victimizing victims rb uj paper (2) · michael burawoy’s ... (1985) demonstrates that ......
TRANSCRIPT
UJ Sociology, Anthropology & Development Studies
W E D N E S D A Y
S E M I N A R Hosted by the Department of Sociology and the
Department of Anthropology & Development Studies
Meeting no 02/2015
To be held at 15h30 on Wednesday, 15 April 2015,
in D-Ring 506, UJ Kingsway campus
'Victimising the victims?': The migration narrative and xenophobic
violence in South Africa - Draft in progress. Do not copy or cite without authors’ permission -
Dr Reason Beremauro
University of Pretoria
- Programme and other information online at www.uj.ac.za/sociology -
1
‘Victimising the victims?’: The migration narrative and xenophobic violence in South Africa Reason Beremauro African Humanities Programme (AHP) Postdoctoral Fellow ‘14 Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn) University of Pretoria Work in Progress, Please do not cite or share
Introduction
In South African communities where large segments of hitherto marginalized individuals and
segments of the population are yet to realize the economic promises of a post‐apartheid era,
growing nationalist discourses have led to the exclusion and ‘othering’ of mainly black African
foreign nationals. Anti‐immigrant sentiments and attitudes have remained strong and
pervasive and have often culminated in waves of violent attacks whereby indigent, mainly
black foreign nationals have been displaced on a large scale, assaulted or killed and their
property looted and destroyed. In this paper, I wish to examine the migration narrative and
discourse within South Africa. I specifically focus on how immigrants have been spoken about,
managed, classified and categorized since the new political dispensation of 1994. I suggest
that the violence, at least partly, emanates from and is a consequence of the ways the state
has over the years spoken about, categorized and excluded immigrants within South Africa.
In the paper I focus on the contradictory immigration regime, a xenophobic nationalist
discourse, the maltreatment of immigrants and exclusionary nation‐building mechanisms,
which, collectively are all poised against the energies of individuals who have traditionally
relied upon mobility for livelihood and survival. The paper is drawn from a broader
ethnographic study that I conducted for my doctoral research whereby I focused on a group
of Zimbabwean immigrants who lived within the Central Methodist Church in the
Johannesburg inner city. I examined experiential suffering and the various localised ways
through which indigent individuals living in an abject space sought to adapt and carve out
meaningful livelihoods in a context of xenophobic violence, deepening poverty, inequality and
limited livelihood resources. This study also focused on the complexities of humanitarian
assistance and how humanitarian interventions may impinge on individual and collective
subjectivities. In the course of this study it became apparent to me that concerns over
migration and immigrants are neither novel nor confined to South Africa. The way immigrants
are spoken about and managed is however, ever changing and part of the conundrums that
immigrants confront stem from this shifting discourse and particularly the ways in which this
discourse has squeezed out black immigrants from the nation state. Below I detail briefly the
history of labour migration and mobility within Southern Africa.
Migration and mobility in South Africa
2
The Southern African region is marked by a long and complex history of labour migration.
South Africa has historically been the epicentre of this labour migration system1. South African
industrialisation and development, some scholars argue, was achieved on the back of the
migrant labour system (see Worden 2011). Migration within the colonial period is better
understood within the complex labour migration system, which has been a central and
persistent defining feature of the southern African region’s history. De Bruijn et al (2001) state
that ‘flexible mobility’ has been part and parcel of life and livelihood since the pre‐colonial
times, affording both individuals and communities survival, the maintenance of social
relations, the exploration of opportunities and the fulfillment of hopes. Individuals migrated
to South Africa to work mainly in the burgeoning mining industry as contract labourers. The
South African mines, in particular, attracted labourers not only from Zimbabwe but also from
Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, Lesotho and other far‐flung regional countries such as
Tanzania (see Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu 2010). Peberdy (2009: 4) alludes to the fact that,
while it is commonly assumed that black African migrants were:
.....excluded from South Africa, this is not entirely [true]; on one level it masks the long‐history of state sanctioned black African temporary migration from Southern Africa to the mines and commercial farms of South Africa, as well as the tacit sanctioning of other forms of migration from the region, including ‘clandestine’ migration, for much of South Africa’s history
Labour migration tended to be mainly temporary. Michael Burawoy’s (1976) critique, as well
as the writings of Stitcher (1985) demonstrates that state coercion and the temporary nature
of the labour system served the capitalist interests through renewing and maintaining a stable
but fluid labour force. Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2010: 238) assert that, since labour
sending areas were diverse and far‐flung being spread out through out southern Africa –
‘regimes of control varied and were shaped by local and national politics’. In general, however,
under the mine labour migrancy system, labourers, were recruited from neighbouring
countries on temporary contracts and were paid part of their wages while working in South
Africa and the remainder when they were returning home. This arrangement served the
interests of the apartheid system in that it militated against the organization of African
workers and it ensured that the workers did not settle, permanently, in urban areas (see Vidal
2010: 55; Crush et al 1991). During the apartheid period, the migrant mine workers, recruited
by employment agencies, were accommodated in single‐sex hostels and compounds and this
arrangement supported capitalist notions of semi‐proletarianization, whereby mine workers
maintained their rural homes and their families were engaged in subsistence modes of
farming whilst they were involved in a capitalist mode of production (see Dansereau 2002;
Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman 1991; Crush and James 1995). According to Adepoju (2003: 7)
the strict influx control laws prevented families from moving with or eventually joining
migrant workers and in the process this disrupted normal family life. Bezuidenhout and
Buhlungu (2010: 238) concur and they contend that mine hostels and compounds had
‘devastating consequences for the social fabric of the black mineworkers and their
1 For a discussion on forced labour see van Onselen (1976); Terreblanche (2003); Burawoy (1976); and Crush and James (1991). Maharaj & Moodley (2000) discuss the migrant labour system.
