flown from Hong Kong to Moscow on June23 to avoid American justice. When Ecuador backed away from its initial enthusiasm over Snowden, Venezuela stepped in last week as Maduro

arrived in Moscow for an energy summit. The 50-year-old Maduro , who found his political calling as a socialist activist with close ties to

Cuba, took a sharply anti- imperialist stand in embracing Snowden . He said the United States had―created an evil system , half Orwellian, that intends to control the communications of the world,‖ and characterized

Snowden as an antiwar activist and hero who had unmasked the dastardly plans of America‘s ruling elite. Political analysts say the



opportunity to take sides against Washington was simply irresistible for a government that has for

years characterized itself as a moral force speaking out for the weak against ―the empire,‖ as the United States isknown in Caracas. And the fact that the secrets Snowden divulged were embarrassing to the Obama administration only gave more fuel to

Venezuela, former Venezuelan diplomats and political analysts in Caracas said. ―EdwardSnowden became the symbol for theanti-imperialist rhetoric , for progressivi sm, for international radicalism,‖ said Carlos Romero, an analyst and author who closelytracks Venezuela‘s international diplomacy. Venezuela helped channel the fury of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Suriname after

Bolivian President Evo Moral es‘s plane was apparently refused entry into the airspace of as many as four European countries last Tuesday because of the belief that Snowden was hiding aboard. And on Monday, Venezuela‘s state media apparatus seemed to take more of fense than theBrazilian government over revelations that the NSA had collected data on countless telephone and e-mail conversations in Brazil. But former

diplomats familiar with Venezuela say that there are other aspects to consider in decipheringMaduro‘s support for Snowde n. Ignacio Arcaya, a diplomat who served the Chávez government in the United States in the early

part of his presidency, said Maduro has had the challenge of trying to ease the concerns of radicalizedsectors in his movement that have been worried about a resumption of relations with Washingtonnow that Chávez is gone. Indeed, until recently, Maduro was spearheading an effort at rapprochement, as shown by a meeting in

Guatemala on June 5 between Secretary of State John F. Kerry and his Venezuelan counterpart, Elías Jaua. ―What Maduro is doingis aimed at quieting the radical sectors of his party who think he is negotiating with the United States

and think that he‘s talking to private industry,‖ Arcaya said. Maduro also has to consider his own unstable political position after the April 14 election, which is being contested by his challenger, Henrique Capriles, who says the vote was stolen

from him. At the same time, Maduro faces millions of Venezuelans tired of the country‘s sky -high inflation, rampant homicide rate and seriousshortages of everything from chicken to toilet paper. Myles R.R. Frechette, a retired American diplomat who served in Venezuela and other

Latin American countries, said Maduro is using a tried-and-true strategy: loudly oppose the United Statesto distract from domestic problems. ―It plays very well,‖ said Frechette. ―It‘s the card to play . It‘s what you‘ve

always got in your drawer. You open your drawer and play to your most radical elements.‖

Maduro won‘t engage with the US Shinkman ‗13 Paul – National Security Reporter at U.S. News & World Report – internally quoting Doug Farah, a former Washington Post investigativereporter who is now a senior fellow at the Virginia-based International Assessment and Strategy Center. ―Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism inVenezuela: How Will Maduro Respond?‖ – US News and World Report – April 24 th – http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsored-narco-terrorism-in-venezuela-how-will-maduro-respond?page=2

[Maduro] has been and will continue to be forced to take all the unpopular macroeconomic steps and corrections that are painful, but Chavez

never took," Farah says. "There is going to be, I would guess, a great temptation to turn to [the elites] for money." ¶ "Most criminal ized

elements of the Boliavarian structure will gain more power because he needs them ," he says, adding "it

won't be as chummy a relationship" as they enjoyed with the ever-charismatic Chavez. ¶ U.S. officials might try to engage the new

Venezuelan president first in the hopes of improving the strained ties between the two countries. ¶ ButMaduro has never been close with the senior military class in his home country, and will likelyadopt a more confrontational approach to the U nited States to prove his credentials to theseBolivarian elites. ¶ "Maybe if he were operating in different circumstances, he could be a

pragmatist ," Farah says. "I don't think he can be a pragmatist right now."



