veto players in presidential regimes: institutional variables and policy change

8/3/2019 Veto Players in Presidential Regimes: Institutional variables and policy change

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693

revista de ciencia pOLítica/vOLumen 29 / nº 3 / 2009 / 693 – 720

Veto players in presidential regimes:

institutional Variables and policy change*

Jugadores con veto en regímenes presidenciales: Variablesinstitucionales y cambio en las políticas públicas

ANÍBAL PÉREZ-LIÑÁNUniversity of Pittsburgh([email protected])

JUAN CARLOS RODRÍGUEZ-RAGA

Universidad de los Andes [email protected]

ABSTRACT

th vlo omol mol o xlo h ff of vo ly l gm. W h loh bw h lglv ow ofh h ofgo of vo ly, lyz how h mb oflgl h oho ff ol bl. W lo oolmol o m h simultaneous m of h fo ovol wo-mol oly . th l gg h y fgmo h mx

mlo whl hoy ky fo xlg oly bly. thm of mo ol vbl ool o h oo of h ly.

Ke ords: vo pl, pl rg, Lgl p, p Fgo,Lglv pow.

RESUMEN

Este estudio presenta un modelo computacional para analizar el efecto de los jugadores con poder de veto en regímenes presidenciales. Exploramos la relación entre los poderes legislativosdel presidente y la configuración de jugadores con veto, y analizamos de qué manera el númerode partidos legislativos y su cohesión afectan la estabilidad de las políticas públicas. A partirde estas ideas desarrollamos una simulación para evaluar el impacto conjunto de estos factores

en un espacio bidimensional. Los resultados sugieren que la fragmentación partidaria tieneefectos mixtos, mientras que el poder de decreto es un factor clave para explicar la estabilidadde las políticas. El impacto de las variables institucionales está en general condicionado porla ubicación de los actores políticos.

Palabras clave: Jugadores con poder de veto, regímenes presidenciales, Partidos legislativos,Fragmentación partidaria, Poderes legislativos.

* aho’ m lhbl o. a l vo of h w h 2003 almg of h a poll s aoo. W b o tho Bäg, mk p. Jo,Gog tbl, wo oymo vw fo h vlbl omm.



aníBaL pÉreZ-LiÑÁn, Juan carLOs rOdríGueZ-raGa

694

th x h ho of o l o h l of l g. W bg wo h of o o: h wok o o l l (tbl 1999; tbl 2002) h l of x-lgl

lo l (mwg shg 1997b; shg c 1992).el of o l l (co 2000; Khbl 1998) ho lw h h hol o o h lgg b of l, ol l o o bg h gh k l (alá tbl 2002; a 2001). a h , bgogo l o l h g o olo bool bl ol hg, boowg (b o lw folzg)h o of h o-l ho.

th gg of o l l g h ofo wo jo

obl. O o h, of ol ho l of l g h o o h o l ol fl h who g h o o lg l o. a l, w how blow, h l hg b oo hoh bo h ff of o o.O h oh h, fol ol of o l h o h off o olo, who g “gl qlb” oh whh ol ff ol lol. th l l, how,gg h ol bl ( o l h oh) o

o h ol oo.W k o h obl b log ool ol of o l l g. i h f of h w o h b o ol h fo h l. i h followg o w h l lo of hoh bo l . so wo xloh loh bw h lgl ow of h h ofgoof o l. so h how h b of lgl hl oho ff ol bl. i h foh o, w h oolol o h lo of h fo wo-ol ol of

ol bl. th l o o o o l of h hoh, b h o blh o wh x ff o bo ol ff o wh h o l o ll ok o jf h.th lo gg h ho b l fo ffgol bl l g, h h ff b of ho ff, h h of o oh ol bl oolo h l loo of h k l.

I. DEfINITIONS

vo l oll o who ol b o ff o l hol -qo. th hol b gh fo decisive l, who ol ff b o o hg xg ol, fo dictators, who



vetO pLayers in presidentiaL reGimes: institutiOnaL …

695

ol boh ff o o w ol (so swl2002). mlol ol of o l k o h obbl of olhg h h h f ol h wll g qlb. th ho

h ool g o o h -qo fo ll ol wll o f h wll f h xg qlb. th ofol oo h bl of fg xg ol kow h winset of h-qo, W(sQ). th lg W(sQ), h g h obbl of ol hg h h low ol bl (tbl 1995). Followg h oh, wol h z of h w (h ooo of ol bl o f h -qo) o bl.

i o o xlo h ol of o l l g, w o wo-ol ol l b 50x50 l. poll o o ol(whh l o o) lo hl o of h 2,500 oloo k o z h bw h l o h oll. Fg 1 ll l of x-lgl lo hol . a wh o ow lo o h gh o h oh of h-qo, whl h Ho h s lo o h lf oh. L ll h preferred-to set v(sQ) o h of ol oo o wh h ff of g o i. In the absence of decisive actors or dictators, h w of h -qo h o of h f-o of ll o l ( b h g

Fg 1). a ool wh W(sQ) f h -qo, whl ol oh w b fo fobl.