3
communities’ and for this reason the migrants and the migrant labour system came to
embody some of the extreme evils of the apartheid system.
The dismantling of the apartheid system in the 1990s, resulted in the influx of immigrants
from countries further afield. While South Africa has long received various categories of
migrants, recently the country has experienced an increase in the volume and complexity of
cross‐border movements. Crush and McDonald (2002) point out that contemporary migration
into South Africa is characterised by high levels of irregular or clandestine migration, circular
migration and informal cross‐border trade, greater feminization, more undocumented
migrants, increased numbers of refugees and the permanence of those who choose to migrate
(see also Olivier, 2011:118, Avato et.al. 2010)
In recent years there have been many initiatives that push for and attempt to foster greater
regional integration through freer movement of people residing in the SADC region; the
emphasis in South Africa (and in Botswana) has been on controlling migration instead of
having more liberal policies that allow greater movement (Hammar, McGregor & Landau,
2010). For example, Olivier (2011: 120) argues that a security perspective dominates within
the SADC region and migration and migrants are understood to be “threats” or “problems”
rather than opportunities. Therefore, migration policies in South Africa tend to be about
control and deportation and not about how migrants can make meaningful contributions to
the country.
I suggest here that the ‘squeezing’ out of migrants from the nation state is a consequence of
some of the state’s nation building initiatives and mechanisms and for a better understanding
of this its prudent to examine the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as
it relates to migrants and their relationship and position within the new political dispensation.
The work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)2, instituted in 1996 as a nation‐
building and transitional justice mechanism is illustrative of the way migrants who, according
to, Kaarsholm (2007; 43) previously embodied the ‘inhuman perversities of the apartheid
system’ were ‘ignored and squeezed out of the national recasting project’ (Jensen and Buur
2007; 69). While the TRC, with its limited brief, could not remedy the far‐reaching effects and
injustices of apartheid its focus on the ‘exceptional’, ‘extreme’ and ‘gross’ human rights
violations obscured the damage caused by the more inordinate but everyday and pervasive
routines of apartheid violence: the legal, medical, economic, bureaucratic acts of violence
against black Africans (Biehl et al 2007, Terreblanche 2003). Also concealed in the thinking of
the TRC, are the social, economic and political consequences suffered by the neighbouring
countries of Southern Africa3 (see Biehl, Good and Kleinman 2007; Buur, Jensen and Stepputat
2007). Through the work of the commission there is a delineation of the political from the
economic in ways that renders those who suffered gross violations victims and others,
including poor migrants, a threat.
2 Richard Wilson argues that the much celebrated TRC was designed primarily to legitimate the post apartheid state by promulgating the image of the new South Africa as a world leader and defender of human rights and liberal democracy (Biehl 2007: 189)
4
Migration governance in South Africa
The South African immigration regime at the level of law has impinged adversely on the
possibilities of migrants in general. I argue that the immigration regimes instituted in the
democratic dispensation have been at odds with the profile of the individuals that move. In
the first instance, there has been an increase in the numbers of the African migrants‐
particularly‐ black migrants who moved into South Africa. Although the South African ‘miracle’
held a promise of inclusivity, migrants have had to confront an ambiguous immigration legal
framework. The new South African government instituted an amnesty period beginning in
1995, which enabled thousands of migrants to apply for residence permits. Apart from that
there have been massive legal changes and tightening of South African immigration laws.
Broadly, the state promulgated the Immigration Act, which came into effect in 2002 having
been preceded by two policy outlines‐ the draft Green paper (1997) and White Paper (1999).
