vico and spinoza

8/12/2019 Vico and Spinoza

1/21

Vico and SpinozaAuthor(s): James C. MorrisonSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1980), pp. 49-68Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2709102.

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2/21

VICO

AND

SPINOZA

BY

JAMES

C.

MORRISON

The

following

is

a

comparative study

of Vico's

New

Science and

Spinoza's

Theological-Political

Treatise.1

A

common

link

which

unifies

these

apparentlyquite

disparate

works is

found in

the

concept

of

history,

for as

Vico

laid the

basis for

the

modern

historization

of

philosophy,

so

Spinoza

laid the

basis for

the modern

historization

of

religion.

Although

our main

purpose

is to

bring

to

light

the

major

philosophical relationships

holding

between these

two

revolutionary

and foundational works of

mod-

ern

philosophy,

we

believe

that the

numerous

striking

agreements among

them

in

thought, expression,

and intention make

it

highly

probable

that

Vico had read

Spinoza

and

was

influenced

by

him.2

We

also

hope

to

demonstrate that

a

comparative

study

of the New Science

and

the Theo-

logical-Political

Treatise

contributes

significantly

to

a

clarification of the

works

themselves.

The

recognition

of

the

Spinozistic

elements

in

Vico's

thought

is

especially

useful

for

disclosing

his

real

(but

veiled)

intentions

and

the ultimate

implications

of the New Science for

religion

and

Scripture.

1

All direct

quotations

and references to

Vico are from the

English

translation

by

T.

G.

Bergin

and

M.

H.

Fisch,

The New Science

of

Giambattista Vico

(Ithaca,

N.

Y.,

1968),

hereafter

designated

as

NS;

numbers refer

to

paragraphs,

which

are

the

same

as

those

in

the

edition

of

Vico's

Opere,

Vol.

IV,

ed.

Fausto

Nicolini

(Bari,

1942). When quoting directly from Spinoza we have used our own translations

based

on

Carl

Gebhardt's

edition,

Spinoza Opera,

Vol. III

(Heidelberg,

1924).

Numbers refer to

pages

of this

edition,

hereafter

designated

as

Op.,

and to

the

English

translation

by

Elwes

in

Works

of Spinoza,

Vol.

I

(New

York,

1951),

hereafter

designated

as

TPT.

2

In

regard

to the

question

of

Spinoza's

direct influence on

Vico,

cf.

Frederick

Vaughan,

La Scienza Nuova:

Orthodoxy

and

the

Art

of

Writing,

Forum

Italicum,

II,

No.

4

(1968),

350;

Vaughan

asserts

that Vico's

New

Science

was

written

under the

spell

of the


Treatise and

Spinoza's

idea

of a new kind of critical history.

He

even goes

so far as to

say

that

Spinoza

was

the

most

important

influence

on the formation of Vico's

philosophy.

Cf.

also

Vaughan's

The Political

Philosophy

of

Giambattista Vico

(The

Hague,

1972),

44-51.

We have

not been able

to find an

unequivocal

affirmation of

Spinoza's

direct

influence on

Vico

in

the

writings

of Fausto Nicolini or in the

Bibliografia

Vichi-

ana,

2

vols.,

ed.

B. Croce

& F.

Nicolini

(Naples,

1947-58).

Croce

says

in

one

place,

non

par

dubbio,

il Vico aveva

letto

il

Tractatus

theologico-politicus

del

reprobo

Spinoza.

And

when

discussing

Spinoza's

views

on

Moses

and the

Pentateuch,

he

adds that si

direbbe

quasi

che dalla critica biblica dello

Spinoza

il

Vico

avesse

avuto incentive alla

sua

della formazione

e dello

spirito

dei

poemi

omerici,

e

che,

passato

per

tal modo dalla storia sacra alla

profana,

da Mose a

Omero,

si

fosse

poi

ostinato

a

non

ripassare

a niun

patto

da Omero a

Mose,

dalla

storia

profana

alla

sacra.

La

Filosofia

di

G.

B.

Vico

(Bari,

1965),

182.

On this

latter

point,

cf.

Section III

below.

49

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3/21

50

JAMES

C.

MORRISON

Our discussion

is divided

into

five sections.

In Section

I

we

make

some

introductory

remarks

about the

general

thematic

and

aims

of

both

works;

in

Section

II we discuss

the

critique

of

divine

providence;

in

Sec-

tion

III

we

turn to

the

general

critique

of revealed

religion

and

Scrip-

ture;

in Section

IV

we

deal with

politics

and

natural

law;

and in

Section

V

we

draw

some

of

the

ultimate

implications

of

Vico's and

Spinoza's

methods,

arguments,

and

doctrines.

1. The


Treatise

has

a

philosophical,

theological,

and

political

purpose.

These are

intimately

connected.

Spinoza says

in

his

Preface

that

philosophical

readers

will find mere

commonplaces

(TPT 11; Op. 12). This means that the work is written not for actual

philosophers

but for

potential

ones.

The latter

are

those

who could

or

would become

philosophers

were

they

not

inhibited

by

the Christian

and

Jewish

claims to

possess

a

suprarational

truth which has

been revealed

by

God. The

belief in

such a revelation

inevitably

leads

to

a

tension be-

tween

reason

and

faith.3 This

tension

expresses

itself

either as

skepticism,

the subordination

of

reason

to

faith

and

revelation,

or

dogmatism,

the

subordination

of faith and

revelation

to reason. The


Treatise,

then,

is a

philosophical

critique

of revelationaddressed o Chris-

tian

or

Jewish

skeptics

or

dogmatists

in order

to convert

a few

of

them

to

philosophy

and the use

of reason.

But the

free use

of

reason

is inhib-

ited

not

only by

faith in

revelation

but

also

by

political

and

ecclesiastical

authority.

Spinoza

tries

to remove this

other obstacle

to

philosophy

by

arguing

that

everyone

ought

to

have the

freedom

to think

what he

likes

and

say

what

he thinks

(TPT

6,

11,265;

Op.

7,12,246-7).4

He

thus

addresses

himself

to

present

and future

rulers

in order to

persuade

them

to

permit

freedom

of

conscience

and

expression.

His

argument

is that

such

freedom

is

necessary

both

for

piety

and

public peace

(TPT

6;

Op. 7).

In

other

words,

the


Treatise

seeks

to

free

actual

and

potential

philosophers

from

persecution

by promoting

the

establishment

of

a liberal

democratic

state. But the

political

and

legal

free-

dom

to

think,

speak,

and

write

is

ultimately

worthless unless

reason

itself

is freed

from

the

limitations

imposed by

belief

in

revelation. The

freedom

to think without fear of political and

ecclesiastical

persecution

therefore

requires

for its

full realization

complete

confidence

in the natural

ight,

i.e.,

one's

capacity

to

know

the

truth

by

one's own reason.5

For

when

the

philosopher's

own

capacity

to know

is doubted

his

will to

know

is

paralyzed.