II. PRESIDENTIAL POwERS AND POLICy STABILITy

th o l h ooll lf ool lw-kg owo o h x o (shg c 1992; shg mwg 1997). po lgl ow llow o lll

“blh, o o blh w qo” (shg Hgg 2001, 72)whl ow llow h o f h qo fo hg b h lgl. th of h of l ow o ol bl owh x. Joho c (2003) l h ool how o gfl l o h oo of olbl fo, whl nlo(2003) how h og lgl ow fo h oo of low ff l-o l o (nlo 2003). el olo bool g of fl h f ol lz, b k ogh,

h wok gg h h ff of l ow b ool o olo h of h ol k, b lo o h bo ol ox. i, cox mog h g h l ow l o olwh h olll wk b l o wh h h o og (cox mog 2002).




696

a. Proactive Poers: Redeining the winset

W o h ool ho (cda) ol bl bfog h o l (c shg 1998).1 Fg 1bo ll how ool ho ff h

bl. a wh og ow, fo , wol b bl o o h

1 Following crey n shgrt (1998) we itingih ontittionl eree thority (cda) from eree

thority elegte by ongre (dda). uner ptil mption, elegtion of eree power imply

lo bw h og ( h h og o h

g). W hfo go dda mo of h o blow.

Fg 1: ex-Lgl rlo pol L

X

50403020100

Y

50

40

30

20

10

0

KEY

Status quo President

Senate Indifference curves

Winset of Status Quo__________________

House




697

-qo oh o oo wh h f-o (lg h ow lo), gg h f of h wo hb.2

th, ol fo of h w of h -qo l o ol h

o of h f of ll o l b lo, wh h x, h o ofh f-o of ll l (o j h f-o of h o).Foll:

W(sQ) = t u (d1 u d2 u...ud J) u (v1 ∩ v2 ∩...∩vK)

Wh t h f-o of h o, d J h f-o of h j-h l, vK h f-o of h k-h o l– of ho

wh h of l o o x. i o l g,W(sQ) oll h o of h : (1) h ol h h loool x , (2) h ol h og l og l o, (3) h ol whh boh o l g.to ll h o, o wo xl. F, g whh h lk jo o ow ( o llow o ) whhh o h h wk ow (h l og o kg o b l jo). i h o: (1) o ol b l lll bh x, (2) jo of lglo l h xg lw, (3) lwhh h g wh h lglo b h jo h h bll og ff o o o. thfo, h w wll b f h of l ol whh jo of lglo g.

now, h h h og ow ( h fo), h h o h ow wh og ow (og ol j kg o wh wo-h of h o). i h (1) h x l h-qo lll h w ol wll bo ff l; (2) og j h hg o l b l jo, b (3) h

o h ogol l h o wh o of o-h ofh lglo l o. thfo, h qo b l b of h olf b h (whh b l b ), b of h olo b wo h of h lglo ( g h ’ wll), o b ofh ol o b l jo of lglo h . no h whwo l h xl, ol oo ol b q bl. polf b h b o b l h o-h of h lglo bl b b o l l fo log. a ol o b wo-h jo og ol b oo o b w l .

2 O ylz o of cda m h: ) xv mmly ffv oly,

b) h “l of ovl” by whh h w -qo m l l h mbly

xlly j h . O h mo ( h ol vo) cy shg

(1998) ngo (2004).




698

b. Reactive Poers

Package veto. mo llow o x kg o o bll o bog. th h h oo of h gg h bll, g h w qo, o

jg h bll oll, llowg h o o o l ( h b of o o). th h l o l f b tbl (1995) Fg 1. pkg o hfo ol bl l b fog h o o l (co 2000; Golo mc 2001; igb yo 1991;Kw mcbb 1988; mc pool 1995; roh so 1985).

Item veto. u l o, ofog ool lg wh lol o ll o hg h qo whl jgoh. th, h o o (o h h o o o, o

w o blow) f b h loo of h ogol bll h oo h loo of h qo h o o. th h lglo’ o log-oll wh h x, fo ow ffl o ol g oo fo ol g oh (Blz c 1999, 37-38).