Notwithstanding the 1995 amnesty, which enabled earlier migrants‐ who came as miners or
general labour migrants, to acquire legal status as well as the 2009 special dispensation for
Zimbabweans, the state’s focus remained one of ‘control and enforcement’ (Klotz 2000; 831
see also Peberdy and Rogerson 2000). Scholars point out that, the striking features of these
immigration laws, is that they have remained restrictive and are cast in the spirit of the last
piece of apartheid era migration legislation, the Aliens control Act (1991) established to
reinforce strict controls on the movement of people. According to Crush, Grant and Frayne
(2007; 11) the state’s attention has been on ‘undocumented’, ‘illegal’ or ‘irregular’ migration
with a focus on identifying, detaining and deporting violators of immigration laws. The
immigration policies and practices implemented after 1994 have also contradicted the urban,
self‐settlement Refugee Act (1998), which was passed partly to forestall a perceived abuse of
the asylum system and has been described as ‘progressive’ and in line with South Africa’s
constitutional and international obligations4 (see Klotz 2000; 832, see also Landau 2004a). The
restrictive and strong enforcement measures effected by the Immigration Act (2002) means
that those with an asylum or even refugee status face challenges in realizing these rights and
the regulation of migrants (legal or illegal) in South Africa depends ‘less on law and more on
discretion, courtesy and the ethical sense of the various law enforcement agencies’ (Jensen
and Buur 2007; 79 see also Landau 2004 and 2006)
The identification of illegal migrants has closely mirrored apartheid practice predicated on
racial cleavages. Here, black migrants, referred to pejoratively as Makwerekwere5 by South
African nationals, can be arrested based only on their physical appearance and their inability
to speak one of South Africa’s official ‘African languages’ or ‘fitting an undocumented migrant
profile’ (Landau 2006; 133, see also Algotsson 2000, Lubkemann 2000, Jensen and Buur 2007
and Nyamnjoh 2006) The identification of illegal migrants this way has also created ‘extra legal
4 South Africa ratified the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, the African Union (1967) Refugee Convention and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 5 Makwerekwere is a word used to refer to, what South African nationals, believe are unintelligible languages, used by African foreigners. According to Nyamnjoh (2006; 39-40) Makwerekwere also means different things in different contexts but as used in South Africa it not only means a black person who cannot speak one of the ‘South African’ languages but one who comes from an economically and culturally inferior context.
5
practices’ whereby state bureaucrats violate constitutional principles and the rights of
refugees, migrants and South African citizens (Landau and Monson 2008; 329).
Vale (2002: 7) who argues that South African immigration regulations remain steeped
within security rationalities that informed the practices of the old regime, asserts that:
Notwithstanding the sacrifices of Africa’s people to the cause of the South Africa’s
liberation or the reality that South Africa was made by migrants, foreign African
migrants in ‘liberated’ and ‘democratic’ South Africa have been subjected to a regime
of violent othering.
The ‘othering’ of African migrants has been much more manifest in the realm of discourse.
The state has over the years maintained, two contrasting and competing discourses, one being
the official pan‐Africanist inclusionary rhetoric and the other a xenophobic nationalist
discourse (Jensen and Buur 2007; 63, see also Peberdy 2002). The official state rhetoric
attempts to closely align South Africa with the rest of Africa. The South African constitution’s
preamble for example, proudly states that the country belongs to ‘all who live in it’. Former
President Thabo Mbeki was also at the forefront of championing what he perceived as an
imminent African renaissance 6 and was instrumental in the transformation of the
Organisation for African Unity (OAU) into the African Union and the formulation of the New
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) (see Landau 2006; Crush and William 2003;
Kaarsholm 2008). The 2010 FIFA World Cup that was held in the country was also cast in the
vein of Pan Africanism, as ‘a victory for Africa’ (Jensen and Buur 2007; 63; see also Landau and
Monson 2008). All these measures are perceived as a way to reciprocate the support that the
country received from other African states during the struggle against apartheid.
Alongside this discourse of pan‐Africanism, openness and inclusivity, lies a competing
conception ‘grounded within a xenophobic national discourse on immigration’ which frames
black migrants as ‘problems and threats’, a drain on national resources and the prosperity
offered by South Africa to its citizens (Crush 1999; 124; Dodson and Oelofse 2000; 126, see
also Crush 1999ab; McDonald et al 1999; Kaarsholm 2008; Jensen and Buur 2007). As Dodson
and Oelofse (2000; 126) argue:
An important even definitive feature of this dominant discourse is that it tends to be
expressed and interpreted at a level of generality that lumps together all international
migrants to South Africa, legal and ‘illegal’, temporary and permanent.