The

resolute

commitment

to

a task

presupposes

complete

con-

3

In

his

discussion

of miracles

or that

which cannot

be

explained

through

natural

causes,

Spinoza

says

that he

recognizes

no

distinction

between

a truth

supra

naturam

and

contra

naturam

(TPT

85,87;

Op.

85,86).

Since

the

spheres

of nature and reason are coextensive, a truth above reason would also be a truth

against

reason.

.

..

For whatever

is

against

nature

is

against

reason,

and

what

is

against

reason

is

absurd

and so

must be

rejected

(TPT

92;

Op. 91).

4

Cf.

the

subtitle

to the

Treatise.

5

Cf.

Spinoza's

critique

of the

belief that

the human

understanding

is

naturally

corrupt

(TPT

7-8;

Op.

10).



4/21

VICO AND

SPINOZA

51

fidence

in one's

ability

to

complete

the task. The

philosophical quest

for

wisdom

would be

annulled

in

advance

it

one

did

not have

complete

con-

fidence

in

one's

ability

to

become

wise.

The

possibility

of revelation or a

suprarational

truth leaves

open

the

possibility

of a contrarationaltruth

and

hence casts

into doubt the

certainty

of reason's

clear

and distinct

ideas.

The

deceiving

demon

of

revelation must

therefore be exorcized

by

reason and

philosophy

themselves,

which must demonstrate

their

autonomy

and

power by

demonstrating

the

limitations and deficiencies

of revealed

religion.

In

short,

the

ultimate

aim

of

the


Treatise

is to refute

the revealed

religion

of

Christianity

and

Judaism

and

replace

it

by philosophical

wisdom.

Whereas

Spinoza's


Treatise is a

propaedeutic

to

philosophy

dealing primarily

with

theological

and

political

questions,

Vico's

New

Science

is

a

philosophical

work

dealing primarily

with

philo-

sophical

and

historical

questions

and

only

secondarily

with

theological

and

political

ones.

Although

Spinoza's

work

is

primarily

theoretical,

it

has an

important practical

purpose.

Vico's

New

Science

is also

primarily

theoretical

but

seems to

have little

direct

practical bearing.6

Its main

aim

is not to free potential philosophers from a pre-philosophicalservitude

to

faith

and

revelation

but to

lay

the

basis

of

a new

philosophy.

Vico's

whole

problematic

rests

on

a

fundamental

distinction

between the

world

of

nations

(history)

and

the

world of

nature.

This distinction

is

linked

with

the

epistemological

principle

that the

knower can know

only

what

he

has

made and

the

metaphysical-theological

principle

that

nature can-

not

be

the

subject

of

human

science

(NS

331).7

Vico nowhere tries

to

bridge

the

dichotomy

between

nature and

history

or

to reconcile them

in a higher unity. For him there is no all-embracingsingle whole but

two

mutually

exclusive

parts.8

The

specific subject-matter

of Vico's

new

science

is the common nature

of nations

or

the

origins

of

institutions,

6

Only

in

##1405-11

(not

included

in

the

published

versions

of

the

Scienza

nuova)

does

Vico

explicitly

raise

the

question

of the

practice

(prattica)

of his

work.

There

he

briefly

alludes

to

possible political

implications

and

applications

of the

theory

of

the

New

Science for the

wise men

and

princes

of

the

com-

monwealths

who desire

to

recall

the

peoples

to their

acme

or

perfect

state

(#1406). These sections have recently been translated and published in Giam-

battista

Vico's Science

of Humanity,

ed. G.

Tagliacozzo

&

N.

Verene

(Baltimore,

1976),

451-54.

7

It also follows

that

man can

have

no

knowledge

of God.

Nor can man

know

that

nature has

been

created

by

God.

From the

point

of view of Vico's

science,

the belief

in God

and

His creation

is a

mere

postulate.

Men

can

know the divine

only

insofar

as

it

is

a

human creation.

Vico's

point

is that

human

knowledge

is limited

to the

human.

It

ends

where

the realm of

history

ends and that

of

nature

begins.

8

By contrast, Spinoza's thought is essentially a doctrine about an all-embracing

whole.

Everything

that

is,

is either nature

or

an

aspect

or

part

of nature

(the

substance,

its

attributes and

modes).

Human

things

are

merely

finite

parts

of

an

infinite

whole.

Humans

and

their creations

are thus

wholly

natural.

They

do

not

constitute

an

independent

realm

in

opposition

to nature

but are themselves

ultimately

manifestations

of

the

power

of

nature.



5/21

52

JAMES C.

MORRISON

religious

and

secular,

among

the

gentile

nations (NS

31).

Its

aim is

to

study

these in

the

light

of

divine

providence

(NS

31,342).

On

one

level

this means

showing

how

God

or

the

divine

will

operates

(NS

182).

On

another

level it

means

showing

the

way

providence naturally

guides

the

process

by

which

man becomes

human

or the

families and

civil

society

develop

from the natural

state

of

bestial

wandering

(NS

146,310,338).

On

yet

another level

it

means

showing

that

the

world

of

civil

society

has

certainly

been made

by

men

(NS

331).

Vico's

argument

moves

vertically

from

the

divine

to

the natural to

the human.

The

chief

accomplishment

of

the

New Science

is therefore

the

secular-

ization of human history. The old Judaeo-Christiantheocentric under-

standing

of

human

things

as

guided

providentially

by

a

divine

mind

is

replaced by

a new

anthropocentric

doctrine

according

to which

men

themselves

have made

the world

of nations.

Tacitly recalling

the

Car-

tesian

assumption

that all traditional

opinions

might

be

false,

Vico

speaks

of

the

night

of

thick

darkness

enveloping

the

earliest

antiquity.

All

historical

knowledge

is obscure and

hence doubtful.

But

in

the

midst

of

this

darkness Vico

discovers

the eternal

and never

failing

light

of

a

truth beyond all question: that the world of civil society has certainly

been

made

by

men

. . .

(NS 331).

The truth

that the

human

world

has been made

by

men recalls

the Cartesian

certainty

of

the

cogito.

But

Vico

replaces

the

Cartesian

Archimedian

point

of

self-conscious-

ness

by

human

self-making:

the

identity

of

thinker and

thought

becomes

the

identity

of

maker

and

made.

He

thereby

completes

the

Copernican

revolution

in

astronomy

and

the

Cartesian

revolution

in

metaphysics

with

a new revolution

in

history.

Human

things

will be understood

by

Vico solely in human terms: men have not been made by God or nature

but

by

themselves.

Human

self-making

will

in

turn

provide

the

basis for

the

accomplishment

of

the ultimate

aim of the

New

Science,

namely,

to

unite

history

( philology )

and

philosophy.

II.