2NC XT: Posturing

Venezuela will say no – any positive action is just political posturing on Maduro‘s part.Meacham, 13 -- director of the CSIS Americas Program. He joined CSIS from the Senate Foreign Relations Co mmittee (SFRC), where he served on the professional staff for SenatorRichard Lugar (R-IN) for over a decade. He served as the senior adviser for Latin America and the Caribbean on the committee, the most senior Republican Senate staff posit ion for this region.In that capacity, he travelled extensively to the region to work with foreign go vernments, private-sector organizations, and civil soc iety groups. He was also responsible for managing the

committee‘s relationship with the State Department regarding the Western Hemisphere and o verseeing its $2 billion budget. (Carl, June 21 st, ―The Kerry-Jaua Meeting: Resetting U.S.-VenezuelaRelations?,‖ CSIS , http://csis.org/publication/kerry-jaua-meeting-resetting-us-venezuela-relations, amils)

Despite recent discussions with the United States, it do esn‘t seem to be the case . Earlier this year, the Venezuelan government suspendedtalks between the U.S. State Department and Venezuelan Foreign Ministry that had begun in late2012, citing alleged U.S. meddling in Venezuela‘s Apri l election . The Maduro government has also largely

followed the Chávez playbook, constantly accusing the U nited S tates of assassination plots, spying,and economic and political sabotage. While the Kerry-Jaua meeting may have made for nice headlines, it‘s difficult to imaginethat the Venezuelan government will not play the anti-U.S. card again, if needed. This week, Calixto Ortega — appointed tohandle matters with the United States — will meet with Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson t o continue discussions and estab lish a new set o f concrete

goals to guide the relationship forward. These good-faith gestures made by the Venezuelan government are neither newnor unheard of. Despite recent efforts, U.S. policymakers should temper any positiveexpectations, as a core basis of Chavismo is its anti- U.S. ideology. It‘s of cour se difficult toimprove relations with a government that consistently defines itself as vehemently against yourforeign policy agenda. This suggests that Venezuela may be looking to reestablish a purely economicrelationship — one that will eliminate U.S. sanctions. Still, even if certain positive steps are taken, history suggests thatthe Venezuelan government could quickly scuttle progress made, likely with the goal of Maduroshoring up support within his own ranks.






2NC AT: Oil Leverage

Venezuela will say no

a) empirically uncooperative on terrorEl Colombiano 10 , Global Newsroom Berta Lucia Villa Isaza, "U.S. says Venezuela is uncooperative in fightagainst terror", www.ecbloguer.com/globalnewsroom/?p=8445 MollieIn its ―Country Reports on Terrorism 2009‖, the U.S. State Department concluded that Venezuela doesnot fully cooperate with counter terrorism strategy and allows groups like Farc and the Eln to useits territory . The department stressed in its report that Venezuela has reduced cooperation to ―an absolute minimum‖, especially since the 2009 signing of a military cooperation agreement which allows theUnited States‘ military to use bases in Colombia. It also highlights that Venezuela n President, Hugo Chavez, hascontinued to strengthen ties with Iran , a country the U.S. has qualified as ―the most active statesponsor of terrorism ‖.The document points out that, based on information available, groups like Farc andthe Eln use Venezuela as a place to ―rest and regroup‖ as well as kidnap and extort mone y fromresidents in an effort to finance their illegal activities. However, the U.S. says the ―degree to which the Venezuelan

Government has provided support‖ for these armed groups during the period in question remains unclear. While theU.S. recalls that Colombia has often accused Venezuela of being a safe-haven for Farc leaders, it didnot specifically make reference to the most recent evidence provided by the Uribe administration to theOAS this past July 22, an episode that led Hugo Chavez to immediately break diplomatic ties withColombia.

b) PosadaReel 05 , Monte Reel, Monte Reel is a former South America correspondent for the Washington Post, and he alsoreported for the newspaper in Washington and Iraq. His first book, The Last of the Tribe (2010), chronicles the storyof the last surviving member of an indigenous tribe in the Amazon rainforest., "Venezuela's demand to U.S.:'respect' / Chavez wields oil supply as potent weapon", SF Gate, originally Washington Post,

www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Venezuela-s-demand-to-U-S-respect-Chavez-2620697.php#page-2 Mollie