Landau (2006; 228) states that public pronouncements by some senior government officials’7
present migrants both as outsiders and ‘threats’ to the country (see also Vale 2002). Landau
(ibid) illustrates that, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the Interior Minister (1994‐2004)
expressed disquiet over the proposed Southern African Development Community (SADC)
6 On the 8th of May 1996 then vice president of South Africa opened his address to the constitutional assembly prior to the adoption of a new constitution with the words, ‘I am an African’ an inclusionary speech symptomatic of post apartheid South Africa. The speech outlined a vision for a post-racial, post-apartheid South Africa comprising not only the nation’s aboriginal population but also migrants from Asia, Europe and the rest of Africa (Landau 2006; 129) 7 The Mayor of Johannesburg in a 2004 ‘State of the City’ address argued that ‘while migrancy contributes to the rich tapestry of the cosmopolitan city, it also places a severe strain on employment levels, housing and public services’
6
draft protocol on free trade and free movement and in outlining a series of challenges facing
the country, argued that:
South Africa is faced with another threat and that is the SADC ideology of free
movement of people, free trade and freedom to choose where you live or work. Free
movement of persons spells disaster for our country’ (own emphasis) (Landau 2006;
228)
In April 2004 Buthelezi also published in the Government Gazette a highly repressive set of
immigration regulations tightening regulations for Chinese, Indians and Africans (Nyamnjoh
2006; 36).
The White Paper on International Migration published in April of 1999 by the Republic of
South Africa [RSA] apart from suggesting that the government would pursue a ‘restrictionist’
immigration policy, expressed concern with the negative impact that the influx of migrants
into the country was having on the provision of social services to locals and on the country as
a whole in terms of crime and violence (RSA, 1999). The paper revealed a construction of
‘good’ versus ‘bad’ immigrants. The ‘good’ immigrants being those seen to add value to the
country, included investors and skilled migrants whereas the ‘undesirables’ are by default the
poor and unskilled migrants who ‘compete for scarce resources’ and ‘insufficient job
opportunities’, and who become ‘involved in criminal activities’ and otherwise ‘weaken the
state and its institutions by corrupting officials, fraudulently acquiring documents and
undeserved rights and tarnishing our8 (own emphasis) image locally and abroad’ (McDonald
and Crush 2002; 11)
The contradictory and ambiguous discourse has had consequences for the survival of
migrants and their integration within local communities. One of the consequences as Murray
(2011: 168) suggests is that, immigrants have been located in a difficult liminal position where
they are subject to a double ‘victimisation’:
Immigrants have been subjected to a double‐pronged attack: by criminalizing their
survival strategies, the agencies of law enforcement have incorporated them into the
polity as lawbreakers, subject to penal sanction. By demonizing them as unwanted
aliens, vigilante mobs have subjected them to extralegal violence, effectively
excluding them from the ordinary protections of the law.
Within poorer communities such as townships and informal settlements in South Africa,
migrants have been subjected to violent attacks and other forms of discrimination. One
explanation for the persistence of the violence against black foreign nationals has been
structural and contextual factors such as the growing poverty and inequality within the
country and the increased influx of migrants into the country.
8 As Jensen and Buur (2007; 68- 69) analysing the language and phrases in the Final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) illustrate, there is the use of exclusive and selective language where national identity is defined through birth within the South African territory, a conceptualization not unlike apartheid’s external boundaries. In this sense apartheid’s Southern African dimensions are ignored and invisibilised as are those individuals not born within the nation state.
7
The socio‐economic context of the ‘new’ South Africa and xenophobic violence
Contemporary South Africa is confronted by serious political and social challenges and is still
a far cry from the envisaged ‘rainbow society’. The country is bedeviled by glaring economic
disparities and widespread and pervasive poverty, violence, unemployment, crime and
HIV/AIDS (see Beinart 2010). The initial optimism generated by the transition from apartheid
rule has largely given way to despair among many of the country’s poor majority. In recent
years, this is evinced in widespread discontent and violent protests in townships and informal
settlements. Peter Alexander (2010: 25) who argues that the protests, have, in some
instances, reached insurrectionary proportions ‘amounting to a rebellion of the poor’, points
out that the violent protests, which are concentrated in shack settlements and townships
rather than suburbs, have been concrete expressions of disillusionment over the provisions
of basic services such as water and housing. The protests, which often place demands on
people in power, have been largely driven by unemployed youth and are perhaps also an
expression of disquiet over rising unemployment (ibid).