If the

history

of

human

things

is

to

be

understood

anthropologic-

ally,

the

theological

conception

of divine

providence

must be

demytholo-

gized :

it must

be shown

to be

a

metaphor

enclosing

and

concealing

human truths. In Vico's own

terminology,

it must be translatedfrom an

imaginative

genus

into an

intelligible genus.

This

is in

fact

what

Vico

does. He

presents

a

non-theological

and

non-traditional

account of the

corso of the nations

under the

veil

of

a

theological

and traditional

account

of

divine

providence.

But

at

the

same

time he

provides

the

hermeneutical

rules

for

stripping

away

this

poetic-theological

surface and

disclosing

its

historical-human

nucleus.

For

the

New

Science,

which

overtly presents

the

method

of

interpreting

the divine

poems

of the

theological

poets,

also

covertly

presents

the

method

for

interpreting

its

own divine

poem

of

history

as

the

unfolding

of

providence.

Just

as

all

myths

are

essentially

civil

histories,

so

the

mythical guise

of

Vico's

providence

masks the



6/21

VICO AND SPINOZA 53

historical-philosophical

truths

which make

up

the real

content of the

New

Science.9

According

to

the

surface

argument

of

the

New

Science,

the

idea

of

providence

is

linked

to

the

division between

gentiles and

Jews,

for

God

aids

the

former

naturallyby

divine

providence

and

the latter

super-

naturally

by

divine

grace

(NS 136;

cf.

310,

313).

This

division,

Vico

says,

was

made

by

the

Jews

themselves

(NS

313).

It

is

thus not

a

philo-

sophical

division

but a

traditional

opinion.

Consistent with his

purpose

of

replacing

old

opinions

by

new

knowledge,

Vico

persistently

ignores

the

division between the

history

of

the

gentiles

and that of

the

Jews,

eventuallycollapsingthe distinctionbetween them and replacingthe theo-

logical

ideas

of

providence

and

grace

by

the

philosophical

idea

of the

ideal

eternal

history

which

holds

universally

for

all nations

(cf.

NS

245,

250,349,393).

Vico's distinction between

the

ordinary

help

from

provi-

dence

for

the

gentiles

and

the

extraordinary

help

from the

true God

for

the

Jews

(NS

313)

is

strikingly

reminiscent of

Spinoza's

distinction

between

the internal

aid

of God

and

the external aid

of God. 10

The

former is whatever human nature

by

its

own

power

alone

can

do

for

preservingits existence, while the latter is whateveraccrues to man's

use

by

the

power

of

external

causes

(TPT

45;

Op. 46).

Both

of

these

reduce to

the

fixed

and

unchangeable

order

of

nature or the

chain of

natural

things

(TPT

44,

cf.

82,89;

Op.

45-6;

82,89).

So

for

Vico,

the

help

of

divine

providence

reduces to

the

unchanging

order

of the corso

of

the

nations.

Both

Spinoza

and

Vico therefore secularize the

divine.

Spinoza

does

so

by

naturalizing

providence

and

identifying

it

with the

course

of

nature,

Vico

by

historicizing

providence

and

identifying

it

with

the course of history.

According

to

orthodox

belief,

a

primary

manifestation

of

divine

providence

in

the

Old Testament

is

God's

covenant with

the

Hebrews.

For

Spinoza,

however,

the

election

and vocation

of

the Hebrews

has

only

a

political

meaning.

It

has to do

with the

temporal happiness

and

advantages

of

sovereignty

TPT 47;

cf.

48;

Op.

48;

cf.

49).

Apart

from

that,

God

is

equally

kind,

merciful,

etc.

to

all

(TPT

49;

Op.

50).

Solomon,

who

speaks

more

rationally

of

God

than

anyone

in the Old

Testament,

taught

that all the

goods

of fortune to mortals were vain

(TPT

39;

Op.

41).11

The

difference

between

Jews

and

gentiles

is

not

based

on the

fact that the Jews

alone had

the

gift

of

prophecy,

for

all

9

This

is

the

real

meaning

of Vico's

phrase,

rational civil

theology

of

divine

providence

(NS

342).

Vico's

reasoning

shows

that

the

theology

of divine

provi-

dence

is

really

a

civil

history

(cf.

NS

352).

10

Vaughan

has

pointed

this

out but not

developed

it;

cf.

op.

cit.,

349-50.

11Cf. Spinoza's account in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione of his

decision

to

dedicate himself to

philosophy

after

experience

taught

me that all

things

which are

usually

found

in common life

are vain

and futile.

Spinoza

Opera,

op. cit.,

II,

5.



7/21

54

JAMES

C.

MORRISON

nations

possessed

prophets.

The

gentile augurs

were true

prophets

and

the Jews themselves were

often deceived

by

false

prophets

(TPT

49-

52; Op. 50-3).12 Vico,

when

discussing

the three

kinds of

reason,

calls

the

first

kind divine

and defines

it as

a

form of

external

speech

to

the

gentiles

through

he

auspices,

the

oracles,

and

other

corporeal

signs,

and

through

the

prophets

and

through

Jesus Christ to

the

Apostles

(NS

948).13

Spinoza

asserts

that

the

prophets always

had some

sign by

which

they

became certain

of

the

things they

were

imagining prophetic-

ally,

that

the

prophets'

revelations

were

always accompanied by

words

and

figures,

and that

only

Moses heard a true voice.

But

God

re-

vealed Himself to Christ's mind immediately, for Christ was not so

much

a

prophet

as the mouth

of

God

(TPT

25,28,64;

Op. 28,30,64).14

According

to

Vico,

the

ignorant

and

vulgar

refer

the

causes of

the

things they

do

not know to the

will of

God without

considering

the means

by

which the divine will

operates

(NS

182).

A

little earlier

he

suggests

that

this

means

s a

confused

idea of

divinity

(NS

178).

Because

of

this

ignorance

of

natural

causes,

the

human

mind

makes

itself the

rule

of

the

universe,

so

that men

ascribe

to the

gods

what

they

them-

selves do (NS 180; cf. 375). Where Spinoza asserts that misconcep-

tions

about

God arise

from

the

view that all

things

in nature act as

men themselves

act,

namely,

with

an

end, 1'

Vico

says

that

because

of

the indefinite nature

of the

human

mind,

wherever

it

is lost

in

ignorance

man makes

himself the measure

of

all

things

(NS

120).

Spinoza speaks

of

men

imagining

miracles,

believing

themselves to

be God's

favorites,

and the

final

cause

for

which God

created and

continually

directs all

things

(TPT

82;

Op. 82).

The

law

and word

of

God

is

used

meta-

phorically for the order and fate of nature (TPT 169; Op. 162). The

idea

of

God

as

legislator

or

prince

is

used

by

Paul

only

as

a concession

to

the weakness

of

the

understanding

of

the

vulgar

(TPT 65; Op.