W o h l- o ol bl b g h z of h’ f-o . Fg 2 ll h o wo-ol

Fg 2: ro of h p’ pf-o u L-i vopoo

P

SQ

X

Y




699

wh h ’ l o p lo o h lf soh of h qo sQ.B h ow h h o o (o o j) h ol, h ff o log l h of kg o,

b h gl wh p h qo sQ o of o(sh 1986).

Veto override. th o l h oo fo o o, h low olbl. if og h h o o l o b l jo,h x ll of ff o ho ( l b o blok ol lo) h ogol jo bo l.if qlf jo q o x h ow, h o l– b ol oo wh h f-o of h jo f h-qo who h x’ o (Khbl 1998). i follow h h lg

h q-jo q b bl o o x o, h g hbl of h -qo.3

III. CONGRESS, PARTIES, AND POLICy STABILITy

so f w h h lgl f o (o wo l hb)who kg o o l oll l. th loo of lgl hb h ol , how, h o of h gggo ofh f of n l lglo hogh l og o. i ho w x h ol o oo h ol of l lglo, , oho o h l. W lo h ff of h o-ll “ow” of h o ol bl.

a. Individual Legislators

Followg h o of l olg, w h h o

l lglo fo h -qo, h g h o fo olhg. i h o k qll l o bo h ff of h og l lglo. O o h, h g h og lglo, hg h of h “olk” of h oll o l, – l jol– h low ol bl (tbl 2002, 48). O h oh h, g og l lglo obbl g lklhoo h h -qo po-ol (.., blog o h “o” of h whol) h lkl o b bl. aog o so mwg, “ ologl h , h ’ o l jo fo ” (mwg

1999, 286).

3 i f, h hhol fo o b hogh of of how h of o l h i. at the limit, when only imple mjority i reqire in ongre to overrie the exetive’ veto, the

v of y bl vo-ly.




700

sll, h o h ff b h z of h lgl. co fol l lgl (o o) oo b n b. th b ofl lglo h wo oll oo ff o ol bl. O o h,

tbl (2002, 48) h oj h h b of l h “olk” of h oll o l, g -oho h ogol hg.4 O h oh h, h b of lglo heffective majority q o l h -qo. B ff jo w f o h looo of o o h l jo oll bo, g z. i o of wo, jo of h o ol b h wh h of h o. i o of h, l jo h wh wo-hof h b. i bo of h, h ff jo o o 51 . a hz of h hb go o f, h ff jo oll oh h

ff hhol. ag h o hoh, h gg h hlg h z of h hb, h o fo jo o l h -qo.

Fg 3 ll h oll l of h ff jo fo of n. thff jo hhol o ol o o n; lo l lg b whh n fo o o b loll h hhol. ao b of lglo llow fo h foo of jo wh ff of ho l “hlf” of lglo. Wh b of lglo, l wg

4 smloly, h mb of vl ly mbly expands h yolk fo qlf

mjo (q-yolk), whh reduces h q-oho, increases oly bly (tbl 2002, 51-55).

Fg 3: eff vog rl aog o h nb of Lglo

50.0

75.0

100.0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

N

E f f e c t i v e M

a j o r i t y

no: Fol og l l jo.




701

olo ol b h wh lll ff of h o l o. Fo xl,f h z of o x fo h o fo, h b of b ofo jo gow fo wo o h, o h 2/3<3/4.

b. Political Parties

Fo h o , o-ol o o o fo o l lglo(who h o -ow) b o lgl . i ow oo wo h h b of lgl b g ol bl. B jo l lkl o x fg lgl h o of ollo bl g, h bl of go o hllg h -qo x o l (cox mcbb 2001; Joho c 2003; mwg 1993;

s, tl, G 1999, 111).i o o ol h of lgl o ol bl, w o wool o, h (w) b of og (J) h lgl wgh(w) o h of h of h . G lgl wh n wh j h bof hl b h j-h , w j= j/n. th ff b of , ooll b h Lko-tg x, f enp=1/Σ(w j

2) (Lko tg1979). a o h ff b of b h b g J whlholg h l z of ll o (oolo), o b g h l

wgh of o o fw whl kg J o (oo). W h ffof h wo obl o ol bl blow.

Multipartism. th oo bw l ol bl oll l h wh wo lk. th f o l h ff bof o h foo of lgl jo, h o o lk h of lgl jo o h o of ol hg.