Venezuelan authorities bristle at suggestions that they are being uncooperative in lawenforcement. They argue that the U.S. government follows a double standard, pointing in

particular to the case of Luis Posada Carriles, a former CIA operative who participated in the failedBay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. A naturalized Venezuelan citizen now in a Texas prison onimmigration charges, Posada, 77, has been accused of bombing a Cuban airliner in 1976, killing all 73aboard. He was arrested in Venezuela on terrorism charges but escaped from prison in 1985. After

becoming embroiled in a network run by former White House aide Oliver North to smuggle weapons toanti-government rebels in Nicaragua, and an alleged assassination attempt against Cuban President FidelCastro for which he was imprisoned in Panama , Posada was spotted in Miami earlier this year. U. S. officialsindicated they were unaware of his whereabouts, but in May, after he was interviewed by the Miami Herald, he wasarrested and sent to a detention facility in El Paso, Texas. Now, Posada is seeking asylum to protect himfrom a Venezuelan extradition request . He faces a hearing in August. The Posada case is as complexas a spy novel, but Venezuelan authorities say it boils down to this: If the United States is seriousabout prosecuting the war on terrorism, it should extradite Posada -- whom they compare toOsama bin Laden -- to face justice in the airliner bombing.

http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Venezuela-s-demand-to-U-S-respect-Chavez-2620697.php#page-2




c) no incentive – weapons ban provesBodzin 10 , Bloomberg, Steven Bodzin, lived in Venezuela, correspondant for the Christian Science Monitor,3/15/10,"Venezuela gets Chinese military jets to replace U.S.",www.chinapost.com.tw/international/americas/2010/03/15/248330/Venezuela-gets.htm MollieCARACAS -- Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez inspected the country's first delivery of sixChinese-made K-8W military training jets as he seeks to equip his armed forces with planesmade outside the U.S. Chavez review of the planes at an air base in the city of Barquisimeto was

broadcast on state television. Each jet can fire air-to-ground missiles and drop bombs, and iscapable of 5 hours of flight without refueling, Alejandro Gonzalez, a colonel in the Venezuelanair force, told Chavez during the broadcast. Venezuela is blocked from buying U.S. militaryequipment to maintain or replace its aging fleet of F-5 and F-16 jets because the U.S. lists thecountry as uncooperative against drug smuggling. Chavez has previously bought Russian-madeSukhoi fighters. The U.S. blocked Chavez's purchases of jets from Brazil and the CzechRepublic.―These men have been trained and developed only to defend the fatherland,‖ Chavez said of thefirst group of 11 pilo ts, who he said were trained in China. ―We have no plans for aggressionagainst anyone.‖ Chavez said buying K-8 jets reduces the ability of the U.S. to controlVenezuela's military. He announced the purchase of the Chinese jets in 2008.

7 massive alt causesCSIS 13 , Center for Strategic & International Studies, "Post-Chavez Outlook for Venezuelan Oil Production",Sarah O. Ladislaw is co-director and senior fellow with the Energy and National Security Program at the Center forStrategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Frank Verrastro is senior vice president and JamesR. Schlesinger Chair for Energy & Geopolitics at CSIS. csis.org/publication/post-chavez-outlook-venezuelan-oil-

production, Mollie

Even under the best of circumstances, reform in the energy sector will take a long time to emerge.

The damage that has been done to not only PDVSA but to the institutions of the state and civil society couldtake years to rehabilitate. A few key reasons for this include: 1. revenue from the oil and gas sectorthat is diverted for political purposes and not reinvested in a way that will drive new production will be hard to direct back to useful investment in the sector, 2. much of the private sector has beendriven away from investment in Venezuela and may be reluctant to return, or for the companies incountry to re-invest in the short-term given their experience in the 2000s. 3. oil field mismanagement anddamage may have likely occurred over the last decade and it will take time and investment to revitalize, 4. manyof Venezuela‘s core assets are in technologically complex and capital -intensive heavy oil

projects that take time and resources to develop and must now be viewed in light of the global array ofupstream options that are now on the table for international oil investors as compared to a decade ago, 5. some ofVenezuela‘s current commercial relationships on the upstream or export side may have to be

revisited in light of a more commercially-based hydrocarbon polic y, 6. Venezuela‘s energy sectoris dominated by the state‘s decisions and management and it will take time to replace themanagerial competency that once existed, 7. highly subsidized oil is a key feature of Venezuelansociety and the political will to reform the entire energy sector into one that is more market-based andopen to private investment will necessarily have to feed into the domestic demand-side of that equation.