65).

Such

usage

illustrates

the

method which

depicts

all

things poetically

and

refers

them to

God

(TPT 92;

Op.

91).

In

the same

way,

Vico

speaks

12

Cf.

Spinoza's

reference to

those

who

dream that

nature had

formerly

created

different

kinds of men

(TPT

45-6;

Op. 47).

.

..

All

men,

Jews

as

well as

Gentiles,

have

always

been the

same,

and in

every

age

virtue has been

very

rare

(TPT

166:

Op.

160).

13

As

far as

we can

determine,

Vico refers

explicitly

to

Christ

in

only

two other

places

in

the

New Science.

One

reference

is

to

a

Jesuit who claimed to

have

read

(Chinese?)

books

written

before

the

coming

of

Christ

(NS

50).

In the

other

reference,

Vico

says

that

during

the returned

barbarian times

paintings

of

God, Christ,

and

Mary depicted

them as

exceedingly

large

(NS

816).

14

Cf.

Spinoza's interpretation

of

Exodus VII:

1,

where he

says

that

Aaron,

in

communicating

Moses'

words

to

Pharoah,

acted the

part

of a

prophet,

and

Moses

himself was like a God to Pharoah, or one who plays the part of God (TPT

13;

Op.

15).

15

In

the

Ethics,

Spinoza

calls the will of God the

sanctuary

of

ignorance.

Everyone judges

of

things

according

to the state of his

brain,

or rather mistakes

for

things

the

forms of

his

imagination.

Ethics,

Part

1,

Appendix.

Cf.

TPT

86;

Op.

86.



8/21

VICO

AND

SPINOZA

55

of that

religious

way

of

thinking

according

to

which it was the

gods

who did whatever men

themselves

were

doing

(NS 629;

cf.

922).

III. The


Treatise is a

critique

of both

religion

and

Scripture,

for

Scripture

is the

record of God's

revelations to

man.

Revelation is

the essential

element

common to Judaism and

Christianity.

The conclusion of

Spinoza's critique

of

Biblical revelation is

that

Scrip-

ture contains no

speculative

philosophical

truths about God

but

only

vulgar

moral

precepts

(TPT

8,190-5;

Op.

9,180-5).

Scripture

does

not

teach

or

claim

to

teach

theoretical

knowledge

but

only practical

obedi-

ence:

it

has

nothing

in

common with

philosophy

(TPT

9;

Op. 10).

Scripture

demands

only

justice

and

charity

in

practice.

Whereas

Spinoza

launches

his

attack

against

Biblical

authority

di-

rectly,

Vico

proceeds

under

the

mask

of

the

pagan

poet

Homer. Homer

is

Vico's

pseudonym

for Moses. '

The first

and

greatest

of

the

pagan

poets corresponds

to

the first

and

greatest

of

the

Hebrew

prophets.

The

question

of

the historical

existence

of Homer

is

the

question

of the his-

torical

existence of

Moses.

The

question

of whether Homer wrote the

Iliad and Odysseyis the question of whetherMoses wrote the Pentateuch.

The

questions

whether Homer was

wise

and whether

his

poems

contain

esoteric

or

philosophical

wisdom are whether

Moses knew

God

better

than

all

other

prophets

and

whether the Pentateuch

contains

true

knowl-

edge

of

the

nature

of

God

(cf.

NS

780).

And

just

as the Homeric

poems

are

two

great

treasure

houses

of

the customs

of

early

Greece

(NS

904),

so

the Old

Testament

should be read as a

treasure house of

the

history

of

the Jews:

their

customs,

institutions,

beliefs,

laws,

etc.

In

short,

the

methodwhich Vico uses to discoverthe true Homer is the same method

to

be used

to

discover the

true

Moses.

The

aim

of

Book

III of

the

New

Science,

Discovery

of the

True

Homer, is,

in

common

with the aim

of

Spinoza's


Treatise,

to

undermine the

authority

of

Scripture.17

That

explains why

16

Vico

also sometimes uses Homer as a

pseudonym

for all

the

authors

of

Scripture.

From this

point

of

view,

the Iliad

corresponds

to the

Old

Testament

and the

Odyssey

to the New

Testament.

For

example,

he

emphasizes

that the

Odyssey

was

composed

later than

the Iliad

because

it

contains

references to

more

advanced and

refined

customs.

For while in

the latter

violent

passions

pre-

dominate,

in the former there

is

evidence

of

an

increased level of reason. The

hero

of

the

Iliad,

Achilles,

is

the hero

of

violence,

while the hero of

the

Odyssey,

Ulysses,

is

the

hero

of

wisdom

(NS 879).

Similarly,

Spinoza

views

the

Old

Testament

as more

primitive

than

the

New

Testament

because

in

the

latter

apostles

or teachers

of

morality

replace

prophets

or

interpreters

of

God.

Whereas

the

apostles

wrote their

epistles

solely by

the natural

light,

the

prophets

prophesied

by

their vivid

imaginations

(TPT

24-25,161;

Op.

27-28,155).

Paul and

the other

apostles philosophized, but the Jews always despised philosophy (TPT 164;

Op.

158).

17

According

to

Nicolini,

Vico

adopts

in Book III

precisamente

il metodo

instaurato

dal filosofo

d'Amsterdam

e dal mentovato

Simon,

e

perfezionato

dalla

critica

moderna,

nello

sconvolgere

analogamente

la

tradizionale

storia esterna

o



9/21

56

JAMES

C.

MORRISON

Vico

made

it

the central

book. What

initially

appears

as

a

digression-a

discussion

of

the existence and characteristicsof an historical

person-is

in

reality

the center:

a

critique

of

the truth

of

Holy Scripture.

While

the

conclusion of

the


Treatise

is

that

Scripture

contains

no

philosophical

theoretical

knowledge

but

only vulgar

practical

precepts,

the conclusion

of

Vico's

critique

of the Homeric

poems

is

that

they

con-

tain

no

philosophical

wisdom

but

only

vulgar

opinion

about the

history

and

customs of the Greek

peoples.

The real

content of the

Homeric

poems

is

not

philosophical

but

historical:

they

give

us not

philosophical

truths

but

philological

certainties. .

.

.

The

meanings

of esoteric

wisdom

were intruded into the Homeric fables by the philosophers who came

later

(NS

834).'8

The

Homeric

poems

are an

expression

of the

history

of

the

natural law

of the

gentes

(NS

904).