F, o h oo bw h b of h of lgljo. G b J of l h lgl, h x obl

l fo h enp x J (wh h n/J ) h oh1.0 (wh h o wh h xo of hgo oollgh g n−J+1 ).5 Wh h g, h wo l of . th fo h x enp o whh jo guaranteed o x hlgl. Blow h l (oghl, enp=2), o h ff b of o o h obbl of obg jo (whh lg). th o l of h x enp whh jo possible. abo h l, fh h ff b of o o h obbl of obg jo (whh l zo).

5 th x o l hohl. th f ll b colob, 1958-74, wh Lbl covv oolly h ql mb of h lgl (enp=2.00) (Hly

1988); h o, by h dom rbl, 1947-52, wh h dom py ooll 43 o of 45

h low hmb llow h wo “ooo” o hv o h (enp=1.09)

(Glíz 1973).




702

W f o h guaranteed majority hhol enpGm. Fo ff b of ll h o ql o enpGm jo o x. th gjo hhol b h gl whh h lg lgl ool

b jo of h h o lg ool ll h g (x fo o lf o h of h g J−2 ). th fg ql oh ff b of lo o, b ll h, 2.0 g J n.Fo n J, h g jo hhol hfo:

ENP

N c

N

N c J

N

GM =

+

+− − +

1

2 22

2 22

2

12+

−( )

N J

Wh c=1 wh n c=0.5 wh n o.

th o l hhol h x ff b of whhh of jo possible. th hhol oo o h enp whh lg ool ff l o h hb ll oh h ql b of . L ll h l enppm, o h

ENP

N c

N

N c

J

N

PM =

+

+

−

−

1

2

2

1

2

−( )

2

1 J

Wh c=1 wh n , =0.5 wh n o.6

th wo fol llow o f h loh bw h b of h of lgl jo. a lgl wh ff b of ll o ql o enpGm g o h jo , lglwh b bw enpGm enppm o o h jo , lgl wh ff b g h enppm g not o h jo . Fg 4 ll h loh hohl lgl of oh b. i follow h ff b of blow enpGm o bo enppm wll not h obbl of jo , h f b

h obbl fx o h o b h obbl zo. i hfo h h g h ff b of , h low h obbl

6 a oxmo o h vl v of n 4(J−1)/J.




703

of fg jo , b h obbl fx h x, fllg fo oo zo wh l [enpGm, enppm].

a o, l whh jo g ol hg. W hllgo fo h o h of oho fo o h l loo

of h jo . W x ol bl wh h jo fo h-qo ol bl f h jo g wh, wllg o ,h xg ol. thfo, w ol h ol bl wll b hghwh enp≤enpGm and h lg fo h -qo, b low fenp>enppm or h lg lo o h -qo.

Part eights. th ff b of lo l o –o fw– o o o . th ff ll o wh h l [enpGm,enppm] b h lgl jo o g ol bh f o q ogh wgh h lgl.

W gh h o b h l wgh of h lg og.Wh h lg ll ll, q o o l h -qo l olo hllg h xg ol. Wh h lg h ogh wgh o bo wg olo, bo o l within h lgl, b h bo o oo hg

Fg 4: m mx enp so fo Lgl Wh Who mjo p

J (raw number of parties)

1.000

2.000

3.000

4.000

5.000

6.000

7.000

8.000

9.000

10.000

2 4 6 8 10

E N P

Impossibility ofmajority party

Possibility ofmajority party

Majority partyis guaranteed

ENPGM (Guaranteed majority) ENPPM (Posible Majority)

Maximum ENP




704

Fg 5: i of p Wgh o pol sbl

5.1. enp=2.999; W(sQ)=0.025

KEYStatus quo Party A (w=34/100) Party B (w=33/100)

Party C (w=33/100) Indifference curves Winset of Status Quo__________________

50

40

30

20

10

0 Y0

X

10 20 30 40 50

o h -qo who kg o o h ’ oo. Fll, f h lg o jo of h h hb, bo o within hlgl partisan veto player lo wh h . th jo

ow bl o k o o bhlf of h oll bo who kg o o hoh ’ l o. th q gg h h loh bw wgh ol bl o l. Wh ll , ol bl b low b ll olo hllg h -qo. Wh “l” o l,ol bl wll o b gl bo h fo of wg olo. Fll, wh h lg h jo, ol bl wllbl l b h , h b of l o, wll b bl ofo b ol hg lo.