Venezuela sees oil as THEIR bargaining chip – they will say noReel 05 , Monte Reel, Monte Reel is a former South America correspondent for the Washington Post, and he alsoreported for the newspaper in Washington and Iraq. His first book, The Last of the Tribe (2010), chronicles the story

http://www.chinapost.com.tw/international/americas/2010/03/15/248330/Venezuela-gets.htm

http://www.chinapost.com.tw/international/americas/2010/03/15/248330/Venezuela-gets.htm



of the last surviving member of an indigenous tribe in the Amazon rainforest., "Venezuela's demand to U.S.:'respect' / Chavez wields oil supply as potent weapon", SF Gate, originally Washington Post,www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Venezuela-s-demand-to-U-S-respect-Chavez-2620697.php#page-2 MollieThere is little doubt, however, that relations between Venezuela and the United States, strained foryears, are plunging to new lows. Chavez has always been outspoken in condemning what hecalls "U.S. imperialism," mocking President Bush as "Mr. Danger" and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as

"Mr. War." Nevertheless, Venezuelan officials insist his recent threats to sever ties with Washington -- therebysuspending the export of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day -- are more than the rhetoric of a populist rallyingdomestic support. "When the president talks, it is not a joke," said Mary Pili Hernandez, a senior Foreign Ministryofficial. " The only country Venezuela has bad relations with is the United States; with all othercountries, we have good or very good relations . But with just one word, the U.S. could resolve allof the problems. That word is 'respect.' " Chavez asserts that the 21st century equivalent of theCold War is the industrial world's thirst for oil -- and its attempts to manipulate weakergovernments to secure it. Oil-rich Venezuela sells 60 to 65 percent of its crude oil to the UnitedStates, making it the fourth-largest supplier to the U. S. market. This year, near-record oil prices havehelped Chavez finance a variety of social programs that he pledges will make Venezuela moreindependent of American influence . Observers say the oil revenue also has emboldened Chavez's

foreign policy strategy . He recently signed oil agreements with Argentina, Brazil and hisCaribbean neighbors and has begun to strengthen ties with China through oil accords. Rafael Quiroz,an oil industry analyst in Caracas, said the Chavez government believes the conflict betweendeveloping countries endowed with such natural resources and nations with high demands willonly intensify in coming years. Chavez would like to precipitate that conflict, Quiroz said. "I think he's correctto try to speed up that kind of confrontation, because the developing world -- where 85 percent of world reserves are-- will stand in a better place after that," Quiroz said. " Every day, it is more apparent that oil isfundamental for Venezuela in its international relations, and it is the main ingredient Chavezuses to form strategic alliances."





1NC Stability Turn

Venezuela will say no to the affEl Colombiano 10 , Global Newsroom Berta Lucia Villa Isaza, "U.S. says Venezuela is uncooperative in fightagainst terror", www.ecbloguer.com/globalnewsroom/?p=8445 MollieIn its ―Country Reports on Terrorism 2009‖, the U.S. State Department concluded that Venezuela doesnot fully cooperate with counter terrorism strategy and allows groups like Farc and the Eln to useits territory . The department stressed in its report that Venezuela has reduced cooperation to ―anabsolute minimum‖, especially since the 2009 signing of a military cooperation agreement which allows theUnited States‘ military to use bases in Colombia. It also highl ights that Venezuela n President, Hugo Chavez, hascontinued to strengthen ties with Iran , a country the U.S. has qualified as ―the most active statesponsor of terrorism ‖.The document points out that, based on information available, groups like Farc andthe Eln use Venezuela as a place to ―rest and regroup‖ as well as kidnap and extort money fromresidents in an effort to finance their illegal activities. However, the U.S. says the ―degree to which the VenezuelanGovernment has provided support‖ for these armed groups during the period in question remains unclear. While theU.S. recalls that Colombia has often accused Venezuela of being a safe-haven for Farc leaders, it did

not specifically make reference to the most recent evidence provided by the Uribe administration to theOAS this past July 22, an episode that led Hugo Chavez to immediately break diplomatic ties withColombia.