Vico

argues

that

the

(false)

belief that Homer

was

a

real

historical

individual and the actual author

of

the

works

traditionally

attributed to

him

has

obscured

this

fact

from

historians. This

suggests

that

the

(false)

belief that Moses was

a

real his-

torical

individual and the

actual author

of

the

Pentateuch

has

prevented

historians

from

realizing

that the

Old

Testament

is

an

expression

of the

natural law of the Hebrews. Vico argues that Homer was not an his-

torical

individual but an

imaginative

genus:

Homer

is

a class term

denoting

an indefinite number of historical

individuals.l'

As

the literal

meaning

of

the

name Homer

mplies,

Homer

was

a binder

or

compiler

of fables

(NS 852), '

an

idea

or

a

heroic

character of

Grecian

men

(NS

873),

the

Greek

peoples

were

themselves

Homer

(S 875).

Moses,

viewed as

the

great law-giver

of

the

Hebrew

people,

is

analogous

to

Solon,

the

great

law-giver

of

the

Athenians. Solon too

was

not an

in-

dividualperson but the Athenian plebeians themselves. Moses is to the

strutturale del Vecchio Testamento.

La

Religiosita

di

Giambattista

Vico

(Bari,

1949),

147.

Vaughan

too

maintains that

Vico uses Homer as a screen for

his

critique

of the Bible.

Op.

cit.,

353.

18

Cf.

Spinoza's

criticism

of Maimonides' method of

interpreting Scripture,

according

to which

reason is used

as a standard for

deciding

what a

given

text

means and the prophets were considered supreme philosophers and theologians.

Thus,

if the literal

meaning

of

a

text

is

unreasonable

or

false,

it must be

interpreted

metaphorically.

For

Spinoza,

this

amounts

to

a

distortion

of

Scripture

(TPT

115-17;

Op.

113-15).

Cf.

Section V

below.

19

Nicolini recalls how

Finetti

(an

early

vociferous

critic

of

Vico's

heterodoxy)

noted

that,

once Homer

is

reduced

to

a

carattere

poetico,

non v'e alcuna

ragione

valida

per

non adotterla

anche

nei

riguardi

della

personalita

storica

dell'autore dei

Salmi.

Op.

cit.,

148-49.

20

Vico

derives

homeros

from

homou

(together)

and

erein

(to link)

(NS

852).

Cf. Martin Buber's

surprisingly

Vichian

analysis

of the

name Moses

as

meaning

he who

draws

forth,

which

signifies

Moses as

the

one

who drew

Israel forth

from

the flood. Buber

calls the Mosaic books

an

historical

saga

or

mythisa-

tion of

history,

i.e.,

the

report by

ardent enthusiasts

of that which

has befallen

them.

Moses

(New

York,

1958),

17,36.



10/21

VICO

AND SPINOZA

57

Hebrews

as

Solon

is

to the

Greeks,

Romulus

to

the

Romans,

Thrice-great

Hermes

to

the

Egyptians

(NS 414-6).21

Although Spinoza,

unlike

Vico,

accepts

the

historical

reality

of

Moses,22

he

too

denies

that

Moses

actually

wrote the

Pentateuch.

Just

as

Vico's

Homer is reduced to a

compiler

of

fables,

so

Spinoza

replaces

Moses

by

the editor

Aben

Ezra.

For

Spinoza

the

Pentateuch,

like

Vico's

Homeric

poems,

is

a

complex

collection of written and oral tradi-

tions

extending

over

many

years

and

issuing

from

many

hands and

mouths

(TPT

128-30;

Op.

125-7).

Just

as

Vico's Homer lived

many

years

after

the

events

his

poems

describe

(cf.

NS

804,806),

so

Spinoza's

Mosaic books were written and edited long after the Mosaic period. Ac-

cording

to

Vico's

Chronological

Table,23

he revelation to Moses

at

Sinai

occurred

in

the

year

of the

world

2491.

(Given

that the traditional

year

of

creation was

4004

B.C.,

this

means 1513

B.C.)

The

same table

says

that in

the

year

3290

(=

714

B.C.)

vulgar

letters

[alphabetical

writing]

had

not

yet

been invented.

This

implies

that the

Pentateuch,

at least in its

present

form,

could not have been written

by

Moses.24

Since

alphabetical

writing

is,

according

to

Vico,

always preceded

by

heroic

and

divine writing (or hieroglyphs ), Moses must have been a number

of

theological

poets

who

wrote

fables about the

gods

in a

divine

mental

language

and

imagined

that

all

things

were done

by

the

gods

(NS

933-5;

922,929).

If

we

take this

conclusion and

relate

it

to Vico's

description

of

the

synchronous

structure

of the course the

nations

run outlined

in

Book IV

(cf.

NS

915ff.),

we

may

draw the

following

inferences

about

his

view

of

Hebrew

history during

the

Mosaic

period.

The nature

of

the Hebrews was

poetic

or

creative

(NS 916);

their

customs

were

21Vico remarks that

Homer

was called the founder

of Greek

polity

or

civility (NS

897).

22

In

many respects, Spinoza's interpretation

of

Moses

is

strikingly

similar

to

Machiavelli's

description

of

the

virtuous

prince.

Moses

is

the

great

law-giver,

the

founder

of

the

Hebrew

people,

nation,

and

religion.

For Moses

surpassed

the

others

in

divine

virtue ;

by

his virtue he established

divine

rights

and

prescribed

them

to the

people ;

because of

his

virtue

and at the divine command

he intro-

duced

a

religion

into

the

commonwealth

(TPT

75;

cf.

74,39;

Op.

75; cf. 74,41).

Cf. for example Machiavelli's discussion in Chapter VI of 11 Principe of the

virtu

and

deeds

of the four

great

princes,

Romulus,

Theseus,

Cyrus,

and

Moses.

23

Cf.

the

insert at the

beginning

of Book

I

of

the

New

Science.

24

Nicolini calculates

that

according

to Vico

alphabetical writing

succeeded

hiero-

glyphic

writing

no later than the

7th or 6th centuries B.C. He thus draws

the obvious

conclusion that Vico

believed

that Moses

had

not written the

Pentateuch,

Joshua

the

Book

of

Joshua,

David

the

Psalms,

nor

Solomon the

works associated

with

his name.

For

the events

recorded

in

these

books

actually

occurred,

and were said

to

have oc-

curred,

before

the

development

of

alphabetical

writing.

In

short,

Nicolini infers

that

Vico's chronology of the history of language significava asserire che la materia

anche

di ciascuno

di

codesti libri

santi,

al

pari

di

quella

dei

poemi

omerici,

si fosse

formata

poligeneticamente;

significava,

insomma, aderire,

implicamente

se non

esplicamente,

alle

conclusioni

del Tractatus

theologicus

politicus

dello

Spinoza

e

dell'

Histoire

critique

du

Vieux Testament

del Simon.

Op.

cit.,

145-47.



11/21

58

JAMES

C. MORRISON

tinged

with

religion

and

piety

(NS

919):

their

natural

law was di-

vine, i.e.,

made

or done

by

a

god

(NS

922);

their

government

was

theocratic

(NS

925);

their

jurisprudence

was

a

mystic

theol-

ogy

(NS 938);

the time

of

Moses was

the

religious

times

(NS

976),

etc.