Fg 5 ll h b lookg h (a, B, c) lo o

wo-ol ol l. th fx h ol oo, bh l wgh ( lgl of h b) llow o hg.i Fg 5.1, h wgh bl, h w of h -qo 2.5 of h o ol . i 5.2, p a o hlf of h whogg jo. th lg “o” fo W(sQ), whh ow fllo 1.6 of h ol . Fll, 5.3 h lg h 60 of h, h z of h w bl x o o 13.6 of h ol .




705

5.2. enp=2.632; W(sQ)=0.016

KEY

Status quo Party A (w=50/100) Party B (w=30/100)


50

40

30

20

10

0Y0

X

10 20 30 40 50

5.3. enp=2.273; W(sQ)=0.136

50

40

30

20

10

0Y0

X

10 20 30 40 50

KEY

Status quo Party A (w=60/100) Party B (w=20/100)





706

th gf hg h who lg h f of og who g h w b of (J).

c. Part CohesionFo h o , h o l o l h lk low oho o ol l (cox mcbb 2001, 39; mwg 1999, h 10;m 2002, 27). el h lo l low l o h lglo’ o l h “ol o” low oo o o bl goo(a 2001; c, Fjoh, Fo 1987; c shg 1995; nlo 2003).ag h w, tbl g h low l k “fflo f o l l ,” olg h “h low h

oho, h low h ol bl” (tbl 2002, 84-85; lo a 2001,14, 205). i , so mwg o h fo wok fo o gh -qo, l h “ l , h ’ ol fo fl bl w” (mwg 1999, 286, 289-91).

W o h h ff of oho o ol bl o foh z loo of h jo. pbl, f h jo og f w fo h -qo, g oho wll low olbl. B of h o, of l h ll hlg, oh lg fl h lo of oo fo ol b x whl oh h h oo of bl goo(cox mcbb 2001). How, f h jo f wh h -qo,g oho wll o g ol bl (Joho c 2003, 131).dg oo fo vzl, J col w h “og o o g fo fo bl. th o of og lg o bog ow o ol wll b o of h o blzglo o k l oll ” (col 2002, 37).

Fg 5 bo gg how o olz oho fo h o of w of o

l ol. Hgh oho ( b h r ix, fo ) l h lg ooo of h b of o o h ol oowh h o (cox mcbb 1993; mc, pool, rohl 2001; roh1991; s Golo 2000). coho l fo 1) l ogl o h bkbh o o fo h ’ oo;2) l jg h ’ ol oo o ox h b’ lo (ool lh); o 3) b l hg h lo (ologl oho) (alh 1995; a 2002; cox mcbb 1993; eo

2002; Jo 2002; Khbl 1993; mwg péz-Lñá 1997; nf 2002; roh1991). Fo h o of w of o ol, ll h o l o h oo:b of h og (l) o gl l o h ol wh h l h f. i Fg 5, ll h perfectly oh.uoh wol h how o o-l g of o, llowgh lglo o “-o” o h ’ l o.




707

d. Partisan Poers o the President

a l log l o wh mwg shg (1997) ll h “ ow”of h (.., h z of h ’ wgh b oho). m

ho h ow k fo oog ol oo oxl l oq of wk ow (ah shg 1997;c 1997; mwg shg 1997). B h ol o h x h h fo h -qo. Ohw, h ow of h wll ll g g bl (c 2002). a l b h k lgg h glok ff of go (cl 1988; Khbl 1998; mhw1991; sq 1988).

th l h lo hz h og ow off h of l o ow ( bo) o ol

bl. Wh h ool og lgl jo, h of ll ow bo l o h ol fo (cox mog2002). poxll, l b o o hox. cogol jo b o wllg o delegate ow oh x f h h g (c shg 1998), cda b o lkl o o qlb oo wh h lo o h lglo (ngo 2004). i boh , h g blof l fl h f h h lkl o l wh hlgl’ f-o .7

tbl 1 blow o h o o o x hoh bo ol l g. Fo o, h bl hobbl of ol hg–o o l, h x z of W(sQ) l oh ol ol . Fo of h hoh l wh l ow; f,wh h b loo of h l lglo; fo, wh h b of h oho, h g h wh h ow of h.

th bl gg h h o-l oh b ool h foh of l g bfo w o o fo lobl of o-ol oo. i o , hohbo h bl og o. i oh, h gg olxo bw bl. i o ol h o of h hoh hllg ghfow oo bw ool ol bl ol bl, b lo h o of h oll off oh. Fo xl, f h ool ho l- o, hll w x oo l ol bl h f h h o of h ow? W h

obl h followg o.

7 d of o lglv o g wh lk vo ow wh

q h xl ovl of og o bom lw (ngo 2004).