That causes massive instability in Venezuela and kills the peaceful transitionCSIS 13 , Center for Strategic & International Studies, "Post-Chavez Outlook for Venezuelan Oil Production",Sarah O. Ladislaw is co-director and senior fellow with the Energy and National Security Program at the Center forStrategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Frank Verrastro is senior vice president and JamesR. Schlesinger Chair for Energy & Geopolitics at CSIS. csis.org/publication/post-chavez-outlook-venezuelan-oil-

production, Mollie

What about Venezuela‘s relationship with the United States? Over the last ten years the sustained tradingrelationship between the United States and Venezuela has been one of the stabilizing forces in anotherwise contentious and sometimes volatile relationship . U.S. refineries in the Gulf Coast arespecifically designed to process Venezuela‘s sour and medium to heavy crude and serves as its naturalmarket. Despite oil production being down, the United States still imports just under a million barrels ofcrude per day from Venezuela (down from a peak of 1.4 mmbd in 1997) and, as stated earlier, thegovernment of Venezuela is highly dependent on those revenues for their ongoing stability ,especially as revenue from other exports and domestic consumption decline . As we look ahead toanother period of transition in Venezuela it is important to be mindful of the potential fordisruption and to look for ways to mitigate the impacts of such disruption, but it is equally important to rememberthe trade ties that bind the two countries for the time being and to find opportunities to drive change in a positivedirection.



AT: Relations

Multiple structural barriers to cooperation the aff doesn‘t resolve.Meacham, 13 -- director of the CSIS Americas Program. He joined CSIS from the Senate Foreign Relations Co mmittee (SFRC), where he served on the professional sta ff for SenatorRichard Lugar (R-IN) for over a decade. He served as the senior adviser for Latin America and the Caribbean on the committee, the most senior Republican Senate staff posit ion for this region.In that capacity, he travelled extensively t o the region to work with foreign governments, private-sector organizations, and civil society groups. He was also responsible for managing the

committee‘s relationship with the State Department regarding the Western Hemisphere and o verseeing its $2 billio n budget. (Carl, June 21 st, ―The Kerry-Jaua Meeting: Resetting U.S.-VenezuelaRelations?,‖ CSIS , http://csis.org/publication/kerry-jaua-meeting-resetting-us-venezuela-relations, amils)

Despite many fits and starts to advance relations in recent years, genuine improvements in the relationship have been hard tocome by . Various U.S. government agencies hold sanctions against elements of the Venezuelangovernment, including on state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) for trading withIran; on a former Iran-Venezuela Bank (IVB) for handling money transfers with a Chinese bankon behalf of the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI); and on the state-owned VenezuelanMilitary Industry Company after it traded with Iran, North Korea, and Syria. The U.S.Department of the Treasury‘s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) , over the past five years,has also designated more than half a dozen Venezuelan government officials for acting for, or on

behalf of, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ( FARC ), designated a narco-terrorist organization by the U.S.

agency. And, le t‘s not forget that the reason there are no ambassadors in Caracas or D.C. was Chávez‘srefusal in 2010 to accept Obama‘s nominee for the post in Venezuela . Similarly, Venezuela severedties with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in 2005 . On the day Chávez ‘s death was announced, Maduro, as caretaker, expelled two

U.S. air force attachés based in the Caracas embassy, accusing them of espionage. T he United States retaliated in kind. The Maduro government alsoarrested U.S. filmmaker Tim Tracy for allegedly instigating postelection violence, though many pointed out he

was simply in Venezuela to film a do cumentary on politics in the count ry. (Tracy was released without further explanation the same morning Kerry and Jaua met.) Suggestions bymembers of the Venezuelan government that the United States may have given Chávez thecancer that caused his death have certainly not helped relations either , neither have repeatedaccusations targeted at former officials and U.S. military and intelligence involvement incountless evidence-free plots . Given the complex reality of the bilateral relationship, it looks like

both sides have a long road ahead of them if they seek to enact positive changes .