(Cf.

NS

944,948,955.)

The

reader

of the


Treatise will

recognize

in

the

above

the

basic

characteristics of

Spinoza's

own

view of

the

early

He-

brews.

Further

similarities

between Vico and

Spinoza

also

readily sug-

gest

themselves. Where Vico

notes

that Homer was called the

father of

all other

poets

(NS

900),

Spinoza

follows tradition

in

calling

Moses

the chief of the prophets.

And

when

Vico

says that

Homer was the

source

of

all Greek

philosophies

(NS

901),

Spinoza suggests

that

Moses'

prophecies

became

the basis

of

all

subsequent

theology

(cf.

TPT

7-8;

Op.

9).

Where

Vico

says

that one

of

the

three

chief

aims of all

great poetry,

including

Homer's,

is

to teach the

vulgar

to

act

virtuously

(NS

376),

Spinoza

says

that

Moses'

laws

aimed at

controlling

the stiff-

necked and obstinate Hebrews

(TPT

75;

Op.

75).

Spinoza

speaks

of

the

Hebrews

at the

time

of

Moses as

men

accustomed

to

the

super-

stitions of the Egyptians, crude and sunk in the most wretched slavery

(TPT

38;

Op. 40-1).

For

Vico,

the Hebrew exodus

from

Egypt

would

be

an

instance of

the rebellion of

the

plebs

against

the

patricians

or the

clients

against

the

fathers.

Moses,

like

Solon,

would

have

been

a

leader

of

the

plebs

and

their first

law-giver

(cf.

NS

416).

The

Pentateuch,

as

the

history

of

the

beginnings

of

the

Hebrew

people

and

nation,

would

be a

barbarous and

fabulous

history

of barbarous and bestial men

with

quite

wild

and

savage

natures

(cf.

NS

338,

302,

840).

When

Vico

speaks of the poverty of the Greeklanguagein early times (cf. NS 830),

we recall

Spinoza's complaints

about the

obscurities

and

inadequacies

of

the

ancient

Hebrew

language

(cf.

TPT

108ff.;

Op.

106ff.).

Finally,

many

of

Vico's remarks

about

early

Roman

history

would

be

applicable,

mutatis

mutandis,

to

early

Hebrew

history.

The

most

ob-

vious

example

is

his

lengthy

discussion of

the Roman

Law of the

Twelve

Tables. Vico's

main

concern

is

to

prove

that this law was not

imported

by

the Romans

from

Greece

but was an

indigenous

expression

of

the

naturallaw (sc. natural customs) of the Romans themselves. Similarly,

the

Mosaic

Decalogue

was not

adopted

by

the

Hebrews from

Egyptian

law,

but

was

an

indigenous expression

of

the

natural

customs

of

the

He-

brews.25The

Hebrews,

like all

peoples

in

the

divine

age,

attributed

their

laws

to the

gods.

For

Vico,

however,

this

poetic

myth

should

be cor-

rected

by replacing

God

and

Moses

by

the Hebrew

people.

The stone

tablets

on which

the

Decalogue

was inscribed

are the

poetic equivalent

of

the bronze

tablets

of

the Roman

Law

of

the

Twelve Tables.

They

were

25

In NS

44,

Vico

explicitly

raises

the

question

of

whether

Moses

brought

Hebrew

divine institutions from the

Egyptians;

and in NS

396

he

says

that

Selden

had

failed to

prove

that the Jews

taught

their natural

law to the

gentiles.

Cf. NS

794.



12/21

VICO

AND SPINOZA

59

thus

written,

not

by

the

hand

of

God

or

Moses,

but

by

the Hebrew

peo-

ple

(if

indeed

they

ever

actually

existed).

The

Mosaic

Decalogue

was

formulated

long

after

the Mosaic

period by

several unknown

authors

in

order

to

codify

traditional Hebrew

customs,

just

as

the

Twelve Tables

were

a

later formulation

of

Roman

legal

tradition.

And

just

as the

validity

of

the

Roman law

is

delimited

by

the

geographical

confines of Rome

and

her

territories,

so

the

validity

of

the

Decalogue

is

limited

by

the

temporal

and

geographical

confines

of the Hebrew

state. It is

not a uni-

versal law valid

for

all men

at

all

times,

but a law

only

for

the Hebrews-

just

as

the

Roman

law

was

binding

only

on Roman citizens and

subjects.

This conclusion, at least in its main outlines, corresponds to Spinoza's

interpretation

of

the Mosaic law

as a national law

(TPT

17;

Op. 19)

and

Hebrew

law and

ceremony

generally

as

valid

only

for the Hebrew

state

while

it

existed and

for

the Hebrews when

they

lived within

its

borders. The Hebrew

God

was the

God

of

the

land and

the

laws

of

the Old Testament were revealed

only

to

the Hebrews

(TPT

37;

Op.

39).

In

short,

for Vico

as

for

Spinoza,

the

morality

of

the Old

Testament

is

not the true

morality simpliciter

nor

by

implication,

is

that

of

the

New

Testament. The revelation at Sinai and the Sermon on the Mount are

merely

historically

conditioned

expressions

of the

historical

lives of

par-

ticular

peoples.

They

must therefore be

replaced

by

a

new

moral teaching

and a new doctrine of

the natural

law.

Both

Vico

and

Spinoza,

although

in different

ways, attempt

to effect this

replacement

by

means

of a

new

philosophy.

IV.

The New

Science

and the


Treatise both

con-

tain a doctrine of natural law. Their respective teachings differfrom one

another

and,

even more

importantly,

from

the traditional

theory

about

natural

law.

Vico

and

Spinoza try

to refute

the traditional

teaching

by

subverting

it,

that

is,

by collapsing

the

distinctions

which

served as its

basis

or

essence.26

For

example,

the traditional

view

contrasts

nature

(physis)

and

custom

(nomos).

The distinction between

the natural

and

the

customary

was the distinction

between

what

exists

independently

of

man

and

what exists as

a result of human

thought

and

activity.

Vico,

however, derives his doctrine of naturallaw (diritto naturale) not from

nature

simply

or

from human nature

(in

contrast

to

human

customs)

but from those

human customs which

are

found

historically

among

all

men: the

natural law is coeval with the

customs of

the

nations

(NS

311;

cf.

134-5).27

Thus,

the distinction between the

natural as

what

exists

everywhere

and

always

among

men,

and

the

customary

as

what

26

The

blurring

and

collapsing

of

basic distinctions

and the

tendency

to reduce

transhuman

phenomena

to the human is

typical

of classical

Sophists.

On

Spinoza's

relation to

sophistic

doctrines,

cf. Hermann

Cohen,

Jiidische

Schriften,

Vol.

III

(Berlin, 1924),

303-04.

27

Cf.