708

tbl 1: s of Hoh

Hoh i bli o

W(sQ)rol

A. Presidential Powers

1cool ho(cda)

po p bo l

2 pkg o ng p bo o l

3i o ng pf-o of h

.

4 vo o po cog bo l

B. Legislature

B1. Legislators

5 d fo sQ po Lg f-o

6 d og lglo po Lg “olk” of oll vp

7* ng sQ qlb (o)

8 nb of lglo ng G -oho

9* po

(o l)

Low ff jo l

B2. Parties:

10 enp>enppm ng Lk of jo

11**enp<enpGm and lg fo sQ

po pog lgl jo g

12 Wgh of lg po(o-l)

“il” o l , b o x, W(sQ)

B3. Party cohesion:13** coho: if enp<enpGm and

lg fo sQpo mjo bl o fo ol

hg

C. Partisan Powers of the President

14** if lo o sQ ng p’ o sQ

15** if fo sQ po p’ l sQ

16** cda and og ow ng p ow off cda

* i oo hoh.** i g bl, oo, o .




709

IV. COMPUTATIONAL MODEL

i o o “wgh” h hoh g h oh, w lo ool

ol of h ol l. th ol lo h hlglo wo-ol ol ow h g wh oo.th of o lo h wo jo g fo o o. i oo fol ol ho ll olo, o oh bl o hl of l “oj” h h l h oh oof h o bw o l (tbl 2002, h 2). a h , o o l ol, h lo g llow o gow fllgl bo g of ool l, of oobo l o , ool h- l o

ho, ll-n l (e axll 1996). th ol llow o k of o fol b h o-l ho, oo h gh ofo l , xl o o g , lz h gg foo l (axlo 1997, 24; Glb tozh1999, 25). th, lhogh h lo oh o o o l ofh hoh bo, xl g h wo k h o h : ) o wh x ff hoh bo h olof o o wh h l o of h ho, b) o whx h ol ff of o ol g o b x f w ool

fo oh ol g.Procedure. th oo follow f l . F, -qo ol J (fo 2≤J≤10) ol lo h 50x50 ol l. eh g ff ll of oho, cj, gg bw zo o.8 so, n lglo(5≤n≤200) ol b og h xg g l ooo h o og o ol bo wh ql o h’ oo o (1−cj)*6.25.9 th g z of h lgl o whol g of oll o l: owfl o, ll

lgl, gl z hb. B h h b x of bl h l (B 1999; Boo l. 2000; Ho mll 1987;Llo 2002; mll, Ho, Kl 1996; tbl mo 1997), o olf h oo, w gl oll o l. th, ol g o of h ol lo h ’l o (.. l).10 Foh, h ow wh oo h

8 alhogh h o l ho lo b tbl (2002) o o l wh , o o

of oly-mkg l ym hyoh gg h mb ( oo) of h lgl.

9 th mxmm o of 6.25 by. i lly m h hghly ohv y wll hv

97.7% of mmb wh 25x25 “q” of h oly . i o, ohv y wh

vo of 1.25 wol hv 97.7% of mmb wh 5x5 oly .10 i h l wol, h bo of ol f o b o: b o ll

lo h lglo, fo , b hy l by o-w lo. Howv, h

bo my o mll fo h vy o o: h oly mo k, h




710

: ) whh h h ool ho o o; b) whhh h kg o, o, o o o ow ll; ) whh ho b o wh l jo, wo-h, o h-foh of h o

h hb.B o h foo, ffh, h h f-o of h ll lglo, obl jo ( -jo) h lgl, hl z of h , h ff b of , ll (g hool g) h z of h w, h ooo of hol ol h f h -qo. no h h ol f of h k jol o h z of h w, oollg fo h go og h l.

W h o f ho , gg wh l h b, loo, of h l, wll h ool g.Ol h z of h ol l w o o llow fo o of h bl. a xl, Fg 6 ll h ol l foobo b 487, howg h loo of h h lglo, h of h lgl o fo ff ol oo, h f of ljo jo of lglo, h f-o of h kg o. Gh 6.4 h gg ofgo of h w, owg of h ol (14/2500) b h o jo h ol

of h ’ h ogol jo’ f-o .Results. th bl o b tbl 2. tbl 3 how ffOLs ol whh W(sQ) h bl h ol oo tbl 1 h o.11 th lg b of l obollow o go h o ff b f l ofgo fo o h oll of h l bl. th lo l gg h,according to the logic of the veto-player theory, w hol x ool ho o o b l jo o h gf g o ol

bl. i boh , “ l” bo, b h of h o b bl ff b, o o og, h x f o oblof oll o. i o , cda h z of h w bw 11 17, l jo o, b bo 5 . ag hoh 2 3,h of ow o ol bl w fbl.

th b of lglo ( bl of o hol l b ghl go bl ) h o gf o h bl. no gl,

lg bo of o’ f h ol , whh lgl l lo o, h of hg h bo of o’ f bw lo, h ofh lol fo lgl lo, og oh fo. G h b of obl h g of l o , g o loo fo o lg b of lo l o h og b of o ogh l loo.