Miscellaneous



Conditional Engagement/Extracting Concessions Bad

Conditional engagement is bad — attempting to extract concessions crushes U.S. credibilityand entrenches Chavista governmentsGriffin 13 — editorial writer for the Harvard Crimson (John Griffin, The Harvard Crimson, 04-03- 13, ―Engagewith Venezuela‖, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/#, Accessed 07-01-2013 | AK)

When Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez died in early February, his count ry was thrown into a period of national mourning as the po litical equilibrium in Latin America hung in t he balance. As

Venezuela chooses its next president, Washington should seek to reverse the current trend of acrid relations between the two nations and engage with the Venezuelan government in Caracas toward stability and prosperityin the Western hemisphere . While it might seem likely that relations between the United States and Venezuela wouldnaturally improve after the death of the combative Chávez, the opposite now seems more likely . Before passingaway, Chávez had handpicked a successor in Nicholas Maduro, who has assumed power in the interim before the presidential elec tion in April. As Chávez‘s handpicked successor,

Maduro has already continued with his mentor‘s trend of using anti -American rhetoric to bring popularity to his government , even declaring that American agents may have infected Chávez with the cancer that killed him. While Washingtonhas officially declared that it is committed to a more functional relationship with Venezuela, its

actions have not been consistent with this idea : The United States offered no official condo lences for Chávez‘s death, and both nations have started

expelling diplomats from the other. Neither nation , it seems, is steering toward more congenial relations with the other .Admittedly, the United States has goo d reason to be less t han enthused about more Chávez-style governance in Venezuela. Calling hi mself a 21st-century socialist, Chávez nationalized thelucrative oil industry, developed st rong trade and diplomatic relationships with Iran a nd Cuba, repeatedly decried the United States as an imperialist force, and cooperated with the Iranians in

developing nuclear technology. Engaging in petty diplomat-expulsion spats , however, is no way to deal with any ofthese problems , and it in fact only strengthens the Chavistas‘ hold on their country . The diplomatic andeconomic opportunities that would stem from greater engagement would far outweigh themeager benefits reaped from our current policies . Diplomatically, positive engagement with Venezuelawould be a major step toward building American credibility in the world at large , especially in LatinAmerica . Chávez (along with his fr iends the Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support for his regime by

pointing out the United States‘ attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics . Soon, a number of populist governmentsin Latin America had rallied around Chávez and his anti-American policies. In 2004, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form theBolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed (but never realized) by the Bush administration.

Chávez galvanized these nations — many of whom have experienced American interventionisttactics — by vilifying America as a common, imperial enemy . Unfortunately for the U nited States, its generalstrategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chávez‘s position . Every time Washington chastises

Venezuela for opposing American interests or attempts to bring sanctions against the Latin Americancountry, the leader in Caracas (whether it be Chávez or Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim thatWashington is a neo-colonialist meddler . This weakens the United States‘ diplomatic position,while simultaneously strengthening Venezuela‘s . If Washington wants Latin America to stop its currenttrend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less astringent tonein dealing with Venezuela . Caracas will be unable to paint Washington as an aggressor , and

Washington will in turn gain a better image in Latin America . Beyond leading to more amicable,cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also beeconomically advisable . With the world‘s largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources ,

and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists, Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically . Even now, America can see the poss ible benefits of economic engagement with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation: Each year, thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated

because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a Boston-area oil company. Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger

economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin America . It was mostly through Venezuela‘s efforts that the United States was unable to create a

―Free Trade Area of the Americas,‖ an endeavor that would have eliminated most t rade barriers among participant nations, ther eby leading to more lucrative trade. In a worldwhere the U nited States and Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would

benefit from such agreements. For both diplomatic and economic reasons , then, positive engagement is the best

http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/





course of action for the United States. As it stands, the negative relationship between the countries has created an atmosphereof animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic cooperation nearly

impossible . While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticized —

authoritarian rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly policies — nothing that the U nited States is doing to counter thosedrawbacks is having any effect . The U nited S tates should stop playing ―tough guy‖ with Venezuela , bite

the bullet, and work toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere . We aren‘t catchingany flies with our vinegar — it‘s high time we started trying to catch them with honey .