NS 309

as an

example

of how Vico

characteristically

blurs and

collapses

the distinctions

between

diritto and

legge,

costumi and

natura.



13/21

60

JAMES

C. MORRISON

exists

only

in

some

places

and

times,

collapses.

Vico's

central notion

of

the

natural law

of

the

gentes 28-a

single

law

which

is

both a law of

nature (ius naturae) and a law of the peoples (ius gentium)-thus im-

plies

the

reduction

of

political

and moral

right

to historical

fact:

what

ought

to be

is

what

everywhere

and

always

is,

has

been,

or

will

be.

Polit-

ical

philosophy

thereby

becomes an

aspect

of the

philosophy

of

history

or

the

unity

of

philosophy

and

philology.29

Traditional

political philoso-

phy

also rested

on the

opposition

between

right

(ius)

and

power

(poten-

tia).

Spinoza,

however,

identifies

right

and

power.

Natural

right

is

simply

the

power

(conatus)

every

individual

being

has

by

nature

to act

and

per-

sist in its existence (TPT 10; cf. 200-01; Op. 11; cf. 189-90). This

means

that

political

and moral

right

are reduced

to natural

fact:

what

ought

to be is

what

every being

can

do. Political

philosophy thereby

is

derived

from the

philosophy

of nature

or

the

doctrine of

the

unity

of

substance.

Traditional

political philosophy

conceived

natural law

as

a trans-

human

standard,

knowable

by

human

reason,

prescribing

limits to hu-

man

actions.3

Vico

denies,

contrary

to

Spinoza,

that the

natural law

is

known by reason. Rather, it is known by sense, i.e., the common

sense

possessed by

all

peoples

of

what

is

useful

or

necessary

for

life.

Human needs and

utilities

are

the two

sources

of

the natural

law of

the

gentes

(NS

141,142;

cf.

145).

Spinoza

denies

that

a

natural

right

is

a

trans-human

standard

possessing

prescriptive

force in

itself;

for it

depends

on

human

decree

that

men

yield,

or be

compelled

to

yield,

the

right

which

they

have

from nature and bind themselves

to

a certain

plan

of

living

(TPT

57;

Op.

58).31

Spinoza

does

not

say

that

natural

right

is itself the product of human decree. Natural right in the sense of one's

natural

power

and desire

is

given

by

nature.

But

this natural

right

be-

comes

a

political

and

moral

right,

and hence

a

standard

for

action,

only

when men decide to

yield

it to those

who will rule

them,

i.e.,

when

in-

dividual

men

by

a

contract

(pactum)

create

a

ruler or

sovereign

(TPT

10,

cf.

202-05;

Op.

11;

cf.

191-94).32

Since men

have had

to

decree and

establish

most

firmly

to

direct all

things

.

.

.

only by

the dictate

of

rea-

son,

it

follows

that

man

is

not

by

nature

a rational

animal

but

by

com-

28

Vico's

expression

is

diritto

naturale delle

genti.

29

Vico calls the

sixth

principal

aspect

of

the

New Science

a

system

of

the

natural

law

of the

gentes,

which

is a

history

of

human

nature

or a

history

of

the

ideas,

the

customs,

and

the deeds

of mankind

(NS

394,368).

30

Cf.

Hugo

Grotius'

succinct

definition

of the

jus

naturale as a dictatum rectae

rationis.

De

Jure Belli

ac

Pacis,

I,I,X,1.

31

On

Spinoza's

tendency

to reduce

reason to

a

plan

or

project

cf.

Leo

Strauss,

Spinoza's

Critique

of

Religion

(New

York,

1965),

16.

32

The utilitarian

aspect

of

Spinoza's

political thought

and his

theory

of the

compact

are no doubt the reason

for Vico's

contemptuous

description

of

Spinoza's

commonwealth

as a

society

of hucksters

(NS

335).

For

according

to

such

a

view,

the state

is formed

by striking

a

bargain

on

the

basis

of mutual

self-

interest

and

profit.



14/21

VICO

AND SPINOZA

61

pact

(TPT

203;

Op.

191;

my

emphasis).

A

life in

accordance

with

reason

is

not

natural

but

conventional. Human

nature

is so consti-

tuted that all indeed seek their own utility, but not from the dictate of

sound

reason

(TPT

73;

Op.

73).33

Men

do

not

by

nature

pursue

what

is

good,

but

each man

pursues

his

own

self-interest or

what he

judges

is the

greatest good

or the least evil.

Spinoza

adds

that this law is so

firmly

inscribed in human nature that

it

ought

to be

placed among

the

eternal

truths

which no one can

ignore

(TPT

203;

Op.

192).34

For

Vico,

the state is not

a

deliberatecreation

resulting

from a

com-

pact

or

yielding

of

natural

right,

but

develops naturally

from families

or society. Families are the first societies since they consist of the

fathers

and

their socii

(or

dependents).

These

form the

basis of

the

later

political

classes of civil

society,

i.e.,

the

patricians

and

plebs.

The

state

or

civil

society

emerged

not when

isolated

individuals

yielded

their

right

or

power

but

when

the fathers chose

a leader to defend themselves

against

the

rebellion

of their

dependents

who

sought

to

share the natural

rights

already

possessed

by

the

fathers

(NS

583-4;

cf.

554-5).

Civil

power emerged

from

family

authority

(NS

585).

Since

those who

made up the families wereconcerned only with the necessities of life ;

they

did

not

recognize good

faith

(NS 570).

Thus,

a

compact,

which

presupposes

mutual

trust,

was

impossible.

In

other

words,

for

Vico

neither

the

state

nor

society

can

arise from a

compact

because

compacts

presuppose

the state and

society.35

For

both Vico and

Spinoza

the

state

arises from

human

actions.

But for

Vico,

these actions

are not

a

con-

tractual

agreement

against

nature

but historical

responses

to

natural ne-

cessities.

The

decision to found a

state is

not

a decision

to live

rationally

according

to a

plan

rather than

naturally according

to desire and

pas-

sion,

but

is

a natural

response

to natural

needs

and

utilities. While

Spin-

oza

contrasts

human reason and

nature,

Vico coalesces

them;

for

Spinoza

the

state

is

an

artifice,

for Vico it

is

a

natural institution

arising

from

natural customs.

Spinoza

and

Vico also differ

concerning

the

end

or

purpose

of civil

society.

For

Spinoza,

the end

of

every society

and

government

is

that

men

may

live

with

security

and

comfort

(TPT

47;

Op.

48).36

To

achieve

this

end it

is

necessary

to free

everyone

from fear.

Living

se-

33

It

follows from this that the

philosophical

life-or

the

pursuit

of

rational

truth

and wisdom-is also not natural for

most

humans.

Philosophy

is

not

the

fulfillment

of man's inherent nature.

Cf.

Spinoza's

opening

statements in the

Preface

about men

being

naturally

superstitious

(TPT

3-5; Op.