11 tob mol wh low og g vlly l l.




711

Fg 6: cofgo fo Obo 487

6.1. Loo of h pl

50

40

30

20

10

0Y0

X

10 20 30 40 50

Party B Party A SQPresident Party C

6.2. d of Lgl so fo pol poo




712

6.3. pol pf b h p Lglo(mjo two-th)

X

50

40

30

20

10

0Y0 10 20 30 40 50

Two-thirds Simole MajorityPresident

6.4. W of h s-Qo50

40

30

20

10

0Y0

X

10 20 30 40 50

W(SQ) 0.0056




713

tbl 2: d s fo slo p

p m mx m s. d.

W(sQ) 0.0004 0.9996 0.4715 0.2877

Players

nb of lglo 5 200 104.7 56.0m bw lglo 2.8 68.4 37.1 10.5m fo sQ 0.0 63.7 25.5 12.0eff b of 1.02 8.88 3.14 1.16sh lg 0.13 0.99 0.49 0.16d lg fo sQ 0.0 60.2 25.5 12.0coho lg 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.29

sh ’ 0.01 0.99 0.35 0.23d ’ fo sQ 0.0 60.9 25.5 12.1coho p’ 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.29

Constitutions*

cda (%) 25.6pkg o (%) 50.3i o (%) 25.1O l jo (%) 43.0O 3/4 (%) 19.5Obo 5000

* cool l o .

h g h bw h lglo h -qo, h g hz of h w. th g bw lglo h owh ff. i of h lg “olk” of h oll o l, g o bwlglo o g ol bl–bl b h -qo

o lkl o b qlb.th lo hllg h ool wo h lg ff b of b g ol bl– f w ooll fo of “obljo”. i lo gg h g jo gfl olbl h lg g fo sQ. ag ll xo, h hof of h lg h o l fl o h of h lgl ofo ol hg (mol 5), oho w l ol o wh fo h -qo ( mol 6, b o mol 8).

alhogh h ow of h h h hohz ff mol 7(xg h z of h w h g fo sQ), h fllf ol h of h ’ fo h -qo, o h zo oho, g h og o of h o fo ol hg. tho bw cda ow how h x g, ggg h ho bo l l fo wh og lgl o.




714

tbl 3: i of iol vbl o W(sQ)

mol1 2 3 4

H1-H4 H5-H9 H10 H11


cda 0.115***

pkg o –0.004

i o –0.027*

O l jo 0.046***

O 3/4 –0.020

B1. Legislators

nb of lglo (n) 0.000

l(n) 0.021*

ag fo sQ 0.013***

ag lglo –0.003***

B2. Parties

eff b of 0.000 –0.005

iobl mj. (enp>enppm) –0.008 –0.004

G mj. (enp<enpGm) –0.049***

d lg fo sQ 0.017***

G jo*d 0.003***

i 0.435*** 0.196*** 0.476*** 0.042***

aj. r2 0.042 0.276 0.000 0.558

n 5000 5000 5000 5000

no: e OLs off ( o o o , lbl o q).d bl h z of h w (ooo of fg sQ).

* sgf .1 ll; ** .05 ll; *** .01 ll.

tbl 3 (co.). i of iol vbl o W(sQ)

mol5 6 7 8

H12 H13 H14-16 H1-16


cda 0.171*** 0.172***pkg o 0.002

i o –0.029***

(it continues in following page)