Successive ANC governments have attempted to redress some of the economic
inequalities of the apartheid era. This, for example, has been attempted through the auspices
of the black economic empowerment (BEE), which has resulted in the emergence of a small
black middle class in business and the professions. However, many scholars, such as Nyamnjoh
(2006: 17) argue that, ‘the structural inequalities of apartheid are yet to be resolved in a way
that benefits more just the Black, Indian, or Coloured elite’ (Nyamnjoh 2006; 17, see also
Adebajo 2007, Worden 2006, Terreblanche 2002). According to Terreblanche (2002; 382), a
very high percentage of the South African population, are abjectly poor and there is a
conspicuous relationship between race and poverty. As is the case with unemployment,
poverty affects mainly blacks.
8
Image showing a group of armed protesters during the 2008 xenophobic violence
(Photographer Gianluigi Guercia)
The present socio‐economic dynamics have affected black migrants in innumerable ways and
one significant consequence has been an upsurge in violence directed towards, mainly black
migrants. This is evidenced by the 2008 xenophobic violence, which spiraled in informal
settlements and squatter encampments in areas such as Diepsloot, Tembisa, Kya Sand,
Jeppestown, Ramaphosa and Zandspruit. Murray (2011: 167) argues that some of the causes
of this xenophobic violence:
….were the deep seated resentment of ordinary South Africans over the failure of the
municipality to address the ongoing high rates of crime, unemployment, lack of
housing and poor service delivery in impoverished areas. Immigrants‐ many of them
political refugees and asylum seekers from Zimbabwe who had fled their own
country’s economic collapse‐ bore the brunt of this misplaced anger.
While the 2008 xenophobic violence stands out in many writings, migrants have, over the
years, become a target of social disenchantment within restive informal settlements and
township communities. Murray (2011) illustrates that Somali traders have often been
attacked for ‘unfairly’ undercutting the prices of local traders. Disquiet and discontent over
the presence of migrants has persistently been hovering under the surface within South
Africa. In many accounts, migrants have therefore come to be an explanation for the
widespread crime, disease and unemployment while immigration itself has increasingly come
‘to be experienced as competition in labour markets, where demand was not expanding to
9
the growth of the South African economy and where unemployment figures continued to be
high’ (Kaarsholm 2008; 39 see also Landau 2006; Landau 2006; 130).
Image showing part of the Central Methodist Church in June 2008 in the immediate aftermath
of a violent attack on the church (Photographer. C. Rogerson)
Image showing the temporary shelters set up after the xenophobic violence.
Of particular salience here are the contradictions and ambiguities in the state and
humanitarian organizations’ responses to the victims of the xenophobic violence which in
many ways mirrors and animates the state’s response to the current wave of violence. Robins
(2009: 640) states that in 2008 there was uncertainty about how to define the victims of the
10
violence and the categorizations shifted from ‘refugees’, ‘asylum seekers’, ‘undocumented
persons’ and ‘internally displaced people (IDPs)’. For Robins (ibid) the fluidity and ambiguities
of the categories conveyed profound uncertainties around classifications for humanitarian aid
purposes and for the state there were possibly legal, social and political implications around
the use of certain words and precise categories. As the violence subsided and media interest
in the victims waned, the government shut down temporary shelters and sought to encourage
the ‘reintegration’ of the victims into the communities where they had hitherto been
attacked. Beyond these measures, the state shifted the discussion from humanitarian and
human rights concerns to one that sought to examine ‘questions of technical‐bureaucratic
administration, effectively making a distinction between the legal and illegal status of non‐
national’ (Robins 2009: 641). The consequences of such a discourse were far reaching; Robins
(ibid) argues that ‘the state’s framing of the refugee problem in international immigration law
terms shifted the political discourse away from compassionate concern about displaced
victims of xenophobic violence’. In the current wave of xenophobic violence that began in
January this year the state was reluctant to term the violence as xenophobic violence but
rather they initially called it ‘acts of criminality’ targeting foreign nationals. In the past few
days the discourse in South Africa as well as in other African countries has been to term the
violence ‘afrophobia’ in order to capture the targeting of perceived black African nationals.
Conclusion
Whilst South Africa has largely retained its position as an economic powerhouse in Africa
economic disparities, which to a large extent, mirror the racial cleavages of the past,
deepening poverty, violence, unemployment and other social ills have remained, seemingly,
intractable and migrants have come to be an explanation for these failures. In this paper I
argue that xenophobic violence has emanated from the manner in which immigrants have
been defined and categorized and immigration acted upon. Black migrants have generally
been cast out of the nation state and subsumed under general, all‐encompassing but
disempowering categories as such ‘refugee’, ‘undocumented migrant’ and ‘illegal migrant’.
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