Cuban Embargo CP

Lifting the Cuban embargo solves the casePagano 13 — Project Assistant at the National Democratic Institute and contributing writer to the TrumanDoctrine (James Pagano, Truman National Security Project, 03-18- 13, ―Moving Venezuela to the Center‖,http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/moving-venezuela-to-the-center/, Accessed 07-03-2013 | AK)

After over a decade in power, Hugo Chavez is now dead , providing U.S. policy makers an opening to mend fencesand steer Venezuela‘s next president towards the center . With smart policy and a light touch, theUnited States can help Venezuela‘s next president lead his country out of the mess that Chavez built .Chavez won the presidency in 1999 o n a promise to ―sow‖ the oil wealth of Venezuela into its social pro gram. Bolstered by rec ord high oil prices, Chavez spent billions on such programs. Whilemillions of Venezuelans were able to obt ain healthcare and an education, the poorly designed pro grams left little money to re invest in oil exploration; out put in Venezuela declined threateningthe longe vity of all Chavez‘s initiatives. Meanwhile, Chavez became an increasingly autho ritarian leader, consolidating power in the e xecutive. He blacklisted opposition figures, altered the

constitution and unevenly enforced laws for personal benefit. By creating a steeply s lanted playing field, Chavez was able to retain power. Venezuela‘s next presidentwill have to decide whether to reverse these trends, or continue the slide to outrightauthoritarianism . The U nited States can and should influence this decision . The United States mustsupport the democratic process and engage the likely winner of April‘s election, Chavez‘s chosen successor, Nicolás Maduro . He willhave a real opportunity to put Venezuela back on the path to a free-market democracy . The next presidentwill face an extremely politicized Supreme Court and military and reforms are likely more palatable if made by Maduro. Changes to apportionment, food subsidies o r tax rates coming from

Enrique Capriles (the opposition candidate) cou ld spark a legal challenge from the supreme court; or worse, opposition from the military. What should the U.S. role be? It mustwork with its Latin American allies in the region , Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico to gently pressure Madurointo making the types of institutional and economic changes necessary for Venezuela to prosper .

Failure to do so could lead to the reemergence of authoritarianism in Latin America, instability in

world oil markets and serious regional security repercussions . Chavez was infamous for his anti- American tirades. George W. Bush‘s poor

global standing gave Chavez an easy target. With a more positive global image, the most important step President Obamacan take is to normalize relations with Cuba . As Venezuela‘s closest ally, Cuba has re mained a

persistent problem in U.S.-Latin American relations . By normalizing relations, Obama wouldtake a huge step in reducing anti-Americanism in Venezuela . Simultaneously, Obama would ingratiate himselfto the rest of the region by ending the dated embargo . Perhaps most importantly, eliminating this issue wouldgive Venezuela‘s next president the political cover necessary to mend relations with the UnitedStates . The U.S. should push for economic reform with the help of Brazil which seeks a greater role in international and

regional politics. Former Brazilian President Lula da Silva has close ties to Venezuela , and touting the recent successes of hiscenter-left government in Brazil could help persuade Maduro to moderate his government . Brazil has

made huge societal gains without suffering the kind of economic setbacks seen in Venezuela. Friendly cajoling, along with the promise ofcloser economic ties could help lead Maduro onto a path of economic reform necessary to extendcertain ―Chavista‖ social prog rams . Colombia, Brazil and the U.S. also have a shared interest inimproving Venezuelan security . Under Chavez, Venezuela became on the most violent countries in Latin America, as drug related crimes skyrocketed. Violence isthe number one concern of Venezuelans, and significant reductions would be a major political victory for whoever is in power. Brazil and Co lombia together should pressure Venezuela to accept

sorely needed D.E.A assistance with the t acit acceptance of modest political reforms, most import antly freer press. The death of Chavez is a critical

juncture in U.S.-Latin American relations and it is important the United States not miss thisopportunity . Having a stable trustworthy Venezuela would allow the U nited States to continue to drawdown operations in the ever-volatile Middle East, fight narcotrafficking and expand trade .

Careful, well thought-out overtures and policy changes will help quell lingering anti-Americanism whilealso improving regional stability . Ending the Cuban embargo would provide absolute economic gainfor all parties, while providing cover for Maduro to thaw relations with the United States and receive aid tostop uncontrollable violence . Strategic engagement with regional allies could help spur the

http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/moving-venezuela-to-the-center/

http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/moving-venezuela-to-the-center/



economic and institutional reforms necessary for Venezuela to prosper moving forward . The situation inVenezuela could be potentially destabilizing t o the region. The United must act deliberately to make Hugo Chavez‘s passing an unmitigated positive development.