715

mol5 6 7 8

H12 H13 H14-16 H1-16

O l jo 0.056***

O ¾ –0.017***

B1. Legislators

nb of lglo (n) 0.000

l(n) –0.002

ag fo sQ 0.003***

ag lglo –0.005***

B2. Parties

eff b of 0.013**

iobl mj. (enp>enppm) 0.001

G mj. (enp<enpGm) –0.008 –0.067***

d lg fo sQ 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.011***

G jo*d 0.002***

sh lg –0.053 0.149

sh lg (q) 0.126 –0.118B3. Party Cohesion

coho lg –0.020** –0.007

mjo*d*coho 0.003*** –0.000

C. Partisan Powers

sh ’ (w) –0.071*** –0.044*

coho p’ () –0.048*** –0.027*

p pow of p (w*) –0.328*** 0.054d ’ fo sQ 0.012*** 0.007***

p pow*d 0.019*** 0.000

cda*p pow –0.290*** –0.312***

i 0.008 0.028*** 0.143*** 0.007

aj. r2 0.556 0.557 0.502 0.710

n 5000 5000 5000 5000

no: e OLs off ( o o o , lbl o q).

d bl h z of h w (ooo of fg sQ).* sgf .1 ll; ** .05 ll; *** .01 ll.

(continuation tabla 3)




716

V. DISCUSSION

tbl 4 l h z of h w (b o mol 8) fo fo l-

of l: og l (wh h x h boh ogool ow), wk l (wh lk boh of ow), “ff” l (ll wk ool ow bog ow), “ff” l (og fol ow bwk ow) (shg c 1992). Fo h l w h x l of W(sQ) wh h ll lo o (10 l) fo (40 l ) h -qo. th o ggh, oxll, h l o of h o-l ol, h policy

preferences of h k l o l fo hg ol bl h h

ol l hl.

tbl 4: p W(sQ) Fo t of pl

t of pl

po

sog Wk eff iff

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

Proactive powers

cda y y no no no no y y

Reactive powers

pkg o (ol) no no no no y y no no

i o y y no no no no y y

Veto override

sl jo no no – – no no no no

two-h no no – – y y no no

th q y y – – no no y y

Party System

eff b of 1.92 1.92 4.08 4.08 1.92 1.92 4.08 4.08sh of ’ 0.60 0.60 0.35 0.35 0.60 0.60 0.35 0.35

coho ’ 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5

President’s distance from SQ 10 40 10 40 10 40 10 40

Predicted W(SQ) 0.018 0.652 0.202 0.764 0.082 0.716 0.218 0.780

95% Confidence interval

Low –0.016 0.622 0.189 0.749 0.054 0.690 0.200 0.762

u 0.051 0.685 0.215 0.780 0.109 0.743 0.235 0.780

no: slo b o mol 8. p z of h w 1000B lo (o wh Clarify). ul bl h B1 go (Lglo) h . th ’ lw o b h lg og. Wh h of ’ 60%, bo of o b 60-40%(enp=1.92). Wh h of ’ 35%, bo o b 35-30-10-10-10-5% (enp=4.08).




717

th l of o ool ol h l fo l ofl o. F, h gf ol l b ol f o h o g bhol ol o o h olkgo. mo lg-n of bl ol l h ol hff of ol bl (ll, h ff b of ) whog h of h k l fo h -qo. th l lo fo h oo: h “-qo” b h o f h oo of kl h ol b h o lo– fo jo oll og l lf-gh o. a l, h ll o foo ool oo l g ( xo, alá sáz 2002; cog1998). How, o l gg h h ff of o k ol bl ool o l fo. th of lgl jo, oho, h ow of h h bll ff ff whh o h ogol jo lo o h -qo h wh h fo . th gg h g ffo hol b o o lblo o of l oo o o o .

so, l h o o of h of oow o ol bl, o ggg h l ow h ll fo ol hg (Joho c 2003) o ggg hh l (F rbo Go 1998; nlo 2003). th b hl of h of ff ol o b l . O o

o h, h o of h ho, ool ho (foho o ol whh llow) l -o hol b g l ol fo hg ol bl, f oh ol f o fo. th fg gg h of olkg l ghol l o o ho . r l l g hcda o l o ll l fo ol bl wol ol qoh o of o l ol fo lo of h ho.

a ol obl wh h oh h h o-l ol o oh b oo o g l of l. Fo ,

ff ol o o ff ol l (.g., b llow fo o b o oh). a x o of o oolol ol l wh ff ol l og h wo o(.g., h ol h ow log X b o y). i o, h oh ol ol-xz (o h o- o off-xz) h h. O ool ol llow fo hl xo o x hl. a wo-ll o “” xo wol h bo of o oh ol , fog l lglo o off h ow ol ffo o o. i l- o of h ol, l lglo

wol o o ff lg l bo of o h (sgh 2002). a h-ll xo of h ol wol lo ooolo foo (al 2000; ao no 2002), fog lglo o how f fo g lo o h . th xo wol h lgho l qo bo o l h of o j g o xlo.




718

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