5-7).

34

Cf. Vico's statement

that

legislation

considers

man

as he

is

in order to

turn human vices into virtues

(NS 132).

35

Vico

quotes

with

approval Pomponius:

when the institutions themselves

dictated

it,

kingdoms

were

founded''

(NS 584).

36

Cf.

Spinoza's interpretation

of God's choice

(electio)

of the

Hebrews

and

their

vocation

(vocatio)

in terms of

temporal happiness

and

advantages

(TPT

47;

Op.

48).



15/21

62

JAMES C.

MORRISON

curely

involves

not

only

the

safety

of

the

body

but the exercise

of one's

free reason : therefore the end of a

republic

is

indeed

liberty

(TPT

258-9; Op. 240-1).

For

Vico,

the

aim of

civil

society

was first

to

render

secure

the

lives,

property,

and

rights

of the

family

fathers

against

the

armed threat

of their

dependents

and

ultimately

to make

possible

the

full

deveopment

of

reason and

thus human

nature

itself

(SS

326,554-5,918,

924,927,973,1008).

The

corso

of

the nations is

therefore

fulfilled

in

a

monarchy,

in which the

natural

equality

of all

men

is

actualized and

protected by

law

and institutions

(NS

995-8,1008).

In this

sense,

mon-

archy

for

Vico is both the most natural and the

best

form of

government

because it is consistent

with both

the natural

end

of the

historical

process

and

human

nature.

By

contrast,

Spinoza's

reduction of

right

to

power,

and

hence

natural

right

to natural

power, implies

that

democracy

is

the

most

natural

regime,

for

there

is no natural

hierarchy

of better and worse

and no

natural end of

either

history

or man.

Since

all men

are

naturally

equal,

democracy

is

most

in

harmony

with human nature

(TPT

263;

Op. 245).

And

because

sovereignty

is the

product

of

a

compact,

a

ruling

class

does not exist

because

of

its

natural

superiority

but

by

a

common

convention. Democracy is also the most natural form of government be-

cause

it

is

most

consonant with individual

liberty

(TPT

207;

Op.

195).

For

Vico,

however,

there

is

a

natural

hierarchy

not

only

in

civil

society

but

also

in

the state

of

nature.

This

hierarchy

is

ultimately

de-

termined

by

superior

virtue or

piety,

for

the founders of

the families

and

the

cities were

the

pious

ones whose

fear of the

gods

caused them to set-

tle

in

one

place.37

The fathers

were the virtuous

few,

the natural

aristoi.

In this

sense,

for

Vico

aristocracy

s

natural,

since it is rule

by

the natur-

ally virtuous few over the naturally vicious or bestial many.38But this

natural

inequality

is,

in

the

development

of

the

nations,

replaced

by

the

progressive

emergence

of reason

and

the

demand

of

the

plebs

for

an

equal

share

in

the

rights,

privileges,

and

power

of the

patricians.

This is

accompanied

by

a

weakening

of

the

plebs'

belief

that the

patricians

are

of

a

different

nature from

themselves,

i.e.,

that

they

are descended

from

the

gods.

The old

belief in natural

inequality

is

replaced by

a new

belief based on the

recognition

of

the

sameness

of

nature insofar

as all

men are rational. That is, it is replacedby the belief in a common human

nature

which,

in

its

state

of

perfection,

is

reasonable

and

intelligent

(NS 918).

The

original

natural

inequality

of

piety

is

replaced

by

the

natural

equality

of

reason:

pious

virtue and

justice

become

rational

virtue

and

justice.

37

.

.

.

The

frightful

thought

of some

divinity

..

.

imposed

form

and

measure

on the bestial

passions

of

those lost

men and thus transformed

them

into human

passions

(NS

340;

cf.

177,338,339,376ff.).

Spinoza,

however,

explicitly

denies

that

religion

exists in the natural

state,

in that no one knows from nature

whether he

owes

any

obedience

towards God.

The state

of nature is

without

religion

or law

(TPT

210;

Op.

198).

38

The earliest

kings

were chosen

by

nature,

that

is,

because

of

their

greater piety,

strength,

and

courage

(NS

584).



16/21

VICO

AND

SPINOZA

63

Vico

presents

his rational

civil

theology

of

divine

providence

as a

refutation

of

the doctrine

of chance

of Hobbes

(despite

Hobbes's de-

terminism), Machiavelli,

and

Epicurus,

and the

doctrine

of

fate

in

Spinoza

and

Zeno

(sc.

the

Stoics)

(NS

179,1109).

In

Vico's

refutation,

he

says

he sides with

the

divine

Plato,

the

prince

of

the

political

philosophers

(NS

1109;

cf.

130).

He also

presents

his

philosophy

as

a

refutation

of

the

atheistic

doctrine of

Bayle

and

Polybius,

according

to which

human

society

and

virtue

are

possible

without

religion

and

piety

(NS

179,

1109).

Vico

refutes the

false

dictum of

Polybius

that

if

there

were

philosophers

in

the world

there

would

be no

need

for

reli-

gions (NS 179,1112). Human things cannot be understood without

the

recognition

of

the

essential

role

of

religion

and

religious

belief.

Al-

though

Vico does

not

associate

Spinoza

with

the

atheistic

enlightenment

view

of

Bayle

and

Polybius

that

science or

philosophy

could

replace

reli-

gion,

he

might easily

have done

so.

For the main

purpose

of the

Theo-

logical-Political

Treatise

is

precisely

to show

that

a

republic requires

the

freedom

of

thought

and

expression,

i.e.,

the

freedom

to

philosophize

without

restriction.

Thus a

society

of

atheists

is

not

unqualifiedly

con-

demned. However, a society of philosophersin the sense of rationalmen

living

in accordance

with

a

plan

cf reason

rather

than

the

impulsion

of

natural

desire

is

not

possible,

since it contradicts

human nature.39

For

all

men are

by

nature

superstitious

(TPT

3;

Op

5).

Only

a

very

few

can

perform

the

extremely

difficult

unnatural

feat

of

mastering

their

passions

by

means

of reason.4

Whereas

for

Spinoza

a

society

of

philosophers

is

a

natural

impossibility,

for

Vico it

is

an

historical

impossibility.

So

too

for

a

society

of

atheists.

For

society

presupposes

law and

law

presupposes

religion.

The first society, that of the families, rests on the three princi-

ples

of

religion,

marriage,

and

burial

(belief

in

immortality).

The first

laws

and

institutions

were

believed to be

of divine

origin,

for law

or

juris-

prudence

was

originally

the

science

of

Jove's

auspices

(NS

398).

And

since civil

society

presupposes

families,

it

too rests

on

piety

and

religion

(NS 179).

Finally,

philosophy

presupposes

religion

because

it

presup-

poses

civil

soci

vico and spinoza

Documents